1
[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070. February 12, 1997] Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte,
MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO
CANTERO, complainants, vs. JUDGE ESMERALDO G.
CANTERO, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible,
and more advised than confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion
and proper virtue.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing exhortation some 400 years
ago. Today, it is still relevant and quotable. By the nature of their functions,
judges are revered as models of integrity, wisdom, decorum, competence and
propriety. Human as they are, however, magistrates do have their own
weaknesses, frailties, mistakes and even indiscretions. In the case before us,
respondent Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero was charged administratively in the
twilight of his government service, as a result of a failed love affair that
happened some 46 years ago. After an otherwise unblemished record, he
would have reached the compulsory retirement age of 70 years on August 8,
1997 had death not intervened a few months ago on September 26, 1996.
Notwithstanding his death, this Court still resolved to rule on this case, as it
may affect his retirement benefits.
Antecedent Facts
In a letter-complaint2 dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag Cantero with her
daughter Teresita A. Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged
the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for
allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.
After receipt of the respondent's Comment, the Court on February 5, 1996,
referred this case3 to Executive Judge Gualberto P. Delgado of the Regional
Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu for investigation, report and recommendation.
The latter submitted his Report and Recommendation4 dated July 26, 1996.
Thereafter, the Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court
Administrator 5 for evaluation, report and recommendation.
According to the complainants:
"Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be respondent) and plaintiff
(should be complainant) Maria Apiag, joined together in holy matrimony in
marriage after having lived together as husband and wife wherein they begot
a daughter who was born on June 19, 1947, whom they named: Teresita A.
Cantero; and then on October 29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was born.
Thereafter, defendant left the conjugal home without any apparent cause, and
leaving the plaintiff Maria Apiag to raise the two children with her meager
income as a public school teacher at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. Plaintiffs
suffered a lot after defendant abandoned them for no reason whatsoever. For
several years, defendant was never heard of and his whereabout unknown.
It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public documents required of
whereupon, plaintiffs begged for support, however, they were ignored by
defendant. x x x"6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty. Redentor G. Guyala,
wrote a letter to respondent as follows:
"Judge Esmeraldo Cantero
Pinamungajan, Cebu
Dear Judge Cantero:
We are writing in behalf of your legal wife, Maria Apiag, and your two
legitimate children by her, Teresita (Mrs. Sacurom) and Glicerio.
It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons known only to you, you left
your conjugal home at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, and abandoned without
any means of support your said wife and children. Since then and up to now,
they have not seen or heard from you.
They would wish now that you do them right by living up to your duty as
husband and father to them, particularly that expressly provided under Art. 68
and Art. 195 of the Family Code (Art. 109 and 195 of the Civil Code) in
relation to Art. 203 of the same Code.
You will please consider this letter as a formal demand for maintenance and
support for three of them, and a request that they be properly instituted and
named as your compulsory heirs and legal beneficiaries in all legal
documents now on file and to be filed with the Supreme Court and other
agencies or offices as may be required under applicable laws, such as, the
insurance (GSIS) and retirement laws.
We hope this matter can be amicably settled among you, your wife and
children, without having to resort to judicial recourse.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) REDENTOR G. GUYALA"7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent. Subsequently,
complainants learned that respondent Judge had another family. In their own
words,
"x x x The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has another wife by the
name of Nieves C. Ygay, a Public School teacher from Tagao, Pinamungajan,
Cebu. According to some documents obtained by plaintiffs, the herein
defendant and Nieves C. Ygay have children of their own, named as follows
with their date of births: Noralyn Y. Cantero -- May 19, 1968; Ellen Y. Cantero
-- February 4, 1970; Erwin Y. Cantero -- April 29, 1979; Onofre Y. Cantero --
June 10, 1977; and Desirie Vic Y. Cantero -- December 2, 1981.
defendant Judge Cantero to be filed with the Supreme Court such as his
sworn statement of assets and liabilities, his personal data sheet (SC Form P.
001), income tax returns and his insurance policy with the Government
Service Insurance System, defendant misrepresented himself as being
married to Nieves C. Ygay, with whom he contracted a second marriage. The
truth of the matter is that defendant is married to plaintiff Maria Apiag with
whom they have two legitimate children, namely: Teresita A. Cantero and
Glicerio A. Cantero."8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his side as follows:
"x x x I admit the existence and form of Annex 'A' of the said complaint, but
vehemently deny the validity of its due execution, for the truth of the matter is
that such alleged marriage was only dramatized at the instance of our parents
just to shot (sic) their wishes and purposes on the matter, without my consent
freely given. As a matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go home
to our town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my
sister's birthday from Iligan City, without patently knowing I was made to
appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our
signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract(.) That was 46
years ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second year high school
days."9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Furthermore, Judge Cantero related that:
"x x x sometime in the year 1947, when both respondent and complainant,
Maria Apiag were still in their early age and in their second year high school
days, they were engaged in a lovely affair which resulted to the pregnancy of
the said complainant, and then and there gave birth to a child, named
Teresita Apiag, having (been) born out of wedlock on June 19, 1947, now
Mrs. Teresita Sacurom, one of the complainants. That in order to save name
and shame, parents of both the respondent and the complainant came to an
agreement to allow the respondent, and the complainant (to) get married in
the (sic) name, but not to live together as husband, wife for being close
relatives, thereby forcing the respondent to appear in a marriage affair where
all the pertinent marriage papers were all ready (sic) prepared (sic), and duly
signed by somebody; that after the said affair both respondent and the
complainant immediately separated each other (sic) without living together as
husband, and wife even for a day, nor having established a conjugal home.
From that time respondent and the complainant have never met each other
nor having (sic) communicated (with) each other for the last 40 years; that
respondent continued his studies at Cebu City, and eventually became
member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examination in the year
1960, that is 14 years after the affair of 1947; that in 1964, respondent was
first connected in the government service as Comelec Registrar of the
Commission on Elections, assigned at Pinamungajan, Cebu(,) that is 16
years after the affair of 1947; that in the year 1982, respondent was appointed
as CLAO lawyer, now PAO, of the Department of Justice, that is 35 years
after the after the affair of 1947; and finally, on October 3, 1989, respondent
was appointed to the Judiciary as Municipal Circuit Trial Judge (MCTC) of the
Municipalities of Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan, province of Cebu, that is 42
years from August 11, 1947; that respondent is (sic) already 32 years in the
government service up to the present time with more than 6 years in the
Judiciary; that respondent is already 69 years old, having been born on
August 8, 1927, and retirable by next year if God willing; that respondent has
served in the government service for the last 32 years, faithfully, honestly and

judiciously without any complaint whatsoever, except this instant case; that
respondent as member of the Judiciary, has live-up (sic) to the standard
required by the (sic) member (sic) of the bar and judiciary; that the charges
against the respondent were all based or rooted from the incedent (sic) that
happened on August 11, 1947 and no other; that the complainants are
morally dishonest in filing the instant (case) just now, an elapsed (sic) of
almost 42 years and knowing that respondent (is) retirable by next year,
1997; that this actuation is very suspicious, and intriguing;
xxx
That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together with another man
during her public service as public school teacher and have begotten a child,
name (sic) Manuel Apiag and respondent promised (sic) the Honorable Court
to furnish a complete paper regarding this case in order to enlighten the
Honorable (Court) that, he who seek (sic) justice must seek justice with cleab
(sic) hand;
That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or judicial declaration (of
nullity) of the alleged marriage because it is the contention and honest belief,
all the way, that the said marriage was void from the beginning, and as such
nothing is to be voided or nullified, and to do so will be inconsistent with the
stand of the respondent; that this instant case (was) simply filed for money
consideration as reflected in their letter of demand; (t)hat as a matter of fact,
respondent and the complainant have already signed a compromised (sic)
agreement, copy of which hereto (sic) attached as Annex '1', stating among
other things that respondent will give a monthly allowance to Terecita (sic)
Sacurom in the (amount) of P4,000.00 and the complainant will withdraw their
complaint from the Supreme Court., and that respondent had already given
the said allowance for three consecutive months plus the amount
of P25,000.00 for their Attorney to withdraw the case, and that respondent
stop (sic) the monthly allowance until such time the complainant will actually
withdraw the instant case, and without knowledge of the respondent,
complainant proceeded (sic) their complaint after the elapsed (sic) of three (3)
years."10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which was executed
sometime in March 1994 by Esmeraldo C. Cantero and Teresita C. Sacurom
and witnessed by Maria Apiag and Leovegardo Sacurom are reproduced
thus:
"That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed and entered into by
ESMERALDO C. CANTERO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and with
residence and postal address at Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines, otherwise
called as the FIRST PARTY, and TERESITA C. SACUROM, also of legal
age, married, Filipino, representing her mother and her brother, and a
residence (sic) of 133-A J. Ramos Street, Caloocan City, after having duly
swirn (sic) to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say:
1. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of
Pinamungajan-Aloguinsan, Cebu, is charged by Second Party for Misconduct
before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court now
pending action;
2
2. That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to have the said case
settled amicably in the interest of family unity and reconciliation, and arrived
at compromise agreement based on law of equity, as follows:
(a) That both parties have agreed voluntarily, the Second
Party will get ONE FOURTH (1/4) of the retirement that the
First will receive from the GSIS, and the rest of it will be for
the First Party;
(b) That the Second Party and his brother will be included
as one of the beneficiaries of the First Party, in case of
death;
(c) That the Second party and his only brother will inherit
the properties of the First party inherited from his parents;
(d) That the Second Party, representing her brother, is
authorized to receive and collect P4,000.00, monthly out of
the second check salary of the First Party (The second half
salary only);
3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the Second Party will cause the
withdrawal and the outright dismissal of the said pending case filed by her
and her mother;
4. That it was also agreed that the above agreement, shall never be effective
and enforceable unless the said case will be withdrawn and dismiss (sic) from
the Supreme Court, and said dismissal be received by the First Party,
otherwise the above-agreement is void from the beginning; and the Second
Party must desist from further claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic) criminal
liabilities.
5. That this agreement is executed voluntarily, in good faith, and in the
interest of good will and reconciliation and both parties is (sic) duty bound to
follow faithfully and religiously."11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In line with the foregoing, the respondent wrote a letter dated 14 March, 1994
addressed to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) designating
Teresita Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio Cantero as additional beneficiaries in
his life insurance policy.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issues
The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues":
"1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on August 11,
1947 is void;
2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more than seven
(7) years raise the presumption that she is already dead, that there was no
need for any judicial declaration;
3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because
assuming that he committed the offense, he was not yet a member of the
judiciary;
4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed;
5. The charges have no basis in fact and in law."13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Report and Recommendation of Investigating Judge and Court Administrator
Investigating Judge Gualberto P. Delgado recommended in his report that:
"After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by the parties, this Office
finds respondent Guilty of the crime of Grave Misconduct (Bigamy and
Falsification of Public Documents) however, considering his length of service
in the government, it is recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year
without pay."14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its
report15 recommending respondent Judge's dismissal, as follows:
"After a careful review of all the documents on file in this case, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the investigating judge.
Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by respondent, he was
married to complainant Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 and have (sic) two
(2) children with her. Respondent's contention that such marriage was in jest
and assuming that it was valid, it has lost its validity on the ground that they
never met again nor have communicated with each other for the last 40 years
cannot be given a (sic) scant consideration. Respondent's argument that he
was not yet a lawyer, much more, a member of the bench when he contracted
his first marriage with the complainant, is unavailing for having studied law
and had become a member of the Bar in 1960, he knows that the marriage
cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of death. Respondent's
second marriage with Nieves Ygay was therefore bigamous for it was
contracted during the existence of a previous marriage.
We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the respondent that he
cannot be held liable for misconduct on the ground that he was not yet a
lawyer nor a judge when the act(s) complained of were committed. The
infraction he committed continued from the time he became a lawyer in 1960
to the time he was appointed as a judge in October 23, 1989. This is a
continuing offense (an unlawful act performed continuously or over and over
again, Law Dictionary, Robert E. Rothenberg). He can therefore be held liable
for his misdeeds.
On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity in his Personal Data
Sheet for Judges, Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth,
Income Tax Return (pp. 99-102, rollo), that he had committed a
misrepresentation by stating therein that his spouse is Nieves Ygay and (had)
eight (8) children (with her) which is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria
Apiag with whom he had two (2) children.

Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense by the respondent
presupposes the imposition of an administrative sanction for the charges filed
against him. 'A judge's actuation of cohabiting with another when his marriage
was still valid and subsisting - his wife having been allegedly absent for four
years only constitutes gross immoral conduct' (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr., 249
SCRA 447). It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral
fitness for membership in the legal profession. While deceit employed by
respondent, existed prior to his appointment as a x x x Judge, his immoral
and illegal act of cohabiting with x x x began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These
are judicial guidepost to(sic) self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts
a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the judiciary (Atienza vs. Brilliantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32-33).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that respondent judge be
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to re-appointment in any branch, instrumentality or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations."
As earlier indicated, respondent Judge died on September 27, 1996 while this
case was still being deliberated upon by this Court.
The Court's Ruling
In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this case on the merits, in
view of the foregoing recommendation of the OCA which, if affirmed by this
Court, would mean forfeiture of the death and retirement of the respondent.
Gross Misconduct Not Applicable
The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge comprises the
following: abandonment of his first wife and children, failing to give support,
marrying for the second time without having first obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage, and falsification of public
documents. Misconduct, as a ground for administrative action, has a specific
meaning in law.
"'Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By
uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of
his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private
individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to
separate the character of man from the character of an officer. x x x It is
settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal
from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of official duties x x x.' More specifically, in Buenaventura vs.
Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first
instance, the present Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring 'to a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.' That
is to abide by the authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re
Horilleno, a decision penned by Justice Malcolm, which requires that in order
for serious misconduct to be shown, there must be 'reliable evidence showing
3
that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to
violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.'"16
The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his
personal life and have no direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do
these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official responsibilities.
Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross
misconduct in office. For any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero" x
x x (t)o warrant disciplinary action, the act of the judge must have a direct
relation to the performance of his official duties. It is necessary to separate
the character of the man from the character of the
officer."17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Nullity of Prior Marriage
It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Maria Apiag prior to marrying Nieves C. Ygay. He argued
however that the first marriage was void and that there was no need to have
the same judicially declared void, pursuant to jurisprudence then prevailing. In
the en banc case of Odayat vs. Amante,18 complainant charged Amante, a
clerk of court, with oppression, immorality and falsification of public document.
The complainant Odayat alleged among others " x x x that respondent is
cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children,
even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive x x x." In order to rebut the
charge of immorality, Amante " x x x presented in evidence the certification (of
the) x x x Local Civil Registrar x x x attesting that x x x Filomena Abella was
married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's
contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio,
because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales." This Court ruled
that "Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under
Article 80 [4] of the New Civil Code, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages."19
Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs x x x a
judicial declaration of such fact"20 before any party thereto "can marry again;
otherwise, the second marriage will also be void."21 This was expressly
provided under Article 4022 of the Family Code. However, the marriage of
Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of
the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante applies in favor of
respondent.
On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it
is based on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge. Since, as shown in the
preceding discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand, so too must the
accusation of falsification fail. Furthermore, the respondent judge's belief in
good faith that his first marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up
these public documents, a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public
document,23 which must be appreciated in his favor.
Personal Conduct of a Judge
However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability on his part does not
preclude this Court from finding him administratively liable for his indiscretion,
which would have merited disciplinary action from this Court had death not
intervened. In deciding this case, the Court emphasizes that "(t)he personal
behavior of a judge, not only upon the bench but also in his everyday life,
should be above reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. He
should maintain high ethical principles and sense of propriety without which
he cannot preserve the faith of the people in the judiciary, so indispensable in
an orderly society. For the judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct
of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to
observe faithfully as the price he has to pay for accepting and occupying an
exalted position in the administration of justice."24 It is against this standard
that we must gauge the public and private life of Judge Cantero.
The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of this
standard because the record reveals he had two families. The record also
shows that he did not attend to the needs, support and education of his
children of his first marriage. Such is conduct unbecoming a trial magistrate.
Thus, the late Judge Cantero "violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which mandates that '[a] judge's official conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the
bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach,' and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which provides that '[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.'"25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted
Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of respondent's record. Other
than this case, we found no trace of wrongdoing in the discharge of his
judicial functions from the time of his appointment up to the filing of this
administrative case, and has to all appearances lived up to the stringent
standards embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering his
otherwise untarnished 32 years in government service,26 this Court is inclined
to treat him with leniency.
Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we
should not look only at his sin. We should also consider the man's sincerity in
his repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the
reformation of his life.
This respondent should not be judged solely and finally by what took place
some 46 years ago. He may have committed an indiscretion in the past. But
having repented for it, such youthful mistake should not forever haunt him and
should not totally destroy his career and render inutile his otherwise
unblemished record. Indeed, it should not demolish completely what he built
in his public life since then. Much less should it absolutely deprive him and/or
his heirs of the rewards and fruits of his long and dedicated service in
government. For these reasons, dismissal from service as recommended by
the Office of the Court Administrator would be too harsh.
However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in
attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage -- children whose
filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until
they came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct, this Court
would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the
promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby DISMISSED.

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460             March 31, 2006
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
x--------------x
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC             March 31, 2006
Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE FLORENTINO V.
FLORO, JR.
x--------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988             March 31, 2006
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)
LUZ ARRIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives."
Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran 1
THE CASES
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A
pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court
Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and
"developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his
application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological
evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion,
social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and
perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro
was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private
practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to
Atty. Floro’s appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73,
Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
4
Upon Judge Floro’s personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-
Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo
L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other
things, that his report be considered as an administrative complaint against
Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate
psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo
recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive
suspension for the duration of the investigation against him.
4 court proceedings;
In a Resolution  dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the
recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1460, in view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as reported
by the audit team:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements regarding qualifications and for announcing in open
court during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of
Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares
that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01,
Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98
pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan
in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct
which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the
Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for
leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial
prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of
the custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle
and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated
homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by
persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of the
accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang
pick-up";
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that
which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for
frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct
when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine
justice system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.
Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court
of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report
and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was directed to
comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself
to an appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted "by
the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or
mental institution." In the same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge
Floro under preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the
administrative charges against him." He was barely eight months into his
position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set
forth both affirmative and negative defenses6 while he filed his
"Answer/Compliance" on 26 August 1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his
case for failure to prosecute.7 However, on 21 March 2000, he presented
himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice
Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for
Inhibition/Disqualification" against Justice Ramirez as investigator9 which was
denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge Floro’s
motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27 July 2000,
Judge Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirez’s
inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled
against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to
comment on Judge Floro’s motion to dismiss, 15 recommended that the same
should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after,
Justice Ramirez came out with a "Partial Report" recommending the dismissal
of Judge Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders him incapable
and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch
73." 17

In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him
and even after Justice Ramirez came out with his report and recommendation
on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against
those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive
suspension follows:
1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA – against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-
Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial Audit Team, Office of the
Court Administrator 18
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ – against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City 19
3. AC No. 5286 – against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo
and Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.20
4. AC No. CBD-00-740 – against Thelma C. Bahia, Court
Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty.
II, Court Management Office, both of the Office of the Court
Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court,
Branch 73, Malabon21
5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) – against former Court
Administrator Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro
A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator22
23
6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez
7. A.C. No. 6050 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez24
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling
seven, be dismissed.25 On 14 February 2006, the Court granted the motion to
dismiss.26
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1460: "(f)or using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in
the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother
of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn
Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal
Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On
5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang
testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro
filed a Memorandum in this case.27
5
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999
of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by
Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re:
Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei,
Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of
Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order denying the petition for
naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty.
David S. Narvasa, the petitioner’s counsel.28 The OCA, through Court
Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for
inhibition and declared it as null and void. However, he ordered the
raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the
petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be
assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should
have continued hearing and taking cognizance of the case. It is
improper for him to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this
violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12,
Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which
provides to wit:
"8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified
application of the interested party who seeks issuance of a
provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive Judge
that unless the special raffle is conducted, irreparable damage shall
be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall be conducted
by at least two judges in a multiple-sala station.
x x x x"
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle
of a case since such is only allowed upon a verified application of the
interested party seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the Executive
Judge’s finding that if a special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will suffer
irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.’s order is contrary to the
above-mentioned Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his
resolution that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his
nomination for judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly
of a "padrino" (who helped him get his position). Such remark even if made as
an expression of deep gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious
impression about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting and
expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge
shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the
motion for reconsideration are judicial matters which this Office has no
authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not administrative.29
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of
ordering the raffle of the case in violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and
(b) his remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that "Justice Hermosisima,
Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x
x x."
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the
recommendations of the OCA.30 Judge Floro, through his counsel, filed his
Comment on 22 October 199931 which was noted by this Court on 7
December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of
Evidence which this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to
Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation
in this case as well as in the second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus,
in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as
well as the other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not
they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for
decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the evidence so far submitted
by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of
the two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
for resolution based on the pleadings and the evidence submitted therein.
Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this
Court, in a Letter dated 28 February 2006, her willingness to submit her case
for decision based on the pleadings already submitted and on the evidence
previously offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge
Floro manifested his preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided
ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are
consolidated cases, we resolve to render as well a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding
Judge Floro’s alleged mental illness and its effects on his duties as Judge of a
Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed
psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator
appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving
as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to depend on the
findings of the mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge
Floro. Our job is simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant
and the irreverent in order to determine once and for all if Judge Floro is
indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the evidence makes out a case
against Judge Floro, the next issue is to determine the appropriate penalty to
be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind
or because of a psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of
this question hinges the applicability of equity.
 6

As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h"
and "j", "e" and "f") will be jointly discussed as they had likewise been jointly
discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts and to treat
them separately will be superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the
supreme penalty of dismissal against Judge Floro
judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the
use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their
qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking
publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or
politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his
professional card, did Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct?
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been
announcing in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise
violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks
of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for
announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and
litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity.
Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice – confident,
competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears
so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their
lawyers’ approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements regarding qualifications AND for announcing in open court during
court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of
Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards
bearing his name as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City,
and indicating therein that he is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and with
"full second honors" from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and
LL.B.32 The audit team likewise reported that: "(b)efore the start of court
session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a graduate of
Ateneo de Manila University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during
the 1983 Bar Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a
reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of Revelation according to
Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were given the
opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions
were asked; hence the session commenced."33
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and
week, Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct only.
simple professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card "may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law (b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
practiced." In herein case, Judge Floro’s calling cards cannot be considered
as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his
The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floro’s chamber[s], there is a
law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the
folding bed with cushion located at the right corner of the room. A man, who
norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.
was later identified as Judge Floro’s driver, was sleeping. However, upon
seeing the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the room." 42
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were
just given by him as tokens and/or only to a few who requested the
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The
same. 37 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals
man the audit team saw "sleeping" on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge
otherwise. An eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro
Floro’s aide or "alalay" whom he allows to rest from time to time (in between
circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge Floro’s very own witness, a
periods and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J.
researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one
Torralba was not sleeping during that time that the audit team was in Branch
of these cards. 39
73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof.

As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should

Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the
use of professional cards containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his
office and residence is not improper" and that the word "title" should be broad
enough to include a Judge’s legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned
or even his Law School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their calling
cards their former/present titles/positions like President of the Jaycees,
Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro
argues that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as
tokens to close friends or by reciprocity to other callers considering that
common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek other
professional employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications,
Judge Floro counters that it was his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda
Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court session, she would
briefly announce his appointment with an introduction of his school, honors,
bar rating and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the introduction
was done only during the first week of his assumption into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain
terms that "a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel
proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." This means
that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their
profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants
hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in
be measured against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No.
Judge Floro having allowed another person to use his folding bed for short
01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140,
periods of time during office hours and while there is no one else in the room.
before its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of
The situation would have been different if there had been any allegation of
Judicial Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of
misuse or abuse of government funds and/or facilities such as in the case of
Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious charge,
Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious
or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he
may simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light
and his family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial
charge.
government paying for the electrical bills.
"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such
something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant;
familiarity from his aide as this becomes fodder for gossip as what had
shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of
apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of
should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent
and attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were understandably
disregard of well-known legal rules. 41
uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge allowing his aide
easy access to his folding bed.
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating
calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of
misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedure
as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but,
from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable
thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human (g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial
Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the
personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within custodian of the accused
the confines of the code they swore to observe.
The memorandum report reads:

c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of
the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded with the hearing of the
following matters:
(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442 entitled "People vs. Luisito
Beltran", "People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino",
and "People vs. John Richie Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing of these
motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a form of direct
examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being
sworn by the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the
Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the start
of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the aforesaid
motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused had
pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge
Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused that they are qualified to
apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to
draft the application in behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on
recognizance will immediately be heard and be consequently granted. As
appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes "3" to
"6"), the custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay
tanod or a member of the lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order
granting the motion for release on recognizance is being issued by Judge
Floro, Jr. since according to him neither rules nor circular mandates the
issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr.
just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the session. Photocopies of the
minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN;
and 20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge
Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion without issuing a written order. Copies of
the minutes are hereto attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule
of procedure with respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team,
asserting that –
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers
only to final and not interlocutory orders. Only final orders and judgments are
promulgated, rendered and entered.
xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein
respondent faithfully complied with the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as
amended, regarding the applications for release on recognizance, thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned
as MOTION FOR RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily
governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due
course/taken cognizance of by respondent, if on its face, the same
bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the City/Public
Prosecutor.
7
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an
courts), especially in RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in
(where respondent practiced from 1985-1998 – almost 14 years), the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of
[and especially the practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, Appeals 50 wherein we held that "no judgment, or order whether final or
RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing,
chambers, regarding his being a responsible member of the signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for
community where the accused reside/resides; the questions filing, release to the parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge
propounded are in the form of direct and even cross examination Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his
questions. orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases No.
20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran,"
"People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena Camino," and "People
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand,
v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such written orders are
since there is no such requirement. All that is required, is to inform
not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floro’s failure was not due to
the accused regarding some matters of probation (optional) such as
inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
whether he was sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he
has had previous cases, etc.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of
probation cases. First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings
accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of
on application for release on recognizance, respondent, for caution
any opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the
in most of the applications, included the interview/hearing on the
release without first requiring the probation officer to render a case study and
applications for release on recognizance, during criminal trial dates,
investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of
where a fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at other times, the
the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
hearing is held in the chambers.45
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the
recognizance, as well as his eventual probation, was already a done deal
rules on probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as
even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels
amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an accused on
for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for probation.
recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the
This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit
applicant. Under the Probation Law,46 and as we explained in Poso v. Judge
team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been approving applications
Mijares,47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to ascertain
for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the requirements of
first that the applicant is not a "disqualified offender" as "(p)utting the
the law for said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning
discharge of the accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to
backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a salutary endeavor, but only
pass upon the request for provisional liberty."
when the situation so warrants. In herein case, however, we cannot
countenance what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to release the
Moreover, from Judge Floro’s explanations, it would seem that he completely accused significantly deprived the prosecution and the private complainants
did away with the requirement for an investigation report by the probation of their right to due process." 52
officer. Under the Probation Law, the accused’s temporary liberty is warranted
only during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report
Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced
on the application for probation and the resolution thereon.48 As we explained
in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow
in Poso v. Judge Mijares49 :
the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 53
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law
conduct case study prior to action on application for release on recognizance,
fully and uphold it conscientiously. 54 When the law is sufficiently basic, a
was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim character of the
judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is
provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated differently, the
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every judicial error
temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective no longer than the
bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not
period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the
warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing short
resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60)
of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering
days to finish the case study and report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days
infallible judgments." 57 This rule, however, admits of an exception as "good
from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve the application for
faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of
probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even before the
tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and
order to submit the case study and report, respondent Judge
the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible
unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the
margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his
detriment of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis
ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59
supplied)
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-
accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct

The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that
in criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused" particularly concerning
detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for the
premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart
upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his
predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused
whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor
assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings
of detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases
had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February 1997 to 5
November 1998. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single
evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he
sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically
stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her
and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with
them especially those under detention as he, himself, had been accused by
his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses. 60
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible
especially since it is corroborated by independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge
Floro’s unwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on
recognizance as previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply
the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent and
honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and
honest" as well. 62 Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but
above suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO
lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his
impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve
personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of
bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge
erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His language, both written and
spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued." 65
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an
independent judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the
accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for
objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the public’s trust in his
ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to
everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not
for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times
human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching
hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays
himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of
being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must
8
be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional
mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and
understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It
is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is
essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that
he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has
been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with
constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle
and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide)
in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that
which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated
homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled:
"People vs. Nenita Salvador", Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public
prosecutor and considering that the private complainant was not being
represented by a private prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and
influence to convince the private complainant to settle and eventually cause
the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making the
private complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the
signed stenographic notes is hereto attached as Annex "8").
xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for
frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the "manifestations" of the
private complainant and the accused relative to their willingness to settle the
civil aspect of the case. In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling
on the said settlement until after the public prosecutor has given his
comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the
aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original
order given in open court. Actually, the said criminal case was already settled
even without the presence of the public prosecutor. The settlement was in the
nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but the criminal
liability as well. It was further reported that the private complainants signed
the compromise agreement due to the insistence or persuasion of Judge
Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes
(unsigned draft order) and the revised order (signed). Copies of the
stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached as Annexes "8",
"13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the parties to
the case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro
docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit
Complaint 67 dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge
Floro forced them to settle her daughter’s case against the accused therein
despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree
on the amount to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred
by complaining witness, they requested respondent that they be given time to
study the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that the
case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!" Moreover,
Judge Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the
accused against the complaining witness would likewise be dismissed, so
they agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by
respondent Judge did not reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in
open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint
filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only
in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants
concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their
differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties
suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge
Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be
reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge
Floro and Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter opined that under Section
27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in criminal cases
is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With this in
mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the hearing on even date was superseded
by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventura’s stance that he has
no power to revise an Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend
or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu
proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of
Appeals 68 wherein we declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical
existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated,
i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the
parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does
not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by
any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment
has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft
thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired
by any party. In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of
court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment,
the Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or
revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or even motu proprio,
provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not
attained finality. (Emphasis supplied)
In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open
court – ostensibly a judicial approval of a compromise agreement – which
was amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the
written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling
regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter into a compromise
agreement after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments
thereto. 69

Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise
his oral order per the Echaus ruling and factoring in his explanation for
resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of
dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in
the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis.
The controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially
approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs.
Arriego actually had no cause for complaint. She cannot, on one hand,
complain that the written order did not reflect the agreement reached during
the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached
under duress at the instance of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor,
ordering the mental and physical examination of the accused based on the
ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up"
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal
Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro "motu proprio ordered the physical and
mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is "mahina
ang pick-up." 70
In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the
accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the manifestations of his counsel
de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of the
trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to
enter a plea of not guilty;
b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench
and he appeared trembling and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted
that accused is "nauutal", has difficulty of reasoning, of speaking,
and very nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his
mind regarding the plea, from not guilty to guilty and to not guilty,
and so forth;
e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by
the Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Rules,
namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule
116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary powers to
issue orders to conform to justice), manifested orally that the
accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
9
f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the
ORDER OF MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled
that "the court may order a physical or MENTAL examination of a party where
his physical or mental condition is material to the issues involved." (27 C.J.S.
p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He
testified that he moved for the suspension of the arraignment of the accused
Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for trial. 72 As
reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge
Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused
is "mahina ang pick-up."
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment
motu proprio and "over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor." It must be
remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999
when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended,
if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant
to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the suspension be
made "upon motion by the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well within the
discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu
proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence
imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found
that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper
defense. 74 As we underscored in People v. Alcalde 75 :
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused
is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his
discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such
affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper
defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the
accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. x x x.
xxxx
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative
obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him
to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial.
While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on
the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings,
the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial
with the assistance the law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the
accused’s mental fitness for trial is already beside the point. If ever he erred,
he erred in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the case, is
not an actionable wrong.
(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98
pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation
of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from
engaging in the private practice of law
(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the
Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of
absence on the scheduled dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending
before the lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the
counsel of record in some of these cases, is just signing the pleadings for him
while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel. When attending the
hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an
application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a
pending civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a
criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported
that in these cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as
party and counsel for himself and even indicating in the pleadings that he is
the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr.
indeed has a pending case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83,
Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the
Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino
V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus – Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro". In
this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Entry of
Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission" wherein he signed as
the petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of
RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court stenographer Marissa Garcia,
RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge Floro,
Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking and his picture together with
President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the said
Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office,
Office of the Court Administrator, to appear as counsel or collaborating
counsel in several civil cases (except the above-mentioned case) pending
before lower courts. 76
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the
private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
unequivocally states that: "No judge or other official or employee of the

superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client." Canon 5,
Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that:
"A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law."
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired
lawyers to attend to his personal cases. 77
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any
concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared as counsel in his personal
cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared a
pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With
Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission") jointly with his counsel of record in
connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the
custody of their "mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He explained, however, that
he prepared the said pleading in the heat of anger as he could not accept the
judgment of dismissal in that case.78 He likewise explained that the pleading
was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had rectified the
same by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally,
during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed the subject
pleading as petitioner and not as counsel. 80
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on
sound public policy, thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law
are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers,
discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give
their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from
extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of
their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are
dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public
interest. 81
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is
envisioned by "private practice" is more than an isolated court appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a
lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the "Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does
not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or
appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with his personal
cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floro’s act of filing the
motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise
constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that
Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he
himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized
practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a
pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch
73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a
picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for such
acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a
fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the
right. 83 Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
that a "judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
10
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency."
By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a
very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro
has been attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing for leave of
absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was
incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that
although administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on
evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to
limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process. 84
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine
justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during
court proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way
Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court proceedings. With the assistance of the court
staff, the team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by
Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of the proceedings (Annex "15").
The tape record of the court proceedings is also submitted along with this
report as Exhibit "A".
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty.
Abelarde was appearing for the plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was
appearing for the defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the counsels
for both parties were guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to
wit:
"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi
nila maayos ang Rules of Court natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of
California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh … dahil sa kanila maraming
nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming … eh ako wala akong
pinagkopyahan yan … but ginawa ko lang yon … Sabi ko si Judge nagko-
complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin
… except … na hindi papayag … kasi marami diyang …"
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead
of holding trial, discussed, in open court, the case involving his brother. He
even condemned the Philippine justice system and manifested his disgust on
the unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:
"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok
ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko napakayaman, ako walang pera."
He continued:
"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung
kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So,
ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun …
ganun … Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang
nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang
ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong
nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko
naman kung ang isang court eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya
malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto (laughs) baka ako ma-
contempt dito." 85
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that
these are all hearsay fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon,
and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to
allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross
neglect of duties which were all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the
Philippine judicial system, Judge Floro contends that this recording was done
clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic
Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions
thereof. They also made it appear that the conversation took place in a court
proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question
were submitted to the OCA sans the "yellow notes" and the official
transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that the transcribed copy that was
submitted by the audit team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial copy and does
not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a court proceeding.
This being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they were
taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro
as the unauthorized recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under
Rep. Act No. 4200. 87
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus
left with only Judge Floro’s word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court
who testified under oath as to Judge Floro’s alleged propensity to criticize the
judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving these particular charges
would therefore depend upon which party is more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial
Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine
Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73
the alleged "kabulukan ng hustisya". Time and again he said the Rules of
Court is of no use. He said that since theory and the practice of law are very
different, the Rules of Court does not always apply to different cases. Not only
the justice system did he criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told us
. . . and I quote "D’yan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na Judges . . . Sa
Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan."

To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he
is now serving? Where is his respect to the court, to the bar and to the
bench? How can he uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself did not
believe in the justice system?
xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly
improper and intemperate language during court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me,
the Court Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always
discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time one
Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan"
and then he would call even not during court session, but during office hours
our Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it did not
surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for
Civil Case No. 25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he uttered offensive
language against his fellow judge. Take the transcription of this court
proceeding is already adapted by the Court Administrator. It was the content
of the tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for consultation and
advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open Court, before all of
us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the
defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the
record the stenographic notes or even the actual transcription of the
proceedings because it contained offensive languages against the justice
system, against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude
Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing
the merit of the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement between the
parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may
not use my discretion whether or not to advise the stenographer to indeed
present the same or attach the same in the record because it contained
offensive languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for
example, "putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera,
etcetera". 88
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and
candid declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs
from Judge Floro himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject
utterances are consistent with Judge Floro’s claims of intellectual superiority
for having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and
having placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against
the judicial system on account of his perception of injustice in the disposition
of his brother’s case are not far removed from his reactions to what he
perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by the
persons who were either in charge of the cases against him or had some sort
of participation therein. Consequently, although there is no direct proof that
Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that
he sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of
crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is more likely that he
actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty
of unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
11
conclusion. 89 In this case, there is ample and competent proof of violation on 2) Charges "c" and "g" – gross ignorance of the law
Judge Floro’s part.
3) Charge "d" – unbecoming conduct
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987
4) Charge "e" – unbecoming conduct
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro –
5) Charges "k" and "l" – unbecoming conduct
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters
involving his personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a]
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140
judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly
as amended, a judge guilty of a serious charge may be dismissed from the
judge generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous
service, suspended from office without salary and other benefits for more than
reactions. Hence, the need to maintain order and proper decorum in court.
three but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but
When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is
not exceeding P 40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In
orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted
herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when
formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be characterized with honor and
he was slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken
dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a judicial trial called to
in his favor. And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that
ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere
he acted in bad faith or with corrupt motives, we hold that a fine is the
must be avoided. And the judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore
appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the maximum, i.e. P
responsible for any detraction therefrom.
40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming
conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1,
1987 provides that trial of cases should be conducted efficiently and
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon
expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so that
Branch due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him
waste of time is avoided.
unfit to discharge the functions of his office
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and
As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly
movements. He must always keep in mind that he is the visible representative
unrelated accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental
of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.’s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers,
illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo
that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death
an appropriate mental or psychological examination and which necessitated
and that he has unseen "little friends" are manifestations of his psychological
his suspension pending investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true,
instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the functions
renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office notwithstanding the fact
and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr.
that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of dismissal
once again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to
from the service against Judge Floro.
remain in the judiciary. 90
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its
the latter applied for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily
title would suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of
withdrew) way back in September 1995. The psychological report, as
justice following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services)
and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that
the 13 charges are inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the
functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that
Judge Floro proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that he There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that
he has unseen "little friends" in determining the transcendental issue of his
REMARKS:
mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to
He was argumentative and over solicitous of questions asked, giving the
be imposed for the seven of the 13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate,
impressions of marked suspiciousness. He centered on his academic
we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13
excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of the College of Law, rated top
charges against him. Thus:
13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his obsessive and
compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of
1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct whether it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and
graduated Law as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and self-

organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a
perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind
and analytical system, he related that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been
experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that the biggest secret of the
universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because of
"power in psychic phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be released,
he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the 13th place. He has been
practicing "parapsychology" – seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are
prominent findings, both in the interview (conscious) and psychological test
results. (unconscious level). 92
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented
himself to the Supreme Court Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship, this
time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista,
M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr.
Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes
pride in this. During the interview, he was quite reluctant to reveal information
about his family background and would rather talk about his work and
academic achievements. However, he failed to integrate his knowledge into a
cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with the various tasks that he
undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to
vacillate with decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to
mood swings with the slightest provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his
personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice. However,
he showed a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has
poor social skills and showed discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid
ideations, suspiciousness of others’ motives as well as perceptual distortions
were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floro’s current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation
(68) which is below the expected cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his
impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in
judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits
such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with
paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a
lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in
dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and
emotionally equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a judge and he may
decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden
situation. 93
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed
Judge Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological
capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July
1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro to submit to "appropriate psychological
or mental examination."
12
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations.
clarified that the "appropriate psychological or mental examination" being However, his test protocol is characterized by disabling indicators. There is
adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC impairment in reality testing which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is
Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to "submit himself to the SC unable to make an objective assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence,
Clinic for psychological or mental examination, within ten (10) days from he is apt to misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to perceptual
notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied by the Court distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural
on 22 February 2000. 96 beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of
healing have become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable
beliefs) system, that it has interfered and tainted his occupational and social
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC
functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing his court duties as a
Clinic was reiterated by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition
judge. 108
that Judge Floro’s failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary
sanctions. 97
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme
Court Senior Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief
On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that –
2000 Resolution with a conjunctive special motion for him to undergo
psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental
institution. 98 This was denied by the Court on 14 November 2000. 99 The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially
supported by evidence. Based on the three[3] psychological tests and
evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the
but to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge
inhibition or disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic doctors 100 and
his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.
psychologist 101 with a manifestation that he filed cases against them for
revocation of licenses before the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC),
the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP 102 for alleged gross Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted
incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. earlier psychological evaluations conducted by several mental health
2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103 professionals which were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations were
in connection with his application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998
brought about by him having "failed" the examination given by the Supreme
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court
Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff psychologist,
Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be sanctioned for obvious
Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-
contempt in refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October
Villasor of the Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:
2000 resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floro’s filing of
administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et al., is an
indication of the latter’s intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
the Court. 104 The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus
Judge Floro was ordered to submit to psychological and mental examination
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall be ordered arrested and
detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x." 105
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual
resources to cope with everyday demands. He is able to
Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December
handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks.
2000. 106 He likewise sought the services of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo
Alert to details, he has a logical approach in evaluating
T. Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January
the relationship between things and ideas.
2001. 107
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations,
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in
where he can consider solid facts to arrived (sic)at
December 2000, this time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460.
concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can
Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer
organize procedures and details so as to get things done
reported that "(o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with
correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional
movement in the paranoid direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated
standards to determine personal progress. Set in his
that:
views, he may not readily accept others’ ideas and
contributions especially if these oppose his own.
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a
cautious, and suspicious individual with a compulsion to analyze and observe
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments
motives in his milieu. Despite his status, cognitive assets and impressive
is expected of FFJ. Generally, he prefers to control his
educational background, his current functioning is gauged along the LOW
emotions and does not let this get in the way of his
AVERAGE intelligence.
judgment and decisions.

II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for
his undertakings. Achievement-oriented, he sets high personal
standards and tends to judge himself and others according to these
standards. When things do not develop along desired lines, he may
become restless and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his
social stature and can be expected to comply with conventional
social demands. 109
Testifying as one of Judge Floro’s witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on
cross-examination that "psychologically speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to
be a judge. Thus:
JUDGE AQUINO:
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here
and on every available records of the proceedings, has been claiming that he
[is] possessed with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the
interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his Psychic Powers
to be a fatal [flaw]?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the
patient?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and
you were here when we were cross-examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard
that we mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would you
consider his failure to tell you about his power of by location to be a fatal
[flaw] and your assessment of his psychological outlook?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Fatal [flaw]?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is
capable of being in a trance?
A: He did not.
13
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?
A: He did not.
xxxx
Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be
pronouncing or making pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this
not correct?
xxxx
A: Yes sir.
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable
of having trances in the course of his private activities and even in the course
of the performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with
that?
A: I agree with you, Sir.
Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person.
Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako
ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng
iba’t iba pang bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging
reality oriented?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.
xxxx
Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir. 110
Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant
Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3
September 1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro –
[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues,
able to discuss a wide variety of topics intelligently without hesitation. His
thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality based. He is well oriented,
intelligent, emotionally stable, with very good judgment. There is no previous
history of any psychological disturbances. 111
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated
September 1998, who stated in his report that –
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled
person with graying hair. When interviewed he was somewhat anxious,
elaborative and at times approximate in his answers. He was alert, oriented,
conscious, cooperative and articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any
perceptual disturbances. Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed.
There was pressure of speech with tendency to be argumentative or
defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of
associations or neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and
appropriate but mood was anxious. There were no abnormal involuntary
movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment,
insight, and other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal
results.
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty.
Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his nomination and appointment to
the post he is seeking. 112
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floro’s witness, Dr.
Jurilla clarified that the interview had its limitations 113 and he might have
missed out certain information left out by his patient. 114 The following
exchange is thus instructive:
JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has
little unseen, unheard friends known as duwendes?
DR. JURILLA: He did not.
xxxx
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information
about his claim to be the number five psychic in the country?
xxxx
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic
phenomena?
A: He did not.
xxxx
Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at
least four (4) kilometers apart, he used to ride on a big white or whatever it is,
horse?
A: Not during our interview.
 14

xxxx
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might
have missed some information or it is possible that our clients or patients
might not [have] told us everything.
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that
Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you in the course of the interview, your
opinion of the patient would be altered a little?
xxxx
A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that
there was abnormality in the person of Judge Floro?
A: Given the data.
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have
your evaluation favorable to Judge Floro drastically altered if I tell you that
based on record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is capable
of typing a letter?
superior intellect in making sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities
is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that
Judge Floro was unfit to be a judge. 117 The relevant exchanges between Dr.
Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge
who shall claim that he is possessed with power of [bi-location]?
xxxx

A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered.
Yes, Your Honor in the absence of any corroborative contradiction.
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the
interview, would that be correct?
A: The interview has its limitations.
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are
confirmed by events that transpired after the interview, would you not say you
have more reason to have your evaluation altered?
A: Yes.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has
been proclaiming himself as the number five psychic in the country [where] no
one has called him as a psychic at all?
xxxx
Q: Would it be really more altered?
A: I would say so.
xxxx
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are
confirmations of what Judge Floro did not tell you during the interview, would
your finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you that he is
capable or possessed of the power of bilocation?
xxxx
A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floro’s
mental and psychological x x x?
xxxx DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2)
places at one time.
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably
drastically altered. 115 Q: And that something must be wrong?
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. A: Yes.
Maaba, M.D., 116 dated 3 January 2001, the relevant portions of which state:
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of the course of his testimony and in this very case that while [he] was so
thought did not reveal delusional thought. He was proud of his achievements testifying there is another spirit, another person, another character unseen
in line with his profession and expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction who is with him at the same time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya".
with the way his colleagues are handling his pending administrative cases. He
was observed to be reality-oriented and was not suffering from hallucinations
xxxx
or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with respect to time, place
and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making capacity were
adequately functioning. A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me
is unbelievable.
xxxx
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some
delusion?
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December
26, 2000. He talked about his family and academic achievements. He claimed
to possess a divine gift for prophecy and a gift of healing. He also talked xxxx
about a "covenant" made during a dream between him and 3 dwarf friends
named Luis, Armand and Angel. He reported that the first part of his ministry
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your
is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal and alleviate
Honor.
sufferings/pain from disease.
Q: No, Delusion.
A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December
28, 2000. The battery of test consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon
Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language Test A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
(4) Sack’s Sentence Completion Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test
results and evaluation showed an individual with an Above Average
Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
meticulous to details and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is
reality-oriented and is deemed capable of making day-to-day decisions in his A: Both are on the same footing.
personal as well as professional decisions. Confusion with regard to sexual
identification, was further observed.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a
witness about hallucinatory matters would turn out to be fit to become a
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, judge?
respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent
person who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic
disorder. He is not deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his xxxx

A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major
psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an organic mental disorder, this
individual suffering from hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge,
however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness
and the hallucinations and delusions could be transient and short in duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing
with psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative proceedings particularly in the course of his
testimony that while he was doing so, he was under trance normal.
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the
Philippines as part of a culture bound syndrome and it could also be an
indication … Basically the phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of
organic mental disorder. It is also common in culture bound syndrome and the
effect of person is usually loss of concentration in a particular settings or
situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose]
concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony of witnesses as
well as arguments given by the counsel for the defense and also for the
prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty in manners of attention
span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience trance as
in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and
he might not be able to rationalize or to control expressions or as well as
physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he
was in a trance?
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim
you will call that person not a normal person.
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the
proceedings in these cases held on October 10, 2000, afternoon session,
page 30 we start with the question of Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness,
can you tell us? Are you in trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE
FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance, but I distinguished not the
trance that you see the – nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. That’s a trance that is
created by the so called… Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit
priest, considered that as mind projection. He is correct in a sense that those
15
nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection or the hypnosis do come,
and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the person. But in my
case I never was changed physically or mentally. Only the lights and heat will
penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this very moment,
Mr. witness, "meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?"
JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge
Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen but… ATTY. DIZON: No, can you see them?"
To point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you have read and
seen this portion wherein Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of
his testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you still consider him
at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal person?
A: No.
Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also
and I will show to you the transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed
that he had, always had and still had a so–called counter part, his other side,
other self, what can you say to that claim, would that be the claim of a normal,
mental sound person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as
judge?
xxxx
A: Yes. 118
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma.
Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro,
Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch
73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case
that President Estrada would not finish his term as President. It is unusual
and queer of him to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de
Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in
his address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a
coup d’etat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his alleged psychic
powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is improper
and grandiose of him to express superiority over other judges in the course of
hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he is very successful over
many other applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is abnormal
for a Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such
self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing, irresponsible and abnormal.
A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So is he
who gets into a trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One
need not be a doctor of medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to
determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit
or insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and
functions of a judge. The life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court
presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he is free
from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the
functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity
which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon,
Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED
and DISMISSED from such office. 119
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC
Judge because of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to
perform the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that neither
the OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is "insane"
as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case have never said
so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the
service due to "insanity," he was apparently using the term in its loose sense.
Insanity is a general layman’s term, a catch–all word referring to various
mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term 120 as
this is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It
is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological evaluations all reported
signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and
happiness of the people. 121 An honorable, competent and independent
judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of
government, and the well-being of the people. 122 Carrying much of the weight
in this daunting task of administering justice are our front liners, the judges
who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted the
destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will only
succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly honorable
men, competent and independent. 123
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man.
And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not
found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the
findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case
indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions,"
of foreseeing the future because of his power in "psychic phenomenon." He
believes in "duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis,
Armand and Angel." He believes that he can write while on trance and that he
had been seen by several people to have been in two places at the same
time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who can inflict pains on
people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of
Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only
to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro explained that
he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers.
Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his
break time. All these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic
 16

about Judge Floro’s uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over
to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However,
such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with
the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary
duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and
principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference to psychic
phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco,
Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited
the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by concluding that the
testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." 125 He then went to state that
"psychic phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who
transcribed the testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge
Floro’s decision is quoted hereunder:
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary
does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they
please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform
their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits
are substantive and procedural rules of law. 128
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate
at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own
ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated
principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and
unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the
"primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his
competence for judicial tasks leaves much to be desired. As reported by the
Supreme Court Clinic:
great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in
speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no
doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism,
incertitude that one’s own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward
views not shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial
process. They are precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from
those entrusted with … judicial power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment … must move within the limits of accepted notions of
justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal
judgment. 134

3. The testimony of the prosecution’s PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of
the incident) NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major
and not regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several
indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his
testimony is not worthy of belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same
may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby declared a FAIRY TALE
or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable only for
SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the foregoing
conclusion:
a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria
were "sinalubong" by Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m.
at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the
"nagpambuno" between Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P.
INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw
the "nagpambuno"; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE
NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR
CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked to submit false
testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing by
accused when he NOTICED him the following day? (TSN dated
May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN was
incorrect due to typographical error, or maybe the Court
Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been SLEEPING
during the testimony, so that the word DAY should have been
corrected to another word SUITABLE to Normandy’s FAIRY TALE,
still, the Court had synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of
Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the seeming error
‘DAY’ should be corrected; the Court’s sole/remaining conclusion is
that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC
PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in having BEEN DESTINED
to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING
DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that –
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has
requirements of competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot
lapses in judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His
thus be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious
character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation
challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.
with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as
a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in
dispensing justice. x x x 130 Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic
benefits for a period of three (3) years.
Judge Floro’s belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that
he served as RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function with the In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. the judiciary as RTC judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed the
history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such
major and unfortunate faux pas.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government.
Thus:
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for
judgeship. He went through the entire gamut of tests and interviews and he
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified
was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic achievements. As
himself with large components of the judge’s role. Especially if he has aspired
to having failed the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must
to a judge’s status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or less
be pointed out that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floro’s
unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is said to have "the judicial
submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by mental health
temperament." He is likely to have displayed the kinds of behavior that the
professionals from the private sector and which were favorable to him.
judge’s role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the bench
Nowhere is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring
develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of
these evaluations.
investiture and of court procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even
the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve to emphasize the
demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous former ambulance The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic
chaser who owes his position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization for a second opinion of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing its
must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as a judge. 131 functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution which
prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other
requirements, persons of proven competence, integrity, probity and
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected
independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-
of other public officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law and they
009, the "Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council," that the JBC put down in
must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater degree than
writing guidelines or criteria it had previously used in ascertaining "if one
legislators or executives. 132
seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule 6
As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to thereof states:
some abstract ideas of right and justice, but according to the rules laid down
by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The function of
SECTION 1. Good health. – Good physical health and sound
the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the
mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant play a critical
exercise of a creative art, whether we call it legislative or not, which requires

role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of administering
justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. – The applicant shall submit to
psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the Supreme Court
Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the
Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the
evaluation of a private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC.
Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological evaluations
of mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floro’s appointment as RTC judge is fait
accompli. What awaits us now is the seemingly overwhelming task of finding
the PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floro’s almost
seven years of suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed
herein does not merit a suspension of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. 137 The Constitution
limits this power through the admonition that such rules "shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights." 138
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in
administrative cases against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the
steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended pending
investigation. This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its
power of administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof. 139 This power -- consistent with the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only
by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among
other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive
suspension resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges
against him within ten (10) days from notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired
Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for
investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for
appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the
proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or
mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective
immediately under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for the duration of the
investigation of the administrative charges against him. 140
17
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floro’s
suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the duration of the investigation of the 13
charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of
receipt by the investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as amended,
now states that "(t)he investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the
investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or
within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant" 141 and, "(w)ithin thirty
(30) days from the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or
Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact
and recommendation." 142
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively
suspended not only for the entire period of his investigation which would be
90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that
it would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his report.
Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a
final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her. 143 This
is because –
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are
charged with a serious offense warranting preventive suspension are not
automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as
mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final
decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a
strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the
measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or
wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the
erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’ image as temples of
justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice
solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of
occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a
class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy, judges are
beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and
proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression. 144
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the
present because of the serious charge of mental unfitness aggravated by the
fact that the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much longer
period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be
directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that
not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of his
cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself
to the appropriate psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out
as single case against him ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated
into one due to common questions of fact and law. 145 All in all, Judge Floro
filed seven cases against those he perceived had connived to remove and/or
suspend him from office, the last of which he filed on 19 May 2003 against
Justice Ramirez. 146
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in
this case considering that the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not
having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best.
We have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed
under preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to the
payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the
entire duration of the preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as
applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in which
a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court "until further
orders".
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13½ months,
during which period he was not paid his salaries, allowances and other
benefits. Except for a teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake
pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other
source of income. He thus incurred several loans to provide for his family’s
basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for the entire period that he was
preventively suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals,
preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but only a
measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to conduct an
unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time
to conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90)
days, the preventive suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of
determining the extent of back salaries, allowances and other benefits that a
judge may receive during the period of his preventive suspension, we hold
that the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should
likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend
beyond ninety (90) days and such may not be entirely unjustified.
Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it would be unfair to
withhold his salaries and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the
preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case was
not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge,
his preventive suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually
becomes without basis and would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must
be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely removed the cause
for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily, therefore, we
must rectify its effects on just and equitable grounds. 147
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is
likewise entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who
find themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders" or,
as this case, "for the duration of the investigation." Judge Iturralde’s
suspension of 13 ½ months even pales in comparison to Judge Floro’s
suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period
of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his profession, thus putting him
solely at the mercy of his brother’s largesse. And, though he was given
donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could not
compensate for his loss of income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period
of suspension exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of back
salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding
to three of his almost seven years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in

Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated as
we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floro’s propensity to delay the
resolution of his case through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases
against those he perceived connived to oust him out of office. In Judge
Iturralde’s case, the investigation was not delayed through any fault of his.
More importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by
analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90 days was
already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely
because, being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other
hand, and as already discussed, contributed to the delay in the investigation
of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been
adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro
beyond the reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not
demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete
justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of
power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent
and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is
variously expressed by different courts. 148
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the
delay in the resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to
award him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period
corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floro’s separation from
the service is not a penalty as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is
imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at least at present, to
continue discharging the functions of his office.
The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the
circumstances. As discussed, if we were to give him more than three years of
back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his role
in delaying the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed
which were only dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own bidding). On the
other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years then the
same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension he
had to live through with Damocles’ sword hanging over his head and with his
hands bound as he could not practice his profession.
Judge Floro’s separation from the service moots the case against him
docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floro’s separation from the service renders
moot the complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most
favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Court’s
decision to separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is
dismissed for being moot and academic.
18
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 Finally, if Judge Floro’s mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or
adverse environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential information
is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or
Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460
adverse environment – factors they have no control over.
and considering that charge "h" is without basis, this particular complaint filed
by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
Judge Floro’s separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all
or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any 1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY
other public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges
against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
As Judge Floro’s separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty,
such separation does not carry with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued 2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge
benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and consider
including government-owned or controlled corporations. him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling
condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the
functions of his office, effective immediately;
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock
of the finding of mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to
disqualify him from re-entering government service for positions that do not 3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.
require him to dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits
Judge Floro’s favor that the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they corresponding to three (3) years;
deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floro’s assets and
strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work
4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v.
environment. Thus:
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and
a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self-
5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution
organization." 149
Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for
MOOTNESS.
b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in
his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private
SO ORDERED.
practice." 150
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149               March 9, 2011
c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2787-RTJ)
occupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena … not
detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151
LYDIA A. BENANCILLO, Complainant,
vs.
d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in
Judge VENANCIO J. AMILA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran
moderate proficiency …. His concern for the details that make up a
City, Respondent.
total field represents his attempts at being systematic and
cautious." 152
RESOLUTION
e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of
the sensitive nature of said position, he may still be successful in other areas Before us is a Verified-Complaint1 dated November 29, 2007 filed by
of endeavor. complainant Lydia A. Benancillo (Lydia) charging respondent Judge Venancio
J. Amila (Judge Amila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Tagbilaran City with Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floro’s
and Procedure, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order, Partiality
current administrative and medical problems are not totally of his making. He
and Impropriety relative to Civil Case No. 7268 entitled "Lydia A. Benancillo v.
was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now, appear to
Paul John Belot," a Petition for Temporary Protection Order and Permanent
render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of
Protection Order under Republic Act No. 9262.
any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but clearly due to a
medically disabling condition.

The facts as culled from the Report2 of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) are as follow:
1. VERIFIED COMPLAINT
xxxx
The complainant, the petitioner in Sp. Civil Case No. 7268, avers that Branch
1 of RTC Tagbilaran City, acting as then Family Court in Tagbilaran City,
issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her live-in partner, Paul
John Belot (Belot). The TPO included a directive to Belot to turn over to her
personal effects, including properties in their diving business called the
Underworld Diver’s Panglao, Inc. (Underworld). Belot sought the
reconsideration of the issuance of the TPO. Meanwhile, their business
partners, Paz Mandin Trotin and Christopher Mandin, filed a motion for
intervention with respect to the properties of Underworld. The complainant
filed an opposition to the motion for intervention with prayer for preliminary
injunction.
The complainant alleges that when Branch 2 of RTC Tagbilaran City,
presided by the respondent judge, was designated as the new Family Court in
Tagbilaran City, Sp. Civil Case No. 7268 was transferred to the said court.
Acting on the pending incidents, the respondent judge denied both Belot’s
motion for reconsideration and the intervenors’ motion for intervention in an
Order dated July 16, 2007. The respondent judge incorporated in the
resolution a cease-and-desist order prohibiting the intervenors from taking
possession of the properties of Underworld.
The complainant further alleges that the respondent judge reiterated his
Order of July 16, 2007 in an Order dated August 14, 2007. Subsequently, the
respondent judge denied the intervenors’ motion for reconsideration in an
Order dated October 2, 2007.
The complainant states that the respondent judge constantly ruled in her
favor as he consistently held that the intervenors had no legal personality in
the case. However, the respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO.
The complainant claims that on October 8, 2007, the respondent judge called
her and her counsel to a meeting in his chambers on October 9, 2007. They
agreed to the meeting but they did not proceed when they learned that the
intervenors were joining them. Subsequent to the respondent judge’s meeting
with the intervenors, he issued an Order dated October 18, 2007 which
rescinded his Order of October 2, 2007. Then, in an Order dated October 25,
2007, he denied the complainant’s motion for reconsideration.
According to the complainant, the respondent judge’s conduct smacks of
impropriety and partiality. She further charges the respondent judge with
grave abuse of discretion, gross ignorance of the law and procedure and
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order for issuing the questioned
Orders of October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007.
The complainant further observed that the respondent judge revoked his
Order of October 2, 2007, without any motion being filed by any of the parties.
Moreover, the Order of October 18, 2007 was based on an inexistent ground
as the respondent judge mentioned in this Order a petition for certiorari
19
supposedly filed by Belot which had not yet been x x x filed with the Court of
Appeals.
The complainant alleged that the respondent judge’s Order of October 25,
2007 ruling on the complainant’s motion for reconsideration of the Order of
October 18, 2007 introduced a new issue on the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of Belot. The respondent judge also ruled on maintaining the
status quo, a position inconsistent with the preliminary injunction he had
previously issued.
2. COMMENT of Judge Venancio J. Amila dated February 8, 2008 wherein
he denies the charges against him.
The respondent judge claimed that the complainant was motivated by her
"insatiable greed to have exclusive control and possession pending trial of the
case [of] all the properties of the Underworld Divers Panglao, Inc. of
respondent Paul John Belot." x x x [H]e added that the "complainant . . . is
only a live-in partner of respondent with no specific address who was branded
repeatedly by Belot as a ‘prostitute’ and one ‘only after his money’."
According to the respondent judge, he rescinded his Order of October 2, 2007
because the complainant had no right to her alleged shares in the corporation
being merely a dummy owner of Belot’s shares. He was "fearful of the
consequence in the event that complainant would stealthily dispose of or
abscond [with] the properties. . . because of the illegitimate status of their
relationship, more so, with their present feud caused by the arrival of Belot’s
son and the alleged coming of the legitimate wife."
The respondent judge averred that the complainant "masterminded all [the]
legal manipulations [and] moved heaven and earth x x x to get possession of
all the properties of Belot to the extent of filing the instant administrative
charge and a petition for certiorari lately with the Court of Appeals, dated
December 21, 2007 using the same offensive and disrespectful language in
her arguments.
The respondent asserted he had the authority to motu proprio rectify an error
to restore things to their status quo during the pendency of the case in order
to avoid damage or loss. x x x [T]he complainant refused to attend the
meeting he called with the intervenor in chambers to explain the
Order.1avvphi1
Respondent Judge Amila incorporated in his submission his comment to a
similar administrative complaint filed earlier by the complainant. x x x [H]e
alleged that he set aside his Order of October 2, 2007 because the Petition
for Certiorari filed by Belot before the Court of Appeals had placed the
jurisdiction of the court under question.
3. REPLY-AFFIDAVIT dated February 29, 2008 of the complainant.
The complainant claimed that she suffered psychological and emotional
violence as the respondent judge echoed Belot’s verbal and psychological
abuse against her that she was "only a live-in partner" "in an illegitimate
relation" and a "prostitute." The respondent judge’s remarks revealed his
prejudice and lack of gender sensitivity and this was unbecoming of a family
court judge. His remarks also manifested his lack of knowledge and/or utter
disregard of the law on the equal protection to women-victims in intimate
relationships under the anti- VAWC law which he was mandated to uphold as
a family court judge.
The complainant averred that the respondent judge refused to enforce the
TPO under the Anti-VAWC law because of his prejudiced view that she would
abscond with the contested properties due to the "illegitimate status" of their
"relationship." His personal bias against the complainant reflects his utter lack
of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The complainant denied the respondent judge’s accusation that she and her
counsel "masterminded all these legal manipulations." She added that the
accusation implies that the respondent judge was not in control of the
proceedings and that he could be manipulated by the parties.
The complainant alleged that as the respondent judge still refused to
implement the TPO despite the dismissal of Belot’s petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, she filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme
Court for the annulment of the Orders dated October 18, 2007 and October
25, 2007.
The complainant asserted that while the respondent judge can change his
mind, he could no longer do so when the Order already became final and
executory and was not questioned anymore by the parties. Moreover, there
was no reason for the respondent judge to call for a meeting with the
intervenors because he already ruled that intervention was not allowed in the
case.
4. AFFIDAVIT-MANIFESTATION dated May 27, 2008 of the complainant.
The complainant manifested that the Court of Appeals of Cebu City already
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Belot which petition the
respondent Judge cited as reason for rescinding his Order dated [October] 2,
2007, the petition being a prohibited pleading under Section 22 of RA 9262
(Anti-VAWC).3
In its Report4 dated September 11, 2008, the OCA found that Judge Amila
acted inappropriately in calling the intervenors to a meeting in his chambers.
It was also noted that he used derogatory and irreverent language in
presenting complainant in his Comment as an opportunist, a mistress in an
illegitimate relationship and that she was motivated by insatiable greed. As
regards the charge for gross ignorance of the law, the OCA noted that the
same is premature considering that complainant filed before this Court a
petition assailing the October 18 and 25, 2007 Orders of respondent Judge.5
The OCA thus recommended:
xxxx
1. That the case be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative
matter;
2. That the charges of Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance
of the Law and Procedure and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust

Judgment or Order relative to the issuance of the Order[s] dated
October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007 be DISMISSED for being
premature;
3. [That r]espondent Judge Venancio J. Amila, Regional Trial Court
(Branch 3), Tagbilaran City, be found guilty of impropriety for the
use of intemperate language and unbecoming conduct and be
FINED in the amount of ₱10,000.00 with the warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense x x x shall be dealt with
more severely.6
We adopt the findings and the recommendations of the OCA.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts
members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of
propriety at all times.
Judge Amila should be reminded of Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.7
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of
all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
xxxx
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights,
they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
Judiciary.
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of
impropriety but even acts which have the appearance of impropriety. The
Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can nevertheless
be perceived by the larger community as such. "Be it stressed that judges are
held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys and
other persons not [vested] with public trust."8
In this case, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the
complainant and the intervenors to a meeting inside his chambers. His
explanation that he called the said meeting to advice the parties that he will
rescind his October 2, 2007 Order is not acceptable. Why would a judge give
the parties advance notice that he is going to issue an Order, more so rescind
his previous Order? Worse, why would he call on the intervenors whom he
had earlier ruled as not having any legal personality in this case? This act of
respondent judge would logically create an impression to complainant that the
meeting of the judge with the intervenors had turned his views around
towards issuing a revocation of the October 2, 2007 Order.
20
In his Comment, respondent judge used degoratory and irreverent language
in relation to complainant. The former in effect maliciously besmirched the
character of complainant by calling her as "only a live-in partner of Belot" and
presenting her as an opportunist and a mistress in an illegitimate relationship.
The judge also called her a prostitute. The judge’s accusations that
complainant was motivated by insatiable greed and would abscond with the
contested property are unfair and unwarranted. His depiction of complainant
is also inconsistent with the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) he issued in
her favor as a victim of domestic violence. Verily, we hold that Judge Amila
should be more circumspect in his language.
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act
betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all
times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or
spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is
esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness.9
Accordingly, respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10,10 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section
11C11 thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but
not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition
with warning.
In as much as Judge Amila was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law in connection with his Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 14988 and
14989 which was docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-07-2071 where he was ordered
to pay a fine of ₱20,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely, the penalty of fine of ₱21,000.00 is
deemed appropriate in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Venancio J. Amila GUILTY of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE him ₱21,000.00.
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601      November 13, 2001
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-834-RTJ)
ELIEZER A. SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ROBERTO S. JAVELLANA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
In a complaint-affidavit, dated 17 September 1999, Eliezer A. Sibayan-
Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana, acting presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave
misconduct in the performance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of
the law. The complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa, docketed
Criminal Case No. RTC 1150, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Romeo
Tan y Salazar," filed by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in behalf of Andersons
Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San Carlos City RTC.
Complainant averred that there was an undue delay in the rendition of
judgment in the aforenumbered criminal case, the decision, dated 16 July
1999, that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having been rendered only
on the tenth month after the case was submitted for decision. Complainant
further claimed that neither respondent judge nor his clerk of court was
present during the promulgation of the decision in contravention of Section 6,
Rule 120, of the Rules of Court. Respondent judge was also cited for
impropriety by complainant because he was often seen with Attorney Vic
Agravante, counsel for the accused, whose vehicle respondent judge would
even use at times.
Required to comment on the complaint, respondent judge admitted that the
decision in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 was rendered beyond the ninety-day
reglementary period but attributed the delay to his voluminous workload.
Respondent was handling two salas, his original station, RTC Branch 59,
designated as being a special court for heinous crimes, and RTC Branch 57.
He explained that he was suffering from hypertension which resulted in his
frequent requests for leave. Respondent judge maintained that the decision in
Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 was validly promulgated. He denied any
irregularity in the promulgation of the decision which was duly conducted by
Atty. Tarjata Ignalaga, Clerk of Court VI, of the Regional Trial Court of San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, in the presence of accused Romeo Tan y
Salazar and his counsel, Atty. Agravante, along with Provincial Prosecutor
Estefanio Libutna, Jr., and private prosecutor Atty. Edwin Magrinto.
Respondent judge denied any close association with Atty. Agravante.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") for
evaluation. In its report of 09 September 2000, the OCA recommended that
an investigation be conducted in order to afford the parties the opportunity to
substantiate their respective claims. In its resolution of 23 October 2000, the
Court adopted the OCA's recommendation and assigned the case to
Associate Justice Bernardo Abesamis of the Court of Appeals.
In due time, Justice Abesamis submitted his report, dated 25 May 2001,
finding respondent judge to have indeed failed to decide Criminal Case No.
RTC-1150 within the ninety-day reglementary period. The Investigating
Justice found no irregularity, however, in the promulgation of the decision. He
also found no gross ignorance of the law on the part of respondent. In order
to impose disciplinary action on judges, Justice Abesamis concluded, it
should be shown that the error or mistake invoked was gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or in bad faith, and that a mere error of judgment would
not be a ground for disciplinary action. Finally, the Investigating Justice held
respondent judge accountable for impropriety for his close association with
Atty. Agravante.
The Investigating Justice ended his report to the Court by recommending
thusly:
"WHEREFORE, after due investigation, and in consideration of the
foregoing discussions, it is most respectfully recommended to the
Honorable Supreme Court that:
"1) The charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondent
judge be DISMISSED for lack of merit.

"2) Respondent judge be held administratively liable for:
"a) failure to render judgment in Criminal Case No. RTC-
1150 within the period prescribed by law (in violation
of §15, ARTICLE VIII OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION, CANON 1, RULE 1.02, and CANON 3,
RULE 3.05 OF THE Code of Judicial Conduct); and
"b) engaging in activities having the appearance of
impropriety which unduly raise suspicion and distrust
among the people in the administration of justice (in
violation of CANON 2, RULE 2.01 AND RULE 2.03 OF
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT);
"3) Respondent JUDGE ROBERTO S. JAVELLANA be
ADMONISHED, with a WARNING that a repetition of similar acts
will be dealt with more severely."1
Section 15, Article XVIII, of the Constitution provides that lower courts have
three months within which to decide cases or matters pending before them
from the date of submission of such cases or matters for decision or
resolution. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct holds similarly by
mandating that the disposition of cases must be done promptly and
seasonably. Admittedly, respondent judge has taken ten months to finally
decide Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 from its submission for decision, a
period clearly beyond the ninety-day reglementary period. He could have
asked for an extension of time to decide the case and explain why, but he did
not. Any undue delay in the resolution of cases often amounts to a denial of
justice and can easily undermine the people's faith and confidence in the
judiciary. Aware of the heavy caseload of judges, the Court has continued to
act with great understanding on requests for extension of time to decide
cases.
The Investigating Justice has seen impropriety on the part of respondent
judge in his close association with a counsel for a litigant; thus:
"Giving respondent judge the benefit of the doubt, and presume
that his close associations with lawyers practicing within the
territorial jurisdiction of his court are all normal and do not in any
way unduly influence him in the discharge of his sworn duties, the
Court cannot just leave respondent judge's acts and consider them
proper.
"It is expressly provided under the CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT that:
"CANON 2. - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY
AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
`xxx      xxx      xxx
21
`Rule 2.01. - A Judge should so behave at all times as to G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ,
JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and
`xxx      xxx      xxx EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE
`Rule 2.09. - A Judge shall not allow family, social or
PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used
or lent to advance the private interests of others to
convey the impressions that they are in special position G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
to influence the judge.'
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
"Hence, a judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of vs.
judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
beyond reproach. One who occupies an exalted position in the administration PHILIPPINES, respondents.
of justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his
private as well as his official conduct must at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety. Because appearance is as important as
reality in the performance of judicial functions, like Caesar's wife, a judge
must not only be pure but also beyond suspicion. A judge has the duty to KAPUNAN, J.:
not only render a just and impartial decision, but also render it in such a
manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and
These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon
impartiality, and also as to the judge's integrity.
which the workings of the contentious and adversarial system in the
Philippine legal process are based — the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the
"It is obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also
proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence,
enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we have no
behave in such a manner that the parties before them should recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to
have confidence in their impartiality."2 the confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to
his client.
The Court shares the view and disquisition of the Honorable Justice. Judges,
indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel The facts of the case are undisputed.
appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias
or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint
or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for
on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
instance, that they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate
Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest,
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges
named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled
should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the
"Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."1
suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their
objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also
they must act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro
comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A.
independence.1âwphi1.nêt Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and
herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law
firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter
WHEREFORE, (a) the complaint against respondent Judge Roberto S.
referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal
Javellana for ignorance of the law is DISMISSED for being without basis; (b)
services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and
said respondent is found administratively liable for failing to render judgment
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative
in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 within the period prescribed therefor and is
and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply,
hereby imposed a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS, with warning that a
as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the
repetition of same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely than herein
members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate
imposed; (c) the respondent, finally, is ADMONISHED to constantly be
the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank
circumspect in his conduct and dealings with lawyers who have pending
representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of
cases before him.
trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with

their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the
assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As
members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul
Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good
Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which
excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case
No. 33 as party-defendant.3 Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private
respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the
identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of
the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J.
Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino
V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja
G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion
Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted,
devised, schemed conspired and confederated with each
other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than
twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including
the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned
investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation,
became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA
Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100
biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately
1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate
books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA
lawyers alleged that:
4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts
with which their codefendants are charged, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1 In the course of rendering
professional and legal services to
clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers,
Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D.
22
Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution,
Eduardo U. Escueta, became herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No.
holders of shares of stock in the 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent
corporations listed under their PCGG. It held:
respective names in Annex "A" of the
expanded Amended Complaint as
xxx xxx xxx
incorporating or acquiring
stockholders only and, as such, they
do not claim any proprietary interest ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not
in the said shares of stock. revealing the identity of the client for whom they have
acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But
until they do identify their clients, considerations of
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one
whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The
Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
purposes not related to the allegations of the expanded
consequences of their acts until they have begun to
Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago
establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the
transferred any material interest therein and therefore
existence and identity of the client.
denies that the "shares" appearing in his name in Annex
"A" of the expanded Amended Complaint are his assets.6
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have
been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a
separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in
the alleged ill-gotten wealth.7 5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has
demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which revelation could show the
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR
lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed the
OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent
PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of
PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-
Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation
defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.8 The Counter-Motion for
to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic
dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October
v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court.
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers
the same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent
exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7,
for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its
PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The
clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the
relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners
disclosures required by the PCGG.
executed in favor of its client covering their respective
shareholdings.9
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the
PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In the
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate
same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be
compliance by private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to
accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.
warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to
wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated
May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG Neither can this Court.
in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private
respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8,
of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to
1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty.
the respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originally
Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG
requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the
as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of
PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10
merit. 12
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the
refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the
same was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA
client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the
lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking
identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11
the following grounds:

I IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who
undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-
stockholders, to the strict application of the law of
agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA
lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore,
deserving of equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence
that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the identities of
the client(s) for whom he acted as
nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had
revealed, or had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of the client(s),
the disclosure does not constitute a
substantial distinction as would make
the classification reasonable under
the equal protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan
sanctioned favoritism and undue
preference in favor of Mr. Roco in
violation of the equal protection
clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this
case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the
PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this
case, the attorney-client privilege
includes the identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required
by the PCGG are not limited to the
identity of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend
to other privileged matters.
23
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in not requiring that the dropping of party-
defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable
and just grounds and with due consideration to the
constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the
equal protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for
reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was denied by
respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's
resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No.
105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant
in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his
alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving him an
advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA
law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking
has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from
revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and
fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of
information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention,
alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of
the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required
(deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee
status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted
correctly in excluding him as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not
filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case
No. 0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a notice of
dismissal',"  14 and he has undertaken to identify his principal. 15
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I we say that? One: There are no really fixed sets of
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-
defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly,
respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish" as they say in
street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a
deal with petitioners — the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion
from the complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned
resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not
revealing the identity of the client for whom they have
acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their choice. But
until they do identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the
existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have
been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.
(Emphasis ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third
Division, entitled "Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission
on Good Government" respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko,
manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies
to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of the
Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust
and deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular persons; some in
blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to
establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one, their
so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it
was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the
monies to these subscription payments of these
corporations who are now the petitioners in this case.
Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some
in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now,
these blank deeds are important to our claim that some
of the shares are actually being held by the nominees for
the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed
deeds of assignment and some of these assignments
have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our
claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Conjuangco
and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of thes e
corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do
officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of
incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial
year. And not only that, they have no permits from the
municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their
addresses now are care of Villareal Law Office. They
really have no address on records. These are some of
the principal things that we would ask of these nominees
stockholders, as they called themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as
defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the
basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as
lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the
complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their

clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such
being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against
petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law
concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where
one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the
object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services
may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, 17 and mandato (contract of
agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract
in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who
requested him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the
principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more
than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust
and confidence reposed on him by his client. 19 A lawyer is also as
independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different
from and superior to those of an ordinary agent.20 Moreover, an attorney also
occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in
fact an officer of the Court 21 and exercises his judgment in the choice of
courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical
conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to
his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by
reason of necessity and public interest 23 based on the hypothesis that
abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal
to the administration of justice. 24
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client
that distinguishes him from any other professional in
society. This conception is entrenched and embodies
centuries of established and stable
tradition. 25 In Stockton v. Ford,26 the U. S. Supreme
Court held:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a
higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and
client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and
faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the
law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and
justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them
in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and
industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not
be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the
party bestowing it. 27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure
enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the
Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any
communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the
24
course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of
the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify
as to matters learned in confidence in the following
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with
a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without
the consent of the client and his employer, concerning
any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in
such capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's
fidelity to client:
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,"
to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him,
save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of
judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him
from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum
the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in
mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed
within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of
attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of
him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud
or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not
that of his client.
Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client relationships are many
and serve several constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional
sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available
to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between
legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal
representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in
some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose
the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self
incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby
rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against
another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at
once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens
the door to a whole spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be
circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An
effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of
confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a
situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of
information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective
representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option
but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing
to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts
and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the
affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in
mystery 30 Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in
the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of this client. 31
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information
is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship
has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there
is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as
a general rule, know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know
who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against
unknown forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by
some important exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing
the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order
requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her client on the ground that the
subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue of the
client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the
unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that
he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a
bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised
her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not
remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited
for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury.
Reversing the lower court's contempt orders, the state supreme court held
that under the circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described
above, even the name of the client was privileged.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig,35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client
identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that
the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very
criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the
activities of the "Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the illegal importation of
drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners, represented key
witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued
summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and
information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of any other
person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under
the facts and circumstances of the case, held:
A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee
arrangements may be privileged where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability
exists that disclosure of such information would implicate
that client in the very criminal activity for which legal
advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680.
While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of
California law, the rule also reflects federal law.
Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to
this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the
principal policy behind the attorney-client privilege. "In
order to promote freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled
disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed;
hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except on
the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at
545. In furtherance of this policy, the client's identity and
the nature of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional
cases, protected as confidential communications. 36
25
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is
privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass
v. Terminal Cab Corporation,37 prompted the New York Supreme Court to
allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his
client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she
was riding, owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab,
whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant
corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information only
as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation
appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed that
the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the second cab when a
man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action,
came to him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was
apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second
cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the
lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that
the insurance company had hired him to defend its
policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney is such
cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder when the
policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence
contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim
against him. 38
xxx xxx xxx
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for
the purpose of professional advice or assistance, are
privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or
contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such
advice or aid; . . . And whenever the communication
made, relates to a matter so connected with the
employment as attorney or counsel as to afford
presumption that it was the ground of the address by the
client, then it is privileged from disclosure. . .
It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of
the second cab came to the attorney in this case as a
confidential communication. His client is not seeking to
use the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on
that theory, nor is the present action pending against him
as service of the summons on him has not been effected.
The objections on which the court reserved decision are
sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,40 the lawyer involved was
required by a lower court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in
a certain transaction. The purpose of the court's request was to determine
whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the
purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought
the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to
divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the
order appealed from, that he represented certain persons
in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made
progress in establishing by such evidence their version of
the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by
the witness would compel him to disclose not only that he
was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of
communications made to him in the course of such
employment as such attorney, he knew that they were
interested in certain transactions. We feel sure that under
such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of
compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile
litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of
the transactions to which it related, when such
information could be made the basis of a suit against his
client. 41
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client
unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only
link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual
of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner,42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the
lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place
the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges
were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably
incorrect and the taxes understated. The clients themselves were unsure
about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird on
the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being
undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the
taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been
previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money
representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for
$12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the
payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird
identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on
the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name the
attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged communication.
A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's
repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal
the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the
government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued
on, and with no government audit or investigation into that client's income tax
liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a client's name is
privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services
rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to possible
investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that
exception to the general rule. Here money was received
by the government, paid by persons who thereby
admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income
taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of
the clients are useful to the government for but one

purpose — to ascertain which taxpayers think they were
delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one
year or several years. The voluntary nature of the
payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more
taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum
previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for
nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual
of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling
of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was
employed — to advise his clients what, under the
circumstances, should be done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could
qualify as exceptions to the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within
the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which
the client seeks legal assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the
attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity
which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to
be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the
entire transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client
may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench,
therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated
earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there
would be not attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal
service sought was duly establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the
PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the
PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of their clients covering their respective
shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the
clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers,
26
regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from
corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained
the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering in In re Grand Jury Proceedings 51 and Tillotson v. Boughner.52 What these
their client's shareholdings. cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what
may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was
part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to their clients. More important, it There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the
constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a
have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the convenient and readily available source of information in the building of a
very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to
sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we
cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name
revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously
would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its
protected by the privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant
case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, "that
case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's
would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client)
identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
of a . . . crime." 47
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes
expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's
on the services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to
case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their
go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case
own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the
where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal
name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the
and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within
nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus
the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The
between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case the it
second case falls within the exception because whether or not the act for
would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the
which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be
name is as much "communication" as information revealed directly about the
used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of
transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly
the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.
privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing
himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be entire attorney-client relationship.
invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the
prosecution may not have a case against the client in the second example
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore
and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the
imposes a strict liability for negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing
latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional
to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well
character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime. 48 The
as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to make
reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are
decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and
founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in
McCloy v. Boon,54 the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the
general, exists.
petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the
latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its
that "under such conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any
compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent
his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such requirements of causation and damages, and found in favor of the client.
information could be made the basis of a suit against his
client." 49 "Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and
employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to
Shipley P.A. v. Scheller55 requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients.
be drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to
In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of
each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as
completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of work done.
privileged communications."50 Where the communicated information, which
The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought
clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but
to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement
there would be not much in the information known to the prosecution which
negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer
would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client would
during the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than what
open up other privileged information which would substantiate the
was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to
prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably linked to
clients in Meinhard v. Salmon56 famously attributed to Justice Benjamin
the subject matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception,
Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind
the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of

sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court found that the
lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the
duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but
extends even after the termination of the relationship. 57
Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients
because the law, which the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess, demanding of her
votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not
prepared to accept respondents' position without denigrating the noble
profession that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what
other gives such scope to realize the spontaneous
energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so
deep in the stream of life — so share its passions its
battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and
actor? . . . But that is not all. What a subject is this in
which we are united — this abstraction called the Law,
wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only
in our lives, but the lives of all men that have been. When
I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are
to speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here
know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained
and lonely passion — only to be won by straining all the
faculties by which man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of
their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients,
because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions
to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential
privilege under the circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity
of the client, then it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation
by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in
the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants
therein, including herein petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut
levy funds the financial and corporate framework and structures
that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and
that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its
wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investment Corporation,
became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of
31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the
ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription
payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or
agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as
instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
27
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official
position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust
enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of
the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their
clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG documents substantiating
the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link "that
would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
the (client) of a crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents
alleged that the private respondent was dropped as party defendant
not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a
nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts
and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which
includes . . . the identity of the principal."59
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted
as a lawyer and nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court
settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners
have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of-court but also
in the Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed
by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of
"legitimate lawyering."60 Being "similarly situated" in this regard,
public respondents must show that there exist other conditions and
circumstances which would warrant their treating the private
respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in order
to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary
consideration behind their decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping
of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose
the identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed
to show — and absolute nothing exists in the records of the case at
bar — that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his
client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to be the
leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the
PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have justified
PCGG's special treatment exempting the private respondent from
prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have required
proof of the undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion"
that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking.
Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were
submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-
investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which
petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal.
These were clients to whom both petitioners and private
respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners
at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted
disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions.61
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or
the filing of the suit in the respondent court without him, therefore,
the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as
species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a
classification which made substantial distinctions based on real
differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records
of the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of
protection against uneven application of status and regulations. In
the broader sense, the guarantee operates against
uneven application of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the
same treatment. 62 Those who fall within a particular class ought to
be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the
liabilities imposed.
. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee
is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For
the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding the rest.63
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent
PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in
PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by
respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.64 It is grossly unfair to exempt one
similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the
same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not
only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but
also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only
in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one
looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of
such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the
privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the
proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are
called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in
confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners
are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position
clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and
they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional
right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right
to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.

It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be
allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners
should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it
is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a
privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing
them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to
continue with respect to them when this Court could nip the
problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an
unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The case
hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of
Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to
continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to
recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which violate the
equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination
and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of
respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on March
18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude
petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz,
Jose C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and
Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No.
0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr., et al."
August 3, 2005
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the Decision dated March 6, 2003, the Court found respondent Atty.
Alfredo Castillo guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and imposed upon him the
penalty of Indefinite Suspension.1 Respondent, who was already married with
three children, had an affair with complainant between 1996 to 1997, while he
was reviewing for the bar until before the release of the results thereof.
Complainant got pregnant and respondent, who was then already a lawyer,
executed a notarized affidavit acknowledging the child as his with a promise
to support said child. Upon the birth of the child, however, respondent started
to refuse recognizing the child and from giving her any form of support.
On April 11, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration seeking
compassion and forgiveness from this Court. He submitted certificates from
government and civic organizations appreciating his services as a lawyer,
certificates of attendance from religious groups, and certificates of good moral
character from judges and lawyers in Occidental Mindoro.2
28
On July 8, 2003, the Court required complainant and the IBP to file comment
thereon.3
On August 11, 2003, the IBP Occidental Mindoro Chapter issued a Resolution
(No. 01-2003) recommending the exoneration of respondent from
administrative liability. It stated that the suspension of respondent, who has
served as Clerk of Court, Public Attorney and 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, would cause a great loss to the community; that respondent has
shown integrity and moral uprightness in the performance of his official
functions; that the acts imputed to him may be attributed to his "youthful
indiscretion period"; and that respondent has mended his ways after taking
his oath as member of the bar.4
The IBP, through Director for Bar Discipline, Rogelio Vinluan, gave its
Comment dated August 15, 2003, stating that the motion for reconsideration
should be denied until respondent admits the paternity of the child and agrees
to support her.5
On August 17, 2003, complainant submitted her Comment stating that
respondent’s motion for reconsideration should be denied since respondent
has not truly repented as he is still not supporting his child.6
On August 25, 2003, respondent’s wife, Livelyn Castillo, submitted a
handwritten letter stating that respondent is loving and "maasikaso" and while
it is true that respondent had an affair with complainant, such was only
because of human frailty. She claims that complainant threatened to file the
present case after respondent ended their illicit affair. Complainant also used
threat to compel respondent to sign the affidavit of acknowledgement and
support. Livelyn further avers that respondent is the sole breadwinner of the
family and that their family will be gravely affected by his suspension.7
On August 28, 2003, respondent filed a Reply to the Comment of the IBP
stating that if the acts acknowledging and giving support to the child of the
complainant are the proofs of his remorse, then he shall comply
unconditionally.8
On September 23, 2003, the Court required complainant to file comment on
Livelyn’s letter.9
On January 13, 2004, complainant’s counsel said that while he sympathizes
with Livelyn and her children, respondent has not taken any move to support
complainant and her child to repair the damage done to them.10
On March 3, 2005, respondent, in his Reply to complainant’s Comment,
reiterated his willingness to support the child if only to show his
remorse. He attached a photocopy of post dated checks addressed to
complainant for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of
₱2,000.00 each.11
On March 4, 2005, Livelyn Castillo, sent another handwritten letter expressing
that it is unfair for her and her three children that respondent had to support
complainant’s daughter when it is not clear who the child’s father is. Livelyn
argues that complainant should have filed a case for support where the
paternity of the child could be determined and not use the present
administrative case to get support from respondent.12
On April 11, 2005, Atty. Luzviminda Puno sent a letter to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro, asking whether or not
respondent is still connected with said office despite having been indefinitely
suspended by this Court. It replied on May 10, 2005 that respondent is still
connected with their office; that he has been regularly receiving his salary and
benefits; and that this was the first time that they received communication
concerning respondent’s administrative case.13
Respondent gave his Comment dated May 9, 2005 stating that he continued
to discharge his duties and received salary and benefits in connection
therewith since he filed a timely motion for reconsideration thus the case has
not yet attained finality.14
In view of respondent’s show of repentance and active service to the
community, the Court deems it just and reasonable to convert the penalty of
indefinite suspension to a definite period of two years suspension.
WHEREFORE, respondent’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The
indefinite suspension imposed on him by the Court in its Decision dated
March 6, 2003 is REDUCED to TWO YEARS suspension effective from date
of receipt of herein Resolution.
Complainant’s further claim for support of her child should be addressed to
the proper court in a proper case.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Castillo’s record in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP, all courts
throughout the country and the Department of Justice including the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro.
G.R. No. 97351 February 4, 1992
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General,
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioner submits for the Court's
adjudication the twin issues of whether or not the Solicitor General neglected
his public duty by withdrawing as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines
and the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in cases he
had filed in court and whether or not the PCGG acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as a result of such withdrawal of
appearance.

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen taxpayer, filed the petition as a
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on the ground that
the subject matters involved are of common and general interest to all Filipino
citizens and taxpayers as they pertain to the enforcement of a public duty and
the prevention of unlawful expenditure of public funds.
According to the petitioner, the Solicitor General is the counsel for the
Republic and the PCGG in thirty-three (33) cases before this Court, one
hundred nine (109) cases in the Sandiganbayan, one (1) case in the National
Labor Relations Commission and another case in the Municipal Trial Court or
a total of one hundred forty-four (144) cases. 1 In December 1990, the
Solicitor General withdrew as counsel in said cases through a pleading
entitled "Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation."2 The pleading states:
The SOLICITOR GENERAL, to this Honorable Court,
hereby respectfully withdraws as counsel for plaintiff
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
in the above-captioned case, with the reservation,
however, conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478,
the provisions of Executive Order No. 292 as well as the
decisional law of "Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et
al.," (G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990), to submit his
comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with
this Honorable Court, if called for by circumstances in the
interest of the government or if he is so required by the
court.
Makati, Metro Manila, December 3, 1990.
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
IBP O.R. No. 289417-2.06.90
The Solicitor General filed a substantially similar pleading in the
cases where the Republic is a party.
As a result of such withdrawal of appearance, the PCGG hired forty (40)
private lawyers, nineteen (19) of whom are trial lawyers. They would receive a
monthly compensation of at least P10,000.00 plus appearance fee of
P1,700.00 in actual trial and/or P500.00 if trial is postponed. 3
Petitioner contends that since the Solicitor General's withdrawal of
appearance was made without any reason, it implied that it was "within the
absolute discretion" of said public official. Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 478 and Section 35 of the Administrative Code of 1987, however,
mandatorily require the Solicitor General to stand in the place of, and act for
the Republic and the PCGG in court. Therefore, the Solicitor General has "no
discretion to reject by withdrawing" as counsel for said entities.
Applying the ruling of this Court with respect to a fiscal in Sta. Rosa Mining
Co. v. Zabala,  4 the petitioner further states that: "Similarly, it is the duty of
the Solicitor General to appear for the Republic and the PCGG, hence
regardless of his personal convictions or opinions, he must proceed to
discharge his duty (not withdraw, which is equivalent to refusal to prosecute),
and let the court decide the merits of the case." 5
29
Moreover, petitioner avers that the Solicitor General cannot withdraw his agents he is expected to represent. The Court must be
appearance "with reservation" nor can he file his "comment/observation on advised of his position just as well. (Emphasis supplied)
the incident/matters" after such withdrawal because by ceasing to appear as
counsel, he loses his standing in court. Unless a case involves the
The petitioner adds the following observations: 9
constitutionality of a treaty, law, ordinance or executive order for which Rule 3
Section 23 of the Rules of Court 6 mandates his appearance, the Solicitor
General is not authorized to appear therein after his withdrawal as counsel Therefore, this case militates more against the Solicitor
inasmuch as he himself is not a party-litigant. General than in his favor. For if the government and its
officials cannot reject the services of the Solicitor
General, neither may the latter select the case he would
Furthermore, under Section 26, of Rule 138,7 the Solicitor General may not
represent by withdrawing in some and retaining others.
unilaterally withdraw his appearance without the consent of the Republic or
For unlike private lawyers who are bound to their clients
the PCGG unless the court authorizes his withdrawal. Since there was no
by contract and, therefore, can reject cases offered to
such court authority, the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance in said
them, the Solicitor General and PCGG are wedded to
several cases is null and void, as it constitutes an act against a mandatory
each other by statute for better and for worse. And only a
law and hence, it may be attacked collaterally. Neither may the Solicitor
divorce, through the abolition of PCGG or resignation of
General withdraw on the authority of Orbos v. Civil Service
the Solicitor General, can untie the marital knot.
Commission 8 wherein this Court held:
Otherwise, the relationship should continue sans PCGG
demurring, and the Solicitor General withdrawing. Absent
In the discharge of this task the Solicitor General must such resignation or abolition, the Solicitor General has to
see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld prosecute or defend the said cases to the best of his
within the limits set by law. . . ability.
xxx xxx xxx Hence, petitioner contends, the PCGG acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as substitutes for the Solicitor General.
Nowhere in Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14 does it appear that the PCGG
There are cases where a government agency declines
is authorized to hire said lawyers. Since the Solicitor General is named by law
the services of the Solicitor General or otherwise fails or
as the lawyer for all government agencies, the hiring of private lawyers by
refuses to forward the papers of the case to him for
such agencies is impliedly excluded. Thus, by employing private lawyers, the
appropriate action. . .
PCGG is creating a public office and naming a public officer. However, in the
absence of a law providing for the creation of the office of PCGG counsel,
The Court finds and so holds that this practice should be said hired lawyers are usurpers or intruders whose acts may be challenged in
stopped. To repeat, the Solicitor General is the lawyer of a collateral proceeding such as an action for prohibition.
the government, any of its agents and officials in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
Similarly, petitioner asserts, prohibition will lie against the Commission on
services of a lawyer. The exception is when such officials
Audit considering that any payment for the services of the PCGG-hired
or agents are being charged criminally or are being civilly
lawyers would result in an unlawful expenditure of public funds. Stressing the
sued for damages arising from a felony. His
need to preserve the status quo until the determination of his rights as a
services cannot be lightly rejected, much less ignored by
citizen and taxpayer, petitioner prays for the issuance of temporary restraining
the officer or officials concerned.
order.
Indeed, the assistance of the Solicitor General should be
Acting on the petition, however, the Court required the respondent to file their
welcomed by the parties. He should be given full support
respective comments on the petition without granting the prayer for a
and cooperation by any agency or official involved in
temporary restraining order. 10
litigation. He should be enabled to faithfully discharge his
duties and responsibilities as the government advocate.
And he should do no less for his clients. His burden of In its comment, the Commission on Audit (COA) alleges that it has not
assisting in the fair and just administration of justice is allowed the disbursement of funds to pay for the services of PCGG-hired
clear. private lawyers. It points out the fact that under COA Circular No. 89-299
dated March 21, 1989, the COA has withdrawn the pre-audit of transactions
entered into by national government agencies pursuant to the constitutional
This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver
provision that the COA has the exclusive authority to "define the scope of its
in the performance of his duty. As a matter of fact, the
audit and examination, to establish the techniques and methods required
Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor
therefor." 11 Neither has the COA allowed in post-audit the disbursements of
General in many proceedings and his continued fealty to
funds in payment of the services of the hired private lawyers. Moreover, under
his assigned task. He should not therefore desist from
COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986, the hiring of private lawyers by
appearing before this Court even in those cases he finds
government agencies and instrumentalities is prohibited unless there is prior
his opinion inconsistent with the government or any of its

written conformity of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate
Counsel, as the case may be, as well as the written concurrence of COA.
For its part, the PCGG, through Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren and
lawyer Eliseo B. Alampay, asserts in its comment that the scope of its
authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14 is broad enough to include
the authority to engage the services of private lawyers, if necessary, for the
fulfillment of its mandate. While such authority is not expressly stated in said
executive orders, "it must be deemed necessarily implied in and subsumed
under the expressly enumerated powers of the Commission." 12
The PCGG contends that its power under Section 1 of Executive Order No.
14 to "file and prosecute all cases investigated by it" includes "the grant of
discretion to the Commission in determining the manner of filing and
prosecuting its cases including the matter of who, in particular, will control
and supervise the prosecution of said cases." The phrase "with the
assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government
agencies" simply means that the Solicitor General is called upon to render
assistance to the PCGG and whether or not such discretion is required by the
Commission is a matter of discretion on its part. Such provision does not
preclude the PCGG from engaging the services of private lawyers in the
same way that it is "clearly authorized to hire accountants, appraisers,
researchers and other professionals as it performs its functions." Since, upon
the dictates of legal and practical necessity, it has hired lawyers in the United
States and in Switzerland, "it may similarly hire Filipino lawyers in prosecuting
its Philippine cases." 13
The PCGG further asserts that the hiring of private lawyers is "not an ultra
vires" act but a "means by which (it) can effectively exercise its powers." It
emphasizes the fact that it hired private lawyers "only after the Officer of the
Solicitor General had unilaterally withdrawn its appearance" for the PCGG in
the various pending PCGG-instituted cases. Its own Litigation Division, which
was constituted after the Solicitor General's withdrawal, is "sorely
undermanned" but it has to contend with "affluent and influential individuals
and entities" who can "afford to hire skilled lawyers and organize vast
litigation networks." The PCGG tried to seek the assistance of the Department
of Justice and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel but only the
former sent two additional prosecutors to handle its cases. 14
The PCGG clarifies that its powers are circumscribed not only by the
executive orders aforementioned but also by the inherent police power of the
State. By hiring private lawyers, it was merely trying to assist the President of
the Philippines in protecting the interest of the State. As such, it was acting as
an alter ego of the President and therefore, it was the Executive which
determined the necessity of engaging the services of private prosecutors.
Contending that "overwhelming necessity" impelled it to hire private lawyers,
the PCGG avers that inasmuch as the Central Bank of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Bank may engage the services of private lawyers, with
more reason may it be allowed to hire private prosecutors after it was
abandoned by the Solicitor General in the prosecution of the ill-gotten wealth
cases. Consequently, "the Solicitor General's withdrawal of assistance is
tantamount to his tacit approval of the PCGG's hiring of private prosecutors in
replacement of the solicitors handling the said civil cases." 15
The PCGG concludes that the reasonableness of the compensation for its
hired lawyers can hardly be questioned considering the expertise of said
lawyers and the complexity of the cases they would be handling for the
30
PCGG. Thus, the prayer for a preliminary injunction must be denied otherwise are sine qua non in both types of relationship. The
"the harm that would be done would be far greater than the perceived relationship is rather one, created as it is by law, where
mischief petitioner seeks to prevent." 16 imposed upon OSG is the responsibility to present to the
courts the position that will uphold the best interests of
the People, the Government and the State, albeit the
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez inhibits himself from appearing in this
same may run counter to its client's position or route of
case "considering that as far as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for
action. At any rate, the PCGG through nationwide TV
brevity) is concerned, the subject is a closed matter among the OSG, the
broadcast and print media, publicly announced that
PCGG and the Courts." 17 In the comment filed by Assistant Solicitor General
PCGG had disposed with or otherwise did not need the
Edgardo L. Kilayko and Solicitor Iderlina P. Pagunuran, the OSG sets out at
legal services of the Lawyer of the Government, and thus
length the history of the PCGG from its creation until the filing in the
OSG descended, not the unmerited remark of having
Sandiganbayan of thirty-nine (39) " prima facie cases" for ill-gotten wealth
"abandoned" the ill-gotten wealth cases, but the time-
against former President Marcos and his cronies. As suits and countersuits
honored principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio
stemmed from the original thirty-nine (39) civil cases, "the OSG had been put
est, i.e., there is no obligation to do impossible things
to a tremendous task and thus invariably in urgent need of being consulted or
(Lim Co Chui v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 463), without in any
informed by the PCGG of the facts and circumstances material to the
way casting any aspersion on the moral integrity of any
prosecution and progress not only of the original 39 civil cases, but also of all
Commissioner or PCGG official, as made clear by the
kinds of "incidents."
Solicitor General to the President in a meeting with
PCGG.
Nonetheless, the OSG lawyers faced the challenge and the odds if only to live
up to their task as "the best lawyers there are in the country." The OSG
Hence, in the light of all the foregoing circumstances, at
further explains: 18
rock-bottom precisely so as not to prejudice "the interest
of the Government" (Orbos), the Solicitor General
On many a time, however a time, however, the lack of withdrew as counsel for PCGG in all said cases by filing
the above-mentioned consultation or information resulted a notice of "Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation."
in situations that rendered the OSG unavoidably
incapable of performing its functions and duties as
In arguing that the instant petition should be dismissed, the OSG contends
Lawyer of the Government, not only as mandated upon it
that this case has become moot and academic as this very Court had
by law and as spelled out in Orbos v. CSC, G.R. No.
resolved to allow the withdrawal of appearance of the Solicitor General in all
92561, September 12, 1990, but also in consonance with
the cases pending before it "with reservation, conformably with PD No. 478,
its office motto: "Integrity In Advocacy."
Executive Order No. 292, as well as the doctrine laid down in 'Orbos v. Civil
Service Commission, et al.,' G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, . . ." 19 For
Once the OSG argued before the Sandiganbayan that an its part, the Sandiganbayan had also resolved that "the appearance of the
asset was under sequestration, only to be informed by Solicitor General is deemed withdrawn to be substituted by the PCGG's legal
the adverse party waving a document before the panel." 20
Sandiganbayan Justices that the sequestration had
earlier been lifted, with a PCGG resolution, the
The OSG maintains further that the instant petition does not present a case
document, to boot (Razon case). Then, again, OSG
and controversy as the petitioner himself does not even have a "court
argued, even before this Honorable Court, that an ill-
standing" and a "litigable interest." All the petitioner seeks is an "advisory
gotten asset had "mysteriously" disappeared, only to be
opinion." The OSG asserts that the "incident" (referring to the Solicitor
informed by the Honorable Court, that a PCGG
General's withdrawal of appearance) should be distinguished from that
Commissioner had earlier by resolution authorized the
in JPC Enterprise, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 21 wherein the Assets
disposition of the asset (COCOFED case). All the
Privatization Trust (APT) decided to appear for itself because the law names
instances need not be enumerated here, as they are not
the Minister of Justice only as its ex oficio legal adviser while by itself it can
meat and substance, even as OSG is rendered thereby a
file suits and institute proceedings and engage external expertise in the
laughing stock in its professionalism.
fulfillment of its tasks. However, since the APT has no personality of its own, it
should have appeared through the Solicitor General. The OSG argues that
As to matters that are of great pith and moment, suffice it said "adversarial incident" is not present in this case.
to say that the recent Benedicto "compromise"
agreement, not to mention the SMC-UCPB Compromise
In his reply to the comments of the PCGG and the OSG, the petitioner insists
settlement, is sub judice or under advisement not only of
that although as between the Solicitor General and the PCGG, this case may
the Sandiganbayan but also of this Honorable Court in
have been rendered moot and academic, as between him on the one hand
separate "incidents," and suffice it to state that the
and the Solicitor General and the PCGG on the other hand, a "real
relationship, obtaining between the Government
controversy" still exists and the issues raised herein have not ceased to exist
offices/agencies and the Office of the Solicitor General as
either. Moreover, a judgment of prohibition and mandamus would have a
counsel, is not at all like one that simply would obtain
"practical legal effect and can be enforced." 22
between private client and private lawyer in private
practice, although constant consultation and advice

Citing Miguel v. Zulueta, 23 and Tañada v. Tuvera, 24 petitioner asserts that he
has a standing in court because where a question of public right is involved
and the object of the mandamus is the enforcement of a public duty, the
relator need not show any legal or special interest in the result of the
proceeding. It is sufficient that, as a citizen, he is interested in having the laws
executed and the duty in question enforced.
The petitioner rebuts the PCGG's contention that its power to hire private
lawyers may be implied from its expressly enumerated powers. He asserts
that since P.D. No. 478 mandates that "the Solicitor General as law office of
the government with the duty to appear for the PCGG," no implication from
the express powers of (the) PCGG can stand against the language of P.D.
No. 478. On the other hand, the law regarding the PCGG and that regarding
the Solicitor General should be harmonized. 25
The Court considers these pleadings sufficient bases for resolving this
petition and, on account of the importance and imperativeness of the issues
raised herein, the filing of memoranda by the parties is dispensed with.
We shall, first of all, confront a preliminary issue interposed by the OSG —
whether or not this case has been rendered moot and academic by this
Court's resolution granting the Solicitor General's motion to withdraw
appearance as counsel in the several cases pending herein. It should be
clarified that the resolution had to be issued with the national interest in mind.
Time was of the essence and any hedging on the part of the PCGG and/or its
counsel could, not merely set back but prejudice, the government's all-out
efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth.
Notwithstanding the ostensible mootness of the issues raised in a case, this
Court has never shirked from its symbolic function of educating bench and
bar by formulating guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines and
rules. 26 More so, if the case is of such magnitude that certain legal
ambiguities must be unravelled for the protection of the national interest. 27
To allow the transcendental issue of whether the OSG may withdraw its
appearance in a cluster of cases of national import to pass into legal limbo
simply because it has been "mooted" would be a clear case of misguided
judicial self-restraint. This Court has assiduously taken every opportunity to
lay down brick by brick the doctrinal infrastructure of our legal system.
Certainly, this is no time for a display of judicial timorousness of the kind
which the Solicitor General is untimely exhibiting now.
Accordingly, we confront the issue conscious of their far-reaching
implications, not alone on the instant case but on future ones as well, which
the OSG will surely be called upon to handle again and again.
The resolution of the first issue laid down at the beginning of
this ponencia hinges on whether or not the Solicitor General may be
compelled by mandamus to appear for the Republic and the PCGG. This
issue is best resolved by a close scrutiny of the nature and extent of the
power and authority lodged by law on the Solicitor General.
At this juncture, a flashback on the statutory origins of the Office of the
Solicitor General is in order. Incorporated in Act No. 136 dated June 11,
31
1901 28 providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine Islands was
Chapter III entitled "The Attorney General." Section 40 states:
There shall be an Attorney-General for the Philippine
Islands, to be appointed by the Philippine
Commission . . .
The catalog of his duties includes the following:
He shall prosecute or defend therein all causes, civil and
criminal, to which the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity, is a
party . . . 29
Section 41 further provides:
There shall be an officer learned in the law to assist the
Attorney-General in the performance of all his duties,
called the Solicitor-General who shall be appointed by
the Commission . . . In case of a vacancy in the office of
Attorney-General, or of his absence or disability, the
Solicitor-General shall have power to exercise the duties
of that office. Under the supervision of the Attorney-
General, it shall be the especial duty of the Solicitor-
General to conduct and argue suits and appeals in the
Supreme Court, in which the Philippine Government is
interested, and the Attorney-General may, whenever he
deems it for the interest of the Philippine Government,
either in person conduct and argue any case in any court
of the Philippine Islands in which the Philippine
Government is interested or may direct the Solicitor
General to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
Six months later, a law was passed reorganizing the Office of the Attorney-
General and providing for the appointment of the said official and the Solicitor
General by the Civil Governor and for an increase in their salaries. Their
duties remained basically the same. 30
In the meantime, Act No. 222 was passed on September 5, 1901 providing for
the organization of, among others, the Department of Finance and Justice
which embraced within its executive control the Bureau of Justice. 31
Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1917,
the Bureau of Justice is specifically constituted "the law office of the
Government of the Philippine Islands and by it shall be performed duties
requiring the services of a law officer." 32 Its chief officials are the Attorney-
General and his assistant, the Solicitor General. 33
As principal law officer of the Government, the Attorney-
General shall have authority to act for and represent the
Government of the Philippine Islands, its officers, and
agents in any official investigation, proceeding, or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. 34
In 1932, the office of the Attorney-General was phased out and his functions
were assumed by the Secretary of Justice. 35 Subsequently, the Bureau of
Justice came to be known as the Office of the Solicitor General, 36 headed by
the Solicitor General. 37
Parenthetically, these institutions were patterned after the Office of Attorney-
General, created by the First U.S. Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789
which called for a "meet person, learned in the law, to act as Attorney-
General for the U.S." 38 When the Department of Justice was established in
1870, the position of Solicitor-General was created as an assistant to the
Attorney-General. 39 Over a century later, their respective positions and
functions remain the same. The Attorney-General of the United States,
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, is now
the head of the Department of Justice. 40 In the same manner, a Solicitor
General, learned in the law, is appointed to assist the Attorney-General in the
performance of his duties. 41
In contrast, the Solicitor-General of the Philippines, emerging from the
shadow of the Attorney-General and later, of the Secretary of Justice, has
come to his own. On July 20, 1948, Republic Act. No. 335, amending Section
1659 of the Administrative Code, bestowed on him the rank of Undersecretary
of a Department. Subsequently, a series of amendatory laws designed to
enlarge the complement of the Office of the Solicitor General was
enacted 42 until on June 4, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 478, its
pivotal role in the government became clearly defined and delineated.
During the martial law years, President Ferdinand E. Marcos leaned heavily
on his Solicitor General to provide legal underpinnings of his official acts.
Reflective of the tremendously enhanced power of the official and the position
was Executive Order No. 454 enacted on September 23, 1975, conferring
upon the Solicitor General the rank of a member of the Cabinet "with all the
rights, honors and privileges pertaining to the position." Said executive order
was superseded by Executive Order No. 473 dated August 12, 1976 "making
the Solicitor General a member of the Cabinet." These executive orders were
capped by Executive Order No. 552 dated August 14, 1979 elevating the
OSG into a Ministry with the same powers and functions defined in P.D. Nos.
478 and 1347.
P.D. 478 became, as it were, the Magna Carta of the Office of the Solicitor
General. After the change of administration, or on July 25, 1987, President
Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 292 instituting the
Administrative Code of 1987. Under Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof, the
Office of the Solicitor General is described as an "independent and
autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice." Headed by the
Solicitor General, "who is the principal law officer and legal defender of the
Government," the Office shall have a Legal Staff composed of fifteen (15)
Assistant Solicitors General and such number of Solicitors and Trial Attorneys
"as may be necessary to operate the Office which shall divided into fifteen
(15) divisions. 43 Among its powers and functions are the following which are
relevant to the issues:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. — The office of the
Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.
When authorized by the President or head of the office

concerned, it shall also represent government owned or
controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the
Government, and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of a lawyer. (Emphasis supplied.) It
shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions
and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in
his official capacity is a party.
(2) Investigate, initiate court action,
or in any manner proceed against
any person, corporation or firm for
the enforcement of any contract,
bond, guarantee, mortgage, pledge
or other collateral executed in favor
of the Government. Where
proceedings are to be conducted
outside of the Philippines, the
Solicitor General may employ
counsel to assist in the discharge of
the aforementioned responsibilities.
x x x           x x x          x x x
(8) Deputize legal officers of
government departments, bureaus,
agencies and offices to assist the
Solicitor General and appear or
represent the Government in cases
involving their respective offices,
brought before the courts and
exercise supervision and control
over such legal Officers with respect
to such cases.
(9) Call on any department, bureau,
office, agency or instrumentality of
the Government for such service,
assistance and cooperation as may
be necessary in fulfilling its function
and responsibilities and for this
purpose enlist the services of any
government official or employees in
the pursuit of his tasks.
Departments, bureaus, agencies,
offices, instrumentalities and
32
corporations to whom the Office of In common or ordinary parlance and in its ordinary
the Solicitor General renders legal significance, the term "shall" is a word of command, and
services are authorized to disburse one which has always and which must be given a
funds from their sundry operating compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or
and other funds for the latter Office. mandatory. It has the invariable significance of operating
For this purpose, the Solicitor to impose a duty which may be enforced, particularly if
General and his staff are specifically public policy is in favor of this meaning or when public
authorized to receive allowances as interest is involved, or where the public or persons have
may be provided by the Government rights which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a
offices, instrumentalities and contrary intent appears. 45
corporations concerned, in addition
to their regular compensation.
The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is
used in an imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a
(10) Represent, upon the instructions different interpretations if sought, it must rest upon
of the President of the Republic of something in the character of the legislation or in the
the Philippines in international context which will justify a different meaning. 46
litigations, negotiations or
conferences where the legal position
Exactly what is the signification of the mandate for the OSG "to represent the
of the Republic must be defended or
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
presented.
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigations or matter
requiring the services of the lawyer?"
(11) Act for the Republic and/or the
people before any court, tribunal,
To "represent" is standing in place, supplying the place,
body or commission in any matter,
or performing the duties or exercising the rights, of the
action or proceeding which, in his
party represented; to speak or act with authority on
opinion , affects the welfare of the
behalf of another; to conduct and control proceedings in
people as the ends of justice may
court on behalf of another.47
require; and
The decision of this Court as early as 1910 with respect to the duties of
(12) Perform such other functions as
Attorney-General well applies to the Solicitor General under the facts of the
may be provided by law. 44
present case. The Court then declared:
In thus tracing the origins of the Office of the Solicitor General to gain a clear
In this jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Attorney General
understanding of the nature of the functions and extent of the powers of the
"to perform the duties imposed upon him by law" and "he
Solicitor General himself, it is evident that a policy decision was made in the
shall prosecute all causes, civil and criminal, to which the
early beginnings to consolidate in one official the discharge of legal functions
Government of the Philippines Islands, or any officer
and services in the government. These took the form mostly of representing
thereof, in his official capacity, is a party . . ." 48
the Government in various legal proceedings.
Being a public officer, the Solicitor General is "invested with some portion of
The rationale behind this step is not difficult to comprehend. Sound
the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
government operations require consistency in legal policies and practices
benefit of the public." 49 Another role of the Solicitor General is an officer of
among the instrumentalities of the State. Moreover, an official learned in the
the Court, in which case he is called upon "to share in the task and
law and skilled in advocacy could best plan and coordinate the strategies and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes;" therefore, he may
moves of the legal battles of the different arms of the government. Surely, the
be enjoined in the same manner that a special prosecutor was sought
economy factor, too, must have weighed heavily in arriving at such a
enjoined by this Court from committing any act which may tend to "obstruct,
decision.
pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice." 50
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official,
In one case where a fiscal manifested before the trial court that he would not
the Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the
prosecute the case in court for insufficiency of evidence after his motion to
government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is
dismiss had been denied, this Court granted a petition for mandamus to
the discernible intent which may be gathered from the term "shall," which is
compel him to prosecute the case. We declared:
invariably employed, from Act No. 136 (1901) to the more recent Executive
Order No. 292 (1987).
Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the
fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence
Under the principles of statutory construction, so familiar even to law
to the Court to enable the court to arrive at its own
students, the term "shall" is nothing if not mandatory.
 33

independent judgment as to the culpability of the
accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his
responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the
case at the hands of a private prosecutor . . . In the trial
of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to
appear for the government since an offense is an outrage
to the sovereignty of the State . . . This is so because
"the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty
where obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligations to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. 51
Undoubtedly, the above arguments apply equally well to the Solicitor General
who is sought to be compelled to appear before the different courts to ensure
that the case of the Republic of the Philippines against those who illegally
amassed wealth at the expense the people maybe made to account for their
misdeeds and return said wealth.
Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in
choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a
prosecution already started, 52 our own Solicitor General may even dismiss,
abandon, discontinue or compromise suit either with or without stipulations
with other party. 53 Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that the
Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reason for the
discretion given him is not unlimited. 54 Its exercise must be, not only within
the parameters set by law but with the best interest of the State as the
ultimate goal. Such are reflected in its policies, thus:
The discretionary power of the attorney for the United
States in determining whether a prosecution shall be
commenced or maintained may well depend upon
matters of policy wholly apart from any question of
probable cause. Although as member of the bar, the
Attorney for the United States is an officer of the court, he
is nevertheless an executive official of the Government,
and it is as an officer of the executive department that he
exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be
a prosecution in a particular case. . . . 55
The first executive order ever issued by President Aquino on February 28,
1986, created the PCGG. It announced the government's policy of recovering
all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives and close associates. It charged the PCGG with the "task of
assisting the President" in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth,
investigation of "such cases of graft and corruption as the President may
assign" to it, and the adoption of safeguards to ensure that corruption may not
be again committed with impunity.
This issuance was followed by Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986
freezing all assets and properties of Marcos, his family and cronies;
prohibiting their transfer, conveyance, encumbrance or concealment, and
requiring all persons in and outside of the Philippines who are in possession
of said properties to make full disclosure of the same to the PCGG.
On April 11, 1986, the PCGG promulgated its Rules and Regulations. A
pertinent provision states:
Sec. 10. Findings of the Commission. — Based on the
evidence adduced, the Commission shall determine
whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the
asset, property or business enterprise in question
constitute ill-gotten wealth as described in Executive
Orders Nos. 1 and 2. In the event of an affirmative
finding, the Commission shall certify the case to the
Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance
with law. Business, properties, funds, and other assets
found to be lawfully acquired shall be immediately
released and the writ of sequestration, hold or freeze
orders lifted accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, or on May 7, 1986, Executive Order No. 14 defining the
jurisdiction over cases involving such ill-gotten wealth was issued, it contains
the following provisions:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, with the assistance of the Solicitor General
and other government agencies, is hereby empowered to
file and prosecute all cases investigated by it under
Executive Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986, and
Executive Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be
warranted by its finding.
Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or
criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.
Sec. 3. Civil suits for restitution, reparation of damages,
or indemnification for consequential damages, forfeiture
proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379,
or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other
existing laws, in connection with Executive Order No. 2
dated March 12, 1986, may be filed separately from and
proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and
may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied).
All these legal provisions ineluctably lead to no other conclusion but that
under the law of its creation and the complementary Rules, the law office of
the PCGG, as it is for the rest of the Government, is the Office of the Solicitor
General. Although the PCGG is "empowered to file and prosecute all cases
investigated by it" under Executive Orders No. 1 and 2, it does not thereby
oust the Office of the Solicitor General from its lawful mandate to represent
the Government and its agencies in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer. Moreover, such express grant of
power to PCGG does not imply that it may abdicate such power and turn over
the prosecution of the cases to private lawyers whom it may decide to
employ. In those instances where proceedings are to be conducted outside of
the Philippines, the Solicitor General, continuing to discharge his duties, may
employ counsel to assist him, 56 particularly because he may not be licensed
to appear before the courts in a foreign jurisdiction.
Under its own Rules and Regulations, specifically the provision aforequoted,
the PCGG certifies to the Solicitor General the cases for which it had found
reasonable ground to believe that certain assets and properties are ill-gotten
under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2. The Solicitor General shall then proceed
"in accordance with law."
Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his
discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the
case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case
at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably
with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at
hand.
After filing a case, he may even move for its dismissal in the event that, along
the way, he realizes that prosecuting the case would not serve the
government's purposes. In other words, because he was appointed to the
position on account of his qualification as a man "learned in the law," the
Solicitor General is obligated to perform his functions and to perform them
well. He may not, however, abdicate his function through an arbitrary exercise
of his discretion. We find that a withdrawal of appearance on flimsy or petty
grounds is tantamount to withdrawing on no grounds at all and to a dereliction
of duty.
The Office of the Solicitor General repeatedly invoked the ruling in Orbos
v. Civil Service Commission,  57 which hardly constitutes authority to uphold its
position with respect to the withdrawal of the Solicitor General in the instant
case. On the contrary, in said case, this Court struck down private
respondent's motion to disqualify the OSG from appearing for petitioner
Department of Transportation and Communications Secretary Orbos. At the
risk of being repetitious, the parties were reminded that under Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 478 —
The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court clarified that even when "confronted with a situation where one
government office takes an adverse position against another government
agency, as in this case, the Solicitor General should not refrain from
performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him
to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best
interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position. In
such an instance, the government office adversely affected by the position
taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its case may
appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative."
The Court further pointed out that it is not entirely impossible that the Office of
the Solicitor General may take a position adverse to his clients like the Civil

Service Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission, among
others, and even the People of the Philippines. In such instances, however, it
is not proper for the Solicitor General to simply decline to handle the case or
arbitrarily withdraw therefrom. The Court enjoins him to "nevertheless
manifest his opinion and recommendations to the Court which is an
invaluable aid in the disposition of the case." 58
However, in those cases where a government agency declines the services of
the Solicitor General or otherwise fails or refuses to forward the papers of the
case to him for appropriate action, the Court categorically held that ". . . this
practice should be estopped." 59 By the same token, the Solicitor General
should not decline to appear in court to represent a government agency
without just and valid reason, especially the PCGG which is under the Office
of the President, he being a part of the Executive Department.
In the case at bar, the reason advanced by the Solicitor General for his
motion to withdraw his appearance as lawyer for the PCGG is that he has
been, more than once embarrassed in court and thereby made "a laughing
stock in its (his) professionalism." Examples are when the OSG lawyers
betrayed ignorance in open court of certain moves taken by the PCGG, such
as the lifting of a sequestration of an asset or when it was under the
impression that an asset had mysteriously disappeared only to be informed
that "a PCGG Commissioner had earlier by resolution authorized the
disposition of said asset."
The last straw, as it were, was the public announcement through media made
by the PCGG that it had "dispensed with or otherwise did not need the legal
services of the lawyer of the government." 60 It is evident that the withdrawal
of the Solicitor General was precipitated by institutional pique, the lawyers
concerned having allowed their collective pride to prevail over their sense of
duty in protecting and upholding the public interest.
One wistfully wishes that the OSG could have been as zealous in
representing the PCGG as it was in appearing for the head of their office, the
Solicitor General, in a civil suit for damages filed against him in a Regional
Trial Court arising from allegedly defamatory remarks uttered by him.
Such enthusiasm, according to this Court, was misplaced. For Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 478 which authorizes the OSG to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, admits of an exception, and that it is, it
stops short of representing "a public official at any stage of a criminal case or
in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony."61
In instances such as the above, the OSG can, with reason, withdraw its
representation even if it has already entered its appearance. But the Solicitor
General, as the officially-mandated lawyer of the government, is not
empowered to take a similar step on the basis of a petty reason like
embarrassment, as that to which the individual lawyers assigned to appear for
their office were subjected. Had they not been too preoccupied with their
personal feelings, they could have checked themselves in time. For a sense
of professional responsibility and proper decorum would dictate that they
distinguish between the institution which, from the very beginning, had been
constituted as the law office of the Government and the individuals through
whom its powers and duties are exercised. No emotions, of whatever kind
34
and degree, should be allowed to becloud their high sense of duty and
commitment to country and people.
The OSG itself admitted refraining from citing other incidents as additional
bases for the Solicitor General's withdrawal "as they are not of meat and
substance" but apparently, their overwhelming sense of shame overcame
them as the OSG was "rendered thereby a laughing stock in its
professionalism." 62
Now a word on the incidents that allegedly caused humiliation to the OSG
lawyers, thus provoking the Solicitor General into withdrawing his appearance
as counsel for the PCGG. No litigation can be assured of success if counsel
does not enjoy the confidence of his client. This is manifested by, among
other things, holding regular, constant and untrammeled consultation with
each other. Who can say but that if the communication lines had been kept
open between the OSG and PCGG, no surprises would have been sprung on
the former by the latter in open court?
Petitioner's claim that the Solicitor General could not withdraw his appearance
as lawyer of PCGG inasmuch as he had neither the consent of his client nor
the authority from the court, applying the pertinent provision of the Rules of
Court, is not well-taken. Here is no ordinary lawyer-client relationship. Let it
be remembered that the client is no less than the Republic of the Philippines
in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides. Whether regarded as an abstract
entity or an ideal person, it is to state the obvious that it can only act through
the instrumentality of the government which, according to the Administrative
Code of 1987, refers to the "corporate governmental entity through which the
functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines . . ." 63 And
the OSG is, by law, constituted the law office of the Government whose
specific powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or
the people before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the
people as the ends of justice may require.
Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a collectivity that
constitutes the Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the distinguished client of
the OSG is the people themselves of which the individual lawyers in said
office are a part.
In order to cushion the impact of his untimely withdrawal of appearance which
might adversely affect the case, the Solicitor General has offered "to submit
his comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this Honorable
Court, if called for by circumstances in the interest of the government or if he
is so required by the court." However, as correctly pointed out by the
petitioner, while the Solicitor General may be free to express his views and
comments before the Court in connection with a case he is handling, he may
not do so anymore after he has formally expressed his refusal to appear
therein. For by then, he has lost his standing in court. Unless his views are
sought by the court, the Solicitor General may not voluntarily appear in behalf
of his client after his withdrawal from the case; otherwise, such reappearance
would constitute a blatant disregard for court rules and procedure, and that,
on the part of one who is presumed to be "learned in the law."
In the face of such express refusal on the part of the Solicitor General to
continue his appearance as counsel of the PCGG in the cases to recover the
ill-gotten wealth of the Filipino people from the Marcoses and their cronies,
the PCGG has had to employ the service of a group of private attorneys lest
the national interest be prejudiced. Were this Court to allow such action to
remain unchallenged, this could well signal the laying down of the novel and
unprecedented doctrine that the representation by the Solicitor General of the
Government enunciated by law is, after all, not mandatory but merely
directory. Worse, that this option may be exercised on less than meritorious
grounds; not on substance but on whimsy, depending on the all too human
frailties of the lawyers in the OSG assigned to a particular case. Under such
circumstances, it were better to repeal the law than leave the various
government agencies, all dependent on the OSG for legal representation, in a
condition of suspenseful uncertainty. With every looming legal battle, they will
be speculating whether they can rely on the Solicitor General to defend the
Government's interest or whether they shall have to depend on their own "in-
house" resources for legal assistance.
The Court is firmly convinced that, considering the spirit and the letter of the
law, there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the
Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to
"represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer."
Sound management policies require that the government's approach to legal
problems and policies formulated on legal issues be harmonized and
coordinated by a specific agency. The government owes it to its officials and
their respective offices, the political units at different levels, the public and the
various sectors, local and international, that have dealings with it, to assure
them of a degree of certitude and predictability in matters of legal import.
From the historical and statutory perspectives detailed earlier in
this ponencia, it is beyond cavil that it is the Solicitor General who has been
conferred the singular honor and privilege of being the "principal law officer
and legal defender of the Government." One would be hard put to name a
single legal group or law firm that can match the expertise, experience,
resources, staff and prestige of the OSG which were painstakingly built up for
almost a century.
Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of
virtually the entire government officialdom, the OSG may be expected to
transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client agency and instead,
promote and protect the public weal. Given such objectivity, it can discern,
metaphorically speaking, the panoply that is the forest and not just the
individual trees. Not merely will it strive for a legal victory circumscribed by the
narrow interests of the client office or official, but as well, the vast concerns of
the sovereign which it is committed to serve.
In light of the foregoing, the Solicitor General's withdrawal of his appearance
on behalf of the PCGG was beyond the scope of his authority in the
management of a case. As a public official, it is his sworn duty to provide
legal services to the Government, particularly to represent it in litigations. And
such duty may be enjoined upon him by the writ of mandamus. And such duty
may be enjoined upon him by the writ of mandamus. Such order, however,
should not be construed to mean that his discretion in the handling of his
cases may be interfered with. The Court is not compelling him to act in a
particular way. 64 Rather, the Court is directing him to prevent a failure of
justice 65 resulting from his abandonment in midstream of the cause of the
PCGG and the Republic and ultimately, of the Filipino people.

In view of the foregoing, there need be no proof adduced that the petitioner
has a personal interest in the case, as his petition is anchored on the right of
the people, through the PCGG and the Republic, to be represented in court
by the public officer duly authorized by law. The requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and hence,
part of the public which possesses the right. 66
The writ of prohibition, however, may not be similarly treated and granted in
this petition. The said writ, being intended to prevent the doing of some act
that is about to be done, it may not provide a remedy for acts which are
already fait accompli.  67 Having been placed in a situation where it was
constrained to hire private lawyers if the Republic's campaign to legally
recover the wealth amassed by the Marcoses, their friends and relatives was
to prosper, the PCGG's action is justified. However, it was not entirely
blameless. Its failure to coordinate closely with the Solicitor General has
spawned the incidents which culminated in the withdrawal of the latter from
appearing as counsel in its cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The
Solicitor General is DIRECTED to immediately re-enter his appearance in the
cases wherein he had filed a motion to withdraw appearance and the PCGG
shall terminate the services of the lawyers it had employed but not before
paying them the reasonable fees due them in accordance with rules and
regulations of the Commission on Audit.
This decision is immediately executory.
G.R. No. 92561 September 12, 1990
SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and NERIO MADARANG, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Jose C. Cimano for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J:
Once again the extent of the authority of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
to pass upon contested appointments is brought into focus in this petition.
The appearance of the Solicitor General on behalf of the petitioner is also
questioned.
In the course of the reorganization of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), Guido C. Agon and Alfonso Magnayon were
appointed to the positions of Head Telecommunications Engineer, range 74.
Nerio Madarang who was also appointed to the position of Supervising
Telecommunications Engineer, range 12, questioned the appointments of
35
Agon and Magnayon by filing an appeal with the Reorganization Appeals
Board of the DOTC composed of Moises S. Tolentino, Jr. of the Office of the
Secretary, as Chairman and Assistant Secretary Rosauro V. Sibal and
Graciano L. Sitchon of the Office of the Secretary, as members. In a
resolution dated January 9, 1989 the said Reorganization Appeals Board
dismissed Madarang's appeal for lack of merit. Hence, he appealed to the
public respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC)
In its resolution dated August 29, 1989, respondent CSC revoked the
appointments of Agon and Magnayon for the contested positions and directed
the appointment of Madarang to the said position of Heads
Telecommunications Engineer. 1 DOTC Assistant Secretary Sibal sought a
reconsideration of the said resolution of the CSC but this was denied in a
resolution dated November 2, 1989. 2
On November 21, 1989, Assistant Secretary Sibal filed a manifestation with
the CSC stating:
The Telecommunications Office through the undersigned,
hereby manifests that we received the CSC resolution in
CSC Case No. 393 on November 12, 1989 and in
compliance thereto, we will convene our Selection and
Promotion Board to deliberate on the position of Head
Telecommunications Engineer (reclassified to Engineer
IV pursuant to National Compensation Circular No. 58
effective July 1, 1989) with qualified candidates including
appellant Nerio Madarang. 3
In a letter dated November 27, 1989, respondent Madarang requested the
CSC to take appropriate action by implementing its resolutions dated August
29, 1989 and November 2, 1989.
In an order dated December 19, 1989, the CSC directed the immediate
implementation of its aforementioned resolution insofar as it concerned the
appointment of Madarang.4
Agon and Magnayon filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the
aforestated resolutions of the CSC but these were denied by the said
commission in a resolution dated January 19, 1990.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
or restraining order which was filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of
petitioner. On March 29, 1990, the Court required the respondents to
comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice and issued a
restraining order enjoining the CSC from enforcing its questioned resolutions
until further orders.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CSC acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it ordered the appointment of Nerio Madarang to the contested position.
While petitioner does not question the aforestated resolutions of the CSC
insofar as it disapproved the appointments of Agon and Magnayon to the
positions of Head Telecommunications Engineer, petitioner maintains that as
the appointing authority, he has the right of choice and discretion to appoint
the persons whom he deems fit to the position to be filled. 5 Petitioner
emphasizes that when the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated November 2, 1989, Assistant Secretary Sibal informed the
CSC through a manifestation that the DOTC Selection and Promotions Board
will be convened to deliberate on the position of Head Telecommunications
Engineer, taking into consideration qualified candidates including Nerio
Madarang. Nevertheless, the CSC stood pat on its resolution directing the
appointment of Nerio Madarang to the contested position.
On the other hand, the CSC contends that it was properly exercising a
constitutional and legal duty to enforce the merit and fitness principle in the
appointment of civil servants and to uphold their equally guaranteed right to
be appointed to similar or comparable positions in the reorganized agency
consistent with applicable law and issuances of competent authorities. 6
Invoking the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 3 (Article IX [B]). — The Civil Service
Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service. It shall strengthen the writ and reward
system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability.
It shall submit to the President and the Congress an
annual report on its personnel programs.' (Emphasis
supplied.);
Section 19, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of
1987) which provides:
Section 19. Recruitment and Selection of Employees
— (l) Opportunity for government employment shall be
open to all qualified citizens, and positive efforts shall be
exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the service.
Employees shall be selected on the basis of the fitness to
perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the
position.;
and Section 12 of the same Executive Order:
Sec. 12. — The Commission shall administer the Civil
Service and shall have the following powers and
functions: (a) Administer and enforce the constitutional
and statutory provision of the said merit systems...
(Emphasis supplied.)
respondent CSC argues that the primary objective of the CSC system is to
promote and establish professionalism by ensuring a high level of morale
among the employees and officers in the career civil service. Pursuant to this
constitutional mandate, the CSC contends it should see to it that the merit
system is applied, enforced and implemented in personnel actions involving
appointments affecting all levels and ranks in the civil service at all times. 7

The Court finds the petition to be impressed with merit.
Paragraph H, Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as
the 'Civil Service Decree of the Philippines," provides:
Section 9. Powers and Function of the Commission. —
The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and
shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those
of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards,
and disapprove those where the appointees do not
possess the appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications. An appointment shall take effect
immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the
appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall
remain effective until it is disapproved by the
Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice
to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments
issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided,
finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of
appointments of all officers and employees in the civil
service. All appointments requiring the approval of the
Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it
by the appointing authority within thirty days from
issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective
thirty days thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing provision it is clear that the CSC has the power
to approve or disapprove an appointment and not the power to make the
appointment itself or to direct that such appointment be made by the
appointing authority. The CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person
chosen to fill a vacant position and it finds the person qualified it must so
attest. The duty of the CSC is to attest appointments. 8 That function being
discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases. 9
By the same token, should the CSC find that the appointee is not qualified for
the position, it has the duty to disapprove the appointment. Thereafter, the
responsibility of appointing the qualified person in lieu of the disqualified
appointee rests upon the discretion of the appointing authority. The CSC
cannot encroach upon such discretion vested solely in the appointing
authority.
This Court has pronounced in no uncertain terms that the CSC has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. The Court likewise held that the CSC does
not have the authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. 10
Petitioner demonstrated his deference to the resolutions of the CSC
disapproving the appointments of Agon and Magnayon. However, in the
implementation of said resolutions he decided to convene the DOTC
36
Selection and Promotions Board to deliberate on the person who should be
appointed as Head Telecommunications Engineer among qualified
candidates including respondent Nerio Madarang. Instead of acknowledging
the authority of petitioner to exercise its discretion in the appointment of a
replacement, the CSC, in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, directed the appointment of
Madarang as the substitute of its choice. This act of the CSC must be struck
down.
Private respondent Madarang, besides his comment, filed a motion to
disqualify the Office of the Solicitor General from appearing for petitioner and
to cite petitioner in contempt of court for the filing of the petition.
The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and its officials or agents including petitioner and public
respondent. This is so provided under Presidential Decree No. 478:
SECTION 1. Functions and Organization. — (1) The
Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. .... (Emphasis supplied.) 10-A
In the discharge of this task the Solicitor General must see to it that the best
interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law. When
confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse
position against another government agency, as in this case, the Solicitor
General should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the
government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he
considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it
may run counter to a client's position. 11 In such an instance the government
office adversely affected by the position taken by the Solicitor General, if it still
believes in the merit of its case, may appear in its own behalf through its legal
personnel or representative.
In the present case, it appears that after the Solicitor General studied the
issues he found merit in the cause of the petitioner based on the applicable
law and jurisprudence. Thus, it is his duty to represent the petitioner as he did
by filing this petition. He cannot be disqualified from appearing for the
petitioner even if in so doing his representation runs against the interests of
the CSC.
This is not the first time that the Office of the Solicitor General has taken a
position adverse to his clients like the CSC, the National Labor Relations
Commission, among others, and even the People of the Philippines. In such
instances, the Solicitor General nevertheless manifests his opinion and
recommendation to the Court which is an invaluable aid in the disposition of
the case. On some occasions he begs leave to be excused from intervening
in the case, more so, when the client had already filed its own comment
different from the stand of the Solicitor General or in a situation when he finds
the contention of a private party tenable as against that of the government or
any of its agencies. The Solicitor General has recommended the acquittal of
the accused in appealed criminal cases.
There are cases where a government agency declines the services of the
Solicitor General or otherwise fails or refuses to forward the papers of the
case to him for appropriate action. The Court finds and so holds that this
practice should be stopped. To repeat, the Solicitor General is the lawyer of
the government, any of its agents and officials in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. The exception is
when such officials or agents are being charged criminally or are being civilly
sued for damages arising from a felony. 12 His services cannot be lightly
rejected, much less ignored by the office or officials concerned.
Indeed, the assistance of the Solicitor General should be welcomed by the
parties. He should be given full support and cooperation by any agency or
official involved in litigation. He should be enabled to faithfully discharge his
duties and responsibilities as the government advocate. And he should do no
less for his clients. His burden of assisting in the fair and just administration of
justice is clear.
This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the performance
of his duty. As a matter of fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the
Solicitor General in many proceedings and his continued fealty to his
assigned task. He should not therefore desist from appearing before this
Court even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the
Government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. The Court must
be advised of his position just as well.
Private respondent Madarang also seeks to hold petitioner in contempt of
court on the ground that the petition was filed in order to circumvent or
obviate the dismissal of a similar petition in this Court filed by Guido Agon and
Alfonso Magnayon. The legal personality of the petitioner to file the petition is
also questioned on the ground it was Assistant Secretary Sibal and not the
petitioner who issued the contested appointments.
The petitioner denies this contention. He asserts that the petition was properly
brought in his name as head of the DOTC as what is in issue is the
reorganization of the said department. The petitioner does not dispute the
disapproval of the appointments of Agon and Magnayon; he only disagrees
with the order of the CSC directing the appointment of Madarang to the
contested position. The petitioner also alleges that he was not aware of the
existence of a separate petition filed in this Court by Agon and Magnayon.
The Court finds the arguments and assertions of petitioner to be well taken.
It is true that the records of this Court show that there is such a case
docketed as G.R. No. 92064 entitled "Guido Agon, et al., vs. CSC et
al." which is a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The petition was dismissed for late filing in a resolution
dated February 27, 1990.
On March 29, 1990 this Court denied with finality the motion for
reconsideration filed by the said petitioners there being no compelling reason
to warrant the reversal of the questioned resolution.
Apparently, the disapproval of the appointments of Agon and Magnayon was
the issue in said petition. In the present petition as aforestated, petitioner
yields to the disapproval of the appointment of the two, but questions the

authority of the CSC to direct the appointment of Madarang to the contested
position.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned resolutions of
the respondent CSC dated August 29, 1989, November 2, 1989 and January
19, 1990 are hereby annulled insofar as they direct the appointment of Nerio
Madarang to the contested position. The petitioner is hereby authorized to
convene the DOTC Selection and Promotion Board to determine who shall
replace Guido Agon and Alfonso Magnayon to the contested position by
considering all qualified candidates including Nerio Madarang. The restraining
order dated March 29, 1990 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
G.R. No. 160656              June 15, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Public Works and
Highways), petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL ANDAYA, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1 liable to pay consequential damages if in enforcing the legal easement on
This is a petition for review of the Decision  dated October 30, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65066 affirming with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 33 in Civil Case
No. 4378, for enforcement of easement of right-of-way (or eminent domain).
Respondent Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of two parcels of land in
Bading, Butuan City. His ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. RT-10225 and RT-10646. These properties are subject to a 60-
meter wide perpetual easement for public highways, irrigation ditches,
aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or public enterprise, at
no cost to the government, except only the value of the improvements
existing thereon that may be affected.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) negotiated with Andaya to
enforce the 60-meter easement of right-of-way. The easement was for
concrete levees and floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan
Development Project. The parties, however, failed to reach an agreement.
On December 13, 1995, the Republic instituted an action before the Regional
Trial Court of Butuan City to enforce the easement of right-of-way or eminent
domain. The trial court issued a writ of possession on April 26, 1996.3 It also
constituted a Board of Commissioners (Board) to determine the just
compensation. Eventually, the trial court issued an Order of Expropriation
upon payment of just compensation.4 Later, the Board reported that there was
a discrepancy in the description of the property sought to be expropriated.
The Republic thus amended its complaint, reducing the 60-meter easement to
10 meters, or an equivalent of 701 square meters.
On December 10, 1998, the Board reported that the project would affect a
total of 10,380 square meters of Andaya’s properties, 4,443 square meters of
which will be for the 60-meter easement. The Board also reported that the
37
easement would diminish the value of the remaining 5,937 square meters. As
a result, it recommended the payment of consequential damages amounting
to ₱2,820,430 for the remaining area.5
Andaya objected to the report because although the Republic reduced the
easement to 10 meters or an equivalent of 701 square meters, the Board still
granted it 4,443 square meters. He contended that the consequential
damages should be based on the remaining area of 9,679 square meters.
Thus, the just compensation should be ₱11,373,405. The Republic did not file
any comment, opposition, nor objection.
After considering the Board’s report, the trial court decreed on April 29, 1999,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court decides as follows:
a) That the plaintiff is legally entitled to its inherent right of expropriation to,
viz.: 1) the lot now known as lot 3291-B-1-A, portion of lot 3291-B-1, (LRC)
Psd-255693, covered by TCT No. RT-10225, with an area of 288 sq. m.; and
2) the lot now known as lot 3293-F-5-B-1, portion of lot 3293-F-5-B (LRC)
Psd-230236, covered by TCT No. RT-10646, with an area of 413 sq. m., both
of the Butuan City Registry of Deeds, it being shown that it is for public use
and purpose --- free of charge by reason of the statutory lien of easement of
right-of-way imposed on defendant’s titles;
b) That however, the plaintiff is obligated to pay defendant the sum of TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
THIRTY (P2,820,430.00) PESOS as fair and reasonable severance
damages;
c) To pay members of the Board of Commissioners, thus: for the chairman ---
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS and the two (2) members at
FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS each;
d) To pay defendant’s counsel FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as
Attorney’s fees; and finally,
e) That the Registry of Deeds of Butuan City is also directed to effect the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Titles for the aforementioned two (2) lots in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines, following the technical description
as appearing in pages 6, 7, and 8 of the Commissioner’s Report.
NO COSTS.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Republic contested the
awards of severance damages and attorney’s fees while Andaya demanded
just compensation for his entire property minus the easement. Andaya
alleged that the easement would prevent ingress and egress to his property
and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan
River. As a result, his entire property would be rendered unusable and
uninhabitable. He thus demanded ₱11,373,405 as just compensation based
on the total compensable area of 9,679 square meters.
The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s decision by imposing a 6%
interest on the consequential damages from the date of the writ of possession
or the actual taking, and by deleting the attorney’s fees.
Hence, the instant petition. Simply put, the sole issue for resolution may be
stated thus: Is the Republic liable for just compensation if in enforcing the
legal easement of right-of-way on a property, the remaining area would be
rendered unusable and uninhabitable?
It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-way in favor of the
Republic. Andaya’s transfer certificates of title7 contained the reservation that
the lands covered thereby are subject to the provisions of the Land
Registration Act8 and the Public Land Act.9 Section 11210 of the Public Land
Act provides that lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not
exceeding 60 meters in width for public highways, irrigation ditches,
aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or any public
enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements
existing thereon that may be affected. In view of this, the Court of Appeals
declared that all the Republic needs to do is to enforce such right without
having to initiate expropriation proceedings and without having to pay any just
compensation.11 Hence, the Republic may appropriate the 701 square meters
necessary for the construction of the floodwalls without paying for it.
We are, however, unable to sustain the Republic’s argument that it is not
Andaya’s property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and
uninhabitable. "Taking," in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the
property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a
practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his
property.12 Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of the
remaining area of Andaya’s property. True, no burden was imposed thereon
and Andaya still retained title and possession of the property. But, as correctly
observed by the Board and affirmed by the courts a quo, the nature and the
effect of the floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the
remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the property and turn
it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River.
For this reason, in our view, Andaya is entitled to payment of just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary
equivalent of the land.13 One of the basic principles enshrined in our
Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without
due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due
process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is
taken for public use. Noteworthy, Section 9, Article III of our Constitution
mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.14
Finally, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court that
just compensation should be paid only for 5,937 square meters of the total
area of 10,380 square meters. Admittedly, the Republic needs only a 10-
meter easement or an equivalent of 701 square meters. Yet, it is also settled
that it is legally entitled to a 60-meter wide easement or an equivalent of
4,443 square meters. Clearly, although the Republic will use only 701 square
meters, it should not be liable for the 3,742 square meters, which constitute
the difference between this area of 701 square meters and the 4,443 square
meters to which it is fully entitled to use as easement, free of charge except

for damages to affected existing improvements, if any, under Section 112 of
the Public Land Act.
In effect, without such damages alleged and proved, the Republic is liable for
just compensation of only the remaining areas consisting of 5,937 square
meters, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date
of the writ of possession or the actual taking until full payment is made. For
the purpose of determining the final just compensation, the case is remanded
to the trial court. Said court is ordered to make the determination of just
compensation payable to respondent Andaya with deliberate dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 30, 2003
in CA-G.R. CV No. 65066, modifying the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Butuan City, Branch 33 in Civil Case No. 4378, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as herein set forth.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City,
Branch 33 for the determination of the final just compensation of the
compensable area consisting of 5,937 square meters, with interest thereon at
the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the writ of possession or
actual taking until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 186403, September 05, 2018
MAYOR "JONG" AMADO CORPUS, JR. AND CARLITO
SAMONTE, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE RAMON D. PAMULAR OF
BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, MRS. PRISCILLA
ESPINOSA,* AND NUEVA ECIJA PROVINCIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
FLORO FLORENDO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
An allegation of conspiracy to add a new accused without changing the
prosecution's theory that the accused willfully shot the victim is merely a
formal amendment.1 However, the rule provides that only formal amendments
not prejudicial to the rights of the accused are allowed after plea.2 The test of
whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment is to determine whether
a defense under the original information will still be available even after the
amendment is made and if any evidence that an accused might have would
remain applicable even in the amended information.3
This Petition for Certiorari4 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
February 26, 2009 Order5 and Warrant of Arrest6 issued by Judge Ramon D.
Pamular (Judge Pamular) of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva
Ecija in Civil Case No. 2618-G. The assailed Order granted the prosecution's
Motion to Amend the Original Information for murder filed against Carlito
Samonte (Samonte) to include Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus (Corpus) as his
co-accused in the crime charged.7 Furthermore, it directed the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against Corpus.8
Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz Street, Cuyapo,
38
Nueva Ecjia on June 4, 2008, causing his death.9 Samonte was caught in
flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested.10 After the inquest proceedings,
an Information11 for murder dated June 5, 2008 was filed against him, thus:12
INFORMATION
Undersigned Inquest Prosecutor accuses CARLITO SAMONTE y LAPITAN of
the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
th
That on or about the 4  day of June, 2008 at around 10:30 a.m. at Corpuz St.,
Dist., in the Municipality/City of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there, with malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to take
the life of ANGELITO ESPINOSA, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
treacherously and taking advantage of superior strength attack the latter and
shot with an unlicensed firearm (1 Colt .45 cal. pistol with SN 217815),
thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds, which directly caused the death
of said Angelita Espinosa, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cabanatuan City for Guimba, Nueva Ecija
June 5, 2008.13
Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense.
Trial on the merits ensued.14
The wife of the deceased, Mrs. Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa (Priscilla), filed a
complaint-affidavit captioned as Reply-Affidavit15 dated September 8, 2008
after the prosecution presented its second witness.16 She also filed an
unsworn but signed Reply to the Affidavit of Witnesses17 before First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo
(Florendo).18 Other affidavits of witnesses were also filed before the
prosecutor's office, which included the following:
a.) Affidavit19 of Mr. John Diego, Vice Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija;
b.) Original Affidavit20 and a supplemental affidavit21 of witness
Alexander Lozano y Jacob; and
c.) Joint Affidavit22 of Victoria A. Miraflex, Ma. Floresmina S. Sacayanan,
Ma. Asuncion L. Silao and Corazon N. Guerzon.23
Based on the affidavit24 executed by Alexander Lozano (Lozano) on June 30,
2008, Corpuz was the one who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito.25
In response to Priscilla's Reply-Affidavit, Corpuz filed a Rejoinder
Affidavit.26 He also filed a Counter-Affidavit27 against witness Lozano's
affidavit.28
In its October 7, 2008 Resolution,29 the Regional Trial Court dismissed
Priscilla's complaint and the attached affidavits of witnesses.30
Priscilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration,31 which was opposed by
Corpus.32 Florendo reconsidered and set aside the October 7, 2008
Resolution.33 He also instructed Assistant Public Prosecutor Edwin S.
Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to conduct the review.34
Bonifacio was not able to comply with the directive to personally submit his
resolution by January 22, 2009, prompting Florendo to order him to surrender
the records of the case as the latter was taking over the resolution of the case
based on the evidence presented by the parties. This order was released on
January 23, 2009 and was received by Bonifacio on the same date.35
In his January 26, 2009 Resolution,36 Florendo found probable cause to indict
Corpus for Angelita's murder. He directed the filing of an amended
information before the Regional Trial Court.37 The amended information
provided:
INFORMATION
Undersigned Prosecutor accuses Carlito Samonte y Lapitan and Amado
Corpuz, Jr. y Ramos of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 2008 at around 10:30 a.m. at Corpuz St.,
Dist., in the Municipality of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Ecija, Phillippines
(sic), and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, with
malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to take [the] life of ANGELITO
ESPINOSA, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, treacherously and taking
advantage of superior strength attack the latter and shot with an unlicensed
firearm (1 Colt .45 cal. Pistol with SN 217815), thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wounds, which directly caused the death of said Angelito Espinosa,
to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cabanatuan City for Guimba, Nueva Ecija, January 26, 2009.38 (Emphasis
supplied)
Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review
Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where he reinstated the Regional Trial
Court October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder
complaint against Corpus.39 The dispositive portion of his Resolution
provided:
In view of the foregoing and probable cause, the Resolution of Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Edison V. Rafanan, dated October 7, 2008, being in
accord with the facts obtaining in this case and with established rules,
procedures and jurisprudence, is reinstated.
The criminal complaint for murder against respondent Mayor Amado "Jong"
Corpu[s] is DISMISSED.40 (Emphasis in the original)
Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend Information, praying
for the admission of the amended information.41 Corpus and Samonte
opposed this Motion by filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition dated
February 2, 2009.42
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration.43 Samonte and Corpus

opposed this through a Vehement Opposition and Omnibus Motion dated
February 4, 2009.44 They averred that Judge Pamular's action was premature
considering that the Motion to Amend Information has yet to be scheduled for
hearing.45 Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned.46 Samonte and Corpus
also claimed that the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be suspended
because the latter intended to appeal through a Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice.47
Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated February 9,
2009 before the Department of Justice.48 They also filed a Manifestation and
Motion dated February 9, 2009 with the Regional Trial Court, asking it to
desist from acting further on the Amended Information in view of the Petition
for Review filed with the Department of Justice.49
However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular of Branch 33, Regional
Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija issued the assailed February 26, 2009
Order, which granted the motion to amend the information and to admit the
attached amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among
others, the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.50 The dispositive
portion of the Order read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court after personally examining
the amended information and its supporting documents finds probable cause
and hereby orders to:
1. Grant the motion to amend the information;
2. Admit the attached amended information;
3. Issue the Warrant of Arrest for the immediate
apprehension of the respondent-movant Amado
Corpu[s], Jr.; and
4. Deny the motion to defer/suspend arraignment and
further proceedings of this case.
SO ORDERED.51
Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 with a prayer for an immediate issuance of a temporary
restraining order, was filed by Corpus and Samonte on March 3, 2009.52 This
Petition seeks to enjoin Judge Pamular from enforcing the February 26, 2009
Order and the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to the Order, and from
conducting further proceedings in the murder case.
Through its March 9, 2009 Resolution, this Court required respondents to
comment on the Petition.53 It also granted petitioners' prayer for a temporary
restraining order. Judge Pamular, Florendo, Priscilla, and all other persons
acting on the assailed Regional Trial Court February 26, 2009 Order were
enjoined from implementing it and the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to it.54
Priscilla filed her comment on April 3, 2009.55 She cites Oaminal v.
Castillo,56 which provided that in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
Section 1 there should be "no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law" available.57 Considering that there is still
a remedy available for the accused apart from filing a petition, the petition
shall fail. She claims that petitioners should have first filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court before resorting to a petition for
39
certiorari before this Court.58
She insists that the Regional Trial Court is correct in granting the motion to
admit the amended information because it has no effect on Samonte's case
and reasoned that:
[F]irst, because there would only be an addition of another accused with prior
authority f[ro]m the Honorable Provincial Prosecutor, second, the amendment
will not cause any prejudice to the rights of the accused and more importantly,
that is what is provided for by the Rules[.]59
She claims that the alleged lack of determination of probable cause before
the issuance of a warrant has no basis since petitioners failed to present
evidence or facts that would prove their claim.60
Judge Pamular filed his Comment on April 8, 2009.61 He asserts that he made
a careful perusal of the case records in issuing the assailed order. His
independent judgment on the existence of probable cause was derived from
his reading and evaluation of pertinent documents and evidence. He states
that he had set the case for hearing on February 13, 2009, when both parties
were heard and given the opportunity to argue.62 He also added:
Yes, indeed, while the undersigned could rely on the findings of the
Honorable Provincial Prosecutor, I am nevertheless not bound thereby. The
termination by the latter of the existence of probable cause is for a purpose
different from that which is to be made by the herein respondent judge. I have
no cogent reason to question the validity of the findings of the Honorable
Provincial Prosecutor. I have much respect for the latter. Thus, after giving
due course to the arguments of parties and their respective counsels, I was
fully convinced in good faith that, indeed, there was a reasonable ground to
believe in the existence of probable cause for ... the immediate apprehension
and prosecution of Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpu[s], Jr. Hence, the issuance of
the assailed controversial Order....63
On July 22, 2009, Priscilla filed a Manifestation64 before this Court. She
asserts that this "present petition questioning the alleged impropriety of the
admission of the amended information as well as the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against Mayor Amado Corpu[s], Jr. has no more legal legs to stand
on."65 She claims66 that Florendo's January 26, 2009 Resolution was upheld
by the Department of Justice in its June 26, 2009 Resolution,67 the fallo of
which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby
dismissed. Accordingly, the Officer-in-Charge Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva
Ecija is directed to file the appropriate Information against the respondent
Mayor Amado Corpu[s], Jr., and to report the action taken thereon within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.68 (Emphasis supplied)
Priscilla asserts further that the issue regarding the suspension of
proceedings pending resolution by the Department of Justice can now be
considered moot and academic.69
On July 24, 2009, petitioners filed a Counter Manifestation.70 They claim that
respondent Priscilla's prayer for the lifting of the temporary restraining order is
premature, thus:71
[Priscilla] should have been more candid. [She] should have informed the
Honorable Court that a motion for reconsideration with the Department of
Justice was filed by the herein petitioner, and is still pending resolution. And
in the event said motion for reconsideration is denied, and as a part of
petitioner/accused right to due process of law, it being clearly provided by the
rules, he would elevate said resolution to the Court of Appeals on
certiorari – and, certainly, the aggrieved party would bring the matter
before this Honorable Court - during which interregnum, the appealed
resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor . . . would not have yet attained finality
which is what jurisprudence underscores before the respondent court should
have proceeded with the amended information.72 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
They further claim that lifting the temporary restraining order would be a relief
"too harsh and preposterous" since Corpus would be immediately imprisoned
and constrained to face trial due to a flawed amended information.73 In case
this Court resolves to quash the amended information and nullify the warrant,
Corpuz will have already "suffered grave and irreparable injury—as he would
not be able to discharge his constitutional mandate/duty to his constituents as
their duly elected mayor."74 As to Samonte, he will be allegedly "forced to face
another set of defense—against the theory of conspiracy in the amended
information which, as we have heretofore stated, after his arraignment and
trial half way, could no longer be proper."75
On August 6, 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment.76 It
claims that petitioners should have made a distinction on the propriety of
respondent judge's acts in granting the admission of the amended information
and in ordering the issuance of a warrant. It posits that these acts are at par
with the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
person of the accused. These acts have nothing to do with the suspension of
arraignment provided for under Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which ordinarily happens after a trial court has acquired
jurisdiction.77
The Office of the Solicitor General also adds that the insertion of the
phrase "conspiring and confederating together" in the amended information
will not affect Samonte's substantial rights.78 Thus, the original charge against
Samonte of murder and his deliberate manner of shooting Angelita remain
unaltered:79
Even if one or all of the elements of the crime of murder as alleged in the
original information filed against petitioner Samonte is not proven, the addition
of conspiracy in the amended information, if duly proven, would not in any
way result in his conviction because conspiracy is not an essential or
qualifying element of the crime of murder.80
The Office of the Solicitor General avers that respondent judge was well
acquainted with the legal and factual circumstances behind the filing of the
original information against Samonte. The amended information merely
added Corpus as a co-conspirator. Thus, before respondent judge issued the
assailed order, a prior hearing was held on February 13, 2009, when all the
parties were heard.81

The Office of the Solicitor General also asserts that while respondent judge
committed error when he denied petitioners' motion to suspend proceedings,
what the law only requires under Rule 116, Section 11 is a maximum of 60-
day suspension of the arraignment. In this case, the 60-day period had
already lapsed, rendering the issue raised by petitioners moot. Hence, there
is no longer any hindrance for respondent judge to continue with Corpus'
arraignment.82
Petitioners filed their reply on August 7, 2009.83 They claim that respondent
judge should have suspended action on the issuance of a warrant considering
the pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice.84 They cite Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,85  which stated:
Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an
information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment
and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment or
suspension, however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound
by the resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the
trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to
withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.86
Petitioners also cite the dispositive portion of Tolentino v. Bonifacio,87 which
directed the respondent judge in that case to desist from proceeding with the
trial until after the Department of Justice would have finally resolved a
pending petition for review.88 Thus:
While [w]e have noted from the expediente that the petitioner has utilized
dilatory tactics to bring the case against her to trial, still she is entitled to the
remedy she seeks. The respondent judge should not be more anxious than
the prosecution in expediting the disposition of the case absent any indication
of collusion between it and the defense. The Ministry of Justice should not be
deprived of its power to review the action of the City Fiscal by a precipitate
trial of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent judge is hereby
ordered not to proceed with the trial of the above-numbered criminal case
until after the Ministry of Justice has resolved the petition for review filed by
Mila P. Tolentino. No costs.89 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the amended
information, Samonte will have an additional burden of setting up a new
defense particularly on any acts of his co-accused since "the act of one is the
act of all."90
Petitioners also claim that respondent judge failed to comply with the
mandate of making a prior determination of probable cause before issuing the
warrant. They insist that this mandate "is never excused nor dispensed with
by the respondent [judge]'s self-serving narration of the law (not the required
facts) stated in [his] assailed order."91
On the issue of whether the arraignment of Corpus may proceed despite the
lapse of the 60-day maximum period of suspension under Rule 116, Section
11(c), petitioners aver that "[w]hat jurisprudence underscores is not the lapse
of the 60-day period, but the issue of finality of the decision on appeal."92 The
matter should not only cover the suspension of arraignment but for
40
respondent judge to defer from further proceedings on the amended
information pending the final resolution of the Department of Justice.93
This Court, through its August 26, 2009 Resolution, required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.94
Petitioners filed their memorandum on October 15, 2009.95 In their
memorandum, they attached the Department of Justice September 8, 2009
Resolution,96 which granted their motion for reconsideration, thus:97
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the respondent is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Resolution promulgated on June 26, 2009
(Resolution No. 473) is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Provincial
Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija is hereby directed to cause the withdrawal of the
information for murder against the respondent, if one has been filed in court,
and to report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.98 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioners assert that Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended:99
Rule 116
Arraignment and Plea
Section 11. Suspension of Arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper party,
the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
....
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the
President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office.
Petitioners add that respondent judge should have refrained from issuing the
assailed warrant of arrest because he was aware of the fact that the amended
information was a result of the flip-flopping stand of the public prosecutor from
his original stand.100 Thus, they claim that the motive behind the filing of the
amended information that included Corpus as an additional accused is
political.101
They aver that respondent judge failed to personally make his independent
findings of probable cause that will justify the issuance of the warrant. They
insist that the February 26, 2009 Order only consists of three (3) short
sentences, which merely pointed out a certain legal provision, instead of
facts, that would supposedly justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
thus:102
Elementary is the rule that the existence of probable cause is indispensable in
the filing of the complaint or information and in the issuance of warrant of
arrest. The legion of jurisprudence has defined probable cause to be
concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The
prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man and not
the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. No law or rule
states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is
determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.103
Petitioners also cite Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which prohibits substantial amendment of information that is
prejudicial to the rights of the accused after his or her arraignment, thus:
Rule 110
Prosecution of Offenses
Section 14. Amendment or Substitution. — A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.104 (Emphasis in the
original)
They cite People v. Montenegro,105 which provided that an allegation of
conspiracy that was not previously included in the original information
constitutes a substantial amendment:106
The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-
accused, which was not previously included in the original information,
is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the
need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial
court. In People v. Zulueta, it was held that:
Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges
will have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly
the allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe
to the accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even
omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The amendment thereby widens the battlefront to allow the use by the
prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the
opposite camp. Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical
movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused
is only guaranteed two-days' (sic) preparation for trial. Needless to
emphasize, as in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at
stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to
avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has
too many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared
adversaries.
To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging conspiracy
among all the accused, will make all of the latter liable not only for their
own individual transgressions or acts but also for the acts of their co-
conspirators.107 (Emphasis in the original)

The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Memorandum on October 16,
2009, which merely reiterated the arguments and discussions in its Comment
to the Petition.108 Similarly, respondent Priscilla's Memorandum adopted the
arguments presented by the Office of the Solicitor General in its comment and
memorandum.109
On March 19, 2014, Priscilla filed a Manifestation,110 which provides that on
October 30, 2013, Samonte executed an affidavit,111 stating that Corpuz
ordered him to kill Angelito.112 Samonte's affidavit provided:
SALAYSAY
Ako si Carlita Samonte kasalukuyang nakakulong sa Provincial Jail ng
Cabanatuan City sa kasong Murder kay Angelita Espinosa sa utos po ni
Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. ay matagal na pong plano ang pagpatay kay
Angelita Espinosa. Nagsimula po ito sa pagwasak sa aircondition sa
magiging opisina ni Angelita Espinosa at sa motor niyang single, at iyon ay sa
utos ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. hanggang umabot sa puntong sabihan
ako na ang tagal-tagal mo namang patayin si Angelita Espinosa pagalit na
sinabi sa akin.
At noong June 4, 2008 sa pagitan ng 9:30 AM at 10 AM ng nasabing oras
sinabi sa akin muli na "Ayokong maupo yang si Angelita Espinosa bilang
secretaryo ng Sangguniang Bayan." Sinabi ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. na
gumawa ka ng senaryo para huwag makaupo yan bilang B-SEC
(Sangguniang Bayan Secretary) Bayan at kahit anong klaseng senaryo
patayin mo kung kaya mong patayin at ako na ang bahala sa lahat. Kunin mo
ang baril dito sa opisina ko, iyan po ang utos sa akin ni Mayor Amado Corpuz
Jr.
Kusa po akong gumawa ng sarili kong affidavit at salaysay na walang
nagbayad, pumilit at nanakot sa akin para gawin ang salaysay at affidavit
kong ito, at marami pa po akong isasalaysay pagharap ko po sa korte.
Gumagalang,      opportunity to object; and
Subscribed and sworn to before Carlita Samonte
me: (signed)            
  (signed)
Atty. Marcus Marcellinus S.
Gonzales113
On April 14, 2014, this Court received Priscilla's letter dated April 11, 2014
addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, asking for assistance in
the resumption of trial in view of Samonte's affidavit.114
The issues for this Court's resolution are as follows:
First, whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
conducted further proceedings on the Amended Information and
consequently issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr.
41
despite the pendency of his and petitioner Carlito Samonte's Petition for
Review before the Department of Justice;
Second, whether or not the arraignment of petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. may
proceed after the lapse of the maximum 60-day period suspension provided
for under Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Third, whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
allegedly admitted the Amended Information in clear defiance of law and
jurisprudence, which proscribes substantial amendment of information
prejudicial to the right of the accused; and
Finally, whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular has personally
determined, through evaluation of the Prosecutor's report and supporting
documents, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr.
The Petition lacks merit.
I
Before this Court delves on the substantive issues in this case, it first rules on
the procedural matter involved.
Respondent Priscilla claims that petitioners should have first filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court before resorting to this Petition.
Failure to do so renders it dismissible.115
This issue was not addressed by petitioners in their reply or memorandum.
However, petitioners justified their direct recourse before this Court insisting
that their case is anchored on pure questions of law and impressed with
public interest. Thus, they claim that regardless of the rule on hierarchy of
courts, their filing of a petition is not a matter of choice but even mandatory.116
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis supplied)
Rivera v. Espiritu117 enumerated the essential requisites for a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65:
(1) [T]he writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.118 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The plain and adequate remedy pertained to by the rules is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order or decision.119 Certiorari, therefore, "is
not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the
required motion for reconsideration."120
It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a "condition sine qua non for
the filing of a Petition for Certiorari."121 This enables the court to correct "any
actual or perceived error" through a "re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case."122 To dispense with this condition, there must be
a "concrete, compelling, and valid reason."123 However, the following
exceptions apply:
(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;
(h) where the proceedings [were] ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.124
Nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court. Apart from bare conclusion,
petitioners failed to present any plausible reason why they failed to file a
motion for reconsideration before filing a petition before this Court. While this
issue was raised by respondent Priscilla in her Comment, this was not
sufficiently addressed by petitioners either in their Reply or Memorandum.
It must be stressed that the filing of a motion for reconsideration, as well as
filing it on time, is not a mere procedural technicality.125 These are
"jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied
with."126 Therefore, petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration with
the Regional Trial Court before filing this Petition is fatal.
II

Two (2) kinds of determination of probable cause exist: executive and
judicial.127 These two (2) kinds of determination of probable cause were
distinguished in People v. Castillo.128 Thus,
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is afimction that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the
crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,
such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has
made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is
a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable
cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
[T]he public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining
whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that courts must respect
the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person
charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.129 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Thus, courts do not meddle with the prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary
investigation because it is exclusively within the prosecutor's discretion.130
However, once the information is already filed in court, the court has acquired
jurisdiction of the case. Any motion to dismiss or determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused is within its discretion.131
Crespo v. Mogul  132 provided:
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to
hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or
information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court
and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly
arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of
the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the
criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the
Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
42
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court
or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition
the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereqfter should be
addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the
action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the
merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss
filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not
be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case
cannot possibl[y be] designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not
believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to
handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the
Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to
see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the
person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the
contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of
evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its
own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or
acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for
the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a
private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The
least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution
although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private
prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case as [to] its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.133 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Hence, when a Regional Trial Court has already determined that probable
cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, like in this case,
jurisdiction is already with the Regional Trial Court.134 Therefore, it can
proceed in conducting further proceedings on the amended information and
on the issuance of a warrant despite the pendency of a Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice.
III.A
Petitioners insist that respondent judge should have deferred from conducting
further proceedings on the amended information and on the issuance of a
warrant considering the pendency of their Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice.135 They cite Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
RULE 116
Arraignment and Plea
....
Section 11. Suspension of arraignment — Upon motion by the proper
party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
....
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either
the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the
period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing
of the petition with the reviewing office. (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertains to
a suspension of an arraignment in case of a pending petition for review before
the Department of Justice. It does not suspend the execution of a warrant of
arrest for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused.
In the assailed February 26, 2009 Order, Judge Pamular denied Corpus'
motion to defer or suspend arraignment and further
proceedings.136 Petitioners claim that he should have suspended action on the
issuance of a warrant considering the pendency of their Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice, citing Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals137 and Tolentino v. Bonifacio138 as their bases.139 Furthermore, they
also assert that the assailed Order defies Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.140
Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
the grounds for suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party,
the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending petition for review of
the prosecutor's resolution filed before the Department of Justice.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion141 dated February 9, 2009 before
the Regional Trial Court, informing it about their pending Petition for Review
of the Prosecutor's January 26, 2009 Resolution before the Department of
Justice.142 Thus, respondent judge committed an error when he denied
petitioners' motion to suspend the arraignment of Corpus because of the
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.
However, this Court's rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of
suspension counted from the filing of a petition with the reviewing
office.143 Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period,
"the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment."144
Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review145 before the Department of

Justice on February 9, 2009.146 Thus, the 60-day period has already lapsed
since April 10, 2009. Hence, respondent judge can now continue with the
arraignment and further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.
III.B
A reading of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals147 reveals that the provided ruling
does not mainly tackle the issue presented in this case.
In Ledesma, a complaint for libel was filed against Rhodora Ledesma
(Ledesma) before the City Prosecutor's Office. Upon finding "sufficient legal
and factual basis,"148 the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information against
Ledesma before the Regional Trial Court. Ledesma then filed a petition for
review before the Department of Justice, which gave due course to the
petition directing the Prosecutor to move for the deferment of further
proceedings and to elevate the records of the case to it. Conformably, the
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment before the Regional Trial
Court, which granted the motion and deferred arraignment until termination of
the Department of Justice's petition for review. Without the trial prosecutor's
consent, the counsel for private complainant filed a motion to lift the order and
to set the case for trial or arraignment. The Regional Trial Court granted the
motion then consequently scheduled Ledesma's arraignment. However, the
Secretary of Justice reversed the prosecutor's findings directing the trial
prosecutor to file before the Regional Trial Court a motion to withdraw
information, which was subsequently denied. Its denial of the motion was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The main issue in Ledesma was whether the respondent judge in that case
erred in denying the motion to withdraw information and the consequent
motion for reconsideration. This Court held that the act of the judge was
erroneous since he failed to give his reasons for denying the motions, and to
make any independent assessment of the motion and of the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice. Thus:
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that
the issue of the correctness of the justice secretary's resolution has been
amply threshed out in petitioner's letter, the information, the resolution of the
secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive
discussion in the motion for reconsideration — all of which were submitted to
the court — the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and
ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our
repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment of the issue(s)
presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the
secretary's recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold
petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to
proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the
secretary's recommendation.
Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he would have discovered that
there was, in fact, sufficient ground to grant the motion to withdraw the
information. The documents before the trial court judge clearly showed that
there was no probable cause to warrant a criminal prosecution for
libel.149 (Emphasis supplied)
This was reiterated in the ratio of that case, which read:
43
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of
lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the
bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the
merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial
court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before
proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it
is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error or
even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such
recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere
pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal
action.150 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners in this case hinge their claim on Ledesma in arguing that
respondent Judge Pamular should have suspended action on the issuance of
a warrant considering the pendency of their Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice, which stated:151
Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an
information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment
and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment or
suspension, however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound
by the resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the
trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to
withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.152
While the quoted portion relates to the issue on suspending arraignment
pending the review of the Department of Justice, there is nothing
in Ledesma that speaks of suspending the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Although there is an error on the part of Judge Pamular in denying petitioners'
motion to suspend the arraignment of Corpus, he can validly issue a warrant
of arrest upon finding probable cause to acquire jurisdiction over Corpus.
Hence, this was strengthened in the cited case of Ledesma, stating that
"[j]urisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution
by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the
case."153
They also cited the dispositive portion of Tolentino, which directed the
respondent judge in that case to desist from proceeding with the trial until
after the Department of Justice would have finally resolved the pending
petition for review:154
While We have noted from the expediente that the petitioner has utilized
dilatory tactics to bring the case against her to trial, still she is entitled to the
remedy she seeks. The respondent judge should not be more anxious than
the prosecution in expediting the disposition of the case absent any indication
of collusion between it and the defense. The Ministry of Justice should not be
deprived of its power to review the action of the City Fiscal by a precipitate
trial of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent judge is hereby
ordered not to proceed with the trial of the above-numbered criminal case
until after the Ministry of Justice has resolved the petition for review filed by
Mila P. Tolentino. No costs.155
Tolentino involved a petition for certiorari that sought to annul the order of the
respondent judge in that case to proceed with the trial of the case premised
on grave abuse of discretion.156 In that case, petitioners Mila Tolentino (Mila)
and Roberto Tolentino were accused of falsification of public documents
before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay. Prior to Mila's arraignment, she
asked for the suspension of the proceedings due to the pendency of a petition
for review before the Ministry of Justice. The respondent judge in that case
required the fiscal to comment. In the comment, the fiscal interposed no
objection on the motion. However, respondent judge denied the motion
stating that the city fiscal had already reinvestigated the case and speedy trial
should also be afforded to the prosecution. Hence, this Court ruled that
respondent judge should not proceed to trial pending the review before the
Ministry of Justice.
However, the factual milieu of Tolentino is different from the present case. It
does not involve the issuance of a warrant of arrest necessary for acquiring
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
IV.A
Petitioners question the inclusion of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase
"conspiring and confederating together" in the amended information. They
contend that Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure prohibits substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to
the rights of the accused after his or her arraignment.157 To buttress their
point, they cited People v. Montenegro,158 which provided that an allegation of
conspiracy which was not previously included in the original information,
cqnstitutes a substantial amendment.159
Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Rule 110
Prosecution of Offenses
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. ... (Emphasis supplied)
Before an accused enters his or her plea, either formal or substantial
amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of
court. After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can be made provided
it is with leave of court and it does not prejudice the rights of the
accused.160 After arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment except
if it is beneficial to the accused.161
Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke this
rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot invoke this argument because he has not yet
been arraigned.
Once an accused is arraigned and enters his or her plea, Section 14 prohibits
any substantial amendment especially those that may prejudice his or her
rights. One of these rights includes the constitutional right of the accused to
be infonned of the nature and cause of the accusations against him or her,

which is given life during arraignment.162
Arraignment is necessary to bring an accused in court and in notifying him or
her of the cause and accusations against him or her.163 "Procedural due
process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he [or she] may be
informed of the reason for his [or her] indictment, the specific charges he [or
she] is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be possibly
meted against him [or her]."164
It is during arraignment that an accused is given the chance to know the
particular charge against him or her for the first time.165 There can be no
substantial amendment after plea because it is expected that the accused will
collate his or her defenses based on the contents of the information. "The
theory in law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his [or her]
defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the information
read to him [or her] during arraignment, then the prosecution must establish
its case on the basis ofthe same information."166 Aside from violating the
accused's right to due process, any substantial amendment in the information
will burden the accused in preparing for his or her defense.
In a criminal case, due process entails, among others, that the accusation
must be in due form and that the accused is given the opportunity to answer
the charges against him or her.167 There is a need for the accused to be
supplied with the necessary information as to "why he [or she] is being
proceeded against and not be left in the unenviable state of speculating why
he [or she] is made the object of a prosecution, it being the fact that, in
criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake."168
IV.B
Apart from violating the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of his or her accusation, substantial amendments to the information
after plea is prohibited to prevent having the accused put twice in jeopardy.
169
Article III,  Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.
The Constitutional provision on double jeopardy guarantees the invocation of
the law not only against the danger of a second punishment or a second trial
for the same offense, "but also against being prosecuted twice for the same
act where that act is punishable by . . . law and an ordinance."170 When a
person is charged with an offense and the case against him or her is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other way without his or
her consent, he or she cannot be charged again with a similar
offense.171 Thus, "[t]his principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice
and conscience."172
The constitutionally mandated right against double jeopardy is procedurally
bolstered by Rule 117, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure,173 which reads:
44
RULE 117
Motion to Quash
....
Section 7. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy. — When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
....
In substantiating a claim for double jeopardy, the following requisites should
be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense as in the first.174
With regard the first requisite, the first jeopardy only attaches:
(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.175
The test for the third requisite is "whether one offense is identical with the
other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information."176
Also known as "res judicata in prison grey," the mandate against double
jeopardy forbids the "prosecution of a person for a crime of which he [or she]
has been previously acquitted or convicted."177 This is to "set the effects of the
first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he [or she] shall not
thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against
him [or her] for the same offense."178
People v. Dela Torre179 underscored the protection given under the prohibition
against double jeopardy:
Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) against multiple
punishments for the same offense.
....
The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine
has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using
its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the
accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves
the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from
successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And
finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant
again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.180 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional concept which guarantees
that an accused may not be harassed with constant charges or revisions of
the same charge arising out of the same facts constituting a single offense.
When an accused traverses the allegations in the information by entering a
plea during the arraignment, he or she is already put in jeopardy of conviction.
Having understood the charges, the accused after entering a plea prepares
for his or her defense based on the possible evidence that may be presented
by the prosecution. The protection given to the accused by the double
jeopardy rule does not attach only after an acquittal or a conviction. It also
attaches after the entry of plea and when there is a prior dismissal for
violation of speedy trial.
An arraignment, held under the manner required by the rules, grants the
accused an opportunity to know the precise charge against him or her for the
first time.181 It is called for so that he or she is "made fully aware of possible
loss of freedom, even of his [or her] life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him [or her]. At the very least then, he [or she] must be fully
informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him [or
her]."182 Thereafter, the accused is no longer in the dark and can enter his or
her plea knowing its consequences.183 It is at this stage that issues are joined,
and without this, further proceedings cannot be held without being
void.184 Thus, the expanded concept of double jeopardy presupposes that
since an accused can be in danger of conviction after his or her plea, the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy should already apply.
IV.C
Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something
which has already been included in the original information, and therefore,
adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is only a formal
amendment that can be made at anytime.185 It does not alter the nature of the
crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new accusation.186 Thus, the following are mere
formal amendments:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court
might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not
charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original
one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of
the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to
invoke prescription.187 (Citations omitted)
On the other hand, "[a] substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
court."188

The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are
similar to that of the original information except as to the inclusion of Corpus
as Samonte's co-accused and the insertion of the phrase "conspiring and
confederating together." The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic
theory of the prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot
Angelita. Hence, the amendment is merely formal. As correctly pointed out by
the Office of the Solicitor General:
Even if one or all of the elements of the crime of murder as alleged in the
original information filed against petitioner Samonte is not proven, the addition
of conspiracy in the amended information, if duly proven, would not in any
way result to his conviction because conspiracy is not an essential or
qualifying element of the crime of murder. The addition of conspiracy would
only affect petitioner Corpuz, if together with the crime of murder leveled
against petitioner Samonte, both circumstances are duly proven by the
prosecution.189 (Emphasis supplied)
In People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,190 this Court held that an
allegation of conspiracy which does not change the prosecution's theory that
the accused willfully shot the victim is merely a formal amendment.
In that case, two (2) informations for frustrated homicide were filed against
accused Sixto Ruiz (Ruiz), who pleaded not guilty to both charges. A
reinvestigation of these two (2) cases ensued in the Department of Justice,
where the State Prosecutor filed a motion for leave of court to amend the
information on the ground that the evidence revealed a prima facie case
against Luis Padilla (Padilla) and Magsikap Ongchenco (Ongchenco) who
acted in conspiracy with Ruiz. The trial judge denied the motion and reasoned
that the allegation of conspiracy constitutes a substantial amendment.
Consequently, the State Prosecutor filed two (2) new informations for
frustrated homicide against Padilla and Ongchenco, which included the
alleged conspiracy with Ruiz. Padilla and Ongchenco moved to quash the two
(2) new informations, which was denied by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. Ruiz also filed a motion to permit to quash and/or strike out the
allegation of conspiracy in the two (2) new informations. The trial judge
ordered that the motions be stricken out from the records and explained that
"the allegation of conspiracy in those cases does not alter the theory of the
case, nor does it introduce innovation nor does it present alternative
imputation nor is it inconsistent with the original allegations."191 This prompted
Ruiz, Padilla, and Ongchenco to file before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction, which was subsequently granted.
However, this Court ruled:
There is merit in this special civil action. The trial Judge should have allowed
the amendment ... considering that the amendments sought were only
formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his memorandum, "[T]here
was no change in the prosecution's theory that respondent Ruiz wilfully[,]
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and shot with a gun Ernesto
and Rogelio Bello ... The amendments would not have been prejudicial to him
because his participation as principal in the crime charged with respondent
Ruiz in the original informations, could not be prejudiced by the proposed
amendments."192 (Emphasis supplied)
In that case, the amended information was impelled by a disclosure
implicating Padilla and Ongchenco. Thus,
45
Otherwise stated, the amendments ... would not have prejudiced Ruiz whose
participation as principal in the crimes charged did not change. When the
incident was investigated by the fiscal's office, the respondents were Ruiz,
Padilla and Ongchenco. The fiscal did not include Padilla and Ongchenco in
the two informations because of "insufficiency of evidence." It was only later
when Francisco Pagcalinawan testified at the reinvestigation that the
participation of Padilla and Ongchenco surfaced and, as a consequence,
there was the need for the amendment of the informations or the filing of new
ones against the two.193 (Emphasis supplied)
The records of this present case show that the original information for murder
against Samonte was dated June 5, 2008.194 Based on Lozano's affidavit
dated on June 30, 2008,195 Corpus was implicated as the one who instructed
Samonte to kill Angelito.196 This prompted the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation, which resulted in the filing of the amended information.197
IV.D
Petitioners quote the portion of People v. Montenegro198 that cited the case
of People v. Zulueta199  as their basis for asserting that the allegation of
conspiracy is a substantial amendment because it warrants a new defense for
the accused:200
Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges
will have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly
the allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe
to the accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even
omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The amendment thereby widens the battlefront to allow the use by the
prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the
opposite camp. Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical
movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused
is only guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize, as
in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is
always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any
possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too many
facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries.201
Zulueta is inapplicable. In that case, this Court declined the admission of the
amended information because it would change the nature of the crime as well
as the prosecution's theory:
Indeed, contrasting the two informations one will perceive that whereas in the
first the accused is charged with misappropriation of public property because:
(1) he deceived Angel Llanes into approving the bargain sale of nails to
Beatriz Poblete or (2) at least, by his abandonment he permitted that woman
to obtain the articles at very cheap prices, in the amended information a third
ground of responsibility is inserted, namely, that he connived and conspired
with Angel Llanes to consummate the give-away transaction.
Again it will be observed that the third ground of action in effect contradicts
the original theory of the information: if the accused conspired with Llanes, he
did not deceive the latter, and did not by mere negligence permit the sale. 202  Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense.208 While conspiracy is
(Emphasis supplied)
Additionally, Montenegro is also inapplicable in this case because the
amendment to the information in that case was considered as substantial due
to the effect of changing the original crime charged from Robbery under
Article 209 to Robbery in an Uninhabited Place under Article 302 of the
Revised Penal Code. With this, the accused were exposed to a charge with a
higher imposable penalty than that of the original charge to which they
pleaded "not guilty."203 Furthermore:
[T]he change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely
different articles from those originally complained of, affects the essence of
the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet
all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their
defenses to the charge filed against them. It will be observed that private
respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo
Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in
the original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for
a crime different from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly
incongruous as to be allowed by the Court.204 (Emphasis supplied)
The case cited by petitioners in this case rendered the addition of conspiracy
in the amended information substantial because it either alters the defense of
the accused or alters the nature of the crime to which the accused pleaded.
However, the factual incidents of the cited cases are different from this
present case because the allegation of conspiracy in the amended
information did not change the prosecution's basic theory that Samonte
willfully and intentionally shot Angelito.
IV.E
Rule 110, Section 14 similarly provides that in permitting formal amendments
when the accused has already entered his or her plea, it is important that the
amendments made should not prejudice the rights of the
accused.205 In People v. Casey,206 this Court laid down the test in determining
whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment. Thus,
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an
information has been said to be whether a defense under the information
as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made,
and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into
Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information
introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused
to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence
of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance — not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.207 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information,
merely a formal amendment, Samonte will be prejudiced if the amendment

will be allowed after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and
corresponding evidence will not be compatible with the allegation of
conspiracy in the new information. Therefore, such formal amendment after
plea is not allowed.
V.A
Petitioners claim that the assailed warrant of arrest was made in utter
disregard of the constitutional mandate which directs judges to personally
conduct an independent examination, under oath or affirmation, of the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce.209 They further assert
that the assailed February 26, 2009 Order only consists of three (3) short
sentences that merely contain a certain legal provision, instead of facts that
will supposedly substantiate the issuance of a warrant of arrest.210
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution reads:
Article III
Bill of Rights
....
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Soliven v. Makasiar,211 the issue raised by the petitioner in that case called
for the interpretation of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. It is apparent
that the inclusion of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the
removal of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to
"other responsible officers as may be authorized by law" has persuaded the
petitioner to believe that what the Constitution now requires is for the "judge
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses"212 in determining
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. However, this Court ruled that
this is not an accurate interpretation.
In that case, this Court underscored that the Constitution gives emphasis on
the "exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself the existence of probable cause."213 In convincing himself or herself
on the presence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, the issuing
judge "is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses."214 "Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would
be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed
before their courts."215
In the 1987 Constitution, the judge is required to "personally" determine the
existence of probable cause.216 This requirement, however, does not appear
in the corresponding provisions found in our previous Constitutions.217 This
gives prominence to the framers' intent of placing "greater degree of
responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous
46
Constitutions."218
Probable cause cannot be merely established by showing that a trial judge
subjectively believes that he or she has good grounds for his or her
action.219 Thus, good faith does not suffice because if "subjective good faith
alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects' only in
the fallible discretion of the judge."220 Before issuing a warrant of arrest, the
judge must satisfy himself or herself that based on the evidence presented, a
crime has been committed and the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
it.221
In Lim v. Felix,222 the ruling in Soliven was reiterated. The main issue raised
in Lim is whether a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail "by simply
relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable
cause exists."223 In that case, the preliminary investigation records conducted
by the Municipal Court of Masbate were still in Masbate. However, the
Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati still issued a warrant of arrest against
the petitioners. This Court ruled that the respondent judge "committed a grave
error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the
questioned Order ... without having before him any other basis for his
personal determination of the existence of a probable cause"224 and reasoned
that:
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the  1987
Constitution which requires "... probable cause to be personally determined
by the judge ..." not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case
where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she
has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made
by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court
of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when
the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own
personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not
possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a
certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners'
motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable
cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can
perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the
evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents
supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the
Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes
depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine
beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be.
The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or
as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge
must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report
whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances
of the case so require.
....
We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is
not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible
officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each
case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge
abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a
warrant of arrest.225 (Emphasis supplied)
Soliven provided that as dictated by sound policy, an issuing judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses as long as
he or she has satisfied himself or herself of the existence of probable
cause.226 To rule otherwise would unduly burden judges with preliminary
examination of criminal complaints instead of attending to more important
matters. However, due to recent developments in the legal system which
include the judicial affidavit rule, the evil sought to be prevented
in Soliven does not exist anymore. To minimize the time required for
completing testimonies of witnesses in litigated cases, this Court approved
the use of judicial affidavits in lieu of witnesses' direct testimonies.227 Thus,
this is more in tune with the Constitutional mandate by lessening the burden
imposed upon judges by expediting litigation of cases for them to attend to
their exclusive and personal responsibility of satisfying themselves with the
existence of probable cause when issuing a warrant.
V.B
Rule 112, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
RULE 112
Preliminary Investigation
....
Section 6. When Warrant of Arrest May Issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case
if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if
the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the provision, the issuing judge has the following options upon
the filing of an Information:

(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of
arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice, the
issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the
information.228 (Citation omitted)
It is required for the judge to "personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence."229 In case the evidence on record
fails to substantiate probable cause, the trial judge may instantly dismiss the
case.230
The records of this case reveal that the February 26, 2009 Order presented a
discussion showing both the factual and legal circumstances of the case from
the filing of the original information until the filing of the Motion to Amend
Information. Respondent Judge Pamular, therefore, is familiar with the
incidents of this case, which were his basis for issuing the warrant. Thus,
before he issued the assailed Order and warrant, a hearing was conducted on
February 13, 2009 regarding the motions and manifestations filed in the
case:231
On February 13, 2009, a hearing was held wherein the parties presented their
arguments. On the issue regarding the undated motion to amend information
without notice of hearing and the motion for reconsideration filed by the
prosecution, the court ruled that the same is moot and academic due to the
conduct of the said hearing.232
Furthermore, respondent Judge Pamular has a working knowledge of the
circumstances regarding the amended information that constrained him to
find probable cause in issuing the warrant. The pertinent portion of the Order
provided:
Elementary is the rule that the existence of probable cause is indispensable in
the filing of complaint or information and in the issuance of warrant of arrest.
The legion of jurisprudence has defined probable cause to be concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not
present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of
judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man and not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. No law or rule states that
probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the
light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.233
In respondent Judge Pamular's Comment, he claimed that:
Be that as it may, still, the undersigned respondent judge made a careful
perusal of the records of the case. Sufficient copies of supporting
documents and/or evidence were read and evaluated upon wlticll,
independent judgment as to the existence of probable cause was
based. But, then again, still not satisfied, the undersigned even went beyond
the face of the resolution and evidences (sic) presented before this Court. On
13 February 2009, Criminal Case No. 2618-G was set for hearing. The
prosecution and the defense were given the chance to argue on the matter
and ample opportunity to be heard.234 (Emphasis supplied)
47
Apart from respondent judge's personal examination of the amended
information and supporting documents, the hearing conducted on February
13, 2009 enabled him to find probable cause prompting him to issue the
warrant of arrest.235
VI
On March 19, 2014, Priscilla filed a Manifestation,236 which provides that on
October 30, 2013, Samonte executed an affidavit237 stating that Corpus
ordered him to kill Angelito.238
Settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.239 These matters are left
to the lower courts, which have "more opportunity and facilities to examine
these matters."240 This Court is not a trier of facts and cannot receive new
evidence that would aid in the speedy resolution of this case.241 It is not this
Court's function to "analyze and weigh the evidence all over again."242
Therefore, based on the foregoing, this Court remands this case to the  conduct preliminary investigation. The First Panel was composed of Senior
Regional Trial Court for it to pass upon this factual issue raised by petitioner
Samonte based on his October 30, 2013 affidavit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Guimba, Nueva Ecija for its preliminary examination of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest and thereafter proceed to the arraignment
of petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr.
G.R. No. 209330
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR
STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR
VIMAR M. BARCELLANO and ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR
GERARD E. GAERLAN, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIO JOEL T. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to
act on any matter that may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but is not
limited to, the conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation
becomes moot after the trial court completes its determination of probable
cause and issues a warrant of arrest.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated March 19,
2013 and Resolution2 dated September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals,
which rendered null and void Department of Justice Order No. 7103 issued by
the Secretary of Justice.4 The Department Order created a second panel of
prosecutors to conduct a reinvestigation of a murder case in view of the first
panel of prosecutors' failure to admit the complainant's additional evidence.
Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a
veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. On January 24,
2011, at around 10:30 am, he was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan
Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.5 After a brief chase
with police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he
made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also
implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and
Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr.6
On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the
Counter-Terrorism Division of the National Bureau of Investigation where he
alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (former
Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.7
On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department
Order No: 0918 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to
Assistant Prosecutor Edwin S. Dayog, Assistant State Prosecutor Bryan
Jacinto S. Cacha, and Assistant State Prosecutor John Benedict D. Medina.9
On February 14, 2011, Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-
Ortega), Dr. Ortega's wife, filed a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint
implicating former Governor Reyes as the mastermind of her husband's
murder. Former Governor Reyes' brother, Coron Mayor Mario T. Reyes, Jr.,
former Marinduque Governor Jose T. Carreon, former Provincial
Administrator Atty. Romeo Seratubias, Marlon Recamata, Dennis Aranas,
Valentin Lesias, Arturo D. Regalado; Armando Noel, Rodolfo O. Edrad, and
several John and Jane Does were also implicated.10
On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and
issued the Resolution11 dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint.
On June 28, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open
Preliminary Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of
mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes and
Edrad.12 On July 7, 2011, while the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of
the Resolution dated June 8, 2011. Both Motions were denied by the First
Panel in the Resolution13 dated September 2, 2011.14
On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No.
710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel was composed of Assistant
State Prosecutor Stewart Allan M. Mariano, Assistant State Prosecutor Vimar
M. Barcellano, and Assistant State Prosecutor Gerard E. Gaerlan.
Department Order No. 710 ordered the reinvestigation of the case "in the
interest of service and due process"15 to address the offer of additional
evidence denied by the First Panel in its Resolution dated September 2,
2011. The Department Order also revoked Department Order No. 091.16

Pursuant to Department Order No. 710, the Second Panel issued a
Subpoena requiring former Governor Reyes to appear before them on
October 6 and 13, 2011 and to submit his counter-affidavit and supporting
evidence.17
On September 29, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed before the Secretary of
Justice a Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the First Panel's
Resolution dated September 2, 2011.18
On October 3, 2011, former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the
Second Panel. In his Petition, he argued that the Secretary of Justice gravely
abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel. He also argued that
the parties were already afforded due process and that the evidence to be
addressed by the reinvestigation was neither new nor material to the case.19
On March 12, 2012, the Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable
cause and recommending the filing of informations on all accused, including
former Governor Reyes.20 Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan
subsequently issued warrants of arrest on March 27, 2012.21 However, the
warrants against former Governor Reyes and his brother were ineffective
since the two allegedly left the country days before the warrants could be
served.22
On March 29, 2012, former Governor Reyes filed before the Secretary of
Justice a Petition for Review Ad Cautelam23 assailing the Second Panel's
Resolution dated March 12, 2012.
On April 2, 2012, he also filed before the Court of Appeals a Supplemental
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan.24
In his Supplemental Petition, former Governor Reyes argued that the
Regional Trial Court could not enforce the Second Panel's Resolution dated
March 12, 2012 and proceed with the prosecution of his case since this
Resolution was void.25
On March 19, 2013, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of Five,
rendered the Decision26 declaring Department Order No. 710 null and void
and reinstating the First Panel's Resolutions dated June 8, 2011 and
September 2, 2011.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of discretion when she issued Department Order No. 710 and created
the Second Panel. The Court of Appeals found that she should have modified
or reversed the Resolutions of the First Panel pursuant to the 2000 NPS Rule
on Appeal27 instead of issuing Department' Order No. 710 and creating the
Second Panel. It found that because of her failure to follow the procedure in
the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, two Petitions for Review Ad Cautelam filed by
the opposing parties were pending before her.28
The Court of Appeals also found that the Secretary of Justice's admission that
the issuance of Department Order No. 710 did not set aside the First Panel's
48
Resolution dated June 8, 2011 and September 2, 2011 "[compounded] the the Second Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012 was void since the
already anomalous situation."29 It also stated that Department Order No. 710 Panel was created by a department order that was beyond the Secretary of
did not give the Second Panel the power to reverse, affirm, or modify the Justice's authority to issue. He further argues that the trial court did not
Resolutions of the First Panel; therefore, the Second Panel did not have the acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by the Second
authority to assess the admissibility and weight of any existing or additional Panel was void.48
evidence.30
The issues for this court's resolution are:
The Secretary of Justice, the Second Panel, and Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated March 19, 2013. The
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Secretary of
Motion, however, was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when she issued Department
Resolution31 dated September 27, 2013.
Order No. 710, and with regard to this:
In its Resolution, the Court of Appeals stated that the Secretary of Justice had
a. Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an
not shown the alleged miscarriage of justice sought to be prevented by the
executive function beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari or
creation of the Second Panel since both parties were given full opportunity to
prohibition; and
present their evidence before the First Panel. It also ruled that the evidence
examined by the Second Panel was not additional evidence but "forgotten
evidence"32 that was already available before the First Panel during the b. Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu
conduct of the preliminary investigation.33 proprio another panel of prosecutors in order to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case.
Aggrieved, the Secretary of Justice and the Second Panel filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari34 assailing the Decision dated March 19, Lastly, whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by
2013 and Resolution dated September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals. the filing of the information in court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul.49
Respondent Mario Joel T. Reyes filed his Comment35 to the Petition in
compliance with this court's Resolution dated February 17, 2014.36 Petitioners'
I
Reply37 to the Comment was filed on October 14, 2014 in compliance with this
court's Resolution dated June 23, 2014.38
The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable
cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the
Petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority when
Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may
she issued Department Order No. 710. They argue that her issuance was a
still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
purely executive function and not a quasi-judicial function that could be the
subject of a petition for certiorari or prohibition.39 In their submissions, they
point out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal,
Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."50 A quasi-
prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.40 judicial function is "the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers
or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
Petitioners' position was that the First Panel "appear[ed] to have ignored the
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."51 Otherwise
rules of preliminary investigation"41 when it refused to receive additional
stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders
evidence that would have been crucial for the determination of the existence
awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have
of probable cause.42 They assert that respondent was not deprived of due
the same effect as the judgment of a court.52
process when the reinvestigation was ordered since he was not prevented
from presenting controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's additional
evidence. 43 Petitioners argue that since the Information had been filed, the In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or
disposition of the case was already within the discretion of the trial court.44 innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines "whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Secretary of Justice had no
for trial."53 As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions.
authority to order motu proprio the reinvestigation of the case since Dr.
In Santos v. Go:54
Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new evidence to the First
Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argues that
all parties had already been given the opportunity to present their evidence [T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
before the First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation.45 innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice's discretion to create a new
crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not
panel of prosecutors was not "unbridled"46 since the 2000 NPS Rule on
a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
Appeal requires that there be compelling circumstances for her to be able to
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
designate another prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation.47 He argues that

probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for
it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a
preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the
extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the
similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of
government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-
judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards,
determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as
judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts
a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information
against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of
Justice is reviewing the formers order or resolutions.55
In Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice,56 a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and. mandamus was filed.against the Secretary of Justice's
issuance of a department order. The assailed order directed all prosecutors to
forward all cases already filed against Celso de los Angeles of the Legacy
Group to the Secretariat of the Special Panel created by the Department of
Justice.
This court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are directed on]y to tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The issuance of the department order was a purely administrative
or executive function of the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of
Justice may perform functions similar to that of a court of law, it is not a quasi-
judicial agency:
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does
not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of
cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-
judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the
finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:
... [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-
making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It
is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for
it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public
prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in
nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public
prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.
49
But the limited similarity. between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough; it
body quickly ends there. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies
government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the that he had jurisdiction over the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking; it performs without authority.67
adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights
of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave
judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming,
public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine. probable
reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a
cause in order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutor's orders or resolutions.57 (Emphasis supplied)
II
Similarly, in Callo-Claridad v. Esteban,58 we have stated that a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court cannot be brought to assail the Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the Secretary of
Secretary of Justice's resolution dismissing a complaint for lack of probable Justice is authorized to issue Department Order No. 710.
cause since this is an "essentially executive function":59
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1007168 outlines the powers granted by law to
A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to the Secretary of Justice. The provision reads:
review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers,
agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the
Section 4. Power of the Secretary of Justice. - The power vested in the
matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer
Secretary of Justice includes authority to act directly on any matter involving
performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of
national security or a probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of
Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice
the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial
performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime
prosecutor or the city prosecutor and to review, reverse, revise, modify or
alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was
affirm on appeal or petition for review as the law or the rules of the
'probable cause to believe that the respondents _were guilty thereof.60
Department of Justice (DOJ) may provide, final judgments and orders of the
prosecutor general, regional prosecutors, provincial prosecutors, and city
A writ of prohibition, on the other hand, is directed against "the proceedings of prosecutors.
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions."61 The Department of Justice is not a
A criminal prosecution is initiated by the filing of a complaint to a prosecutor
court of law and its officers do not perform quasi-judicial functions. The
who shall then conduct a preliminary investigation in order to determine
Secretary of Justice's review of the resolutions of prosecutors is also not a
whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial in court.69 The
ministerial function.
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor on whether to dismiss the
complaint or to file the corresponding information in court is still subject to the
An act is considered ministerial if "an officer or tribunal performs in the context approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor.70
of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the
exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the
However, a party is not precluded from appealing the resolutions of the
act done."62 In contrast, an act is considered discretionary "[i]f the law
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor to the Secretary of
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or
Justice. Under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal,71 appeals may be taken within
when the duty shall be performed."63 Considering that "full discretionary
15 days within receipt of the resolution by filing a verified petition for review
authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of
before the Secretary of Justice.72
probable cause during a preliminary investigation,"64 the functions of the
prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial.
In this case, the Secretary of Justice designated a panel of prosecutors to
investigate on the Complaint filed by Dr. Inocencio-Ortega. The First Panel,
However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial,
after conduct of the preliminary investigation, resolved to dismiss the
quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise
Complaint on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a
of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of
finding of probable cause. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open
discretion.65 In Auto Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn: 66
and a Motion for Partial Investigation, which were both denied by the First
Panel. Before Dr. Inocencio-Ortega could file a petition for review, the
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 and constituted
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his determination of another panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate the case. The question therefore
the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must is whether, under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice
be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive may, even without a pending petition for review, motu proprio order the
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal conduct of a reinvestigation.
hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or

The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review
before the Secretary of Justice can reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed
resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor.73 The
Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct of a reinvestigation in order
to resolve the petition for review. Under Section 11:
SECTION 11. Reinvestigation. If the Secretary of Justice finds it necessary to
reinvestigate the case, the reinvestigation shall be held by the investigating
prosecutor, unless, for compelling reasons, another prosecutor is designated
to conduct the same.
Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of
Justice may motu proprio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or
city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition
for review. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given
an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
....
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of
Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or
modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary
investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors
and it is within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions
of her prosecutors. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:74
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary
of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power
of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus
affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2,
Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over
the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution
Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in
Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
50
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to
act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials
or units[.]75
Similarly, in Rural Community Bank of Guimba v. Hon. Talavera:  76
The actions of prosecutors are not unlimited; they are subject to review by the
secretary of justice who may affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their actions or
opinions. · Consequently the secretary may direct them to file either a motion
to dismiss the case or an information against the accused.
In short, the secretary of justice, who has the power of supervision and
control over prosecuting officers, is the ultimate authority who decides which
of the conflicting theories of the complainants and the respondents should be
believed.77
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the
authority to directly act on any "probable miscarriage of justice within the
jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the
provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor." Accordingly, the Secretary of
Justice may step in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior motion or
petition from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice.
Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open the preliminary Investigation
before the First Panel in order to admit as evidence mobile phone
conversations between Edrad and respondent and argued that these phone
conversations tend to prove that respondent was the mastermind of her
husband's murder. The First Panel, however, dismissed the Motion on the
ground that it was filed out of time. The First Panel stated:
Re-opening of the preliminary investigation for the purpose of receiving
additional evidence presupposes that the case has been submitted for
resolution but no resolution has been promulgated therein by the investigating
prosecutor. Since a resolution has already been promulgated by the panel of
prosecutors in this case, the motion to re-open the. preliminary investigation
is not proper and has to be denied.78
In the same Resolution, the First Panel denied Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's Motion
for Partial Reconsideration on the ground that "the evidence on record does
not suffice to establish probable cause."79 It was then that the Secretary of
Justice issued Department Order No. 710, which states:
In the interest of service and due process, and to give both parties all the
reasonable opportunity to present their evidence during the preliminary
investigation, a new panel is hereby created composed of the following for the
purpose of conducting a reinvestigation ....
....
The reinvestigation in this case is hereby ordered to address the offer of
additional evidence by the complainants, which was denied by the former
panel in its Resolution of 2 September 2011 on the ground that an earlier
resolution has already been promulgated prior to the filing of the said
motion, and such other issues which may be raised before the present
panel.80 (Emphasis supplied)
In her reply-letter dated September 29, 2011 to respondent's counsel, the
Secretary of Justice further explained that:
The order to reinvestigate was dictated by substantial justice and our desire
to have a comprehensive investigation. We do not want any stone unturned,
or any evidence overlooked. As stated in D.O. No. 710, we want to give "both
parties all the reasonable opportunity to present their evidence. "81
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Secretary of Justice issued
Department Order No. 710 because she had reason to believe that the First
Panel's refusal to admit the additional evidence may cause a probable
miscarriage of justice to the parties. The Second Panel was created not to
overturn the findings and recommendations of the First Panel but to make
sure that all the evidence, including the evidence that the First Panel refused
to admit, was investigated. Therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not act in
an "arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal
hostility."82
Accordingly, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's Petition for Review before the Secretary
of Justice was rendered moot with the issuance by the Second Panel of the
Resolution dated March 12, 2012 and the filing of the Information against
respondent before the trial court.
III
The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the
respondent's warrant of arrest has already rendered this Petition moot.
It is settled that executive determination of probable cause is different from
the judicial determination of probable cause. In People v. Castillo and Mejia:83
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the
crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,
such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has
made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is
a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made
by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the
judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.84 (Emphasis supplied)
 51

The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary
investigation. The prosecutor's determination of probable cause is solely
within his or her discretion. Prosecutors are given a wide latitude of discretion
to determine whether an information should be filed in court or whether the
complaint should be dismissed.85
A preliminary investigation .is "merely inquisitorial,"86 and is only conducted to
aid the prosecutor in preparing the information.87 It serves a two-fold purpose:
first, to protect the innocent against wrongful prosecutions; and second, to
spare the state from using its funds and resources in useless prosecutions.
In Salonga v. Cruz-Paño:88
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open
and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials.89
Moreover, a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial. It is not a
trial on the merits. An accused's right to a preliminary investigation is merely
statutory; it is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence, any alleged
irregularity in an investigation's conduct does not render the information void
nor impair its validity. In Lozada v. Fernando:90
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to
hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or
information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court
and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly
arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of
the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the
criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the
Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court
or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition
the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be
addressed for the consideration of the Court, the only qualification is that the
action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due process of law.1âwphi1
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. · The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.95 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it would be ill-advised for the Secretary of Justice to proceed with
resolving respondent's Petition for Review pending before her. It would be
more prudent to refrain from entertaining the Petition considering that the trial
court already issued a warrant of arrest against respondent.96 The issuance of
the warrant signifies that the trial court has made an independent
determination of the existence of probable cause. In Mendoza v. People:97
While it is within the trial court's discretion to make an independent
assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an
appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the
prosecutor's determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a
determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor's finding.98

It has been said time and again that a preliminary investigation is not
properly" a trial or any part thereof but is merely preparatory thereto, its only
purpose being to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof. The
right to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
constitution. At most, it is statutory. And rights conferred upon accused
persons to participate in preliminary investigations concerning themselves
depend upon the provisions of law by which such rights are specifically
secured, rather than upon the phrase "due process of law."91 (Citations
omitted)
People V. Narca92 further states:
It must be emphasized that the preliminary investigation is not the venue for
the full exercise of the rights of the parties. This is why preliminary
investigation is not considered as a part of trial but merely preparatory thereto
and that the records therein shall not form part of the records of the case in
court. Parties' may submit affidavits but have no right to examine witnesses
though they can propound questions through the investigating officer. In fact,
a preliminary investigation may even be conducted ex-parte in certain cases.
Moreover, in Section 1 of Rule 112, the purpose of a preliminary investigation
is only to determine a well grounded belief if a crime was probably committed
by an accused. In any case, the invalidity or absence of a preliminary
investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the court which may have
taken cognizance of the information nor impair the validity of the information
or otherwise render it defective. 93 (Emphasis supplied)
Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the
case and any motion to dismiss the case or to determine the accused's guilt
or innocence rests within the sound discretion of the court. In Crespo v.
Mogul:94
Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
recommendation by the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
exists. for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable
motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore,
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the
has transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the
merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue has been rendered
moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss
filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed
be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case
before them when the trial court issued its warrant of arrest. Since the trial
cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not
court has already acquired jurisdiction over the case and the existence of
believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to
probable cause has been judicially determined, a petition for certiorari
handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the
questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases to be the
Secretary of Justice.
"plain, speedy, and adequate remedy"99 provided by law. Since this Petition
for Review is an appeal from .a moot Petition for Certiorari, it must also be
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to rendered moot.
see that justice is -done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the
person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the
The prudent course of action at this stage would be to proceed to trial.
contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of
Respondent, however, is not without remedies. He may still file any
evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its
appropriate action before the trial court or question any alleged irregularity in
own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or
the preliminary investigation during pre-trial.
acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for
the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for being moot. Branch 52 of the
private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The Regional Trial Court of Palawan is DIRECTED to proceed with prosecution of
least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution Criminal Case No. 26839.
although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private
prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
A.C. No. 6593               February 4, 2010
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,
filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction
vs.
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1 and a supplemental
affidavit2 for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty.
Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross
immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our
marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita,
Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6)
children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza,
Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed
Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children,
one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on
the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming
that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed
it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my
daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my
husband strolling at the Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita,
Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified
as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia
Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to
secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among
others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel
Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married
at Hongkong sometime on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and
joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to
give us our needed financial support to the prejudice of our children
who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged
in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their
immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation,
wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
52
In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges and relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.10 The IBP
imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.11
wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he
married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his
(Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and
escapades and understood his "bad boy" image before she married him in
Recommendation for the respondents’ disbarment.12 The Commission on Bar
1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial
Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved
problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia
and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No.
to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal
XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido
denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea,
emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido
secondary course.4 Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of
employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years. the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality.
However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he
became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage
contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on
children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer. Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated
January 18, 2007.
In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of
Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for
Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any
the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the
claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.
Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea
kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian
silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a
considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life,
house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a
and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life
proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things
notwithstanding his situation.
were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that
Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A.
Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline,
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the
filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is
very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings6 in view for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of
of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied
this motion for lack of merit.
THE COURT’S RULING
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the complaints after the
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty.
Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with
Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the
respect to Atty. Valencia.
legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no
personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged
that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. General Considerations
Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed
before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also
denied this motion.9 Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription
of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant – do not
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for
against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly membership in the Bar.13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason
to depart from this ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a

component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public.15 The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.
Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice
of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may
inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment
case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is
wholly his or her own;16 effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral
acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the
qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of
law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession.
From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were
committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we
explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,17 the possession of good moral character is
both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.
Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon
proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of
the respondent before he became a lawyer.18 Admission to the practice only
creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications
to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary even after admission to the Bar.19
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the
disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely
incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of
law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or
violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of
desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a
complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits
of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are
now available for the Court’s examination and consideration, and their merits
are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the
evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and,
impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community.20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.21 We make
these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct
requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.22
53
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty.
contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering
that his marriage with Maelotisea was not "valid."
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple
marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty.
that the respondent’s pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union
marriage and family – institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing entered into while another marriage was in place.
of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and
well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously
whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward
cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were
respondent.
both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a
period of more than ten (10) years.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant
while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea.
respondent’s act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty,
Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not
justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by
an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This
the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.
was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past
actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,25 where the complaint was filed against him.
respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his
client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal
of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he
profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s
made a mockery of marriage – a sacred institution that demands respect and
oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time
of his admission to the Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the
oath,28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,29 and Canon 1 of the
admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct
Code of Professional Responsibility,30 all of which commonly require him to
that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or
obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of
unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with
Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other
women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code
his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually
of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in
exclusive.
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same
Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
he was already married to Constancia.26 This was a misrepresentation given Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct
as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship. that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession."
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea
notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open
admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime. As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation
and that he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia
his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal
while his two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration
profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of
the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took
convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims
as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.
and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted
relationships.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea
upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the
him a daughter.
standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals
and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.31 Lawyers

are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.32 Lawyers are at all
times subject to the watchful public eye and community
approbation.33 Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and
private – fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, accordingly penalized.34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty.
Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross
immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March
27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them exemption from
sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to
admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct
was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life.
Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not
relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of
the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that
respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of
them as members of the Bar.35
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
reality.36 To have good moral character, a person must have the personal
characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good
reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the
estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is
known.37 The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3)
to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer,
Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to
Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty.
Garrido’s admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him
proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for
about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she
married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second
marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she
lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person
possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by
another with respect to the latter’s family problems, would not aggravate the
situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice,
thereby effectively alienating the other person’s feelings and affection from his
wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea
was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman
who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to
ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-
married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have
said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison
with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from
54
legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than
this, because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even
left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This
scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of
law.1avvphi1
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s
second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty.
Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on
confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s marriage to
Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong,
not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the
declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s second marriage, we can only call
this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino
tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty.
Valencia’s claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed
her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the
celebration of their marriage in Hongkong39 leads us to the opposite
conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that
Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of
using the surname of her "husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to
mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but
with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty.
Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman. This,
to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia’s perverse sense of moral
values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s
actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a
criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to
another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled
and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she
preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him
during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned,
Atty. Valencia’s conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the
point of shocking the community’s sense of decency; while she professed to
be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior
to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband
with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and
discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to
adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.40 In Barrientos v.
Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was
admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege
bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the
essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this
privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this
reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware
that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.42
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present
case is one of them. The records show the parties’ pattern of grave and
immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional
fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido’s plea for compassion and his act
of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot
grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules
of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under
other circumstances are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencia’s behavior over a long period of time
unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which
we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal
profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into
question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a
willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed
into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross
immorality, violation of the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross
immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel
E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and
Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119             June 30, 2008
[Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI No. 07-2709-RTJ]
ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, complainant,
vs.

JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By letter-complaint dated May 19, 20061 which was received by the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane
(complainant) charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent), Presiding
Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of "demean[ing],
humiliat[ing] and berat[ing]" him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of
Civil Case No. 3514-2003-C, "Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel
Malabanan, et al" in which he was counsel for the plaintiff.
To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in the
course of the proceedings conducted on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by
stenographer Elenita C. de Guzman, viz:
COURT:
. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the
University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE:
No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,]
[Y]our Honor.
COURT:
No, you're not from UP.
ATTY. MANE:
I am very proud of it.
COURT:
Then you're not from UP. Then you cannot equate
yourself to me because there is a saying and I know
this, not all law students are created equal, not all law
schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created
equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are
created equal in His form and substance.2 (Emphasis
supplied)
Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings were "duly recorded
in a tape recorder" by stenographer de Guzman, and despite his motion (filed
on April 24, 2006) for respondent to direct her to furnish him with a copy of
the tape recording, the motion remained unacted as of the date he filed the
55
present administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He, however, attached a
copy of the transcript of stenographic notes taken on February 27, 2006.
In his Comments3 dated June 14, 2006 on the complaint filed in compliance
with the Ist Indorsement dated May 31, 20064 of the OCA, respondent alleged
that complainant filed on December 15, 2005 an "Urgent Motion to
Inhibit,"5 paragraph 36 of which was malicious and "a direct assault to the
integrity and dignity of the Court and of the Presiding Judge" as it "succinctly
implied that [he] issued the order dated 27 September 2005 for [a]
consideration other than the merits of the case." He thus could not "simply sit
idly and allow a direct assault on his honor and integrity."
On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to furnish complainant with
a copy of the "unedited" tape recording of the proceedings, respondent
quoted paragraphs 4 and 37 of the motion which, to him, implied that the trial
court was "illegally, unethically and unlawfully engaged in 'editing' the
transcript of records to favor a party litigant against the interest of
[complainant's] client."
Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the two motions that he
ordered complainant, by separate orders dated June 5, 2006, to explain
within 15 days8 why he should not be cited for contempt.
Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4,
2006,9 stating that it was a mere result of his impulsiveness.
In its Report dated November 7, 2007,10 the OCA came up with the following
evaluation:
. . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing
an administrative complaint does not divest the Court of its
disciplinary authority over court officials and personnel. Thus, the
complainant's withdrawal of the instant complaint will not bar the
continuity of the instant administrative proceeding against
respondent judge.
The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not the
statements and actions made by the respondent judge during the
subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute conduct unbecoming
of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the respondent's
comment and the documents at hand, we find that there is no issue
as to what actually transpired during the February 27th hearing as
evidenced by the stenographic notes. The happening of the
incident complained of by herein complainant was never denied by
the respondent judge. If at all, respondent judge merely raised his
justifications for his complained actuations.
xxxx
. . . [A] judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance
of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety
and must be beyond reproach. A judge must at all times be
temperate in his language. Respondent judge's insulting
statements which tend to question complainant's capability
and credibility stemming from the fact that the latter did not
graduated [sic] from UP Law school is clearly unwarranted and
inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate language, the
lawyer can return the attack on his person and character, through
an administrative case against the judge, as in the instant case.
Although respondent judge's use in intemperate language may be
attributable to human frailty, the noble position in the bench
demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court.
Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and
courteous both in conduct and language.
xxxx
Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always
observe courtesy and civility. In addressing counsel, litigants, or
witnesses, the judge should avoid a controversial tone or a tone
that creates animosity. Judges should always be aware that
disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be
mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket
where the judge should be respected but free to insult lawyers
and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential part
of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good
breeding. If a judge desires not to be insulted, he should start using
temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a
storm.
It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did
respondent judge make insulting and demeaning remarks but he
also engaged in unnecessary "lecturing" and "debating". . .
xxxx
Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to
inhibit filed by complainant, but, instead, he opted for a conceited
display of arrogance, a conduct that falls below the standard of
decorum expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that there is a
need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called
him in his chambers where he can advise him privately rather than
battering him with insulting remarks and embarrassing questions
such as asking him from what school he came from publicly in the
courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is
highly reprehensible. It betrays the judge's lack of patience and
temperance. A highly temperamental judge could hardly make
decisions with equanimity.
Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from
lecturing the counsels or debating with them during court hearings
to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and integrity. While judges
should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that
they should act and behave in such manner that the parties before
them should have confidence in their impartiality.11 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of
the same shall be dealt with more severely.12
By Resolution of January 21, 2008,13 this Court required the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings already filed. Respondent complied on February 26,
2008,14 manifesting in the affirmative.
The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads:
Rule 3.04. - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to
lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and
others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are
made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
An author explains the import of this rule:
Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge
should be courteous to counsel, especially to those who are young
and inexperienced and also to all those others appearing or
concerned in the administration of justice in the court. He should be
considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his
court. He should be courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of
a judge to utter intemperate language during the hearing of a
case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a judge should be
studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits
of the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition.
He should not interrupt counsel in their arguments except to clarify
his mind as to their positions. Nor should he be tempted to
an unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment.
A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust may
endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to
the courts, to their clients and to the adverse party and his lawyer,
so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business before
the court. He may utilize his opportunities to criticize and
correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his
attention, but he may not do so in an insulting
manner.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted
verbatim, taken during the February 27, 2006 hearing show that respondent
made sarcastic and humiliating, even threatening and boastful remarks to
complainant who is admittedly "still young," "unnecessary lecturing and
debating," as well as unnecessary display of learning:
COURT:
xxx
Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis?
56
ATTY. MANE:
Ah, with due respect your…
COURT:
Tell me, what is your school?
ATTY. MANE:
I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.
COURT:
Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the
principle of Stare Decisis and the interpretation of
the Supreme Court of the rules of procedure where it
states that if there is already a decision by the
Supreme Court, when that decision shall be complied
with by the Trial Court otherwise non-compliance
thereof shall subject the Courts to judicial
sanction, and I quote the decision. That's why I quoted
the decision of the Supreme Court Sir, because I know
the problem between the bank and the third party
claimants and I state, "The fair market value is the price
at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not
compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not
compelled to buy." Sir, that's very clear, that is what fair
market value and that is not assessment value. In fact
even you say assessment value, the Court further state,
"the assessed value is the fair market value multiplied.
Not mere the basic assesses value. Sir that is the
decision of the Supreme Court, am I just reading the
decision or was I inventing it?
ATTY. MANE:
May I be allowed to proceed.
COURT:
Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court
decision which I quoted and which you should have
researched too or I was merely imagining the Supreme
Court decision sir? Please answer it.
ATTY. MANE:
No your Honor.
COURT:
Please answer it.
xxxx
COURT:
That's why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own
pleadings, hale me to the Supreme Court otherwise I will
hale you to the bar. Prove to me that I am grossly
ignorant or corrupt.
ATTY. MANE:
Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . .
COURT:
No, sir.
ATTY. MANE:
Yes your Honor . . .
COURT:
No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to
the IBP Because hindi naman ako ganon. I am not that
vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take cover from
the instruction of your client because even if the
instruction of a client is "secret." Upon consideration, the
language of the pleader must still conform with the
decorum and respect to the Court. Sir, that's the rule of
practice. In my twenty (20) years of practice I've never
been haled by a judge to any question of integrity.
Because even if I believed that the Court committed error
in judgment or decision or grave abuse of discretion, I
never imputed any malicious or unethical behavior to the
judge because I know and I believe that anyone can
commit errors. Because no one is like God. Sir, I hope sir
you understand that this Court, this Judge is not God but
this Judge is human when challenge on his integrity and
honor is lodged. No matter how simple it is because that
is the only thing I have now.
Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of assets
and liabilities?
ATTY. MANE:
I think that is not necessary your Honor.

COURT:
No counsel because the imputations are there, that's why
I want you to see. Show him my assets and liabilities
for the proud graduate of MLQU. Sir, look at it. Sir, I
have stock holdings in the U.S. before I joined the bench.
And it was very clear to everyone, I would do everything
not be tempted to accept bribe but I said I have spent my
fifteen (15) years and that's how much I have worked in
fifteen (15) years excluding my wife's assets which is
more than what I have may be triple of what I have. May
be even four fold of what I have. And look at my assets.
May be even your bank can consider on cash to cash
basis my personal assets. That is the reason I am telling
you Atty. Mane. Please, look at it. If you want I can show
you even the Income Tax Return of my wife and you will
be surprised that my salary is not even her one-half
month salary. Sir, she is the Chief Executive Officer of a
Multi-National Publishing Company. That's why I have
the guts to take this job because doon po sa salary niya
umaasa na lamang po ako sa aking asawa. Atty. Mane,
please you are still young. Other judges you would
already be haled to the IBP. Take that as a lesson. Now
that you are saying that I was wrong in the three-day
notice rule, again the Supreme Court decision validates
me, PNB vs. Court of Appeals, you want me to cite the
quotation again that any pleadings that do not conform
with the three-day notice rule is considered as useless
scrap of paper and therefore not subject to any judicial
cognizance. You know sir, you would say but I was the
one subject because the judge was belligerent. No sir,
you can go on my record and you will see that even prior
to my rulings on your case I have already thrown out so
many motion for non-compliance of a three-day notice
rule. If I will give you an exception because of this, then I
would be looked upon with suspicion. So sir again,
please look again on the record and you will see how
many motions I threw out for non-compliance with the
three-day notice rule. It is not only your case sir,
because sir you are a practitioner and a proud
graduate of the MLQU which is also the Alma Mater of
my uncle. And I supposed you were taught in thought
that the three-day notice rule is almost sacrosanct in
order to give the other party time to appear and
plead. In all books, Moran, Regalado and all other
commentators state that non-compliance with the
three-day notice rule makes the pleading and motion
a useless scrap of paper. If that is a useless scrap of
paper, sir, what would be my ground to grant
exception to your motion? Tell me.
xxxx
COURT:
Procedural due process. See. So please sir don't confuse
the Court. Despite of being away for twenty years from
57
the college of law, still I can remember my rules, In your abugado. I challenge anyone to file a case against me for
motion you said . . . imputing things to the Court. Sir graft and corruption, for incompetence.
please read your rules. Familiarize
yourself, understand the jurisprudence before you be
xxxx
the Prince Valiant or a Sir Gallahad in Quest of the
Holy Grail. Sir, ako po ay mahirap na tao, karangalan ko
lang po ang aking kayang ibigay sa aking mga anak at COURT:
iyan po ay hindi ko palalampasin maski kanino pa. Sir,
have you ever heard of anything about me in this Court
I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they
for one year. Ask around, ask around. You know, if you
believe that you are not imputing any wrong doing to me I
act like a duck, walk like a duck, quack like a duck,
will apologize to you.
you are a duck. But have you ever heard anything
against the court. Sir in a judicial system, in a Court, one
year is time enough for the practitioner to know whether a Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect
judge is what, dishonest; 2), whether the judge is the old practitioner, whose integrity is unchallenged.
incompetent; and 3) whether the judge is just playing
loco. And I have sat hear for one year sir and please ask
Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to
around before you charge into the windmill. I am a proud
defend your position, so be it.
product of a public school system from elementary to
college. And my only, and my only, the only way I can
repay the taxpayers is a service beyond reproach without Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I
fear or favor to anyone. Not even the executive, not even know that you are an old practitioner hammered out by
the one sitting in Malacanang, not even the Supreme years of practice and whose integrity by reputation
Court if you are right. Sir, sana po naman inyo ring precedes you. Please read what your younger
igalang ang Hukuman kasi po kami, meron nga po, companero has written to this Honorable Court in
tinatanggap ko, kung inyo pong mamarapatin, meron pleading and see for yourself the implications he hurled
pong mga corrupt, maaari pong nakahanap na kayo ng to the Court in his honest opinion. Remember he said
corrupt na Judge pero hindi po lahat kami ay corrupt. honest. That implication is your honest opinion of an
Maaari ko rin pong tanggapin sa inyong abang lingcod implication sir.
na merong mga Hukom na tanga pero hindi po naman
lahat kami ay tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito
Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your
po ako sa husgado ko. Aalis po ako dito sa hapon,
honest opinion. Remember the word you said honest
babasahin ko lahat ang kaso ko para ko po malaman
opinion.
kung any po ang kaso, para po pagharap ko sa inyo at sa
publiko hindi po ako magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please
have the decency, not the respect, not to me but to the Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant
Court. Because if you are a lawyer who cannot respect and vigorous in the pursue of pride. But if you are vigilant
the Court then you have no business appearing before and vigor, you should never crossed the line.
the Court because you don't believe in the Court system.
That's why one of my classmates never appeared before
Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three
Court because he doesn't believe in that system. He
paragraphs?
would rather stay in their airconditioned room because
they say going to Court is useless. Then, to them I salute,
I give compliment because in their own ways they know ATTY. HILDAWA:
the futility and they respect the Court, in that futility rather
than be a hypocrite. Atty. Mane hindi mo ako kilala, I've
There will be some . . .
never disrespect the courts and I can look into your eyes.
Kaya po dito ko gusto kasi di po ako dito nagpractice
para po walang makalapit sa akin. Pero kung ako po COURT:
naman ay inyong babastusin ng ganyang handa po
akong lumaban kahit saan, miski saan po. And you can
quote me, you can go there together to the Supreme What sir?
Court. Because the only sir, the only treasure I have is
my name and my integrity. I could have easily let it go ATTY. HILDAWA:
because it is the first time, but the second time is too
much too soon. Sir, masyado pong kwan yon, sinampal
na po ninyo ako nung primero, dinuran pa po ninyo ako . . . indiscretion.
ng pangalawa. That's adding insult to the injury po. Hindi
ko po sana gagawin ito pero ayan po ang dami diyang COURT:

Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an
old practitioner could say to the Court because of
respect.
Sir, salamat po.
xxxx
COURT:
Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado.
Indiscretion na lang. Now you say that is your honest
opinion and the old practitioner hammered through years
of practice could only say indiscretion committed by this
judge. Much more I who sits in this bench?
Now is that your honest opinion?16 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken.
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the
law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of
the Lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed
to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer
of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to
determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his
alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the
counsel. If respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being
"assaulted," he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why
he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when
he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes
show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.
This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of
boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves
in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court.17
Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a
light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by any of the following: (1)
a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3)
reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the
penalty of reprimand.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, is found GUILTY of
conduct unbecoming of a judge and is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
58
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered
financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support
to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings
on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK
failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to
its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A
public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition
with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I
Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage
of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel,
former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify
respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to
Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently
became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and
his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse
to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when
he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the
Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter”
and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter.
Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen
involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed
with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in
CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza
on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion
No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
“matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with
the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed,
the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of
banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot
apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen
is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil
case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The
applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is
that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where
the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous
such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The
court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial.
He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In
such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics:
“ A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ,
should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as
a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his
tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03
makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public
office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who
once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement
or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the service.
G.R. No. 191972               January 26, 2015
HENRY ONG LAY HIN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (2nd Division), HON. GABRIEL T. INGLES, as
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 58, Cebu City, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

Hiring legal counsel does not relieve litigants of their duty to "monitor the
status of [their] case[s],"1 especially if their cases are taking an "unreasonably
long time"2 to be resolved.
This is a Petition3 for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for
preliminary and/or mandatory injunction to set aside the Court of Appeals’
Entry of Judgment4 in CA-G.R. CR No. 24368, and the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 58, Cebu City’s Order5 dated March 25, 2004 and Order of
Detention6 dated February 15, 2010 in Criminal Case No. CBU-48773.7
In the Decision8 dated February 8, 2000, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58,
Cebu City, convicted petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin (Ong) and Leo Obsioma,
Jr. (Obsioma, Jr.) of estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code.9 The trial court found that Ong and Obsioma, Jr. failed
to pay Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company a total of 344,752.20, in
violation of their trust receipt agreement with the bank.10 They were sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one
(1) day of prision correccional as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.11
12
Ong filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  which the trial court denied in its
Order13 dated March 31, 2000.
Ong filed a Notice of Appeal,14 which the trial court gave due course.15 The
trial court then transmitted the case records to the Court of Appeals.16
In the Decision17 dated November 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the trial court’s Decision.18 The Court of Appeals likewise denied Ong’s
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in
its Resolution19 dated April 14, 2003 for raising mere rehashed arguments.20
The Court of Appeals then issued an Entry of Judgment,21 declaring that the
case became final and executory on May 15, 2003. The Court of Appeals
based the date of finality on the date of receipt indicated in the registry return
card22 corresponding to the mail sent to Ong’s former counsel, Zosa &
Quijano Law Offices. Based on the registry return card, Zosa & Quijano Law
Offices received on April 29, 2003 a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution
denying Ong’s Motion for Reconsideration.23
On March 22, 2004, the trial court received the original records of the case,
the Decision, and the Entry of Judgment issued by the Court of Appeals. In
view thereof, the trial court, then presided by Judge Gabriel T. Ingles, ordered
the arrest of Ong.24
Almost six (6) years after, or on February 12, 2010 at about 10:30 p.m., Ong
was arrested at Ralphs Wines Museum located at No. 2253 Aurora
Boulevard, Tramo, Pasay City.25 He was initially ordered committed to the
Cebu City Jail26 but is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid
Prison.27
On May 6, 2010, Ong filed before this court a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus with application for issuance of preliminary and/or
mandatory injunction.28
59
In the Resolution29 dated June 16, 2010, this court ordered respondents to On Ong’s prayer to be allowed to post bail, the People argues that the grant
comment on Ong’s Petition.30 of bail is premised on the uncertainty of whether an accused is guilty or
innocent.47 Considering that Ong’s conviction had already removed this
uncertainty, "it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit [Ong] to bail."48
In the meantime, Ong filed the Urgent Motion for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction or, Alternatively, for Bail,31 which this court noted in the
Resolution32 dated July 28, 2010. The issues for this court’s resolution are:
The People of the Philippines then filed a Comment33 on the Petition for (1) Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus. It also commented on Ong’s Motion issuing the entry of judgment;
for Preliminary Injunction or, Alternatively, for Bail.34
(2) Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing
Ong replied to the Comment on the Petition35 and to the Comment on the the warrant of arrest and commitment order against petitioner
Motion for Preliminary Injunction or, Alternatively, for Bail.36 He then filed a Henry Ong Lay Hin; and
supplemental pleading to his Reply.37
(3) Whether petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin’s former counsel was
In his Petition for Certiorari, Ong alleges that his counsel never received a grossly negligent.
copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution denying his Motion for
Reconsideration. Consequently, the Decision of the Court of Appeals never
This petition should be denied.
became final and executory, and the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment. Judge Gabriel T. Ingles likewise
gravely abused his discretion in issuing a warrant for his arrest and ordering I
his commitment to the Cebu City Jail.38
There is no grave abuse of discretion in this case
Assuming that his former counsel received a copy of the Court of Appeals’
Resolution, Ong argues that his counsel was grossly negligent in failing to
Grave abuse of discretion is the "arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due
appeal the Court of Appeals’ Resolution. This gross negligence allegedly
to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a
deprived him of due process and, therefore, should not bind him.39
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
Considering the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the Court of Appeals and law."49
the trial court, Ong prays that this court issue a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction for him to be "liberated from his . . . illegal imprisonment."40 In the
In the present case, petitioner failed to prove the Court of Appeals’ and trial
alternative, he prays that this court allow him to post bail for his provisional
court’s grave abuse of discretion.
liberty while this court decides his Petition for Certiorari.41
The registry return card is the "official . . . record evidencing service by
In its Comment, the People of the Philippines argues that the registry return
mail."50 It "carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official
card "carries the presumption that ‘it was prepared in the course of official
duties that have been regularly performed [and, therefore,] it is presumed to
duties that have been regularly performed [and must be] presumed to be
be accurate, unless proven otherwise[.]"51
accurate unless proven otherwise.’"42 In this case, the registry return card
corresponding to the copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution sent to Ong’s
former counsel indicates that his counsel received the Resolution on April 29, Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption.
2003. This date, therefore, must be presumed to be the date of receipt of the
Resolution. Since Ong failed to appeal within the reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals’ Decision became final and executory and the Court of The affidavits of petitioner’s wife and mother-in-law, Mary Ann Ong and Nila
Appeals correctly issued the Entry of Judgment.43 Mapilit, stating that petitioner’s former counsel told them that the law office
never received a copy of the Resolution,52 are inadmissible in evidence for
being hearsay.53 Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s false claim, his former
Even assuming that his former counsel did not receive a copy of the counsel had notice that the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Resolution, the People argues that this negligence bound Ong under the rule Reconsideration as early as April 21, 2004 when his counsel received a copy
that the negligence of counsel binds the client.44 of the trial court’s Order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
petitioner.54
With respect to Ong’s prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, the People contends that he "failed to point out [the] specific With petitioner failing to rebut this presumption, it must be presumed that his
instances where the [Court of Appeals and the trial court] had committed former counsel received a copy of the Resolution on April 29, 2003 as
grave abuse of discretion[.]"45 Consequently, Ong is not entitled to the Writ indicated in the registry return card. The 15-day period to appeal commenced
prayed for.46

from this date.55 Since petitioner did not file an Appeal within 15 days from
April 29, 2003, the Decision became final and executory on May 15, 2003.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion in
issuing the Entry of Judgment, which declared petitioner’s conviction final and
executory as of May 15, 2003. Under Rule 51, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court on "Judgment," "if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution
shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The
date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be
deemed as the date of its entry."
As for the trial court, it likewise did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing
the arrest warrant against petitioner and ordering his commitment to the Cebu
City Jail. Since the Court of Appeals had already issued the Entry of
Judgment and had remanded to the trial court the original records of the case,
it became the trial court’s duty to execute the judgment.
II
The negligence of petitioner’s former counsel bound him
The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even
mistakes in the application of procedural rules.56 The exception to the rule is
"when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of
due process of law."57
The agency created between a counsel and a client is a highly fiduciary
relationship. A counsel becomes the eyes and ears in the prosecution or
defense of his or her client’s case. This is inevitable because a competent
counsel is expected to understand the law that frames the strategies he or
she employs in a chosen legal remedy. Counsel carefully lays down the
procedure that will effectively and efficiently achieve his or her client’s
interests. Counsel should also have a grasp of the facts, and among the
plethora of details, he or she chooses which are relevant for the legal cause
of action or defense being pursued.
It is these indispensable skills, among others, that a client engages. Of
course, there are counsels who have both wisdom and experience that give
their clients great advantage. There are still, however, counsels who wander
in their mediocrity whether consciously or unconsciously.
The state does not guarantee to the client that they will receive the kind of
service that they expect. Through this court, we set the standard on
competence and integrity through the application requirements and our
disciplinary powers. Whether counsel discharges his or her role to the
satisfaction of the client is a matter that will ideally be necessarily monitored
but, at present, is too impractical.
Besides, finding good counsel is also the responsibility of the client especially
when he or she can afford to do so. Upholding client autonomy in these
choices is infinitely a better policy choice than assuming that the state is
omniscient. Some degree of error must, therefore, be borne by the client who
does have the capacity to make choices.
60
This is one of the bases of the doctrine that the error of counsel visits the We fail to see how petitioner could not have known of the issuance of the
client. This court will cease to perform its social functions if it provides succor Resolution. We cannot accept a standard of negligence on the part of a client
to all who are not satisfied with the services of their counsel. to fail to follow through or address counsel to get updates on his case. Either
this or the alternative that counsel's alleged actions are merely subterfuge to
avail a penalty well deserved.
But, there is an exception to this doctrine of binding agency between counsel
and client.1âwphi1 This is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, almost
bordering on recklessness and utter incompetence, that we can safely WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
conclude that the due process rights of the client were violated. Even so,
there must be a clear and convincing showing that the client was so
maliciously deprived of information that he or she could not have acted to
protect his or her interests. The error of counsel must have been both
palpable yet maliciously exercised that it should viably be the basis for
disciplinary action.
Thus, in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People,58 this court reiterated:
For the exception to apply . . . the gross negligence should not be
accompanied by the client’s own negligence or malice, considering that the
client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself
up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client should
suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.59
In Bejarasco, Jr., Peter Bejarasco, Jr., failed to file a Petition for Review
before the Court of Appeals within the extended period prayed for. The Court
of Appeals then dismissed the Appeal and issued an Entry of Judgment. His
conviction for grave threats and grave oral defamation became final, and a
warrant for his arrest was issued.60
In his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court, Peter Bejarasco, Jr.
argued that his counsel’s negligence in failing to file the Appeal deprived him
of due process.61
This court rejected Peter Bejarasco, Jr.'s argument, ruling that "[i]t is the
client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be
informed of the progress and developments of his case[.]"62 "[T]o merely rely
on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of
is not enough."63
This court noted the 16 months from the issuance of the Entry of Judgment
and the 22 months from the issuance of the trial court's Decision before Peter
Bejarasco, Jr. appealed his conviction.64 According to this court, "[h]e ought to
have been sooner alerted about his dire situation by the fact that an
unreasonably long time had lapsed since the [trial court] handed down the
dismissal of his appeal without [his counsel] having updated him on the
developments[.]"65
In the present case, petitioner took almost seven (7) years, or almost 84
months, from the Court of Appeals' issuance of the Resolution denying his
Motion for Reconsideration to file a Petition before this court. As this court
ruled in Bejarasco, Jr., petitioner ought to have been sooner alerted of the
"unreasonably long time"66 the Court of Appeals was taking in resolving his
appeal. Worse, he was arrested in Pasay City, not in Cebu where he resides.
His failure to know or to find out the real status of his appeal "rendered
[petitioner] undeserving of any sympathy from the Court vis-a-vis the
negligence of his former counsel."67