MARTIN - THe Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing

The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing
Author(s): Terry Martin

Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 70, No. 4, (Dec., 1998), pp. 813-861
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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The Originsof Soviet Ethnic Cleansing*
Terry Martin
HarvardUniversity
In February 1937, a young English adventurer,Fitzroy Maclean, arrivedin

Moscow to take up the position of third secretary at the British Embassy.
Macleanharboreda secret ambition:"I was going, if it was humanlypossible,
to the Caucasus and CentralAsia, to Tashkent,Bokhara and Samarkand."''
However,foreignerswere then forbiddenaccess to centralAsia. So Maclean
instead boarded a train for Baku, hoping that from there he could cross the
CaspianSea and reach centralAsia. In Baku, he illegally boardeda steamerto
Lenkoran, a Caspian port near the border of Azerbaijanand Persia. There
he found a hotel room. The next morninghe was awakenedearly by a proces-
sion of trucks,which continuedthe entire day, "drivingheadlong throughthe
town on the way to the port, each filled with depressed-lookingTurko-Tartar
peasants under the escort of NKVD frontiertroops with fixed bayonets."2At
the port, the peasantswere being loaded onto ships for deportationto central
Asia.
The people of Lenkorangatheredto watch the deportationand speculateon
its cause. Macleanfavoredthe explanationof an elderly Russian,who said that
"the arrestshad been decreed from Moscow and merely formed part of the
deliberatepolicy of the Soviet government,who believed in transplantingpor-
tions of the populationfrom place to place as and when it suited them. The
place of those now being deportedwould probablybe takenby otherpeasants
from centralAsia."This, he said, had happenedbefore. It was, he remarked
somewhat cryptically,"a measure of precaution."3Another local approached
* Researchsupportfor this articlewasprovidedby the Social Sciences andHumanities
ResearchCouncil(SSHRC)of Canada,the InternationalResearchandExchangesBoard
(IREX), and the MacArthurFoundation'sCASPIC program.Drafts of the article were
presentedat the Universityof Chicago'sHistoricalSociology and ComparativePolitics
Workshopand at Andrea Graziosi's seminar,"New Approachesto the History of the
1930s,"in Paris.I wouldlike to thankthe participantsin those conferencesfor theircom-
ments, as well as Sheila Fitzpatrick,DavidLaitin,NormanNaimark,GaborRittersporn,
andYuriSlezkine.
I FitzroyMaclean,EasternApproaches(New York,1949), p. 2.
2British Foreign Office: Russia Correspondencereel 7 (1937), vol. 21107, p. 213
(hereaftercited as BFORC). See also Maclean,p. 33. Macleanfiled a reportto the em-
bassy afterhistrip.The accountin his book is a shortened,butentirelyconsistent,version.
3BFORC reel 7, p. 214; see also Maclean,p. 34.
[TheJournalof ModernHistory 70 (December 1998): 813-861]

X) 1998 by The Universityof Chicago. 0022-2801/98/7004-0002$02.00
All rightsreserved.
814 Martin
Maclean and showed him a cartoonfrom the Soviet satiricaljournalKrokodil

about British deportationsin India. "This is exactly what happens here,"he
said.4
Since all the ships to centralAsia were occupied with the deportation,Mac-
lean decided to rent a horse and ride inland to explore the nearbymountains.
After a few hours,he was suddenlyovertakenand surroundedby secret police
(NKVD) bordertroops:5
BeforeI hadtakenin whatwashappening, I foundmyselfstaringdownthebarrelsof

a pistolandhalfa dozenrifles."Handsup,"saidthe officer,andup wentmy hands.I
tookadvantage of the somewhatembarrassing pausewhichnowensuedto explainto
my captor,a shifty-looking thatI was a diplomatandcouldthereforenot
littleTartar,
be arrested.Did he knowwhata diplomatwas?To this he replied,his foolishface
suddenlycrafty,thathe knewonlytoowellandthatif I wenton arguinghe wouldshoot
me onthespotinsteadof waitingtill we gothome.I saidthatif he didtheconsequences
wouldbe veryunpleasant for him,to whichhe repliedthattheywouldbe evenmore
unpleasantforme.
Maclean escaped unscathed,but with a warning that the NKVD "had to be

careful so nearthe frontier."6
In September1937, Macleanmade a second attemptto reach Soviet Central
Asia. This time he took the Trans-Siberianrailwayas far as Novosibirsk,where
he defied Soviet law by boarding a train heading south towardBarnaul.Re-
markably,just before reachingBarnaul,Maclean witnessed yet anotherlarge-
scale ethnic deportation:7
AtAltaisk. .. we stoppedforseveralhourswhilea numberof cattletruckswerehitched

on to ourtrain.Thesewerefilledwithpeoplewho,atfirstsight,seemedto be Chinese.
Theytumedoutto be Koreans,who withtheirfamiliesandbelongingswereon their
wayfromtheFarEastto CentralAsiawheretheywerebeingsentto workon thecotton
Theyhadno ideawhytheywerebeingdeported
plantations. butall grinnedincessantly
andI gatheredfromthe few wordsI couldexchangewithsomeof theirnumberthat
theywerepleasedto haveleft theFarEasternterritorywhereconditionswereterrible
andto be goingto CentralAsia of whichtheyhadevidentlybeengivenenthusiastic
accounts.LaterI heardthatthe Sovietauthoritieshadquitearbitrarily removedsome
200,000Koreansto CentralAsia,as likelyto proveuntrustworthy in theeventof a war
withJapan.I waswitnessingyet anothermassmovementof population.
When I first encounteredMaclean'sreportsin the British Foreign Office's

Russia Correspondence,it struckme as an incrediblecoincidencethathe could
4 BFORCreel 7, p. 225; Maclean,p. 34.

s BFORCreel 7, pp. 216-17; Maclean,p. 36.
6 Maclean,p. 37.
7 BFORCreel 6 (1937), vol. 21105, p. 221; Maclean,pp. 54-55.
Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing 815
have undertakentwo journeys to the Soviet peripheryand on each occasion

became an eyewitness to ethnic cleansing. I knew about the Koreandeporta-
tion but had never heard of the Azerbaijanione. In fact, it was only after six
months' work in the Moscow archivesthat I found an archivalfile confirming
Maclean'saccount.8I also found that Maclean'sencounterswere not such a
coincidence after all. Between 1935 and 1938, at least nine Soviet nationali-
ties-Poles, Germans,Finns, Estonians,Latvians, Koreans,Chinese, Kurds,
Iranians-were all subjectedto ethnic cleansing.9Nor was Maclean'sunpleas-
ant encounterwith the NKVD bordertroopsunusual.He had strayedinto what
was known as "the forbiddenborderzone," a huge region runningdozens of
kilometersdeep along the entire Soviet border.Had he been a Soviet citizen,
Maclean would have gotten a one- to three-yearprison term.10Soviet ethnic
cleansingbegan from these forbiddenborderzones. Finally,I found thatMac-
lean's old Russian was on the right track. Peasants deportedfrom the border
regions were routinelyreplacedwith demobilizedRed Army soldiers.
It might seem initially that the phenomenonof Soviet ethnic cleansing re-
quireslittle explanation.After all, ethnic cleansing has been a regrettablycom-
mon feature of the twentieth-centurylandscape. The nationalist project of
making state borderscoincide with ethnic borderswould seem to imply either
assimilation,segregation,or ethnic cleansing."'The Soviet Union was one of
8 GosudarstvennyiArkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF) 5446120a/493

(1937).
9 The standardworks on Soviet ethnic cleansing briefly mentionedthe 1937 Korean
deportation.AleksandrM. Nekrich,ThePunishedPeoples: TheDeportationand Fate of
Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second WorldWar(New York, 1978), pp. 98-99;
RobertConquest,TheNation Killers: TheSovietDeportationof Nationalities(London,
1977), p. 77. The Finnish deportationsare mentionedin Nikolai K. Deker and Andrei
Lebed,eds., Genocidein the USSR(Munich,1958), pp. 56-57, as well as in the excellent
articleby Ian M. Matley,"TheDispersalof the IngrianFinns,"Slavic Review38 (March
1979): 1-16. In recentyears,N. F Bugai has publishednumerousdocumentcollections
on the pre-WorldWarII deportations.His findingsaresummedup in N. F Bugai, L. Be-
riia-I. Stalinu: "Soglasno vashemu ukazaniiu"(Moscow, 1995). See also Mikolaj
Iwanov,Pierwszy narod ukarany:Polacy w zwiazkuradzieckim,1921-1939 (Warsaw,
1991); Jean-JacquesMarie, Les peuples deportes d'unionsovie'tique(Paris, 1995), pp.
21-33; MichaelGelb, "TheWesternFinnicMinoritiesandthe Originsof the StalinistNa-
tionalities Deportations,"Nationalities Papers 24 (June 1996): 237-68, and "AnEarly
Soviet Ethnic Deportation:The Far-EasternKoreans,"Russian Review 54 (July 1995):
389-412. AmirWeiner,"ExcisingEvil: The Soviet Quest for Purityand the Eradication
of the NationalistMovementin the VinnytsiaRegion,"inAn Empireof Nations: TheSo-
viet StateandItsPeoples in theAge of LeninandStalin,ed. RonaldGrigorSunyandTerry
Martin,in press.
10Sobraniezakonovi rasporiazheniiSSSR(05.09.35): 45/377.
11Fora good theoreticalaccount,see ErnestGellner,NationsandNationalism(Ithaca,
N.Y, 1983). For the specific case of diasporanationalities,see JohnArmstrong,"Mobi-
816 Martin
history'smost violent and repressiveregimes. It engaged in mass deportations

of putative class enemies. Given these facts, ethnic cleansing might seem
grimly inevitable. However,the Soviet Union was not a nation-state,nor was
its leadershipever committedto turningit into a nation-state.12No attemptwas
made to forge a new Soviet nationality,nor to forcibly assimilate the non-
Russianpopulation.Quite the contrary.In the early Soviet period, even volun-
tary assimilation was actively discouraged.The Soviet regime devoted con-
siderableresourcesto the promotionof the national self-consciousness of its
non-Russian populations. Each Soviet nation, no matter how small, was
grantedits own nationalterritory,nationalschools, and nationalelites. Dozens
of writtennationallanguageswere createdfor ethnic groupsthat lacked them.
This commitmentto ethnic proliferationwould seem to have made the Soviet
Union a highly unlikely site for the emergence of ethnic cleansing.13
Indeed,the simultaneouspursuitof nationbuilding and nationdestroyingin
the Stalinistperiod remains a paradoxin need of explanation.Earlierstudies
of the Soviet nationalitiespolicy tendedto emphasize a shift from a moderate
policy of national concessions in the 1920s to a repressivepolicy featuring
ethnic deportations,national terror,and russification.14 More recent studies
haveinsteadfocused on the impressivecontinuityin the Soviet commitmentto
nation building throughoutthe entire Stalinistperiod and beyond.15 However,
neitherapproachgives a satisfactoryexplanationof the most strikingparadox
of the last two decadesof Stalin'srule:the simultaneouspursuitof nationbuild-
ing andnationdestroying.My discussionof the origins of Soviet ethniccleans-
ing will attemptto addressthis paradoxby showing how, undercertaincondi-
tions, the same principlesthat informed Soviet nation building could and did
lead to ethnic cleansing and ethnic terroragainst a limited set of stigmatized
lized and Proletarian Diasporas,"American Political Science Review 70 (1976):

393-408.
12 On this point, see YuriSlezkine, "TheUSSR as a CommunalApartment,or How a
Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,"Slavic Review 53 (Summer 1994):

414-52.
13 For a detailedstudyof the Soviet nationalitiespolicy andits consequences,see Terry
Martin, "AnAffirmativeAction Empire:Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923-1938"

(Ph.D. diss., Universityof Chicago, 1996).
14 For representativeworks, see WalterKolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (London,
1953); Conquest,TheNation Killers;AlexandreA. Bennigsen andEndersS. Wimbush,

Muslim National Communismin the Soviet Union: A RevolutionaryStrategyfor the
Colonial World(Chicago, 1979).
15The most influentialworksareRonaldGrigorSuny,TheRevengeof thePast:Nation-
alism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, Calif., 1993);
Slezkine;RogersBrubaker,NationalismReframed:Nationhoodand the National Ques-
tion in theNew Europe(Cambridge,1996), pp. 23-54.
nationalities,while leaving nation-buildingpolicies in place for the majority

of nonstigmatizednationalities.
ETHNIC CLEANSINGIN THE EURASIAN BORDERLANDS,1912-53
Before attemptingto explain this Stalinistparadox,I will briefly situateSoviet

actions in a contemporaryregionalcontext in orderto highlightboth what was
typical and what was distinctivein Soviet ethnic cleansing. I will also specify
precisely what I mean by "ethnic cleansing."This term, of course, emerged
during the recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia,but the practice itself is
considerablyolder and has been especially common in the twentiethcentury.'6
For thatreason,both scholarsand popularwritershave now extendedthe term
"ethniccleansing"to other historicaland contemporaryinstances of the forc-
ible removal of an ethnically defined populationfrom a given territory.Y7Of
course, as any Soviet historian is well aware, populations defined by class,
religion, political reliability,race, and many other categories have also been
subjectedto forcible relocation.However,ethnic cleansing has been by far the
most widespreadpracticein the twentiethcentury.Indeed, a goal of my article
is to explain the unexpectedSoviet transitionfrom class-baseddeportations- to
ethnic cleansing.
A comprehensivehistory of ethnic cleansing has not yet been written.'8In
orderto contextualizeSoviet behavior-to illustrateboth the ubiquityand the
variety of contemporaryethnic cleansing-I will providea very brief and in-
complete surveyof ethnic cleansingfrom 1912 to 1953 in the Eurasianborder-
16
For a good comparativediscussionof the originsof the term"ethniccleansing"and
the politics surroundingit, see RobertM. Hayden,"Schindler'sFate: Genocide, Ethnic
Cleansing,andPopulationTransfers," Slavic Review55 (Winter1996): 727-48; see also
AkbarS. Ahmed, "'Ethnic Cleansing':A Metaphorfor OurTime?"Ethnic and Racial
Studies 18, no. 1 (1995): 1-25.
17 For example, a title search of the OCLC WorldCatdatabaseon March 26, 1998,
found twenty-sevenbooks with "ethniccleansing"in the title, all publishedafter 1992.

Eleven books deal with the warsin the formerYugoslaviaand sixteen books with other
historicalor contemporaryinstancesof theforcible removalof an ethnicallydefinedpop-
ulationfrom a given territory.The wordingof this definitionis mine. It differs slightly
fromthe definitionof ethniccleansingformulatedby an official UnitedNationscommis-
sion as "renderingan area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidationto
removefroma given areapersonsof anotherethnic or religious group"(cited in Hayden,
p. 732). In fact, ethnic cleansingrarelyaims at complete ethnic homogeneity.The com-
mon practiceis the removalof one or more stigmatizedethnicgroups.
18Brief and somewhateclectic surveysare providedin AndrewBell-Fialkoff, Ethnic
Cleansing (New York, 1996), pp. 7-50; Milica ZarkovicBookman, The Demographic
StruggleforPower: ThePolitical Economyof DemographicEngineeringin the Modern
World(London,1997), pp. 121-46.
818 Martin
lands: that is, the L-shaped swath of territoryextending southwardfrom Le-

ningradthroughthe Balkans, and then eastwardacross southernUkraineand
Turkeyinto the Caucasusregion. Although ethnic cleansing began in this re-
gion long before 1912, the two Balkan wars of 1912-13 witnessed a dramatic
extension of the practice,as each of the warringstates engaged in purposeful
expulsions and massacresof rival minoritiesin orderto furthertheir postwar
demographicclaims to conqueredterritory.19 The conclusion of these warswit-
nessed the world'sfirstinternationallysanctioned"populationexchange"in the
form of a 1913 Turko-Bulgarianconvention agreeing to the exchange of
48,570 Turksand46,764 Bulgariansfrom the two countries'respectivefifteen-
kilometer frontierzones. As would frequentlybe the case with future analo-
gous agreements,the populationsconcernedhad alreadybeen expelled andthe
treatyserved only to formalizethe expulsions and regulatepropertyclaims.20
WorldWarI led to a dramaticescalationin the practiceof ethnic cleansing.
In 1915, the OttomanEmpirenot only deportedits entireArmenianpopulation
from the north-eastfrontierbut also subjectedthe deportedArmeniansto geno-
cidal massacres,starvation,and death from exposure.21 At the same time, the
Russianarmydeportedapproximately800,000 of their own ethnicallyJewish
and ethnically Germancitizens away from the front and other regions under
militaryrule.22In addition,the Russiangovernmentpassed andbegan to imple-
19On ethniccleansingin the nineteenthcentury,see JustinMcCarthy,Death and Exile:

TheEthnicCleansingof OttomanMuslims(Princeton,N.J., 1993);AlanW Fisher,"Emi-
gration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years after the Crimean War,"
Jahrbiicherfir GeschichteOsteuropas35, no.3 (1987): 356-7 1. On the Balkanwars,see
George F Kennan, The Other Balkan Wars:A 1913 Carnegie EndowmentInquiry in
Retrospectwitha New IntroductionandReflectionson thePresentConflict(Washington,
D.C., 1993).
20 StephenP. Ladas, TheExchangeof Minorities:Bulgaria, Greeceand Turkey(New
York,1932), pp. 18-20. In 1914, in responseto Ottomanthreatsto deporttheirGreekmi-

nority away from the Aegean coast, Greece signed an agreement with the Ottoman
Empirefor an exchangeof some of theirrespectiveGreekandTurkishminoritypopula-
tions. The outbreakof WorldWarI preventedthe implementationof this agreement.
Ladas,pp. 20-23.
21 VahaknN. Dadrian,TheHistoryoftheArmenianGenocide:EthnicConflictfromthe
BalkanstoAnatolia to the Caucasus(Oxford,1995).

22 The standardwork on these deportationshas been writtenby Eric Lohr, "Internal
EnemyPolitics andthe Nationalizationof ImperialSpace:EnemyAliens withinthe Rus-
sian EmpireduringWorldWarI" (Ph.D. diss., HarvardUniversity,forthcoming),chaps.
2-3. I thankthe authorfor letting me read and cite his manuscript.For published ac-
counts, see Ingeborg Fleischhauer,Die Deutschen im Zarenreich.Zwei Jahrhunderte
deutsch-russischeKulturgemeinschaft(Stuttgart,1986), pp. 507-11; Joshua Sanborn,
"Draftingthe Nation: Military Conscriptionand the Formationof a Modem Polity in
Tsaristand Soviet Russia, 1905-1925" (Ph.D. diss., Universityof Chicago, 1998), chap.
5; "Dokumentyo presledovaniievreev,"Arkhivrusskoirevoliutsii,tom 19 (Berlin, 1928),
pp. 245-84. For a fascinatingdiscussionof the originsof various"cleansing"operations
ment legislationliquidatingGermanlandholdings(i.e., land owned by Russian

citizens of ethnic Germandescent) in a 100- to 150-kilometerstrip along the
entire L-shapedcurve of the Russian borderfrom the Baltic to the Caspian.23
Germanyhad alreadybegun a limited expropriationof Polish landholdingsin
its easternborderregions in 1908.24During the war, plans were drawnup to
annexRussianterritoryanddeportthis Polish populationeastward,but Germa-
ny's defeat preventedtheirexecution.25Finally,the collapse of the 1919 Greek
invasion of Turkeyin September 1922 was accompaniedby the expulsion of
almost a million Greeksfrom Turkey'sAegean coast. The 1923 Treatyof Lau-
sanne formalized this expulsion and likewise authorizedan involuntaryex-
change of Turkey'sremainingGreekpopulationand Greece'sremainingTurk-
ish minority.26
Withthe exceptionof the Soviet ethnic deportationsdescribedin this article,
there were no furtherovert episodes of ethnic cleansing until the outbreakof
WorldWarII, which initiatedthe largestwave of ethnic cleansing in European
history.The Nazi state had grandioseplans to ethnically cleanse large regions
of easternEurope,particularlyPoland, for resettlementby ethnic Germans-
plans thatwere partiallyrealized priorto Germany'sdefeat.27The genocide of
6 million EuropeanJews was a uniqueevent in both scope and kind, but it was
also the most extreme manifestationof the contemporarypractice of ethnic
cleansing. Germany'sallies and satellite states were allowed to undertaketheir
in TsaristRussiaandthe revolutionaryperiod,see PeterHolquist,"'To Remove'and 'To

ExterminateTotally':PopulationStatisticsand PopulationPolitics in Late Imperialand
Soviet Russia'"forthcomingin SunyandMartin,eds. (n. 9 above).
23 K. E. Lindemann, Prekrashcheniezemlevladeniia i zemlepolzovaniiaposelian-
sobstvennikov(Moscow, 1917). The expropriationstechnicallytargetedGerman"colo-

nists" or poselian-sobstvennikov,an ethno-soslovie category that exempted Baltic
Germannobles andothers.
24 WilliamW.Hagen, Germans,Poles, and Jews: TheNationalityConflictin the Prus-
sian East, 1772-1914 (Chicago, 1980), pp. 188-207.
25Ibid., pp. 206-7, 320-22; ImmanuelGeiss, Der Polnische Grenzstreifen,1914-
1918: Ein BeitragzurdeutschenKriegszielpolitikim ersten Weltkrieg(Liubeck,1960).
26 Ladas, pp. 335-53. The Greeks of Istanbuland Turksof westernThracewere ex-
empted. A 1919 treaty between Greece and Bulgaria also authorized a voluntary
exchangeof theirrespectiveminorities,which was consummatedonly aftercoercionwas
employed.Ladas,pp.27-123. The formationof new statesin east centralEuropein 1919
led to a series of semivoluntarypressuredemigrations.See DariaStolz, "ForcedMigra-
tions in CentralEuropeanHistory,"InternationalMigrationReview 26, no. 2 (1992):
329.
27 Priorto October1941, approximately1.3 million Poles andJewswere deportedfrom
the westernregions of Polandthat were formallyannexed and includedin the German
reich.Approximately1.25 million GermansfromeasternEuropeandthe Reich werethen
resettledin these regions.JosephB. Schechtman,EuropeanPopulationTransfers,1939-
1945 (New York,1946), pp.3-366. On thecontinuitybetweenImperialGermanandNazi
policies in this region, see Hagen,pp. 320-22.
820 Martin
own ethnic cleansing projects.The CroatianUstasha state murderedhundreds

of thousandsof Serbs and forced many more to flee Ustasha-controlledterri-
tory.28Beginning in 1943, the UkrainianInsurrectionaryArmy (UPA) adopted
a policy of massacringand expelling the Polish populationof Volhynia and
Eastern Galicia.29Bulgaria'sannexationof southernDobrujafrom Romania
in 1940 was accompaniedby the two countries' agreementto an involuntary
exchangeof 100,000 Romaniansfrom this territoryfor 61,000 Bulgariansfrom
northernDobruja.30In conqueredMacedonia,Bulgariaengaged in a mass ex-
pulsion of hundredsof thousandsof Greeksand Serbs.3'
Germany'sinvasionof the Soviet Union led to a massiveescalationin Soviet
ethnic cleansing.The Soviet governmentimmediatelydeported1.2 million cit-
izens of Germanorigin from EuropeanRussia to Siberia and CentralAsia.32
After the retreatof the Germanarmyin 1943-44, the Soviet state deportedits
entire CrimeanTatar,Kalmyk,Chechen,Ingush,Balkar,Karachai,and Mesk-
hetian Turkpopulationsto CentralAsia on the charge of collective treason.33
In addition,from 1944 through1953, a numberof peoples-Kurds, Khemshils
(Moslem Armenians),Greeks, Bulgarians,Armeniansfrom the Black Sea re-
gion, Iranians-were deportedawayfrom the Soviet borderregions in Crimea
and the Transcaucasus.34 In addition, it now appearsthat Stalin may indeed
havebeen planningthe deportationto Siberiaof the entireSoviet Jewishpopu-
lation in the monthspriorto his deathin March 1953.35
Germany'sdefeat in 1945 triggered a massive internationallysanctioned
28AleksaDjilas, TheContestedCountry:YugoslavUnityand CommunistRevolution,

1919-1953 (Cambridge,Mass., 1991), pp. 103-27.
29TadeuszPiotrowski,Vengeanceof the Swallows, pp. 23-102; Jozef Turowski,ed.,
Zbrodnienacjonalistowukrainskichdokonanena ludnoscipolskiej na Wolyniu,1939-
1945 (Warsaw,1990).
30
Schechtman,EuropeanPopulationTransfers,pp.404-14.
31 Ibid.,pp. 415-24.
32 Bugai, L. Beriia (n. 9 above), pp. 27-55. The
remainingFinnishpopulationin Le-
ningradoblastwas also deportedin 1941-42 (pp. 191-92).
33 Ibid.,pp. 56-185. For earlieraccounts,see Nekrich(n. 9 above);and Conquest,The
Nation Killers (n. 9 above).
34 Bugai, L. Beriia, pp. 163-250. I have included in this list only deportationsbased
explicitly on ethniccriteria.The mass deportationsfrom the annexedterritoriesof Mol-
davia, westernUkraineand Belorussia,and the three Baltic republicsoverwhelmingly
affectednon-Russians,butthe deportedweretargetedas class enemies or,moreprecisely,
as "formerpeople"(byvshie):formerlandlords,policemen,teachers,membersof various
political parties,officers, etc. (given Polish overrepresentationin these positions, they
were also overrepresentedin the deportations).On these deportations,see Bugai, L. Be-
riia, pp. 186-250; andDeportatsii.Zakhidnizemli Ukrainykintsa30-kh-pochatku 50-
kh rr Dokumenty,materialy,spohady.Tom1. 1939-1945 rr (L'viv, 1996).
35 For an archivallybased discussionof this question,see GennadiKostyrchenko,Out
oftheRed Shadows:Anti-Semitism in Stalin'sRussia(Amherst,N.Y, 1995), pp.248-306.
wave of ethnic cleansing in eastern Europe. At Potsdam, the Allied powers

formally authorized"the transferto Germanyof Germanpopulations,or ele-
ments thereof, remainingin Poland, Czechoslovakiaand Hungary."36 Twelve
to 14 million Germanswere expelled from easternEurope, including several
million who fled in response to atrocitiesby the Red Army and local vigilan-
tes.37In September1944, the Soviet Union and the Polish Lublin Committee
signed a series of agreementsauthorizinga putativelyvoluntaryexchange (in
practice, there was much coercion) of the Polish populationlying to the east
of the Curzon line and the Ukrainian,Belorussian, and Russian populations
lying to the west.38The 139,467 Polish Ukrainiansnot relocatedby the summer
of 1947 were then roundedup and deportedfrom Poland'seasternborderre-
gions to westernand northernPoland.39After Czechoslovakiaceded Carpatho-
Ukraine to the Soviet Union in 1945, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia
agreedto a voluntaryexchangeof populations.40 In addition,the postwaryears
witnessed an abortedSlovak-Hungarianexchange of minorities and a semi-
voluntaryrepatriationof ethnic Turksfrom Bulgaria.41 The death of Stalin in
1953 marked the end of this era of mass ethnic cleansing in the Eurasian
borderlands.42
This brief survey should serve to demonstratethe great variety of actions
that must be included under the general category of the forcible removal of
an ethnically defined populationfrom a given territory.In orderto isolate the
distinctivefeaturesof Soviet ethnic cleansing, we can examine five majorvari-
36
JosephB. Schechtman,PostwarPopulationTransfersin Europe,1945-1955 (Phila-
delphia, 1962), pp. 36-37.
37 Germanswerealso expelled, withoutformalauthorization, fromYugoslaviaandRo-
mania. On the atrocities suffered by the Germanpopulation, see Alfred-Mauricede
Zayas,TheGermanExpellees: Victimsin Warand Peace (New York,1993).
38 Schectman,Postwar Population Transfers,pp. 151-79; Bohdan Kordan,"Making
Borders Stick: PopulationTransferand Resettlementin the Trans-CurzonTerritories,

1944-1949," InternationalMigrationReview 31, no. 3 (1997): 704-50. For excellent
documents,see Deportatsii,pp. 294-647. Approximately1.5 million people were relo-
catedin the period 1944-46.
39 Kordan,pp. 712-17; EugeniuszMisilo,Akcja "Wisla." Dokumenty(Warsaw,1993).
40 At least on the Czechoslovakside, this exchangeappearsto havebeen voluntary.
Al-
most all of the Soviet Union's Czechs and Slovaks emigrated, while about 4,500 of
Czechoslovakia's91,000 Ukrainians/Ruthenians and Russiansemigrated.Schechtman,
PostwarPopulationTransfers,pp.43-49.
41
Ibid.,pp. 129-50,341-62.
42
Ethniccleansing, however,has been quite common in the new states of Africa and
Asia. JosephB. Schechtman,PopulationTransfersinAsia (New York,1949);Jean-Marie
Henckaerts,Mass Expulsion in Modern InternationalLaw and Practice (The Hague,
1995); Donald L. Horowitz,Ethnic Groupsin Conflict(Berkeley, 1985), pp. 196-201.
Thecollapse of Communismin the late 1980s, of course,triggereda resumptionof ethnic
cleansingin the Balkansandthe Caucasus.
822 Martin
ables in the practice of ethnic cleansing in general. Ethnic cleansing may in-
volve forcible removalwith no intent to murder,or it may (more frequently)
be accompanied by varying degrees of intentional mass murder.43Ethnic
cleansing may be carriedout by trainedprofessionals(usually the securitypo-
lice) or it may involve varying degrees of mass popularmobilization.Ethnic
cleansing may be partialor total. The stigmatizedethnicity may be expelled
abroad (usually to their "home"nation-state)or resettled internally (usually
awayfrom sensitive frontierregions). Finally,ethnic cleansing may occur dur-
ing war or peace.44One might also note the presence or absence of several
practicesthatoften accompanyethnic cleansing, such as ethnic dilution(reset-
tling membersof trustedethnic groupsinto regions dominatedby stigmatized
ethnic groups),ethnic consolidation(territoriallyconcentratingdispersedeth-
nic groups),and forced assimilation.45
Soviet ethnic cleansing was not accompaniedby overt intentionalmurder.
However,the ethnic deportationsalwaysincludedmany arreststhatresultedin
incarcerationin high-mortalityprisoncamps. Moreover,the deportationswere
carriedout incrediblyswiftly,which insuredthatlarge numbersof individuals
would die of exposure, starvation,and disease both duringand afterthe depor-
tations,especially since the deportedwere placed in prison-like"specialsettle-
ments."46Finally, and most importantly,under Soviet conditions all deported
ethnic groups(andotherpopulationcategories)were stigmatizedand therefore
extremelyvulnerableduringperiodicterrorcampaigns.The diasporanational-
ities deportedin the periodbetween 1935 and 1938 were singled out for dispro-
portionatearrestand mass execution duringthe GreatTerrorof 1937-38 to a
degree that, as I will show, verged on the genocidal. Therefore,as with most
cases of ethnic cleansing, the Soviet practiceincluded substantiallevels of in-
tentionalmurder.47
43 Whenmurderitself becomes the primarygoal, it is typicallycalled genocide. On the
term "genocide,"see Leo Kuper,Genocide: Its Political Use in the TwentiethCentury

(New Haven,Conn., 1981). Ethnic cleansing is probablybest understoodas occupying
the centralpartof a continuumbetween genocide on one end and nonviolentpressured
ethnicemigrationon the otherend. Giventhis continuum,therewill alwaysbe ambiguity
as to when ethniccleansingshadesinto genocide, or pressuredemigrationinto forcedre-
location.For a similarcontinuum,see Bell-Fialkoff(n. 18 above),p. 3.
44This list is not meant to be exhaustive. One might add that the targets of ethnic
cleansing may be citizens or noncitizens (I excluded actions againstthe latterfrom my
survey). Ethnic cleansing may be carriedout by states or by stateless armies (such as
UPA).In multiethnicstates,it mayeven be carriedoutby one ethnicgroupagainstanother
withoutstatesanctionor support.
45 On ethnicconsolidationandethnicdilution,see Bookman(n. 18 above),pp. 121-29.
46 For personalaccountsof the deportations,see Taketo bylo. Natsional'nyerepressii
v SSSR,1919-1952 gody, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1993).

47The manyintemationallysanctioned"populationtransfers"were not accompanied
by intentionalmurderbut had almost alwaysbeen preceded,duringthe previouswar,by
the terrorizationandmassacreof the populationto be deported.
Soviet ethnic cleansing was professionalizedto an unprecedenteddegree.48

The deportationswere carriedout with extraordinaryspeed and efficiency by
enormouscohortsof well-trainedsecuritypolice in close cooperationwith of-
ficials in transport,housing, food supply,and other bureaucracies.49 The local
civilian populationwas intentionallydemobilized. However, as we shall see,
to some extentpopularsentimentwas reflectedin the choice of targetedethnic
groups. Soviet ethnic cleansing began in the mid-1930s with the partialre-
movalof stigmatizedethnicgroupsfrom the westernborderregions (combined
with ethnic dilution throughtheir replacementwith demobilized Red Army
soldiers),50but by August 1937 it had escalatedinto totalremoval,which would
remain the typical pattern(with a few exceptions) until Stalin'sdeath. Soviet
ethnic cleansing was mostly domestic (involvingtransfersawayfrom sensitive
borderregions), but afterWorldWarII the Soviet Union also took partin inter-
nationalpopulationexchanges.51 Finally,almost all ethnic cleansingin our sur-
vey took place during or in the immediate aftermathof war, whereas, while
Soviet ethnic cleansing intensifiedduringWorldWarII, it had alreadybegun
in 1935 and continued throughto Stalin'sdeath in 1953.52 To sum up, then,
Soviet ethnic cleansing was distinctivein the degree of its professionalization
(including the professionalizationof mass murder),the extent of its commit-
ment to total ethnic removal,and especially its practiceof ethnic cleansing in
conditionsof peace.
To conclude this comparativediscussion of Soviet ethnic cleansing, I will
say a final word aboutmy use of the term "ethniccleansing,"since it is a novel
and controversialone.53I have shown thatthe forcible removalof an ethnically
defined populationfrom a given territoryhas been a widespreadand crucial
phenomenonof the twentiethcentury,and particularlyso in the Eurasianbor-
48
The only exception to this statementwould be the Red Army's actions in eastern
Europe, where mass rape and violence were used indiscriminatelyto punish the local
Germanpopulationandto intimidatetheminto fleeingtheterritoryof postwarPolandand
Kaliningradoblast. See de Zayas(n. 37 above);andNormanM. Naimark,TheRussians
in Germany:AHistoryof the SovietZoneof Occupation,1945-1949 (Cambridge,Mass.,
1995), pp. 69-140.
49The organizationof the deportationsis documentedvery well in Belaia kniga o de-
portatsii koreiskogonaseleniia Rossii v 30-40-kh godakh. Kniga pervaia (Moscow,
1992); andDeportatsiia(n. 34 above).
50As we shall see, the Soviet Union also engaged in ethnic consolidation.Forcedas-
similation,in contrast,was largelyabsentfrom Soviet nationalitiespolicy.
51 Given the Red Army'spresencein Polandand the participationof the Communist-
dominatedLublinCommittee,the Polish-Sovietpopulationexchangewas at least quasi-
domestic.
52 The connectionbetweenethnic cleansingandwaris hardlyconfinedto the Eurasian
borderlands.See Panikos Panayi, ed., Minorities in Wartime:National and Racial
Groupingsin Europe, NorthAmerica and Australia during the Two WorldWars(Ox-
ford, 1993).
53 Again, on the controversy,see Hayden(n. 16 above);andAhmed(n. 16 above).
824 Martin
derlands. Since ethnic cleansing has emerged as the most accepted term to
denote this practice in both popularand scholarly usage, I have employed it.
Otherterms-population transfer,forced migration,mass expulsion-are not
appropriatefor all instances of the forcible removal of an ethnically defined
populationfrom a given territory.Moreover,"ethniccleansing"does have the
advantageof accuratelyrepresentingthe perspective of the perpetrator.It is
the perpetratorwho providesthe ethnic definitionof the targetedgroup,which
may or may not coincide with the population'sself-definition.54And it is the
perpetratorwho views the removalof this populationas "cleansing."Like the
Serbsin the early 1990s, the Soviet governmentused the term"cleanse"(ochis-
tit', ochistka) to describe the deportationof ethnic groups from its borderre-
gions.55The Nazi statelikewise used the termfor its ethniccleansing andgeno-
cidal actions, as did the imperialRussian governmentduringWorldWarI and
the CzechoslovakgovernmentafterWorldWar11.56
THE BACKGROUNDTO SOVIETETHNIC CLEANSING
I excluded one importantvariablefrom the precedingcomparativediscussion

of ethnic cleansing:the type of state engaging in ethnic cleansing andits goals
in doing so. The statesinvolvedin ethniccleansingin my surveywere all either
nation-states(the overwhelmingmajority,including almost all the new states
of easternEurope), movements aspiringto form nation-states(UPA), or em-
pires attemptingto transformthemselves into nation-states(the late Ottoman
54 Althougha distinctivemodem practice,ethniccleansingwould appearto be particu-
larly common in transitionalstates (the late Ottomanand Russian Empires,the early

SovietUnion, the newly formedstatesof eastem Europe)andoftentargetsgroupsin tran-
sition from ambiguousethno-estateidentities (such as the ethno-religiousmillets in the
OttomanEmpireorethno-sosloviecategoriessuchas the Germancolonistsin the Russian
EmpireandSovietUnion) to modem ethnicidentities.
55 Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'ednan' Ukrainy (hereafter
TsDAHOU)fond1, opis' 6, delo 396 (19.06.35), p. 166 (hereafterfond/opisYdelo[date]:

page), 1/16/12 (29.09.35): 229, and 1/16/12 (04.11.35): 343. For the same usage in later
Soviet deportations,see Bugai, L. Beriia (n. 9 above),pp. 149, 164, 189, 190. Cleansing
(chistka,ochistka)was a commontermin the Bolshevik vocabulary,used in particularto
referto the routineexpulsion of membersof the CommunistPartydeemedunworthy,as
well as to the arrestor deportationof membersof variousstigmatizedpopulationcate-
gories.
56 On ImperialRussianusage, see Lohr (n. 22 above),chaps. 2-3; Nazi Germanusage
in the form of the term "judenrein"is well known; on Czechoslovakusage of the term
"cleansing"(ocista) for the general process of cleansing the state, which included the
removal of all Germans, see Benjamin Frommer,"Unmixing Marriage in Postwar
Czechoslovakia"(paper presentedat the HarvardUkrainianResearch Institute,April
1998). Citedwith author'spermission.Presumablymanyotherperpetratorsuse the term
"cleansing."
andRussianempires).57In each case, theirgoal in carryingout ethniccleansing

was to furthertheirethnichomogeneity(and,in some cases, to establishdemo-
graphicclaims for territorialexpansion).The Soviet Union had no ambitionto
transformitself into an ethnically homogeneous nation-state,but it still en-
gaged in large-scale ethnic cleansing over an extended period of time. Why?
Although Soviet ethnic cleansing was a phenomenonof the 1930s, the era of
the GreatTerror,its origins lay in the 1920s. Accordingly,I will begin by ana-
lyzing an importantset of Bolshevik conceptualcategories and practicesfrom
that time period, which served as preconditionsfor the emergence of Soviet
ethnic cleansing.
The first of these was ethnically based agriculturalresettlement. In the
1920s, Soviet policy was markedby a commitmentto ethnic proliferation.All
Soviet nations,no matterhow small, were guaranteedtheir own nationalterri-
tories. This policy led to the formationof a byzantinenetworkof nationalter-
ritories, servicing around one hundreddifferent nationalities and including
several dozen large national republics and oblasts, several hundrednational
regions (population10,000-50,000) and several thousandnationaltownships
(population500-5,000).58 Not all nations,however,were convenientlyterrito-
rially concentrated.In some cases, it was necessary to resettle members of
ethnic groupsin compactagriculturalsettlementsso thatthey could form their
own nationalterritories-in other words, to engage in a policy of ethnic con-
solidation.
The largest such programled to the creationof a Jewish autonomousoblast
in the far easternregion of Birobidzhan,as well as four Jewishnationalregions
and seventeen Jewish townships in Crimeaand south Ukraine.59Gypsies and
Assyrians were likewise resettledin compactgroups to form nationalterritor-
ies.60 Nomadic Kalmykson the North Caucasussteppe were concentratedin a
single nationalregion.6'Karelianswere resettledfrom centralRussia to bolster
the populationof the KarelianAutonomousSoviet Socialist Republic(ASSR).
57 The Nazi Germanstateis somethingof an exceptionhere, since its goal was to form
a territoriallyexpandedGermannation-stateas the dominantcore of a multiethnicem-

pire.TheTsaristRussianEmpire'sdeportationof GermansandJewsrepresenteda radical
intensificationof its previouslysporadiceffortsto russifythe westem borderlands,but it
should be pointed out thatit was not accompaniedby similarlyaggressiverussification
measureselsewherein the RussianEmpire.
58 Martin,"AnAffirmative Action Empire"(n. 13 above),p. 605.
59la. Kantor,Natsional'noe stroitel'stvosredi evreev v SSSR (Moscow, 1934); Allan
Laine Kagedan,"TheFormationof Soviet JewishTerritorialUnits, 1924-1937" (Ph.D.
diss., ColumbiaUniversity,1985), pp. 23-28; N. F Bugai, "20-e-50-e gody: Pereseleniia
i deportatsiievreiskogo naseleniiav SSSR'"Otechestvennaiaistoriia, no. 4 (1993), pp.
175-85.
60
GARF 1235/128/2 (1933): 110,166.
61'GAJff 1235/141/1531 (1933): 103.
826 Martin
When this failed, around25,000 Finnishimmigrantswere recruitedfrom Can-

ada and the United States.62The Soviet Union'scentralagency for agricultural
resettlementeven established a principle that, in the process of agricultural
resettlement,nationalgroupsshouldas a rule be settledcompactly.63 Likewise,
within each national district, free land was often reserved for migrantswho
belonged to the national majority.64 These populationtransfers,it should be
emphasized,were largely voluntary.Nevertheless,they established,alreadyin
the 1920s, the principleof resettlementof populationsalong ethnic lines.
The formationof several thousandnationalterritoriesnaturallyhad an im-
mense impact on ethnic relations.The Bolshevik leadershiphoped that their
policy would reduce ethnic conflict by satisfying nationaldesires and thereby
enabling class-based internationalsolidarity.In fact, the opposite occurred.
Popularopinion adopted an exclusive attitudetowardnational territories,in-
sisting on the majority'sright to dominate their own (nash) national region.
This led to an intolerancetowardnationaloutsiders,who were frequentlytold
to returnto "their"(svoi) nationalterritory:"Getout of Uzbekistan,go to your
own (svoi) Turkmenistan"; or "The Kirgizhave theirown republic,where they
should go to get land."65The fact that the Soviet state itself sanctioned the
movementof ethnic populationsin orderto form nationalterritoriesnaturally
enhancedand legitimized this attitude.
However,only undercertainconditionsdid this feeling of nationalexclusiv-
ity go beyond rhetoric and lead to actual attemptsat violent popular ethnic
cleansing. In general,four conditions combinedto create such a heated atmo-
sphere:conflicts over land and nationalterritorybetween groups that were di-
vided along statusand ethniclines. By status,I mean the prerevolutionarycate-
gories thatgave differentprivileges to differentstatusgroups(sosloviia).66 For
example,Cossacksandforeign colonists were given legal rightsdeniedto ordi-
nary Slavic peasants,while nomadicAsians (inorodtsy)and immigrantKore-
ans had a lower-statusranking.In ruralregions,higher-statusgroupsinvariably
possessed moreland.As a result,when statusandethniccategoriesoverlapped,
conflicts between different status groups over land possession became inter-
62Michael Gelb, "'KarelianFever':The Finnish ImmigrantCommunityduringSta-

lin'sPurges,"Europe-AsiaStudies45 (1993): 1091-1116.
63 "V sovete natsional'nosteiSSSR,"Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti, no. 1 (1930), p.
111.
64
TsDAHOU1/20/2019 (1925), p. 171;"VUTsIKUSSR, Sovetskoestroitel'stvo,nos.
5-6 (1928), pp. 218-19.
65These aretwo of hundredsof similarquotationsfrom OGPU informationalreports.
Rossiiskii TsentrKhraneniiai IzucheniiaDokumentoyNoveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI)
62/2/882 (1927): 274, and 62/2/1808 (1929): 134; Martin,"AnAffirmativeAction Em-
pire'"pp. 521-58.
66 GregoryL. Freeze, "The Soslovie (Estate)Paradigmand Russian Social History,"
AmericanHistoricalReview91 (1986): 11-36.

twined with conflicts over the formationof nationalterritories.When the na-

tional majorityof a new national territorycame from a formerly low-status
group, they often attemptedto use their new political power to seize the for-
merly dominant-statusgroup'sland and drive it out of the new nationalterri-
tory.I will refer to this as popularethnic cleansing.
The most striking example of popular ethnic cleansing took place in Ka-
zakhstan.In the last two decades of Tsaristrule, a large numberof Slavic peas-
ants had been settled on land traditionallyutilized by Kazakhnomads.67The
resultingethnic and statustension exploded in the bloody 1916 Kazakhupris-
ing and the postrevolutionarycivil war,both of which pittedRussianCossacks
and Slavic settlers against the local Kazakh and Kirgiz population.68During
these conflicts, the Kazakhpopulationsufferedsevererepressionsand Russian
settlers seized still more land. In September1920, the Soviet governmentde-
creed a set of reparationsaimed at reconciling the local population,including
the removalof illegal Russian settlers,the equalizationof nativeand European
landholdings,and the prohibitionof futuresettlement.69 These reforms,carried
out in 1921-22, resultedin a mass expulsion of Slavic settlersand Cossacks.70
Kazakhstan'sRussianpopulationdeclinedby 19.5 percentand its sewn areaof
crops by 50.6 percent.71 The center quickly lost control of the land reform.
Unauthorized"special punitive expeditionarymissions" attacked settler vil-
lages.72EntireRussianvillages were "in twenty-fourhours ... drivenout into
the frost."73The process, a central investigationlater concluded, "took place
with excessive cruelty and took on the characterof revenge."74At the end of
1922 the landreformwas officially halted,but, despite stringentcentralefforts,
Russian settlers continuedto be driven off their land in both Kazakhstanand
Kirgiziaas late as 1927.75
A similarsituationprevailedin the North Caucasus.DuringTsaristrule, the
indigenous mountainpeoples (gortsy) had been progressivelydriven out of
the more fertile Caucasianfoothills deeper into the mountains.Theirland was
67 GeorgeJ. Demko, TheRussianColonizationof Kazakhstan, 1896-1916 (Blooming-

ton, Ind., 1969).
68
EdwardDennis Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian CentralAsia (Baltimore,
1953).
69 Sezdy sovetovRSFSRi avtonomnykh respublikRSFSR,vol. 1 (Moscow, 1959), pp.
434-36; V. L. Genis, "Deportatsiiarusskikhiz Turkestanav 1921 godu ('Delo Safa-
rova')9"Voprosyistorii,no. 1 (1998), pp. 44-58.
70 GARF3316/64/220(1926): 11-14ob.
71 GARF 3316/16a/177 (1924): 28-31. These statisticsrefer to the populationwithin
the post-1924 KazakhASSRborders.
72Ibid.
73GARF 1235/140/127 (1926-28): 39.
74GARF3316/64/220 (1926): 13. See also Genis, pp. 46-54.
75Martin,"AnAffirmativeAction Empire"(n. 13 above),pp. 532-48.
828 Martin
granted first to Cossacks and then to Slavic settlers. As in Kazakhstan,the

resultingethnic tension led to brutalnationalconflict duringthe civil war.The
first act of the newly formed MountaineerASSR in 1921 was to redressthis
historic grievance: "For the satisfaction of the desperate needs of landless
Mountaineers,immediately begin the planned expulsion of Cossack settle-
ments beyond the bordersof the MountaineerASSR."76In fact, on centralor-
ders, the liquidationof numerousTerekCossack settlementshad alreadybe-
gun.77Theirland was given to landlessgortsy.These deportationspunishedthe
Cossacksfor theirrole in the anti-BolshevikWhite movement.78 However,they
were also a form of anticolonialreparationdirectly linked to the formationof
a new mountaineernational territory.Again, this action naturallyreinforced
the mountaineers'feeling that all the land belonged to them. Therefore,as in
Kazakhstan,although state-sanctioneddeportationsceased in 1922, it took
years for the state to control populargortsy efforts to expel Russian settlers
and Cossacks.79
Otherregions witnessed similarhostility. In the Far East, popularhostility
between Russian settlers and Koreanimmigrantsled to insistent demandsby
the formerthatthe latterbe physicallyremovedfrom the region.80In this case,
it was the higher-statusRussianswho were attemptingto expel the lower-status
Korean immigrants.In the Soviet Union's western border regions, conflict
arose between the prosperouswestern national minorities (in particularGer-
mans, Poles, and Finns, manyof whom belonged to the prerevolutionarycolo-
nist or landownersosloviia) and the local Slavic peasantry.81This popularani-
mosity resultedin violence duringthe civil war,simmeringtensions duringthe
mid-1920s and, as we shall see, open conflict again duringthe anarchicperiod
of collectivization.Westernnationalminoritiesand Koreanswould be the first
targetsof Soviet ethnic cleansing.
In the 1920s, then, the Soviet statewas alreadywilling to sanctiontwo forms
of ethnic resettlement.First, it quite unambiguouslysupportedthe voluntary
resettlementof dispersedethnic groups in orderto facilitate the formationof
nationalterritories.Second, in two isolated cases, centralauthoritiessponsored
76
S'ezdysovetovRSFSRi avtonomnykhrespublikRSFSR,p. 718.
77 N. F.Bugai, "20-40-e gody: Deportatsiianaseleniias territoriievropeiskoiRossii,"
Otechestvennaiaistoriia, no. 4 (1992), pp. 37-40. For documents, see N. F Bugai,
"Kazaki,"Shpion,no. 1 (1993), pp. 40-55.
78 For an excellent study of anti-Cossack actions on the Don, see Peter Holquist,
"'Conduct Merciless Mass Terror':Decossackizationon the Don, 1919," Cahiers du

monderusse 38 (January-July1997): 127-62.
79 Bugai, "Kazaki, pp. 52-55.
80
RTsKhIDNI17/87/199 (1925): 96.
81
This was most dramaticallyevident in the treatmentof Germansby the Makhno
movement.See DietrichNeufeld,A RussianDance of Death: Revolutionand Civil War
in the Ukraine(Winnipeg,1977).
a limited removalof settlerpopulationsfrom newly formednationalterritories

as a form of postcolonial reparation.In neithercase did the Soviet state itself
conceive of these deportationsas ethnic. In Kazakhstan,only recently arrived
illegal settlers were to be removed.In the North Caucasus,collective punish-
ment was meted out against a hostile soslovie group. Nevertheless, the local
national populationmost certainly did conceive of these deportationsas na-
tional in natureand supportedthem overwhelminglyfor exactly that reason.
Moreover,the regime understoodthese popularsentimentsand was temporar-
ily willing to indulge them.
THE PIEDMONTPRINCIPLEAND THE SOVIET BORDERREGIONS
It was the Soviet leadership'sstrong commitmentto forming a multinational

state, ratherthan any hostility to ethnic identities,that politicized ethnicityby
linking it to the formationof administrativeterritories,land possession, and
resettlement.This domestic nationalitiespolicy was then furtherlinked to So-
viet foreign policy goals. In orderto explore this linkage, I will introducetwo
furtherBolshevik concepts-Soviet xenophobiaandthe PiedmontPrinciple-
and show how they led to the formationof a novel Soviet administrativeterri-
tory:the borderregions. By Soviet xenophobia,I mean simply the exaggerated
Soviet fear of foreign influence and foreign contamination.I absolutelydo not
mean traditionalRussian xenophobia.Soviet xenophobiawas ideological, not
ethnic.It was spurredby an ideological hatredand suspicionof foreign capital-
ist governments,not the nationalhatredof non-Russians.Foreign intervention
during the civil war did not create Soviet xenophobia.It merely confirmeda
preexistingideological inclination.
Soviet xenophobiawas, however, given a national focus by ongoing low-
intensity guerrillawarfareand sporadicpartisanuprisingsalong the entire So-
viet frontier.Whereasforeign militaryinterventionhad been brief and discrete,
guerrillawarfareinvolvedongoing secretivebordercrossings and relied on an
ambiguouscombinationof foreign and domestic support.Most famously,the
Basmachirebellionin centralAsia, which continuedinto the mid-1930s, relied
heavily on clan and ethnic alliances linking northernAfghanistanand Soviet
CentralAsia.2 Majoruprisings also flaredup in other Soviet borderregions:
in Chechniaand Dagestanfrom 1920 to 1922, in Kareliain 1921-22, Georgia
in 1924, Yakutiain 1924-25 and 1927-28, andAdzharistanin 1927 and 1929.
Throughoutthe early 1920s, the Soviet secret police reportedongoing "politi-
cal banditry"acrossthe Polish-Ukrainianfrontier.83 This deepenedSoviet fears
82 BaymirzaHayit, "Basmatschi":Nationaler KampfTurkestansin den Jahren1917

bis 1934 (K6ln, 1992).
83
Forexample,see RTsKhIDNI17/87/177 (1924), and 17/87/178 (1923-24).
830 Martin
of surreptitiousforeign penetrationand focused Soviet xenophobia on the

largely non-Russianborderregions.
In July 1923, Soviet xenophobiawas given an institutionalembodimentby a
governmentdecreethatdelineateda special continuousadministrativeterritory
called "theborderregions"(pogranichnyeraiony),4 All modernnations have
clearly markedborders,and some havehad the concept of a borderregion, but
no nationwent as far as the Soviet Union in the ideological and administrative
definitionof distinctborderregions.85The 1923 decree, which was draftedby
the Soviet secret police, establisheda series of increasinglyhigh-securitybor-
der strips running along the entire land and sea border of the Soviet Union
at the depth of 4 meters, 500 meters, 7.5 kilometers, 16 kilometers, and 22
kilometers.86The entire 22-kilometer-wideborderstrip was placed under the
special supervisionof the secret police borderguard,which was given an un-
limited right of searchand seizure.87
The 1923 decree focused exclusively on defensive securitymeasuresand so
exemplifiedthe Soviet fear of foreign influence. However,by 1925 the Soviet
Union felt it had achieved an adequatedegree of frontier security and now
hoped to use its borderregions to projectSoviet influenceoutward,particularly
along the Soviet Union'swesternborder.To that end, in July 1925, the Soviet
Politburopassed a sweeping resolutionestablishinga varietyof privileges for
the westernborderregions:highersalaries,moreeconomic investment,a better
supply of goods, permissionto run budget deficits, and more culturalinvest-
ment.88This decree was explicitly based on the idea that "ourborderregions
are thatpartof our territoryby which the workersof neighboringnationscon-
cretelyjudge the Soviet Union."89
Nationalitiespolicy was a crucial component of the Soviet borderregime.
The Soviet governmentwas particularlyconcerned about the loyalty of the
borderregions' Finnish,Polish, and Germanpopulations.A 1925 investigation
reportedthatthe LeningradFinnishpopulationwas exposed to a strong"Finn-
ish influence, due to both historic and culturalties, and the efforts of Finland
herself, who tries in all ways to widen her sphere of influence on the Finnish
population of our borderregions."90Similar concerns were registered about
84
GARF 3316/16a/22 (1923): 3-12; RTsKhIDNI17/3/339 (08.03.23): protokol 53/
punkt6.
85
On the ImperialGermanborderlands,see Hagen (n. 24 above).On ImperialRussia,
see TerryMartin,"The Empire'sNew Frontiers:New Russia's Path from Frontierto
Okraina,1774-1920' RussianHistory 19(1992): 181-201.
86 GARF 3316/16a/22 (1923): 4.
87
Ibid.,pp. 3-7; also GARF 3316/64/218 (1925): 51.
88
RTsKhIDNI17/3/511 (16.07.25): 71/34.
89
GARF 1235/120/11 (1925): 4.
90GARF 374/27/594 (1925): 4.
the Soviet Union'sPolish and Germanpopulations.9'Given these securitycon-

cerns, one might have expected the Soviet governmentto restrictnationalself-
expressionin the borderregions. In fact, the exact opposite was the case. The
1925 Politburo decree specifically stipulatedthat national minorities in the
borderregions should be given more nationalrights than those in the central
regions of the Soviet Union. There should be more nationalschools, more na-
tional territories,an expanded native-languagepress, aggressive recruitment
and promotionof nationalcadres, and strict punishmentof all Russian chau-
vinism.92Farfrom attemptingto furtherethnichomogeneity,the Soviet govern-
ment consciously aimedto emphasizeandpromotethe ethnic diversityof their
borderregions.
This somewhatsurprisingpolicy was aimedat promotingSoviet foreignpol-
icy goals. The Soviet Union's western border, along its entire length, cut
throughthe ethnographicterritoryof Finns, Belorussians,Ukrainians,and Ro-
manians. Soviet policy aimed to exploit this situation:the leadershiphoped
thata generouspolicy towardthese nationalitieswithinthe Soviet Union would
attracttheir ethnic brethrenin Poland, Finland,and Romania.As one official
put it: "The Soviet Polish populationlives largely in our borderregions with
Polandand so the executionof ournationalitiespolicy with regardto the Polish
populationwill help revolutionizethe foreign Polish population."93 The Mol-
davianASSR was formedin 1924 as partof an effort to provokean uprisingin
RomanianBessarabia.94 The KarelianASSR was formedand staffedby emigre
Finnish Communiststo provide an exemplarymodel of Finnish Communism
situateddirectlyon Finland'seasternborder.95
UkrainianCommunists were particularlyavid supportersof this strategy.
They hoped to expand Soviet Ukraineto include majorityUkrainianterritory
in Poland,Romania,and Czechoslovakia.Theirfavoritemetaphorfor this pro-
cess was "Ukraineas Piedmont":"Therewas a time when Galicia served as
the "Piedmont"for Ukrainianculture.Now, when Ukrainiancultureis suffo-
cating in "cultured,""european"Poland, its center has naturallyshifted to the
UkrainianSSR.:96In this metaphor,Soviet Ukrainewould serve as the center
for the political and culturalunificationof the divided Ukrainianpopulation,
the role Piedmont had played for Italy in the nineteenthcentury.Therefore,
a prominentUkrainianCommunist,Mykola Skrypnyk,titled an article "The
91Ibid.,p. 79; TsDAHOU1/16/1 (26.05.25): 178.

92
RTsKhIDNI17/113/677 (12.11.28): 80/3, 107-9; GARF 1235/120/11 (1925-26),
and3316/64/67 (1926-27).
93 TsDAHOU1/20/2019 (1925): 10.
94 TsDAHOU 1/16/1 (1924-25); see also, RTsKhIDNI17/162/2 (26.03.25): 54/12,
94-98.
95 Gelb, "'KarelianFever"'(n. 62 above),pp. 1091-92.
96
VistiVUTsIK,no. 87 (17.04.24): 1.
832 Martin
UkrainianSSR-Piedmont of the UkrainianLaboringMasses,"97while an-

other Ukrainian Communist, Volodymyr Zatonskyi, called the Moldavian
ASSR our "MoldavianPiedmont"and the KarelianASSR a "KarelianPied-
mnont."98 Borrowingthis favoriteUkrainianmetaphor,I will refer to the Soviet
attemptto exploit cross-borderethnic ties to projectSoviet influenceabroadas
the PiedmontPrinciple.
A fundamentaltension, then, lay at the heartof the Soviet nationalitiespol-
icy in the borderregions. Soviet xenophobiaencouragedethnic suspicions and
a restrictionon nationalself-expression,while the PiedmontPrincipledictated
an ostentatiouspromotionof nationalinstitutions.Throughoutthe 1920s, the
latter tendency prevailed. It would take a series of domestic- and foreign-
policy shocks to eventuallyprovokean abandonmentof the ethnophiliaof the
1920s and a turntowardthe ethnic cleansing of the 1930s. In both the 1920s
and 1930s, however,the adoptedpolicy was based on the exact same premise:
the Bolsheviks' strong belief in the political salience of cross-borderethnic
ties.
THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION
This tension between Soviet xenophobiaand the PiedmontPrinciplewas per-

haps most dramaticallyexemplifiedin the Soviet attitudetowardimmigration.
On the one hand, immigrationwas a victory for the Piedmont Principle, de-
monstrativeevidence that the Soviet Union was attractiveto cross-border
populations.On the other hand, immigrationwas feared as an easy cover for
foreign espionage. Still, despite this latter concern, illegal immigrantswere
usually not deported.In fact, they were grantedthe same national rights as
indigenous Soviet nationalities. For instance, Afghan immigrants (Beluchi,
Dzhemshid,Khazara)were given land in the borderregions, theirown national
territories,and othernationalrights:'A positive Soviet mood among them will
evoke sympathyand attractto us class-friendlyelements from the foreign [Af-
ghan] borderregions."99
If the Soviet governmentnervously accepted new immigrants,it actively
solicited the returnof most non-RussianSoviet emigres. Treatieswith Finland
and Poland both stipulatedthe right of emigres to returnto the Soviet Union.
About 12,000 Finns and many more Poles took up this offer of amnesty.100
97 MykolaSkrypnyk,Stattiipromovy.Natsional'nepytannia.TomII. ChastynaDruha
(Kharkov,1931), pp. 153-59.

98 GARF 3316/64/933 (1931): 28.
99RTsKhIDNI62/2/2205 (1930): 6, 33-34; RTsKhIDNI62/1/829 (18.03.31), 62/1/
467 (30.04.28), 62/1/882 (27.06.31), 62/3/465 (15.01.29): 18-23.
100Matley(n. 9 above),p.5; Iwanov(n. 9 above),p. 72.
Efforts were likewise made to entice Volga Germanemigres to return.101 In

centralAsia, where the civil warand Basmachiuprisingled to massive emigra-
tion, the governmentundertookaggressivemeasuresto improvethe economic
conditions of its borderregions and therebyto preventfurtheremigrationand
lure back emigres: "It is politically extremely negative, that every year in the
Afghan borderregions, more and more forces openly hostile to us are gather-
ing which, if political conditions worsen, will be used againstus:"102
In Ukraine and Belorussia, the return of immigrantswas directly linked
to the Piedmont Principle. In both republics, leaders of civil war-era anti-
Bolshevik nationalistgovernmentsand movementswere encouragedto return
and take partin the new Soviet projectof building Ukrainianand Belorussian
culture.Even MykhailoHrushevskyi,the famous Ukrainianhistorianandpres-
ident of the CentralRada duringits conflict with the Bolsheviks in 1917-18,
was given permissionto returnin 1924 and was appointedhead of the Histori-
cal Section of the UkrainianAcademy of Sciences, allowed to edit a popular
historicaljournal, and almost elected presidentof the entire academy.'03This
policy, which aimed at popularizingand legitimizing the Soviet nationalities
policy among cross-bordernationalpopulations,was one of the most striking
instances of the PiedmontPrinciplein action.
However,the recruitmentof immigrantsalso provokedconsiderableanxiety.
On his return, Hrushevskyi was immediately placed under comprehensive
secret police surveillance.104 Illegal immigrantswere frequentlymoved away
from the borderregions to thwartpotential espionage.'05This concern about
immigrantswas most evident in the Soviet FarEast, where a massive influx of
Koreanshad createdextremelytense ethnic relations.From 1917 to 1926, the
Soviet Koreanpopulationtripledfrom 53,600 to 168,009.106By 1926, Koreans
representedover a quarterof the rural populationof the Vladivostok region
(145,511 of 572,031).107There was an enormous class and status difference
between Koreansand Russians. In 1922, 84.3 percent of Koreanhouseholds
101RTsKhIDNI17/3/517 (27.08.25): 77/12.

102 RTsKhIDNI62/2/1261 (1928): 1. On measurestaken, see RTsKhIDNI62/1/1106
(27.02.33): 92-102,62/1/467 (30.04.28): 240-49,62/1/829 (18.03.31): 49-61.

103 On Hrushevskyi'sreturnandlast yearsin Ukraine,see RuslanPyrih,ZhyttiaMyk-
haila Hrushevskoho:ostanniedesiatylittia,1924-1934 (Kiev, 1993); lurii Shapovaland

Volodymyr Prystaiko,Mykhailo Hrushevskyii HPU-NKVD. Trahichnedesiatylittia:
1924-1934 (Kiev, 1996).
104Shapoval andPrystaiko,pp. 130-32.
105RTsKhIDNI62/1/467 (30.04.28): 248-49,62/1829 (18.03.31): 51.
106GARF 1235/140/141 (1925): 4; S. D. Anosov, Koreitsy v ussuriiskom krae
(Khabarovsk-Vladivostok, 1928), pp. 7-8; Vsesoiuznaiaperepis' naseleniia 1926 goda.
TomVII(Moscow, 1928), p.8.
107 Vsesoiuznaiaperepis'. TomVII,pp. 126-27. When one includes the city of Vladi-
vostok,Koreansrepresented22.4 percentof the population.

834 Martin
were landless and only 32.4 percent even possessed Soviet citizenship.'08In
1925, 68.8 percent of Koreansstill cultivatedexclusively rentedland (vs. 7.8
percentof Russians).The averageKoreanhouseholdpossessed less than one-
third the land of local Russians (15.9 vs. 4.6 acres).'09Conflict centered on
land possession, since Soviet policy called for transferringland to those who
cultivatedit. This meant giving Russian land to immigrantKorean tenants.
Russians respondedby refusing to rent land and, accordingto the OGPU, by
"demandingthe resettlementof Koreansinto a differentregion."110
However, Soviet policy, as dictated by the Piedmont Principle, demanded
the exact opposite:the formationof an autonomousKoreannationalterritory.
Mass Koreanimmigrationhad eloquently demonstratedthe attractivenessof
the Soviet Union for the Koreansof Japanese-occupiedKorea.The formation
of an autonomousKoreanterritorywould furtherattractKoreansand put pres-
sure on the Japanesecolonial regime. Such was the argumentof the Comin-
tern'sEasternDepartmentwhen, in May 1924, it petitionedthe Soviet govern-
ment to form a Koreanautonomousoblast."'1This petition coincided exactly
with the formation in the Soviet west of the "MoldavianPiedmont,"whose
goal was to put political pressureon Romania.A KoreanASSR of almost the
exact same size and ethnic preponderancecould have been formed."12The pro-
posal was seriously debated,but by 1925 it had been rejected."13
Two factors appearto explain the rejectionof a KoreanASSR. Most impor-
tantly,the Soviet leadershipfelt politically and militarilyweak in the FarEast.
They were, therefore,more concernedoverpotentialJapaneseinfluenceon the
Soviet Koreanpopulationthan over projectingSoviet influenceinto Japanese-
ruled Korea.A 1929 governmentreportbluntly stated that Japanviewed Ko-
rean immigrationto the Soviet Union "as the naturalexpansion of the bound-
aries of Korea, which at the proper moment could be claimed formally.""'4
This fear led the ForeignMinistryin January1926 to demandemergencymea-
sures to stop Koreanimmigration."15In addition,the Far EasternCommunist
leadershipgave expressionto popularethnichostility.They supportedthe local
108 GARF 1235/140/141 (1925): 6; Anosov,p. 29.

109GARF 1235/140/141 (1925): 4.
'IORTsKhIDNI 17/87/199 (1925): 96.
111GARF 1235/140/141 (1924): 20-34; for earlier efforts, see Belaia kniga (n. 49
above),pp.40,46-47.
112 The MoldavianASSRhada Moldavianpopulationof 170,263 out of a totalpopula-
tion of 572,339 (29.7 percentMoldavian).A KoreanASSR with 152,424 Koreansout of

680,011 (22.4 percent)could havebeen formed,or a smallerterritorywith a Koreanma-
jority (85,299/157,438 = 52.4 percent) could have been established. Martin, "An
AffirmativeAction Empire"(n. 13 above),p. 714.
113
GARF 1235/140/141 (1924-25): 42-47.
114 GARF 374/27s/1706 (1929): 3.
115
GARF 1235/140/141 (1926): 141ob.
Russianview of Koreansas potentiallydisloyal and economically detrimental

illegal aliens who shouldbe resettledawayfrom the sensitiveborderregions.116
As a result, a contradictorypolicy emerged. On the one hand, smaller Ko-
rean nationalterritorieswere authorized:one Koreannationalregion and 171
Korean townships."17 Korean-languageschools and newspapers were estab-
lished."18A Far Eastern national minorities bureaucracywas formed with a
plenipotentiaryon Koreanaffairs.Koreanswere systematicallypromotedinto
the Far Easternbureaucracy."l9 This policy line presentedKoreansas a model
Soviet national minority to be poignantly and publicly contrastedwith the
wretchedKoreansliving underJapanesecolonial occupation.
On the otherhand, at the exact same time this policy line was being imple-
mented, the central governmentissued a secret decree (December 6, 1926)
confirminga plan to resettle most Koreansnorthof the 48.5th parallel (north
of Khabarovsk).Accordingto this decree, all Koreanswho had not yet received
land-slightly over half the population-would be resettled to the north.'20
Two large land funds were reserved for the Koreans. When this policy was
justified publicly (which was rare), it was portrayedas analogous to Jewish
resettlement.Landlessnationalswere to be resettledcompactlyonto free gov-
ernmentland, to providethem with land andto allow them a betteropportunity
to develop their national culture.'2'The comparison,however, was specious.
Dispersed Jews were being concentratedvoluntarilyon excellent agricultural
land. Koreanswere alreadyterritoriallyconcentratedon good agriculturalland
and were to be involuntarilydispersed and then immediately replaced with
Slavic peasantsfrom centralregions.'22It was this last measurethatmost infu-
riated Korean Communists, since it clearly implied that the Soviet Koreans
were disloyal.'23
The Koreanresettlementprogramwould have been the firstinstance of So-
viet ethnic cleansing, had it in fact been implemented.However,throughthe
end of 1928, virtually nothing had been done.'24The opposition of Korean
116
GARF 1235/140/141 (1925): 54-75; Belaia kniga,46-49. Gelb, "AnEarlySoviet"
(n. 9 above),pp. 394-95.
117 GARF 374/27s/1706 (1929): 25; S. G. Nam, Koreiskiinatsional'nyi raion: Puti
poiska issledovatelia(Moscow, 1991).
118 Anosov (n. 106 above),pp. 80-84.
119GARF 1235/120/60 (1927): 71-78; Belaia kniga, 37-39; GARF 374/27s/1706
(1929): 28.
120
GARF 1235/140/141 (1926): 144.
121
See the propagandainstructionsin GARF 1235/120/60 (1928): 17-20. Anosov
obliquelymentionsresettlement.Anosov,p. 64.
122
GARF 1235/140/141 (1926): 144.
123
GARF 1235/140/141 (1928): 146-52.
124
GARF 1235/141/1356 (1931): 3, 3316/64a/1078 (1931): 5, 374/27s/1706 (1929):
7-9.
836 Martin
communists,passive resistance of Koreanpeasants, absence of central fund-

ing, lack of Russiansettlers,and a deeply contradictorystatepolicy caused the
resettlementplan to go unfulfilled.Nevertheless,the law remainedformallyin
effect and served to stigmatize the Soviet Koreans. In the Far East, then, a
rough kind of balancebetween Soviet xenophobiaand the PiedmontPrinciple
prevailed.Before full-scale ethniccleansingcould emergein eitherthe FarEast
or the westernborderregions, two furtherpolicy shocks would have to occur.
COLLECTIVIZATION AND EMIGRATION
The first shock came in the form of collectivization and the emigrationmove-
ment it triggered.The reintroductionof coercive grainrequisitionsin the win-
ter of 1927-28 immediately reversed the existing immigrationflow. Central
Asia and the Transcaucasusreporteda suddengrowthin emigrationand plans
to emigrate.'25The most dramatic and politically consequential emigration
movement,however,took place in the fall of 1929. In September1929, Soviet
citizens of ethnic Germandescent began to converge on Moscow to demand
exit visas to leave the Soviet Union permanently.Word of this development
soon reachedthe Germanembassy,who sent out a representativeto investigate.
He was accompanied by two German and three American correspondents.
They found that about 4,500 Germans,mostly Mennonites,had congregated
in the Moscow suburbs.The Germanstold of horriblerepressionand reported
they had sold or abandonedall theirpossessions andwere resolvedto emigrate
to Canada.'26
The foreign correspondentsimmediatelypublished sensationalaccounts of
the repressionthese Germanpeasants had suffered, which in turntriggereda
storm of media coverage and provokeda significantpolitical scandal in Ger-
many.'27An organization,"Brothersin Need,"was formed to raise money for
the Soviet Germans, and President Hindenberg himself donated 200,000
Marks of his own money.'28The Germanembassy, which previously had re-
fused to intervene on behalf of ethnic German Soviet citizens, so as not to
offend their Soviet hosts, now intercededaggressively on their behalf.'29Sur-
125
RTsKhIDNI62/2/1261 (1928): 1-17,42-43,75-76, and 157/5/83 (1927): 229-30.
126
From 1923 to 1926, around20,000 Mennoniteshad been permittedto emigrateto
Canada.They now soughtto resumethis movement.CapturedGermanMaterials(here-
after CGM), microfilm reel 4763 (11.10.29): L192465-75; Harvey Dyck, Weimar
Germanyand Soviet Russia, 1926-1933 (New York, 1966), pp. 162-74; Meir Buchs-
weiler, Volksdeutschein der Ukraineam VorabendundBeginndes ZweitenWeltkriegs-
ein Fall doppelterLoyalitaet?(Gerlingen,1984), pp. 58-64.
127 Dyck, p. 163.
121 Ibid.,p. 171.
129 CGMreel 5213 (01.08.29): K480944-49, reel 4763, L192270-475.

prisedby this unexpecteddevelopment,the Soviet governmentbehavederrati-

cally, first allowing 5,461 Germans to emigrate and then deporting the re-
maining 9,730 to their original places of residence.'30The episode ended up
embarrassingthe Soviet governmentat the height of the collectivizationdrive
and significantlysouringSoviet-Germanrelations.
In theory,collectivization was not supposed to have an ethnic dimension,
but in practiceit quickly developedone. The anarchyandviolence of collectiv-
ization, with its sudden reversalof the NEP order,enabled the expression of
ethnic hostility. Where sentiments of popular ethnic cleansing existed, NEP
"losers"took revenge. In Kazakhstan,Russians revenged themselves on the
suddenlyvulnerableKazakhnomads.'3'Likewise, in Ukraine,popularopinion
viewed all Germansas kulaks.A CentralCommitteereportnoted that "certain
high officials have the incorrectopinion that all German villages are exclu-
sively kulak."132 AnotherCommunistput it more colorfully:all Germanswere
"kulakcolonizers to the marrowof their bones."' 33 The numerousinternalre-
ports attemptingto explain the emigrationmovementunanimouslyagreedthat
these sentimentshad led to an exceptionallyharshtreatmentof Germansdur-
ing collectivization.'34Such popularattitudeshad likewise surfacedduringthe
civil war and were linked to the Germans'privilegedprerevolutionarystatus.
Similar treatmenthelped inspire the development of smaller emigration
movementsin 1929-30 among almost all of the Soviet Union's "westernna-
tional minorities":Poles, Finns, Latvians, Greeks, Estonians, Lithuanians,
Czechs, Swedes, Bulgarians.'35These movementsconsisted largely of group
and individualpetitions to Soviet authoritiesand foreign consuls. There were
also demonstrationsand, most disturbingfor the Soviets, illegal flight across
the westernborder.'36 The most active were the Poles, who were also subjected
to the greatestdegree of popularand local Communisthostility duringcollec-
tivization.'37The popularidentificationof Pole and kulak was summed up in
the rhyme: "raz Poliak-znachit kulak."'138Poles were bluntly told, "You are
130 GARF 3316/64/759 (1929-30).

131
RTsKhIDNI94/1/1 (1928): 625-85; Martin,"AnAffirmativeActionEmpire"(n. 13
above),pp. 547-48.
132 RTsKhIDNI17/113/786 (16.10.29): 126/6,44.
133 GARF 1235/141/561 (1930): 59.
134RTsKhIDNI 17/113/786 (16.10.29): 160/6, 42-46, and 17/113/822 (06.02.30):

181/4, 1-250; GARF 1235/141/561 (1930), 3316/64/928 (1930), 3316/64/759-761
(1929-30).
135 For the OGPU'sevaluation,see GARF 3316/64/760 (1930): 95-98; in general,see
GARF3316/64/760 (1930), 3316/64/928 (1930), 3316/23/1356 (1930): 14-15.

136 GARF 3316/23/1360 (1930): 6-6ob, 3316/64/928 (1930): 12-16.
137GARF1235/141/561 (1930): 135-37, 3316/23/1360 (1930): 6, 3316/23/1318

(1930): 12-15.
138 GARF 3316/64/760 (1930): 79; also quotedin GARF 3316/64/928 (1930): 15.
838 Martin
being dekulakizednot because you are a kulak,but because you are a Pole."139
This reflecteda widespreadsentimentof popularethnic cleansing, exemplified
in this comment from a Russian village: "If he's a Pole, he annoys us and
shouldbe drivenout of the village, as a foreignelement."140 Hundredsof Poles,
including many Communists, succeeded in fleeing across the well-guarded
Polish-Soviet border.'4'OtherPoles engaged in mass demonstrativemarches
to the border,in crowds of up to 2,000, to publicize theirdemandto be allowed
to emigrate.'42
These emigrationmovementsdramaticallyconfrontedthe Soviet leadership
with the failureof the PiedmontPrinciple.The Soviet Union'swesternnational
minorities were meant to serve as attractiveCommunistexamples for their
ethnic brethrenabroad.Instead, they themselves had been attractedby their
respective "home"countries and had repudiatedtheir Soviet fatherlandin an
exceedingly embarrassingfashion. In addition to spawning these emigration
movements,the non-Russianperipheryin general offered more violent resis-
tance to collectivizationthandid the Russiancore.'43 Moreover,such resistance
often focused on the borderregions. The Basmachimovementreceived cross-
borderassistancefromrelatedclans in centralAsia. "14The worstpeasantupris-
ing of the collectivizationera broke out along the Polish-Ukrainianborderin
late February1930.145Both the emigrationmovements and these mass upris-
ings deepenedSoviet concernsaboutthe loyalty of the inhabitantsof theirnon-
Russianperipheryand aboutthe securityof theirborderregions.
Given this outcome, one might have expected dramaticpolicy revisions.
However,the official response,in both secret and publishedresolutions,called
instead for an intensificationof the existing nationalitiespolicy.'46The policy
had not failed, it was declared,butratherhadneverbeen properlyimplemented
and was seriouslydistortedduringcollectivization.This was not simply verbal
cover for a real change in policy. Throughout1930, enormouseffort was put
into increasingthe numberand qualityof Germannationalinstitutions.'47The
139 GARF3316/64/1355 (1930): 19.

140
GARF3316/64/928 (1930): 15.
141 GARF 3316/64/760 (1930): 62-63.
142
GARF3316/23/1360 (1930): 6,3316/64/928 (1930): 12.
143 See the extensive statisticaltables in Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin:
Collectivizationand the Cultureof PeasantResistance(Oxford,1996), pp. 100-180.

144Hayit (n. 82 above), pp. 362-75.
145 AndreaGraziosi,"Collectivisation,revoltespaysanneset politiquesgouvernemen-
tales a traversles rapportsdu GPU d'Ukrainede fevrier-mars1930$"Cahiersdu monde

russe 35 (1994): 437-632; TsDAHOU 1/20/3184 (1930), 1/20/3195 (1927-30), 1/20/
2522 (1927-31),1/20/3185 (1930).
146 RTsKhIDNI17/113/821 (06.02.30): 181/4; GARF 1235/141/561 (1930): 10-12,
23,201, 3316/16a/443 (1930): 10-12.

147 Thereareliterallythousandsof pages of documentsdevotedto this question.GARF
1235/141/561 (1930),3316/64/928 (1930),3316/64/968 (1929-30),3316/64/759-761.

same was true for Poles and other western national minorities.'48Of course,
there was also an increase in repression against "notoriouslymalicious ele-
ments (zavedomozlostnye elementy),"but the policy emphasis remained on
promoting,ratherthan attacking,nationalidentity.
There were, however, two importantexceptions. The mass processions of
Poles to the Polish borderparticularlyalarmedSoviet authorities,since they
took place in late February1930 duringthe mass uprisingagainstcollectiviza-
tion in the Ukrainianborderregions. Although this uprisinginvolved mostly
Ukrainianpeasants,Poles also participated.'49 The OGPU and governmentre-
ports spoke of increasedPolish espionage and Polish governmentencourage-
ment for the uprising.'50The Soviet nightmarescenariowas a mass Polish emi-
gration movement, akin to the German one, but directed toward the Polish
border ratherthan towardMoscow: "Recently we have registered facts that
work is being undertakenin orderto preparea mass demonstrativedeparture
of Poles from the USSR to Poland.... There is no doubt that this campaign
has the goal of preparingpopular opinion to justify an armed attack on the
Soviet Union."l5' It was in this environmentthat the Soviet leadershipauthor-
ized its firstexplicitly ethnic deportation.
On March5, 1930, the Politburoauthorizedthe deportationof 3,000-3,500
additionalkulak families from Belorussia and another 10,000-15,000 from
Ukraine,with the addedstipulation,"Inthe first line, those of Polish national-
ity."152 Six days later,this deportationwas referredto as an exclusively Polish
operation:
Fromourdatathereis reasonto believethatin the case of seriouskulak-peasantup-

risingsin right-bankUkraineandBelorussia-especiallyin connectionwiththecom-
ing deportation of Polish-kulak and spyingelementsfromthe
counter-revolutionary
borderregions-thatthePolishgovernment Inorderto avoid
mightdecideto intervene.
this...
5. Preparethe operationfor the arrestand deportationof kulakPolishcounter-
revolutionaryelementswithgreatcareandcarryoutin a maximallyshortperiod.
6. Carryouttheoperation kulak-Polish
of deporting elementswithmaximum organi-
zationandwithoutfanfare.'53
Collectivization,dekulakization,the Polish emigrationmovement,and intense

Soviet concern over the security of their borderregions, then, led to the first
148 GARF3316/16a/443 (1930): 1-2,3316/64/760 (1930): 8-10.

149 TsDAHOU1/20/3184 (1930): 17-18.
150 TsDAHOU1/20/3184 (1930): 17; GARF3316/23/1318 (1930): 3, 15.
151 GARF3316/64/928 (1930): 1.

152
RTsKhIDNI17/162/8 (05.03.30): 119/5.
153 RTsKhIDNI17/162/8 (11.03.30): 120/72. TsDAHOU 1/16/7 (13.03.30): 154. For
evidence the deportationdid takeplace, see GARF3316/23/1360 (1930): 6.

840 Martin
case of Soviet ethnic cleansing.154 Still, after this deportation,Soviet policy

towardthe Poles did not undergo a dramaticchange. Remarkably,in 1932 a
new Polish national district was even established along the Belorussian-
Polish border.'55
In the Soviet Far East, collectivization also provokedincreasedethnic ten-
sion and growing security concerns. Anti-Koreanand anti-Chinesepopular
violence increaseddramaticallyfrom 1928 to 1932.156This atmosphereled to
a mass outflow of Chinese migrantlabor.157Approximately50,000 Koreans
also fled back to Korea.'58The authoritiesdid not oppose this emigration.In
fact, they revived plans to resettle much of the remainingKoreanpopulation
away from the Soviet-Koreanborder.On April 13, 1928, a decree was passed
calling for "theresettlementof Koreansfrom Vladivostokokrugand the more
strategicallyvulnerablepoints of Primor'einto Khabarovskokrug."The land
of the resettled Koreans was to be transferredimmediately to "settlersfrom
overpopulatedagrarianregions of the Soviet Union." '59 The plan was to settle
demobilizedRedArmy soldiersinto the FarEasternborderzones to form "Red
Army collective farms."'160Disloyal Koreans were to be replaced with loyal
Slavs.
An official five-yearplan called for resettling88,000 Koreans(over half the
Koreanpopulation)north of Khaborovsk.'6'All Koreanswithout Soviet citi-
zenship were to be resettled, "exceptthose having provedtheir complete loy-
alty and devotion to Soviet power."162 The disloyaltyof the majorityof Soviet
Koreanswas thus assumed.Anyone refusing resettlementwas not threatened
with arrest.Leadersof Koreanvillage soviets thatharboredillegal aliens were
154
Theremay havebeen a Finnishdeportationas well. The March5 Politburodecree
called for the OGPU to study the Leningradborder regions and propose measures.
Groupsin Finlandclaimedtherewas an ethnicallytargeteddeportation.See The Ingrian
Committee,TheIngrianFinns (Helsinki, 1935), p.8. 1 foundno evidence to confirmthis
deportation(butI did not workin St. Petersburgarchives),and Gelb also doubtsthatan
ethnically targeted deportationtook place. Gelb, "WesternFinnic Minorities" (n. 9
above),pp. 238-42.
155
GARF3316/64/1284 (1932); Iwanow(n. 9 above),pp. 128-38.
156
See GARF3316/64/1078 (1931): 1-4,20-53,76-77; GARF374/27s/1076 (1929):
59-63; A. Nugis, Protivvelikoderzhavnogoshovinizmai mestnogonatsionalizma(Kha-
barovsk, 1933), pp. 26-28; GARF 3316/64/1078 (1931): Sob; Agi Zakir,"Zemelnaia
politikav kolkhoznomdvizhenii sredikoreitsevdal'no-vostochnogokraia,"Revoliutsiia
inatsional'nosti, nos. 2-3 (1931): 76-81.
157
GARF374/27s/1706 (1929): 40Ob.
158
HarukiWada,"Koreansin the Soviet FarEast, 1917-1937,"in Koreansin theSoviet
Union,ed. Daac-SookSuh (Honolulu,1987), p.40.
159 GARF3316/16a/384 (1928): 1-2.
160 GARF5446/15a/258 (1933): 41-42.
161
GARF374/27s/1706 (1929): 8ob.
162 GARF 1235/141/359 (1929): 3.
likewise threatened,showing thateven KoreanSoviet officials were suspect.'63

The deportationwas scheduledto begin in 1930. Ten thousandKoreanswere
to be moved northwardand 10,000 demobilized Red Army soldiers and their
families were to be settled in the Far Easternborderzones.'64In reality,only
1,342 Koreans were actually resettled in 1930, "including431 resettled by
force (prinuditel'nymsposobom)."'165In 1931, the plan was officially aban-
doned.'66In the end, only five hundredKoreanfamilies (about2,500 individu-
als) had been resettled.'67It appearsthat the Foreign Ministiy's concerns that
Japancould use the deportationof Japanesesubjects from the Soviet border
regions as a casus belli led to the abandonmentof Koreanresettlement.'68
In both the west and east, then, the Soviet governmentretreatedfrom large-
scale ethnic cleansing as the collectivization emergency subsided. However,
the effects of this crisis were felt in a greatly intensifiedregime of control in
the border regions. By 1929, the term "borderregions" had been expanded
to include not only all raiony touching the Soviet border(called the primary
borderzone) but also all raiony touching those borderraiony (the secondary
borderzone).'69In Ukrainealone, this includeda populationof about2-3 mil-
lion.'70In keeping with the new militantrhetoric,borderraionywere now often
referredto as "front"(frontovye) raionyin oppositionto nonborder"rear"(tylo-
vye) raiony.'7 Each year likewise witnessed an increase in the size of the
OGPU'sborderguard.'72Deportationsof "activecounter-revolutionary andku-
lak elements"from the borderregions intensified.'73A furtherinnovationbe-
gun duringcollectivizationwas the formationof Red Army collective farmsin
the borderregions. Ambitiousplans were drawnup to settle tens of thousands
of demobilized Red Army soldiers in the Far East's border regions, though
only about 10,000 were actually settled before the endeavorwas temporarily
abandonedin 1933, only to be revivedwhen the next wave of ethnic cleansing
163 Ibid.,pp. 3-4.

164
GARF 1235/141/1356 (1930): 18-19, 3316/64/1078 (1931): 83; Rossiiskii Gosu-
darstvennyiArkhivEkonomiki(RGAE)7486/42s/5 (1931): 113.
165
GARF 1235/141/1356 (1930): 18-19.
166 Ibid.,
pp. 18-20; RTsKhIDNI17/3/77 (30.02.30): 118/8, 17/3/813 (15.02.31):
26/32.
167
GARF3316/64/1078 (1931): 83.
168 GARF5446/29/67 (1937): 18.
169 GARF393/ls/283 (1929): 1.
170
TsDAHOU1/16/8 (16.01.32): 167-73.
171
RTsKhIDNI62/1/829 (10.03.31): 33.
172 RTsKhfDNI17/162/8
(20.04.30): 124/80,17/162/11 (01.12.31): 78/80, (27.02.32):
90/45; 17/162/12 (16.04.32): 96/21.
173
TsDAHOU 1/16/8 (08.01.32): 136, 1/16/35 (21.03.31): 16; RTsKhIDNI17/162/8
(20.04.30): 124/80, 17/162/14 (19.04.33): 136/94; "Spetspereselentsy-zhertvy'splosh-
noi kollektivizatsii,"'Istoricheskiiarkhiv,no.4 (1994), p. 156.
842 Martin
swept throughthe Far East in 1937.174Red Army collective farms emerged as

part of the 1928 Koreandeportationplan and would consistently accompany
Soviet ethnic cleansing. If national territoriesin the borderregions were the
symbol of the PiedmontPrinciple,Red Armycollective farmsbecame the sym-
bol of Soviet xenophobia.
THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS
Collectivizationand the accompanyingemigrationmovementfocused Soviet

xenophobia on the Soviet Union's diaspora nationalities-Germans, Poles,
Koreans-whose flight was felt to have demonstratedgreaterloyalty to their
foreign homelands than to the Soviet Union. Their actions naturallyunder-
mined the viability of the PiedmontPrincipleand exacerbatedSoviet xenopho-
bia. However,the diasporanationalitieswere of little importanceto domestic
Soviet nationalitiespolicy and of less importanceto Soviet foreign policy am-
bitions than large border republics such as Ukraine and Belorussia, whose
cross-borderethnic ties were key to the Soviet goal of underminingPolish
rule in Poland'smajorityUkrainianand Belorussianterritories.The Ukrainian
crisis, which climaxed in 1932-33, would cast doubts on these cross-border
ethnic ties as well, and so lead to a complete abandonmentof the Piedmont
Principle.
In the 1920s, Ukrainewas the site of extremely aggressiveefforts to imple-
mentthe policy of Ukrainization,which involvedestablishingUkrainianas the
republic'sofficial language of governmentand the promotionof ethnic Ukrai-
nians into positions of leadershipin government,education, and industry.'75
This program'sprimarygoal was domestic: to disarm Ukrainiannationalism
by grantingthe forms of Ukrainiannationhood.However, it also served the
importantforeign policy goal of makingSoviet Ukraineattractiveto the cross-
borderUkrainianpopulationin Poland-in the words of a prominentUkrai-
nian Communist,of turningSoviet Ukraineinto "a center of attractionfor the
mass of discontented Ukrainians [in Poland]:'1'76This ambition succeeded
spectacularly.By the mid-1920s, Soviet Ukrainehad become broadlypopular
in Polish Ukraine.The PiedmontPrinciplewas working.An autonomousCom-
munistPartyof westernUkrainehad been formedto exploit this seditious po-
174 RGAE 7486/42s/8 (1932): 42-55; 7486/42s/5 (1931): 113; GARF 5446/15a/262
(1934): 20; 5446/15a/258 (1933): 41-42.

175 George 0. Liber,SovietNationalityPolicy, UrbanGrowth,and IdentityChangein
the UkrainianSSR,1923-1934 (Cambridge,1992);Martin,"AnAffirmativeAction Em-

pire"(n. 13 above),pp. 63-173.
176 RTsKhIDNI17/69/58 (1927): 166.
tential.'77In December 1924, in a furtherappeal to Ukrainiannational senti-

ment, the Comintern promised the eventual annexation of all majority
Ukrainianterritoryto Soviet Ukraine.'78
However, as with collectivization and the emigrationmovement, the Pied-
mont Principle became enmeshed with a domestic political crisis. In April
1926, a prominent Ukrainian Communist, Oleksandr Shumskyi, attacked
Ukraine's first party secretary,Lazar Kaganovich, for failing to implement
Ukrainization decisively.'79 Stalin supported Kaganovich and, after nine
months of maneuvering,Shumskyi was publicly denounced as a Ukrainian
nationalistand transferredto a provincialRussiancity. Such incidentswere not
uncommonin the 1920s andthe "ShumskyiAffair"would havebeen of limited
political significance were it not for the Piedmont Principle. The Shumskyi
Affair was suddenlyinternationalizedwhen the leadershipof the West Ukrai-
nian CommunistPartyvoted unanimouslyto defend Shumskyi and denounce
Kaganovichas a GreatRussian chauvinist.'80Their action provokeda furious
polemic between the sister Ukrainianparties, which finally resulted in the
Comintern'sexcommunicationof the entire leadershipof the West Ukrainian
Communist Party. This outcome was an enormous embarrassmentfor the
Cominternand the Soviet leadership.'8'
Still, it might have remainedonly an embarrassmenthad it not also coin-
cided with the height of the 1927 war scare. MarshallPilsudski'scoup d'etat
in Polandin May 1926 was interpretedby the Soviet leadershipas the firststep
in an imminentattackby world imperialismon the Soviet Union.'82After his
successful coup, Pilsudskilauncheda well-publicizedattemptto improverela-
tions with Poland'sUkrainianpopulation.'83These efforts were interpretedin
the Soviet Union as an ominous attemptby "internationaland especially En-
glish imperialism ... along with Polish fascism ... to turn Western Ukraine
into a bridgeheadfor an attack on Soviet Ukraine.''l84The defection of the
West UkrainianCommunistleadershipwas assimilatedinto this sinister sce-
177 JanuszRadziejowski,The Communist

Party of WesternUkraine,1919-1929 (Ed-
monton, 1983).
178
Skrypnyk,Stattii promovy.TomII (n. 97 above),pp. 404-19. The decreepromised
the same for SovietBelorussia.
179 JamesE. Mace, Communismand the Dilemmas
of National Liberation:National
Communismin Soviet Ukraine,1918-1933 (Cambridge,Mass., 1983); Martin,"AnAf-
firmativeAction Empire,"pp. 312-54.
180 Radziejowski,pp. 127-3 1.
181
MykolaSkrypnyk,Dzherelataprychynyrozlamuv KPZU(Kharkov,1928).
182
Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered WorldPolitics (Berkeley, Calif.,
1994), pp. 206-32.
183 Radziejowski, pp. 94-96.
184
Skrypnyk,Dzherelataprychyny,p. 124.
844 Martin
nario. One UkrainianCommunistleader noted with alarm that, "due to the

clever policy of Pilsudski,"westernUkrainewas being turnedinto a "Piedmont
to attractdiscontentedelements within [Soviet] Ukraine." 185 In other words,
the tableshadbeen turned.The PiedmontPrinciplewas now being used against
the Soviet Union.
Remarkably,the Piedmont Principle was also being used by the Soviet
Ukrainian leadership to make territorialclaims within the Soviet Union.
Throughoutthe 1920s, the Ukrainianleadershipclaimed majorityUkrainian
territorynot only from Poland, which of course was perfectly acceptable,but
also from the Russian federal republic (RSFSR).186 For instance, Skrypnyk
cited the December 1924 Cominternresolution,which advocatedthe eventual
annexationof Polish Ukraine,to claim neighboringmajorityUkrainianregions
from the RSFSR.'87The Piedmont Principle, in his opinion, worked in both
directions. It authorizedterritorialclaims against both capitalist Poland and
Soviet Russia. While Ukraine'sterritorialclaims on the RSFSR were mostly
rejected,a compromise solution led to the formationof about 130 Ukrainian
nationalregions and 4,000 Ukrainiantownships in the RSFSR.188 This policy
was deeply resentedby local Russianofficials, who understandablysaw it as a
preludeto the eventualannexationof theirterritoryby Ukraine.It also intensi-
fied centralsuspicions as to the loyalty of the UkrainianCommunists.
These suspicions surfaceddramaticallyduring the grain requisitionscrisis
of 1932-33. The 1932 Soviet harvestwas insufficientto feed the country.Con-
frontedwith this situation,Stalin decided to extractas much grain as possible
from the peasantryin orderto feed the cities. This meantthe famine would be
concentratedin the Soviet Union'sgrain-growingregions.The two regions that
failed most conspicuously to fulfill the resulting onerous grain requisitions
were Ukraineandthe NorthCaucasus.Stalininterpretedthese failuresas polit-
ical resistance.With regardto Ukraine, on August 11, 1932, he wrote Kaga-
novich:
Themostimportant thingnow is Ukraine.Thingsin Ukrainearebad.They'rebadin

theParty.Theysaythatin twoUkrainian oblasts(I believeKievandDneprepetrovsk)
around50 raikomyhavespokenout againstthe grainrequisitionsplan,declaringit
Inotherraikomy,
unrealistic. it appearsthingsareno better.Whatis thislike?It'snota
party,buta parliament,a caricature
of a parliament ...
If we don'ttakemeasuresnow to correctthe situationin Ukraine,we may lose
185RTsIiIDNM 17/69/58 (1927): 167.

186
For an accountof this campaign,see Martin,"AnAffirmativeAction Empire,"pp.
566-82.
187
Skrypnyk,"Zlikviduvatyliuksemburgiianstvo," in (1925) Stattii promovy,pp. 75-
76. In 1928, Skrypnykeven triedto get Cominternbackingforhis position.M. Skrypnyk,
Natsional'nyivoprosvprogrammekominterna(Kharkov,1929), pp. 35-37.
188 Martin,"AnAffirnativeActionEmpire"(n. 13 above),p. 605.
Originsof Soviet Ethnic Cleansing 845
Ukraine.Keepin mindthatPilsudskiis not sleeping,andhis agentsin Ukraineare

manytimesstrongerthan[Ukrainian GPUhead]Redensand [Ukrainian FirstParty
Secretary]Kosiorthink.Keepin mindthatin the UkrainianCommunistParty(500
thousandmembers,ha-ha)therearenot a few (yes, not a few) rottenelements,con-
sciousandsubconscious andfinally-directagentsof Pilsudski.As soonas
Petliurites,
thingsworsen,theseelementswill not hesitateto open firewithin(andwithout)the
Party,againstthe Party.'89
Stalinthen suggesteda few changesneededto turnUkraineinto "atruefortress

of the USSR," and he again concluded that "withoutthese changes, . . . I re-
peat, we may lose Ukraine."l90 Here againdomesticpolitical difficultiesimme-
diately became enmeshed with foreign-policy concerns. In Stalin'sview, the
PiedmontPrinciplewas againbeing reversed.The UkrainianCommunistParty
was not leading western Ukraine but had itself fallen under the influence of
west Ukrainiannationalism(the Petliurites)and their foreign patron,Marshal
Pilsudski,with his long-standingirredentistambitionsin Ukraine.
This suspicionof cross-borderUkrainianinfluencewas soon extendedto the
North Caucasus as well. In October 1932, the Politburo sent a commission
headedby Kaganovichto the NorthCaucasusto enforce the center'sgraincol-
lections quota.On his arrival,Kaganovichblamedlax local Communistleader-
ship for the region'sfailure to fulfill its quota, but he also cited sabotage by
"organizedgroupsamongthose arrivingfrom Ukraine,especially in the Kuban
where Ukrainianis spoken."l9'Kaganovichfocused his commission'spunitive
efforts on the Kubanregion.'92Moreover,afterKaganovich'sreturnto Moscow,
on December 14, 1932, the Politburoissued a decree that officially linked the
failure of grainrequisitionsin both Ukraineand the North Caucasusto Ukrai-
nian nationalistresistanceand the policy of Ukrainization.WithinUkraineit-
self, "Ukrainizationwas carriedout mechanically,withoutconsideringthe spe-
cifics of each region, without a carefulchoice of Bolshevik Ukrainiancadres.
This made it easy for bourgeois-nationalistelements, Petliuritesand othersto
create a legal cover for their counter-revolutionary cells and organizations."193
Withinthe North Caucasus,"the light-headed,non-Bolshevik 'Ukrainization'
of almost half the North Caucasusdistrictsdid not serve the culturalinterests
of the populationand,with the total absenceof surveillanceby NorthCaucasus
189
RTsKhIDNI81/3/99 (1932): 145-48.
190Ibid., p. 150.
191RTsKhIDNI 81/3/214 (1932): 4.
192 Nobuo Shimotomai, "A Note on the Kuban Affair (1932-1933)," Acta Slavica
Iaponica,no. 1 (1983), pp. 39-56; E. N. Oskolkov,Golod 1932/1933: Khlebozagotovkii
golod 1932/1933 goda v severo-kavkazskom krae (Rostov-na-donu,1991); Martin,"An
AffirmativeAction Empire,"pp. 606-32.
193 Holod 1932-1933 rokivna Ukriani:ochyma istorykiv,movoiu dokumentiv(Kiev,
1990), p. 121.
846 Martin
organs of the Ukrainizationof schools and the press, gave a legal form to the
enemies of Soviet power for the organizationof oppositionto Soviet power by
kulaks, officers, re-emigratedCossacks, membersof the KubanskyiRad, and
so forth."'194
Ukrainiannationalism,then, was blamed for the failure of grain
requisitionsin bothUkraineandthe NorthCaucasus.Moreover,in each region,
the influence of cross-borderethnic ties in the form of returnedCossack emi-
gres and west UkrainianPetliuriteswas highlighted.
The perniciousrole of cross-borderethnicinfluencewas a majorpropaganda
theme in the 1933 Ukrainianterror,duringwhich tens of thousandsof putative
Ukrainiannationalists were arrestedfor allegedly conspiring with the new
Nazi leadershipin Germanyto separateUkrainefrom the Soviet Union.'95The
major targetfor arrestduring this campaign was the diasporacommunity of
west Ukrainianemigres.'96For the first time, ethnic Germansand Poles (both
Soviet citizens and noncitizens)were likewise targeted.'97 The PiedmontPrin-
ciple was now irrevocablyabandoned.Withthe rise of fascist and authoritarian
regimes throughouteast centralEurope, official Soviet propaganda,adopting
the phrasefrom Stalin'sletterto Kaganovich,now insteademphasizedturning
Ukraine-and, indeed, the entire Soviet Union-into a "fortress"against all
foreign influence.
ETHNIC CLEANSING
The Ukrainiancrisis not only markedthe final abandonmentof the Piedmont

Principle;it also led to a mass deportationthat was at least partiallyethnic.
The December 14 Politburodecree orderedthe deportationof the entireKuban
Cossack town of Poltava for "the sabotage of grain delivery."'98In the next
month, anothertwo Cossack towns were deported;ultimately,a total of ap-
proximately60,000 Kuban Cossacks were deportedfor failing to meet their
grainrequisitions.'99Following the emerging Soviet norm,the Cossacks were
replaced with 14,090 Red Army soldiers and their families.200The Cossacks
were officially deportedfor "kulak"sabotage, but the deportationof kulaks
194IJbid.,pp. 292-93.
195
S. Kosior,Itogi i blizhaishiezadachiprovedeniianatsional'noipolitiki na Ukraine
(Kharkov,1933).
196
Q. S. RublovandA. Iu. Cherchenko,Stalinshchynai dolia zakhidnoukrains'koi in-
telihentsii.20-50-ti rokuXXst. (Kiev, 1994).
197
PiotrMitzner,"WidmoPOW,"Karta,no. 11 (1993), pp. 21-23; Iwanov(n. 9 above),
pp. 351-56; GARF 1235/128/3 (1933): 216-17.
198Holod 1932-1933 rokiv,p. 293.
199Oskolkov,pp. 55-60; RGVA9/36/613 (1933): 6,46.
200 RGAE 5675/1/33 (1933): 19.
had never involved entire villages. In one sense, these deportationsmarkeda

repetitionof the soslovie-baseddeportationof the TerekCossacks in 1920-21,
a parallel raised by Kaganovichhimself in November 1932: "All the Kuban
Cossacks must be remindedhow in 1921 the TerekCossacks were deported.
It's the same situation now."'20'However, the Kuban Cossacks were also
labeled as Ukrainiannationalistsand thereforethe deportationstook on a new
ethnic dimension.The KubanCossackdeportation,in fact, markeda transition
from class-baseddeportations,which predominatedpriorto 1933, to the ethnic
deportationsthatpredominatedfrom 1933 to 1953.
These ethnic deportationsbegan in the westernborderregions in 1935. The
targetswere diasporanationalities-that is, nationalminorities(such asPoles,
Germans,Finns) with cross-borderethnic ties to a foreign nation-state.As we
have seen, the Soviet leadershiphad alreadysanctionedethnic resettlementin
the 1920s. Also, the diasporanationalitieswere subjectto considerablepopular
ethnic hostility, which led to harsh treatmentduring collectivization and the
resultingemigrationmovementsthatin turnraised concernabouttheirloyalty.
These concernsescalatedin 1933-34, when a campaignwas launchedin Ger-
manyto help their starvingGerman"Brothersin Need" in the Soviet Union by
sending tens of thousandsof food packets and foreign currencyremittances
(called "Hitlerhelp" by the Soviets).202This campaign provided furtherevi-
dence that the diaspora nationalities could be used by foreign governments
as weapons against the Soviet Union. The 1932-33 Ukrainiancrisis not only
discreditedthe PiedmontPrinciplebut also greatlyintensifiedSoviet concerns
over cross-borderethnic ties. Finally,the rise of Hitler and the German-Polish
nonaggressionpact of January1934 focused Soviet xenophobiaon the western
borderregions.203
In 1934, the Soviet governmentundertooka reevaluationof its policy toward
its Polish populationand an intensificationof its regime for the westernborder
regions. The Polish investigationfound "an incorrectpolicy and practice of
introducingPolish schools into raionyandvillages with a majorityBelorussian
population and the compulsory instruction in Polish for Belorussian chil-
dren."204 The head of the Belorussian government,N. M. Goloded, gave this
discoverya new sinisterinterpretation:
201
Oskolkov,p. 52.
202
Buchsweiler (n. 126 above), pp. 64-71; CGM reel 5213 (25.05.32): K481339-41
(06.06.32): K481348-50; Nimtsiv Ukraini20-30-ti rr XXst. (Kiev, 1994): 179-85.
203 JonathanHaslam, The Soviet Union and the Strugglefor Collective Security in
Europe,1933-1939 (New York,1984), p. 36.

204 RTsKhIDNI17/21/404 (03.08.34): 2, 18-21. Belorussian-speaking Catholicsoften
consideredthemselvesPoles anddemandedPolisheducationfortheirchildren,a practice
consideredlegitimatepriorto 1934.
848 Martin
We forgot thatwith the formationof a Polish nationalraion our task becomes consider-
ably more difficult. The enemy also exploits this act of Soviet power. Do you really
think that the defense and other organs of Poland did not take into considerationthis
act of Soviet power?They did and they acted-it can'tbe excluded that-in a closed
plenum we can speak of this-that Polish organs may have specially worked on the
Polonizationof [our]schools ... the possibility can'tbe excludedthat special workwas
undertakento Polonize the Belorussianpopulationthroughthese schools. The possibil-
ity can'tbe excluded that here we see an attemptby Polish fascism to build something
for futurecontingencies.205
This statementrepresenteda fundamentalshift, for it sanctionedthe view that

Polish nationalinstitutionshad fostered ratherthan disarmednationalism,an
interpretationthat wouldjustify both the abolition of nationalinstitutionsand
the onset of ethnic cleansing. In the fall of 1934, the Politburoalso formulated
a new regime for its westernborderregions.206 This regime createdyet another
border category, the "forbiddenborder zone" (zapretnyipogranichnyi zon),
into which no one could enterwithout special NKVD permission.207 This zone
was officially only 7.5 kilometers deep, but in Leningradit ran as deep as
ninety kilometersalong the Latvianand Estonianborders.208 A varietyof secu-
rity measuresaccompaniedthis decree. One of them was ethnic cleansing.209
Between February20 and March 10, 1935, a total of 8,329 families (about
41,650 individuals)were deportedfrom the borderregions of Kiev and Vin-
nitsya oblasts to easternUkraine.Although Germansand Poles made up only
a few percent of the local population, they represented57.3 percent of the
deportees.210This limited initial action against "unreliable"elements was ex-
pandedin the course of 1935. In July 1935, Kiev officials wrote the Ukrainian
CentralCommitteethat "thenumberof householdsdeportedand resettledhad
not completely cleansed (ochistit') the Markhlevskii [Polish] raion of anti-
Soviet elements."'211They asked for and received permission to deport three
hundredadditionalPolish households.212 In October 1935, the UkrainianTsK
petitionedMoscow for permissionto deportstill another1,500 Polish house-
holds.213In response,NKVD chairmanGenrikhlagoda wrote Molotov thatthe
springdeportationshad "significantlycleansed (ochistilo) the borderregions,
especially Kiev oblast,from counter-revolutionary nationalist(Polish and Ger-
205 Ibid.,pp. 87-88.

206 RTsKhIDNI77/1/425 (1934): 1.
207
TsDAHOU1/16/13 (26.08.36): 104-9; SZ (17.07.35): 45/377.
208 Leningradskaiapravda, no. 113 (23.05.35): 1; BFORC reel 3
(03.06.35), vol.
19454, pp. 171-74.
209
TsDAHOU1/16/11 (20.12.34): 316-17,1/16/12 (23.01.35): 39.
210
2,866 Polish and 1,903 Germanfamilies. See GARF5446/16a1265(1935): 14.
211
TsDAHOU1/6/396 (17.08.35): 46/30,166.
212
Ibid.,pp. 166-67; TsDAHOU1/16/12 (05.09.35): 267-68.
213
TsDAHOU1/16/12 (16.10.35): 314.
man) and anti-Soviet elements ... [but] in the border regions of Vinnitsya
oblastthereremainsignificantcadresof counter-revolutionary Polish national-
ist elements.?'214The charge of counterrevolutionand the language of ethnic
cleansing had now fully emerged.
In January1936, before this thirddeportationhad even been completed,the
orderwas given for a massive new deportationof 15,000 Germanand Polish
households,now to KazakhstanratherthaneasternUkraine.215 In Kazakhstan,
they were quickly reduced to the same status as the formerly deported
kulaks.216These deportations,however,still remainedpartial.Not all Germans
and Poles were labeled counterrevolutionaryand deported.The deportations
of 1935-36 includedapproximatelyhalf the Germanand Polish populationof
the Ukrainianborder regions.217No one outside the border regions was de-
ported.However,the GermansandPoles who remainedin Ukrainesaw a grad-
ual abolitionof their nationalinstitutions.218
Ethniccleansing in Leningradoblast followed the Ukrainianpatternclosely.
A large deportation,authorizedby lagoda on March 25, 1935, targeted the
small Estonian and Latvian and larger Finnish population of the Leningrad
borderregions.219Accordingto Finnishsources,about7,000-9,000 Finns were
deportedto Siberia and CentralAsia.220As in Ukraine, this first deportation
targetedindependentpeasants, lishentsy, and other stigmatizedcategories.221
However,againfollowing the Ukrainianpattern,in the springof 1936 a second
larger deportationof about 20,000 Finnish peasants to Siberia took place.222
214
GARF5446/16a/265 (1935): 14-15.
215GARF5446/18a/209 (1936): 1; TsDAHOU 1/16/12 (25.11.35): 346, 1/16/13
(15.03.36): 25; RTsKhIDNI17/42/186 (16.02.35): 6-10; 17/42/208 (31.03.36): 15.
216 Initially,the deportedwere not formallydeprivedof theircivil rightsbut were, like
the kulaks,settledin NKVD worksettlements(trudposelki).Laterthey wereformallyre-

ducedto the existing kulakstatusof spetspereselentsy.GARF 5446/18a1209(1936): 30,
70-73; NikolajF Bugaj," 'SpecjalnateczkaStalina':Deportacjei reemigracjapolakow,"
ZeszytyHistoryczie,no. 107 (1993), pp. 137-38.
217 This is an approximation basedon the 1926 census. By 1941,70-80 percentof the
Germanshad been deportedfrom the GermanPulinskii raion. Buchsweiler (n. 126
above),p. 157.
218 B. V. Shyrko,"'Shkidnytstvoriznykhnatsii,"'ArkhivyUkrainy,no. 4 (1992), pp.
32-40; Martin,"AnAffirmativeAction Empire"(n. 13 above),pp. 757-59.

219 BFORCreel 3 (1935), vol. 19453, pp. 259-64, vol. 19454, pp. 171-74; BFORCreel
5 (1936), vol.20349, p. 169, reel 6 (1936), vol.20353, pp. 14-17; The IngrianCommittee
(n. 154 above),pp. 12-14; Gelb, "WesternFinnic Minorities"(n. 9 above), pp. 242-44;
N. F Bugai, Iosif Stalin-LavrentiiuBerii: "Ikhnado deportirovat"'(Moscow, 1992), p.
20. lagodahadapprovedthe deportationof 3,547 families, not all of whom were Finns.
220
The IngrianCommittee,p. 14.
221
BFORCreel 6 (1936), vol. 20353, p. 16.
222 Manley,p. 9. BFORC reel 16 (29.07.36), vol. 20353, pp. 14-17; Gelb, "Western
FinnicMinorities,"p. 243.
850 Martin
Still, not all Finns were deported.The removalof 30,000 Finns amountedto
about30 percentof the LeningradFinnishpopulation.223 The deportationswere
accompanied,again as in Ukraine, by an abolition of many national institu-
tions.224
The novel factor in Leningradoblast was that the city of Leningraditself
lay within the forbiddenborderzone.225The mass arrestsand deportationof
unreliableelements from Leningradin late 1934, following the murderof Ki-
rov, was actuallypartof the new borderregime and had been plannedpriorto
Kirov's murder.In a reply to an angry letter by Academic Pavlov protesting
this repression, Molotov made clear this connection: "In Leningradspecial
measuresarebeing takenagainstmalicious anti-Sovietelements, which is tied
to the special borderposition of this city."226Again, majortargetsof this wave
of repressionswere the western national minorities:Finns, Latvians,Estoni-
ans, Germans,Poles.227
By 1936, then, the Soviet Union's western diasporanationalitieshad been
stigmatized as collectively disloyal and subjectedto ethnic cleansing. In the
Far East, although Koreanshad been threatenedwith deportationalready in
1926, ethnic cleansing was delayed.Therewas a majorwave of Koreanarrests
in 1935.228In July 1936, the Far Easternkraikomfirst petitioned Sovnarkom
for permissionto implementthe new borderregime in the FarEast, in orderto
frustrate"the aggressive tactics of the local authoritiesin Manchuriaand the
Japanese,who exploit every bordercrossing from our side, either to recruit
spies and saboteurs or to make various accusations against the Soviet
Union.'229This appealto Soviet xenophobiawas opposedby Maxim Litvinov,
who noted that the PortsmouthTreatyforbade"militarymeasureson the Ko-
reanborder."230 At this point, the need to placatethe Japaneseoutweighedcon-
cern over Japaneseinfluence on the Koreanpopulationof the Far East border
223
Matley (n. 9 above),pp. 8-10.
224GARF3316/30/825 (1937); BFORCreel 6 (29.07.36), vol. 20352, p. 24.
225 One did not need NKVD permissionto enterLeningrad,only to reside in it.
226
"'Poshchaditezhe Rodinui Nas'. ProtestyakademikaI. P.Pavlovaprotivbol'shev-
istskikh nasilii,"Istochnik,no. 1 (1995), p. 143 (letterfrom Molotov to Pavlov,March
15,1935).
227 BFORCreel 5 (31.01.36), vol.20349, pp. 169-70. The special suspicionagainstSo-
viet westernnationalminoritiesis nicely illustratedby an informantof the Britishconsul,

who relatedthatballet dancerswho socialized with the Germanconsul were told to stop:
"Whenthey enquiredwho were the foreignerswhom they were to avoid,they were told
membersof theGerman,Finnish,Estonian,Latvian,andPolishconsulates."BFORCreel
5(31.01.36), vol. 20349, p. 169.
228 "Koreitsy," Taketo bylo, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1993),pp. 47-84; Gelb, "AnEarlySoviet"
(n. 9 above),p. 397.
229 GARF5446/29/67 (1936): 42-43.
230 Ibid.,p.
18.
regions. Only on July 28, 1937, after interventionsby Ezhov and Voroshilov,
was the Foreign Ministryforced to accept the introductionof the new border
regions' regime in the FarEast.231
On August 18, 1937, Stalin and Molotov sent a draftproposalfor a Korean
deportationto the Far Easternleadership.232 This proposal was similar to the
1935 deportationsin Ukraineand Leningradoblast in thatthe deportationwas
confined to twelve border raiony, but it was distinct in that it targetedonly
Koreans, and all Koreans were to be deported.Three days later, the official
TsK and Sovnarkomdeportationdecree was expandedto include twenty-three
raiony,which increasedthe numberof Koreansto be deportedfrom 44,023 to
135,343.233DemobilizedRed Army soldierswere also to be settledin formerly
Koreancollective farms.234 The scope of the deportationcontinuedto expand
until finally, on September22, 1937, the assistanthead of the NKVD, V. V.
Chernyshev,askedEzhov for the rightto deportevery last Koreanfrom the Far
Easternkrai. His reasoningwas highly revealing:"Toleave these few thousand
Koreansin the FarEasternkrai,when the majorityhave been deported,will be
dangerous,since the family ties of all Koreansare very strong.The territorial
restrictionson those remainingin the Far East will undoubtedlyaffect their
mood and these groups will become rich soil for the Japaneseto work on."235
In other words, we have injuredsome Koreans,and thereforewe can assume
all Koreansare now our enemies. This psychology is extremely importantnot
just for the spreadof ethniccleansingbut also for the ratchetingup of all Soviet
terror.Chernyshev'srequestwas approved.236 By October29, Ezhov could re-
port to Molotov that 171,781 Koreanshad been deportedto Kazakhstanand
Uzbekistan.237The first ethnic cleansing of an entire nationality,including
Communists,had been accomplished.
When the kolkhoznik Kim-Sen-Menwas told that all Koreanswere being
deportedto centralAsia, he respondedthat "in all likelihood, they will create
for us a KoreanAutonomousOblast there.?238 Kim's comment was as reveal-
ing as Chernyshev's,for it illustratedthe continuitybetween the 1920s policy
of ethnically based agriculturalresettlementand the 1930s policy of ethnic
231
GARF5446/29/67 (1937): 18-25.
232 RGVA33879/2/181 (1938): 8-11.
233 Belaia RGVA
kniga,64-67; 33879/2/181 (1937): 3-6.
234 GARF5446/29/113 (1938).
235 Belaia
kniga (n. 49 above),pp. 85-86,88, 109-110.
p. 111.
23661bid.,
237
GARF5446/29/48 (1937): 156. He notedthatseven hundreddispersedKoreansre-
mained to be roundedup. Approximately11,000 Chinese were also deportedwith the
Koreans,as were six hundredPoles, and severalhundredGermans,Latvians,andLithu-
anians were arrested. Nikolai F. Bugai, "Koreiskii vopros' na dal'nem vostoke i
deportatsiia1937 goda,"Problemydal'nego vostoka,no.4 (1992), p. 158.
238B elaia kniga,p. 133.
852 Martin
cleansing. Surprisingly,Kim was not entirelymistaken.The deportedKoreans

were settled in separateKoreancollective farms.239Korean-languageschools
were formed.240 Ezhov himself authorizedthe transferof an entireKoreanped-
agogical school, a Koreanpublishinghouse, and a Koreannewspaperto cen-
tral Asia.241Even in the midst of 100 percent ethnic cleansing, where every
Koreanhad been declareda potentialspy andtraitor,the formulasof the Soviet
nationalitiespolicy could still not be entirely abandoned.
ENEMYNATIONS
The Koreandeportationtook place at the onset of the mass operationsof the

Great Terror,which helps explain why that deportationspread so quickly to
become a total deportationof all Koreans.The GreatTerrorwitnessed the cul-
minationof a gradualshift from predominantlyclass-basedterrorto terrorthat
targeted(amongothers)entirenations.At this time, the dualitythatallowedfor
the simultaneousdeportationof all Koreansand the formationof new national
institutionsin theirplace of exile was finally resolved.At the 1937 Ukrainian
party congress, Oleksandr Shlikhter, an ideology specialist, spoke of the
"wreckingof variousnations"(shkidnytstvoriznykhnatsii) in referenceto the
Germansand Poles of Ukraine.242 Few otherswere so bluntin such a relatively
public forum, but this sentimentunderlaya new internalparty discourse that
justified collective terroragainstthe Soviet Union'sdiasporanationalities.
The GreatTerrorsaw an extension of ethnic cleansing to all the Soviet bor-
der regions and all of the Soviet Union's diasporanationalities.On July 17,
1937, Sovnarkomissued a decree extendingthe new borderregions' regime to
territoryborderingon Iran and Afghanistan.The new regime included ethnic
cleansing: the deportationof over 1,000 Kurdish families in late 1937 and
2,000 Iranianfamilies in 1938.243By the end of 1938, the new regime had
been extendedalong the entire Soviet border.244 Therewere also furtherethnic
deportationsfrom the westernborderregions. In November 1937, the Odessa
239
GARF5446129148(1937): 156.
240Ibid., p. 176.
241
Belaia kniga,p. 100; GARF5446120a/509(1937): 1-12.
242Nimtsiv Ukraini(n. 202 above),p. 13.
243GARF 5446/20a/933 (1937): 7-8, 5446123a150(1938): 1-2; Nikolai F.Bugai, "Ka-
nun voiny: Repressiiv otnoshenii sovetskikhkurdov,"in Sovetskiekurdy:Vremiapere-
men (Moscow, 1993), p. 48; "Kurdy,"in Taketo bylo, vol. 1, pp. 95-125; GARF 5446/
23a/29 (1938): 23. "Iranian"was actually not an ethnic term, but one that embraced
Persians,Azerbaijanis,and Kurdswho originatedin Iran(even if they were now Soviet
citizens), again pointingto the key role of cross-borderethnic ties.
244GARF5446/29/96(1938): 1-10, and5446/29/67 (1938): 52.
obkom orderedthe deportationof 5,000 Germanhouseholds.245 The decline in

the German and Polish populations of Ukraine and Belorussia between the
1937 and 1939 censuses suggest there may have been other deportationsas
well.246
Most significantly,as ethnic cleansing spreadoutwardto all the Soviet bor-
der regions, terroragainstdiasporanationalitiesalso spreadinwardto embrace
the entire Soviet Union.247This process began with the anti-Germanand anti-
Polish campaignsduringthe 1933 Ukrainianterror.It took on all-uniondimen-
sions with the November 5, 1934, Politburo decree, "On the Battle with
Counter-Revolutionary Fascist Elements in the GermanColonies,"which led
to mass arrestsand show trialsnot only in Ukrainebut also in centralterritories
such as the Slavgorod German raion in Siberia.248Likewise, the Leningrad
repressionsfollowing Kirov'smurdertargeted(amongothers)diasporanation-
alities. In 1936, the PartyControlCommission and the NKVD began a purge
of all political emigres in the Soviet Union, with Poles as the primaryfocus, a
purge that quickly escalated into mass arrests.249 With the onset of the Great
Terror's"massoperations"in the summerof 1937, this elite terroragainstfor-
eign Communistsmergedwith the mass ethnic cleansing of domestic diaspora
245
TsDAHOU1/6/458 (19.11.37):9/7, pp. 63-70.
246
Ukraine'sPolish populationdeclined by approximately90,000 individualsand its
German population by 40,000. In Belorussia, the Polish population declined from
119,881 in 1937 to 54,500 in 1939 (45.46 percent).Calculated(with adjustmentsfor the
inflated 1939 numbers) from Vsesoiuznaiaperepis' naseleniia 1937 goda (Moscow,
1937), p. 94, and Vsesoiuznaiaperepis' naseleniia 1939 goda (Moscow, 1939), p. 68.
However,these populationlosses mayreflectarrestsandexecutionsduringthe GreatTer-
rorratherthandeportations.
247 The terrordid not targetthose stateless diasporas,whose coethnics did not live in
concentratedcommunitiesadjacentto the Soviet Union, such as Jews, Assyrians, and

Gypsies.Althoughthey were treatedwith greatersuspicionduringthe GreatTerror,and
some of theirinstitutionswere abolished,I have found no decrees specifically targeting
them for repression.Nor have the statisticson the ethnic impactof the terrorsuggested
they weretargeted.Accordingto Vaksberg,who hadaccess to the formerKGB archivein
Moscow, the first specifically Jewish cases were initiatedin 1939 afterthe Hitler-Stalin
pact.ArkadyVaksberg,Stalin against the Jews (New York,1994), pp. 80-102. See also
Martin,"AnAffirmativeAction Empire"(n. 13 above),pp. 782-85.
248 L. P.Belkovec, "DerBeginndes Massenterrors: Die Getreiderequirierung von 1934
im westsibirischenDeutschenRayon,"Forschungenzur GeschichteundKulturderRuss-
landdeutschen,no. 4 (1994), p. 121; Victor Chentsov,"Die deutsche Bevolkerungam
Dneprim Zeichen des stalinistischenTerrors,"Forschungenzur Geschichteund Kultur
derRusslanddeutschen,no. 5 (1995), pp. 11-13; GARF 3316/30/831 (1936): 7-8, 3316/
29/631 (1935): 18-19; Nimtsiv Ukraini,pp. 186-87.
249 V. N. Khaustov, "Iz predystorii massovykh repressii protiv poliakov: Seredina
1930-kh gg," in Repressii protiv poliakov i pol'skikhgrazhdan (Moscow, 1997), pp.

10-21; NikitaPietrow,"PolskaoperacjaNKWD,"Karta,no. 11 (1993), pp. 24-27.
854 Martin
nationalitiesto produce a mass terrorcampaign against the new category of

enemy nations.250 On August 9, 1937, the PolitburoconfirmedNKVD decree
00485, "On the Liquidationof the Polish Sabotage-EspionageGroupand the
OrganizationPOV (Pol'skoiorganizatsiivoiskovoi).9925'Two days later,Ezhov
formally issued this decree (accompaniedby a massive historical account of
POV's origins and activities as justification of the anti-Polish operations),
which identifiedtargetsfor arrest:all Polish political emigres and refugees, as
well as "the most active part of local anti-Soviet nationalist elements from
Polish raiony."252 In October 1937, this category was extended to all Poles
with "ties to [Polish] consuls"(konsul'skie sviazi), a categorythat could easily
embraceany Soviet Pole.253By 1938, the NKVD was arrestingPoles (andother
diasporanationalities)exclusively based on their nationalidentity.254
The August 11, 1937, POV decree servedas the model for a series of NKVD
decrees targetingall of the Soviet Union'sdiasporanationalities.255 The NKVD
referredto these decrees collectively as "the national operations"(to distin-
guish them from the other"massoperation"launchedby NKVD decree 00447
on July 30, 1937, targeting "formerkulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet
elements").256 A January31, 1938, Politburodecree extended until April 15,
1938, this "operationfor the destructionof espionage and sabotagecontingents
made up of Poles, Latvians, Germans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians,
Kharbintsy,Chinese, and Romanians, both foreign subjects and Soviet citi-
zens, accordingto the existing decrees of the NKVD."This decree also author-
ized a new operation "to destroy the Bulgarian and Macedoniancadres."257
250
Therewas also a July 25, 1937, NKVD decree, which targetedexclusivelyforeign
Germansworking in military plants or in transport.Leningradskiimartirolog, 1937-
1938, tom 2 (St. Petersburg,1996), pp.452-53.
251 "Massovyerepressiiopravdany byt' ne mogut, Istochnik,no. 1 (1995), p. 125. The
decree is reproducedin Pietrow,pp. 27-29. POV was a real undergroundorganization
formedduringWorldWarI to supportPilsudski'slegions. It ceased operationsin Poland
in 1918 andin Ukrainein 1921.Arrestsby theNKVD for membershipin POV begandur-
ing the 1933 Ukrainianterrorand continuedthroughthe GreatTerror.Mitzner(n. 197
above),pp. 21-23.
252 Both documents are reproducedin Iurii Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, and
Vadym Zolotarov,eds., ChK-HPU-NKVDv Ukraini: Osoby,fakty, dokumenty(Kiev,

1997), pp. 347-77.
253 N. V. PetrovandA. B. Roginskii,"'Polskaiaoperatsiia'NKVD 1937-1938 gg.,"in
Represiiprotivpoliakov (n. 249 above),p. 27. "Konsul'skiesviazi"were also a standard

arrestcategoryin the othernationaloperations.See Chentsov,p. 14.
254 Petrovand Roginskii, pp. 29-34; Pietrow,p. 32; S. Bilokin, "Dokumentyz istorii
NKVD URSR,"Nashe mynule,no. 1 (1993), pp. 40-41.

255
PetrovandRoginskii,pp. 28-29.
256
Ibid., pp. 30-3 1. For decree 00447, see "Limityterroru, Karta,no. 11 (1993), pp.
8-15.
257
Taketo bylo, vol. 1 (n. 228 above),p. 253.
Koreans and Afghans too were targeted by NKVD decrees.258The NKVD

spoke of their "Germanoperation"and "Latvianoperation."259 They arrested
individuals"accordingto the Polish line" or "Finnishline" of the nationalities
terror.260Most revealingly,internalNKVD documentsreferto theiroperations
as directedagainst"nationalitiesof foreign governments,"a designationfor the
diasporanationalities-the vast majority of whom were Soviet citizens and
whose ancestorshad resided for decades in the Soviet Union and Russianem-
pire-that absolutizedtheir cross-borderethnic ties as the only salient aspect
of their identity,sufficientproof of their disloyalty and sufficientjustification
for their arrestand execution.26'
The national operations were not at all a minor part of the Great Terror.
Accordingto recentlyreleasedstatisticsfrom the formerKGB archivein Mos-
cow, from July 1937 to November 1938 a total of 335,513 individualswere
convicted in the national operations, while 767,397 were convicted in the
operationcarriedout underdecree 00447 (formerkulaks,criminals,and other
anti-Sovietelements).262 We do not have an arresttotal for this time period,but
we do have a figure of 1,565,041 arrestedon political charges between Octo-
ber 1, 1936, and November 1, 1938. Even using this extended time period,
the national operationsmade up 21.4 percent and decree 00447 made up 49
percent of all arrests.When we examine total executions, the national opera-
tions assume a still larger role. Of the 681,692 executions in 1937-38, the
national operationsmade up 247,157 (36.3 percent) and decree 00447 made
up 386,798 (56.7 percent). Of all those arrestedon political and nonpolitical
charges in 1937-38, a total of 19 percentwere executed;of those arrestedun-
der decree 00447, a total of 49.3 percent were executed; of those arrestedin
the nationaloperations,73.7 percentwere executed.The execution rate on the
Polish operationwas slightly higher(79.4 percent)and the Greek,Finnish,and
Estonianoperationseven higher,while the Afghan and Iranianexecutionrates
were much lower.263 To sum up, the nationaloperationsmade up about a fifth
of the total arrestsand a thirdof the total executions duringthe GreatTerror,
258
"Limityterroru,"p. 8; Petrovand Roginskii,p. 33. In July 1937, Stalin authorized
the arrestof all Afghancitizens in Turkmenistan.TsentrKhraneniiaSovremennykh Dok-
umentov(hereafterTsKhSD)89/48/7 (25.07.37): 1.
259 Rastsyslav Platonavand Mikola Stashkevich, "Dzve aperatsyi suprats' 'vorahav
naroda,"'Belaruskihistarychnychasopis, no. 1 (1993), pp. 78-79.

260
PetrovandRoginskii,p. 28.
261 Ibid.,p. 34.
262
Unless otherwisenoted,all statisticsin the following two paragraphsaretakenfrom
ibid., pp. 32-33,37-38; andPietrow(n. 249 above),pp. 33, 39-40.
263 This was the only informationprovided.The data follow the general patternof
greaterseverityin the west andlesser severityin the south.

856 Martin
and arrestin the national operationswas much more likely to result in exe-
cution.264
Unfortunately,we do not know exactly how many membersof the diaspora
nationalitieswere arrestedor executed, since not everyonearrestedin the Pol-
ish operationwas a Pole, nor were all arrestedPoles included in the Polish
operation.For instance,throughSeptember1, 1938, in Belorussia,Poles made
up only 43 percentof those arrestedin the Polish operation,Germansmade up
76 percentof the Germanoperation,and Latviansmade up 74.6 percentof the
Latvianoperation.265 Moreover,all threenationalitieswere includedin all three
operations.In Moscow oblast, throughJuly 1, 1938, Poles made up 57 percent
of the Polish operation, and for the entire Soviet Union from Septemberto
November1938 Poles made up 54.8 percentof the Polish operation.Roginskii
and Petrovreportthat 139,835 individualswere arrestedin the Polish opera-
tion, while 118,000-123,000 Poles were arrestedduringthe GreatTerrorin all
the nationaloperationsand the decree 00447 operationcombined.Therefore,
the number of Poles arrestedamountedto 84.4 to 88.0 percent of the total
numberarrestedin the Polish nationaloperations.If this same ratio holds for
the othernationaloperations,then diasporanationalitiesmade up 25.7 to 26.8
percentof total arrests(and a still higher percentageof executions) duringthe
mass operationsof the GreatTerror,althoughthese same nationalitiesrepre-
sented only 1.6 percentof the overallSoviet population.266
264 For the nationaloperations,no quotaswere providedfor executionsand incarcera-
tion as they were with decree00447, althoughall executionsin both operationshadto be

ratifiedby centralauthorities(albeitin the most rote fashion).This is one possible reason
for the higherexecutionratesin the nationaloperations.
265 Platonavand
Stashkevich,pp. 78-79.
266 Vsesoiuznaiaperepis'naseleniia 1937g. (n. 246 above),pp. 83-84. The
targetingof
diasporanationalitiesis also confirmedby some recentevidence fromLeningradoblast.
Using the biographicalinformationof the 7,750 individualsexecuted in Leningradcity
andoblastinAugust, September,andOctober1937, as listed in Leningradskiimartirolog
(n. 249 above)(thelist is saidto be almostcomprehensiveandso validfor statisticalanal-
ysis), I calculatedthe percentageof each nationalityrelativeto the percentagethatwould
be expected based on their total representationin the populationof Leningradcity and
oblast.Althoughthe nationaloperations(exceptthe Polish one, which beganAugust20)
werejust beginningandmost executionswouldhavebeen partof the decree00447 opera-
tions, the diasporanationalitieswere still disproportionatelyaffected. The numberof
Poles executedwas 2,204 percentof what would be expected based on theirtotal repre-
sentationin the populationof Leningradcity and oblast. In otherwords,due exclusively
to theirethnicity,Poles were 22.04 times morelikely to be executedthannon-Poles.For
diasporanationalities,the targetingwas not yet so extreme:Finns 183 percent,Estonians
265 percent,Germans245 percent,Latvians 161 percent.These figureswould be much
higher were the post-September1937 executions included. Non-diasporanationalities
were mostly underrepresented: Russians75 percent,Jews 50 percent,Tatars19 percent.
Ukrainianswere slightly overrepresentedat 137 percentandBelorussianshighly overre-
presentedat461 percent(second only to the Poles). I suspectthis substantialBelorussian
Mass ethnic cleansing and the national operationswere unsurprisinglyac-

companiedby decrees abolishing all national soviets and national schools of
the stigmatized diasporanationalities.267 These decrees allowed the party to
articulatean internalnon-publicexplanationfor the nationalitiesterror.These
nationalinstitutionswere declaredto have been "artificiallycreated"(iskusst-
venno sozdano);thatis, they were not even historicallyjustified. Moreover,as
Malenkov argued,it was often not even the party who created them: "It has
now been establishedthat in numerouscases nationalraiony were createdby
the initiative of enemies of the people in order to ease the development of
counter-revolutionary espionage and wrecking."268 Likewise, a delegate to the
October 1937 TsK plenum stated: "The Poles, throughtheir national fascist
and Trotskyistagents, filled the borderregions with their people (svoimi li-
ud'mi), such that their person (svoi chelovek) became head of the kolkhoz,
head of the village soviet, and so forth."269
Althoughexpressedin the paranoid
vocabularyof the GreatTerror,these commentsessentially express the follow-
ing realization:we thought national Soviets would disarm nationalism,but
they have strengthenedit; we thoughtthey would insureloyalty from our dias-
poranationalities,but they haveunderminedit; we felt they would help project
our influence abroad,but the exact opposite occurred.
Before drawing my final conclusions about the origins of Soviet ethnic
cleansing, I should firststronglyemphasizethe importantconsequencesof the
previously unappreciatedscope of the mass terroragainst diasporanationali-
(andless substantialUkrainian)overrepresentation is the resultof two factors.First,many

Belorussians(anda smallernumberof Ukrainians)were Catholics,who in the 1920s de-
claredthemselves to be Poles and sent theirchildrento Polish schools. Therefore,they
were arrestedin large numbersduringthe Polish operation.For instance, in Belorussia
itself, Belorussiansmade up 47.3 percentof those arrestedin the Polish operation(more
thanthe Poles at 43.0 percent).They madeup 14.2 percentof those arrestedin the Polish
operationstatewidefrom Septemberto November1938, morethanany othernationality
except the Poles themselves (Ukrainianswere next at 13.6 percentand Russiansnext at
8.8 percent).Second,BelorussiaandUkrainewerehome to the largestdiasporanational-
ity populations,and thereforethe NKVD was simply likely to be more active in those
republics(the same would be trueof Leningradand the FarEast). The publishedGulag
statisticsfor 1939 also show a substantialoverrepresentation of diasporanationalitiesand
underrepresentation of indigenousnationalities.However,Ukrainiansareslightlyunder-
representedandBelorussiansonly slightly overrepresented,which mayreflectthe higher
executionratesof the Polish operation.J.ArchGetty,GaborT.Ritterspom,andViktorN.
Zemskov,"Victimsof the Soviet PenalSystemin the Pre-WarYears: A FirstApproachon
the Basis of ArchivalEvidence,"AmericanHistoricalReview98 (October1993): 1028.
267 RTsKhIDNI17/3/994 (11.12.37): 56/75,56/76, 17/114/633 (01.12.37): 75/6,75/7.
Therewas one majorexception:theVolgaGermanASSRandGermanschools withinthat

republicwere not abolished.
268
RTsKhIDNI17/114/829 (01.12.37): 75/6, p. 122.
269
RTsKhIDNI17/2/627 (11-12.10.37): 55-56.
858 Martin
ties for our understandingof the GreatTerror.Approximately800,000 individ-

uals were arrested,deported,or executed in the ethnic cleansing and mass na-
tional operationsfrom 1935 to 1938. This representsaroundone-thirdof the
total political victims in that time period.270That fact alone requiresat least
two revisions to our interpretationsof the GreatTerror.First, in terms of the
origins of the GreatTerror,in additionto elite political explanationsthatfocus
on Stalin and his circle, regionalexplanationsthathighlighttensions in center-
peripheryrelations, ideological explanationsthat emphasize the continuation
of class-basedterror(the "formerkulaks"in decree 00447), and social expla-
nations that focus on leadershippanic over crime (the "criminals"in decree
00447), we must add the nationalor xenophobic explanationthat I have out-
lined in this article.27'In otherwords,the origins of Soviet ethnic cleansing are
an importantpartof the origins of the GreatTerror.
Second, in termsof the course of the GreatTerror,it is strikingthatthe terror
itself exemplified and, to some degree, completed the largertransitionfrom a
primaryfocus on class-based terrorto a preponderantemphasis on ethnic-
based terror,which would continue until Stalin's death. Based on extensive
work in the centralNKVD archives,Roginskii and Petrovconclude that,from
Januaryto February1938 (i.e., six to seven months into the sixteen-month
period of mass terror),the national operationseclipsed decree 00447 as the
primaryfocus of NKVD activity.By the final months of the terror,they were
virtually the exclusive focus.272Indeed, with only minor exaggeration, one
might say thatby November 1938 the GreatTerrorhad evolved into an ethnic
terror.
CONCLUSION
I beganthis articlewith a puzzle:How did a statewith no ambitionto turnitself

into a nation-state-indeed, with the exact opposite ambition-nevertheless
become the site of large-scaleethnic cleansing?In fact, the Soviet turntoward
ethnic cleansing in the 1930s was not even accompaniedby a trend favoring
270 This is a
roughestimate.I do not havearrestfiguresfor 1935-36, or comprehensive
deportationfiguresfor 1937-38.
271 On elite political
explanations,see RobertConquest,TheGreatTerror:A Reassess-
ment(New York,1990). Onregionalexplanations,see J.ArchGetty,Originsof the Great
Purges: TheSoviet CommunistPartyReconsidered,1933-1938 (Cambridge,1985). For
a "class-based"explanation,see Sheila Fitzpatrick,The Russian Revolution (Oxford,
1994), pp. 163-70. Forthe social explanationbased-oncrime,see David Shearer,"Crime
and Social Disorderin Stalin'sRussia:A Reassessmentof the GreatRetreatandthe Ori-
gins of Mass Repression,"Cahiersdu monderusse 39 (1998): 119-48. This is, of course,
not meantto be a completecatalogof factorsleadingto the terror.
272 Petrovand
Roginskii(n. 253 above),p. 30.
assimilation,but ratherby an increased emphasis on the distinct primordial

essence of the Soviet Union'snationalities.273 My explanationhas three major
strands.First, the Soviet leadershipwas alreadycommittedto ethnic resettle-
ment in the 1920s to promote ethnic consolidation and the formationof na-
tionalterritories.Lenin andWoodrowWilson were the two greatpropagandists
for the right of nations to self-determination.While Lenin and Stalin opposed
the creationof a Russiannation-state,they acceptedthe principleof the nation-
state and sought to create its basic essentials-a nationalterritory,elite, lan-
guage, and culture-for each Soviet ethnic minority.They were, if you will,
internationalnationalists.Thereis, then, a direct line connecting Soviet ethnic
consolidationprojectsin the 1920s and Soviet participationin and sponsorship
of the internationallysanctioned"liberal"ethnic cleansing that accompanied
the conclusion of WorldWarII: the Soviet Union'sown populationexchanges
with Poland and Czechoslovakiaand the expulsion of the Germanminority
from eastern Europe.274 These actions were not undertakenin the pursuit of
Russificationor the creation of a Russian nation-state;rather,they embodied
Soviet sponsorshipof the ethnic consolidation(throughethniccleansing) of its
futureEast Europeanallies, particularlyPoland and Czechoslovakia,as well
as of its own republicsof Ukraine,Belorussia,and Lithuania.
Second, popularethnic hostility played a role in the origins of Soviet ethnic
cleansing. Due to the coincidence of status and ethnic divisions with conflicts
over land and territory,some of the most importantdiasporanationalities(Ko-
reans, Germans,Finns, Poles) became the targets of popularethnic hostility.
This hostility led to harshtreatmentduringcollectivization,which helped pro-
voke mass emigrationmovements.It led local Communiststo stigmatizethese
groups. Here again there is a link to the spreadof Soviet ethnic cleansing be-
yond diasporanationalitiesduringWorldWarII to embraceseveralNorthCau-
casus nationalities(Chechens,Ingush, Balkars,Karachai).These nationalities
had been involvedin the most severe popularethnic conflict duringthe 1920s
and 1930s (as well as, of course, in the Tsaristperiod).275
Third, and most importantly,the Soviet belief in the political salience of
ethnicity,which was reflectedin the government'sentire policy of supporting
nationalinstitutions,led to its adoptionof the PiedmontPrinciple:the attempt
273 Slezkine (n. 12 above);Martin,"AnAffirmativeAction Empire"(n. 13 above),pp.
944-60.
274 On the liberal ideology of national self-determinationand ethnic cleansing, see
DavidLaitin,Ethnic Cleansing,LiberalStyle,MacArthurFoundationProgramin Trans-

nationalSecurity,WorkingPaperSeries,no. 4 (Cambridge,1995).
275 This is not to arguethatall nationalitiesthatwere the subjectof popularethnichos-
tility were deportedeven in the North Caucasus.Dagestan had been the site of much
ethnicconflictbut experiencedno deportations,whereasKalmykiahad seen little ethnic
conflictandnonethelessthe Kalmykswere deported.
860 Martin
to exploit cross-borderethnic ties to project influence abroad.However, the

exaggerated Soviet fear of foreign capitalist influence and contamination-
what I have called Soviet xenophobia-also made such cross-borderties po-
tentially suspect. Once it became clear to the Soviet leadership that cross-
borderethnic ties could not be exploited to undermineneighboringcountries,
but instead had the opposite potential,their response was ethnic cleansing of
the Soviet borderlandsand, ultimately, ethnic terror throughoutthe Soviet
Union. Again, ethnic cleansing of nationalitieswith suspect cross-bordereth-
nic ties awayfrom the Soviet borderlandscontinuedthroughoutthe late Stalin-
ist period with the removalof the CrimeanTatars,Greeks,Armenians,Bulgar-
ians, MeskhetianTurks,Kurds,Iranians,and Khemshils from the Black Sea
and Transcaucasianborderregions.276
Diasporanationalitieshave often been seen as disloyal and so as an impedi-
ment to nation building, and thereforehave been subject to ethnic cleansing.
However,the Soviet case is unusualsince, as I have emphasized,Soviet xeno-
phobia was an ideological ratherthan an ethnic concept. It took on an ethnic
content only due to the PiedmontPrinciple'sfocus on cross-borderethnic ties
which, given the Soviet Union'sgeography,were exclusively non-Russian.In
the late 1930s, alongside ethnic cleansing and ethnic primordialism,there was
also a revival of a rathervirulentstate-sponsoredRussian nationalistrhetoric,
a revival that in fact peaked at the height of the GreatTerror.277
However,this
Russiannationalismis best understoodas an effect ratherthan a cause of So-
viet xenophobia.The growing fear of non-Russiannationalismand disloyalty
due to the greaterresistanceto collectivizationand the ethnicizationof Soviet
xenophobiathroughthe reversalof the PiedmontPrincipleled the Soviet gov-
ernmentto identify the state to a greaterextent with its Russiancore.
However,this did not preventeven Russians from becoming an enemy na-
tion undercertaincircumstances.The January1938 Politburodecree targeted
the following diaspora nationalities for terror: Poles, Latvians, Germans,
Estonians,Finns, Greeks,Iranians,Chinese, Romanians,and Kharbintsy.278In
this context, Kharbintsysounds like some exotic Eurasianethnicity.In fact,
Kharbinwas a town in northernChinawhere the headquartersof the Chinese-
Manchurianrailwaywere located. Until the mid-1930s, the railwaywas owned
and operatedby the Soviet Union. Kharbintsy,who were primarilyethnic Rus-
sians, were the railway workers.After the sale of the railwayto Japan,many
returnedto the Soviet Union. For the Soviet leadership,although they were
ethnic Russians, their cross-borderethnic ties to the Kharbintsyremainingin
276
For evidence thatthese operationswere considered"cleansing"of borderregions,
see Bugai, L. Beriia (n. 9 above),pp. 149-50, 163-85.
277
Martin,"AnAffirmativeAction Empire,"pp. 962-7 1.
278 Taketo bylo, vol. 1 (n. 228 above),p. 253.
Chinaturnedthem into the functionalequivalentof a diasporanationality.And

so, despitetheirRussianness,they too became an enemy nationtargetedas part
of the national operationsduring the GreatTerror.279This seems convincing
evidence that it was Soviet, not Russian,xenophobiathatdrovethe practiceof
Soviet ethnic cleansing.
279
In addition to the January1938 Politburoresolution on the Kharbintsy,see the
NKVD targetingthe Kharbintsy(modeled afterthe Polish decree 00485), "Operativnyi
priaz NKVD SSSR No. 00593, 20.09.37,"Memorial-Aspekt,no. 1 (July 1993), p. 2.

MARTIN - THe Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing

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MARTIN - THe Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing

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The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing

Author(s): Terry Martin

In February 1937, a young English adventurer,Fitzroy Maclean, arrivedin

[TheJournalof ModernHistory 70 (December 1998): 813-861]

Maclean and showed him a cartoonfrom the Soviet satiricaljournalKrokodil

BeforeI hadtakenin whatwashappening, I foundmyselfstaringdownthebarrelsof

Maclean escaped unscathed,but with a warning that the NKVD "had to be

AtAltaisk. .. we stoppedforseveralhourswhilea numberof cattletruckswerehitched

When I first encounteredMaclean'sreportsin the British Foreign Office's

4 BFORCreel 7, p. 225; Maclean,p. 34.

have undertakentwo journeys to the Soviet peripheryand on each occasion

8 GosudarstvennyiArkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF) 5446120a/493

history'smost violent and repressiveregimes. It engaged in mass deportations

lized and Proletarian Diasporas,"American Political Science Review 70 (1976):

Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,"Slavic Review 53 (Summer 1994):

Martin, "AnAffirmativeAction Empire:Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923-1938"

1953); Conquest,TheNation Killers;AlexandreA. Bennigsen andEndersS. Wimbush,

nationalities,while leaving nation-buildingpolicies in place for the majority

ETHNIC CLEANSINGIN THE EURASIAN BORDERLANDS,1912-53

Before attemptingto explain this Stalinistparadox,I will briefly situateSoviet

found twenty-sevenbooks with "ethniccleansing"in the title, all publishedafter 1992.

lands: that is, the L-shaped swath of territoryextending southwardfrom Le-

19On ethniccleansingin the nineteenthcentury,see JustinMcCarthy,Death and Exile:

York,1932), pp. 18-20. In 1914, in responseto Ottomanthreatsto deporttheirGreekmi-

BalkanstoAnatolia to the Caucasus(Oxford,1995).

ment legislationliquidatingGermanlandholdings(i.e., land owned by Russian

in TsaristRussiaandthe revolutionaryperiod,see PeterHolquist,"'To Remove'and 'To

sobstvennikov(Moscow, 1917). The expropriationstechnicallytargetedGerman"colo-

own ethnic cleansing projects.The CroatianUstasha state murderedhundreds

28AleksaDjilas, TheContestedCountry:YugoslavUnityand CommunistRevolution,

wave of ethnic cleansing in eastern Europe. At Potsdam, the Allied powers

Borders Stick: PopulationTransferand Resettlementin the Trans-CurzonTerritories,

43 Whenmurderitself becomes the primarygoal, it is typicallycalled genocide. On the

term "genocide,"see Leo Kuper,Genocide: Its Political Use in the TwentiethCentury

46 For personalaccountsof the deportations,see Taketo bylo. Natsional'nyerepressii

v SSSR,1919-1952 gody, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1993).

Soviet ethnic cleansing was professionalizedto an unprecedenteddegree.48

THE BACKGROUNDTO SOVIETETHNIC CLEANSING

I excluded one importantvariablefrom the precedingcomparativediscussion

54 Althougha distinctivemodem practice,ethniccleansingwould appearto be particu-

larly common in transitionalstates (the late Ottomanand Russian Empires,the early

TsDAHOU)fond1, opis' 6, delo 396 (19.06.35), p. 166 (hereafterfond/opisYdelo[date]:

andRussianempires).57In each case, theirgoal in carryingout ethniccleansing

a territoriallyexpandedGermannation-stateas the dominantcore of a multiethnicem-

When this failed, around25,000 Finnishimmigrantswere recruitedfrom Can-

62Michael Gelb, "'KarelianFever':The Finnish ImmigrantCommunityduringSta-

AmericanHistoricalReview91 (1986): 11-36.

twined with conflicts over the formationof nationalterritories.When the na-

67 GeorgeJ. Demko, TheRussianColonizationof Kazakhstan, 1896-1916 (Blooming-

granted first to Cossacks and then to Slavic settlers. As in Kazakhstan,the

"'Conduct Merciless Mass Terror':Decossackizationon the Don, 1919," Cahiers du

a limited removalof settlerpopulationsfrom newly formednationalterritories

THE PIEDMONTPRINCIPLEAND THE SOVIET BORDERREGIONS

It was the Soviet leadership'sstrong commitmentto forming a multinational

82 BaymirzaHayit, "Basmatschi":Nationaler KampfTurkestansin den Jahren1917

of surreptitiousforeign penetrationand focused Soviet xenophobia on the

the Soviet Union'sPolish and Germanpopulations.9'Given these securitycon-

91Ibid.,p. 79; TsDAHOU1/16/1 (26.05.25): 178.

94 TsDAHOU 1/16/1 (1924-25); see also, RTsKhIDNI17/162/2 (26.03.25): 54/12,

UkrainianSSR-Piedmont of the UkrainianLaboringMasses,"97while an-

THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION

This tension between Soviet xenophobiaand the PiedmontPrinciplewas per-

(Kharkov,1931), pp. 153-59.