Cases for Search and Seizure

1. People vs. Pastrana, February 21, 2018 – Purpose

2. Dela Cruz vs. People, January 11, 2016 – Scope

Title:
DELA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE GR No. 209387
Date: January 11, 2016
Ponente: LEONEN, J
ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, Petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled, "coming back and
forth taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu
Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a
porter. It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of
the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the x-ray
machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag.

Flores, the x-ray machine operator-on-duty, saw the impression of what appeared to be three (3)
firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called the attention of port
personnel Igot who was the baggage inspector then. Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of
the bag. Dela Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative and consented to Igot's manual inspection of the
bag.

Port Police Officer Abregana was called by Igot and was told that there were firearms in a bag owned by
Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag. The bag was then inspected and the
following items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman's book; other personal
items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had the proper
documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative. Dela Cruz was then arrested and
informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law. He was also informed of his constitutional rights.

In the Information, Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession
of firearms. Subsequently, another Information was filed charging him with the violation of Commission
on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment.

After trial, RTC Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban under Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. The trial court also
finds the search conducted by the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the
accused's constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms
and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even
without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and
ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against [the]
accused.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Judgment.

Petitioner’s Contention:
1. Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search. In petitioner's
case, it may well be said that, with the circumstances attending the search of his luggage, he had no
actual intention to relinquish his right against warrantless searches. He knew in all honest belief that
when his luggage would pass through the routine x-ray examination, nothing incriminating would be
recovered. It was out of that innocent confidence that he allowed the examination of his luggage. He
believed that no incriminating evidence would be found. He knew he did not place those items. But
what is strikingly unique about his situation is that a considerable time interval lapsed, creating an
opportunity for someone else to place inside his luggage those incriminating items.

Respondent’s Argument:
1. Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz's right to unreasonable search and
seizure, thus warranting his conviction. Dela Cruz was caught in flagrante delicto. The firearms were
seized during a routine baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure.
According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless searches and seizures conducted by
airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security procedures. Records are also clear that Dela Cruz
voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable searches and seizure.
ISSUE/S
I. Whether or not petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures- YES
II. Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case- YES
RATIO
For a full understanding of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, the court examined three (3)
points of alleged intrusion into the right to privacy of petitioner: first, when petitioner gave his bag for x-
ray scanning to port authorities; second, when the baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and called
the Port Authority Police; and third, when the police officer opened the bag to search, retrieve, and
seize the firearms and ammunition.

The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for inspection to port personnel
—the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector manning the x-ray machine station. The court held
that the search WAS NOT rendered unreasonable at the first point of intrusion.

With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different from that
imposed on state agents or authorized government authorities. In People v. Marti, This court held that
there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The evidence obtained against the accused was not
procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized government agencies. The Bill of
Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of
private individual. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be
first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by private persons
are not covered by the exclusionary rule. To determine whether the intrusion by the port personnel in
this case was committed by private or public persons, we revisit the history and organizational structure
of the Philippine Ports Authority.

The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and
vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in
this case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered
agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine
security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function.

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed
agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port
security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection
in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

In People v. Suzuki, the accused "entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal." He
was "bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small traveling bag
and a box marked 'Bongbong's piaya." The accused "proceeded to the 'walk¬ through metal detector,' a
machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic substance or
object." "Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of
metallic substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying." When the accused was asked to
open the content of the box, he answered "open, open." Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting tops
were then found inside the box. Suzuki argued that the box was only given to him as "pasalubong" by a
certain Pinky, whom he had sexual relations with the night before. He did not know the contents of the
box. This court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on the accused was a valid exception to the
prohibition against warrantless searches as it was pursuant to a routine airport security procedure.

It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search
conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights.
Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is
deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana obtained in the course
of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant.

The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into
airports or ports of travel Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure
of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-
ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable,
given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v. People where the court upheld the validity of the
search conducted as part of the routine security check at the old Manila Domestic Airport. Port
authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray scanning machines for
inspection of passengers' bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in
the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of petitioner's bag. Notably,
petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.

The second point of intrusion was when the baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and called the
attention of the port police officer. The court also held that the search WAS NOT rendered unreasonable
at the second point of intrusion,

The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and
vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to
inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine. The presentation of petitioner's bag for x-
ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to present the bag or not. He had the
option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual
inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime is being or has been committed are part of
reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers passing through ports or terminals.
Probable cause is reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged.
It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.

A third point of intrusion to petitioner's right to privacy occurred during petitioner's submission to port
security measures. This court should determine whether the requirements for a valid waiver against
unreasonable searches and seizures were met.

The Constitution safeguards a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless
search is presumed to be unreasonable. However, this court lays down the exceptions where
warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2)
seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not validly consent to the search conducted by the
port authorities. He argues that he did not have an actual intention to relinquish his right against a
warrantless search. In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. The trial court's findings show that petitioner presented
his bag for scanning in the x-ray machine. When his bag went through the x-ray machine and the
firearms were detected, he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities. It was
after the port personnel's inspection that Officer Abregana's attention was called and the bag was
inspected anew with petitioner's consent.

Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui Malasugui and People v. Omaweng who permitted authorities
to search their persons and premises without a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from claiming an
invalid warrantless search when he voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In addition,
petitioner's consent to the search at the domestic port was not given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances.

We also cannot subscribe to petitioner's argument that there was no valid consent to the search
because his consent was premised on his belief that there were no prohibited items in his bag. The
defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence would be found does not automatically negate valid
consent to the search when incriminating items are found. His or her belief must be measured against
the totality of the circumstances. Again, petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to port security
measures and, as he claimed during trial, he was familiar with the security measures since he had been
traveling back and forth through the sea port.
Consequently, we find respondent's argument that the present petition falls under a valid consented
search and during routine port security procedures meritorious. The search conducted on petitioner's
bag is valid.

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are
not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 8, 2012 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR No. 01606 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016januarydecisions.php?id=3
3. Pollo vs. Chairperson Constantino-David, October 18, 2011- Scope

G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

FACTS:

On January 3, 2007 an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent alleged that the chief of the
“Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na” division of the CSC has been lawyering for accused gov’t
employees having a pending cases in the CSC.

Chairperson David immediately formed a team and issued a memo directing them to conduct an
investigation and to back up all the files in the computers found in the “Mamamayan Muna” and Legal
divisions. The team backed up all the files from the computers of said divisions, which included the
computer of Pollo, who was the OIC of the “Mamamayan muna” program of the CSC.

The team obtained from petitioner’s personal files around 40-42 drafts of legal pleadings or documents
which were for and on behalf of parties facing charges as respondents in administrative cases pending
before the CSC or other tribunals giving rise to the inference that petitioner was aiding and advancing
interests adverse to the interest of the CSC as agency of the government tasked to discipline
misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. And since these these draft pleadings were
obtained from the computer assigned to and under the direct control and disposition of Pollo, it
invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand in their drafting or
preparation.

The CSC charged petitioner with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service and Violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. The CSC subsequently issued a resolution finding petitioner guilty of the charges against him
and dismissed him from the service. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondents and denied his motion for reconsideration. Thus, the
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent constituted a violation of his constitutional right to
privacy.

RULING:

The SC held that the search on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files were
both LAWFUL and DID NOT VIOLATE his constitutional right to privacy.

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable"
searches and seizures.

In resolving the case, the SC relied on the following US court rulings:

In Katz v. US, the court noted the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). .

O’Connor vs. Ortega teaches that in the case of searches conducted by a public employer, the court
needs to balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the
government’s interests. A public employer’s intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy
interests of government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under
all the circumstances. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: (1)
whether the action was justified at its inception and (2) whether the search was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.

Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related
purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
the nature of the misconduct.

In US v. Simons, the defendant, an employee of the CIA, was convicted of receiving and possessing
materials containing child pornography. The agency had a policy that employees were to use the
Internet for official government business only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically
prohibited. It also stated that the agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the user’s
Internet access as deemed appropriate. The US Supreme Court held that the search of his computer files
remains valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the crime
was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection. And although Simons
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of
privacy with regard to the files in his computer in light of the policy of the agency.

Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, the SC ruled
on the following questions: 

(1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?

NO, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.  

Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files.  Petitioner did not allege that he had a
separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and
not open to other employees or visitors.  Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any
means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files.  On the contrary, he submits that
he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he
even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request.  

Furthermore, as in the Simons case, the office had a policy regulating the use of office computers which
explicitly provides that employees have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or
receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using
both automated or human means.  This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that
the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes. 

(2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, involving the copying of the contents of the hard drive
on petitioner’s computer, reasonable in its inception and scope?

YES, the search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair, which involved the copying of the contents of
the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, was reasonable in its inception and scope.

The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding
anomalies in the CSC.  

The nature of the imputation in the complaint was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If a CSC
employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending
cases before the Commission a cast clouds of doubt would be cast upon the institutional integrity of the
Commission as a quasi-judicial agency.

That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the
easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Considering the temporary nature of
computer files, that they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, drastic and immediate action
was necessary and thus the need for the warrantless search.
 4. People vs. Marti, January 18, 1991 - To whom directed

"Package of marijuana to be sent abroad"

The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals.
It’s a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law.
It could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint is imposed.

Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send packages to their friend in Switzerland and contracted
the services of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and inspect the packages, Marti refused, assuring
that the packages simply contained books and cigars.
However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final inspection as part of their SOP. Upon opening, they
suspected that the contents were illegal drugs.
The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected content were
marijuana.
In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened and found dried marijuana leaves inside.
After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which, according to him, is
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication.
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State? NO.
The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government. Its protection is directed only to governmental action.
This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.
In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore, there is no reason why it should
not be admitted to prosecute him.
Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence.
The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable search of the packages in
compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected into a warrantless search and seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight
is not a search.
Marti further argued that since the Constitution expressly declares as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not
whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals.
The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.

Additional notes:
When a private individual violates another person’s right to privacy, the evidence obtained therefrom is
admissible; however the violator could be held civilly liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
5. Miguel vs. People, July 31, 2017 - To whom directed

6. Worldwide Web Corporation vs. People, July 13, 2014 - Nature of a search warrant; general
warrants

World Wide Web Corporation v. PLDT

G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014
Search and Seizure
: Rule 126 Section 14 (Motion to Quash a Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence, Where to File)
Rule 126 Section 4 (Requisites for Issuing Search Warrant)
Rule 126 Section 3 (Personal Property to be Seized)

FACTS: Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office of the PNP
filed applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon City to search the office premises of Worldwide
Web Corporation and Planet Internet Corporation. The applications alleged that petitioners were
conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of P.D. No. 401
(Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of
Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the PLDT.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicants Rivera and
Gali of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.

According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass through the local exchange
or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the international gateway
facilities (IGFs) in the Philippines. The call is then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits,
either via fiber optic submarine cable or microwave radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll
center of one of the IGFs in the destination country. The toll center would then meter the call, which will
pass through the PSTN of the called number to complete the circuit. In contrast, WWC and Planet
Internet were able to provide international long distance call services to any part of the world by using
PLDT’s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing
and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency
which connects directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the originating country or the
country where the call is originated."
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to WWC was
used to provide a service called GlobalTalk, "an internet-based international call service, which can be
availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts." During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the
local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the given access line. After a voice prompt required him to enter
the user code and PIN provided under a GlobalTalk prepaid account, he was then requested to enter the
destination number, which included the country code, phone number and a pound sign. The call was
completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the records, it showed that the
call was only directed to the local number 6891135. This indicated that the international test call using
GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.

Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to WWC. However, upon an
ocular inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant of the unit is
Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC. These telephone lines are
interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC.

Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by petitioners
to a piece of equipment that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they violated P.D.
No. 401 as amended, on unauthorized installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also committed
theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and with clear intent
to gain, they illegally stole business and revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted
contrary to the letter and intent of R. A. No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded
the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar
facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues from international long distance calls.
Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National
Telecommunications Commission prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment without first
securing type approval license from the latter. PLDT computed a monthly revenue loss of P764,718.09.
They alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of
taxes, license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.

During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be searched,
as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and servers that would be
taken. The RTC granted the application for search warrants. Three warrants were issued against the
office premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items in the office premises of
WWC and Planet Internet, which includes various telecommunications equipment consisting of
computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, and
support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to
support the illegal toll bypass operations. The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO
operatives of the NCR-PNP.

Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 CPUs, 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes
and files, and a laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees
were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as the
President’s Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and
broken computers, were also seized. Petitioners filed their respective motions to quash the search
warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without probable
cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was
not a crime; (3) the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto
were "fruits of the poisonous tree." PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.

In the hearing of the motions to quash, the test calls alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown to
have passed the IGF of Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. and of Capital Wireless. Planet
Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire both provided international direct dialing services, which
Planet Internet marketed by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the
first phase of the call; but for the second phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet
Internet religiously paid PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage.
None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.

The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of
general warrants. Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to
petitioners.

PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on the ground that it had failed to get the
conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. PLDT appealed to the CA and the appellate court reversed and set aside
the RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and effective.

Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. Among the points raised was that
PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when it questioned the RTC
Resolution before the CA. The appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not conformity of the public prosecutor is necessary prior filing a motion for
reconsideration to question an order quashing search warrants

2) Whether or not an order quashing a search warrant issued independently prior to the filing of a
criminal action is deemed a final order that can be the subject of an appeal

3) Whether or not the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause, considering that the
acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft

4) Whether or not the assailed search warrants were general warrants

HELD:

1) No. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, therefore, conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary to give PLDT personality to question the motion to quash granted by the
RTC.

SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.

The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the
prosecution of all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information. However, a search
warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application
therefor.

An application for a search warrant is a special criminal process, rather than a criminal action. The
application for and the obtention of a search warrant cannot be equated with the institution and
prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal
process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction
over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. The requisites, procedure and purpose
for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal
action.

A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant
is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of
discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a
public necessity.

A search warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the
exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its
original jurisdiction.

Therefore, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. The Supreme Court consistently
recognizes the right of parties to question orders quashing those warrants. The CA's ruling that the
conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for
reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants is sustained.

2) Yes. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the filing of a
criminal action, is not merely an interlocutory order. It partakes of a final order and can be the proper
subject of an appeal. Therefore, PLDT was correct when they assailed the quashal orders via an appeal
rather than a petition for certiorari.

A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined; on the other hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be done upon its merits.

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main
criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of
which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the
purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search
warrant.

Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, the quashal of a search
warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e.,
the determination of the guilt of the accused therein.

In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be
filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the
judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.

Thus, the CA correctly ruled that is this case, the applications for search warrants were instituted as
principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued
were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the
quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly
taken therefrom.

3. Yes. The assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause. Trial judges determine probable
cause in the exercise of their judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant is accorded respect by reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.

The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.

There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a
matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function.
They determine probable cause based on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the offender.

When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the
finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts.

It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A
magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.

Petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable cause necessitates the prior
determination of whether a crime or an offense was committed in the first place. They argue that there
is no law punishing toll bypass, the act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed that
would justify the issuance of the search warrants.

According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls and not overseas calls,
thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of access, termination or bypass charges, and accounting
rates; payment to the government of taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT
concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives legitimate telephone operators, of the
compensation which it is entitled to had the call been properly routed through its network. As such, toll
bypass operations constitute theft, because all of the elements of the crime are present therein.

Petitioners argue that there is no theft to speak of, because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT
partake of the nature of future earnings and lost business opportunities and, as such, are uncertain,
anticipative, speculative, contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of such unrealized
earnings and opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.

However, it is to be noted that the affidavits of Rivera and Gali that accompanied the applications for
the search warrants charge petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass per se, but of theft of PLDT’s
international long distance call business committed by means of the alleged toll bypass operations.

For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the taking by
petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5)
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon
things.

It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of
theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without the installation of
telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held liable
for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:

Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped gas connection without
previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric
Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas Corporation, as the case
may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices
whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or
water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or
pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone
wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision correccional in
its minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both.

It must be noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable
cause. The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature
of general warrants, which was reversed by the CA.

4) No. The assailed search warrants are not general warrants. The requirement of particularity in the
description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search warrant bear a
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought.

A general warrant is defined as a search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be
arrested or the property to be seized. It is one that allows the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.

Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to
abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the
most compelling and lawful reasons.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify
the rules regarding the following places and items to be searched under a search warrant:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:

a) Subject of the offense;

b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense;
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.

Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants, the Court has been
mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers in describing the items to be searched,
especially when these items are technical in nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is
largely unknown to them.

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not
required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the
property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission.
Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute
detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it
would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly
what kind of things to look for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the
officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.

The particularity of the description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is required
wherever and whenever it is feasible. A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in
precise and minute detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.

A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized
when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.
PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the
warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the
search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and was able to
confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines,
cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d support
equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the
illegal toll bypass operations.

The petitions were DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision were AFFIRMED.

Ratio: Rule 126 Search and Seizure. Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress
evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained
thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued
search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently
filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.

Rule 126 Search and Seizure. Section 4. Requisites for Issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the jusdge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.

Rule 126 Search and Seizure. Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued
for the search and seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense;
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense

7. People vs. Dichoso, June 4, 1993 - General search warrants

Facts:

Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag , the accused, appealed from June 11, 1991 of the RTC of San Pablo
City where he has been convicted of the crime violating Sec. 15, Art. II and Sec. 4, Art. II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties, to pay fine of P20, 000 and the cost of suit. Likewise, Jaime Pagtakhan, was also
charged with illegal possession of regulated drug violating Sec.16 , Art. III of the Dangerous Drug Act .
However, Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because as for the words of the trial court
“she cannot be located”. The three cases were consolidated for a joint trial. In Branch 30 of the RTC San
Pablo City.
According to the accused-appellant Redentor Dichoso, the said accusation of illegal possession
of dangerous has been framed up or planted evidence. Aside from that, he contends that the search
warrant is a general warrant which does not satisfy the particular offense which he violated, and the
search conducted was unconstitutional and the items obtained inadmissible.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible?

2. Whether or not the search warrant against them is valid?
3. Whether or not the accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violating
the Dangerous Drugs Act?

Rulings:

In the first issue, no, because the search warrant cannot be assailed as a general warrant, it
particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized and specifies the offense involved.
Items seized are admissible. For the second one, the search warrant has been examined and found out
that it was valid. Lastly, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City is hereby
modified that Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec.
16, Art. III of the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced in each case to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight years as minimum to
twelve years as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.

8. Chua vs. People, July 01, 2003 - Conditions of a valid warrant

9. Allado vs. Diokno, May 5, 1994 - Requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

Facts: The crime alleged to petitioner Allado and Mendoza, by the PACC [Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission], is heinous crime of kidnapping with murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German
national, who is reportedly an international fugitive from justice. Other incidental crimes charged were
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, and usurpation of authority. The whole
investigation was triggered by an extrajudicial confession by a Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a
discharge of the Philippine Constabulary. Based on the confession of Umbal, Judge Barrios of RTC Br 11
issued a search warrant against petitioners. For the institution of criminal proceedings the DOJ took over
the case, after a new panel of prosecutors were recommended [cz petitioners claim the first set of
prosecutors were affiliated w/ Lacson head of PACC and could not be impartial] and after preliminary
investigation found probable cause that accused commited the crime and submitted the case for trial
which was assigned to Judge Diokno of Br 62. Judge Diokno after finding probable cause issued warrant
of arrest.

Issue: WON the judge erred in finding probable cause issuing the search warrant?

Ruling: Yes, there is no probable cause in this case. The probable cause test is an objective one, for in
order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief
by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been
committed. There is serious doubt on Van Twest’s reported death since the corpus delicti has not
been established, nor have his remains been recovered.

We are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin, decided ninety-two years ago where this Court
ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one
witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved. In People v. Inting, we
emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable
cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the
judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor
does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge
does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor’s certification
of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if
any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor’s certification which are material in
assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should
distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held
for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause
for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or
not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial – is a function of the
prosecutor he extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies – In Lim v. Felix,
where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said -

The Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can
perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be
a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal’s bare certification. All these should be
before the Judge.

The extent of the Judge’s personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge’s
examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond the Prosecutor’s
certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the court’s probing questions when the circumstances of the case
so require.

10. Columbia Pictures vs. Flores, June 29, 1993 - Requisites in the issuance of search warrants

11. Prof. David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, May 03, 2006 - Steps in the conduct of search and seizure

12. Mendoza vs. People, April 21, 2014 - Two kinds of determination of probable cause

Facts:

Juno Cars hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator,
Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been
sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission. Juno Cars alleged
that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo
pilfered a total amount of ₱1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage. On March 4, 2008, Provincial
Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an
information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa. He then filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice. While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed before
the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City.

On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an order
dismissing the complaint, the court holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of
probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals and was granted. Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45
before this court. He argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause
as shown by the evidence on record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is
broader than [the] executive determination of probable cause" and that "it is not correct to say that the
determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor.

Issue: When warrant of arrest may issue

Ruling:

The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has not
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase “upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce” allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly
dismissed the case against Alfredo. A judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to
lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he
or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or
she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate
to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.

13. People vs. Choi, August 03, 2006 - Requisites for determination of the existence of probable
cause

Facts:
• Mario Nieto, an intelligence operative of the Department of Finance, applied for a search
warrant against Choi for violation of the Intellectual Property Code. (fake Marlboro red cigarettes and
cardboard cases)
• After examination of the applicant and the witnesses, the judge issued the search warrant.
Search was conducted the same day.
• Choi questioned the validity of the search warrant before the RTC and the CA, arguing that
probable cause was not sufficiently established because the examination conducted was not probing
and exhaustive. Moreover, the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be searched.
• CA ruled that the judge committed GADLEJ in relying upon the conclusion of the witness that the
cigarettes he received from Choi were fake, without requiring the presentation of the alleged fake
cigarettes and genuine ones for comparison.

Issue:
• Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant

Ruling:
• No. A search warrant can be issued upon a finding of probable cause.
• Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
• In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
o The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally
o The examination must be under oath
o The examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers
• Although there is no hard and fast rule governing how a judge should conduct his examination,
it is necessary that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory, or pro forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
• The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. Probable cause is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably
prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after full-blown trial.
• The questions of the judge during the examination in this case were sufficiently probing, and not
at all superficial and perfunctory. The testimonies were consistent with each other, and the narration of
facts was credible. The testimonies and other evidence on record constituted adequate bases to
establish probable cause that the alleged offense has been committed.
• Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge, the findings
of the judge deserve great weight, and may only be overturned when there is clear disregard of the facts
before him and dictates of reason, which is not present in this case.

14. Homar vs. People, September 02, 2015, Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (in flagrante
delicto arrest)

ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES J.

Brion September 2, 2015 G.R. No. 182534
Doctrine
1. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of these rights
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary to the public welfare, the exercise of this power and the implementation of the law
should not violate the constitutional rights of the citizens. To determine the admissibility of the seized
drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful.
2. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.

Facts
● Prosecution’s version: PO1 Tan and CA (civilian agent) Tangcoy were ordered by their superior to man
the South Wing of Roxas Boulevard one August evening in 2002 when they saw Homar jaywalking. He
was immediately accosted and was told to use the pedestrian crossing.

● Homar picked up something from the ground prompting Tan and Tangcoy to frisk him. They found a
knife and soon enough, a plastic sachet which they suspected contained shabu.

● Homar’s version: He claimed he was on his way home that night from selling imitation sunglasses
when the police stopped and frisked him despite his refusal and accusing him of being a “holdupper.”
They allegedly forced him to go with them, confiscated his kitchen knife (to cut cords) and investigated
for alleged possession of shabu.

● RTC: Convicted Homar due to presumption of regularity in the arrest and straightforward testimony of
the arresting officers.

● CA: Affirmed the RTC based on Rule 113, Section 5 (a) which enumerates the instances when 1
warrantless arrest is permitted. Homar committed jaywalking in the presence of Tan/Tangcoy so the
arrest was valid.

● The subsequent frisking and search were incident to a lawful arrest under Rule 126, Section 13 . 2
Likewise, he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of shabu.

● Homar’s arguments: Shabu is inadmissible because the arrest was unlawful. He was not committing
any crime and no criminal charges were filed against him. Also, Section 13 only contemplates those
“which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense.” The sachet of shabu
had nothing to do with jaywalking.

● Respondent’s position: Non-filing of a criminal charge does not render the arrest invalid. Besides, he
can no longer question his arrest since he already submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

Ratio/Issues W/N the prosecution was able to prove a lawful warrantless arrest precede the search on
Homar’s person (NO) – 1, 2.

(1) Police alleged that Homar committed jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in their presence. The
prosecution has to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest, otherwise, the corpus delicti (in this case,
the shabu) will be in admissible. (

2) To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the
arresting officer.

(3) The prosecution was not able to discharge this burden, particularly that Homar was actually
committing a crime. They did not identify the place where Homar allegedly crossed and that it was
illegal to cross that area. He was also not charged with jaywalking.

(4) NOTE: The filing of a criminal charge is not required to prove a valid warrantless arrest because the
prosecution still has to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest.

(5) Presumption of regularity: This cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused still enjoys this constitutional right until proven otherwise by the
prosecution.

(6) Accost vs. Arrest: The police testified that they “accosted” Homar when he jaywalked. However, this
is different from an actual arrest as contemplated by the Rules on warrantless arrests. See Doctrine 3.

(7) No arrest preceded the search because they did not intend to bring him under custody or restrain his
liberty. The lack of intent was further proven by the absence of criminal charges against him. Intent only
came after they allegedly confiscated the shabu. The shabu was not recovered immediately after the
alleged lawful arrest but only after the initial search.

(8) Intent to arrest is indispensable because otherwise, any evidence obtained in violation thereof will
be inadmissible (Luz v People).

W/N Homar had waived the inadmissibility of the evidence seized when he submitted to the court’s
jurisdiction (NO) (1) Despite having actively participated in all the proceedings, this waiver does not
automatically carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence seized. (2) The shabu as
evidence is inadmissible and precludes conviction.

Held Petitioner ACQUITTED.

15. Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (in flagrante delicto arrest and seizure of evidence in
"plain view")

16. Veridiano vs. People, June 07, 2017 - Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (warrantless
search was incidental to a lawful arrest)

Facts:
1.) At about 7:20am of 15 January 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves, police radio
operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias “Baho” who was later
identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.

PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO3 Alvin Vergara who were both
on duty. Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at
Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano. They chanced upon Veridiano at around
10PM inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and
asked the passengers to disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to
check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.

The police officers recovered from Veridiano “a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.”
PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised
of his constitutional rights. He was then brought to the police station.

At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his
initials. PO1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the
seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory. The contents of the tea bag tested
positive for marijuana.

2.) RTC found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.

3.) Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested." The CA
rendered a Decision affirming the guilt of Veridiano.

4.) The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in
his possession.

5.) Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was denied.

6.) Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petition was granted.

Issue:

Whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner

Ruling:
Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is
made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be
reversed."78For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant.
Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test79 as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.”

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In
Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did
not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of
illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest.92 The rule requires that an
offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."93 That a crime was in fact
committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule.94 An arrest under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the
point of arrest.

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that
would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act
from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed,
or is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating
that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge
of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime.
This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered
through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and
convincing evidence.134 Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress or coercion."

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits
of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except
for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either
arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint
was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing
marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be
acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 16976-SP
and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CR. No. 33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is
hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause.

17. People vs. Cogaed, July 30, 2014, warrantless searches and seizures (stop- and-frisk search)

FACTS:
 Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a checkpoint,
the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana
inside Cogaed’s bag; the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the accused about the
contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside and that he was just
transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed subsequently opened the bag revealing
the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated is
admissible as evidence.

HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be admissible
as evidence.

As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that
can only be determined by a judge.

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The known
jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

(2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement.
That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However,
this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation
where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of
the police officer. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a
“genuine reason to serve the purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception.

The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched
was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag
to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason
to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The apprehension
of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his
apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. There
were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession
of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have
qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object
when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to
such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the
exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance of general
warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful
seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.” It ensures that the fundamental
rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a
pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
 18. Sanchez vs. People - November 19, 2014, Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (stop- and-
frisk search and search incidental to a lawful arrest)

Title
Sanchez v. People GR No. 204589
Date: November 19 , 2014
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Rizaldy Sanchez, petitioner People of the Philippines , respondent
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to reverse and set aside the July 25, 2012 Decision
and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 filed by
petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili (Sanchez), affirming the April 21, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 (RTC), which convicted him for Violation of Section 11, Article l l of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

FACTS
1. Sanchez was charged for violation of Sec. 11 of Article II of RA 9165 for the possession of shabu.
He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Prosecution’s Version of Facts
• SPO1 Elmer Amposta together with other CSUs Hernandez, Tagle, and Monzon, acted on the
information that Jacinta Marciano was selling drugs to tricycle drivers. They were dispatched to Brgy.
Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite, to conduct an operation.
• While at the place, they waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from the house of Jacinta.
After a few minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group
chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested Sanchez to alight. It was then they noticed
Rizaldy holding a match box.
• SPO1 Amposta asked Sanchez if he could see the contents of the match box which the latter
agreed to. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a
white crystalline substance. Suspecting that it was a regulated drug, the group accosted Sanchez and the
tricycle driver. They were brought to the police station.
• The forensic chemist from NBI found that the said susbtance was shabu.

Defense’s Version of Facts

• Sanchez denied all the allegations of the prosecution. He said that he and Darwin Reyes were on
their way hope where they transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by four armed men
riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and Darwin. He protested and
asked what offense did they commit. The officers told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan.
He reasoned out that he merely transported a passenger there but the policemen still accosted him and
he was brought to Imus Police Station.
• On cross-examination, the accused admitted tht it was the first time that he saw the police
officers at the time he was arrested.

2. The RTC ruled that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto, in actual possession of shabu. It
stated that the police operatives had reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in possession of
the said dangerous drug and suspicion was confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying was
found to contain shabu.
3. The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of facts and conclusions
reached by the RTC and upheld the conviction of Sanchez. According to the CA, there was probable
cause for the police officers that he was seen leaving the residence of a notorious drug dealer, where,
according to a tip they received, illegal drug activities were being perpetrated. It also conccluded that
the confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotics from Sanchez was pursuant to a valid
search.
ISSUE/S
I. Whether or not the Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto hence a search warrant was no
longer necessary –NO
RATIO
It is observed that the Court of Appeals confused the search incidental to a lawful arrest with stop-and-
frisk principle.

A stop-and-frisk search is entirely different from and should not be confused with the search incidental
to a lawful arrest envisioned in Sec. 13 Rule 126.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. The law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made, the process cannot be
reveresed. The arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the
latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which
was used in the commission of the crime.

As held in Terry v. Ohio, the Terry stop-and-frisk serach is a limited protective searcch of outer clothing
for weapons. Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as apoliceman and makes reasonable inquiries, he is entitled for the protection of
himself.

The two-fold interest of stop-and-frisk are:

1. The general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause
2. The more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police office to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

IN THE CASE AT BENCH, neither the in flagrante delict arrest nor the stop-and-frisk principle was
applicable to justify the warrantless search and seizure made by the police operatives. The search
preceded the arrest of Sanchez . There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the search. Under Sec. 1 of
Rule 113, arrest is the taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. Sec. 2 of the same rules provides that an arrest is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.

It appears that SPO1 Amposta after they caught up with the tricycle just noticed Sanchez holding a
match box and requested if he could see the contents. The arrest was made only after the discovery by
SPO1 Amposta of the shabu inside the boxx. What happened in this case was a search first before arrest
was effected. This does not qualifiy under a valid warrantless arrest under Sec. 5 Rule 113*.

The evidence on record reveals that no physical act could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had just committeed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime. He was merely seen by the police operatives leaving the residence of a known
drug peddler. IT has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set in par. B of Sec 5 of Rule
113 have been complied with. The police officers had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez
bought shabu from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded
the tricycle. The police officers had no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the
known drug dealer. Nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show that the drug dealer was
conducting her nefarious drug activities insidde the house. There was no over manifestation on the part
of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in, or was attemptin to engage in the
criminal activity of ilegally possessiong shabu.

There is no valid stop-and-frisk. This is an act of apolice officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him and pat him for weapon/s or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce
himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possible concealed weapons. The apprehending
officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons or contraband
concealed.

The Court does not find the totality of the circumstance sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that
would justify a stop-and-frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and
boarding a tricylce without more, were innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not give
rise in the mind of an experienced and prudent police officer of any belief that he had shabu in his
possession.
Lastly, the OSG characterizes the seuzure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as seizure of evidence in
plain view. The SC disagrees.

Under the plaint view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
The following are the requisites:
1. the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area
2. the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent
3. it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

It is readily apaprent that the seizure of the subject shabu does not fall within the plain view exception.
There was no valid intrusion. Sanchez was illegally arrested. The subject shabu was not inadvertently
discovered and it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was alledly inside amatch
box being then held by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers.

RULING
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the
seized shabu that the prosecution introduced in evidence. The prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering the seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to
doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial scrutiny. WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y
Cajili is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court orders the immediate release of the
petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date
of his release, or reason for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.

Notes
* Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
 19. People vs. Cuizon, April 18, 1996 - Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (search incidental to
a lawful arrest)
20. Caballes vs. CA, January 15, 2002 - Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (search of moving
vehicle, plain view doctrine and consented search)

FACTS:
Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in a Barangay in Laguna,
spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded
with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. With appellant's alleged consent,
the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the
high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the
appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander
of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. Thus, the court a quo rendered judgment
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.

SSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof was valid.

RULING: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons
and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of such right.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section
12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;9
(3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search);12 and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is
necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be
complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence
or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched and the character of the articles procured.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio. SO ORDERED.