223 Phil.

357

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 68470, October 08, 1985 ]
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MANUEL V.
ROMILLO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH CX,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
PASAY CITY, AND RICHARD UPTON, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: 

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks
to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil
Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss
said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property.  Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.  The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case.  The denial is now the subject of this Certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal.  Certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question
the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court.  However, when a, grave
abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously
and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to
exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such
a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[1] Prohibition would then lie since it
would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. [2] We
consider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it
due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds; and that
respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the
same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the
property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage,
were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime.  The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction
over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the
case.  It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address
as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the
divorce case, Karp & Gradt, Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property
nor community obligations.[3] As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno,
Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
"You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer,
appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
"1.  That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

"2.  That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

"3.  That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

 x x x                               x x x                               x x x"[4]
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States.  The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen.  For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as
herhusband, in any State of the Union.  What he is contending in this case is that
the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code[5], only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. 
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. [6] In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.  As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.  The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.  A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.  When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner.  He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.  As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.  Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent.  The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property.  She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to

dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.

[1]
 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).

[2]
 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).

[3]
 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.

[4]
 p. 98, Rollo.

[5]
 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad."

[6]
 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p.
52; Salonga, Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: November 21, 2014 

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507 Phil. 485

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 152577, September 21, 2005 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. CRASUS L.
IYOY, RESPONDENT. 

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J. 

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30
October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint [3] for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. 
According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December
1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City.  As a result of their
union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos –
who are now all of legal ages.  After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant."  In
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all
of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of
respondent Crasus.  Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus
received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
disregarded the said request.  Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child.  In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. 
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might
not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him.  Fely returned to
the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child,
Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in
1995, for unknown reasons.  Fely continued to live with her American family in New
Jersey, U.S.A.  She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in
the Philippines and in the U.S.A.  For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time
the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned
respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between
them.  Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely�s acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.  Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the
Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997.  She
asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now
married to Stephen Micklus.  While she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other
allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint.  She explained that she
was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the
latter's drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and
to contribute to the maintenance of their household.  She could not have been
extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs.  Indeed,
Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what
she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to
support their family.  Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus,
she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus.  Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for
one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons.  While she did file for
divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to
respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers.  After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and
acquired American citizenship.  She argued that her marriage to her American
husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality.  Fely also pointed out that
respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him
a child.  She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00
which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert.  On
the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to
Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, [5] the
RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence.  Petitioner
Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. [6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his
Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April
1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; [8] and (3) the invitation to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American
husband's surname, Micklus.[9]

Fely's counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of
witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and
California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside.  Despite the Orders[12] and
Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and
California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.  Taking into
account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his
evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC
issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived her
right to present her evidence.  The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring
the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of
the following findings – 

The ground bearing defendant's psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable

consideration.  As observed, plaintiff's testimony is decidedly credible.  The Court
finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity,
observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support.  From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned
him.  She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married
another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own.  Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to
another man in another country.

Defendant's intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the
marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage
provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding.  It appears to be
the case in this instance.

Certainly defendant's posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very
low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the
foundation of human society throughout the civilized world.  It is quite evident that
the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital
obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in
question is shown by defendant's own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant's psychological

incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at
the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven.  The evidence
in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy,
firmly.

Going over plaintiff's testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity
to comply with her marital obligations.  These are her excessive disposition to
material things over and above the marital stability.  That such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant's own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.  And for these reasons there is a legal
ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was
contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.  The
appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed
Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein.  It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void, to wit –

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is

now permanently residing in the United States.  Plaintiff-appellee categorically
stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their
marriage...

...

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26.  All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS

VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to
avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse
because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad.  In the case at bench, the
defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband's citizenship and thus
has become an alien as well.  This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26
aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually
embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would
still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her
marital covenants to the former.  To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a
marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse
who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn
him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not
countenance.  Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial
court's declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. [16]

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, [17] denied its
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this
Court, based on the following arguments/grounds – 

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent's wife do not per

se constitute psychological incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with
law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed
serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely's

psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed
applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
already become an American citizen.  He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines
authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the
Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding
of psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code
of the Philippines, reads –

ART. 36.  A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity.  In a

series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined,

thus –

". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.  There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.  This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated...

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.[21]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the

Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina,[22] which, although quite lengthy, by its significance,
deserves to be reproduced below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation."  It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.  Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. [23]

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage.  The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job...

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts...

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.  The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated
under Canon 1095.[24]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that

the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity.  Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
[26]
 Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of
the evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court

finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably
to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is
no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was
his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the
absence of any other corroborating evidence.  He submitted only two other pieces
of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the
Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being
celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus,
Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband's surname.  Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent
Crasus's Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming
the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines

contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse.[27] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. [28]

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves.  It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of marriage.  It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."[29]

Fely's hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent

Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American
family and her American surname, may have hurt and embarrassed respondent
Crasus and the rest of the family.  Nonetheless, the afore-described characteristics,
behavior, and acts of Fely do not satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave, and which has been existence at the time of
celebration of the marriage, and is incurable.  Even when the rules have been
relaxed and the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no
longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines,[30] the totality of evidence presented during trial
by respondent Crasus, as the spouse seeking the declaration of nullity of marriage,
must still prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity;[31] which, it failed to do so herein.

Moreover, this Court resolves any doubt in favor of the validity of the marriage.
[32]
No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.[33]

II

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the
case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of

the married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse.  By its
plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.  Although the exact date
was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that
she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the
United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.  In
the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. 
At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.  Philippine laws, then
and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. 
Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in

proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued
that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on
behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the
instant Petition on behalf of the State.  Article 48 provides –

ART. 48.  In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,

the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him
or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity
of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government.[34] His Office is tasked to represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.  The
Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and,
as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. [35]

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or
the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization
of such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to
bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. [36] While it is the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court.  Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to
the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and
practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office
of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the
conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor
General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that
were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v.
Ancheta[37] –

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid
down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family
Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.  No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition.  The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.  The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State...
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, [38] which became effective on
15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the
authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. 
The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part
in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the
RTC and on appeal to higher courts.  The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below –

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –

...

(4)     It shall be filed in six copies.  The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition
on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof
of such service within the same period.

...

Sec. 18.  Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date
the trial is terminated.  It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its
own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State.  No other
pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.  After the lapse of the
period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or
without the memoranda.

Sec. 19.  Decision. –

...

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be
served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail.  If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive
part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to
the parties.  Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or
new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the
Solicitor General.

...
Sec. 20.  Appeal. –

...

(2)  Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from
the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of
the motion for reconsideration or new trial.  The appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely.  At most, Fely's abandonment, sexual
infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code.  While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is
now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem. [39]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of
the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy
and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Acting Presiding
Justice Cancio C. Garcia and Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring;
Rollo, pp. 23-31.

[2]
 Penned by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos, Id., pp. 63-66.

[3]
 Records, pp. 1-3.

[4]
 Id., pp. 8-13.

[5]
 Id., pp. 25-29, 30-32.

[6]
 Id., pp. 23-24.
[7]
 TSN, 08 September 1997.

[8]
 Records, p. 36.

[9]
 Id., p. 37.

[10]
 Id., pp. 40-45.

[11]
 Id., pp. 48-49.

[12]
 Penned by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos, dated 07 November 1997 (Id., p. 51) and
01 August 1998 (Id., p. 58).

[13]
 Id., p. 52.

[14]
 Id., p. 61.

[15]
 Supra, note 2, pp. 65-66.

[16]
 Supra, note 1, pp. 28-30.

[17]
 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alino-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices
Cancio C. Garcia and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring; Rollo, p. 32.

[18]
 Id., p. 13.

[19]
 Id., pp. 36-41.

[20]
 G.R. No. 112019, 04 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 24.

[21]
 Id., pp. 33-34.

[22]
 G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198, 209-213.

[23]
 As will be subsequently discussed in this Decision, later jurisprudence and rules
of procedure on petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Rule 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines do not require the examination of the parties by
an expert, i.e., a psychiatrist or psychologist, to establish the psychological
incapacity of either or both parties.

[24]
 The roles of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General are now
governed by the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 01-11-10-SC), which became effective
15 March 2003.  The requirement of a certification by the Solicitor General on his
agreement or opposition to the petition has been dispensed with to avoid delay.
[25]
 G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755.

[26]
 Section 2(d) of the Rule on Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 01-11-10-SC) reads –

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

...

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged.
[27]
 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra, note 22, p. 211.

[28]
 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA
422; Dedel v. Court of Appeals and Corpuz-Dedel, G.R. No. 151867, 29 January
2004, 421 SCRA 461; Guillen-Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356
SCRA 588; Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 126010, 08 December 1999, 320 SCRA 76.

[29]
 Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25, p.  765.

[30]
 Ibid.

[31]
 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 21.

[32]
 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra, note 28; Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No.
109975, 09 February 20001, 351 SCRA 425; Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25;
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 28; Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, supra, note 22.

[33]
 Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Philippine Constitution of 1987.

[34]
 Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Section 34.

[35]
 Id., Section 35.
[36]
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda, G.R. No. 134436, 16 August
2000, 338 SCRA 254, 265.

[37]
 G.R. No. 145370, 04 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 738-739.

[38]
 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

[39]
 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra, note 28, p. 439; Dedel v. Court of
Appeals and Corpuz-Dedel, supra, note 28, p. 467; Santos v. Court of
Appeals, supra, note 20, p. 36.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: September 30, 2014 

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509 Phil. 108

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 154380, October 05, 2005 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. CIPRIANO
ORBECIDO III, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.: 

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law'

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May
15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE

FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent's situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant
to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. [7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition-Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. [8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage

between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are
also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of
his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as
when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent' Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment'

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose

spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who
 are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even

for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce
them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and
can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only
after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
foreign citizenship by naturalization'

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.
[11]
 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. [12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him

or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted
by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the
present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent's submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 20-22.

[2]
 Id. at 27-29.

[3]
 Id. at 21-22.

[4]
 Id. at 105.

[5]
 Id. at 106-110.

[6]
 Id. at 110.

[7]
 Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

[8]
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364
SCRA 281, 286, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993,
227 SCRA 729, 737.

[9]
 Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
[10]
 No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

[11]
 G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.

[12]
 Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100
Phil. 850, 855.

[13]
 Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33,
38.

[14]
 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.

[15]
 Id. at 451.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: September 22, 2014 

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739 PHIL. 331

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014 ]
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF JUAN
LUCES LUNA, REPRESENTED BY GREGORIO Z. LUNA AND
EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.: 

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted
by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable
against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

The Case

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the
adverse decision promulgated on November 11, 2005, [1] whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City. [2] The CA thereby
denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium
unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.

Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law
firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time
when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil ceremony conducted
by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7)
children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L.
Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia,
and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and
EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and
agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled “AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT”
dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage,
this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan,
Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.

On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang
Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium
Project (condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square
meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36 months starting
on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be used as law office of
LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium
unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10,
1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,
married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to
Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100)  x x x”
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R.
Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a
new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,
married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to
Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x”
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was
partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT
No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the
condominium unit would be 25/100 share.

ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato
G. De la Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The
said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by
Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then
leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to
Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la
Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the
law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed
by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint
alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since
they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the
death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½
share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which
was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and that the heirs of
ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the
subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of
the ¾ portion of the subject properties; that the same be partitioned; that an
accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of
SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the
subject properties; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s
fees and costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.[3]

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
aforementioned facts,[4] disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100)
SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through
his sole industry;

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of
the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna
should be changed from “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna” to “JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna”;

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in
the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as
soon as appropriate arrangements have been made for transport and storage.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[5]
 Decision of the CA

Both parties appealed to the CA.[6]

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT

WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES
LUNA;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF

THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED
OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND
LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND
LUNA;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

FACT THAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF
THE FAMILY CODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF
ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY
PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and

IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE

INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY
FILING FEE.[7]

In contrast, the respondents attributed the following errors to the trial court, to wit:
 I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE
USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING

PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO
RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND
ESTOPPEL.[8]

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, [9]holding
and ruling:

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s
death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the
Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x
x[10]

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of
the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from
the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;

(b)  Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
Luna” to “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna”;

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus
Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports found in the condominium unit.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]

On March 13, 2006,[12] the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. [13]

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorari that:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent
Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not
dissolved and liquidated;

B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican

Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;

C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to

adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of
purchase of the subject condominium unit; and

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not
entitled to the subject law books.[14]

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be
entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso  share in the condominium unit; and to the law
books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports).

The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that
should determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly,
whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled the latter to any rights in property.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

1.
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized
in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule.
The Civil Code  continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad.[15]Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of
Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until
the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in
the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has
remained even under the Family Code,[16] even if either or both of the spouses are
residing abroad.[17] Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our
laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against
such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the
marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first
marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.[18] Conformably with the nationality rule,
however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his
death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution, [19] and regards it as a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life.[20] The non-recognition of absolute
divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the
marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment
of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or
upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long as this public policy on
marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in
this jurisdiction.

2.
The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property

Settlement(Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and
executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo
in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was
enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.

The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage
settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This
is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their
marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they
had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage.
Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife
place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of
the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various
causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article
191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements,

the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it
shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal
separation has been granted.

xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of
the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified
of any petition for judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his
interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third
persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215
shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in
articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)

But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership
of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?

The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took
place only as an incident of the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were
identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce. [21] With the divorce not
being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also
legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their
marriage.

3.
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty.
Luna and Soledad?

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on

January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous, [22] on the ground that the marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree
rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted
until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

The Court concurs with the CA.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are

void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent

marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.[24]

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab
initio  by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144
of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to

confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for
the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of
property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent
evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v.
Court of Appeals:[25]

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the

issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage
and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-
ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation
that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in
Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property
was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient
proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of
the property.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense.
This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed
to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief
prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff
must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted
only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such
relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.[26]

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in
the purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least
P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of P159,072.00, and in repaying the
loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling
P146,825.30;[27] and that such aggregate contributions of P306,572.00
corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of
P1,449,056.00.[28]

The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her
personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a “thank you” note;
[29]
that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and
that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness
of the income derived from his law practice.

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on

her actual contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own
independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books
subject matter in contention in this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of
the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases where
properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and
wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article
144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was
not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because
it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without
impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership
where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between
the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code.
Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same
rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of
credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties
were in bad faith.
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict
rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are
not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case
of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355,
thus:

xxxx

As to the 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit,

SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said
property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were
indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit.
This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
“x x x The first check, Exhibit “M” for P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz
Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the
Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit “7” was signed. Another check issued on April
29, 1978 in the amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit “P” was payable to Banco Filipino.
According to the plaintiff, this was in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third
check which was for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also
for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit “M”, for P4,072.00
was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject
condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x”
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of P100,000.00 is
unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership
over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found
that the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:

“The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit “9”, covering the condominium unit was in the
name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the
plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was
acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking
Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his
partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully
or partially. x x x”

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name
of “JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna” was no proof that SOLEDAD
was a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title
but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase “married to” preceding
“Soledad L. Luna” is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that
SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the
law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she
actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law books. It
is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space
and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he
headed.[30]

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because
they were substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any
reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the
co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her
contributions, not being evidence,[31] did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given
the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds
and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties  in
litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his
death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty.
Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as
the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11,

2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo,  pp. 34-51; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding Justice) and Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr. concurring.

[2]
 Id. at 198-210.
[3]
 Id. at 37-39.

[4]
 Id. at 198-210.

[5]
 Id. at 210.

[6]
 Id. at 211-214.

[7]
 Id. at 217-219.

[8]
 Id. at 283.

[9]
 Supra note 1.

[10]
 Rollo, p. 44.
[11]
 Id. at 50-51.

[12]
 Id. at 52-53.

[13]
 Id. at 54-65.

[14]
 Id. at 17.

[15]
 Article 15, Civil Code, which is a revision of Article 9.1, Spanish Civil Code,
states:

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. (9a)

[16]
 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas  (G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 266,
277), the Court declares:
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void and
voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage.
Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.
[17]
 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 446.

[18]
 Rollo, p. 37.

[19]
 Article XV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.

[20]
 Article 1, Family Code.

[21]
 Id. at 74, 81-82.

[22]
 Id. at 48.

[23]
 Article 83, Civil Code; Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.109454, June 14,
1994, 233 SCRA 155, 158.

[24]
 The Civil Code relevantly states:
Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;
xxxx
[25]
 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

[26]
 Id. at 686-687.
[27]
 Rollo, pp. 23-24.

[28]
 Id. at 25.

[29]
 Id. at 27.

[30]
 Id. at 45-50.

[31]
 Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 593,
602.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: September 18, 2017 

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 EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. MARELYN
TANEDO MANALO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.: 

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision [1] and October 12,
2015 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October

2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43,
in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April
25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week
for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During the initial
hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the
trial court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan
to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning
the title and/or caption of the petition considering that, based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted.
The Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national

named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract x x x;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and
after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by
the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorced
Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her
daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former
Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not
appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is
no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event
that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by
said entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already
dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the
said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use. her maiden
surname, MANALO.[4]

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan
for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to
be sufficient in form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March
5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,

Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.[5]

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling
that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined
that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination
of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
including marriages."[6]

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed
for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes
the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.[7] ruling that the
meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of
the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer
married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the
divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge
Romillo, Jr.[8] where the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved
through a divorce filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage,
are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves
the bond in full force.[9] In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.[10]
2. Consistent with Articles 15[11] and 17[12] of the New Civil Code, the marital bond
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained
abroad.[13]

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.[14]

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to

contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [15]

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines, which took
effect on August 3, 1988.[16] Shortly thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
1987.[17] Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26.[18] This provision was originally deleted by
the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee), but it was presented and approved
at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. [19] As modified, Article
26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the

effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.[20] It authorizes our courts
to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce.[21] Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.[22] Under the principles of comity,
our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our
courts.[23]

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the

amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his
or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because
he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.[24] The aim was that it would solve the problem of many Filipino women who,
under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even
after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands')
national laws and perhaps have already married again.[25]

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case

where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:[26]

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.
In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married.
The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law
and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner; and 

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him

or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[27]

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the
recognition and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court
and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry "in order
that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the
event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed
by said entry of marriage," and to return and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin[28] and Van Dorn[29] already recognized a foreign divorce

decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen, sued
his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only, the latter who
exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding
following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to
reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but
it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit but
not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction x x x.[30]

Van Dorn  was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint
was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render
an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be
declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part,
her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could
not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the
same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the
Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal
property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[31]

In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from
Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.[32] and Medina v. Koike.[33]

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese
national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court, which declared
the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national,
void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife
of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse
not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x
x x[34]

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly
filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the
RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground
that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing
his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be proven in accordance with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and
ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.[35] and Garcia v. Recio,
[36]
 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven.
Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action
including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual
issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When

this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the
usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity.
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal
status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the
divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that
a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but
also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is,
therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift
the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the

alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the
one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither
can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers.[37] "The legislature is presumed
to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."[38]

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart
from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.[39] Laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.[40] As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:[41]

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which
the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to
address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. [42] Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband
or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place
and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction.
In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found

under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact,
the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may
provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature
only if they are constitutional.[43]

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification
and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice,
such classification may be subjected to judicial review.[44] The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution. [45] When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties,
and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.
[46]
 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and
the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.[47]

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.[48] It includes the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to
exercise free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right
to travel, and the right to vote.[49] On the other hand, what constitutes compelling
state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history.[50] It is akin to the paramount interest of the
state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of
public interest, public safety or the general welfare.[51] It essentially involves a
public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and
allows the former to take precedence over the latter. [52]

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle
applies with respect to the acts of the President, which have the force and effect of
law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites[53] of the equal protection
clause.[54] Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce
decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial,
arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial
differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic,
cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained
abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree
obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.[55]

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree
upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it
not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is

inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the
Family Code.[56] In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he
or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's
comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray
for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the
mechanisms now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For
the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically apply in
Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there
is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26

encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the
indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce
proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was shown
to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of
good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputably
presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that
a person is innocent of crime or wrong,[57] that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts,[58] that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,[59] that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in
was conformable to the law and fact,[60] that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
[61]
 and that the law has been obeyed.[62] It is whimsical to easily attribute any
illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she
opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that
Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are
more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not
for Us to prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien national.
In one case, it was said:

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not
and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together
or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. [63]

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is

the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. [64]Nevertheless, it
was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose
Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas
during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical
about this point.[65] Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be
understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make
this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My
intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not
necessarily discourage divorce. But now that he mentioned the issue of divorce, my
personal opinion is to discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.[66]

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11,
1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery
on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act
No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.[67] On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the
authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce
Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for absolute
divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one
year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse
against the other to such an extent as to make further living together
impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity. [68] When the Philippines was
liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force
and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.[69] From August 30, 1950, upon the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce
obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. [70]

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current
17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116,[71] 1062,[72] 2380[73] and 6027[74]were
filed in the House of Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303
entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House
Committee on Population and Family Relations on February 28, 2018. It was
approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and
2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce
are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code,
modified or amended, as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a

common child, or a child of the petitioner; 
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious
or political affiliation; 
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement; 
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, even if pardoned; 
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the respondent; 
f. Homosexuality of the respondent; 
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in
the Philippines or abroad; 
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than
one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the
spouses, a child is born to them by  in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife
bears a child after being a victim of rape; 
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a
child of the petitioner; and 
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than
one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more than two (2)
years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce
based on said judicial decree of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, restated
as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled

was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twenty-one (21),
and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party,
in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21), such
party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband or wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such
party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other and such incapacity continues or appears to be
incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection found
to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the
marriage or supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5)
years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and
reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36
of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the
time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or
transitions from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to
petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as
respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in
the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest
and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary
to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as
an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However,
none of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching;
otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated. [75]

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government
can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establish a state religion.[76]

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. [77] While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are
governed by the Family Code.[78] It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in
total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside
from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.[79] It is also obligated to
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.[80] To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations
if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children
are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence.
In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate,
the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and similar practices),
R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004"),
R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No. 10354 ("The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening
the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose
sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person,
guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.[81]

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If

We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he
or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer
the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the
adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold
a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to
be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but
without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to
families formed according to indigenous customs. [82]

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. [83] Living in a
flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in the
context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing
marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of
rotten quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.[84] In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v.
San Luis[85] quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a
way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in
a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are
not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its
cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words
of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that
it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.[86]

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law.[87] A statute may, therefore, be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.[88]

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by

granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by
the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign

judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
a foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. [89]The
fact of divorce must still first be proven.[90] Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [91]

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the

document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record
of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[92]

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of
the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by
the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the
Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a
fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment
decreeing the divorce.[93]

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign court. [94] As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit
an opportunity to do so.[95]

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those
are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. x x x The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. [96]
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18,

2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
law on divorce.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,[*] Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr.,

and  Gesmundo, JJ., concur. 
Leonen, J., concur. See separate opinion. 
Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., join the dissent of J. Caguioa.
Caguioa, J., see dissenting opinion.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.
Jardeleza, J., no part. 

[*]
 Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices
Vicente S.E. Veloso and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela concurring; rollo, pp. 23-31.

[2]
 Rollo, pp. 32-33.

[3]
 Id. at 30. (Emphasis in the original)

[4]
 Id. at 42-43.

[5]
 Id. at 25, 37-38.

[6]
 Id. at 40-41.

[7]
 663 Phil. 546 (2011).

[8]
 223 Phil. 357 (1985).

[9]
 Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 575 (2007), citing Garcia v.
Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 735-736 (2001).

[10]
 Garcia v. Redo, supra, at 730 and Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27,
2016, 798 SCRA 733, 739.
[11]
 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. (9a)

[12]
 Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of
the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.(11a)

[13]
 Tenchavez v. Escano, et al., 22 Phil. 752, 759-760 (1965), as cited in Cang v.
Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 129, 162 (1998); Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil.
342, 356 (2000); and Perez v. Court of Appeals, 516 Phil. 204, 211 (2006). See
also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 504
(2005); and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, 739 Phil. 331, 341-342 (2014).

[14]
 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730-731.

[15]
 FAMILY CODE, Article 26 Paragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at
730 and Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.

[16]
 Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108, 112 (2005), as cited in San
Luis v. San Luis, 543 Phil. 275, 291 (2007).

[17]
 Id. at 112-113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, supra.

[18]
 Id. at 113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, supra.

[19]
 Sempio-Diy, Alicia V., HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
1988, pp. 26-27.

[20]
 Medina v. Koike, supra note 10 and Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524, 555 (2013).

[21]
 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra.

[22]
 Id.

[23]
 See Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, 681 Phil. 493, 498 (2012); Roehr v.
Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608, 617-618 (2003); and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra
note 13.
[24]
 Supra note 19, at 27. See also Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supranote
16, at 114, as cited in Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 555 and San Luis v. San
Luis, supra note 16, at 292.

[25]
 Supra note 19, at 27.

[26]
 Supra note 16.

[27]
 Id. at 114-115. (Citations omitted).

[28]
 625 Phil. 494 (2010).

[29]
 Supra note 8.

[30]
 Dacasin v. Dacasin, supra, at 507. (Citations omitted; underscoring ours)

[31]
 Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr., supra note 8, at 361-363. (Citations omitted).

[32]
 Supra note 20.

[33]
 Supra note 10.

[34]
 Fujiki v. Marinay, et al., supra note 20, at 549-550. (Citations omitted).

[35]
 642 Phil. 420 (2010).

[36]
 Supra note 9.

[37]
 Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Ferry, Inc., 298 Phil. 79, 86 (1993).

[38]
 Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 660 (1992), as
cited in Victoria v. Commission on Elections, 299 Phil. 263, 268 (1994); Enjay Inc.
v. NLRC, 315 Phil. 648, 656 (1995); and Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, 345
Phil. 1057, 1073 (1997). See also National Food Authority v. Masada Security
Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 251 (2005); Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. v.
Monetary Board, 545 Phil. 62, 72 (2007); Rep. of the Phils. v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87,
100 (2007); and Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR) v. Phil. Gaming
Jurisdiction Inc. (PEJI), et al., 604 Phil. 547, 553 (2009).

[39]
 Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259, 268 (1995).

[40]
 Id.

[41]
 623 Phil. 531, 564-565 (2009).

[42]
 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 555.
[43]
 See Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 72 (1933), as cited
in Tenchavez v. Escaño, et al.,  supra  note 13, at 762.

[44]
 See Assn. of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 808 (1989) and Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v.
Cabiles, 740 Phil. 403, 436 (2014).

[45]
 Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil.
531, 597 (2004) as cited in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil.
245, 436 (2009). See also Puno, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 100 (2010); Brion, J., Separate
Opinion, Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 550 (2010); and
Leonardo-De Castro, J., Concurring Opinion, Garcia v. Judge Drilon, et al., 712 Phil.
44, 125 (2013).

[46]
 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra.

[47]
 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 601 Phil. 245, 282 (2009)
and Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. Nos.
189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016, 800 SCRA 313, 360. See also Brion, J.,
Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,  supra; Velasco,
Jr., J., Concurring Opinion, International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Phils.), et al., 774 Phil. 508, 706
(2015); and Jardeleza, J., Concurring Opinion, Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1, 904.

[48]
 Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
supra note 45, at 553.

[49]
 See Morales, J., Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 697-698 (2004) as cited by Brion, J.,
Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 45,
at 553, and Leonen, J., Separate Opinion, Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan
v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017.

[50]
 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 601 Phil. 245, 298 (2009).

[51]
 Id.

[52]
 Brion, J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Sps. Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,
732 Phil. 1, 326- 327 (2014).

[53]
 To be valid, the classification must conform to the following requirements:

1.) It must rest on substantial distinctions. 

2.) It must be germane to the purpose of the law. 
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. 
4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class. (See PAGCOR v. Bureau
of Internal Revenue, 660 Phil. 636, 648 [2011]; Maj. Gen. Garcia v. The Executive
Secretary, et al., 692 Phil. 114, 141-142 [2012]; Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353,
405 [2014]; Ferrer, Jr. v. Mayor Bautista, 762 Phil. 233, 277 (2015); Drugstores
Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Council on Disability Affairs, G.R. No.
194561, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 25, 55; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos.
225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016;
and Mindanao Shopping Destination Corp. v. Duterte, G.R. No. 211093, June 6,
2017).

[54]
 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

[55]
 Tenchavez v. Escano, et al., supra note 13, as cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 13;; Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13; and  Perez v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 13. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730; Republic v.
Iyoy supra note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, supranote 13. FAMILY
CODE, Article 26 Paragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730
and Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.

[56]
 Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians; 
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages
unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good
faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41; 
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of
the other; and 
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the

fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children; 
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; 
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that
other person's spouse or his or her own spouse. (82)

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons, (n)

Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the
requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent
marriage shall be null and void.

[57]
 RULE 131, Section 3(a).

[58]
 Id., Section 3(c).

[59]
 Id., Section 3(d).

[60]
 Id., Section 3(x).

[61]
 Id., Section 3(aa).

[62]
 Id., Section 3(ff).
[63]
 Rep. of the Phils. v. Albios, 719 Phil. 622, 636 (2013).

[64]
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2. This echoed the Family Code
provision, which provides:

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

[65]
 Bernas, Joaquin G, S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS,
1995 Edition, pp. 1132, citing V RECORD 41.

[66]
 Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates, Volume V,
September 24, 1986, p. 41.

[67]
 See Garcia Valdez v. Soteraña Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 944 (1920); Francisco v.
Tayao, 50 Phil. 42 (1927); People v. Bitdu, 58 Phil. 817 (1933); Sikat v. Canson, 61
Phil. 207 (1939); and Arca, et al. v. Javier, 95 Phil. 579 (1954).

[68]
 See Baptista v. Castañeda, 16 Phil. 461 (1946); Luz v. Court of First Instance of
Tacloban, 77 Phil. 679 (1946); and Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006).

[69]
 Baptista v. Castañeda, supra, at 463.

[70]
 Tenchavezv. Escano, et al.,supra note 13, at 759-760, as cited in Cang v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 13; Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra  note 13; and Perez
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730;
Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, 739 Phil.
331, 341-342 (2014).

[71]
 Entitled "Instituting Absolute Divorce in the Philippines And For Other Purposes,"
with Representative Edcel C. Lagman as Principal Author.

[72]
 Entitled "An Act Amending Title I, Chapter 3, of Executive Order No. 209,
Otherwise Known as the Family Code of the Philippines, Prescribing Additional
Ground for Annulment," with Representative Robert Ace S. Barbers as Principal
Author.

[73]
 Entitled "An Act Introducing Divorce in the Philippines, Amending for the
Purpose Articles 26, 55 to 66 and Repealing Article 36 Under Title II of Executive
Order No. 209, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, and For Other Purposes," with Gabriela Women's Party Representatives
Emmi A. De Jesus and Arlene D. Brosas as principal authors.
[74]
 Entitled "An Act Providing for Grounds for the Dissolution of a Marriage," with
Representatives Teddy B. Baguilat, Jr., Rodel M. Batocabe, Arlene D. Brosas, Ariel
B. Casilao, France L. Castro, Nancy A. Catamco, Pia S. Cayetano, Emmi A. De
Jesus, Sarah Jane I. Elago, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Ana Cristina Siquian Go, Edcel C.
Lagman, Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Antonio L. Tinio, and Carlos Isagani T. Zarate as
Principal Authors.

[75]
 See Leonen, J., dissenting in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November
14, 2016.

[76]
 Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC (Resolution), March 7,
2017.

[77]
 See Sps. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 732 Phil. 1, 167 (2014).

[78]
 Tilar v. Tilar, G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017.

[79]
 Article XV, Section 1.

[80]
 Article XV, Section 3(2).

[81]
 Article II, Sections 11, 12 and 14. See also Republic Act Nos. 7192 ("Women in
Development and Nation Building Act") and 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women").

[82]
 Bernas, Joaquin G, S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS,
1995 Edition, pp. 1132, citing V RECORD 40, 44.

[83]
 See Paras v. Paras, 555 Phil. 786, 804 (2007)

[84]
 San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 292-293.

[85]
 Supra note 16.

[86]
 San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 293-294.

[87]
 Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra  note 16, at 115.

[88]
 Id.

[89]
 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited in Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee,
supra note 23, at 501.

[90]
 Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 544 and Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee,
supra note 23, at 499.
[91]
 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited in Medina v. Koike, supra note 10
and Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 116. See also Bayot v.
The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 591 Phil. 452, 470 (2008).

[92]
 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 732-733. (Citations omitted). See also Vda. de
Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 23, at 499 and 501-502 and San Luis v. San
Luis, supra note 16, at 294.

[93]
 Rollo, pp. 29-30.

[94]
 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 733-734.

[95]
 See Bayot v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 75, at 470-471;
and Roehr v. Rodriguez, supra note, 23, at 617.

[96]
 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 735. (Citations omitted). See also Vda. de
Catalan v. Catalan- Lee, supra note 23, at 500-501; San Luis v. San Luis,
supranote 16, at 295; Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 116;
and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13, at 354. 

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 24, 2018 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached
herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on May 17, 2018 at 3:15 p.m.

Very truly yours,

  (SGD.) EDGAR O.
ARICHETA
Clerk of Court

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia of Justice Peralta, adding the following points.

The proposal of the Solicitor General is to give Article 26[1] of our Family Code an
interpretation which capacitates and empowers the Japanese husband the option to
divorce and how such choice has effects in our country while, at the same time,
disallowing the Filipina wife from being able to do the same simply because she is a
Filipina.

That interpretation may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our

Constitution provides:

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

This constitutional fiat advances the notion of gender equality from its passive
formulation in Article III, Section 1[2] to its more active orientation.

Article III, Section 1 simply states that "nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." Traditionally, this means that the State has no duty to find
ways and means to ensure equality. It is only a prescription that whatever legal
burdens and benefits are given to men should likewise be given to women. It does
not require the State, through any of its organs, to find affirmative ways and means
to battle the patriarchy—that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors
that ensure women's disempowerment.

By enacting our Constitution and signing on to our political obligations to the

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, we
have legally committed to do better.

We likewise note that the Family Code was followed by Republic Act No. 7192 or the
Women in Development and Nation Building Act. Within this law are provisions
which ensure equal treatment between men and women, thus:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes the role of women in nation

building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men. The State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal to that of men.

....

Section 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. - Women of legal age, regardless of civil

status, shall have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every
respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances.

In all contractual obligations where married men have the capacity to act, married
women shall have equal rights.
To this end:

(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as men;
   
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and non- material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in
agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
   
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
   
(4) Married women shall have the rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports,
secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.

In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall
have the capacity to act which shall in every respect be equal to those of men
under similar circumstances. (Underscoring supplied)

Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women reflects the state policy to
"[abolish]. . . the unequal structures and practices that perpetuate discrimination
and inequality"[3] between the sexes, and Section 19 of the law is specific on the
equality of women and men as to rights relating to marriage and family relations:

Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations. -
The State shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and shall ensure:

(a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or common law relationships referred to
under the Family Code without prejudice to personal and religious beliefs;
   
(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and
full consent. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect;
   
(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights;
   
(d) the same personal rights between spouses or common law spouses including the right to
choose freely a profession and an occupation;
   
(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law spouses in respect of the ownership,
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property;
   
(f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether titled or not, and inheritance, whether
formal or customary; and
   
(g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire, change, or retain their nationality. The
State shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by
 the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her
stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband. Various statutes of other countries
concerning dual citizenship that may be enjoyed equally by women and men shall likewise be
considered.

Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That they do not

discriminate against women. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 19 is straightforward: the State shall ensure that men and women are to
have "the same rights to enter into and leave marriages."

Following section 19 of Republic Act No. 9710, Article 26 of the Family Code should
be read to mean that who initiates the divorce proceedings abroad is immaterial.
Once a divorce decree is issued, the foreign spouse is deemed to have "obtained" a
divorce which capacitates him or her to remarry. The same status should therefore
be afforded to the Filipino spouse.

Besides, in many jurisdictions, the foreign spouse is given the option to divorce on
the basis of a mutual recognition that irreconcilable differences have surfaced in the
context of their relationship. Some foreign laws, therefore, allow joint filing for a
divorce decree to ensure that there be less incrimination among the spouses, a
more civil and welcoming atmosphere for their children, and less financial burden
for the families affected. The interpretation proposed by the Solicitor General does
not accommodate this possibility. It is blind to the actual complexities experienced
by our citizens in mixed marriages.

II

Justice Caguioa provides the argument that interpreting Article 26 of the Family
Code in the manner provided in the ponencia violates the nationality principle
enshrined in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

I disagree.

Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

Clearly, it is not only Article 26 of the Family Code or the Civil Code that applies. It
should also include the Constitution, which is the bedrock of rights of any citizen.
Thus, the State's obligation to "ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men"[4] applies with equal if not greater force. In my view, this is the
full extent of the nationality principle. It is borne of rational interpretation, not
judicial legislation.
 III

Finally, my agreement with the ponencia is also impelled by my understanding that

divorce is more consistent with the constitutionally entrenched fundamental
freedoms inherent in individuals as human beings. It is also most consistent with
the constitutional command for the State to ensure human dignity.

The restrictive nature of our marriage laws tends to reify the concept of a family
which is already far from the living realities of many couples and children. For
instance, orthodox insistence on heteronormativity may not compare with the
various types of care that various other "non-traditional" arrangements present in
many loving households.

The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the

other formulaic. That is, that it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are
dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each commitment is unique,
borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through,
and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.

In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be
different for each couple. It is that which we should understand: intimacies that
form the core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not by social
expectations but by the care and love each person can bring.

Yet, the present form and the present interpretation we have on the law on
marriage constrains. In love, there are no guarantees. In choosing our most
intimate partners, we can commit mistakes. It is but part of being human.

Our law cruelly defines the normal. The legal is coated in a false sense of morality
poorly reasoned. It condemns those who have made bad choices into a living
inferno.

In my view, this case is a step forward in the right direction.

IV

As I stated in a dissent[5] I wrote in 2016, we had absolute divorce laws in the past.
Act No. 2710,[6] enacted in 1917, allowed the filing of a petition for divorce on the
ground of adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the
husband.[7]

Eleven grounds for divorce were provided in Executive Order No. 141, [8] effective
during the Japanese occupation. These grounds included "intentional or unjustified
desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of a [petition] for
divorce" and "slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to
such an extent as to make further living impracticable." [9]
After the Japanese left, the laws they enacted were declared void. [10] Act No. 2710
again took effect until the Civil Code's enactment in 1950. Since then, absolute
divorce has been prohibited in our jurisdiction.

A world whose borders are increasingly becoming permeable with the ease of travel
as well as with the technological advances will definitely foster more inter-cultural
relationships. These relationships can become more intimate.

I am of the belief that the law never intended for the Filipino to be at a
disadvantage. For so long as the Constitution itself guarantees fundamental
equality, the absurd result from a literal and almost frigid and unfeeling
interpretation of our laws should not hold. To say that one spouse may divorce and
the other may not contributes to the patriarchy. It fosters an unequal relationship
prone to abuse in such intimate relationships.

The law is far from frigid. It should passionately guarantee equality and I stand with
this Court in ensuring that it does.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the Petition for Review on Certiorari and to affirm,
with modification, the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The
case should be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce. 

[1]
 FAMILY CODE, art. 26 provides:

Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4),
(5) and (6), 3637 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

[2]
 CONST, art. III, sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

[3]
 Rep. Act No. 9710, sec. 2 provides:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - Recognizing that the economic, political, and

sociocultural realities affect women's current condition, the State affirms the role of
women in nation building and ensures the substantive equality of women and men.
It shall promote empowerment of women and pursue equal opportunities for
women and men and ensure equal access to resources and to development results
and outcome. Further, the State realizes that equality of men and women entails
the abolition of the unequal structures and practices that perpetuate discrimination
and inequality. To realize this, the State shall endeavor to develop plans, policies,
programs, measures, and mechanisms to address discrimination and inequality in
the economic, political, social, and cultural life of women and men. The State
condemns discrimination against women in all its forms and pursues by all
appropriate means and without delay the policy of eliminating discrimination
against women in keeping with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and other international instruments
consistent with Philippine law. The State shall accord women the rights, protection,
and opportunities available to every member of society.

The State affirms women's rights as human rights and shall intensify its efforts to
fulfill its duties under international and domestic law to recognize, respect, protect,
fulfill, and promote all human rights and fundamental freedoms of women,
especially marginalized women, in the economic, social, political, cultural, and other
fields without distinction or discrimination on account of class, age, sex, gender,
language, ethnicity, religion, ideology, disability, education, and status. The State
shall provide the necessary mechanisms to enforce women's rights and adopt and
undertake all legal measures necessary to foster and promote the equal opportunity
for women to participate in and contribute to the development of the political,
economic, social, and cultural realms.

The State, in ensuring the full integration of women's concerns in the mainstream
of development, shall provide ample opportunities to enhance and develop their
skills, acquire productive employment and contribute to their families and
communities to the fullest of their capabilities.

In pursuance of this policy, the State reaffirms the right of women in all sectors to
participate in policy formulation, planning, organization, implementation,
management, monitoring, and evaluation of all programs, projects, and services. It
shall support policies, researches, technology, and training programs and other
support services such as financing, production, and marketing to encourage active
participation of women in national development.

[4]
 CONST., art. II, sec. 14.

[5]
 See Dissenting Opinion in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14,
2016, < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/november2016/203284. pdf > [Per J. Del Castillo, Second
Division].

[6]
 An Act to Establish Divorce (1917).

[7]
 Act. No. 2710, sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife
or concubinage on the part of the husband, committed in any of the forms
described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code.

See Valdez v. Tuazon, 40 Phil. 943, 948 (1920) [Per J. Street, En Banc].

[8]
 Otherwise known as "The New Divorce Law."

[9]
 Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461, 462 (1946) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].

[10]
 Id. at 462-463. 

DISSENTING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

The Supreme Court x x x aims to adopt a liberal construction of statutes.

By liberal construction of statutes is meant that method by which courts
from the language used, the subject matter, and the purposes of those
framing laws, are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp
distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a
court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which
someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal
construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is
judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the
three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the
judicial.[1]

On the basis of the Court's rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[2] (Van Dorn),
Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III[3] (Orbecido), and Dacasin v. Dacasin[4]
(Dacasin), the ponencia holds that Article 26(2) of the Family Code permits
the blanket recognition, under Philippine law, of a divorce decree obtained abroad
by a Filipino citizen against the latter's foreigner spouse.

I disagree.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that the public policy against absolute divorce
remains in force. At present, there exists no legal mechanism under Philippine law
through which a Filipino may secure a divorce decree upon his own initiative.
Accordingly, it is the Court's duty to uphold such policy and apply the law as it
currently stands until the passage of an amendatory law on the subject.
As members of the Court, ours is the duty to interpret the law; this duty does not
carry with it the power to determine what the law should be in the face of changing
times, which power, in turn, lies solely within the province of Congress.

Article 26(2) of the Family Code is an exception

to the nationality principle under Article 15 of
the Civil Code.

Article 26(2) was introduced during the meetings of the Joint Civil Code and Family
Law Committee (the Committee) to address the effect of foreign divorce decrees on
mixed marriages between Filipinos and foreigners. The provision, as originally
worded, and the rationale for its introduction, appear in the deliberations:

[Professor Esteban B. Bautista (Prof. Bautista)]'s position, even under the present
law, was that the Filipina wife should be allowed to remarry as long as the divorce
is valid under the national law of the husband, with which [Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy
(Judge Diy)] and [Justice Leonor Ines-Luciano (Justice Luciano)] concurred.

After further deliberation, [Justice Ricardo C. Puno (Justice Puno)] suggested that
they formulate the base to cover the above situation. Judge Diy and [Justice
Eduardo P. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa)] formulated the base as follows:

In a mixed marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, both capacitated to

marry under Philippine law, in case the foreigner should obtain a valid divorce
abroad, capacitating him to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.[5]

However, subsequent deliberations show that the Committee ultimately resolved to

delete the provision and defer action until absolute divorce is determined in future
legislation:

On Article [26(2)], [Justice Jose B.L. Reyes (Justice Reyes)] commented that it
seems to discriminate against Filipinos, who are married to Filipinos, since the
provision governs only Filipinos married to foreigners.

Justice Puno suggested that, in line with Justice Caguioa's view that xxx they
should make the Proposed Family Code as acceptable as possible and since they are
not touching on divorce which is one of the big issues and they are leaving it to
future legislation, they omit Article 126(2)] temporarily and take it up when
they take up the matter of absolute divorce.

Prof. Bautista remarked that it is a matter of equity, justice and fairness that Article
[26(2)] should be retained. On the point raised by Justice Reyes, Prof. Bautista
opined that there is no unfairness in the case of a Filipino, who is married to a
Filipino, because in the case of a Filipino who is married to a foreigner, the foreigner
is already free, and yet the Filipino is still married to nobody. [Dean Bartolome S.
Carale (Dean Carale)] added that if two Filipinos are married anywhere, they are
both covered by the Philippine prohibitory laws because they are nationals of the
Philippines. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that, in effect, there is
preferential treatment in the case of Filipinos married to foreigners, since if the
foreigner gets a divorce, the Filipino spouse also automatically gets a divorce. Dean
Carale remarked that Article [26(2)] will in effect encourage Filipinos to marry
foreigners. Prof. Bautista disagreed since it is the foreigner and not the Filipino,
who will seek divorce.

xxxx

Justice Reyes remarked that this article is an implicit recognition of foreign

divorce, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Prof. Bautista and
[Professor Flerida Ruth P. Romero (Prof. Romero)] pointed out that the
article will only cover exceptional cases and special situations and that
there is a reasonable and substantial basis for making it an exception.

After further discussion, Justice Puno rephrased Article [26(2)] in accordance with
Dr. Cortes' suggestion as follows:

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

abroad and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad capacitating such
foreigner to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.

xxxx

Having sufficiently discussed the matter, the Committee decided to put the issue to
a vote.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, Dr. Cortes, Dean Carale, Dean Gupit and Prof.
Baviera were for the deletion of Article [26(2)].

(2) Justice Diy, Prof. Bautista, Prof. Romero and [Director Flora C. Eufemio] were
for its retention.

Hence, the Committee agreed that x x x Article [26(2)] shall be deleted x x

x.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, Article 26(2) did not appear in the initial version of the Family Code
under Executive Order (EO) 209 which was signed into law by then President
Corazon Aquino on July 6, 1987. Days later, or on July 17, 1987, President Aquino
issued EO 227 which incorporated, among others, Article 26(2). Thus, when the
Family Code finally took effect on August 3, 1988, Article 26, in its entirety, read as
follows:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.

While Article 26(2) was reinstated by executive fiat, it is nevertheless clear that the
true spirit behind the provision remains explicit in the Committee deliberations —
Article 26(2) had been crafted to serve as an exception to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, which states:

ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

The deliberations show that Article 26(2) has the effect of (i) enforcing divorce
decrees which are binding on foreign nationals under their national law; and (ii)
recognizing the residual  effect of such foreign divorce decrees on their Filipino
spouses who are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce under the Civil
Code.[7]

To be sure, Article 26(2) had not been crafted to dilute the Philippines' policy
against absolute divorce. In fact, this perceived possible dilution is precisely what
prompted the majority of the Committee members to vote for the deletion of Article
26(2) in the initial version of the Family Code found in EO 209. As the
deliberations indicate, the exception provided in Article 26(2) is narrow,
and intended only to address the unfair situation that results when a
foreign national obtains a divorce decree against a Filipino citizen, leaving
the latter stuck in a marriage without a spouse, thus:

Justice Caguioa explained that the intention of the provision is to legalize foreign
divorces for the Filipino so that in the case of a Filipina, who was married to an
American, who in turn later secured a divorce, said Filipina will be allowed to
remarry. Justice Puno and Judge Diy remarked that this is not clear in the provision
[Article 26(2)]. Justice Puno, however, commented that it will open the
gates to practically invalidating the Philippine laws by the simple
expedient of marrying a foreigner, and that it will be an additional cause
for the breakage of families, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge
Diy stated that, on the other hand, it is an absurdity for a Filipina to be
married without a husband.[8](Emphasis supplied)

I believe that this view is consistent with the Court's rulings in Van Dorn, Orbecido,
and Dacasin.
In Van Dorn, a case decided prior to the enactment of the Family Code, an
American citizen sought to compel his former Filipina wife to render an accounting
of their alleged conjugal business in Manila. The American citizen argued that he
retained the right to share in the proceeds of the disputed business, as the divorce
decree issued by the Nevada District Court cannot be given effect in the Philippines.
Ruling against the American citizen, the Court held that the divorce decree
issued by a United States court is binding against him as an American
citizen.[9] As a residual effect of such divorce, the American citizen no
longer had standing to sue as the husband of his former Filipina wife.
[10]
 Hence, in Van Dorn, the Court held:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. x x
x[11](Emphasis supplied)

In Orbecido, a Filipino citizen sought permission to remarry before the courts,

claiming that his former Filipina wife had obtained a divorce decree against him
from an American court after she had become a naturalized American citizen. The
Court held that the effects of the divorce decree should be recognized in
the Philippines since it was obtained by the former wife as an American
citizen in accordance with her national law, and that as a consequence, the
Filipino husband should be allowed to remarry pursuant to Article 26(2). In
so ruling, the Court laid down elements for the application of Article 26(2), thus:

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him

or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when [the Filipino spouse's] wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between [them].
As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus x x x the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.[12] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Still, in Dacasin, a Filipino wife secured a divorce decree against her American
husband from an Illinois court. The decree awarded sole custody over the parties'
daughter in favor of the Filipino wife. While the parties subsequently executed a
Joint Custody Agreement, the Filipino wife refused to honor the agreement,
prompting the American husband to seek redress before the Philippine courts. The
Court held that the Illinois divorce decree is binding on the American citizen, and
that the latter cannot be permitted to evade the terms of the custodial
award. Citing the nationality principle, the Court stressed that "a foreign
divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this
jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien's nationality,
irrespective of who obtained the divorce."[13] It bears stressing that the issue
raised in Dacasin was the enforceability of the Joint Custody Agreement against the
American husband, and not the validity of the foreign divorce decree as against the
Filipino wife.

Thus, rather than serving as bases for the blanket recognition of foreign
divorce decrees in the Philippines, I believe that the Court's rulings in Van
Dorn, Orbecido and Dacasin merely clarify the parameters for the
application of the nationality principle found in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
and the exception thereto found in Article 26(2) the Family Code. These
parameters may be summarized as follows:

1. Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by the
prohibition against absolute divorce. As a consequence of such prohibition, a
divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen cannot be enforced in
the Philippines. To allow otherwise would be to permit a Filipino citizen
to invoke foreign law to evade an express prohibition under
Philippine law. 

2. Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by a foreign

nationalmay be extended to the Filipino spouse, provided the latter is able
to prove (i) the issuance of the divorce decree, and (ii) the personal law of
the foreign spouse allowing such divorce.[14] This exception, found under
Article 26(2) of the Family Code, respects the binding effect of the divorce
decree on the foreign national, and merely recognizes the residual effect of
such decree on the Filipino spouse.

It should be emphasized, however, that the prohibition against absolute divorce

only applies to Filipino citizens. Accordingly, it cannot be invoked by a foreign
national to evade the effects of a divorce decree issued pursuant to his national
law. To reiterate, a divorce decree issued by a foreign court remains binding
on the foreign spouse in the Philippines, regardless of the party who
obtained the same provided that such decree is valid and effective under
the foreign spouse's national law.

In essence, the applicable rule (whether Article 15 of the Civil Code on one hand, or
Article 26[2] of the Family Code on the other), is determined by (i) the law upon
which the divorce decree had been issued; (ii) the party who obtained the divorce
decree; (iii) the nature of the action brought before the Philippine courts; and (iv)
the law governing the personal status of the party seeking relief.

The corresponding effect of these determining factors are, in turn, illustrated by the
relevant cases involving the issue at hand, decided after the issuance of EO 227:

Case Incidents of Divorce
Pilapil v. Ibay- Divorce obtained in
[15]
Somera (Pilapil) Germany by German
spouse
 
 
Republic v. Iyoy[16] Divorce obtained in the
(Iyoy) United States by
Filipino wife prior to
her naturalization as an
American citizen
 
 
Orbecido Divorce obtained in the
United States by
naturalized American
spouse  
 
Dacasin Divorce obtained in the American spouse
United States by sought enforcement of
Filipino spouse the Joint Custody
Agreement he had
Incidents of Action in
Court's Resolution
the Philippines
German spouse filed The divorce decree is
two (2) complaints binding on the German
charging Filipino spouse pursuant to the
spouse with adultery nationality principle.
Accordingly, the
German spouse lacks
standing to file the
complaints as
"offended spouse",
having obtained the
divorce decree prior to
the filing of said
complaints.
Filipino husband The divorce decree
invokes the divorce cannot be recognized in
decree secured by his the Philippines since
Filipino wife as the Filipino wife
additional ground to obtained the same
grant his petition for while still a Filipino
declaration of nullity citizen, and was, at
such time, bound by
Philippine laws on
family rights and
duties, pursuant to the
nationality principle.
Filipino spouse sought The effects of the
enforcement of divorce divorce decree must be
in the Philippines recognized in favor of
the Filipino spouse
pursuant to Article
26(2) of the Family
Code. Accordingly, the
Filipino spouse should
be allowed to re-marry.
The divorce decree is
binding on the
American spouse,
pursuant to the
 executed with his nationality principle.
former Filipino wife, Accordingly, he cannot
which bore terms be allowed to evade the
contrary to those in thesame by invoking the
divorce decree terms of the Joint
Custody Agreement. 
Bayot v. Court, of Divorce obtained in the Naturalized American The divorce decree is
Appeals[17](Bayot) Dominican Republic spouse sought binding on the
by naturalized annulment of her naturalized American
American spouse marriage with her spouse, pursuant to the
Filipino spouse through nationality principle.
a petition for Accordingly, she is left
annulment filed before without any cause of
the Regional Trial action before the RTC,
Court (RTC) as a petition for
annulment presupposes
a subsisting marriage.
Fujiki v. Divorce obtained in First husband (also a The effect of the
[18]
Marinay (Fujiki) Japan by Filipina wife Japanese national) divorce decree issued
against her second sought recognition of pursuant to Japanese
husband, who is a the divorce obtained by law may be recognized
Japanese national his Filipina wife in the Philippines in
against her second order to affect the
husband through a status of the first
Petition for Judicial husband, who, pursuant
Recognition of Foreign to the nationality
Judgment (or Decree of principle, is governed
Absolute Nullity of by Japanese law. Such
Marriage) filed before recognition is in line
the RTC with the Philippines'
public policy, which
characterizes bigamous
marriages as void ab
initio.
[19]
Medina v. Koike Divorce jointlyobtaine Filipina wife sought to The case was remanded
(Medina) d in Japan by Filipina enforce the divorce in to the CA to allow
wife and Japanese the Philippines through Filipina wife to prove
husband a Petition for Judicial that the divorce
Recognition of Foreign obtained abroad by
Divorce and herand her Japanese
Declaration of husband is valid
Capacity to Remarry according to the latter's
before the RTC national law.

The factual circumstances in the foregoing cases illustrate and confirm the
legislative intent behind Article 26(2), that is, primarily, to recognize foreign divorce
decrees secured by foreign nationals insofar as they affect Filipinos who would
otherwise be precluded from invoking such decrees in our jurisdiction, and, as well,
to recognize those foreign divorce decrees obtained by Filipinos insofar as they
affect their foreign spouses whose national laws allow divorce. For emphasis, I
quote the relevant portion of the deliberations:

Prof. Bautista remarked that it is a matter of equity, justice and fairness that Article
[26(2)] should be retained, x x x Dean Carale added that if two Filipinos are
married anywhere, they are both covered by the Philippine prohibitory laws because
they are nationals of the Philippines. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that, in
effect, there is preferential treatment in the case of Filipinos married to foreigners,
since if the foreigner gets a divorce, the Filipino spouse also automatically gets a
divorce. Dean Carale remarked that Article [26(2)] will in effect encourage Filipinos
to marry foreigners. Prof. Bautista disagreed since it is the foreigner and not
the Filipino, who will seek divorce.

xxxx

Justice Reyes remarked that this article is an implicit recognition of foreign

divorce, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Prof. Bautista and Prof.
Romero pointed out that the article will only cover exceptional cases and
special situations and that there is a reasonable and substantial basis for
making it an exception.[20](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court held in Iyoy:

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of

the [parties in the marriage] is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino
spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied
to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still, a Filipino citizen. x x x At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was stilla Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she
was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.[21] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Article 26(2) of the Family Code merely

recognizes the classification previously made
pursuant to the nationality principle.

The ponencia characterizes Article 26(2) of the Family Code as unconstitutional, as

it proceeds from a "superficial [and] arbitrary" classification. [22] This position
appears to be based on the premise that Article 26(2) creates new distinctions in
itself. This premise, however, is simply erroneous.
The classification under Article 26(2), (that is, between Filipinos in mixed marriages
and Filipinos married to fellow Filipinos) was created as a matter of necessity,
in recognition of the classification between Filipinos and foreign nationals which had
been created by Article 15 of the Civil Code decades prior.

In his Separate Opinion in Pilapil, Justice Paras highlights the interplay between
these two provisions, thus:

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court
considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and his American
wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and
capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no
decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of
the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different
nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law
and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute
divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as
the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite
expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the
absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application
of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the
foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the
forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on
the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino
wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would
seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took
effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.[23] (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, to characterize Article 26(2) as unconstitutional in such respect would be to

disregard the nationality principle and the reasons which render the adoption
thereof necessary; it would be tantamount to insisting that Filipinos should be
governed with whatever law they choose.

Article 26(2) of the Family Code rests on

substantial and reasonable distinctions.

It has been argued that the verba legis interpretation of Article 26(2) of the Family
Code violates the equal protection clause, and that the application of the provision
in this manner would not only be oppressive, but likewise unconstitutional.

These reservations appear to proceed from three different classifications which, in

turn, have been called into question — first, that between Filipinos in mixed
marriages and Filipinos who are married to fellow Filipinos; second, that between
Filipinos and foreigners; and finally, that between men and women.

As earlier discussed, the ponencia finds the first classification "superficial [and]

arbitrary"[24] insofar as it limits the scope of recognition to cover only those divorce
decrees obtained by foreign nationals.

It bears to stress, however, that the guarantee of equal protection under the
Constitution does not require that all laws indiscriminately operate with equal force
with respect to all subjects at all times;[25] the guarantee does not preclude
classification provided they are reasonable and based on substantial distinctions. [26]

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons
merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that
is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must
apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
[27]
 (Emphasis supplied)

There should be no dispute on the existence of substantial distinctions between

Filipinos in mixed marriages and those who are married to fellow Filipinos. In fact,
several of these distinctions were highlighted in the ponencia, thus:

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial
differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic,
cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a
divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is
recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.
[28]
 (Emphasis supplied)

As observed by the ponencia, the most important distinction between Filipinos in

mixed marriages and those who are married to fellow Filipinos is their exposure to
the absurdity for which Article 26(2) had been precisely crafted, as only Filipinos in
mixed marriages may find themselves married without a spouse due to the effects
of a foreign divorce decree. This distinction is "substantial" as to necessitate a
difference in treatment before the law.

To disregard these substantial distinctions for the sake of liberality would empower
Filipinos in mixed marriages to obtain divorce decrees by invoking foreign law at
whim, and effectively sanction a legal preference in their favor at the expense of
those Filipinos who happen to be married to their fellow Filipinos. A liberal
interpretation of Article 26(2) would, in Dean Carale's words, "encourage Filipinos
to marry foreigners."[29]

To stress, all Filipinos are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce. The
recognition afforded to foreign divorce under Article 26(2) is extended
only as a means to recognize its residual effect on Filipinos whose marital
ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national
laws. The provision was not intended to grant any preferential right in
favor of Filipinos in mixed marriages, but intended merely to recognize the
operation of foreign divorce on foreigners whose national laws permit
divorce.

Equally apparent is the fundamental distinction between foreigners and Filipinos

under the second classification, the former being subject to their respective national
laws and the latter being bound by the laws of the Philippines regardless of their
place of residence. Clearly, foreigners and Filipinos are not similarly situated.
Hence, the determination of their legal status, among others, cannot be made
subject to the same parameters. In any case, I emphasize, at the sake of being
repetitious, that such classification had been created not by Article 26(2) of the
Family Code, but rather, the nationality principle under Article 15 of the Civil Code:

ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

Finally, I find that Article 26(2) does not make any discernable distinction between
men and women, as the exception therein may be invoked by both men and
women with equal force to attain the same end, provided that the requirements for
its application obtain. While I am certainly aware that the respondent in this case is
one of the many Filipino women who find themselves in unsuccessful marriages
with foreign nationals, I am equally aware that this unfortunate circumstance is
similarly faced by Filipino men, who, like their female counterparts, are precluded
from obtaining an absolute divorce under Philippine law.

Respondent's case falls outside of the scope of

Article 26(2) of the Family Code.

In this case, it has been established that (i) the respondent is a Filipino citizen who
married a Japanese national; (ii) it was the respondent who subsequently
obtained a divorce decree against her Japanese husband from a Japanese
court; and (iii) the respondent thereafter filed a Petition for Recognition and
Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment[30] before the RTC.[31] It is clear that respondent
is, and has always been, a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to the nationality principle,
respondent's personal status is subject to Philippine law which, in turn, prohibits
absolute divorce.

Hence, the divorce decree which respondent obtained under Japanese law cannot
be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the
Philippines. Nevertheless, the verba legis application of Article 26(2) does not
deprive the respondent of legal remedies, as she may pray for the severance of her
marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under
the Family Code.

The Constitution mandates the protection of the family as a basic autonomous

social institution.[32] In this connection, the Family Code characterizes marriage as a
special contract of permanent union, and regards the family as "an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law"
and generally, not subject to stipulation.[33] Upon these fundamental principles rests
the prohibition against absolute divorce, which had remained effective and
unchanged since the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950. [34]

Adherence to this prohibition is met with much reservation, as it purportedly forces

Filipinos to play second-fiddle to their foreign spouses, and places said Filipinos at a
disadvantage. Moreover, it had been argued in the deliberations of the Court that
such adherence sanctions various forms of abuse that plague mixed marriages, and
deprives Filipinos in such marriages of a way out. I find that these observations,
pressing as they are, already delve into the wisdom of statutes governing marriage
and personal status with which the Court cannot interfere.

To note, Article 26(2) of the Family Code has remained unchanged since the
issuance of EO 227. The blanket recognition of absolute divorce overturns the
Court's unequivocal interpretation of the provision as laid down in the cases
of Pilapil, Iyoy, Orbecido, Dacasin, Bayot, Fujiki and Medina, which span a period of
nearly three decades. Ascribing a contradictory interpretation to the provision,
under the guise of equal protection, essentially re-writes Article 26(2) and gives it a
meaning completely different from the framers' intention.
While I am not oblivious to the difficulty that results from the prohibition on
absolute divorce and commiserate totally with the respondent in this regard, I find
that the prohibition remains, and thus, must be faithfully applied. To my mind, a
contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also
that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is bound
to respect the prohibition, until the legislature deems it lit to lift the same
through the passage of a statute permitting absolute divorce.

As recognized by the ponencia, there are currently four bills on the subject of

divorce and severance of marriage pending before the 17th Congress: (i) House Bill
No. 116 (HB 116) and House Bill No. 2380 (HB 2380) which propose different
grounds for the issuance of a judicial decree of absolute divorce; (ii) House Bill No.
1062 (HB 1062) which proposes the inclusion of separation in fact as an additional
ground for annulment of marriage; and (iii) House Bill No. 6027 (HB 6027) which
proposes additional grounds for dissolution of marriage. These bills have been
consolidated and substituted by House Bill No. 7303[35] (HB 7303), which, at
present, is awaiting deliberations before the Senate.[36]

HB 7303 proposes the issuance of divorce decrees on the basis of the following
grounds:

1. The existing grounds for legal separation and annulment of marriage under
Articles 55 and 45 of the Family Code;
2. Separation in fact for at least five years;
3. Psychological incapacity, whether or not present at the time of the
celebration of the marriage;
4. Gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another
undertaken by either spouse; and
5. Irreconcilable marital differences.[37]

These movements towards the passage of a divorce law illustrate that the difficulty
which results from the absolute prohibition against marriage is being addressed by
the 17th Congress through a statute specifically crafted for the purpose. That the
legislature has seen it necessary to initiate these proposed laws is a clear
delineation of the Court's role — that is, to simply apply the current law
and not for it to indulge in judicial legislation.

Indeed, it is desirable, if not imperative, that statutes in a progressive democracy

remain responsive to the realities of the present time. However, responsiveness is
a matter of policy which requires a determination of what the law ought to be, and
not what the law actually is.[38] Widening the scope of the exception found in Article
26(2) so as to indiscriminately recognize foreign divorce in this jurisdiction is doing,
in Justice Elias Finley Johnson's[39] words, "exactly what the Legislature itself [has]
refused to do."[40] It not only subverts the standing public policy against absolute
divorce; worse, it sanctions a violation of the fundamental principle of separation of
powers — a violation which cannot be undone by any subsequent law. To wield
judicial power in this manner is to arrogate unto the Court a power which it does
not possess; it is to forget that this State, is foremost governed by the rule of law
and not of men, however wise such men are or purport to be.

Considering the foregoing, I submit that the Court of Appeals erred when it
reversed the RTC's order denying respondent's Petition for Enforcement. Hence, I
vote to GRANT the instant Petition for Review. 

[1]
 See Tañada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515-516, 519 (1935) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc];
emphasis supplied.

[2]
 223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].

[3]
 509 Phil. 108 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

[4]
 625 Phil. 494 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[5]
 Minutes of the 146th joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
dated July 12, 1986, p. 5.

[6]
 Minutes of the 149th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
dated August 2, 1986, pp. 14-15.

[7]
 See CIVIL CODE, Arts. 15 and 17.

[8]
 Supra note 5.

[9]
 Supra note 2, at 361.

[10]
 Id. at 362.

[11]
 Id.

[12]
 Supra note 3, at 115-116.

[13]
 Supra note 4, at 508; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

[14]
 See Medina v. Koike, 791 Phil. 645, 651-652 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First
Division]; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 725 and 730-731 (2001) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division].

[15]
 256 Phil. 407 (1989) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].

[16]
 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].

[17]
 591 Phil. 452 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
[18]
 712 Phil. 524 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[19]
 Supra note 14.

[20]
 Supra note 6.

[21]
 Supra note 16, at 503-504.

[22]
 Ponencia, p. 14.

[23]
 Supra note 15, at 421.

[24]
 Ponencia, p. 14.

[25]
 See generally Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, 259
Phil. 1016 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

[26]
 See Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 206-208 (2003) [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., En Banc].

[27]
 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487
Phil. 531, 559-560 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

[28]
 Ponencia, p. 14.

[29]
 Supra note 6, at 14.

[30]
 Formerly captioned as Petition for Cancellation of Entry of Marriage;
see ponencia, p. 2.

[31]
 Ponencia, p. 2.

[32]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 12.

[33]
 FAMILY CODE, Title I, Art. 1.

[34]
 See generally Raymundo v. Peñas, 96 Phil. 311 (1954) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En
Banc].

[35]
 AN ACT INSTITUTING ABSOLUTE DIVORCE AND DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE IN
THE PHILIPPINES.

[36]
 HB 7303 passed its second reading on March 14, 2018, and was likewise
approved on its third and final reading before the lower house on March 19, 2018.
See "House passes divorce bill on second reading,"
< http://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/423557 > (last accessed on March 19, 2018)
and "House approves divorce bill on 3rd  reading,"
< https://www.rappler.com/nation/198516-divorce-bill-philippines-passes-third-
reading-house-representatives > (last accessed on March 22, 2018).

[37]
 See HB 7303, Sec. 5.

[38]
 See generally People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].

[39]
 Justice Elias Finley Johnson served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines from 1903 to 1933.

[40]
 See Nicolas v. Alberto, 51 Phil. 370, 380 (1928) [Dissenting Opinion, J. Johnson]

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 SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018 ]
STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.: 

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Amended Decision [1] dated March 3,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its
former Decision dated November 25, 2015, which in turn, affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, granting
petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11,
2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the
parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their
marriage.[2] Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40,
Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the
petition and recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under
Philippine Laws.[3] On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

In an Amended Decision[4] dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its

findings and recalled and set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate
court, the second of the following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is
missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.[5] This is because the divorce herein was
consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai
alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein,
said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that
petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was
fatal to her cause.[6]
On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following
arguments:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER

LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE
SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT
BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER
JAPANESE HUSBAND.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER

LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
REQUIREMENT ON THE SUBMISSION OF AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL
CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES. [7]

Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as
Divorce by Agreement in Japan, as opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more
practical and common type of divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her great
disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized and instead, Judicial Divorce is
required in order for her to avail of the benefit under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, since their divorce had already been granted abroad.
[8]
 Moreover, petitioner asserts that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce
does not prevent the application of Article 26 for said provision does not state that
where the consent of the Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the same no
longer finds application. In support of her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling
in Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein the Court held that a Filipino
spouse is allowed to remarry in the event that he or she is divorced by a Filipino
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship.[9] As to the issue of evidence
presented, petitioner explains that the reason why she was unable to present
authenticated copies of the provisions of the Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce
is because she was unable to go to Japan due to the fact that she was pregnant.
Also, none of her friends could obtain a copy of the same for her. Instead, she went
to the library of the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code. There, she was
issued a document which states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do not
issue certified true copies of Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of
Japanese Law due to the potential problem in the legal interpretation thereof. Thus,
petitioner maintains that this constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules on
Evidence.[10]

We grant the petition.

The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v.
Manalo,[11] the facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo,
respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino, was married to a Japanese national named
Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce before a Japanese Court,
which granted the same and consequently issued a divorce decree dissolving their
marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized in the Philippines
and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan,
Metro Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a hindrance if and
when she decides to remarry. The trial court, however, denied Manalo's petition and
ruled that Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to
foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country.

On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed,
instead, the ruling of the CA. There, the Court held that the fact that it was the
Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce
proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the
true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision,
therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.[12]

Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules
that despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan,
and even if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to
benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently,
since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the
divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry,
petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition

for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain
guidelines before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the
effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.[13] This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.[14] Since both the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24 [15] of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court applies.[16] Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [17]

In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the
existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be
proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that
Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. [18]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
104253 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
law on divorce.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), J., I concur in result. See Separate
Opinion.

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate
Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Socorro B. Inting, concurring; rollo, pp. 18-
21.

[2]
 Rollo, pp. 5 and 33.

[3]
 Id. at 33-34.

[4]
 Supra note 1.

[5]
 Rollo, p. 19.

[6]
 Id. at 20.
[7]
 Id. at 7.

[8]
 Id. at 9.

[9]
 Id. at 10.

[10]
 Id. at 13-14.

[11]
 G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018.

[12]
 Id.

[13]
 Corpus v. Sto. Tomas, 642 Phil. 420, 432 (2010).

[14]
 Id.

[15]
 Section 24 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in

paragraph (a) of section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office.

[16]
 Id.

[17]
 Id.

[18]
 Republic v. Manalo, supra note 11.
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 THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019 ]
MARLYN MONTON NULLADA, PETITIONER, V. THE HON. CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF MANILA, AKIRA ITO, SHIN ITO AND ALL
PERSONS WHO HAVE OR CLAIM ANY INTEREST,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

A. REYES, JR., J.: 

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, which seeks to assail the Decision[1] dated January 21, 2016 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 of Manila in Special Proceedings Case No. 14-132832,
that denied the recognition of a foreign divorce that was obtained by petitioner
Marlyn Monton Nullada (Marlyn) with Japanese national Akira Ito (Akira).

The Antecedents

The action arose from a Petition[2] for registration and/or recognition of foreign

divorce decree and cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, by Marlyn in 2014
with the RTC of Manila. She claimed that on July 29, 1997, she and Akira got
married in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as evidenced by a Report of Marriage [3]that
was issued by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. The document was
registered with both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then
National Statistics Office, Civil Registry Division.[4]

The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their
relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a
divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree
in Japan. The Divorce Certificate[5] that was issued by the Embassy of Japan in the
Philippines reads as follows:

Cert. No. IB12-08573-12

DIVORCE CERTIFICATE
   
Name: MARLYN MONTON NULLADA
   
Date of Birth: SEPTEMBER 03, 1968
   
Nationality: FILIPINO
   
Name of Spouse: AKIRA ITO
   
Date of Marriage: JULY 29, 1997
   
Date of Divorce: NOVEMBER 16, 2009

This is to certify that the above statement has been made on the basis of the
Official Family Register issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku, Tokyo, Japan on
February 06, 2013. This certificate is issued for the purpose of the process of
Notification of Foreign Divorce in the Republic of the Philippines.

Marlyn and Akira's acceptance of the notification of divorce by agreement was

supported by an Acceptance Certificate [6] that was issued by the Head of
Katsushika-ku in Japan, an English translation of which forms part of the records.

As she sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines, Marlyn filed
with the RTC the petition that ended with the following prayer:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that, after notice and

hearing, judgment be rendered as follows:

1. Recognizing the divorce obtained by [Marlyn and Akira], which was

validly decreed in Japan thus dissolving their marriage, to be likewise
valid and effective in Philippine jurisdiction; 

2. Ordering respondent Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila to cancel the entry

of marriage of [Marlyn and Akira] recorded in the Office of the Local
Civil Registry of Manila; 

3. Ordering respondent Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila to register the

Japan divorce decree of [Marlyn and Akira] in the entry of marriage
recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila, and;

4. Declaring [Marlyn's] marriage to [Akira] as dissolved with a

pronouncement that petitioner [Marlyn] shall have the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

Petitioner prays for other relief just and equitable under the premises. [7]

The RTC found the petition to be in due form and substance, and thus, issued an
Order of Hearing[8] with order for publication. Copies of the petition were also
ordered served upon the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila.[9] On February 12, 2015, the OSG entered its appearance for
the Republic of the Philippines, and then deputized the City Prosecutor of Manila for
assistance in all the hearings of the case.[10] Given proof of compliance with the
action's jurisdictional requirements, trial before the RTC ensued. [11]

During the trial, Marlyn testified mainly to identify the following pieces of
documentary evidence that were submitted to support the petition:

(1) Report of Marriage[12] (Exhibit "H") that was issued by the Embassy of the Republic of the
Philippines in Japan on the registration with the embassy of Akira and Marlyn's marriage on
July 29, 1997 in Japan;
   
(2) Authentication Certificate of the Report of Marriage[13] (Exhibit "H-1");
   
(3) Divorce Certificate[14] (Exhibit "J") issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines on the
basis of the Official Family Register issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku, Tokyo, Japan;
   
(4) Authentication Certificate of the Divorce Certificate[15] (Exhibit "J-1");
   
(5) Acceptance Certificate[16] (translated in English) (Exhibit "L"); and
   
(6) Excerpts of the Japanese Civil Code[17] (Exhibit "M").

Marlyn also identified and submitted a Judicial Affidavit[18] (Exliibits "N," and "N-1"),
which was adopted as her direct testimony.[19] Mary Ann Chico, registration officer
of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, also testified in court to present original copies
of the divorce and authentication certificates that were filed with local civil registry.
[20]

Akira did not file an Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by

publication. The Republic also did not offer any evidence to rebut the case of
Marlyn.[21]

Ruling of the RTC

On January 21, 2016, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition.
The  falloof the RTC decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED.

Notify the parties/counsels/Trial Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General.

SO ORDERED.[22]

Under the third paragraph of Article 17[23] of the New Civil Code is a policy of non-
recognition of divorce. For the trial court, the fact that Marlyn also agreed to the
divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which would have otherwise allowed a
Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien spouse had validly obtained a divorce.
[24]
While the intent of the law is to equalize Filipinos with their foreigner spouses
who are free to marry again after the divorce, the Filipino spouse cannot invoke the
intention of equity behind the law when he or she is an initiator or active participant
in procuring the divorce.[25]

Dissatisfied, Marlyn moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied by the
trial court via an Order dated April 26, 2016.[26] This prompted Marlyn to file the
present petition for review on certiorari.

The Present Petition

Marlyn seeks to justify her immediate recourse to the Court by explaining that the
present petition involves a pure question of law based on a lone issue, as follows:
Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code has a restrictive
application so as to apply only in cases where it is the alien spouse who sought the
divorce, and not where the divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouses. [27]

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition.

At the outset, the Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from the decision
of the RTC on the ground that the petition raises a pure question of law on the
proper application of Article 26 of the Family Code. "[D]irect recourse to this Court
from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions
of law are raised or involved."[28] In this case, the RTC's resolve to dismiss the
petition filed before it delved solely on its application of the statutory provision to
the facts undisputed before it. This question of law was directly resolved by the
Court in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo,
[29]
 which was promulgated by the Court subsequent to the filing of the present
petition.

The legal provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the Family Code,
which states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4),
(5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Underscoring ours)
The facts in Manalo are similar to the circumstances in this case. A divorce decree
between a Filipino and a Japanese national was obtained by the spouses upon a
case that was filed in Japan by Manalo, the Filipino spouse. Initially, the recognition
of the divorce decree in the Philippines was rejected by the RTC where the petition
for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment was filed, as the trial court
cited Article 15 of the New Civil Code and reasoned that as a rule, "the Philippine
law 'does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the
country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country x x x[.]"' On
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), however, the RTC decision was overturned.
The appellate court held that Article 26 of the Family Code should apply even if it
was Manalo who filed for divorce. The decree made the Japanese spouse no longer
married to Manalo; he then had the capacity to remarry. It would be unjust to still
deem Manalo married to the Japanese who, in turn, was no longer married to her.
The fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce was inconsequential. This ruling of
the CA was then affirmed by the Court in Manalo upon a petition for review
on certiorari that was filed by the Republic of the Philippines.

Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar factual milieu
that attended in Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC's decision
that refused to recognize the divorce decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn
and her foreigner spouse in Japan solely on the ground that the divorce was jointly
initiated by the spouses. The Court finds no reason to deviate from its recent
disposition on the issue, as made in Manalo, thus:

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision [Art. 26], a
Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her
alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.

We rule in the affirmative.

In the Manalo decision, the Court went on to cite jurisprudence wherein the legal

effects of a foreign divorce decree, albeit obtained by a Filipino spouse, were
acknowledged in our jurisdiction but limited on the issues of child custody [30] and
property relations.[31] In several other jurisprudence,[32] recognition of the effects of
a foreign divorce was also implied from the Court's disposition of the cases. The
specific issue on the binding effect of a divorce decree obtained by a Filipino spouse
on one's marital status was then expressly and directly tackled by the Court. In
determining whether a divorce decree obtained by a foreigner spouse should be
recognized in the Philippines, it is immaterial that the divorce is sought by the
Filipino national. The Court reasoned:

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When

this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the
usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity.
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.

xxxx

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the

alien capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent
in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is
presumed to know that meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and
to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."

xxxx

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to
address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband
or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place
and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreing
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter's national law. (Emphasis ours)

While opposition to the foregoing interpretation is commonly raised on the basis of

the nationality principle, such principle is not an absolute and unbending rule. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code should be deemed an exception
to the general rule.[33]

Applying the foregoing to the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC
warrants the Court's reversal. The dismissal of Marlyn's petition based on the trial
court's interpretation of Article 26 of the Family Code is erroneous in light of the
Court's disposition in Manalo. The fact that the divorce was by the mutual
agreement of Marlyn and Aldra was not sufficient ground to reject the decree in this
jurisdiction.

While Marlyn and Akira's divorce decree was not disputed by the OSG, a recognition
of the divorce, however, could not extend as a matter of course. Under prevailing
rules and jurisprudence, the submission of the decree should come with adequate
proof of the foreign law that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce must then be
sufficiently proved. "Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven x x x like any other
fact."[34] In ATCI Overseas Corp., et al. v. Echin,[35] the Court reiterated the
following rules on proof of foreign laws:

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which
read:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in

paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
his seal of office.

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or

record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of court having a seal, under the seal of such court. [36]

Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a
photocopy of excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan
Information and Culture Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay
City 1300.[37] This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on
proof of Japan's law on divorce. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed
by the Court in Manalo  to resolve such failure, a remand of the case to the RTC for
further proceedings and reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on divorce is
allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision

dated January 21, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 of Manila in Special
Proceedings Case No. 14-132832 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.

Peralta (Chairperson), Leonen, Hernando, and  Carandang,[*] JJ., concur. 

May 9, 2019

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on January 23, 2019 a Decision, copy attached hereto,
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of
which was received by this Office on May 9, 2019 at 11:35 a.m.

Very truly yours,

 
(SGD.) WILFREDO V.
LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
[*]
 Designated Member per Special Order No. 2624, dated November 29, 2018.

[1]
 Rendered by Presiding Judge Roy G. Gironella; rollo, pp, 25-29

[2]
 Id. at 31-36.

[3]
 Id. at 37.

[4]
 Id. at 32.

[5]
 Id. at 39.

[6]
 Id. at 41.

[7]
 Id. at 34.

[8]
 Records, pp. 23-25.

[9]
 Rollo, p. 23.

[10]
 Records, pp. 49-50.
[11]
 Id. at 59-60.

[12]
 Id. at 67.

[13]
 Id. at 66.

[14]
 Id. at 69.

[15]
 Id. at 68.

[16]
 Id. at 70.

[17]
 Id. at 71-78.

[18]
 Id. at 79-83.

[19]
 TSN, August 28, 2015, p. 16.

[20]
 TSN, October 23, 2015, pp. 6-7

[21]
 Records, p. 104.

[22]
 Id. at 107.

[23]
 Art. 17. x x x.

xxxx

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have,
for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

[24]
 Rollo, p. 28.

[25]
 Id.

[26]
 Records, p. 131.

[27]
 Rollo, pp. 13-20.

[28]
 Rep. of the Phils. v. Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378, 384 (2014).

[29]
 G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018.

[30]
 Dacasin v. Dacasin, 625 Phil. 494, 502 (2010).
[31]
 Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr., 223 Phil. 357, 360 (1985).

[32]
 Fujiki v. Marinay, et al., 712 Phil. 524 (2013); and Medina v. Koike, 791 Phil.
645 (2016).

[33]
 Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, supra note 29.

[34]
 Ando v. Department of Foreign Affairs, 742 Phil. 37, 48 (2014).

[35]
 647 Phil. 43 (2010).

[36]
 Id. at 50.

[37]
 Records, pp. 71-78.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: May 15, 2019 

This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System

Supreme Court E-Library

543 Phil. 275

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 133743, February 06, 2007 ]
EDGAR SAN LUIS, PETITIONER, VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
RESPONDENT. 

[G.R. NO. 134029] 

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, PETITIONER, VS. FELICIDAD

SAGALONGOS ALIAS FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995[2] and January 31, 1996[3] Resolutions of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15,
1998 Resolution[4] denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom
he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce[5] before the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. [6]

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. [7] He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets

and the settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration [8] before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his
death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent's surviving heirs are respondent as legal
spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that
the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo
by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal[10] of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial
court issued an Order[11] denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994
her opposition[12] thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they
bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed
that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,
[13]
 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
[14]
Jr.

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.
[15]
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondent's bigamous marriage with Felicisimo
because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 [16] of the Family
Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed
a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the
case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order [17] denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the
legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the
motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic[18] because then Acting
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition[19] against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994.
On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration [20] from the Order
denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and
law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order [21] granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995,[22] the trial court required the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file
the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested [23] that he is adopting the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his
position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14,
[24]
and June 20,[25] 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also
ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo's legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration[26] and for the disqualification[27] of Judge

Arcangel but said motions were denied.[28]

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24,
1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.[29]

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence
or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor
in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters
of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[30] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[31] It found that the
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus -

With the well-known rule - express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason
and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, - there is no justiciable
reason to sustain the individual view - sweeping statement - of Judge Arc[h]angel,
that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state
against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express
mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992,[32] the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry
under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x[33]

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration [34] which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review
on certiorari.[35] Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said
petition which was granted.[36]
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time
of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that
pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray[37] and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City,[38] "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his
domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent's marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter's marriage
to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous
marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1,[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court
of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia
Fule v. Court of Appeals,[40] we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence - as contradistinguished from domicile - of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from

"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature -
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.[41](Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile."
The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because
they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between
"residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning.[42] However, for purposes of fixing venue under
the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.[43] Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted
in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[44] dated January 5, 1983 showing that the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements[45] from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the
period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association [46] and Ayala
Country Club, Inc.,[47] letter-envelopes[48] from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased's
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased's calling cards [49] stating
that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the
subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court[50] which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject
petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated
in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. [51] Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is
divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52] involved a marriage between a foreigner and
his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce
obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their
conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.[53]

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should
no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner

has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to
a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.[54] (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[55] where the Court

recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held
that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his
Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." [56]

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[57] the Court stated that where a Filipino is

divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.
[58]
Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of

divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the
Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." [59] In Garcia v.
Recio,[60] the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.
[61]

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[62] the historical background and

legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed,
to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case

of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.[63](Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a

divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent.

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance

intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.[64] Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse
obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15[65] and 17[66] of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce
is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of
this Court's rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
[67]
 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[68] the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a
way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in
a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are
not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its
cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words
of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice.[69]

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,[70] the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.[71]

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in

California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text[72] of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia,however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and proved.[73]

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.

Section 6,[74] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may
be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. - A petition for letters of

administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as
known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.[75]

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144[76] of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven.[77]

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which
has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry.[78] In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,[79] we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs.[80] The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together
as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent
proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage
and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's defense. x x
x[81]

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife
of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of
the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners' motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case
be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and  Chico-Nazario, JJ.,  concur.

[1]
 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D.
Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A.
Barrios.

[2]
 Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

[3]
 Id. at 391-393.

[4]
 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna
and concurred in by Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A.
Barrios.

[5]
 Records, p. 125.

[6]
 Id. at 137.

[7]
 Id. at 116.

[8]
 Id. at 1-5.

[9]
 Id. at 10-24.

[10]
 Id. at 30-35.

[11]
 Id. at 38.

[12]
 Id. at 39-138.

[13]
 When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

[14]
 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[15]
 See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.

[16]
 This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested rights or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

[17]
 Records, p. 259.

[18]
 Id. at 260.

[19]
 Id. at 262-267.

[20]
 Id. at 270-272.

[21]
 Id. at 288.

[22]
 Id. at 301.

[23]
 Id. at 302-303.

[24]
 Id. at 306-311.

[25]
 Id. at 318-320.

[26]
 Id. at 339-349.

[27]
 Id. at 350-354.

[28]
 Id. at 391-393.

[29]
 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.

[30]
 Supra note 14.

[31]
 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

[32]
 Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken
finding of fact because the records clearly show that the divorce was obtained on
December 14, 1973 (not December 14, 1992) and that the marriage of Gov. San
Luis with respondent was celebrated on June 20, 1974. These events both occurred
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.

[33]
 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.

[34]
 See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.
[35]
 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.

[36]
 Id. at 75.

[37]
 52 Phil. 645 (1928).

[38]
 G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.

[39]
 SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. - If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

[40]
 G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.

[41]
 Id. at 199-200.

[42]
 Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.

[43]
 See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation
Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-
129.

[44]
 Records, pp. 76-78.

[45]
 Id. at 60-75.

[46]
 Id. at 79.

[47]
 Id. at 80.

[48]
 Id. at 81-83.

[49]
 Id. at 84.

[50]
 The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over
this case because the value of Gov. San Luis' estate exceeded P200,000.00 as
provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).

[51]
 SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the
Executive Order issued by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983,
declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary, the territorial jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region are hereby defined as
follows:

xxxx

5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati - over the municipalities
of Las Pinas, Makati, Muntinlupa and Parañaque. x x x
[52]
 Supra note 14.

[53]
 Id. at 139, 143-144.

[54]
 Id. at 144.

[55]
 Supra note 31.

[56]
 Id. at 664.

[57]
 G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.

[58]
 Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005,
472 SCRA 114, 121.

[59]
 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.

[60]
 G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.

[61]
 Id. at 447.

[62]
 Supra note 58.

[63]
 Id. at 119-121.

[64]
 Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).

[65]
 ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

[66]
 Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

[67]
 Supra note 14 at 144.
[68]
 G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.

[69]
 Id. at 264-265, 268.

[70]
 Supra note 60.

[71]
 Id. at 448-449.

[72]
 Records, pp. 118-124.

[73]
 Supra note 60 at 451.

[74]
 SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. - If x x x a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.

[75]
 Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).

[76]
 Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

[77]
 Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).

[78]
 Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494, 506.

[79]
 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

[80]
 Id. at 686.

[81]
 Id. at 679, 686-687.
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642 Phil. 420

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 ]
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, PETITIONER, VS. DAISYLYN TIROL
STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BRION, J.: 

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review
on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. [3]  On January 18, 2005,
Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. [4]  Due
to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding.  He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce.  The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree
took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina
to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert
went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate.  Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. [6]

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign

divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. 
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition
to Gerbert's petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but
was prevented by financial and personal circumstances.  She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert's.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerbert's petition.  The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.  It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.[9]  Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to "avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." [11]

THE PETITION

From the RTC's ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his
rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into
account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse.  He
claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the
standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse - an interpretation he claims
to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code.  He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest,
to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for
bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office
of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, [14] both support
Gerbert's position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT'S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of
the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages - void [15] and
voidable[16] marriages.  In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino

and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227,
amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Court's holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[20]
 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21]  In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge
the alien spouse's assertion of marital rights after a foreign court's divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino.  The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses.  The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be

considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.[22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." [23]  The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.  Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. [24]  Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to
the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond;[25]  Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country.  The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.  If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage.  No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26]

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.  In other words,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes

the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion - i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens - with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition
before the RTC.  In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.  The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.--The effect of a judgment or

final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or

final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.  In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.[27]

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws.  Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country."[28]  This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. [29] 
The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of
his claim or defense.

In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts
of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into
play.  This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents.  If the copies of
official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree,
as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, [30] but failed to include a
copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31]  Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem
it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article
26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious
conformity with the petition.  A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.  Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.[33]

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the
foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial
recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.  This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry

Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's
marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34]  We
consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of
the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."  The
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person's legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not."[35]

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a

person's legal capacity and status that must be recorded.  In fact, Act No. 3753 or
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. - A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered: 

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. -- The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper
entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages

solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages. 

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization

register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto  authorize the
decree's registration.  The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata  effect.  In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree.  Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, [36] and Department
of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] - both of which required a final order
from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,
can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of
the decree.  For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any
legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry.  A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order."  The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected.  Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing
the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located; [38] that the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have
not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with
the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree
in the civil registry - one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.  The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. 
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as
well as its February 17, 2009 order.  We order the REMAND of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above.  Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Bersamin,  *Abad, and  Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

*
  Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.

[1]
 Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.

[2]
 Id. at 3-20.

[3]
 Id. at 27.

[4]
 Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.

[5]
 Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.

[6]
 Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:

It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register

of Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of execution of
such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.

[7]
 Supra note 1.

[8]
 Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.

[9]
 Rollo, p. 31.

[10]
 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.

[11]
 Id. at 121.

[12]
 Gerbert's  motion for  reconsideration  of  the  RTC's October 30, 2008  decision 
was denied in an order dated February 17, 2009; rollo,  p. 32.

[13]
 Supra note 2.
[14]
 Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.

[15]
 The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41,
44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.

[16]
 The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family
Code.

[17]
 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.

[18]
 Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Volume One, with the Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.

[19]
 Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.

[20]
 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

[21]
 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

[22]
 Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.

[23]
 Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.

[24]
 The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether
the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.

[25]
 See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:

Art. 15.  Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

xxxx

Art. 17.    x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

[26]
 Parenthetically, we add that an alien's legal capacity to contract is evidenced by
a certificate issued by his or her respective diplomatic and consular officials, which
he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code).   
The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial
action for a declaration of authority to remarry.

[27]
 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note
20.

[28]
 Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.

[29]
 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note
17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7,
2008, 570 SCRA 472.

[30]
 Rollo, pp. 38-41.

[31]
 The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and
Daisylyn was dissolved by the Canadian court.  The full text of the court's judgment
was not included.

[32]
 Literally means "a thing adjudged," Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it
establishes a rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits, on points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28 at 462.

[33]
 See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June
19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several
cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for
this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the
foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished
from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.

[34]
 On the face of the marriage certificate, the word "DIVORCED" was written in big,
bold letters; rollo, p. 37.

[35]
 Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390,
citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).

[36]
 Rollo, pp. 47-50.

[37]
 Id. at 51.
[38]
 Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

[39]
 Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

[40]
 Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

[41]
 When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a
person), a Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil
Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.

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418 Phil. 723

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 138322, October 02, 2001 ]
GRACE J. GARCIA, A.K.A. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,
PETITIONER,VS. REDERICK A. RECIO, RESPONDENT. 

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.: 

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,

provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven.  Our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved
and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties."[3]

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen,

in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia.  On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.
[6]
Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our
Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. [7] In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."[8]

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage.  While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia. [9]

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had
a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994.  She
claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that
his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit
for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a
divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage
ha[d] irretrievably broken down."[13]

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground
that it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.[16] After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.[17]

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines.  It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the
marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.  Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.  The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or
annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"1

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia
by the respondent ipso facto  terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson
thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a

certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioner's marriage to the respondent

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35,
40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our
courts."[19]

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner.  Because of our ruling on these two, there is no
more necessity to take up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

 First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between

Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson.  Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the
divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.  She adds that respondent
miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis).  In effect, the Code requires the presentation
of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for
our discussion.  Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 [22] and 17[23] of the Civil
Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 [25]of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.[27]

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made.  Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law."[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29] Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must
first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the
Family Code.  These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11.  Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties
shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the following:

x x x                                                x x x                                        x x x

"(5)             If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage
was dissolved or annulled;

x x x                                                x x x                                        x x x"

"ART. 13.  In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to

"ART. 13.  In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse
or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.  x x x.

"ART. 52.  The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a
public document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it
requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself.  Before a foreign judgment is given

presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted
in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. 
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. [31] The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country.[32]

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal
custody of the document.  If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.  [34]

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an

authentic one issued by an Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight
by the judge.  Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. [38]

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting
an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
[40]
 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don
the attires of their adoptive countries.  By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. 
He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and
was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in
that country for quite a long time.  Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in
the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded.  The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action."[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent,
the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.  Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.

Second Issue: 
Respondent's Legal Capacity 
to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent
was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.  Hence, she concludes that their
marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted
in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian
law.

Respondent's contention is untenable.  In its strict legal sense, divorce means the

legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.  But divorces
are of different types.  The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro.  The first kind terminates
the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
[45]
There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or

provisional judgment of divorce.  It is in effect the same as a separation from bed
and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. [46]

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.  Under some other jurisdictions,
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was
granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again.  The
court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. [47]

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1.               A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy." [48]

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted.  It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law.  Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto  restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48,
Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate

of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage
license.  According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal
capacity to remarry.

We clarify.  To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the

national law of the party concerned.  The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien
applicant for a marriage license.[50]

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal

capacity to marry petitioner.  A review of the records before this Court shows that
only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner:
(a) Exhibit "A" - Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit "B" - Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12,
1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit "C" - Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit "D" - Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A.
Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit "E" - Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit "1" --
Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit "2" - Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; [57](c) Exhibit "3" -
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit "4" - Decree
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and
Exhibit "5" -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A.
Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994.  We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo  erred
in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the
Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy.  After all, it may turn out that under Australian
law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree.  Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to
marry petitioner.  Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,

we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence
which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing
in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug,  and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura; rollo, pp. 7-9.

[2]
 Rollo, p. 10.

[3]
 Ibid., p. 9.

[4]
 Rollo, p. 37.

[5]
 Ibid., p. 47.

[6]
 Id., p. 44.

[7]
 Id., p. 36.

[8]
 Annex "1"; temporary rollo, p. 9.

[9]
 The couple secured an Australian "Statutory Declaration" of their legal separation
and division of conjugal assets.

See  Annexes "3" and "4" of Respondent's Comment; rollo, p. 48.

[10]
 Id., pp. 33-35.

[11]
 Id., p. 39.

[12]
 Amended Answer, p. 2;  rollo, p. 39.

[13]
 Id., pp. 77-78.

[14]
 Id., p. 43.

[15]
 Rollo, pp. 48-51.

[16]
 TSN, December 16, 1998, pp. 1-8; records, pp. 172-179.

[17]
 RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.

[18]
 The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11, 2000, upon this
Court's receipt of the Memorandum for petitioner, signed by Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba.  The Memorandum for respondent, signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of
Gomez and Associates, had been filed on December 10, 1999.

[19]
 Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 242-243.

[20]
 43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.

[21]
 Ruben F. Balane, "Family Courts and Significant Jurisprudence in Family
Law," Journal of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,  1st & 2nd Quarters, 2001, Vol.
XXVII, No. 1, p. 25.

[22]
 "ART. 15.  Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad."

[23]
 "ART. 17.  The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.

x x x          x x x          x x x

"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country."
[24]
 Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29, 1965; Barretto Gonzalez
v. Gonzalez,  58 Phil. 67, 71-72, March 7, 1933.

[25]
 "Art. 26.  All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a)

"Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27, 1987)

[26]
 Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October 8, 1985;
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,  174 SCRA 653, 663, June 30, 1989.

[27]
 Van Dorn v. Romillo  Jr., supra.

[28]
 Ibid., p. 143.

[29]
 For a detailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private International Law,
1995 ed. pp. 295-300.  See also  Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and
Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 16;

[30]
 "SEC. 19.  Classes of documents.--For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.

"Public documents are:

"(a)            The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether in the
Philippines, or of a foreign country.

x x x          x x x          x x x."

[31]
 Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases,  Vol. IV,
1926 ed., p. 3511; §3, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides that "when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself."

[32]
 "SEC. 19.  Classes of documents.-- For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a)              The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether in the
Philippines, or of a foreign country.

x x x          x x x          x x x."

[33]
 "Sec. 25.  What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be.  The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
the seal of such court."

[34]
 "Sec. 24.  Proof of official record.--The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of  the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.  If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office."

See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,  296 SCRA 539, 550-551, September 25,
1998; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,  161 SCRA 122, 133-134, May 6, 1988.

[35]
 The transcript of stenographic notes states that the original copies of the divorce
decrees were presented in court (TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 5; records, p. 176),
but only photocopies of the same documents were attached to the records
(Records, Index of Exhibits, p. 1.).

[36]
 TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.

[37]
 TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.

[38]
 People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November 28, 1955; Marella v. Reyes,  12
Phil. 1, 3, November 10, 1908; People v. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516, April 18,
1997; De la Torre v. Court of Appeals,  294 SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14,
1998; Maunlad Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 114942,
November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9.

[39]
 Art. 15, Civil Code.
[40]
 Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary,  1996 ed., p. 566.

[41]
 Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines,  second edition,
p. 382.

[42]
 Ibid., p. 384.

[43]
 Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,  GR No. 119602, October 6,
2000, p. 7.

[44]
 Francisco, p. 29, citing De los Angeles v. Cabahug, 106 Phil. 839, December 29,
1959.

[45]
 27A CJS, 15-17, §1.

[46]
 Ibid., p. 611-613, §161.

[47]
 27A CJS, 625, §162.

[48]
 Rollo, p. 36.

[49]
 "SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.--The effect of a judgment
or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:

x x x          x x x          x x x

"(b)           In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or

final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.

"In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact."

[50]
 In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an
irregularity in complying with the formal requirement for procuring a marriage
license.  Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the
validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without
that certificate.  (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines,  1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family
Code of the Philippines Annotated,  1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria
Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.)
[51]
 Records, pp. 1-3.

[52]
 Ibid., p. 4.

[53]
 Id., p. 5.

[54]
 Id., p. 180.

[55]
 Id., pp. 170-171.

[56]
 Id., pp. 84-89.

[57]
 Id., pp. 181-182.

[58]
 Id., pp. 40-41.

[59]
 Id., p. 183.

[60]
 Id., pp. 184-187.

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791 Phil. 645

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016 ]
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, A.K.A. "DOREEN GRACE
MEDINA KOIKE," PETITIONER, VS. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA,
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: 

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated July 31,
2014 and the Resolution[3] dated November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Facts

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent

Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in
Quezon City, Philippines.[4] Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was
born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. [5]

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce[6] before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were
divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate [7] and the same was
duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike. [8]

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of

Marriage[9] on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on
February 7, 2013 a petition[10] for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code[11] before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc.No. Q-13-72692.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. [12] On the other hand,
Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of
Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"[13] and "Family Register of Michiyuki
Koike"[14] both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the
Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a
certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the
Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the
Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification [15] issued by the City
Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed
and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan
and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The
Civil Code of Japan 2000"[16] and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009"[17] were likewise
submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce. [18]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[19] dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that
in an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the
Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and" the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance
with Sections 24[20] and 25[21] of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The
RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully
proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving
the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce.
The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of
Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in
Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the
testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its effect
on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a
qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working
knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce.
It likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section
46,[22] Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the
subject matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and law. [23]

Doreen's motion for reconsideration[24] was denied in a Resolution[25] dated

November 28, 2014; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying
the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code -
which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine

courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. [26]

In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,[27] the Court had the occasion to rule that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.[28] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citation omitted)

Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,[29] it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown
that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven.[30] Since our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any
other fact.[31]

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki,
as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially
factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the
issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the
ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. [32]In
this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered
by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[33]

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-

adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. - x x x

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court
submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or
appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not
issues of fact are involved shall be final.

This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an
appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error in the choice or mode of
appeal.[34]

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the
appeal or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in the instant
appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA
for further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were
intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may
thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice
is the core reason for the existence of the courts. [35]

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case
is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the
reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ.,
concur.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 3-54.

[2]
 Id. at 58-65. Penned by Judge Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale.

[3]
 Id. at 66-70.

[4]
 Id. at 80.

[5]
 Id. at 59.

[6]
 See Certificate of Receiving; id. at 109.

[7]
 Id. at 81.

[8]
 See id.

[9]
 Id. at 97.

[10]
 Id. at 71-79.

[11]
 Executive Order No. 209, as amended, entitled "The Family Code of the
Philippines," August 4, 1988.

[12]
 Rollo, p. 58.

[13]
 Id. at 109-110.

[14]
 Id. at 101-107.

[15]
 Id. at 83.

[16]
 Id. at 111-115.

[17]
 Id. at 116-119.

[18]
 See id. at 62.

[19]
 Id. at 58-65.

[20]
 SECTION 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-general,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.

[21]
 SECTION 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
the seal of such court.

[22]
 SECTION 46. Learned treatises. - A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on
a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth
of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in
the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or
pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject.

[23]
 Rollo, pp. 63-64.

[24]
 Id. at 169-193.

[25]
 Id. at 66-70.

[26]
 Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524, 555 (2013).

[27]
 642 Phil. 420 (2010).

[28]
 Id. at 432-433.

[29]
 418 Phil. 723(2001).

[30]
 Id. at 725.

[31]
 Id. at 735.

[32]
 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sarabia Manor Hotel Corporation, 715 Phil. 420,
433-435 (2013). 

[33]
 See Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 766-
767 (2013).
[34]
 CGP Transportation and Services Corporation v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.,
548 Phil. 242, 253-254 (2007).

[35]
 Spouses Agbulos v. Gutierrez, 607 Phil. 288, 295 (2009).

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 SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. FLORIE
GRACE M. COTE, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

REYES, JR., J: 

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated January 21, 2014 and Resolution[2] dated
June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122313.

The Facts

As culled from the records, the antecedent facts are as follows:

On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent Florie Grace
Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married in Quezon City. At the time of their marriage,
the spouses were both Filipinos and were already blessed with a son, Christian
Gabriel Manongdo who was born in Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America
(USA).[3]

On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court of
the First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their marriage was irretrievably
broken. This was granted on August 23, 2002 by the issuance of a decree that
states among others:
A decree of absolute divorce is hereby granted to [Rhomel], the bonds of
matrimony between [Rhomel] and [Florie] are hereby dissolved and the parties
hereto are restored to the status of single persons, and either party is permitted to
marry from and after the effective date of this decree.[4]
Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
granting the divorce before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Florie also prayed for
the cancellation of her marriage contract, hence, she also impleaded the Civil
Registry of Quezon City and the National Statistics Office (NSO). The Office of the
Solicitor General, representing Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), deputized
the Office of the City Prosecutor to appear on behalf of the State during the trial. [5]

On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to be capacitated
to remarry after the RTC's decision attained finality and a decree of absolute nullity
has been issued. The RTC ruled, inter alia, that Rhomel was already an American
citizen when he obtained the divorce decree,[6] viz.:
[Florie] has sufficiently established that she is a Filipino citizen and married to an
American citizen. Her husband obtained a Divorce Decree on 22 August 2002 and
was authenticated and registered by the Consulate General to the Philippines in
Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A. [Florie] being a Filipino citizen and is governed by
Philippine laws, she is placed in an absurd, if not awkward situation where she is
married to somebody who is no longer married to her. This is precisely the
circumstances contemplated under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
which provides a remedy for Filipino spouses like [Florie].

Under the above-cited provision, [Florie] is allowed to contract a subsequent

marriage since the divorce had been validly obtained abroad by her American
husband, capacitating her to remarry. In this line, the court holds that this petition
be, as it is, hereby GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring

[Florie] capacitated to remarry pursuant to Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family
Code, in view of the Divorce Decree which had been validly obtained abroad by her
American spouse, dissolving their marriage solemnized on 31 July 1995 in Quezon
City, Philippines.[7]
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2011. However, the RTC, believing
that the petition was covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied
Section 20 of said Rule and denied the appeal because the notice was not preceded
by a motion for reconsideration.[8]

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA claiming that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion.

In a Decision[9] dated January 21, 2014, the CA denied the petition. The pertinent
portions read as follows:
The fact that even the Solicitor General and private respondent were confused as to
the true nature of the petition and the procedure that must be followed only shows
that We cannot attribute a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment to the
RTC.

xxxx

Besides, petitioner's omission, by itself, is a ground for dismissing the petition. The
last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court allows the dismissal of a
petition for certiorari if the material parts of the records were not attached to the
petition. "Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking it must
strictly observe the requirements for its issuance." Although it has been ruled that
the better policy is for petitioner to be accorded, in the interest of substantial
justice, "a chance to submit the same instead of dismissing the petition" We cannot
allow petitioner to benefit from this rule because the need to submit the transcript
of stenographic notes and all other pieces of evidence is quite obvious for petitioner
which is questioning the sufficiency of the evidence presented. Hence, it would be
bending the rules too far if We still allow petitioner to be excused from this lapse. [10]
Hence, this present petition.

The Issues

I. THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE DID NOT
COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE
PROCEDURAL RULES FOR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE PROCEEDINGS
UNDER A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC IN A PROCEEDING FOR RECOGNITION
OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE;

II. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STATE HAS NO

PERSONALITY TO INTERVENE IN PROCEEDINGS FOR RECOGNITION
OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE;

III. THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER

TO APPEND COPIES OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES
OF FLORIE'S DIRECT EXAMINATION AND HER JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT IS
FATAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE VERY SAME DOCUMENTS WERE
INCORPORATED AND QUOTED BY FLORIE IN HER COMMENT; and

IV. THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED

APRIL 7, 2011 GRANTING FLORIE'S PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF
FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE DESPITE LACK OF SHOWING THAT
HER FORMER FILIPINO HUSBAND WAS ALREADY AN AMERICAN
CITIZEN AT THE TIME HE PROCURED THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. [11]

Ruling of the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the provisions of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC[12] applies in a case involving recognition of a foreign decree of
divorce.

It bears stressing that as of present, our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino husbands and wives. Such fact, however, do not prevent
our family courts from recognizing divorce decrees procured abroad by an alien
spouse who is married to a Filipino citizen.

Article 26 of the Family Code states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The wordings of the second paragraph of Article 26 initially spawned confusion as to
whether or not it covers even those marriages wherein both of the spouses were
Filipinos at the time of marriage and then one of them eventually becomes a
naturalized citizen of another country.

In the landmark case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[13] the Court ruled that the
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[14]

Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce
involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise benefits from the effects
of the divorce cannot automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino spouse
can remarry, he or she must file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce.

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.[15]

To clarify, respondent filed with the RTC a petition to recognize the foreign divorce
decree procured by her naturalized (originally Filipino) husband in Hawaii, USA. By
impleading the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the NSO, the end sought to be
achieved was the cancellation and or correction of entries involving her marriage
status.

In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.,[16] the Court briefly explained the nature of

recognition proceedings vis-a-vis cancellation of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, viz.:
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article
412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by
which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108
of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements
that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others,
that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the
time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
x x x.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree
in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically
for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition
of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding
by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.[17]
The RTC, in its Decision[18] dated January 21, 2014 ruled that Florie had sufficiently
established that she is married to an American citizen and having proven
compliance with the legal requirements, is declared capacitated to remarry.

The confusion arose when the RTC denied petitioner's appeal on the ground that no
prior motion for reconsideration was filed as required under Section 20 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. Petitioner posits that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC do not cover cases
involving recognition of foreign divorce because the wording of Section 1 thereof
clearly states that it shall only apply to petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages, viz.:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines. [Underscoring Ours]
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court applies; Motion for Reconsideration not a
condition precedent to the filing of an appeal

The CA is correct when it ruled that the trial court misapplied Section 20 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.

A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as

defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only covers void[19] and
voidable[20] marriages that are specifically cited and enumerated in the Family Code
of the Philippines. Void and voidable mmTiages contemplate a situation wherein the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it never
existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and is usually due
to circumstances arising after the marriage.

It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's appeal Section 20
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Since Florie followed the procedure for cancellation of
entry in the civil registry, a special proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, an appeal from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 3 [21] of Rule
41 of the Rules of Court and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
As culled from the records, petitioner received a copy of the RTC Decision on May 5,
2011. It filed a Notice of Appeal[22] on May 17, 2011, thus complying with the 15-
day reglementary period for filing an appeal.

An appeal is a statutory right that must be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. Having satisfactorily shown that they have
complied with the rules on appeal, petitioners are entitled to the proper and just
disposition of their cause.[23]

This now brings the Court to the issue whether or not the RTC's denial of
petitioner's appeal is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. The Court rules in
the negative.

No grave abuse of discretion

Although the Court agrees with petitioner that the RTC erroneously misapplied A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, such error does not automatically equate to grave abuse of
discretion. The Court has ruled time and again that not all errors attributed to a
lower court or tribunal fall under the scope of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in this wise:
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. [24]
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented and Florie having sufficiently
complied with the jurisdictional requirements, judgment was rendered by the lower
court recognizing the decree of foreign divorce. It likewise declared Florie legally
capacitated to remarry citing the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Thus, the CA is correct in denying the Rule 65 petition for certiorari,
notwithstanding the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's appeaL The dismissal, albeit
erroneous, is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The Court finds no indication from the records that the RTC acted arbitrarily,
capriciously and whimsically in arriving at its decision. A petition for certiorari will
prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. The burden
is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error on the part of
private respondent, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision

dated January 21, 2014 and Resolution dated June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 122313 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Carpio,* (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

*
 Designated as Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28,
2018.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 65-72.

[2]
 Id. at 73.

[3]
 Id. at 65.

[4]
 Id.

[5]
 Id.

[6]
 Id.

[7]
 Id. at 115.

[8]
 Id. at 65.

[9]
 Id. at 65-72.

[10]
 Id. at 13-15.

[11]
 Id. at 36-37.

[12]
 Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Mariages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.

[13]
 509 Phil. 108 (2005).

[14]
 Id. at 115.

[15]
 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al., 642 Phil. 420, 432-433 (2010).

[16]
 642 Phil. 420 (2010).

[17]
 Id. at 436-437.

[18]
 Rollo, pp. 65-72.

[19]
 The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41,
44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.

[20]
 The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family
Code.

[21]
 Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.

[22]
 Rollo, p. 116.

[23]
 Republic of the Phils. (rep. by the Phil. Orthopedic Center) v. Spouses Luriz, 542
Phil. 137, 137 (2007).

[24]
 Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. CA, et al., 665 Phil. 261, 267 (2011).

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: June 21, 2018 

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THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018 ]
REDANTE SARTO Y MISALUCHA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.: 
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 31
July 2012 Decision[1] and the 6 March 2013 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 32635, which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Decision [3] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400
finding petitioner Redante Sarto y Misalucha (Redante) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Bigamy.

THE FACTS

On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly
contracting two (2) marriages: the first, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria
Socorro), and the second, without having the first one legally terminated, with
private complainant Fe R. Aguila (Fe). The charge stemmed from a criminal
complaint filed by Fe against Redante on 4 June 2007. The accusatory portion of
the Information reads:

That on or about December 29, 1998, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been
previously united in lawful marriage with one Ma. Socorro G. Negrete, as evidenced
by hereto attached Certificate of Marriage mark as Annex "A," and without said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there, willfully and feloniously
contract a second marriage with FE R. AGUILA-SARTO, herein complaining witness,
to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

During his arraignment on 3 December 2007, Redante entered a plea of "not

guilty." Pre-trial ensued wherein Redante admitted that he had contracted two
marriages but interposed the defense that his first marriage had been legally
dissolved by divorce obtained in a foreign country.

On 22 May 2008, the defense filed a motion to allow the taking of Maria Socorro's
deposition considering that she was set to leave the country on the first week of
June 2008.[5] This was granted by the RTC in its Order,[6] dated 26 May 2008.

Maria Socorro's deposition was taken on 28 May 2008. On 22 August 2008, the
prosecution moved for a modified or reverse trial on the basis of Redante's
admissions.[7] The RTC granted the motion in its Order,[8] dated 27 August 2008,
wherein the defense was directed to present its case ahead of the prosecution.

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented Redante and Maria Socorro as witnesses. Their testimonies,
taken together, tended to establish the following:

Redante and Maria Socorro, both natives of Buhi, Camarines Sur, were married on
31 August 1984 in a ceremony held in Angono, Rizal. [9] Sometime thereafter, Maria
Socorro left for Canada to work as a nurse. While in Canada, she applied for
Canadian citizenship. The application was eventually granted and Ma. Socorro
acquired Canadian citizenship on 1 April 1988.[10] Maria Socorro then filed for
divorce in British Columbia, Canada, to sever her marital ties with Redante. The
divorce was eventually granted by the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 1
November 1988.[11]

Maria Socorro came back to Buhi, Camarines Sur, sometime in 1992 for a vacation.
While there Redante's mother and grandparents, who were against the divorce,
convinced her and Redante to give their marriage a second chance to which they
acceded. Their attempts to rekindle their romance resulted in the birth of their
daughter on 8 March 1993 in Mandaluyong City. In spite of this, Redante and Maria
Socorro's efforts to save their marriage were futile. [12]

Sometime in February 1998, Redante met Fe to whom he admitted that he was

previously married to Maria Socorro who, however, divorced him. [13] Despite this
admission, their romance blossomed and culminated in their marriage on 29
December 1998 at the Peñafrancia Basilica Minore in Naga City. [14] They established
a conjugal home in Pasay City and had two children. Their relationship, however,
turned sour when Ma. Socorro returned to the Philippines and met with Redante to
persuade him to allow their daughter to apply for Canadian citizenship. After
learning of Redante and Maria Socorro's meeting and believing that they had
reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal home on 31 May 2007. [15] On 4 June
2007, Fe filed a complaint for bigamy against Redante.[16]

Meanwhile, Maria Socorro married a certain Douglas Alexander Campbell, on 5

August 2000, in Chilliwack, British Columbia, Canada.[17]

The defense presented a Certificate of Divorce[18] issued on 14 January 2008, to

prove the fact of divorce.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution waived the presentation of testimonial evidence and presented

instead, the Marriage Contract[19] between Redante and Maria Socorro, to prove the
solemnization of their marriage on 31 August 1984, in Angono, Rizal; and the
Marriage Contract[20] of Redante and Fe to prove the solemnization of Redante's
second marriage on 29 December 1998, in Naga City. The prosecution also adopted
the Certificate of Divorce[21] as its own exhibit for the purpose of proving that the
same was secured only on 14 January 2008.

The RTC Ruling

In its judgment, the RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy. The trial court ratiocinated that Redante's conviction is the only
reasonable conclusion for the case because of his failure to present competent
evidence proving the alleged divorce decree; his failure to establish the
naturalization of Maria Socorro; and his admission that he did not seek judicial
recognition of the alleged divorce decree. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Redante Sarto y Misalucha guilty beyond

reasonable doubt for the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court
hereby sentenced him an imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.[22]

Aggrieved, Redante appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's Judgment. The appellate court
ratiocinated that assuming the authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of
Divorce, since the order of divorce or the divorce decree was not presented, it could
not ascertain whether said divorce capacitated Maria Socorro, and consequently
Redante, to remarry. It continued that Redante failed to present evidence that he
had filed and had secured a judicial declaration that his first marriage had been
dissolved in accordance with Philippine laws prior to the celebration of his
subsequent marriage to Fe. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision
provides:

WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant Redante
Sarto y Misalucha of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400, is AFFIRMED. [23]

Redante moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its 6
March 2013 resolution.

Hence, the present petition.

On 26 June 2013, the Court issued a Resolution [24] requiring the respondent

Republic of the Philippines to file its comment.

The OSG's Manifestation

In compliance with this Court's resolution, the respondent, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment)[25]advocating
Redante's acquittal. The OSG argued that the RTC had convicted Redante solely
because of his failure to provide evidence concerning the date when Maria Socorro
acquired Canadian citizenship. It observed that Maria Socorro failed to provide the
exact date when she acquired Canadian citizenship because of the loss of her
citizenship certificate at the time she took the witness stand. The OSG claimed,
however, that Redante was able to submit, although belatedly, a photocopy of
Maria Socorro's Canadian citizenship certificate as an attachment to his appellant's
brief. The said certificate stated that Maria Socorro was already a Canadian citizen
as early as 1 April 1988; hence, the divorce decree which took effect on 1
November 1988 is valid. The OSG further averred that substantial rights must
prevail over the application of procedural rules.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY FOUND
PETITIONER REDANTE SARTO y MISALUCHA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF BIGAMY.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is bereft of merit.

Elements of bigamy; burden of proving the

termination of the first marriage.

For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur: (1)
that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the provisions of the Civil Code; (3) that the
offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. [26]

Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however, put forth the
defense of the termination of his first marriage as a result of the divorce obtained
abroad by his alien spouse.

It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof lies with the
party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action.[27] Since the divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is
incumbent upon him to show that it was validly obtained in accordance with Maria
Socorro's country's national law.[28] Stated differently, Redante has the burden of
proving the termination of the first marriage prior to the celebration of the second.
[29]

Redante failed to prove his capacity to contract a

subsequent marriage.

A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating

to the status of a marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree
does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by
Philippine courts may be required before the effects of a divorce decree could be
extended in this jurisdiction.[30] Recognition of the divorce decree, however, need
not be obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that purpose. Philippine courts
may recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.[31]
Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove it as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it. Proving the foreign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory
considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial
notice of foreign laws.[32] For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of
the divorce decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence. This is in
consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive
evidentiary value only after it is presented and admitted in evidence. [33]

In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking
them must present copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court.[34] Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and
foreign law may be proven through (1) an official publication or (2) or copies
thereof attested to by the officer having legal custody of said documents. If the
office which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of said documents must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [35]

Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the
existence of the divorce as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the
celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe.

Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of
evidence presented by the defense to prove the divorce, is the certificate of divorce
allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 14
January 2008. Said certificate provides:

In the Supreme Court of British Columbia 

Certificate of Divorce

This is to certify that Ma. Socorro Negrete SARTO and Redante M SARTO who were
married at ANGONO, RIZAL, PHILIPPINES on August 31, 1984 were divorced under
the Divorce Act (Canada) by an order of this Court which took effect and dissolved
the marriage on November 1, 1988.

Given under my hand and the Seal of this Court January

 
14, 2008
   
(SGD.)
  __________________ 
REGISTRAR

This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge

against Redante. First, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required
by the rules and jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce decree
required to prove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the
foreign court and not a mere certification. Second, assuming the certificate of
divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was not accompanied by a
certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed
in Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged
Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably
determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with Maria Socorro's
national law.

Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was
satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly secured by Maria
Socorro - whether an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited
divorce which merely suspends it[36] - and whether such divorce capacitated her to
remarry could not also be ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his defense
that he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to
Fe. His liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.

This Court is not unmindful of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. Indeed, in Republic v. Orbecido,[37] a case invoked by Redante to support his
cause, the Court recognized that the legislative intent behind the said provision is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse
under the laws of his or her country. The Court is also not oblivious of the fact that
Maria Socorro had already remarried in Canada on 5 August 2000. These
circumstances, however, can never justify the reversal of Redante's conviction.

In Orbecido, as in Redante's case, the alien spouse divorced her Filipino spouse and
remarried another. The Filipino spouse then filed a petition for authority to remarry
under paragraph 2 of Article 26. His petition was granted by the RTC. However, this
Court set aside said decision by the trial court after finding that the records were
bereft of competent evidence concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization
of the alien spouse. The Court reiterated therein the rules regarding the recognition
of the foreign divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it, as well as the
necessity to show that the divorce decree capacitated his former spouse to remarry.
[38]

Finally, the Court notes that the OSG was miserably misguided when it claimed that
the sole reason for the RTC's judgment of conviction was Redante's failure to
provide evidence, during trial, of the date Maria Socorro acquired Canadian
citizenship.

An examination of the 18 May 2009 judgment would reveal that the trial court
rendered the said decision after finding that there was lack of any competent
evidence with regard to the divorce decree[39] and the national law governing his
first wife,[40] not merely because of the lack of evidence concerning the effectivity
date of Maria Socorro's naturalization. Thus, even if the Court were to indulge the
OSG and consider Maria Socorro's citizenship certificate, which was a mere
photocopy and filed belatedly, it would not have any effect significant enough to
produce a judgment of acquittal. The fact that Redante failed to prove the existence
of the divorce and that it was validly acquired prior to the celebration of the second
marriage still subsists.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed

Decision, dated 31 July 2012, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 32635
which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
Naga City, in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner
Redante Sarto y Misalucha is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of bigamy and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur. 

April 23, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on February 28, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto,
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of
which was received by this Office on April 23, 2018 at 1:30 p.m.

Very truly yours,

 
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
   
  By:
   
(Sgd.) MISAEL DOMINGO C.
  BATTUNG III
Deputy Division Clerk of Court 

[1]
 Rollo pp. 18-26. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with
Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Elihu A. Ybanez, concurring.
[2]
 Id. at 29-30.

[3]
 Records, pp. 151-157.

[4]
 Id. at 1.

[5]
 Id. at 78-79.

[6]
 Id. at 80.

[7]
 Id. at 100-101.

[8]
 Id. at 103.

[9]
 TSN, 28 May 2008, p. 7.

[10]
 Id. at 4.

[11]
 Id. at 7; Records p. 36, Exh. (3.)

[12]
 Id. at 10.

[13]
 TSN, 27 October 2008, pp. 7-8.

[14]
 Id. at 3.

[15]
 Id. at 10.

[16]
 Records, p. 3-4.

[17]
 TSN, 28 May 2008, p. 8.

[18]
 Records, p. 36, Exhibit "3."

[19]
 Id. at 34, Exh. "A."

[20]
 Id. at 35, Exh. "B."

[21]
 Id. at 36, Exh. "C.''

[22]
 Id. at 157.

[23]
 Rollo, p. 26.

[24]
 Id. at 34.

[25]
 Id. at 43-55.
[26]
 Antone v. Beronilla, 652 Phil. 151, 166 (2010).

[27]
 Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 735 (2001).

[28]
 Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, 681 Phil. 493, 500 (2012).

[29]
 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 656 (2000).

[30]
 Fujiki v. Marinay. 712 Phil. 524, 546 (2013).

[31]
 VanDorn v. Romillo, 223 Phil. 357-363 (1985); Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 642 Phil.
420-432-433 (2010); Noveras v. Noveras 741 Phil. 670, 682 (2014).

[32]
 Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 576 (2007).

[33]
 Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 28 at 499.

[34]
 ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin, 647 Phil. 43, 50 (2010).

[35]
 Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 33; San Luiz v. San Luiz, 543 Phil.
275, 294 (2007).

[36]
 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 27 at 735-736.

[37]
 509 Phil. 108, 114 (2005).

[38]
 Id. at 116.

[39]
 CA rollo, p. 19.

[40]
 Id. at 21.

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 SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018 ]
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO, PETITIONER, VS.
RYOJI*MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: 

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 105 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the
Decision[2] dated July 18, 2016 of the RTC in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which
denied petitioner Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition before it.

The Facts

Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon

City on December 8, 2009.[3] Thereafter, they lived together in Japan for one (1)
year and three (3) months but were not blessed with a child.  During their married
life, they would constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in
addition to the fact that he was much older than Luzviminda.[4] As such, she and
Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku,
Nagoya City, Japan, which was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly
recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on July 1, 2012. [5] In
view of the foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce
decree obtained by her and Ryoji[6] before the RTC so that she could cancel the
surname of her former husband in her passport and for her to be able to marry
again.[7]

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for
hearing. Since nobody appeared to oppose her petition except the government,
Luzviminda was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After the presentation
and absent any objection from the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of
evidence was admitted as proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements,
and as part of the testimony of the witnesses.[8]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[9] dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held
that while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized in the
Philippines – provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of the
alien – the same does not find application when it was the Filipino
spouse, i.e.,petitioner, who procured the same. Invoking the nationality principle
provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws
do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree she herself obtained in Japan is not
binding in the Philippines;[10] hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly denied
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree she procured with
Ryoji.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as

follows: first,  Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the
courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 15[11] and 17[12] of
the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws;
and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the
former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.[13]

The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated
in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code which reads:

Article 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise. have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.

This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g.,  on custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. The rationale for
this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he
or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law.
[14]
 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,[15] the Court held:

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying
his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage
to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph
in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves
as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts
can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. [16]
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

According to Republic v. Orbecido III,[17] the following elements must concur in

order for Article 26 (2) to apply, namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [18] In the
same case, the Court also initially clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not only to
cases where a foreigner was the one who procured a divorce of his/her marriage to
a Filipino spouse, but also to instances where, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired
foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree.[19]

However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),[20] the Court En

Bancextended the application of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code to further cover
mixed marriages where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign
spouse. Pertinent portions of the ruling read:

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a

Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.

We rule in the affirmative.

xxxx

When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues
of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of
absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual
obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed
and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses
change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

xxxx

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the

alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is
the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths
of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted

to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart
from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes. x x x.
xxxx

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to
address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.

xxxx

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a

Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and
substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt,
there are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying
legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is
married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce
decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a
divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized
if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a

Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In
the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no
longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them
based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

xxxx

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in
total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside
from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development. It is also obligated to defend,
among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
To our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the
alien spouse. x x x. 

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If

We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he
or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer
the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the
adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold
a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to
be tilted in favor of marriage and. against unions not formalized by marriage, but
without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to
families formed according to indigenous customs.

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full
human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a
marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages
and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten
quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared commitment

between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it. x x x.[21] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages

between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this
jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided,
of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce
decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [22]
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's
petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was
anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings
which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid
down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory.
However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for
recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of
her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity
with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on such
issues. Since these are questions which require an examination of various factual
matters, a remand to the court a quo  is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18,

2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-
12-71830 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case
is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., maintains dissent in RP vs. Manalo. See separate concurring opinion.

*
 "Kyoji" in some parts of the rollo.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 9-25.

[2]
 Id. at 26-29. Penned by Presiding Judge Rosa M. Samson.

[3]
 Id. at 26 and 30.
[4]
 Id. at 27.

[5]
 See Divorce Notification; id. at 37-38.

[6]
 Dated August 24, 2012. Id. at 30-33.

[7]
 See id. at 27.

[8]
 See id. at 27-28.

[9]
 Id. at 26-29.

[10]
 See id. at 28-29.

[11]
 Article 15 of the Civil Code reads:
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

[12]
 Article 17 of the Civil Code reads:
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.

[13]
 See Republic v. Manalo, G.R No. 221029, April 24, 2018; citations omitted.

[14]
 See id.; citations omitted

[15]
 642 Phil. 420 (2010).

[16]
 Id. at 430; citations omitted.

[17]
 509 Phil. 108 (2005).

[18]
 Id. at 115.

[19]
 See supra note 13.

[20]
 Id.

[21]
 See id.; citations omitted.

[22]
 See id.; citing Garcia v. Recio,  418 Phil. 723, 731 (2001). See also Medina v.
Koike, 791 Phil. 645 (2016); Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 15;  Bayot v. 
CA,591 Phil. 452 (2008); and San Luis v. San Luis, 543 Phil. 275 (2007).

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

I concur in the result.

I submit, as I did in the case of Republic v. Manalo[1] (Manalo), that Article 26(2) of

the Family Code had been crafted to serve as an exception to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code. Such exception is narrow, and
intended only to address the unfair situation that results when a foreign national
obtains a divorce decree against a Filipino citizen, leaving the latter stuck in a
marriage without a spouse.

As stated in my Dissenting Opinion in Manalo:

x x x [R]ather than serving as bases for the blanket recognition of foreign divorce
decrees in the Philippines, I believe that the Court's rulings in [Van Dorn v. Judge
Romillo, Jr.[2]], [Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III[3]] and [Dacasin v.
Dacasin[4]] merely clarify the parameters for the application of the nationality
principle found in Article 15 of the Civil Code, and the exception thereto found in
Article 26(2) [of] the Family Code. These parameters may be summarized as
follows:

1. Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by

the prohibition against absolute divorce. As a consequence of such
prohibition, a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen
cannot be enforced in the Philippines. To allow otherwise would be to
permit a Filipino citizen to invoke foreign law to evade an express
prohibition under Philippine law.

2. Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by a foreign

national may be extended to the Filipino spouse, provided the latter is
able to prove (i) the issuance of the divorce decree, and (ii) the
personal law of the foreign spouse allowing such divorce. This
exception, found under Article 26(2) of the Family Code, respects the
binding effect of the divorce decree on the foreign national, and merely
recognizes the residual effect of such decree on the Filipino spouse. [5]

Petitioner herein is a Filipino citizen, seeking recognition of a divorce decree

obtained in accordance with Japanese law.

Unlike the divorce decree in question in Manalo,  the divorce decree herein had been
obtained not by petitioner alone, but jointly, by petitioner and her then husband,
who, in turn, is a Japanese national. Hence, the twin requisites for the application of
the exception under Article 26(2) are present — there is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[6]

Based on these premises, I vote to GRANT the Petition.

[1]
 G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018.

[2]
 223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].

[3]
 509 Phil. 108 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
[4]
 625 Phil. 494 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[5]
 J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion in Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24,
2018, p. 6.

[6]
 Republic v. Orbecido III,supra note 3.

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