Canon 13

G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF
FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.

No. 78791 September 30, 1987

KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-

OLALIA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS,
CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, and
petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987
in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the
pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the
Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional
shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in
utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with
slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.

These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and
Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might
be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt
of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were
maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the
opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San
Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union of
Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs.
Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly
Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to
appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why
they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW
CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.
On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court,
represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of record
of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for
the above-described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise
manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were wrong and
that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the
circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of
the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in the
Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union. 2

Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of
their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has
always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.

To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the
citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court
required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents
complied with on July 17, 1987.

We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the
sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this
Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should
not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently
resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future
similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to
pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any,
must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other
pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled
to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."  3

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments.
However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the
standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of
civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be
immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in
court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies." 4

Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial
tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest
in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference."   The aforecited acts of the
5

respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of
the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free
speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence
courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within
the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the
course of justice constitutes contempt of court.   The duty and responsibility of advising them,
6

therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the
untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members
of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on
matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the
importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no
demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or
the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all
courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6052               December 11, 2003

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL

GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY
31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents.

DECISION

TlNGA, J.:

This is a Petition filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly
1 

seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera "from being elected Governor of
Eastern Mindanao" in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") Regional Governors’
elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners
Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent President, respectively, of the
Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.

The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.

The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") was set on April 26, 2003, a month
prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in
compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:

SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one month before the national
convention, the delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003, reset the
2 

elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.

Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in
Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent
a letter dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution of April 6, 2003.
3 

Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP
By Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national
convention of the IBP will prevent it from being politicized since post-convention elections may
otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the
election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests
in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By
Laws, to wit:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days
after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a
written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall
forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest,
with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later
than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.

On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV-
2003-162. 4

On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May 24,
2003, the petitioners filed a Petition dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1) the
5 

postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third week of June 2003; and
(2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera "from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern
Mindanao Region."

The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent portions of
the Resolution read:

WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the elections for
regional governors and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.

WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the
postponement of the elections especially considering that preparations and notices had already
been completed.

WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the
petition to be premature considering that no nomination has yet been made for the election of IBP
regional governor.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the petition. 6

Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date, May 29,
2003, the petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those
sought in their Petition before the IBP.

On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners’ application, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons
acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from proceeding with the election for the IBP
Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao. 7
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of the IBP
officers from the Chapter Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board which is
its highest policy-making body, as well as the underlying dynamics, to wit:

IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years. The IBP Chapter
Presidents in turn, elect their respective Regional Governors following the rotation rule. The IBP has
nine (9) regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia,
Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western Mindanao. The governors serve
for a term of two (2) years beginning on the 1st of July of the first year and ending on the 30th of
June of the second year.

From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP) shall be
chosen, also on rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both the Regional
Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a chance to serve the IBP, to avoid
politicking and to democratize the selection process.

Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the incumbent EVP will
automatically be the National President for the following term.

Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have had two (2)
National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for
Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the
EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. For the next term in turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to
June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately before then will automatically assume the post of IBP National
President.

Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP
membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del
Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP presidency. The transfer of IBP membership to
8 

Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a
mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for it implies that
there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.9

Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, executive
vice-president and national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera lacks the
requisite moral aptitude. According to them, respondent De Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme
Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on the
constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that he could have been disbarred in the United States
for misappropriating his client’s funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice law.
Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao
Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the
IBP By-Laws. 10

After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful Comment  on 11 

the Petition.

In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no jurisdiction
over the present controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal
matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP.
Respondent De Vera also assails the petitioners’ legal standing, pointing out that the IBP By-Laws
does not have a provision for the disqualification of IBP members aspiring for the position of
Regional governors, for instead all that it provides for is only an election protest under Article IV,
Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can validly lodge an election protest which is
to be made after, not before, the election. He posits further that following the rotation rule, only
members from the Surigao del Norte and Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to run for
Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for the term 2003-2005, and the petitioners who are from
Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are not thus qualified to be nominees. 12

Meeting the petitioners’ contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP member is
entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership. He cites the last paragraph of Section
13 

19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws, thus:

Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular
Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political
subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case
shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its
membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of
the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another
Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than
three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.

The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in Section 4,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted
provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:

Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a
lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or
area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any
lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is unfair and
unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was done for convenience and as a
mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship. 14

On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the Court
or to any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the
administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in
California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he
maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of
the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings
of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in character similar to the recommendatory findings
of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of
the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has
retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainant’s money, but unfortunately the
retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he
committed during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless
to assume that he was campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to support his
candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the petitioners did not present
any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his
region at the Century Park Hotel. 15

On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply to the Respectful Comment of respondent De Vera
16 

who, on July 15, 2003, filed an Answer and Rejoinder. 17

In a Resolution dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this case, the IBP
18 

Board, to file its comment on the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General Counsel, filed
a Manifestation dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position stated in its Resolution dated 29 May
19 

2003 that "it finds the petition to be premature considering that no nomination has as yet been made
for the election of IBP Regional Governors." 20

Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:

(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;

(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the determination of
which in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues, namely:

(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under the IBP By-
Laws; and

(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;

(3) whether the present Petition is premature;

(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not premature,
whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;

Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De Vera submits
that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those
who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
IBP.

The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied)
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the
election of its officers.

The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section 13,
Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law. It reads:

SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly worded
provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution through all the years have been the sources of this
21 

Court’s authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The term "Bar" refers to the "collectivity
of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys." Pursuant to this power of supervision,
22 

the Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the
Commission on Bar Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the
Philippine Bar. Not long after, Republic Act No. 6397 was enacted and it confirmed the power of the
23  24 

Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per
curiam Resolution of this Court captioned "In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the
Philippines," we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the
Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power under the 1935
Constitution.

The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP independence
from the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the
Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 of the IBP By-Laws vests on the Court the power
25 

to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu propio or upon recommendation of the
Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15, the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP
26 

elections, whether local or national. Section 44 empowers the Court to have the final decision on the
27 

removal of the members of the Board of Governors.

On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the
irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No. 491
entitled "In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines" the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections. The results of
the investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities, with the principal
candidates for election committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws. The Court
28 

invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as well as explicitly
disqualified from running thereat the IBP members who were found involved in the irregularities in
the elections, in order to "impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness of
the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and
to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive
electioneering."

The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed direct election
by the House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP President; and (c)
Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system of the IBP Board choosing
the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from among themselves on a rotation
basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP to the
position of the President upon the expiration of their common two-year term. Third, it amended
Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall be elected by the members of
their respective House of Delegates and that the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated
among the different chapters in the region.

The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP and
establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.

In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action against him,
respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify candidates
for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or post-election cases under
Section 40 thereof which reads:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days
after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a
written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall
forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest,
with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later
than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.

Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of
candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the election
protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to just anybody.

Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees for the
position of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP By-
Laws, to wit:

SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a candidate

must be raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the Chairman. An
appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates in attendance who shall forthwith resolve
the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands. The decision of the Delegates shall
be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had
in accordance with Section 40.

The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of the Board of
Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the members of the House of
Delegates at its annual convention held every other year. The election was a two-tiered process.
29 

First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote, not less than two nor more than
five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. The names of all the nominees, arranged
by region and in alphabetical order, were written on the board within the full view of the House,
unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed to all the Delegates. Thereafter,
30 

each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one nominee for Governor for each
Region. The nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes was declared and
31 

certified elected by the Chairman.32

In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court deemed it
best to amend the nomination and election processes for Regional Governors. The Court localized
the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the delegates of the
concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through the following provisions, to wit:
SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed
by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in
Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one Governor for each region to be
elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor
should be rotated among the different chapters in the region.

SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the national
convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less
controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool
from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process
operates.

The simplification of the process was in line with this Court’s vision of an Integrated Bar which is
non-political and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal
33 

profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth and progress of the
Philippine society.34

The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on
disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition has
no firm ground to stand on.

Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the IBP By-
Laws, petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to be
nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that following the
rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP members from Agusan del
Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.

Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, petitioners are
not the proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file
with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. As claimed by
respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and
Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional
Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted
Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the
other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently,
the petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.

On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.

This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek the
disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao
Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case,
respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has
been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too,
assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from
Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member of the
PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate
goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in
changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included in
the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his
preference or choice, thus:

Section 19. Registration. -

....

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than
one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will
become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the
discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does
not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he
resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in registering one’s preference is that a lawyer
cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP
membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership
roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds
set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another Chapter as
certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three months
immediately preceding any Chapter election.

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than
three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del
Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a
letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon
35 

J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent De Vera’s
transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a
substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De
Vera’s transfer was made effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and September 3, 2001. On
February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the
Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of
Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other
year. Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This
36 

makes respondent De Vera’s transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the
chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.

Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to
occupy the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the
IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected
governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the IBP; 2) he is37 

included in the voter’s list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs; (3) he does not
38 

belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is
the start of a new season or cycle; and (4) he is not in the government service.
39  40

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can
run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a
candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based
on each member’s standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the
latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a
candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral
turpitude.

Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged sanction
imposed by the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder law, is
apparently referring to this Court’s Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re: Published Alleged Threats
Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera. In this 41 

case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper
articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of the report, with De
Vera’s statements written in italics.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Tuesday, November 6, 2001

Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers

Plunder Law

De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by
Estrada’s lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.

De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.

Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law,
with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a
coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of Estrada.

"We are afraid that the Estrada camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices- considering
that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in a
pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague," the group said. 42

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001

 SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes

Xxx

"People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged." said lawyer Leonard De Vera
of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.

He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional
would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.

Xxx

De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People Power II if the
rumor turned out to be true.

"People wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must
prevail. " 43

In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said

statements but denied to have uttered the same "to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence
in it and to bring it into disrepute." He explained that he was merely exercising his constitutionally
44 

guaranteed right to freedom of speech.

The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at
influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. 45

The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he
was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.

In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections, the Court
46  47 

defines moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals." The determination of whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual issue and
48 

frequently depends on the circumstances attending the violation of the statute. 49

In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s opinion on a public interest issue can
be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity.  Respondent De Vera did not bring
1âwphi1

suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder
Law. Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of
50 

respondent De Vera’s alleged immorality.

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still
practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California
Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the
case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a
basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case,
51 

the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera’s moral
fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from
Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners
did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court. 52

WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of
IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined
the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED.
Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election with proper notice
and with deliberate speed.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF
THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG

PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to
televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The
motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really
no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the
one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between
these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people,
as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a
safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish
interests.

On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and
radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that,
based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for
so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the
people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and
prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage. 1âwphi1.nêt

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due
deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of
its members,1 the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.

In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, 2 has
resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial.

What follows is the opinion of the majority. lawphil.net

Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and
the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-
visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan
shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film
shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for
historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law. 4

For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity
of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, §21 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations
which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings
shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case
may be.

There are several reasons for such televised recording.  First, the hearings are of historic
1awphil.net

significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man,
but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.)
Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental
right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio visual
presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the
people.

Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes.
The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold
print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be
primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or
decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of
stenographic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.

On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking
part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper
performance of their roles -- whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges -- will be
allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may
jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility
that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own
will be avoided.

At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial -- which, it may be assumed,
is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will be
addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing until after the decision of the cases
by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time
TV and radio broadcast will be avoided.

Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trial can be served by audio-visual
recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.

Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the
filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then
Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A
limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is
a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him
constitute matters of a public character."6

No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record
is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy
against such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.

Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes
célèbres was made was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he
explained:

In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly
moving. An educational television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader
on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four installments,
several months after the case was concluded -- concluded incidentally, with a verdict of
acquittal.

No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in
which the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and
ambiguities through presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which
judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.

I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good
reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the
broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an
educational experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and with
suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an agency of enlightenment that could
have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.

Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a
desperate need.7

Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is
perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV
and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a case,
while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the
proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.

WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the
following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as
the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall
be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary
to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have
rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of
contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the
conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant
to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for
public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. I am for full live coverage hence I maintain my original view; nonetheless. I concur.

Kapunan, J. I maintain my original view prohibiting live T.V. and radio coverage and concur with the
separate opinion of Justice Vitug.

Quisumbing, J. Although earlier I respectfully Dissented as I favor live TV coverage, I now concur in
the result.

Pardo, J. I concur with the denial of the motion for reconsideration only. The conditions are
inadequate. I join J. Vitug's opinion.

Buena, J. I concur with the Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.

Ynares-Santiago, J. I concur with the separate opinion of J. Jose Vitug.

De Leon, Jr., J. I concur with Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. I concur but only in the denial with finality of the MR.

Footnote

1 Nine (9) members of the Court, namely, JUSTICES VITUG, KAPUNAN, MENDOZA, PARDO, BUENA, GONZAGA-REYES, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DE LEON, and
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, vote to deny reconsideration, while six (6), namely, CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE, JR. and JUSTICES BELLOSILLO, MELO, PUNO, PANGANIBAN,
and QUISUMBING, vote to grant a reconsideration.

2 CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE, JR. and JUSTICES BELLOSILLO, MELO, PUNO, MENDOZA, PANGANIBAN, QUISUMBING, and GONZAGA-REYES.

3 JUSTICES VITUG, KAPUNAN, PARDO, BUENA, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DE LEON, and SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.

4 R.A. No. 8492 provides in pertinent parts:

SEC. 7. Duties and Function. - The [National] Museum shall have the following duties and functions:
7.1. Acquire documents, collect, preserve, maintain, administer and exhibit to the public, cultural materials, objects of art, archaeological artifacts, ecofacts, relics and other
materials embodying the cultural and natural heritage of the Filipino national, as well as those of foreign origin. Materials relevant to the recent history of the country shall be
likewise acquired, collected, preserved, maintained, advertised and exhibited by the Museum. (Emphasis added)

DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 13-A, dated May, 9, 1985, of the Department of Education Culture and Sports provides:

Rule 7. Transfer of Records to Archives. -

7.5 Preservation of Archival Records.

7.5.1 Archival records shall be stored under one roof and authorize their accessibility to the public, subject to certain security and safety measures to preserve the integrity of
the records.

7.5.2 It shall be the responsibility of the Archives Division to protect archival documents in its custody and undertake corrective measures to rehabilitate weakened or brittled
documents in accordance with modern techniques.

5 160 SCRA 861 (1988). Cf. Lagunzad v. Soto Vda. De Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979), involving the novelized film on the life of Mioses Padilla, a majoralty candidate of
Magallon, Negros Occidental, who was murdered for political reasons at the instance of then Governor Rafael Lacson.

6 Id. At 870.

7 Paul A. Freund, Contempt Power: Prevention, Not Retribution, TRIAL, January-February 1971 at 13.

Separate Opinion

VITUG, J.:

Due Process is timeless. It is a precious fundamental right that secures and protects, under a rule of law, the life, and liberty of a person from the oppression of power. A
cherished fixture in our bill of rights, its encompassing guarantee will not be diminished by advances in science and technology. I fail to perceive it to be otherwise.

Precisely, in its 29th June 2001 decision, the Court did not consider it propitous to allow live television and radio coverage of the trial in order to help ensure a just and fair trial.
The Court felt it judicious to insulate not only the Sandiganbayan but also the trial participants, the lawyers and witnesses, from being unduly influenced by possible adverse
effects that such a coverage could bring. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above ruling and countered that, if one must be pitted against the other, the right to
public information of grave national interest should be held more paramount than the right of the accused to a "fair and public trial," the former being appurtenant to the
sovereign and latter being merely a privilege bestowed to an individual.

I am not ready to accept such a notion. I see it as being an implicit retreat, unwisely, from an age-old struggle of the individual against the tyranny of the sovereign. 1 The right
of the public to information, in any event, is not here really being sacrified. The right to know can very well be achieved via other media coverage; the windows of information
through which the public might observe and learn are not closed.

In addressing the present motion for reconsideration, colleagues on the Court opine that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings for documentary
purposes because, first, the hearings are of historic significance, second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to
know how their government works; third, the audio-visual presentation is essential for education and civil training of the people; and fourth, such recording can be used by
appellate courts in the event that the review of the proceedings, ruling, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. 2
lawphil.net

The proposition has novel features, regrettably, I still find it hard to believe that the presence of the cameras inside the courtroom will not have an untoward impact on the court
proceedings. No empirical data has been shown to suggest otherwise. To the contrary, experience attests to the intimidating effect of cameras and electronic devices in
courtrooms on the litigants, witnesses and jurors. 3 In addition, the natural reticence of witnesses at the stand can even easily be exacerbated by placing them on camera in
contravention of normal experience.4 The demeanor of the witnesses can also have an abstruse effect on the ability of the judge to accurately assess the credibility of such
witnesses.5 The presence of cameras, for whatever reason, may not adequately address the dangers mentioned in the Court's decision of 29 June 2001. There are just too
many imponderables.
Most importantly, it does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of the cases against Mr. Estrada. Dignity is a precious part of personability innate in ever human
being, and there can be no cogent excuse for impinging it even to the slightest degree. It is not the problem of privacy that can cause concern more than the erosion of reality
that cameras tend to cast.

In the petition, albeit entitled an administrative matter, the only issue raised is whether the case of a former President pending before the Sandiganbayan can be covered
by live television and radio broadcast. The matter now being sought to be addressed by my esteemed colleagues is not even an issue. If it has to be considered at all, the
rule must be of general application and promulgated after a thorough study and deliberation, certainly far more than what have been said and done in this case. Hearings,
where expert opinion is sought and given, should prove to be helpful and of value.
1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, I concur but only in the denial with finality of the motion for reconsideration.

G.R. No. L-12871             July 25, 1959

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.

Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.

City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz
against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from
continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection
with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better
understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings
and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.

Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and
implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar
Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty
of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence although
without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be
reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon
retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated
by the same trial court.

It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case.
The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of
the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the investigation for the
Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession,
pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of
Manuel Monroy.

Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by
those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the
Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of
Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and
Malacañang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this
Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons
investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo
Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said
motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the
meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the
same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial was based,
and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a
committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A.
Avendañio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.

In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner
Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to
testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place
by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner
Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from
September 21, due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that
same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary
investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned
the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary
investigation in view of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was
pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the
filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the
preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.

The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by
respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief,
Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even
picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.

The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People
vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court,
much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the
administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein
appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to
cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.

Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of
the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses
for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him.
Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed
any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed
him.

Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear
at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made.
Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the
affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his
committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being
present at that investigation so that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants
when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions, either repudiating, modifying or
ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed to respondent Salva asking that the
investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be
unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he
was objecting to his being cited to appear at the investigation.

As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his
committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for
according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice
to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is
appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have
terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to
determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.

However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his
reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of
the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was
arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other
accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had
begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according
to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in
August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he
had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and
documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of
the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and
determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be
convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than
those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants,
including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the
case against Realista.

In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested
by authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the
conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the

prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form
of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that
they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate
cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of
Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
 calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one. (69 United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case
of Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)

With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the
scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that
investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the
killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent
Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be
present at said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than
a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner
expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter
changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear
at said investigation, he could not be compelled to do so.

Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as
contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate
the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others
by questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office,
quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.

However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was
conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City
evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members
of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and
photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the
encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this,
but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his
testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you
want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my
own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent
Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as
ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and
address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is
difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and
publicize his investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he
accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer
and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now before us.

But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the
testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place
during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel
Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under
appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all
with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.

Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse
or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence,
discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is
being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and
sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending
consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court,
in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its
repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.

Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the
imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed
that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.

In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary
investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the
writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view
of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel
him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against
petitioner is hereby set aside.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part.
Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly
reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had
given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt
of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe
disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.

A.C. No. 7199               July 22, 2009

[Formerly CBD 04-1386]

FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and
manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name "CDO,"
filed a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as
"Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS,
Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB,
for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyer’s oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to
investigating prosecutors.

The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in
Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero
and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and
soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.

Cordero’s wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD).
Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.

Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a
conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded ₱150,000 as
damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in
contravention of company policy and, in any event, "outrageous."

Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the
Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the
Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.

Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime or
on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be
August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12 2 which complainant
found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products.
Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the ₱150,000 demand
of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the
Corderos, but respondent turned it down.

Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for ₱50,000, ₱15,000 of which would go to the
Corderos and ₱35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid
advertisements in the tabloids and television program.

The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before
the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. 4 Respondent, who affixed his signature to the
KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared
the document.

On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract 5 asking complainant to
advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at ₱15,000 per issue or a
total amount of ₱360,000, and a Program Profile 6 of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot
buy 15-second TVC at ₱4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at ₱7,700; and (c) season buy [13
episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for ₱130,000.

As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid
amounting to ₱45,000 at ₱15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the
television program at ₱7,700 each or a total of ₱23,100. Acting on complainant’s offer, respondent
relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to
proceed with the publication of the articles/columns. 7

On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio station
DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which
announcement was transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang
Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at
433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, ‘aling
liver spread ang may uod?’ Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan
ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa
nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating
tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver
spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light.
Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article
captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA PANG
PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13,
2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another
article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO." 10

Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in
another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles: 11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread," Setyembre
6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);12 (b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO," Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277); 13 (c)
"Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278); 14 (d) "Uod sa liver spread
kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15 (e) "Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod,"
Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280); 16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285); 19 (i) "CDO guards
pinababanatan sa PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287); 20 (j) "May uod na CDO liver spread
sa Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288); 21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO,"
Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); 22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO," Setyembre
21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero," Setyembre 22, 2004
(Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO," Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg.
293).25

In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an

article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread." 26

And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo ang
Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the "same
baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it.27

Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time
of the filing of the present administrative complaint. 28

In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent
Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,29 alleging:

xxxx

2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx

2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to happen?

2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his
complaint?

xxxx

8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an investigating
prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents
expect justice to be meted to them?

9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them in
this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but,
more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;

10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been the
willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a
top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing products
of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?

11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere staff
and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their
respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and
relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant,
and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got
when he filed his kidnapping charge here; 30

And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction 31 which respondent filed, as counsel for
his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:

xxxx

5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick
skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this
action.32 (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several
others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and
raffled to Branch 75 thereof.

The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding, respondent
continued to publish articles against complainant 34 and to malign complainant through his television
shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and
Recommendation:35

I.

xxxx

In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the Order
dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C.
Sison which in part reads:

"Anent the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the instant
plaintiff’s motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file an
opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiff’s prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to
maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person
acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or
broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation
of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products."

Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch Sheriff
on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December
2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.

Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein addressed
to him to desists [sic] from "further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of
the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff
and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the prohibited
subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the
tabloid "Balitang Bayan –Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).

The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional
Responsibility which reads: "A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."

II.

xxxx

In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the
Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the following statements:

xxxx

The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the
Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly
assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not
even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of
the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect
[d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y
[o]thers."

III.

The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the
Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent. …

xxxx

In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said
"Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this
accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.

However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal of the
complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media
offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous
articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004
(Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles
against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining order issued against him
expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said articles and
submitted them for publication in the tabloids.

Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the
defects of complainant’s products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a baser
motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainant’s
failure to give in to respondent’s "request" that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television
programs of respondent. Complainant’s explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the
true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from the
fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself
prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright
when he prepared said "Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste
complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have
been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges
of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media
personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct
contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.36 (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the
findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for two years.

The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.

The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and
comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking
advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest – to obtain funds for his Batas
Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.

He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:

A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party.

For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At
the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a
member of the legal profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities."

Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which mandate, viz:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper, by using intemperate language.

Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
1awphi1

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.39 (Underscoring
supplied)

By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession,
respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer
to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession." 40
1avvph!1

The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v.
Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondent’s services as "she was
impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality," 42 only to
later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action
was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.

On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and
watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have
affected the sales of complainant.

Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent’s motion for reconsideration, took
note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges
against the therein complainant.43

To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises,
sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and breach of ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990

KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City
Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.

Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari  1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B.
Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the
requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the legal fees and the non-attachment of the
duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for
reconsideration, the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2

On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition.   This time, the amount of P316.50 was
3

remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and
also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for
reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders.
Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied "with
FINALITY."  4

Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a
copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the
Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as
complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or
ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution."   The complaint was
5

signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang,
allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto.   By reason of the strong and intemperate
6

language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he should
know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme
Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct.   On March 21, 1990, Atty.
7

Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt
With For An Improper Conduct (sic)."  8

In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended
to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned, as
Respondents (sic).   Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court in
9

issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this
particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such
order."  Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and
10

procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in
accordance with the law just like a common tao."  11

Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the
various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the
President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as
follows:

VI

That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable
Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative
Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and determined to phase-out all the
scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your administration without
bloodshed but by honest and just investigations, which the accused-complainant
concurs to such procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel
with the undersigned with a cause for being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied
of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the Highest and most
Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court);   (Emphasis ours.)
12

VII

That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being
Constitutionally created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic), being
bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions
the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by him in good faith, is that
they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose common intention is to sabotage the
Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice
and Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and turmoil to their advantage
 and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest, firm and determined Decision
to bring back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and
progress of your people and the only country which God has given us. —
PHILIPPINES.   (Emphasis ours.)
13

VIII

That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet
they refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-complainant, so to save their
brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, . . .  14

IX

. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices
of the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was based more of
money reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath of Life to
every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts of the Justices of the Second
Division, Supreme Court. By reason of fear for the truth Respondents ignore the
equal right of the poor and innocent-accused (complainant) to be heard against the
rich and high-ranking person in our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our
Honorable Court, for the respondents is too expensive and can't be reached by an
ordinary man for the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely strict and
meticulous to the common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and our
Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any man,
regardless of ranks and status in life"   (Emphasis ours.)
15

xxx xxx xxx

5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal by
complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents
denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice, for
the Respondents-Justices, were so strict or inhumane and so inconsiderate that
there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was too far and beyond the reach of the
Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved by records of both cases mentioned
above. 16

xxx xxx xxx

D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by

Judges and Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people
in general for no Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court Records were
cited for contempt by any presiding Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is
a cruel means to silence a righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any
person with close relation. 17

scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did so
"to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that
the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the Court
maintains a double standard in dispensing justice — one set for the rich and another for the
poor — went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not relevant to the
cause of his client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral
 and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know
that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any
extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates.

It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to fully
comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious disposition of
cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989, after due
publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for
reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees,   furnished the Court with a duplicate original
18

copy of the assailed trial court's decision,   and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date he paid his
19

dues.   But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88. He failed to
20

furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the other questioned orders
issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation given by Atty. Castellano did
not render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in our Resolution dated October 18,
1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration, "no valid or compelling reason (having
been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought." Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No.
1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance with the above requirements will not warrant
reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it be shown that such non-compliance was due to
compelling reasons."

It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed
to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable negligence
and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the
Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, the means by which
Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. As an officer of the
Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep
the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and
his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."   Thus, "while a
21

lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can
marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo." 22

To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the
criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake
it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts."   In this regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
23

Responsibility that:

CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE
TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

xxx xxx xxx

RULE 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing

language or behavior before the courts.

RULE 11.04 — A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
record or have materiality to the case.
 x x x           x x x          x x x

We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even
the most basic tenet of our government system — the separation of powers between the judiciary,
the executive, and the legislative branches has — been lost on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take
this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme — the third
great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with
finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them 'unjust.'"   Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the
24

President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.

Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to
correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as
Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible
accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to
question his act of having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a
contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however,
reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty. Castellano's
complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court
and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and

IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered
to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava,
Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice
of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes final, with a
WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with more severely. Let notice
of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other
Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.