Tudoroiu 2011

East European Politics and
Societies
Volume 26 Number 1
February 2012 135-161
© 2012 Sage Publications
The European Union, 10.1177/0888325411404885

http://eeps.sagepub.com
hosted at
Russia, and the Future http://online.sagepub.com
of the Transnistrian
Frozen Conflict
Theodor Tudoroiu
Centre d’études sur la paix et la sécurité
internationale, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
In recent years, increased European Union interest in its eastern “neighborhood” has
been hailed as a possible solution of the Transnistrian frozen conflict. The fall of the
communist authoritarian regime of Chişinău and the internal crisis of the Smirnov
regime in Tiraspol also modified the conditions of the nineteen-year conflict. However,
the European involvement in Moldova is perceived by the Kremlin as an intrusion in
its own domaine réservé. Moreover, the 2008 war in South Ossetia illustrates Russia’s
return to the early 1990s policy of overt instrumentalization of the post-Soviet frozen
conflicts. This volatile situation is analyzed in order to predict the future evolution of
the Transnistrian conflict in the larger context of the developing regional rivalry between
Brussels and Moscow.
Keywords: Transnistria/Transdniestria; frozen conflict; Moldova; Russia; European

Union
T he almost forgotten post-Soviet frozen conflicts were suddenly rediscovered by

the Western public in August 2008. The Russian tanks that “liberated” South Ossetia
and invaded Georgia showed two things. First, that the frozen conflicts of the Common
wealth of Independent States (CIS) continue to represent a serious threat to regional
stability. Second, that the Kremlin decided to upgrade its longstanding instrumentaliza-
tion of such conflicts in order to prevent what it considers illegitimate external intru-
sion in its own sphere of influence. In the Georgian case, this concerns the American
involvement. Elsewhere in the CIS, there is the increasingly visible regional rivalry
between Russia and the European Union (EU). After the February 2010 Ukrainian presi-
dential election that put a final end to the hopes generated by the Orange Revolution,
Author’s Note: The author is grateful to Dr. Manuel Litalien (McGill University), Dr. Mihai Sima
(University of Victoria), and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful suggestions.
135
Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

136 East European Politics and Societies
newly democratizing Moldova became the most likely target of Moscow’s anti-EU
initiatives. In recent years, Brussels has developed an increasing interest in this small
former Soviet republic. The course of bilateral relations was favored greatly by the
2009 fall of the communist authoritarian regime in Chişinău and by the pro-Western
stance adopted by the new governing coalition. Yet Moldova has its own frozen con-
flict. The situation created by the 1992 war in Transnistria is very similar to that of South
Ossetia. The Transnistrian crisis represents Moldova’s weakest point and has already
been instrumentalized by the Russians. Furthermore, the resolution of this crisis is
one of Brussels’ main objectives in the region. It is therefore logical to expect the trans-
formation of the Transnistrian frozen conflict into a key element of the developing
regional duel between Russia and the European Union.
This is the complex phenomenon explored in this article. The depiction of Brussels’
and Moscow’s interests and actions takes into account recent major changes in both
Chișinău and Tiraspol, namely, Moldova’s still fragile process of democratization
and the legitimacy crisis of Transnistria’s authoritarian regime. By analyzing all involved
parties, the article tries to predict the future development of the Transnistrian con-
flict as well as its regional implications.
The next section makes a brief presentation of the post-Soviet frozen conflicts.
The following sections describe Moldova, the secessionist region of Transnistria, and
their long but fruitless negotiation process. The involvement of external actors—Russia,
Romania, the European Union, Ukraine, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), and the United States—is then analyzed on the basis of their respec-
tive regional interests. The Conclusion explains in what way all these elements can
influence the future course of the Transnistrian crisis.
Unfreezing the Frozen Conflicts
Generally speaking, “frozen” conflicts are simply conflicts that were not formally
concluded by a peace agreement. This is a vast and heterogeneous category1 including,
for example, the Korean War and the Cyprus crisis. The post-Soviet frozen conflicts,
however, represent a very homogenous subcategory. Leaving aside crises that could
have evolved in the same direction but finally took a different course—such as Crimea
or Tatarstan—there are four such conflicts located in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh. All were initiated during the terminal phase of the
Soviet Union as reactions against the independence moves of Moldova, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan. In most cases, they were mainly ethnic conflicts (Transnistria’s situation
is more complex). From the very beginning, they were supported and instrumentalized
by the Soviet and then Russian leaderships in a divide et impera logic. The Kremlin
tried to keep the three Soviet republics first within the crumbling USSR and then
within the Russian sphere of influence. It has to be noted that during the early 1990s,
Chișinău, Tbilissi, and Baku were the most centrifugal members of the Commonwealth

Tudoroiu / The Future of the Transnistrian Frozen Conflict 137
of Independent States and their membership in this organization is due in a large mea-
sure to the constraints associated with the four frozen conflicts. The crises degenerated
into civil wars that were won by the secessionists with the military support of Moscow.
Peacekeeping arrangements were made and enforced with the mediation of Russia
and with the participation of its forces (except for Nagorno Karabakh). Militarily, all
conflicts were completely “frozen” until 2008. However, from a political point of view
there was no significant progress despite almost two decades of negotiations.
Because of their almost identical profiles, the post-Soviet frozen conflicts can be
analyzed as a unitary phenomenon characterized by the following elements. First, its
mainly political nature. The term conflict has obvious military connotations and indeed
in each of the four cases there was a brief war. Moreover, as shown by the August 2008
Georgian episode, the use of force has always remained an option. Still, after 1992-
1994 the probability of military operations decreased considerably. The political instru-
mentalization of the secession, on the contrary, has been frequent and visible. Second,
the breakaway enclaves have developed very similar de facto states2 pursuing coher-
ent state-building projects. They are “highly authoritarian and militarized, and their
populations confined to a Moscow-centered informational environment.”3 They are
also characterized by a “political economy of crime, corruption, trafficking and vio-
lence.”4 Third, the frozen conflicts have hampered seriously the development of the
three former Soviet republics as they “drain economic resources and political ener-
gies from these weak countries and impoverished societies,” generate rampant cor-
ruption and organized crime, and prevent the consolidation of their nation-states.5
Fourth, from the very beginning these were three-sided and not bilateral conflicts.
Moscow has been a decisive actor that provided the secessionists with military,
political, moral, economic, and financial support. It prevented greater international
involvement and used its position in the negotiating mechanisms to protect the de
facto states.6 It also granted Russian citizenship to many of the residents of the seces-
sionist republics, thus creating the basis for extraterritorial interventions under the
pretext of protecting its own citizens.7 Moscow’s policy paradigm with respect to
these conflicts was defined by Vladimir Socor as “controlled instability.” It promotes
Russia’s geopolitical interests by perpetuating Russian military presence, fostering
state weakness and chaotic conditions in the target countries, distracting the latter
from the agenda of systemic reforms, and discouraging Western interest in developing
close relations with Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.8
This already “classical” picture of the post-Soviet frozen conflicts is affected
today by a set of new factors. Because of successive enlargements, NATO and the
European Union are now close to and interested in the southwestern part of the CIS.
The concerned post-Soviet republics have undergone significant changes in both
their domestic affairs and foreign relations and try to strengthen their relations with the
West.9 For its part, Russia is engaged in a policy of “pragmatic reimperialization”
that seeks to restore Moscow’s regional dominance and reestablish zones of “privileged
interest” in the former Soviet bloc.10 In this context, the frozen conflicts “are gradually

becoming cornerstones for a renewed foreign policy of Russia”11 as they allow Moscow
to prevent “the conclusive resolution of a Eurasian security order, something to which
it is deeply and instinctively opposed.”12 The Kremlin’s negative attitude toward NATO
and its eastern enlargement is not new. One of its consequences was the August 2008
“heating” of the frozen conflict of South Ossetia. Brussels, on the contrary, was not
considered a danger before the mid-2000s:
The EU [was] perceived by pro-government elites in Russia as a heterogeneous con-

glomeration of states, which Russian can divide from within, using energy resources
and by corrupting some European politicians.13
Yet in recent years the European Union has become increasingly involved in cer-
tain ex-Soviet republics. In Moscow, this led to an important change of perception:
The EU is more and more on the offensive in its relations with Russia . . . [and] acts as
a tough adversary and competitor. . . . The EU is starting to become a competitor for
Moscow already on the Russian territory itself, let alone in the post-Soviet space.14
Consequently, Russia tries to “freeze the process of European integration and

replace it with a regional bipolarity”15 that would limit drastically the EU influence
in the CIS republics.
As already mentioned in the Introduction, newly democratizing Moldova is the
most likely target of Moscow’s anti-EU initiatives. This makes Transnistria an inter-
esting case study. For Russians and Europeans alike, it provides an opportunity to
increase their influence and prestige. Consequently, the evolution of the Transnistrian
crisis is a good indicator of the regional balance of power between the Kremlin and
Brussels. Moreover, the outcome of this duel will influence considerably Moldova’s
chances of following the European trajectory of its western neighbors.
The Poorest Land in Europe: Moldova
All or part of what is today the Republic of Moldova changed hands—mainly

between Romania and Russia—in 1812, 1856, 1878, 1918, 1940, 1941, 1944, and
1991. Soviet social engineering changed deeply its ethnical and social composition.
Consequently, the ideological debate concerning the Moldovan identity is an extremely
complex and yet unsolved matter.16 The dismantlement of the Soviet Union trig-
gered a traumatic economic downfall. Between 1991 and 1993, Moldova’s produc-
tion dropped by 60 percent and the purchase power by 80 percent.17 Today, 53 percent
of the Moldovans still live in rural areas. More than one quarter of the active popula-
tion works abroad. Moldova is the world’s second remittance recipient (36.2 percent
of the GDP) and Europe’s poorest country.18

Predictably, all these elements had negative consequences on the Moldovan demo-
cratic life. According to the assessment of Freedom House, Moldova’s post-independence
hybrid regime19 was followed in 2001 by a semiconsolidated authoritarian regime20
that lasted until 2009. That year, rigged elections, the brutal police repression of ensu-
ing large-scale youth protest, and early elections led to the fall of the ruling Party of
Communists of the Republic of Moldova.21 Four mainly liberal parties formed a coali-
tion government that adopted a pro-democracy and pro-Western stance. However,
its parliamentary seats were too few to allow the election of a president. New early
elections were held in November 2010. The renewed anti-communist governing coali-
tion won a larger majority but continued to be unable to elect a president. Consequently,
the situation is not yet stable. The new leadership has to either change the Constitution
or call new early parliamentary elections, while electoral support for the Communists
remains strong. But this has not affected hopes that the ruling coalition will be able to
create a genuinely consolidating Moldovan democracy.
However, for almost two decades the main political preoccupation of the Moldovans
has not been democratization, EU accession, or relations with Romania. All these
matters have been secondary in relation to Transnistria. The secession of the eastern
province has been a question of capital importance for both the political elite and the
public opinion. This is due to a number of reasons. First, from a legal and constitu-
tional point of view, the Moldovan state cannot accept the loss of a part of its
national territory. Second and perhaps more importantly, in symbolic and ideologi-
cal terms Transnistria is essential for the definition of the Moldovan identity. Unlike
the rest of the republic, it has never belonged to Romania22 and it is inhabited by large
Russian and Ukrainian communities that reject firmly any perspective of union with
the neighboring country. Moldova’s reunion with Transnistria would represent implic-
itly a guarantee of independence vis-à-vis Romania. Third, the Transnistrian conflict
is frozen but not extinguished. This means that at least in principle, Chișinău has to
cope with a possible military threat. Fourth, the secession of Transnistria preserves
the conditions allowing the presence of Russian troops on Moldova’s territory and
gives Moscow an important means to influence Moldovan politics. Fifth, most of the
republic’s industry is located in Transnistria and therefore outside Chișinău’s con-
trol. All taxes go to the self-proclaimed government in Tiraspol. Sixth, the seces-
sionist republic controls the main transport and communication lines with Ukraine
and can cut them in order to put pressure on the Moldovan government. Seventh,
Transnistria is a hub of illegal activities, many of which extend to Moldova. Finally,
the politicians in Chișinău have instrumentalized constantly the Transnistrian ques-
tion in their own interest. This has kept it high on the Moldovan political agenda and
very visible to the public.
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the settlement of the
Transnistrian crisis represents one of the major tasks of Moldova’s new democratic
government. The latter’s pro-Western orientation combined with increased EU interest

in the region undoubtedly create new opportunities. The same factors, however, can
have serious negative consequences.
The Making of Transnistria
The first Transnistrian political-administrative unit was created by Moscow in 1924

as an autonomous “Moldovan” republic within Soviet Ukraine. This artificial construct
had the role of preparing the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia. When this Romanian
province was invaded in 1940 and again in 1944, its northern and central parts were
merged with the western strip of the prewar autonomous republic to form the new
Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. While having no special administrative status,
diminished Transnistria became the industrial core of Moldova and home to the Soviet
14th army. The latter’s mission in case of war—occupying Istanbul in no more than
seven days—led to the creation of huge stocks of weapons and ammunition.
In 1989, Moldovans represented 39.9 percent of Transnistria’s 546,000 inhabit-
ants; Ukrainians, 28.3 percent; and Russians, 25.5 percent (by 2004, the balance had
changed to 31.9 percent, 28.8 percent, and 30.3 percent respectively).23 While far
from representing a majority, the Russians nevertheless controlled the region.24 One
might think of Gramscian hegemony, but blunt Brezhnevian domination is perhaps a
more appropriate term. However, at the end of the 1980s the dominant position of this
Soviet elite was threatened by Moldovan moves toward independence. Transnistria’s
predominantly Russian and Ukrainian directors and leading personnel from the state
enterprises feared for their positions and career opportunities. When new language
legislation favoring the use of Romanian/Moldovan was adopted in autumn 1989 they
mobilized the urban Russian and Ukrainian population behind plans to establish an
autonomous Transnistrian republic.25 This was the beginning of a political process
aptly described by Steven D. Roper as a “conflict between Moldovans and a region-
ally concentrated Russophone population that had a ‘Soviet’ identity.”26
The Moldovan Supreme Soviet elected in spring 1990 adopted new state symbols
and a declaration of sovereignty while the very active Popular Front announced that
union with Romania was its political goal. In response, Transnistrian politicians
proclaimed a separate Transnistrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic on 2 September
1990. During 1991 and early 1992 they evicted the Moldovan executive and judicial
authorities with the help of personnel of the Soviet 14th army.27 Its commander,
General Gennadii Yakovlev, even accepted the position of Transnistrian Defense
Minister in December 1991.28 As in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh,
the Kremlin encouraged a process destabilizing a republic that seemed ready to
escape Moscow’s control. In fact, the strongly pro-Romanian agenda of the Popular
Front did not receive broad popular support.29 The Moldovan government became
less nationalistic after the ousting of Popular Front Prime Minister Mircea Druc in

May 1991 and adopted a defensive stance.30 Trying to avoid bloodshed, the Moldovans
left most of Transnistria.31 It was only on 19 June 1992, when the Transnistrian
forces attacked the last police station controlled by Chișinău in the town of Tighina/
Bender, that the Moldovan President Mircea Snegur finally ordered a counterattack.
Yet on the night of 20-21 June 1992 the 14th army intervened, defeated the
Moldovans, and occupied the town.32 Moldova ceased all military operations as it
was clear that it could not defeat the Moscow-supported Transnistrians. The left
(eastern) bank of the Nistru River as well as the town of Tighina/Bender on the right
bank became a de facto independent state.
Sisyphus: The Endless Negotiations
The armed conflict was “frozen”—but not ended—through a trilateral peace-

keeping operation reuniting Russian, Transnistrian, and Moldovan troops. Even
today, they monitor a demilitarized security zone under the supervision of a Joint
Control Commission. This was the result of the “Yeltsin-Snegur Agreement” of 21
July 1992. At first, peace negotiations were held in the so-called “4” format, that is,
between Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and Moldova (Bulgaria declined to participate).
In 1993, Bucharest was excluded from the process. The same year, on Moldova’s
request the OSCE started a civilian long-term mission in Chișinău and became
involved in the peace process. After 1994, the negotiations continued in the “5”
format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, Moldova, and Transnistria). It was only in May
1997 that Moldova and Transnistria signed a Memorandum on the principles of the
normalization of their relations. But this document included the ambiguous term
common state. Disputes on its interpretation have prevented any further progress.33
In 2001, one of the factors that contributed to the electoral victory of the
Communists was their promise to settle the Transnistrian conflict. This was credible
because the communist leader, Vladimir Voronin, was openly pro-Russian and
advocated reconciliation with the separatist region. His party’s electoral platform
could have been written by the Transnistrians: it included the official status of the
Russian language in Moldova, the accession to the Russia–Belarus Union, and the
deepening of economic relations with the CIS partners. Relations with Tiraspol
improved rapidly. In May 2001, four bilateral cooperation agreements were signed.
But that same month, the Russian State Duma proposed multilateral consultations
for the accession of both Moldova and Transnistria to the Russia–Belarus Union.
This generated extremely negative reactions within the Moldovan society, further
fuelling the 2001-2003 anti-communist mass demonstrations. Voronin was forced to
abandon his most ambitious projects. In turn, the Transnistrians blocked the nego-
tiations.34 Moscow nevertheless realized that having the Moldovan Communists in
power was a unique opportunity that should be exploited. It therefore prepared the

2003 “Kozak Memorandum,” a project that would have allowed the presence of
Russian troops in Transnistria until 2020. Another critical aspect was the creation of
an upper chamber of the Moldovan Parliament composed of twenty-seven represen-
tatives equally divided between Moldova, Transnistria, and Gagauzia. This would
have given the Transnistrians and Gagauz the means to block any major Moldovan
constitutional and political change. Again, fierce public protest forced Voronin to
reject the agreement he had initially accepted. Moreover, it was obvious that Russia
continued to support its Transnistrian protégés, thus preventing the Moldovan
Communist from obtaining a much needed political victory. This was one of the
main reasons that determined Voronin to adopt an increasingly pro-European stance,
implicitly downscaling his Russophile orientation.
In a speech at the 2004 Istanbul NATO summit, the Moldovan president asked
for the first time for the departure of the Russian troops from Transnistria. At the
same time, the Orange Revolution in neighboring Ukraine created the conditions for
a new approach. In April 2005, the new Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko,
launched what came to be known as the “Yushchenko Plan.” It was a seven-step
proposal based on the organization of free, democratic elections for the Supreme
Soviet of Transnistria and on increased international (and Ukrainian) involvement.
Yet for the leaders in Tiraspol, the acceptance of this plan would have been suicidal.
For its part, Moldova was afraid of legitimizing a democratic but not necessarily
friendly Transnistrian leadership. The plan failed.35
A new impetus was due to Brussels’ increased interest in Moldova. In November
2005, the European Union sent a Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and the
Republic of Moldova. It also became, together with the United States, an observer
of the Transnistrian negotiations. The present “5+2” format was thus created. There
are two main negotiators (Moldova and Transnistria), three mediators (the OSCE,
Russia, and Ukraine), and two observers (the United States and the European
Union). This has improved the negotiating capacity of Moldova, which can use
international support to compensate for Moscow’s pro-Transnistrian parti pris. A
number of European actions seemed to succeed in pushing Tiraspol toward an agree-
ment.36 Still, by 2008 it became obvious that no major breakthrough could be
achieved in the short term. This came at a time when Voronin had already taken the
decision to improve relations with Moscow and believed that solving the Transnistrian
problem would help win the 2009 election. Consequently, he reverted to secretive
trilateral negotiations with Russia and Transnistria. In September 2008, the Moldovan
prime minister even stated that some elements of the Kozak Plan would be accepted
by Chișinău.37 Yet no major progress was made before the April 2009 election.
Later, political turmoil, new election, and the creation of the anti-communist govern-
ment coalition completely changed the situation. The Transnistrians immediately
accused the new Moldovan leadership of being part of a Romanian and NATO plot.
They also started to speak about a possible new war (see below). The settlement of
the conflict suddenly became highly improbable.

The repeated failure of the negotiations was due mainly to the incompatibility of
the Moldovan and Transnistrian positions with respect to the constitutional status of
the secessionist region. Chișinău was ready to accept a degree of autonomy even more
advanced than that of Gagauzia, which is frequently mentioned as an international model.
Tiraspol, however, asked stubbornly for a confederation. This would have allowed its
leaders to block any major change both at home and in Chișinău. Moreover, as a
confederate republic Transnistria would have automatically acquired the right to quit
the confederation. Many Moldovans believed that this was little more than a consti-
tutional way to legitimize Tiraspol’s full independence. It is clear that the only pos-
sible compromise would be based on a more or less balanced federation. In more than
one occasion, Chișinău seemed ready to accept such a solution and the nineteen-year
odyssey included episodes of justified optimism. Still, Moldova’s occasional open-
ness was not mirrored by a similar Transnistrian stance. And it is logical to think that
this stalemate will persist as long as two interrelated factors do not change. One is
regional and concerns Russia’s geopolitical interest. It will be addressed in a later
section. The other is local and relates to Transnistria’s ruling elite.
A Working Political Fiction
Transnistria was created as a garrison state meant to protect local ethnic minorities
from discrimination within Moldova and from annexation by irredentist Romania.
Ironically, Moldova did not unite with Romania and the rights of its minorities—
including the Russian one—are fully respected. Furthermore, after 2001 Moldova
was ruled by the Communists who shared Transnistrians’ view on history, language
issues, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the attitude toward Romania.38 Still, this
did not prevent the continuing instrumentalization of ethnic fears by the Tiraspol
leaders. Even today, they
are putting efforts into flooding the Internet with stories of “ex-combatants,” witnesses,
“victims,” that “have seen with their own eyes” what has happened during the conflict.
Funds and efforts are put into printing books and writing articles. An especially interest-
ing example is the case with Wikipedia: Tiraspol authorities have hired personnel who
write detailed descriptions of the Moldovan-Russian relations, Transnistrian conflict
events; they manipulate the facts and generally attempt to promote a different version
of the conflict, similar to how Soviet-time specialists were building virtual history.39
Another, related means of ensuring public support for the regime is based on
something that might be labeled the culture of the international plot. Official propa-
ganda speaks constantly of the danger of a Moldovan/Romanian/NATO invasion.
But it is not the only one to do that. An interesting example is provided by Novaya
Gazeta,40 the journal of the Tighina/Bender-based political analyst Andrey Safonov.

A former minister and, since 1999, rival of President Igor Smirnov, Safonov is one
of the very few independent (or, at least, autonomous) voices tolerated by the
regime. In May 2009, he published a geopolitical assessment of the region. It was
after the April turmoil in Chișinău and one might have expected to find an analysis
of that event’s consequences. The world Safonov describes, however, has little in
common with what Westerners or even Moldovans know about Eastern Europe.
That part of the world is in fact a savage, dangerous international environment
haunted by ferocious predators. Fortunately, computer simulations allow the Russian
military experts to predict future evolutions. In turn, these predictions help the
Kremlin elaborate its strategic plans. Basically, the influence of the United States is
diminishing while the European Union is increasing its presence. The main danger
is the expansionism of Romania. This country is targeting Moldova as well as for-
mer Romanian territories now controlled by Ukraine. By getting Moldova and the
Ukrainian gas-rich continental shelf of the Black Sea, Bucharest intends to become
a regional super power posing a lethal threat to Transnistria. The only hope is an
already planned Russian intervention that would lead to the dismantlement of Romania.
This is a “politically incorrect but necessary scenario” similar to those used in
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and USSR. Romanian Moldova (between the Prut and
the East Carpathians) would merge with the Republic of Moldova. Transylvania
would become Hungarian and South-Western Romania Serbian (nothing is said
about Bucharest). This would solve all tensions in South-Eastern Europe as well as
“many financial problems.” The only possible complication might be caused by
Ukrainian ambitions. For Tiraspol, a Russian–Ukrainian or Russian–Polish war would
be a “cataclysm.” In any case, Moscow represents Transnistria’s only protector.41
Everywhere in Europe, this 1939-type scenario would seem grotesque. The fact that
in Transnistria it is published and widely commented on is illustrative of the results
of almost two decades of Stalinist-style propaganda. At least a part of the population
sees the separatist region as a besieged fortress that has to struggle for its physical
survival. Under these circumstances, contesting the patriotic leadership in Tiraspol
can only be suicidal.
Such widespread convictions help perpetuate the rule of the Soviet elite already
legitimized by the initial conflict. Under the pretext of resisting Moldovan “fascism,”
President Igor Smirnov (a Russian citizen), Minister of State Security Vladimir
Antyufeyev (a former OMON officer accused of political crimes in Soviet Latvia),
and their group built a consolidated authoritarian regime whose Stalinist methods are
not unlike those of Central Asian dictators. There are no free and fair elections. Any
dissent is brutally suppressed. Politicians and journalists who display the slightest
degree of disloyalty are harassed or banned. The Ministry of State Security has even
sponsored the creation of the Proryv youth group whose mission is to prevent a
Colored Revolution and to “protect Transnistria from the orange plague.”42
Smirnov and his associates also benefit from the very profitable economic activ-
ities that made Transnistria known worldwide. In 2000, in this region there were

42,000 tonnes of weapons and ammunitions belonging to the Russian Federation.

About half of them were evacuated or destroyed during 2000-2004.43 The rest, as
well as weapons manufactured illegally in Transnistria, are simply being sold on the
international black market. Tiraspol’s lack of international recognition has the para-
doxical effect of preventing any legal action against its companies. Russian arms export-
ers did not miss the opportunity and started to use Transnistria for their own illegal
trade. Governments under international embargo, guerilla fighters, and terrorist
groups are today regular customers of the region’s arms traffickers (Xavier Deleu, a
French journalist who built close links with Transnistrian officials and businessmen,
published a 2005 book on this subject44). Furthermore, all sorts of traffickers outside
the weapons sector also discovered the advantages of Tiraspol’s special status. Consequ
ently, Transnistria, already a “weapons laundry,” has become “a virtual free criminal
zone” described by a report funded by the British Department for International Devel
opment as “a smuggling company masquerading as a state.”45 The main profiteers
are the leaders in Tiraspol. They are fully aware that trafficking can go on only as long
as Transnistria maintains its present unclear status. Hence their resolute opposition
to any settlement that would bring the region under the control of the Moldovan police
and judiciary.
The Transnistrian Wind of Change

and Its Negative Consequences
Smirnov’s firm grip on power prevents any democratization move. However, in

recent years the regime came to be contested by members of the Transnistrian oligar-
chy. Authoritarian excesses and human rights abuses led to the increasing interna-
tional isolation of the region. When this took the form of serious obstacles to
Transnistrian exports, some business groups realized that their interests diverge from
those of the regime. Consequently, in the December 2005 parliamentary elections,
twenty-three of the forty-three seats of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet were won
by the candidates of the Sheriff business group formally represented by the
Obnovlenye (Renewal) party.46 Sheriff is an extremely influential group that domi-
nates most of the region’s economy. Its very existence would not have been possible
without a close relation with the Smirnov regime. In fact, Oleg Smirnov, one of the
dictator’s sons, even worked for the group. But the latter’s export had seriously
diminished in 2004 and it was clear that only a political change could have improved
the situation. However, Obnovlenye’s political platform was similar to that of
Smirnov on most major points and especially on the independence of Transnistria.
Sheriff simply wanted to replace the top policy makers with its own men, not to over-
throw the authoritarian regime. The Obnovlenye leader, the young, Moscow-educated
Evgheni Shevchuk, became the speaker (chairman) of the Supreme Soviet. He was
replacing the only ethnical Moldovan among the associates of Smirnov, Grigori

Mărăcuță, who had held this position since 1991. Shevchuk mobilized a significant
group of deputies and succeeded in imposing constitutional changes that weakened
the position of the president and enhanced the independence of the judiciary. He also
tried to turn the Transnistrian official TV into a public company and to reduce the
control of local councils by the Tiraspol authorities.47 However, Shevchuk refrained
from a full-fledged crusade. Most notably, in 2006 he did not run as a presidential
candidate, allowing Smirnov to be reelected. He claimed that he did not want to
endanger Transnistria’s unity at a moment of major external challenge. He might have
added that, given Smirnov’s methods, he didn’t want to endanger his own security
either. The dispute continued in the domain of constitutional reform. The project of a
new Constitution, completed in April 2009, was limiting drastically the attributions
of the president while reinforcing those of the Supreme Soviet. Smirnov threatened to
“mobilize the Cossack troops” and to dissolve the legislative assembly and conceived
a competing project reinforcing his own position.48 Finally, in July 2009 Shevchuk
resigned from his position of speaker of the Supreme Soviet, accusing the president
of “undemocratic and anticonstitutional actions.”49 The then Moldovan President
Voronin, who had put great hopes in a political change in Tiraspol, bitterly accused
Shevchuk of being “a weak man.”50 In any case, despite this victory the image of the
Smirnov group was seriously affected. On 18 November 2009, thirty-six of the forty-
three members of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet rejected the president’s call for a
referendum modifying the Constitution in his favor.51 Both Shevchuk and Mărăcuță
took the opportunity to ask Smirnov to step down.52 In the December 2010 parliamen-
tary elections, Obnovlenye won twenty-five of the forty-three seats of the Supreme
Soviet.53 Perhaps more importantly, Evgheni Shevchuk announced his decision to
enter the 2011 presidential race.54 It is more and more clear that the survival of the
present leadership in Tiraspol depends on its capacity to relegitimate itself.
Exaggerating the gravity of the external threats provides the simplest and most
convenient solution. In 2007, NATO’s opening of an information and documentation
center in Chişinău was presented by the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet as a decisive
Moldovan step toward joining the Atlantic Alliance.55 But it was the 2009 fall of
Moldova’s communist regime that provided the much needed “proof” of a plot threat-
ening the very existence of Transnistria. Smirnov warned that the new right-wing
Moldovan government will start “a new wave of violations of the rights of the Russian
speaking citizens” and paralleled the “nationalist policies of Georgia and Moldova.”
To counter the efforts of the new government in Chişinău to “reduce to zero Russia’s
influence in the region” and to put an end to the presence of Russian troops, he pro-
posed the accession of his region to the Russian Federation. Short of that, the
Transnistrians would be forced “to prepare to defend by themselves the borders of
their state.”56 Some of his colleagues were even more aggressive. When the Moldovan
acting President Mihai Ghimpu asked for the retreat of the Russian forces from
Transnistria, he was accused by the president of the Security, Defense, and Peacekeeping
Committee of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet, Oleg Gudymo, of being

genetically unable to accept the fact that Transnistria is not a part of Moldova. . . .
Mihai Ghimpu cannot sleep well as long as in Transnistria we sleep in peace. . . .
Drastic actions such as the retreat of the Russian troops will not lead to anything good.
The presence of the Russian pacificators could put an end to the war. We are against
their retreat. President Ghimpu’s statement on the retreat of Russia from Transnistria
was foolish.57 (emphasis added)
The departure of the Russian soldiers, concluded Gudymo, would lead to a new
war. In 2006, when Chișinău was ruled by the Communists, he had already stated
that “Moldova has sharp teeth and aggressive plans with regard to the Transnistrian
Moldovan Republic.”58 Now, with a pro-Western government, Moldova can only
prepare an overt aggression. Unsurprisingly, this point of view is shared by the entire
Transnistrian leadership, which can emphasize once again its patriotic goals.
To show the seriousness of the “Moldovan threat,” the Transnistrian secret ser-
vice entered the scene. In the spring of 2010 it arrested a Tiraspol journalist, Ernest
Vardanean, and a Tighina/Bender civil servant, Ilie Cazac, on charges of treason and
spying in favor of Chișinău. The alleged use of brutal interrogation methods led to
“confessions” that were broadcast by Transnistria’s official television. In December
2010, Vardanean was sentenced to fifteen years in prison after a trial assessed by
Moldovan and international human rights activists as “a flagrant violation of funda-
mental freedoms.”59 It is not illogical to think that Smirnov might even contemplate
the ignition of some small-scale armed incidents on the Nistru. This would ensure
large-scale mobilization within Transnistria, reinforcing greatly the legitimacy of
the present regime. However, the Tiraspol leaders do not have the freedom of decid-
ing such extreme actions by themselves. On serious matters, the final decision has
always been taken by the Kremlin.
Player and Referee: Russia
Writing about Russia’s role of “patron state,” Nicu Popescu formulated the best
brief description of the Tiraspol–Moscow relation: “Transnistria could not have
emerged without Russia, nor could it have survived.”60 The picture is completed by
Nicholas Dima’s equally short explanation of the 1992 war: “Russia wanted to keep
Moldova under control, Romania at bay, and Ukraine under threat.”61 Despite its
1999 Istanbul commitment, the Kremlin still maintains on the territory of Transnistria
1,500 soldiers and huge stocks of weaponry. This force is small, but not insignificant
if added to Tiraspol’s own militia and compared with Moldova’s poorly trained and
armed 7,000 soldiers.62 More importantly, the Russian military presence is perceived
by all parts as explicit support for the secessionists. The latter have always been
pictured in Russia as victims of Chișinău’s aggression. Moscow responded to the
Moldovan efforts to force the withdrawal of its troops with a media campaign claim-
ing that this would lead to renewed violence.63

The 1992 Transnistrian and 2008 South Ossetin episodes indicate clearly that any
Moldovan military action would trigger a Russian direct intervention. For Chișinău,
this is a strong incentive for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. But the
Transnistrians know they are well protected and see no reason to change the status
quo. In this, they have been helped by Moscow’s attitude in the negotiation process.
The Russians have undermined constantly the five-sided negotiations as they believe
that third parties are favorable to Moldova. In fact, Russia “transformed the other
participants in the 5+2 format, Ukraine, OSCE, EU and USA [into] onlookers.”64 It
tried to impose direct Chișinău–Tiraspol negotiations, while assuming the role of a
biased, pro-Transnistrian arbitrator.
This protecting attitude at the international level has been paralleled by direct
Russian involvement inside Transnistria. A 2008 report of the Moldovan Institute
for Public Policy assesses this involvement as including the following elements:
(1) Massive offer of Russian passports to the inhabitants of Transnistria. Out of a
total population of about 550,000, more than 100,000 are today Russian citizens.65
(2) Financial assistance and the promotion of expectations regarding the extension
to Transnistria of social assistance programs from Russia. (3) Support for periodical
referendums regarding independence and affiliation with Russia. (4) Illegal privatiza-
tion of strategic economic entities by Russian public and private capital. (5) Imposition
of a pro-Russian media space openly hostile to the “enemy” (Moldova). Russia is
presented as the only defender and savior. (6) Holding elections for the state bodies
of Russia in Transnistria exactly as on the territory of the Russian Federation.
(7) Imposition of and support for Russian citizens who execute the Kremlin’s indi-
cations in the Tiraspol administration. (8) Transformation of the Transnistrian secret
service into a branch of the Russian secret service.66
Ironically, while Russian propaganda in Transnistria presents Chișinău as the
arch-enemy, Moscow has made also visible efforts to project its influence inside
Moldova.67 Using Moldovan printed media, local editions of popular Russian news-
papers, and Internet-based platforms, Moscow conducted an efficient propaganda
campaign that discredited NATO, the United States, Western Europe, as well as pro-
Western and pro-Romanian local politicians.68 This explains the preference of 50.4
percent of the Moldovans for Russia as their country’s most important strategic
partner. The much less active European Union is supported by only 25 percent of the
population; the United States, by about 1 percent.69
The propaganda is far from exhausting Moscow’s arsenal. When the Moldovan
Communists came to adopt a rather pro-Western stance, the Russian National Security
Council, the Russian government, and the State Duma decided to use a “complex
pressure mechanism” against Moldova (and Georgia).70 The most visible measure
was the 2006 banning of the Moldovan agricultural and wine imports. Chișinău’s
dependence on Russian gas was also fully exploited. The first set of measures tar-
geted the economic interests of the Moldovan elites. The second affected seriously

the conditions of living of the common people. Voronin’s 2007 pro-Russian turn is
therefore hardly surprising.71
The Russian support for Transnistria is the result of a coalition of interest groups
inside the Russian Federation.72 First, important Russian business groups are
involved in the secessionist region. Benefitting from corrupt links with the Smirnov
regime, they took part in the privatization process and made Russia the largest for-
eign investor. Second, elements of Russia’s military-industrial complex cooperate
with Transnistrian factories. In fact, Russian orders have been crucial in preventing
them from going bankrupt. Third, the region is frequently used for illegal traffic by
influent Russian business, military, and mafia groups. For obvious reasons, all these
“interested actors” try to keep a low profile. But they are very influential in shaping
Moscow’s policies. Finally, at the political level, the most vocal supporters of the
regime in Tiraspol are the nationalist and communist deputies of the Russian State
Duma. They have constantly put pressure on the executive to adopt tougher policies
toward Moldova and succeeded in creating a pro-Transnistrian attitude within the
Russian public opinion.73
However, economic, ideological, and cultural factors only represent the tip of the
iceberg. They are important but cannot be compared with Moscow’s geopolitical
interest. For the Kremlin, the present situation of Transnistria presents multiple
advantages in keeping Moldova inside the Russian sphere of influence and project-
ing Moscow’s influence in the region. First, it prevents the normalization of the
political and constitutional situation of Moldova. This perpetuates the image of an
unstable, almost failed state that cannot be welcomed as a member by the European
Union or any other Western structure as long as it does not solve its internal prob-
lems. Even the Romanian public believes that it is better to stay away from this
crisis-ridden region. Second, it forces any leadership in Chișinău to maintain a rela-
tively pro-Russian attitude. For the overwhelming majority of Moldovans, the
reunion with Transnistria is a major policy objective. Any anti-Russian measure can
only hamper this reunion and is therefore unpopular. In extreme cases, small-scale
military action undertaken unilaterally by Transnistrian forces could be used to
stress the need for Russian mediation and peace keeping. Moreover, an openly hos-
tile attitude toward Moscow might lead to Russian recognition of Transnistria’s
independence. Such a move would be a shock for most Moldovans and would seri-
ously delegitimize the local government perceived as having caused it. Third,
Russian political and military presence in Transnistria can be used to put pressure on
Kiev. Many of Ukraine’s lines of communications with Moldova, Romania, and
Central Europe cross the territory controlled by the separatists. Fourth, a fundamen-
tally changed geopolitical context might require the projection of Russian military
force in South-East Europe. In that case, Moscow might decide to use Transnistria
as a military outpost. For a Westerner, such a perspective seems very unlikely. But
one should not forget that things are seen from Russia through nineteenth-century

lenses. Fifth, the eastern bank of the Nistru is used by Russian companies for large-
scale illegal export of weapons. Besides its obvious utility for some Russian oli-
garchs, this represents a convenient way to arm disreputable overseas friends.
This is why the Kremlin has supported the Transnistrians and has made visible
efforts to maintain the status quo. Russia might accept the reunion of the secession-
ist region with Moldova, but only under conditions mirroring the present situation.
Transnistria should receive a constitutional status equal to that of the rest of the
country and allowing it to maintain special relations with Russia as well as the latter’s
troops. Russian influence should also be decisive in Chișinău. Moldova should abandon
any plan of joining Western structures.74
During the April 2009 crisis, the Communists were supported by the Kremlin, but
their subsequent electoral failure was not perceived by Moscow as its own defeat.
At the September 2009 Chișinău CIS summit, Medvedev did not even meet
Voronin.75 It seems that the Russians were deeply dissatisfied with the Communists’
pro-Western episode and did not trust the former Moldovan president. Furthermore,
election rigging could have triggered a colored revolution with extremely negative
consequences for Russia’s position in Moldova. Consequently, the Kremlin preferred
to show a smiling face to the new government in Chișinău despite its pro-Western
attitude. However, the chairman of the Commission for relations with CIS member
states and co-nationals of the Russian State Duma, Aleksey Ostrovsky, made clear
that the Russian Federation could recognize the independence of Transnistria if the
new Moldovan leadership becomes too pro-Romanian.76
All this suggests that, despite the political change in Chișinău, Moscow intends
to maintain its previous attitude toward Transnistria and Moldova. It will push for a
settlement of the conflict only under conditions that are extremely favorable to its
own geopolitical interests. Otherwise, it will continue to protect the secessionist
region and will oppose any move to modify the status quo.
The Missing Link: Romania
At the fall of communism, Moldova was hardly one of the Romanians’ main
priorities. To Vladimir Socor, “the Romanian public at large appeared almost wholly
indifferent to the issue.”77 A rather vague preference for the union with the former
Romanian province was due mainly to the activity of some intellectuals invoking
what Charles King called the “Kosovo complex”: the idea that “a particular piece of
territory within the historical homeland is mystically linked with the collective well-
being of the ethnos.”78 All the political parties included irredentist elements in their
programs, but the importance of these elements was modest. Even for the two parlia-
mentary ultranationalist parties—the Transylvania-based Party of Romanian National
Unity and the Greater Romania Party—Moldova was a matter of secondary impor-
tance as they targeted mainly the Hungarian minority. The superficially reformed

former Romanian Communist Party led by Ion Iliescu adopted a pro-Moscow stance.
Consequently, it did nothing to support effectively Moldova’s anti-Soviet moves and
then became “the sole political actor in Romania willing to accept Moldovan state-
hood for the long term.”79 This was very important because Iliescu took power in
December 1989 and built a semiconsolidated authoritarian regime that lasted until
1996.80 Hence, he was able to control fully Bucharest’s foreign policy and limited
drastically Romanian support for the Moldovan Popular Front. At times, there were
some concessions made to nationalist supporters and allies. In symbolical terms, the
most important was the July 1991 Declaration of the Romanian Parliament con-
demning the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and urging a
peaceful correction of this legacy of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.81 Iliescu also
offered the Moldovans a significant aid package to pay for outstanding fuel debts to
the Russian Federation. A range of official connections was created between the gov-
ernments in Chișinău and Bucharest, including high-level working groups on bilat-
eral relations. Romania became Moldova’s largest trading partner outside the CIS.82
Yet none of these elements was intended as the first step of a Romanian–Moldovan
unification process. Furthermore, beginning with the mid-1990s—when the Moldovans’
lack of interest in reunion with Romania was generally acknowledged—the Romanian
parties downscaled accordingly their already weak irredentist programs. The
Transnistrian leaders, however, saw the situation in a very different light. From the very
beginning, they used Romanian pro-union statements—even if they came from mar-
ginal political or cultural groups or individuals—to build an aggressive rhetoric against
“irredentist” Romania. The “annexation” of Moldova was presented as imminent,
which in turn justified the secession and the creation of the Smirnov-led garrison state.
For their part, most Romanians see Transnistria as a remote and obscure place
with which they do not have anything in common. However, for the first time since
perhaps 1944, in the mid-2000s there was a short-lived official Romanian initiative
concerning the secessionist region. In December 2004, at the beginning of his
presidential tenure, Traian Băsescu promoted an aggressively pro-American foreign
policy illustrated by his project of a “Bucharest–London–Washington axis.” While
supporting Romania’s military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, he advocated the
presence of American military bases in Romania and asked for an active involve-
ment of NATO and the United States in the Black Sea region. In a speech delivered
in March 2005 at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, he asked for the
“formulation of a common Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region” in order
to promote “freedom, democracy, prosperity, and stability,” leading to the creation
of a “new identity for the Black Sea region.” A Romanian–American strategic part-
nership was proposed in order to
find lasting solutions for the “frozen conflicts” in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh [which] threaten the security of Europe by spilling
over organized crime, human and arms trafficking, and transnational terrorism.

Coming to the point, he explicitly asked for the withdrawal of Russian troops from
Transnistria and Georgia.83 He tried to win President Bush’s support for this plan dur-
ing two visits to the White House, in March 2005 and July 2006.84 In September 2005,
in a speech delivered at Stanford University, he even proposed the creation of a
U.S.–European Union military task force in the region, as “the Russian Federation
does not accept the internationalization of the Black Sea.” He insisted that “it is time
for the Black Sea to cease being a Russian lake.”85 Romania’s National Security Strategy,
adopted in April 2006, reflected the same ideas.86
However, despite the genuine interest of the Bush administration in this project,
there were few visible consequences, none of which concerned Transnistria.
Because of West European opposition, the April 2008 NATO Summit—held pre-
cisely in Bucharest—failed to mark the acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia in
NATO’s Membership Action Plan. In September 2009, the decision of the Obama
administration to abandon plans for the anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech
Republic put an end to any hope for increased American interest in the region.
Furthermore, domestic evolutions also affected the coherence of Bucharest’s
eastern policy. President Băsescu is in control of only one of the three major
Romanian political groups. His Democrat Liberal Party, now in power, was part of
coalition governments during 2005-2007 (with the Liberals) and from December
2008 to October 2009 (with the Social Democrats). These two parties try to build
good relations with Russia. Since 2006, the Liberal National Party is under the total
control of the controversial billionaire Dinu Patriciu, who advocates openly close
economic ties with the CIS countries. Within the Social Democrat Party (the former
Communists), Ion Iliescu, now honorary president, is supported by the party’s over-
whelmingly pro-Russian old guard. Their view on Moldovan matters is well illus-
trated by an interview given in September 2009 to the Moldovan department of
Radio Free Europe by Iliescu’s former defense minister, Ioan Mircea Pașcu. Asked
to comment on the new anti-communist government coalition in Chișinău, Pașcu,
now a Social Democrat member of the European Parliament, spoke exclusively and
insistently of the Moldovans’ energy dependence on Russia, of their need to adopt
an attitude favorable to Russian interests, and of the great danger of antagonizing
Moscow.87 It seemed more of a statement of a Comecon representative than that of
a European parliamentary. The 2005-2010 Social Democrat president, Mircea
Geoană, belongs to the younger, pro-Western faction. However, in November 2009
it was disclosed that on 27 April 2009, when he was president of the Senate and vice
president of Romania’s Supreme Defense Council, he made the first of a series of
three secret visits to Moscow. There he allegedly met Arkady Dvorkovich, assistant
to the president of the Russian Federation on economic matters, and Sergei
Prikhodko, aide to the Russian president. Geoană first denied the events. When he
was forced to recognize them, he claimed those were private visits designed to “nor-
malize the Russia-Romania dialogue.”88 He did not disclose any further detail, but
press reports claimed that he negotiated Russian financial and political support for

his 2009 presidential campaign. In exchange, he allegedly promised that once elected,
he would downscale the Romanian involvement in the Nabucco gas pipeline project
while joining South Stream, the Russian rival project.89 While these allegations can-
not be proved, the visits themselves demonstrate the interest of the younger Social
Democrats in improving the Bucharest–Moscow relation. Any involvement in
Transnistria might complicate this task and therefore the Social Democrats have
joined the Liberals in discouraging it. They are helped by the fact that the Romanian
public opinion is resolutely hostile to any involvement in post-Soviet crises. Consequently,
despite his continuing support for an American military presence in the region,
president Băsescu had to abandon his earlier plans. Romania’s brief presence on the
Transnistrian stage came to an irreversible end.
Deus ex Machina: The European Union
The European Union–Moldova relationship began quite modestly. A bilateral

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1994 and entered into force
in 1998. In June 2001, Chișinău became a member of the EU-initiated Stability Pact
for South-Eastern Europe. Yet Moldova’s importance was perceived in Brussels as
marginal. Between 1991 and 2006, the EU assistance amounted to only €300 mil-
lion.90 However, an important change was determined by the launching of the
European Union’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).91 An ambitious joint ENP
Action Plan was adopted in February 2005 by the EU–Moldova Cooperation
Council. The European Union also increased its presence in Moldova. In October
2005, a full European Commission Delegation was opened in Chișinău and Adriaan
Jacobovits de Szeged was appointed EU Special Representative for Moldova.92 In
fact, the European démarche has two independent constituents. The first concerns the
Europeanization of Moldova, in a way similar to that of the post-communist coun-
tries now members of the European Union. It probably contributed, in a limited
measure, to the societal change that finally led to the 2009 electoral defeat of the
Communists. The second has the objective of putting an end to the Transnistrian
crisis. It seems that Brussels considered this an easier task and gave it priority.
Consequently, the Transnistrian question was addressed by both the 2005 ENP
Action Plan93 and the European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013
for the Republic of Moldova.94 Progressively, a three-level Transnistrian strategy
emerged.95 First, direct pressure was put on Tiraspol. Already in 2003, the European
Union (and the United States) introduced a visa ban against leading members of the
separatist regime. The ban has been renewed annually.96 Also in 2003, the European
Commission convinced Ukraine to conclude with Moldova an agreement forcing
Transnistrian exporters to acquire customs stamps only issued by Chișinău.97 A more
ambitious (but short-lived) customs regime was introduced by Kiev in 2006 also
under EU pressure.98 Moreover, an EU Border Assistance Mission was deployed to

prevent illegal traffic at the Moldovan–Ukrainian border. The second level is incen-
tive based. In recent years, Brussels has offered Moldova increased financial assis-
tance, trade concessions, programs of student scholarships, etc. This trend became
very visible after the 2009 regime change in Chișinău. The negotiations for a new
Association Agreement started on 12 January 2010.99 Tiraspol is excluded from the
Moldova–European Union cooperation and this becomes more and more frustrating.
Transnistrian trade with the European Union has increased, with 59 percent during
2006-2008, and could benefit greatly from the preferential regime granted to Moldova.100
The third level is represented by the already mentioned direct European involvement
in the negotiation process. This led to the creation of the 5+2 format that improved
significantly the position of Chișinău. However, as shown earlier in this article, in
2008 Voronin abandoned this format in favor of secretive trilateral negotiations with
Russia and Transnistria that ended without any result. An important development
took place in June 2010, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed to President
Dmitri Medvedev of Russia to resolve the long-running conflict in Transnistria by
reviving the 5+2 negotiations. In return, Mrs. Merkel offered the establishment of an
EU–Russia Political and Security Committee where Brussels and Moscow would
work closely together in civil and military crisis management operations.101 The proposal
was further developed at the October 2010 Merkel–Medvedev–Sarkozy reunion in
Deauville and at the December 2010 OSCE Astana Summit.102 Yet Russia cannot be
asked to study seriously this German plan as long as it is not transformed into a full-
fledged EU initiative. And for the time being, it is not clear if Chancellor Merkel’s
views are supported by the other EU members.
On one hand, all these elements might lead to optimism. The European Union is
forging increasingly efficient instruments that turn it into a major regional player. The
secessionists in Tiraspol have to face a new set of sticks and carrots and, ideally, might
be tempted to give up. On the other hand, however, the plot-obsessed Transnistrian
leaders perceive the EU actions as hostile and illegitimate. They hardly appreciate
Brussels’ pro-Chișinău attitude and assess it as the result of a dangerous Romanian–
Western plan. Moscow has a similar stance. “Losing” Transnistria to a fully indepen-
dent Moldova is inacceptable, as this would cancel the multiple advantages enumerated
in the section on Russia. But “losing” Transnistria to Moldova and the European
Union would be even worse. The Kremlin’s geopolitical vision allows only one inter-
pretation of such an event: the Russian sphere of influence would diminish in favor of
a rival, aggressive sphere of influence. This demands counteraction, not appeasement.
The Minor Actors: Ukraine, the OSCE,

and the United States
Ukraine has been a mediator in the Transnistrian negotiations and stations mili-
tary observers on the demarcation line. In principle, Kiev is interested in putting an

end to a crisis that destabilizes the region and maintains Russian forces at its Western
border. Still, as it was shown in the previous sections, it has taken little effective action.103
Moreover, it did so only under strong pressure from the European Union. The
Orange revolution brought the Yushchenko Plan, but its results were disappointing.
In part, this is due to the fact that Ukraine has important interests in the separatist
region. There are major Ukrainian investments in Transnistrian companies. Corrupt
officials in Ukraine benefit from smuggling through the region. And Transnistrian
trade through the Ukrainian customs, territory, and seaports represent an important
source of revenue for the budget of the Odessa region.104 More importantly, Ukraine’s
Transnistrian policy is only an element of the complex and troubled Kiev–Moscow
relation. This is a subject too vast to be presented here. But it is clear that Ukraine
is not free to play a fully independent role on the Transnistrian arena. This can only
change if and when Kiev breaks its eastern links and follows a genuinely European
trajectory.
The role of the OSCE was mentioned in the section on the negotiation process.
In the 1990s, its contribution was quite important and helped stabilize the region.105
Later, however, it became clear that the organization had exhausted its potential.
Neutral brokerage is today insufficient and the OSCE lacks the instruments needed
in order to break the deadlock. This is even more obvious when compared with the
European Union’s actions in the region.
Finally, the United States have always avoided any serious engagement in
Transnistria. When they did take some action—such as the 2003 adoption of the visa
ban or the 2005 decision to become an observer within the 5+2 negotiation format—
it was in conjunction with the European Union. This already cautious approach can
only be reinforced by the September 2009 decision of the Obama administration to
adopt a foreign policy less hostile to Russian interests. In this context, it would be
unrealistic to expect any new major American involvement in the settlement of the
Transnistrian crisis.
Conclusion
A cynical description of the Transnistrian situation would depict a nineteen-year

old, three-sided game between Moldova, Transnistria, and its Russian protector.
Somewhere close to the table but unable or unwilling to play are Romania, Ukraine,
the OSCE, and the United States. However, a new player has entered the game. The
European Union is bringing new sticks and carrots for the Transnistrian leadership.
Besides this major change, three of the initial actors have undergone important trans-
formations. Moldova has overthrown the authoritarian regime of the Communists
and has adopted a pro-Western foreign policy. The weakened Transnistrian regime
tries to take advantage of this new “threat” in order to relegitimize itself. And
Moscow considers the EU support for Moldova as a threat to its own sphere of influence.

It is clear that the two local actors are weak and unable to win the game by them-
selves. Moldova remains a country with many problems that has only very recently
reverted to democracy. The new regime is fragile and its future unclear. It is highly
unlikely that such circumstances will allow a “victory” that could not be achieved
by the stable and coherent regime of the Moldovan Communists. Transnistria is in a
similar position. Domestically, the disputes within the authoritarian leadership illus-
trate a legitimacy crisis that endangers the very survival of the Smirnov regime. At
the international level, the situation of Tiraspol is reminiscent of the Republika
Srpska in the mid-1990s. The Bosnian Serbs were rejecting the reunion with their
Muslim adversaries. They could not be defeated militarily. But the recently arrived
Americans negotiated directly with the Belgrade leader and imposed the Dayton
agreement that everybody else had to accept. Similarly, the regime in Tiraspol can
survive only as long as Russia supports it. A deal with the Kremlin could bring the
settlement of the Transnistrian question in a matter of weeks.
The crisis, then, has to be scrutinized at the regional and not local level. Moreover,
unlike Bosnia, for the two global players—Moscow and Brussels—Transnistria is
not an isolated case. The European Union started what seems to be a cautious but
nevertheless revolutionary involvement in the CIS area. What is at stake on the
Nistru River is not the settlement of a minor 1992 conflict. The European Union is
testing its capacity to pacify, Europeanize, and eventually bring under its influence
parts of what, until recently, used to be Moscow’s uncontested chasse gardée. On
the opposite side, Russia is carefully watching the intrusion. To a geopolitics-obsessed
Kremlin observer, there is little difference between the European involvement in
Moldova and the American one in Georgia. Both are threatening the Russian sphere
of influence. Unfreezing the South Ossetia conflict was the Russian response to
Washington. The same radical option is unlikely on the Transnistrian theater only
because Moscow has a wider range of instruments at its disposal and the magnitude
of the “external threat” is more modest than in Georgia.
It is important to note that the frozen conflict itself as well as its possible unfreez-
ing plays a purely instrumental role. It is difficult to find arguments showing that the
overall geopolitical game is subordinated in any way to the internal logic of the
Transnistrian crisis. On the contrary, the crisis itself has been and continues to be
instrumentalized by the major regional players. The obvious conclusion is that a set-
tlement can be secured only through a Dayton-style agreement between these players
that would leave little space to maneuver to Tiraspol and Chișinău. Such an agree-
ment, however, is unlikely because of the obvious regional imbalance between
Russia and the European Union. First, the resources they can mobilize in Moldova/
Transnistria differ greatly. Moscow has troops, an important economic presence,
strategic energy resources, the control of major TV stations and newspapers, and the
support of important local political forces. Brussels provides only limited assistance
and trade concessions. The only factor that would certainly change the situation is a

credible commitment to accept Moldova as an EU member. Yet for the time being,
this is out of question. Second, a similar imbalance characterizes the Russian and
European perceptions of the legitimacy of their involvement in the region. In Russia,
both the political elite and the general public are familiar with the crisis and share the
conviction that they have the right and the obligation to protect the Russian minority
of a land defended heroically by Suvorov and Stalin. The average European citizen,
on the other hand, is unable to point Moldova on the map. His or her interest in
Transnistria is roughly equal to that in Western Sahara. Third, this huge difference
leads to equally different political priorities. The Kremlin regards this part of the CIS
as belonging clearly to its sphere of influence. Any intrusion has to be eliminated. The
European Union could hardly adopt a similarly resolute attitude. The simple citizens
don’t even know that a crisis exists. The governments of the EU member states are
divided on the relation with Russia. The bureaucrats in Brussels adopt by definition
cautious strategies. And the nomination of a low-profile EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy made any change improbable. Fourth, the local
perception of the two major actors is very different. Because of its capabilities, com-
mitment to the region, and aggressiveness, Moscow is feared by everybody, friend or
foe. Acting against its interests is seldom perceived as a wise attitude. For its part, the
European Union is seen as a friendly but remote and weak power. One should think
twice before relying on such a partner when it comes to face the angry bear.
These differences prevent Brussels from forcing a new Dayton. Today, an EU–
Russia agreement on Transnistria could only take the form of a slightly modified
Kozak Memorandum. The European Union has no reason to support a settlement that
would be so unfavorable to Moldova. It is more logical to wait until the constantly
increasing European presence in the region improves significantly Brussels’ negotia-
tion status. This means that in the short and, probably, medium term there will be no
significant progress in the settlement of the crisis. Despite the encouraging EU dis-
course, the present stalemate will most likely be preserved for a long period of time
with all its negative consequences for the regional security and for Moldova’s politi-
cal and economic development. The Transnistrian question will most likely continue
to be instrumentalized by both Russia and the Moldovan Communists in ways that
can affect negatively Moldova’s democratic consolidation process.
Notes
1. See Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto
States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 4–7.
2. For a definition and discussion of this term see Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States, 15–16.
3. Vladimir Socor, The Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Interests (Report prepared
by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, on the occasion of the NATO Summit 2004, 2004).
http://www.jamestown.org/fileadmin/Vlads_Corner/policypapers/KonstRon.doc, 2.

4. Ceslav Ciobanu, Political Economy of “Frozen Conflicts” in ex-Soviet States: Challenges and
Prospects for the U.S. and Russia (Chişinău: Institute for Public Policy, 2007), 9. http://www.pasos.org/
content/download/14333/83843/file/Frozen+Conflicts.doc.
5. Socor, The Frozen Conflicts, 1.
6. Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States, 79–80.
7. Pierre Jolicoeur, The Frozen Conflicts of the Wider Black Sea Region (Occasional Paper,
Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, 2008), 7.
8. Socor, The Frozen Conflicts, 2.
9. Jolicoeur, Frozen Conflicts of the Wider Black Sea Region, 5
10. Janusz Bugajski, “Russia’s Pragmatic Reimperialization,” Caucasian Review of International
Affairs 4, no. 1 (2010): 3.
11. Mykola Kapitonenko, “Resolving Post-Soviet ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Is Regional Integration
Helpful?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3, no. 1 (2009): 37.
12. Stephen Blank, “Russia and the Black Sea’s Frozen Conflicts in Strategic Perspective,”
Mediterranean Quarterly 19, no. 3 (2008): 31.
13. Arcadie Barbăroşie et al., Synthesized Vision over the Transnistrian Issue (Chişinău: The Black
Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, Institute for Public Policy, 11 September 2008). http://www.ipp.md/
files/Summary_11_1_.09.2008_eng.doc.
14. Nicu Popescu, “The EU in Moldova—Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood,” European
Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper no. 60 (October 2005), 25.
15. Blank, “Russia and the Black Sea’s Frozen Conflicts,” 31.
16. Luke March, “From Moldovanism to Europeanization? Moldova’s Communists and Nation
Building,” Nationalities Papers 35, no. 4 (2007): 601–26 ( 603–4). See also Charles King, “Marking
Time in the Middle Ground: Contested Identities and Moldovan Foreign Policy” Journal of Communist
Studies and Transition Politics 19, no. 3 (September 2003): 60–82.
17. Cristian Ghinea and Sergiu Panainte, “The Political System from the Republic of Moldova and
Its Evolution,” in Moldova. At the Crossroads, ed. Sergiu Panainte (Bucharest: Soros Fondation
Romania, 2009), 99. http://www.soros.ro/ro/fisier_acord_general.php?id_fisier=4.
18. Institutul pentru Dezvoltare şi Iniţiative Sociale Viitorul, Political & Security Statewatch.
Monthly Analytical Bulletin on Moldova 14, no. 7 (July 2008): 2.
19. According to the Freedom House definition, the hybrid regimes are “electoral democracies that
meet only minimum standards for the selection of national leaders. Democratic institutions are fragile and
substantial challenges to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist. The potential for sus-
tainable, liberal democracy is unclear.” Freedom House, “Nations in Transit 2009,” “Methodology.”
http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/nit2009/methodology.pdf. See also Larry Diamond, “Thinking
about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 21–35; Matthijs Bogaards, “How to
Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism,” Democratization 16,
no. 2 (2009): 399–423.
20. The semiconsolidated authoritarian regimes “attempt to mask authoritarianism with limited
respect for the institutions and practices of democracy. They typically fail to meet even the minimum
standards of electoral democracy.” Freedom House, “Nations in Transit 2009,” “Methodology.”
21. Cristian Ghinea and Sergiu Panainte, “Moldova’s Relations with the European Union and the
Role Played by Romania.” In Moldova. At the Crossroads, ed. Sergiu Panainte (Bucharest: Soros
Fondation Romania, 2009), 113–15. http://www.soros.ro/ro/fisier_acord_general.php?id_fisier=4.
22. Except for the military occupation during World War II.
23. Galina Lungu, “Populaţia băştinaşă a Transnistriei a fost neîntrerupt românească,” Vocea Basarabiei
(28 September 2009). http://social.moldova.org/news/populatia-bastinasa-a-transnistriei-a-fost-neintrerupt-
romaneasca-203734-rom.html.
24. Natalia Cojocaru, “Nationalism and Identity in Transnistria,” Innovation: The European Journal
of Social Science Research 19, no. 3 (2006).

25. Gottfried Hanne, “The ‘Dniester Moldovan Republic’: Building an Authoritarian State,” in The
EU & Moldova: On a Fault-Line of Europe, ed. Ann Lewis (London: Federal Trust for Education and
Research, 2004), 80.
26. Steven D. Roper, “Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of Transnistria and Gagauzia,” in
Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict, ed. James Hughes and Gwendolyn
Sasse (London: F. Cass, 2002), 106.
27. Hanne, “The ‘Dniester Moldovan Republic,’” 80.
28. Roper, “Regionalism in Moldova,” 107.
29. William Crowther, “Moldova’s Post-Communist Transition: Ambiguous Democracy, Reluctant
Reform,” in The EU & Moldova: on a Fault-Line of Europe, ed. Ann Lewis (London: Federal Trust for
Education and Research, 2004), 29.
30. Claus Neukirch, “Russia and the OSCE: the Influence of Interested Third and Disinterested
Fourth Parties on the Conflicts in Estonia and Moldova,” in National Integration and Violent Conflict in
Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova, ed. Pål Kolstø (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield 2002), 235.
31. Hanne, 80.
32. Roper, “Regionalism in Moldova,” 108–9.
33. Constantin Solomon and Artur Gumeniuc, “Conflictul transnistrean şi procesul de negocieri în
formatul ‘5+2,’” Moldoscopie (Probleme de analiză politică), 17, no. 3 (2008): 176–79.
34. Munteanu et al., Moldova on the Way to Democracy and Stability: From the Post-Soviet Space
towards the World of Democratic Values (Chişinău: Cartier 2007), 228.
35. Solomon and Gumeniuc, “Conflictul transnistrean,” 180–81.
36. Ibid, 182–83.
37. Institutul pentru Dezvoltare şi Iniţiative Sociale Viitorul, Political & Security Statewatch.
Monthly Analytical Bulletin on Moldova, 16, no. 9 (September 2008).
38. Nicu Popescu, “The EU in Moldova—Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood,” European
Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper no. 60 (October 2005), 21–22.
39. Dumitru Mînzărari, “Russian Foreign Policy as an Obstacle to Democratic Development in
Post-Soviet Area,” Institutul pentru Dezvoltare şi Iniţiative Sociale Viitorul Discussion Paper no. 5
(March-May 2009), 44.
40. Available at http://novaiagazeta.da.ru; not to be confused with the same name Russian journal at
http://www.novayagazeta.ru.
41. “Ruşii fac scenarii pentru dezmembrarea României,” Gardianul (18 May 2009).
42. Popescu, “The EU in Moldova,” 18–19.
43. Munteanu et al., Moldova on the Way to Democracy, 133.
44. Xavier Deleu, Transnistrie. La poudrière de l’Europe (Paris: Hugo et Compagnie, 2005).
45. Mark Galeotti, “The Transdnistrian Connection: Big Problems from a Small Pseudo-State,”
Global Crime 6, no. 3 (2004): 398–99.
46. “Elections to the Transnistrian ‘Supreme Soviet,’” Democracy and Governing in Moldova 64/3
(6–19 December 2005). http://www.e-democracy.md/en/e-journal/20051221/#3.
47. Popescu, “The EU in Moldova,” 23.
48. Octavian Racu, “Conflict în interiorul familiei Smirnov sau mimarea luptei politice?” Flux no.
200988 (9 October 2009). http://www.flux.md/articole/7921/.
49. “Preşedintele Parlamentului de la Tiraspol a demisionat,” Reporter Special (9 July 2009). http://
reporter-special.radiolynx.ro/tag/evgheni-sevciuk/.
50. “Voronin: Evghenii Şevciuk este o persoană slabă de fire” (15 July 2009). http://politicom
.moldova.org/news/voronin-evghenii-evciuk-este-o-persoan-slab-de-fire-202633-rom.html.
51. Octavian Racu, “Igor Smirnov s-a împăcat cu Sovietul Suprem,” Flux no. 200994 (18 November
2009). http://www.flux.md/editii/200994/articole/8234/.
52. The Moldovan Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 18 November 2009.

53. Obnovlenye (Renewal) Party, “Podvedeny Predvaritel’nye Itogi Vyborov V Verhovnyi Sovet”
(13 December 2010). http://www.obnovlenie.info/news.php?id=1819.
54. “Transdniester’s Fate To Be Decided by Oligarchs,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (14 December 2010).
55. Institutul pentru Dezvoltare şi Iniţiative Sociale Viitorul, “Tiraspolul este îngrijorat de apropierea
de Moldova a Alianţei Nord-Atlantice” (4 October 2007). http://www.viitorul.org/libview.php?l=
ro&idc=297&id=931.
56. “Transnistria se cere în Rusia,” Ziarul Financiar (7 October 2009).
57. “Oleg Hudima: Retragerea trupelor ruse din Transnistria va duce la un nou război,” New Land
of Transnistria (10 October 2009).
58. “Oleg Gudimo: Pentru Mihai Ghimpu prezenţa pacificatorilor ruşi pe teritoriul Transnistriei e ca
şi cîrpa roşie pentru un taur,” BBC Romanian Service (26 July 2006). http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/
news/story/2006/07/060726_transnistria_moldova_arme.shtml.
59. Financial Magazine, 18 December 2010. “U.S. Regrets and Follows with Concern the Case
Vardanean.” http://financial-magazine.net/regrets-follow-concern-case-vardanean/12461.html; Timpul,
2 July 2010. “Încă un autodenunţ în Transnistria. Ilie Cazac recunoaşte că a făcut spionaj în favoarea RM.”
http://www.timpul.md/articol/inca-un-autodenunt-in-transnistria--ilie-cazac-recunoaste-ca-a-facut-spionaj-
in-favoarea-rm-12833.html; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 27 December 2010. “Jurnalism şi spionaj
în Transnistria.” http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/2260701.html.
61. Nicholas Dima, “The Moldavian-Dnestr Republic: A Geo-Political Game,” The Journal of
Social, Political and Economic Studies 24, no. 1 (1999): 37.
63. Mînzărari, “Russian Foreign Policy,” 44.
64. Arcadie Barbăroşie et al., Synthesized Vision.. http://www.ipp.md/files/Summary_11_1_.09.2008
_eng.doc.
65. Ceslav Ciobanu, “Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts in the Post-Soviet States: Genesis, Political Eco
nomy and Prospects for Solution,” (2008): 141. http://www.ipp.md/files/Publicatii/2008/USIP_manuscript
_MAR13_08__Moldova_.doc.
66. Barbăroşie et al., Synthesized Vision.
67. Mînzărari, “Russian Foreign Policy,” 42–43.
68. Ibid, 43–44.
69. Institutul de Opinii Publice, Barometer of Public Opinion (November 2009), 108. http://www
.ipp.md/files/Barometru/2009/BOP_noiembrie_2009_Englsih.pdf.
70. Mînzărari, “Russian Foreign Policy,” 18.
71. Ibid, 18–19, 27.
73. Ibid, 24–25.
74. Ibid, 21; Barbăroşie et al., Synthesized Vision.
75. Kommersant, 10 October 2009.
76. “Russia Likely to Recognise the Independence of Transnistria,” Democracy and Governing in
Moldova 144/7 (1-18 September 2009). http://www.e-democracy.md/en/e-journal/20090918/#3.
77. Vladimir Socor, “Moldovan-Romanian Relations Are Slow to Develop,” RFE/RL Research
Report 1, no. 26 (26 June 1992): 38.
78. Charles King, “Moldovan Identity and the Politics of Pan-Romanianism,” Slavic Review 53, no. 2
(1994): 363.
79. Socor, “Moldovan-Romanian Relations,” 38.
80. Vladimir Tismaneanu, “Romanian Exceptionalism? Democracy, Ethnocracy, and Uncertain
Pluralism in post-Ceauşescu Romania,” in The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe, ed.
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

81. Vladimir Socor, “Annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina Condemned by Romania,”
Report on the USSR 3, no. 29 (19 July 1991): 23.
82. King, “Moldovan Identity,” 364.
83. Traian Băsescu, “The Black Sea Region—Advancing Freedom, Democracy and Regional
Stability,” speech delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC (10 March 2005). http://
www.nato.int/romania/president1003.htm.
84. Ziua, 28 July 2006.
85. Jurnalul Naţional, 17 September 2005.
86. Romania’s National Security Strategy. http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf.
87. The Moldovan Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 17 September 2009.
88. Evenimentul Zilei, 14 November 2009; Curentul, 3 December 2009.
89. Ibid.; Evenimentul Zilei, 13 November 2009; România Liberă, 13 November 2009.
90. Commission of the European Communities, EC Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 for the
Republic of Moldova, 10. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_moldova_en.pdf.
91. A detailed presentation of this policy is available on the Internet site of the Delegation of the
European Commission to Moldova, http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/2_en.shtml. For
further details see Popescu, “The EU in Moldova,” 9.
92. Delegation of the European Commission to Moldova. http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and
_moldova/index_en.shtml.
93. Commission of the European Communities, EU/Moldova Action Plan (February 2005), 11-12.
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.
94. Commission of the European Communities, EC Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 for the
Republic of Moldova. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_moldova_en.pdf.
95. Solomon and Gumeniuc, “Conflictul transnistrean,” 182–83.
96. In 2008 the ban was lifted for Evgheni Shevchuk in recognition of his moderate stance
(“Chisinaul incearca sa ia decizii pentru UE, comenteaza Tiraspolul,” România Liberă, 21 December
2009).
97. Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy Country Report
Moldova {COM(2004)373 final} SEC(2004) 567 (Brussels, 12 May 2004), 10–11. http://ec.europa.eu/
world/enp/pdf/country/moldova_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf.
98. Vladimir Socor, “Ukraine Breaking Ranks with Europe and Moldova on Transnistria,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor 3, no. 57 (22 March 2006).
99. Hotnews Moldova, 12 January 2010. “Moldova este pregătită de negocierile pentru semnarea
Acordului de asociere cu Uniunea Europeană.” http://hotnews.md/articles/view.hot?id=302.
100. Solomon and Gumeniuc, “Conflictul transnistrean,” 183.
101. Moldova Azi, 7 June 2010. “Merkel, Medvedev Say They Want New EU-Russia Security
Committee.” http://www.azi.md/en/story/11826; The New York Times, 27 October 2010. “Challenging
Russia to Fix a Frozen Feud.”
102. Ibid.; Moldova Azi, 2 December 2010. “OSCE Lacks Leverage for Settling Regional Conflicts—
Angela Merkel.” http://moldova.azi.md/en/story/15130.
103. For a detailed analysis see Popescu, “The EU in Moldova,” 25–28.
104. Ibid., 27.
105. See Neukirch, “Russia and the OSCE,” 233–48.
Theodor Tudoroiu, PhD, is an associate researcher at the Centre d’études sur la paix et la sécurité inter-
nationale, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. His research covers mainly subjects related to the democratization
processes and the authoritarian regimes of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States.

Tudoroiu 2011

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Tudoroiu 2011

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

East European Politics and

The European Union, 10.1177/0888325411404885

Keywords: Transnistria/Transdniestria; frozen conflict; Moldova; Russia; European

T he almost forgotten post-Soviet frozen conflicts were suddenly rediscovered by

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Unfreezing the Frozen Conflicts

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

The EU [was] perceived by pro-government elites in Russia as a heterogeneous con-

Consequently, Russia tries to “freeze the process of European integration and

The Poorest Land in Europe: Moldova

All or part of what is today the Republic of Moldova changed hands—mainly

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

The Making of Transnistria

The first Transnistrian political-administrative unit was created by Moscow in 1924

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Sisyphus: The Endless Negotiations

The armed conflict was “frozen”—but not ended—through a trilateral peace-

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

A Working Political Fiction

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

42,000 tonnes of weapons and ammunitions belonging to the Russian Federation.

The Transnistrian Wind of Change

Smirnov’s firm grip on power prevents any democratization move. However, in

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Player and Referee: Russia

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

The Missing Link: Romania

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Deus ex Machina: The European Union

The European Union–Moldova relationship began quite modestly. A bilateral

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

The Minor Actors: Ukraine, the OSCE,

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

A cynical description of the Transnistrian situation would depict a nineteen-year

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on April 8, 2015

Вам также может понравиться

Keywords: Transnistria/Transdniestria; frozen conflict; Moldova; Russia; European