Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195

Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229
and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu.  His car already had
warning lights and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle to
reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes.
It was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and due
process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the expense f
car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the unconstitutionality
and undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a
regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less
than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a
citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual
record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in overthrowing
the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was
oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because it’s installed when parked for 30
minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesn’t violate any constitutional
provision.
LOI 229 doesn’t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only
prescribes rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for installation of
ewd’s. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration of principles in the
Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.

PEOPLE v. POMAR

November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.

(Labor Standards: Police Power, basis of social legislation)

FACTS:

Julio Pomar is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to
La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in the
City of Manila. under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her
pregnancy. However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days
before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement. Despite demands made by her, Pomar still
refused to pay Fajardo.

The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071. POmar
appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.

Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed
police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in
“factory, shop or place of labor of any description,” and of insuring to them, to a certain extent,
reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of
the state.

RULING:

The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and public
conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the
growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that
power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express
inhibition of the people’s law – the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended
and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.

It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the
employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will
hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of
labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for
sixty days during which no services were rendered.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions
of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.

Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed.

WHITE LIGHT CORP., VS. CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance prohibiting
short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the
City of Manila”. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the
Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC
ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of
police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty.
It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary
regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels
and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed
rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is
more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June
1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of
Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN

FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all
kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the
City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC,
known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for
the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for
even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion
into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of
its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect
and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded
social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare
of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a
mere likelihood or a naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can
instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation
of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are
other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes,
the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s
fundamental right to liberty and property.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if
it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months
from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The
directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left
empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable
use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert
into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private
property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The
police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon
no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The
Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly,
the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the
community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community.”

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide
the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the
due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.

The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory as
prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to
women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance
per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of
property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens
it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting
its summary abatement without judicial intervention.

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499.
As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into
a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an
ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council
to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.

Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Petition Denied.
LTO VS. CITY OF BUTUAN

Facts:
    Relying on the  fiscal autonomy granted to LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Butuan enacted an ordinance "Regulating
the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and
Permit, and Imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes."  The ordinance provided
for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire,
fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. 

    Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been
transferred to local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO
to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

    The RTC and CA ruled that the power to give registration and license for driving tricycles has been
devolved to LGU's.

Issue:
    Whether or not, the registration of tricycles was given to LGU's, hence the ordinance is a valid exercise
of police power.

Ruling:
    No, based on the-"Guidelines to Implement the Devolution  of LTFRBs Franchising Authority over
Tricycles-For-Hire to Local Government units pursuant to the Local Government Code"-  the newly
delegated powers to LGU's pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers exercised by the LTFRB and
not to the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for
the driving thereof. Corollarily, the exercised of a police power must be through a valid delegation. In
this case the police power of registering tricycles was not delegated to the LGU’s, but remained in the
LTO.

    Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of LTO under R.A. No.4136 requiring
the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or operated on or upon any public highway" in the
country. 

    The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are empowered at anytime to examine
and inspect such motor vehicles to determine whether said vehicles are registered, or are unsightly,
unsafe, improperly marked or equipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated on because of possible
excessive damage to highways, bridges and other infrastructures. The LTO is additionally charged with
being the central repository and custodian of all records of all motor vehicles. 
    Adds the Court, the reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local government
units, specifically under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential. 

    Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the
State might share with local government units by delegation given under a constitutional or a statutory
fiat. All these inherent powers are for a public purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities just
about end there. The basic aim of police power is public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses
on the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry out its
legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many respects, the grant of one does not
necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers are, by tradition and jurisprudence,
separate and distinct powers, varying in their respective concepts, character, scopes and limitations. 

    To construe the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the LGC indistinctively would result in the repeal to
that extent of LTO's regulatory power which evidently has not been intended. If it were otherwise, the
law could have just said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of the Local Government Code in the same
manner that the specific devolution of LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has been provided.
Repeal by implication is not favored. 

    The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to LGUs is
the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The
exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the Local Government Code
must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to cause the
registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions of
the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose
basic objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and
the competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute must not
be construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the extant body of laws.

    LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant
franchises for the operation thereof, and not to issue registration. 

    Ergo, the ordinance being repugnant to a statute is void and ultra vires.  

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARTIN

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's
clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:

(1) No.  Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."  Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists.  Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.  But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  

Leave Division of OCA vs Heusdens

A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011

Facts: Respondent left for abroad without waiting for the result of her application. It turned out that no
travel authority was issued in her favor because she was not cleared of all her accountabilities as
evidenced by the SC Certificate of Clearance. The OCA found respondent to have violated the OCA
Circular for failing to secure the approval of her application for travel authority.

Issue: What are the inherent and statutory limitations on the constitutional right to travel?
Ruling: The exercise of one’s right to travel is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and
inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 provides that “neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law.” Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those that naturally emanate from the
source. An example of such inherent limitation is the power of the trial courts to prohibit persons
charged with a crime to leave the country. Some of these statutory limitations are the following:

1. The Human Security Act of 2010 or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372.
2. The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239.
3. The “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003” or R.A. No. 9208.
4. The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A.
No. 10022.
5. The Act on Violence against Women and Children or R.A. No. 9262.
6. Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

Facts:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return
of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer.
This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar

4. Honasan’s failed coup

5. Communist insurgency movements

6. secessionist movements in Mindanao

7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their
travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also
questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security,
public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel
which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.

Decision:

No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same
article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines
tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not
stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is
obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do
anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153),  inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to
maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to
the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in
that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must
be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis
for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the
Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that
happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-
preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERTS, INC. VS. DRILON

FACTS:

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm “engaged principally in the recruitment
of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,” challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character
of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC
AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS”.

Specifically, the measure is assailed for “discrimination against males or females” that it “does not apply
to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills”, that it is violative of
the right to travel.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the POEA
invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

ISSUE:

Whether D.O. No.1 in the nature of a police power measure is constitutional.

HELD:

Yes. The concept of police power is it is the authority of the State to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” It may be consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, and (2) in order to foster the common good.

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not
purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties “Even liberty itself, the greatest of
all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one’s will.” It is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning
workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the
Court sustains the Government’s efforts.

Petition is dismissed.
Hilado vs Judge Reyes

G.R. No. 163155.

July 21, 2006.

Information Access to Records

Facts:

During the lifetime of Roberto Benedicto, petitioners Alfredo Hilado and company filed two complaints
for damages or collection of sums of money in RTC of Bacolod City. From January 2002 until November
2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC allowed petitioners through their
counsel Sedigo and Associates to examine the records of the case and to secure certified true copies
thereof. By December 2003, Atty. Grace Paredes, an associate of petitioners’ counsel, was denied access
to the last folder-record of the case which, according to the court’s clerical staff, could not be located
and was probably inside the chambers of public respondent for safekeeping. Petitioners’ counsel
requested Judge Reyes to allow Atty. Paredes to personally check the records of the case. The OIC/Legal
Researcher told the petitioners’ counsel that Judge Reyes authorized only the parties or those with
authority from the parties to inquire or verify the status of the pending case in court. They may go over
the records if they are authorized by the administrarix, which in this case was the wife, Julia Benedicto.
Intending to compare the list of properties in the estate’s inventory, petitioners’ counsel sent the Branch
Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC a letter requesting to be furnished with certified true
copies of the “updated inventory” of the properties of the deceased. And through another letter, they
requested to be furnished with certified true copies of the order issued by the court during the hearing
of February 13, 2004, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken thereon.

The respondent Judge ignored the motion of inhibition filed by the petitioners’ counsel on the grounds
of gross ignorance, dereliction of duty, and manifest partiality towards the administratrix. Public
respondent issued in an order why petitioners had no standing to file the Motion for Inhibition as well as
to request for certified true copies of documents. Judge said that since they were not allowed to
intervene in the proceedings per order of this Court dated January 2, 2002, copies of all
pleadings/orders filed/issued relative to this case may only be secured from the administratrix or
counsel.

Petitioners contend that the records of the case are public records to which the public has the right to
access, inspect and obtain official copies thereof, recognition of which right is enjoined under Section 7,
Article III of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 135 and Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners also argue that public respondent manifested her arbitrariness, malice and partiality through
her blatant disregard of basic rules in the disposition and safekeeping of court records, and her denial of
their right to access the records suffices to bar her from presiding over the case; and public respondent’s
incompetence, malice, bad faith and partiality are underscored by her failure to enforce for more than
three years the requirement of the Rules of Court on the prompt submission by the administratrix of her
final inventory and the filing of a periodic accounting of her administration.
Issue:

1. Whether a writ of mandamus may issue to compel public respondent to allow petitioners to examine
and obtain copies of any or all documents forming part of the records of the case

Held:

1. Yes

Article III, Section 7 guarantees a general right - the right to information on matters of “public concern”
and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to “official records.” The right to information on
“matters of public concern or of public interest” is both the purpose and the limit of the constitutional
right of access to public document.

The term “judicial record” or “court record” does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the
courts. It includes the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all
processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took
place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the
courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter,
map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporter’s notes,
transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic form, made or
received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and
includes all evidence it has received in a case.

Access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective
powers of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is
based. In this case, the petitioners’ stated main purpose for accessing the records is to monitor prompt
compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the
estate, hence they are “interested persons” in the case. If any party, counsel or person has a legitimate
reason to have a copy of court records and pays court fees, court may not deny access to such records.

Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre Trial, AM No. 10-11-5-
SC, June 14, 2011

Facts: Almost a year after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news
reporters , the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media
entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and
radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices be permitted inside the
courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the
broadcast coverage and the use of devices. Petitioners assert the exercise of the freedom of the press,
right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for
redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to
be issued by the Court. Hence, this petition docketed as AM No. 10-11-5-SC.
Issue: Can there be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings?

Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that there can be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court
proceeding but subject to some guidelines which addressed also the concerns mentioned
in Aquino and Estrada. Furthermore, the court held “that the impossibility of holding such judicial
proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private
complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough.  What more if the right itself commands that a
reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside
the courtroom.  Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the
courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.”

Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Abelardo T. Domondon, Jose A. Gangan and Violeta J. Josef,
Respondents, G.R. No. 165036; 5 July 2010 Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe,
Respondent, G.R. No. 175705; 5 July 2010

Facts: Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure Exam she
took in October 1997. Convinced she deserved to pass the Exam, she wrote to the Board of Accountancy
(Board), requesting that her answer sheets be re-corrected. She was shown her answer sheets but since
these showed only shaded marks, she was unable to determine why she failed the Exam. Consequently,
she asked the Board for copies of the questionnaire, her answer sheets, the answer keys and an
explanation of the grading system (collectively, the Examination Papers). Her request was denied on two
grounds: (1) Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of
1994, only allowed access to her answer sheets, and reconsideration of the result of her examination
can be made only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of the answer sheets, or malfeasance;
and (2) the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than the answer sheets)
by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. The Board later informed her that her
exam was investigated and no mechanical error was found in the grading.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction, against the Board and its members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that the
Board provide her with all documents that would show whether the Board fairly administered the exam
and correctly graded her answers, and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA.
She later amended her Petition to clarify that she only wanted access to the documents requested, not
recorrection of her exam, deleting in the process her original prayer for issuance of a certificate of
registration as CPA.

Petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Exam and took her oath as a CPA. Consequently, the RTC
denied her application for mandatory injunction for being moot. She amended her Petition a second
time to implead the PRC and to ask, in addition to access to the documents she had requested, that if
warranted, appropriate revisions in the October 1997 Exam results be made by the Board and the PRC.
The RTC considered the matter moot and dismissed the petition. On her motion, however, the RTC
reconsidered the dismissal, holding that her passing of the subsequent CPA examination did not render
the petition moot because the relief “and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as
Certified Public Accountant” was deleted from the original petition. As regards whether she had the
constitutional right to have access to the documents she requested, the RTC resolved to let the parties
first adduce evidence, and to have PRC air its side of the case. The RTC also ordered the PRC to preserve
and safeguard the questionnaire, petitioner’s answer sheets, and the answer keys for the October 1997
CPA Licensure Exam.

When their motion for reconsideration was denied, respondents brought the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) which set aside the RTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal of the case because: (1) the
petition was mooted when petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA exam; (2) Section 20, Article IV of PRC
Resolution No. 338, series of 1994, constituted a valid limitation on her right to information and access
to government documents; (3) the Examination Documents were not of public concern, because she
merely sought review of her failing marks; (4) it was not the ministerial or mandatory function of the
respondents to review and reassess the answers to examination questions of a failing examinee; and (5)
she failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she did not elevate the matter to the PRC before
seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner may seek judicial intervention to compel the re-correction of her
examination; (2) Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies; (3) Whether
or not the case was mooted by petitioner’s passing the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination; and (4)
Whether or not petitioner has the constitutionalright to have access to the Examination Papers.

Held: (1) Any claim for re-correction or revision of petitioner’s 1997 examination cannot be compelled
by mandamus. In AgustinRamos vs. Sandoval[G.R. No. 84470, February 2, 1989 (Minute Resolution)],
where therespondent Judge was questioned for dismissing therein petitioners’ mandamus action to
compel the Medical Board of Examiners and the Professional Regulation Commission to re-correct their
ratings, the Supreme Court held that “(t)he function of reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners’
answers to the examination questions, in the light of the facts and arguments presented by them x x x is
a discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within
the scope of thewrit of mandamus.”

For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to
the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be
equally clear. No such clarity exists here. And despite petitioner’s assertion that she did not demand re-
correction, the most cursory perusal of her Second Amended Petition and her prayer that respondents
“make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination” belied this claim.

(2) Like the claimants in Agustin, petitioner’s remedy from the Board’srefusal to release the Examination
Papers should have been through an appeal to the PRC. Under Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No.
223, the PRC has the power to review and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and regulations,
orders and decisions of the various professional Boards, including the results of their licensure
examinations, and the decisions of the Boards on administrative cases shall be final and executory
unless appealed to the PRC within 30 days from promulgation. Contrary’s to petitioner’s claim, this
power is not limited to administrative investigations but encompassesrequests for documents. And since
the PRC itself issued the resolution (PRC Resolution No. 338) questioned by petitioner, it was in the best
position to resolve questions addressed to its area of expertise.

One of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is thewell-entrenched doctrine on

separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with
matters falling primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of other departments. However,
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to exceptions, among which is when
only a question of law is involved.

Whether or not petitioner had a constitutional right to demand access to the Examination Papers was
one such question of law which cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.

(3) An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.

In this jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his or her right to
information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen possesses the inherent
right to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship, petitioner’s belated passing of the CPA Board Exams
did not automatically mean that her interest in the Examination Papers had become mere superfluity.
Undoubtedly, the constitutional question presented, in view of the likelihood that the issues in this case
would be repeated, warranted review.

(4) Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute; it is limited to “matters
of public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law” (Section 7,
Article III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is limited to “transactions
involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law” (Sec. 28, Art. II,
1987 Constitution). The Court has always grappled with the meanings of “public interest” and “public
concern” which “embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of
an ordinary citizen,” and which are, in the final analysis, up to the courts to determine on a case by case
basis [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535 (1987)].

National board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace
in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and
competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into
the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely
quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the
art and science of accounting.

The Court, nonetheless, realizes that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination
Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it
may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding,
administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and
answers remain confidential for a limited duration. The PRC, however, had not been given an
opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the
Examination Papers confidential.

In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may impact on every board examination
administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the Court deemed it
best to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
UNITED STATES VS. CAUSBY

Facts: Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was
located near an airport used regularly by the United States military. According to Causby, noise from the
airport regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The
problem became so severe that Causby was forced to abandon his business. Under an ancient doctrine
of the common law, land ownership extended to the space above and below the earth. Using this
doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm.
By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without
compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of
Claims accepted Causby's argument, and ordered the government to pay compensation.

Issue: Did the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a violation of
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Held: Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court concluded
that the ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world." Justice Douglas noted that,
were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental flight would subject the operator
to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea." However, while the Court rejected the
unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if
the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights
over the land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage caused by the particularly low,
frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the government had violated Causby's rights,
and he was entitled to compensation. (Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22; Justice Robert
H. Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision in the case, leaving the court with 7 members.)

GUINGONA VS. COMELEC

Facts: The petitioners cited various media reports as regards the preparation for 10 May 2010election
such as overpriced ballot secrecy folders, failed product of indelible ink, wrong supply of ultra violet ink,
malfunctioning of PCOS machines. In light of the foregoing alarming developments, petitioners filed a
special civil action for mandamus and pray that the Court order respondent Comelec to explain the
complete details of its preparations for the impending election.

 Respondent Comelec contends petitioners have no legal standing to file the present special civil action
for mandamus.

Issue: WON petitioners are real party-in-interest and mandamus is the proper remedy

Held: The Court granted the petition in part. If the petition is anchored on the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement
of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general public which possesses the right. It is not enough, however, that the information petitioners
seek in a writ of mandamus is a matter of public concern. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the
information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. In this case, respondent Comelec failed to cite any provision of law exempting the
information
sought by petitioners from the coverage of the government’s constitutional duty to disclose fully
information of public concern. Petitioners’ prayer to compel Comelec to explain fully its preparations for
the coming 10May 2010 elections finds overwhelming support in the Constitution, specifically under
Section 7 of Article III and Section 28 of Article II on the people’s right to information and the State’s
corresponding duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.

IDEALS vs PSALMS

GR 192088, 9 Oct 2012

Petitioners: IDEALS et al

Respondents: PSALM et al

FACTS:

PSALM is a GOCC created by virtue of the EPIRA law. Said law mandated PSALM to manage privatization
of NPC. When PSALM commenced the privatization an invitation to bid was published and the highest
bidder K-Water was identified. The sale to K-Water was sought to be enjoined by petitioners who
contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it violated the
people’s right to information without having previously released to the public critical information about
the sale.

ISSUES:

1. Can the bid documents, etc. used in the on-going negotiation for the privatization and sale of
Angat hydro plant be accessed via the right to information?
2. Is the duty to disclose information the same with the duty to permit access to information on
matters of public concern?

HELD:

1. Yes. The court reiterated that the constitutional right to information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.
2. No. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the Constitution, the other
aspect of the people’s right to know requires a demand or request for one to gain access to
documents and paper of the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of
information which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter
contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency.
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. VS DSWD
ET.AL.  (2007)
30 Nov 2017

[526 SCRA 130; G.R. No. 166494; June 29, 2007] Constitutional Law| Police
Power| Bill of Rights

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., doing business under the name and style
“Carlos Superdrug,” ELSIE M. CANO, doing business under the name and
style “Advance Drug,” Dr. SIMPLICIO L. YAP, JR., doing business under the
name and style “City Pharmacy,” MELVIN S. DELA SERNA, doing business
under the name and style “Botica dela Serna,” and LEYTE SERV-WELL CORP.,
doing business under the name and style “Leyte Serv-Well Drugstore,”
petitioners, 
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD),
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DOH), DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (DOF),
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR and LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (DILG), respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating pharmacies
in the Philippines.

Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ,
and the DILG, specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with
the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring
drugstore establishments.

On 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, otherwise known as the “Expanded
Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that:

SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be
entitled to the following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments

relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
Petitioners assail the said Act because it allegedly constitutes deprivation of
private property and compelling drugstore owners and establishments to
grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital.

ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 4(a) of  the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” is
constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.The State, in
promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose
upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government
program. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the
contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and
privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State
considers them an integral part of our society.

Police power has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.”
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare.