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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
MANILA

WILLIAM B. TING and G.R. NO. L-421455


MARIANA B. ACOSTA,
Petitioner,

-versus-

NAPICO HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION III, INC.,
represented by its Vice
President ROSELLER D.
FORTICH,

Honorable Commissioners
REA CORAZON GOLEZ-
CABRERA, ROLANDO B.
FALLER and DOMNINA T.
RANCES of the HLURB Board
of Commissioners Third
Division

Honorable Housing and Land


Use Arbiter JOSELITO F.
MELCHOR of the HLURB
Expanded National Capital
Region Field Office
Respondents.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH PRAYER FOR THE


ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION
AND/OR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

NOW COMES the Petitioner, BY THEMSELVES, in the above-entitled


case, unto the Honorable Supreme Court, most respectfully avers THAT:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

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“If the misery of the poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but
by our institutions,
great is our sin.” 
― Charles Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle

This is a Petition for Certiorari, with a Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory


Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order, asking the Most
Honorable Court to SET ASIDE the 27 January 2012 Writ of Execution
issued by the Honorable Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and the
19 March 2015 2nd Notice to Vacate issued by the Office of the Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pasig City, including preceding orders,
decisions and resolutions issued by the same court, the HLURB Board of
Commissioners and HLURB Arbiter and the Honorable Court of Appeals
being repugnant to the fair and orderly administration of justice by not
adhering to the “doctrine of prospective application of law” and to the
gross negligence of counsel that results to outright deprivation of
petitioners’ property.

Petitioner also begs the Most Honorable Court, pending final resolution of
this petition, to issue a preliminary prohibitory injunction and/or a
temporary restraining order prohibiting the public respondents, and
anyone acting under their authority, stead or behalf, from implementing
the decision of the administrative agency a quo.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL DATES AND


TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

1. On 20 March 2015, petitioners received a photocopy of a 2 nd Notice


to Vacate issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of Pasig City based on the Writ of Execution dated 27 January
2012 issued by the Hon. JOSELITO F. MELCHOR, Housing and Land
Use Arbiter of the HLURB Expanded National Capital Region Office.
Said notice is just giving herein petitioners ten (10) days to voluntarily
vacate and peacefully turn over/surrender possession of our respective
occupied premises embraced and described in TCT NO. PT 121274 to
respondent, NAPICO Homeowners Association III, Inc.

2. This petition is an offshoot of a complaint filed by the private


0respondent on 24 January 2007 seeking judicial confirmation of herein
petitioner from membership to respondent association and from
enjoyment of the premises they are now occupying by means of eviction.

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3. Petitioners, being not fully lettered with the intricacies and
technicalities of the law, gave so much trust and confidence to their
former counsel. The case treaded various courses without petitioners
knowing the possible outcomes but resulted into gaining unfavorable
judgment.

4. Petitioners, on the above-cited date, received the 2nd Notice to


Vacate that prompted them to revisit all available documents on hand only
to find out that the controversy was determined on technicalities
attributable to the gross negligence of the counsel.

Petitioners can no longer afford to engage the services of a counsel who is


a member of the bar and they submitted for consideration of the Most
Honorable Court that they are litigating the instant case “BY
THEMSELVES. Again, herein petitioners most respectfully submit to the
Most Honorable Court to consider that the absence of a counsel on record
should not affect their assertion of enforcing they legal rights.

5. There is no appeal or any plain and speedy remedy in the ordinary


course of law that could resolve this very important matter. Except, to
beseech the Most Honorable Court to use its expansive powers to review
cases and controversies, including the duty to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

6. Under Rule 65, petitioners have sixty (60) days from 20 March
2015 within which to file this petition. The 60th day falls on 20 May 2015
to consider that petitioner filed the same on time. Petitioner will pay the
docket and other lawful fees simultaneous with the filing of this petition.

PARTIES

7. Petitioners WILLIAM TING and MARIANA ACOSTA are


residents of NAPICO, Manggahan, Pasig City but for facility of serving
pleadings, notices, orders and decisions of the Most Honorable Court,
these processes can be forwarded to 1522 Monggo St., NAPICO,
Manggahan Pasig City c/o ARMANDO CANLAS.

8. Respondent NAHA III, represented by its Vice President


ROSELLER D. FORTICH, is an organization formed and existing under
the Philippine law with principal address at 437 Chico St., NAPICO,
Manggahan, Pasig City, and it may be served with pleadings, notices,
orders and other processes at the said address.

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9. The public respondents are the following public officials:
Honorable Commissioners REA CORAZON GOLEZ-CABRERA,
ROLANDO B. FALLER and DOMNINA T. RANCES, Housing and
Land Use Arbiter JOSELITO F. MELCHOR are being sued in their
capacity as the officials that will implement the resolution of the
Honorable Court of Appeals Third Division. They may be served with
notices, orders and resolutions at Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, Kalayaan Avenue cor. Mayaman St., Diliman, Quezon City.

BACKGROUNDS

10. The controv,ersy started when NAHA III filed an initiatory


pleading on 24 January 2007, when the governing law on homeowners
association was then covered by Section 26 of the Republic Act 8763,
otherwise known as the Home Guaranty Corporation Act of 2000". But
when the case was being heard by the Honorable Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and the Honorable Court of Appeals, Republic Act
9904 (Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners Associations) was
already in effect.

11. Gross negligence of the petitioners’ counsel is evident in the review


of the records that no board resolution expelling the petitioners (together
with other respondents) from the said association. No board resolution
naming the person who will represent the association in the case filed
against the petitioners and other respondents in the expulsion case,
including authority of the representative to sign the verification.

12. Instead of considering that Republic 9904 was already the


governing law of homeowners and homeowners association when the
controversy was being determined by the Honorable HLURB Board of
Commissioners, specifically on matters of delisting members, the
Honorable HLURB Board of Commissioners instead affirmed the
decision of Honorable Joselito F. Melchor on judicial confirmation of
expulsion and eviction, which by its nature is an action for Ejectment.

13. There was an oversight when both the Honorable Arbiter and the
Board of Commissioners rendered their respective decisions in not
applying the provision of RA 9904 pertain Resolutions Delisting or
Expelling Association Members in Land Tenurial Projects, which is the
most applicable section of the IRR of RA 9904, including the issuance of
the Writ of Execution.

14. Arguments and counter-arguments were put forth by the parties and
the case passed through the various procedures until elevated to the
Honorable Court of Appeals for the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
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of the Rules of Court, and then to the Second Division of the Most
Honorable Court.

15. On 12 September 2012, the Second Division of the Most Honorable


Court issued a Resolution CLOSING AND TERMINATING GR No.
202402.

16. On 22 March 2013, Hon. Joselito F. Melchor issued an Order


directing the petitioners to file comments/opposition on private
respondent’s Motion for Special Order, which herein petitioners complied
and filed said comments and opposition on 16 May 2014. Copy of said
order is attached as Annex “C”.

17. The decisions that disregarded the provisions of the operative


law, Republic Act 9904 or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners Associations and the “non-application of the dictum of
prospectivity of law” is a serious invalidation of statutes not on
constitutional grounds are ordinarily of sufficient importance to warrant
review. Hence, the instant petition.

LOCUS STANDI OF PETITIONER

20. Petitioners as respondents in the case filed with the HLURB and
being an appellant to the Honorable Court of Appeals has a legal standing
to file the instant petition. Settled in our jurisprudence that locus standi
means personal and substantial interest in the case such that party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act complained of.
Petitioners are proper parties because they have sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining injury as concomitant result of the act
being assailed.

For a party to assert legal standing he needs only to prove injury to his
right or interest as first requisite, and the reasonably perceptible causal
connection between the asserted injury and the assailed conduct.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

22. Petitioner contends and most respectfully submits that the


decisions and resolutions rendered by the Honorable Housing and Land
Use Arbiter, the Honorable HLURB Board of Commissioners and the
Honorable Court of Appeals is in direct conflict with the decisions of the
Most Honorable Court in the long line of cases applying the operative law
and the “dictum of prospective application of law in absence of
retroactive provision.”
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23. Definitely, a lower court or a quasi-judicial body cannot
expressly reject a Supreme Court decision. However, there are instances
when an operative law or dictum was overlooked, disregarded or
misapplied, consciously or unconsciously, that give rise to chances that
the quasi-judicial body or lower court’s decision is in tension with a
decision of the Supreme Court.

24. In their respective decisions, the Honorable Housing and Land


Use Arbiter and the Honorable HLURB Board of Commissioners applied
Section 26 of Republic Act 580, as amended by Executive Order 535,
transferring the powers, authorities and responsibilities of the Home
Insurance Guaranty Corporation to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, instead of applying the provisions Republic Act 9904, which was
already signed into law and the governing law with respect to
supervision of homeowners associations when the judicial confirmation
and eviction case filed by NAHA III against the herein petitioners was in
the stage of hearing and on appeal.

Although there may be an existence of similarity in the state of facts but


when factual variant is introduced, especially when a new law was passed
and operative, application of said principle would be inappropriate. The
confusion of the agency a quo and the Honorable Court of Appeals on
what law should be applied signaled that the issue is ripe for
reexamination and possible overruling or limitation.

25. The controversy is amply ripe for the Most Honorable Court’s
adjudication. The rule of ripeness found its basis on the doctrine that in
order for the court to act, there must be an actual controversy involving
disagreement of legal rights and assertion conflicting claims susceptible
of judicial settlement. Under the same principle, the issue is not ripe when
it is prematurely lodged. Although there is no rigid or fast rule in
determining the ripeness of a controversy, the principle gives emphasis
that the court would find it difficult to weigh up the realistic qualities of
each party when the controversy becomes concrete and required attention.

27. The instant petition involves petitioners who questioned the


manner respondents ignored requirements laid down by law and
established jurisprudence, which would result in the unfair administration
of justice, satisfied the existence of justiciable controversy.

28. The instant petition involves matters of public interest and


transcendental importance that warrant brushing aside technicalities of
procedure, if any. Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of
the Rules of Court, and their relaxation or suspension should only be for
persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant of an

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injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. (Lazaro v. Court of
Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000). The emerging trend of jurisprudence
is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of the Rules of
Court. However, we have not been remiss in reminding the bench and the
bar that zealous compliance with the rules is still the general course of
action. Rules of procedure are in place to ensure the orderly, just, and
speedy dispensation of cases; (Heirs of Cesar Marasigan v. Marasigan,
G.R. No. 156078, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 409). To this
end, inflexibility or liberality must be weighed. The relaxation or
suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a case from their
operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of
justice requires it. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation (formerly Southern Energy Quezon, Inc.), G.R. No. 159593,
October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 484, 496.)

30. The instant petition might be touching some issues of


Constitutional concern like doctrine of equal protection and due process,
which are of public interest and transcendental importance; nevertheless,
herein petitioner is exerting all efforts in delimiting on a solitary issue
of non – application of dictum of prospectivity of law absence a
retroactive provision. Thus, as the issue raised herein is of public interest,
petitioners most respectfully beg that procedural barriers, if any, in taking
cognizance of this petition be brushed aside.

31. Glimpsing back at the stage of formulation of Republic Act 9904


and during plenary deliberation of Senate Bill 3061, Senator Miguel
Zubiri pointed out, “ x x x "homeownership is not necessarily dependent
on full and actual ownership, as even those with beneficial ownership can
be entitled to the rights granted to homeowners."

He said "provided that lessees in government socialized housing projects


or urban estates and those in communities of underprivileged and
homeless citizens covered under the term under Section 3 (1) of this Act,
will be considered as homeowners for the purpose of qualifying as a
member of a homeowners' association without need of such written
consent or authorization."

The Majority Leader also clarified that "all homeowners can become
members of the homeowners' association and at the same time allows
homeowners not to engage or member in any homeowners association as
indicated in Article III, sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution, stating
"membership in homeowner's association is generally voluntary, subject
only to a few exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court through
various decisions on the matter."

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He said that while the law recognized that membership in any association
is voluntary unless it is stipulated in the contract or annotated in the title.

The proposed act likewise recognized two classes of homeowners exist,


non-member homeowners and the homeowner members.

"The rights of both classes are enumerated in the proposed legislation,


subject to any additional benefits which they may receive by virtue of the
homeowners' association by-laws," Zubiri said.

"A non-member homeowner has the duty to pay the costs and expenses
incurred by the association for the payment of basic community services."

"On grounds of equity alone, a non-member homeowner should


contribute in the community expenses that redound to his or her benefit.”

Nothing in the sponsorship speech touches about eviction mainly on


reason that the intention of the law is to provide every Filipino an abode
of his own.

32. Petitioners beg the Most Honorable Court to consider Section 47


of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9904 as applicable and
the most appropriate in the resolution of the case NAHA III filed against
the petitioner, which reads:

Section 47. Resolutions Delisting or Expelling


Association Members in Land Tenurial
Projects. – In cases of CMP, GLAD and other
similar land tenurial projects/arrangements,
the resolution delisting/expelling members
from the association, and the corresponding
substitutions, if any, shall be submitted to the
HLURB, within thirty (30) days from its
adoption. Otherwise, the delisting or
expulsion of members shall not be
enforceable.

It is an accepted tenet that when the law is applied to strictly and


mechanically, the law cannot keep pace with social developments.
Equally, a return to the policies outlining the basic supposition supporting
potentially relevant rules of law and the best guidelines for resolving the
dispute, if there is completely new situation.

33. Petitioners and their respective families are in the verge of losing
their abode due to non-application of an existing law. Jurisprudence has
consistently summoned that a statute, whether original or amendatory,
should prospectively apply to avoid inequity and social injustice. Former
Chief Justice Andres Narvasa penned in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et
al, (227 SCRA 444, 448-455 (1993) this Court, thru Chief Justice Andres
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Narvasa, held: “The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or
amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v.
PNB, 961, (sic) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act
No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to
accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an
offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Lagardo v.
Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, as
amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts
jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive
effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA
18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90,
amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application;
People v. Que Po Lay, 94 SCRA 640, holding that a person cannot be
convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, when the
alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the
Official Gazette; Baltazar v. CA, 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive
application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants
from rice and corn farm holdings, pending the promulgation of rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128
SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 which removed ‘personal cultivation’
as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive
effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v.
CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code
by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v.
Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only
prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and
Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419). chanrobles virtual law library
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative
rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v.
CTA, October 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive
effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317,
ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections,
which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive
application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given
retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an
employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular
was issued.

34. The RA 9904, including its implementing rules and regulation, is


the controlling law governing in the case filed by private respondent
against petitioners. Thus, the non-consideration of the previously
mentioned Section 47 of the IRR of RA 9904 and other related provisions
of the same law defeats the compelling purpose of the legislature and the
intention of Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners
Associations.
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35. Republic Act 9904 expands the duties and responsibilities of the
HLURB, in addition to the powers, authorities and responsibilities vested
in it by Republic Act No. 8763, Presidential Decree No. 902 - A, Batas
Pambansa Big. 68 and Executive Order No. 535, Series of 1981,

It is settled that, “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the


contrary is provided," (Article 4 of the Civil Code); thus, petitioners sees
no reason why Magna Carta for Homeowners was not resorted to during
the stage of hearing and appeal of the case filed by private respondent
against the petitioners.

36. The heart-breaking result of the present controversy emanated from


the gross negligence of the petitioners’ counsel applying the doctrine
“negligence of the counsel is negligence of the client.” However, herein
petitioners believe that their present plight is an exception to the doctrine.
The Most Honorable Court, in the long line of cases decided admitted
exceptions to the general rule when: (1) the client is deprived of due
process, (2) the application of the general rule will result in outright
deprivation of client’s liberty or property, and (3) where the interest of
justice so requires, and accord relief to client who suffered by reason of
lawyers gross negligence.

38. Petitioners’ case is analogous to the case of Escudero vs. Dulay,


G.R. No.L-60578, 23 February 1988 where the Most Honorable Court
held that the counsel’s blunder is an exception to the rule that the client is
bound by the mistakes of counsel, and the Most Honorable Court made
this pronouncement:

“Petitioners contend, through their new counsel,


that judgments rendered against them by the
respondent court are null and void, because they
were therein od their day in court and divested of
their property, without due process of law, through
the gross ignorance, mistake and negligence of
their previous counsel. They acknowledge that,
while as a rule, clients are bound by the mistake of
their counsel, the rule should not be applied
automatically to their case, as the trial counsel’s
blunder in procedure and gross ignorance of
existing jurisprudence changed their cause of
action and violated their substantial rights.

We are impressed with petitioner’s contention.

x x x Ordinarily, a special civil action under rule


65 of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or
10
cure for failure to file timely petition for review on
certiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules.
Where, however, the application of the rule will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, the rule may be relaxed. x x x

While this Court is cognizant of the rule that,


generally, a client will suffer the consequences of
negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his
counsel, in the interest of justice and equity,
exception may be made to such rule, in accordance
with the facts and circumstances of each case.
Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant
case, result in the outright deprivation of their
property through a technicality.”

39. One specific point that petitioners beg the Most Honorable Court to
consider is the claim of ownership by the respondent on the premises
occupied by the petitioners, which is a patent misrepresentation. There is
nothing in the Complaint that alleged herein respondent is the absolute
owner of the property being an essential requisite of mortgage and it has
the free disposal of the property.

40. Respondent concealed some other documents like the Deed of Sale
between the respondent and Metro Manila Development Authority, its
alleged predecessor-in-interest, the Deed of Mortgage between the
respondent and the National Housing Authority. The non-presentation of
said document will give rise to presumption that the transfer certificates of
title respondent presented are spurious.

43. This presumption could be fully established by the evidence


discovered after the trial. If these were produced and admitted at the
trial, the judgment will be altered due to its materiality and weight. This
evidence is the reply, dated 17 March 2015, of the DENR National
Capital Region signed by certain Ignacio R. Almira, Jr., Chief of the
Regional Survey Division, to the request of certain Johny S. Atienza of
242 Kaimito Extension, NAPICO, Pasig City. Second paragraph of the
said reply states:

Please be informed that per verification made and


based on records on file in the Land Records
Section, Surveys and Mapping Division of this
Office, Bgy. Mangahan of Pasig Cityhas not yet
been cadastrally surveyed, hence your request
cannot be granted. (Emphasized supplied)
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Photocopy of said letter-reply is attached as Annex “E”. Petitioners
procured a certified true copy of the said reply but the office of origin did
not issue one; nevertheless, Johny Atienza is willing to testify on this
matter once called by the Most Honorable Court.

44. The “concept of cadastre” is either unfamiliar or not clear to the


population at large. This, however, is a vital tool used by specialists
involved in land and land related dealings. In plain, a cadastre is an
official register showing details of ownership, boundaries, and value of
real property in a district, made for taxation purposes (Collins English
Dictionary 1979). A cadastral map displays how boundaries subdivide
land into units of ownership. The cadastre is used as the foundation for
dealings in: land valuation and taxation land registration and land
transfers, land use planning, determination of sustainable development,
applicable modes of environmental protection, mapping management of
leases and licenses, determination of political territories and electoral
boundaries, and other land based administrative purposes. Although in the
present time, it is digitized by computer to deliver maps showing the
digital coordinates of land parcels and supplementary information related
to the land.

45. The active and material misrepresentation of the respondent, the


failure of the Honorable Arbiter and the Honorable HLURB
Commissioners to notice substantial and material facts of the case, and
the gross negligence of petitioners former counsels resulting to the
outright deprivation of property warrants nullification of the HLURB
ENCRFO 21 January 2010 Decision and to forestall 27 January 2012
Writ of Execution.

In closing, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by


any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the
highest court of the land.

However, the Most Honorable Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve
substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the
merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (APO
Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 164195,October 12, 2010).

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Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court
reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can
be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself
had already declared to be final. (Barnes v. Padilla 482 Phil. 903 (2004).

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Petitioner most respectfully prays of
the Most Honorable Court the following:

1. That this Petition be given due course;

2. That a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary


Restraining Order be issued pending resolution of the instant petition;

3. That after notice and hearing, a final order be issued: SETTING


ASIDE AND OVERRULING HLURB ENCRFO 21 January 2010
Decision and to forestall 27 January 2012 Writ of Execution.

Other reliefs and remedies, which are just and equitable, are likewise
prayed for.

Pasig City for City of Manila; 26 March 2015


Respectfully Submitted:

WILLIAM B. TING MARIANA B. ACOSTA


Petitioner Petitioner

VERIFICATION WITH DECLARATION


OF NON- FORUM SHOPPING

We, WILLIAM B. TING and MARIANA B. ACOSTA, both


Filipinos and of legal age, and presently residing in NAPICO,
Manggahan, Pasig City, after having been duly sworn on oath, hereby
deposes and states THAT:

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1. We are the Petitioners in the above-entitled petition;

2. We caused the preparation and filing of the above Petition for


Certiorari With Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction and all the allegations thereon were read
by us and we found them to be true and correct of my personal
knowledge and based on authentic records;

3. That we have not previously filed a similar complaint, petition


or any other action before the Honorable Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, Regional Trial Court or any other office or tribunal,
and if such complaint, petition, action or proceedings will be
discovered by us in the future, we undertake to report the same
to this Honorable Office within five (5) days from discovery
thereof.

IN TRUTH WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this 26 th day


of March 2015 here at the City of Pasig, Philippines.

WILLIAM B. TING MARIANA B. ACOSTA


Affiant Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _____of March


2015 here at the City of Pasig, Philippines. Affiants exhibiting to me his
Voter’s Identification Card bearing Number ____________as evidence
establishing his identity.

Notary Public

DOC. NO.
PAGE NO.
BOOK NO.
SERIES OF 2020

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