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Filing # 104909967 E-Filed 03/16/2020 09:06:44 AM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT


IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

JANE DOE, Case No. 2019-027633 CA 05

Plaintiff,

vs.

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG


SERVICE ORGANIZATION, INC., a Florida
corporation; CLEARWATER ACADEMY,
INC., a Florida corporation; THE CHURCH
OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a
California corporation; RELIGIOUS
TECHNOLOGY CENTER, a California
corporation; and DAVID MISCAVIGE, a
California resident,

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

DEFENDANT RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER’S


MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………………...1

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND……………………………...5

A. The Complaint Concedes RTC is Not Subject to General Jurisdiction in


Florida and Alleges No Facts Establishing RTC Is Subject to Specific
Jurisdiction in Florida…………………………………………………………………..…5

B. RTC’s Motion to Dismiss Challenges the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction


Over RTC………………………………………………………………………………….6

C. Plaintiff’s Notice Unilaterally Setting RTC’s Depositions Is Improper,


Overly Broad, and Unconstitutionally Intrusive………………………………………….7

D. RTC’s Meet and Confer Efforts to Resolve the Dispute and/or Identify
Alternative Dates for the Depositions Were Unsuccessful, Compelling the
Filing of This Motion……………………………………………………………………...9

ARGUMENT…………………………………………………………………………………….11

A. Standard for Obtaining a Motion for Protective Order………………………………..11

B. Broad Merits-Based Discovery is Not Appropriate…………………………………..12

C. Jurisdictional Discovery is Not Appropriate Because Plaintiff Has Failed


to Respond to the Motion to Dismiss and Failed to Submit Competing
Evidence on Personal Jurisdiction………………………………………………………..14

D. The Notice Infringes on RTC’s Constitutional Protections Against


Excessive Entanglement and Invasive Discovery of a Church…………………………..16

E. The Notice Provides No Valid or Appropriate Basis for Pursuing Limited


and Narrowly Tailored Jurisdictional Discovery…………………………………………19

1. Plaintiff concedes RTC is not subject to general jurisdiction


and should not be permitted to burden RTC with discovery
demands purportedly in furtherance of general jurisdiction……………………...19

2. Plaintiff’s Notice topics are not appropriate for seeking


discovery on general jurisdiction under Daimler’s framework…………………...19

3. Plaintiff’s Notice does not establish grounds for engaging


in discovery as to specific jurisdiction over RTC…………………………………21

i
F. If, Notwithstanding the Foregoing, the Court Remains Inclined to Grant
Limited and Narrowly Tailored Jurisdictional Discovery of RTC,
RTC Should be Permitted Jurisdictional Discovery of Plaintiff First…………………….22

G. It is Reckless and Irresponsible to Proceed with a Non-Emergency


Deposition in Los Angeles During a Public Health Crisis………………………………23

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………..23

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace,


570 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1983)………………………………………………………17

Britt v. Superior Court,


20 Cal. 3d 844 (Cal. 1978)……………………………………………………………….17

Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc.,


789 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2015)……………………………………………………...19, 20

Cheshire v. Bank of Am., N.A.,


351 Fed. App’x 386 (11th Cir. 2009)……………………………………………………11

Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.,


123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997)………………………………………………………….12

Church of Scientology Flag Service Org. v. City of Clearwater,


2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993)…………………………………………………………….16

Church of Scientology FSO v. Williams,


671 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…………………………………………………….17

Daimler AG v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117 (2014)……………………………………………………………..….1, 5, 19

Dickinson Wright, PLLC v. Third Reef Holdings, LLC,


244 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)…………………………………………………….14

Estes v. Rodin,
259 So. 3d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)……………………………………………………..14

Gleneagle Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Leondakos,


602 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1992)………………………………………………………….15, 21

Mason v. Hunton,
816 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)……………………………………….……………22

McCullough v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,


No. 16-cv-20194, 2017 WL 6372619, *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2017)……………………..12

McMillan v Troutman,
740 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA1999)……………………………………………………22

iii
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490 (1979)……………………………………………………………………...16

Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
591 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009)…………………………………………………………...17

Peruyero v. Airbus, S.A.S.,


83 F. Supp. 3d 1283 (S.D. Fla. 2014)………………………………………………..14, 15

Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd,


178 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1999)……………………………………………………….....14

Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc.,


500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987)………………………………………………………….……11

Rizack v. Signature Bank, N.A.,


267 So. 3d 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)………………………………………………….…..22

Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,


426 U.S. 696 (1976)………………………………………………………………….…..16

Thompson v. Carnival Corp.,


174 F. Supp. 3d 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2016)…………………………………………..…..15, 20

United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer,


556 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2009)………………………………………………………….14

U.S. v. Church of Scientology of Boston,


933 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1991)……………………………………………………………17

Varga v. Palm Beach Capital Mgmt.,


No. 99-82398-CIV, 2010 WL 8510622, *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2010)…………………...11

Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,


554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989)……………………………………………………………….14

Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v. Jones,


227 So. 3d 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)……………………………………………………..14

Waite v. All Acquisition Corp.,


901 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2018)………………………………………………………….19

iv
Statutes

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c)…………………………………………………………………..………..1

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(6)………………………………………………………………………...9

v
Defendant, RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER (“RTC”), by and through its

undersigned counsel, moves this Court for a protective order pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c),

excusing RTC’s witnesses from appearing for a deposition until the Court rules on RTC’s pending

Motion to Dismiss, and in support thereof, states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff falsely accuses RTC of involvement in abuse she claims occurred years ago. The

Complaint is an abject fabrication. A plain reading of the Complaint makes clear Plaintiff has no

facts whatsoever to support her outrageous and contrived claims against RTC, other senior Church

entities, and the ecclesiastical leader of the religion itself. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint is replete

with falsehoods, including her jurisdictional allegations. Plaintiff lacks personal jurisdiction over

RTC to assert any claims against it in Florida. RTC’s Motion to Dismiss1 challenges both general

jurisdiction under the highly restrictive “at home” framework set out in Daimler AG v. Bauman,

571 U.S. 117 (2014), and Plaintiff’s failure to plead any facts establishing specific jurisdiction

over RTC.2

In support of its personal jurisdiction challenge, RTC attached the Declaration of Warren

McShane (“McShane Declaration”) to the Motion to Dismiss. Now, nearly four (4) months later,

in apparent recognition that her claims against RTC are false and unsupportable, Plaintiff has failed

1
See Defendant Religious Technology Center’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or, in
the Alternative, Motion to Transfer for Improper Venue and Reservation of Rights to Move to Compel Arbitration or,
in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted or, in the
Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement (“Motion to Dismiss”).
2
Plaintiff also falsely maintains venue is appropriate in Miami-Dade County but alleges no facts establishing she has
any connection with Miami-Dade County or ever lived, worked, or suffered injury in Miami-Dade County. The only
connection Plaintiff has to Miami-Dade County is her selection of local counsel to represent her in this case. That is
clearly not a proper basis for venue. And, as discussed in detail in RTC’s pending Motion to Dismiss, no parties are
located in Miami-Dade County, no evidence and likely no witnesses are located in Miami-Dade County, and none of
the torts alleged in the Complaint occurred in Miami-Dade County. Plaintiff’s claims have a clear nexus to Pinellas
County, and this action should be transferred to Pinellas County. This, in addition to RTC’s challenge to personal
jurisdiction, compels the conclusion that discovery of any sort is inappropriate.

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to respond to RTC’s Motion to Dismiss. Despite finally agreeing to a hearing on April 20, 2020,

Plaintiff also has never, until now, sought discovery of any kind. Moreover, Plaintiff has, to date,

failed to advance any competing evidence to the sound averments in the McShane Declaration that

reinforce RTC is unquestionably not subject to either general or specific jurisdiction in Florida.

Instead, weeks after agreeing to a hearing date, still having made no effort to respond to RTC’s

jurisdictional challenge, Plaintiff requested dates for the deposition of Warren McShane. The

request was rejected as inappropriate and premature, given Plaintiff’s failure to rebut the McShane

Declaration. Because Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that RTC is subject to jurisdiction in

Florida, it is incumbent on her to submit an affidavit setting forth the bases for making such an

allegation. To do so does not require a deposition of Warren McShane. Following that, the Court

can decide whether jurisdictional discovery is appropriate.

Plaintiff’s counsel did not respond to RTC’s position and, instead, filed a Notice of Taking

Videotaped Depositions (“Notice”), attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Notice unilaterally set the

deposition of Warren McShane and RTC’s corporate designee for March 19, 2020. The Notice as

to the RTC corporate designee sets forth 26 separate topics seeking far reaching discovery while

RTC’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction remains pending. The topics are overly

broad, misdirected to an incorrect pre-Daimler general jurisdiction analytical framework, and are

unconstitutionally intrusive and violative of RTC’s First Amendment protections against excessive

entanglement and invasive discovery into internal church matters.

In an attempt to avoid additional motion practice and reach a mutually agreeable

accommodation, counsel for RTC and CSI spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel about new deposition

dates for Warren McShane, Lynn Farny and the RTC and CSI corporate representatives (given the

unavailability of RTC and CSI counsel and the risk in travel due to the Coronavirus pandemic),

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the need to narrow the scope of the broad-ranging deposition topics, a date to depose Plaintiff on

her unfounded jurisdictional allegations in the Complaint, and the withdrawal of the improper

Notice of Deposition of David Miscavige, in his capacity as Chairman of the Board for RTC.

Despite giving assurances that the parties could reach agreement on deposition dates and that the

Notice to Mr. Miscavige would be withdrawn, Plaintiff’s counsel has now taken the position that

RTC is not entitled to reciprocal discovery, and has been non-committal on withdrawing the Notice

to Mr. Miscavige. In short, the parties are no closer to an agreement, despite RTC’s and CSI’s

good faith efforts to find a middle ground.

Addressed herein are the grounds for issuing a protective order to prohibit Plaintiff’s

improper discovery tactics.

First, merits discovery from Warren McShane and the RTC corporate representative is not

permitted when, as here, a jurisdictional challenge has been raised. Plaintiff’s Notice is unlimited

in scope and timing. RTC should not be forced to expend significant resources answering

discovery in a matter in which it claims it is not subject to personal jurisdiction and where the need

for discovery may be eliminated with the Court’s ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.

Second, Plaintiff’s efforts to obtain jurisdictional discovery are also not appropriate. Such

discovery is permitted only in limited circumstances after a court has made a determination that

affidavits submitted by plaintiff and defendant in support of their respective positions are in

material conflict and cannot be harmonized by the Court. That has not happened here, and cannot

happen (if at all) until the Court considers such affidavits at the April 20 hearing on RTC’s (and

other entity defendants’) Motions to Dismiss and for Change of Venue. Plaintiff has not responded

to RTC’s Motion to Dismiss and has failed to advance any evidence to rebut the McShane

Declaration, the only evidence before the Court. Plaintiff may not upend long-settled Florida

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procedure by seeking premature, onerous, and overly broad jurisdictional discovery in the form of

open-ended depositions without first bearing the burden to substantiate her rote and frivolous

jurisdictional allegations in the Complaint. Because there are no disputed evidentiary facts here,

only the unrebutted McShane Declaration in support of RTC’s unopposed Motion to Dismiss,

jurisdictional discovery is not appropriate.

Third, discovery pursuant to the broad-sweeping Notice is directed to a Church, its

leadership, and affiliated organizations, and squarely implicates First Amendment entanglement

issues. Whether directed to merits discovery, jurisdiction issues, or both, it is improper. Plaintiff

should not be permitted to embark on a dilatory fishing expedition of a church such as RTC under

any circumstances, certainly not where the requests are invasive and designed to harass.

Fourth, because Plaintiff acknowledges RTC is incorporated in California and has its

principal place of operations in California, she effectively concedes that RTC is not subject to

general jurisdiction in Florida. Plaintiff may not retreat from this judicial admission or seek

oppressive and unnecessary discovery to address an issue that is conclusively established. Nor

should Plaintiff be permitted to use the guise of discovery into specific jurisdiction as a pathway

to conduct improper merits-based discovery. It is incumbent upon Plaintiff to undertake sufficient

due diligence and pre-filing investigation directed to matters related to her ability to sue RTC in

Florida, including on matters of jurisdiction, before making false accusations in a public filing.

For the reasons set forth herein, a protective order excusing RTC’s witnesses from

depositions until such time as the Court considers any competing evidence on jurisdiction and

rules on RTC’s pending Motion to Dismiss should be issued. If, however, the Court is inclined to

permit limited and narrowly tailored jurisdictional discovery, such discovery should be reciprocal.

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Moreover, the absence of any jurisdictional facts beyond conclusory allegations in the Complaint

justifies RTC being given priority to depose Plaintiff before any deposition of RTC personnel.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint Concedes RTC is Not Subject to General Jurisdiction in Florida and
Alleges No Facts Establishing RTC Is Subject to Specific Jurisdiction in Florida.
On September 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against RTC and four other

Defendants in Miami-Dade County. In it, Plaintiff asserts five (5) claims against RTC—Florida

RICO violation (Count VII), false imprisonment (Count VIII), intentional infliction of emotional

distress (Count IX), invasion of privacy (Count X), and civil conspiracy (Count XI). Nowhere

does Plaintiff allege any facts establishing any acts or omissions by RTC in furtherance of any of

the claims. In fact, Plaintiff advances very few allegations about RTC by name, instead

misleadingly conflating RTC with the other defendants as “Defendants”, “Institutional

Defendants” or “Scientology.”

Plaintiff concedes, however, that RTC is a “California corporation with its principal place

of business in California,”3 (Compl. ¶ 7), which is quite literally the only accurate statement about

RTC in the entire Complaint. This effectively establishes that RTC is “at home” in California, not

Florida, and thus, is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Florida. See Daimler, 571 U.S.

at 138-39. Beyond that allegation, Plaintiff advances no specific jurisdictional allegation that RTC

had any contacts in the State of Florida, business operations, or other activities in Florida that

3
Plaintiff’s Complaint is actually internally inconsistent on the issue of jurisdiction over RTC, alleging on the one
hand that RTC “reside[s] in Miami-Dade County, Florida . . .” (Compl. ¶ 10), which is abjectly false, and, on the other
hand, that RTC is a California corporation with its principal place of business in California, (id. at ¶ 7) which is
undeniably true. If, as RTC argues in the alternative, infra at § F, the Court deems limited but reciprocal jurisdictional
discovery is appropriate, RTC should be afforded the opportunity to probe, among other things, the factual bases for
Plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations in the Complaint to expose her lack of foundation for such allegations, which may
provide grounds for seeking sanctions under Section 57.105, Fla. Stat.

5
caused harm or injury to Plaintiff. None. On a plain reading, then, Plaintiff fails to carry her

burden to plead facts sufficient to establish general or specific personal jurisdiction over RTC.

B. RTC’s Motion to Dismiss Challenges the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Over RTC.
On November 18, 2019, RTC filed its Motion to Dismiss challenging personal jurisdiction

and submitted the McShane Declaration as evidence to address the Court’s lack of jurisdiction

over RTC.

The McShane Declaration echoes that RTC is incorporated in California and has its

principal place of business in California and exposes the false and inaccurate conclusory

allegations in the Complaint that were intended to establish jurisdiction over RTC. (See, e.g.,

McShane Decl. ¶¶ 7-10.) Among other things, the McShane Declaration establishes that RTC is

a separate and distinct legal entity from the other “Institutional Defendants”, including the Florida-

based entities, (see, id. at ¶¶ 11-13), that RTC committed no tortious act against, directed at, or

involving Plaintiff in Florida (or anywhere else), nor has it committed any act that directly or

indirectly caused harm to Plaintiff in Florida or anywhere else, as alleged in the Complaint, (id. at

¶¶ 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21), and that RTC had no direct dealings or affiliation whatsoever with

Plaintiff, (id. at ¶¶ 15, 16). The McShane Declaration is unrebutted evidence that RTC’s minimal

contacts in Florida have no bearing on Plaintiff’s claims of harm and, thus, RTC is not subject to

specific jurisdiction. As the only evidence before the Court on the issue of RTC’s contacts with

Florida (or lack thereof), it compels the conclusion that the Court lacks specific personal

jurisdiction over RTC.

C. Plaintiff’s Notice Unilaterally Setting RTC’s Depositions Is Improper, Overly Broad,


and Unconstitutionally Intrusive.
RTC and its co-defendants made multiple, unsuccessful attempts to schedule the Motion

to Dismiss for hearing. Finally, on February 5, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to April 20, 2020,

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for a three-hour special set hearing at which the Court would take up RTC’s and the other entity

defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Change Venue. Despite having RTC’s Motion to

Dismiss for over 2 1/2 months, at no time did Plaintiff request any discovery, much less

jurisdictional discovery, prior to setting the Motion for hearing on April 20.

On February 18 and 21, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel contacted the undersigned by email

seeking deposition dates for Warren McShane. The request was not limited to jurisdictional

discovery. Upon returning to the office, the undersigned responded, in pertinent part, as follows:

A deposition is not appropriate and your request is rejected. As you know, RTC
has raised threshold jurisdictional and venue challenges, each of which is
meritorious and, we believe, will be successful. Insofar as you intend to conduct
jurisdictional or venue discovery, your client’s allegations are false and frivolous
and do not warrant discovery. . . . When you respond to our Motion to Dismiss
with a declaration from your client, the court will then have the discretion to
determine whether the declarations can be harmonized and whether venue or
jurisdictional discovery should proceed. That is the process that should be
followed. . . .

(Email of C. Oprison, 2/25/20 (emphasis added) (Ex. B).)

Without meeting and conferring with the undersigned or with counsel for any other

defendants, on March 5, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel served the Notice on RTC and the Church of

Scientology International (“CSI”). The Notice unilaterally set March 19, 2020 as the deposition

date when counsel and RTC’s witness are not available. As to RTC, the Notice seeks an open-

ended deposition of Warren McShane and a separate deposition of a corporate representative from

RTC under FRCP 1.310(b)(6) to testify about twenty-six (26) separate and exceedingly broad

topics appended to the Notice. Topic 1 is paradigmatic of the global scope of the deposition topics

explicitly seeking merits discovery, to wit: “[a]ll allegations involving Jane Doe as described in

Plaintiff’s Complaint.” (Ex. A, ¶ 1, at 6 (emphasis added).)

7
The Notice is writ large, objectionable. It seeks overly broad, and unnecessarily

burdensome information (see, e.g., Ex. A, ¶¶ 2, 4, 8, 17, 20, 25), privileged and work product

information, (see, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 2, 7, 11, 18, 19), and improper discovery in aid of a judgment, (see,

e.g., id. at ¶¶ 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, 23, 24). The Notice further seeks deposition testimony on matters

spanning more than fifteen (15) years, back to January 2005, as well as for more than six (6)

months after the filing of the Complaint, (see, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 3, 4, 6-25), while other topics have no

temporal limits and appear to request information from the beginning of time, (see, e.g., id. at ¶¶

5, 26). Insofar as the Notice is directed to jurisdictional discovery, virtually every single topic

seeks information utterly irrelevant to the issue of general jurisdiction under a Daimler “at home”

framework and/or specific jurisdiction. (See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 1-25.) Equally troubling is the Notice’s

conspicuous attempt to seek information invading parishioner privacy and violating RTC’s First

Amendment rights and protection against excessive entanglement and invasion into ecclesiastical

activities. (See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 2, 3, 11, 20, 25.)

D. RTC’s Meet and Confer Efforts to Resolve the Dispute and/or Identify Alternative
Dates for the Depositions Were Unsuccessful, Compelling the Filing of This Motion.
Given RTC’s objections to the improper unilaterally noticed depositions, the undersigned,

along with counsel for Defendant Church of Scientology International (“CSI”), contacted counsel

for Plaintiff on Tuesday, March 10, 2020, to discuss the Notice. The parties agreed to schedule a

meet and confer call for Thursday, March 12 at 2pm.

During the meet and confer call, RTC’s counsel explained why jurisdictional discovery is

improper and premature, and why the Notice was objectionable. Plaintiff makes jurisdictional

allegations in the Complaint and she is required to provide an affidavit showing she has some basis

for making those allegations. Under established Florida authority, cited to Plaintiff’s counsel and

discussed below, until Plaintiff submits a jurisdictional declaration, no depositions of any RTC (or

8
CSI) witnesses are appropriate. Plaintiff’s counsel disagrees, maintaining he needs to depose

Warren McShane on matters set forth in the McShane Declaration to test his averments. Counsel

further conveyed Plaintiff’s intent to depose an RTC corporate representative pursuant to Florida

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310(b)(6) on jurisdictional matters set forth in the Notice. Although

ultimately conceding, the Notice topics go beyond narrow jurisdictional discovery and into merits

issues, (see, e.g., Topic 1), Plaintiff’s counsel insisted that he was even entitled to conduct merits

discovery notwithstanding RTC’s jurisdictional challenge, a notion that is diametrically at odds

with the prevailing law in Florida.

While Plaintiff’s counsel disagreed that jurisdictional discovery was premature and

improper, counsel understood RTC and CSI were unavailable on March 19, and indicated he would

be willing to discuss alternative dates for depositions but insisted that such depositions needed to

be set in advance of the April 20 special set hearing on the Motions to Dismiss to enable Plaintiff

to prepare a response to the jurisdictional challenges. Ultimately, during the call, Plaintiff’s

counsel agreed to work with RTC’s and CSI’s counsel to narrow the scope of the Notice topics to

limit the depositions to jurisdictional issues, to discuss a jurisdictional deposition of Plaintiff, and

to withdraw the Notice to Mr. Miscavige.

On March 13, 2020, the undersigned, along with CSI’s counsel, contacted Plaintiff’s

counsel by email to reaffirm RTC’s and CSI’s objections to the Notice and any discovery

proceeding. (See C. Oprison email of March 13, 2020) (Ex. C.) Subject to and without waiving

the objections that no discovery is appropriate before the April 20 hearing on the Motions to

Dismiss, in the interest of reaching a resolution without the need for court intervention, RTC and

CSI agreed to make Mr. McShane, Mr. Farny, and corporate representatives available for a limited

deposition during the first week in April (more than two (2) weeks hence given concerns about the

9
rapid spread of the pandemic Coronavirus) on condition that counsel work together to narrow the

scope of the Notice topics, make Plaintiff available for deposition on her jurisdictional allegations

first, and withdraw the Miscavige Notice as agreed. (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel objected to the

undersigned’s summary of the call, in particular, that he had agreed to withdraw the improper

Miscavige Notice. After further communication, Plaintiff’s counsel ultimately agreed that “[y]our

notes are close to my recollection of our conversation and I don’t take issue with them.” (Id.) On

Saturday, March 14, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed the undersigned that his co-counsel would respond

substantively but expressed confidence the parties could reach an agreement. That did not happen.

Four (4) hours later, another of Plaintiff’s counsel responded by refusing to move the

March 19 depositions unless alternative dates before March 31 (that is, within 2 weeks) were

provided by RTC and CSI, and failed to agree to the requested jurisdictional deposition of

Plaintiff.4 Counsel further refused to commit to withdrawing the Miscavige Notice absent new

dates for the RTC and CSI witnesses and, even then, would not commit to foregoing any deposition

of Mr. Miscavige as Chairman of the Board of RTC despite being unable to identify a single basis

for deposing Mr. Miscavige on jurisdictional issues. Having received two different responses from

two counsel at the same firm relating to the same depositions, it became clear that reaching a

resolution without Court intervention was unlikely.

As of the time of filing this Motion, despite efforts by RTC, the parties have been unable

to reach agreement on the need for and scope of the depositions, thereby necessitating this Motion.

RTC’s strong position, as detailed below, is that a protective order precluding both merits and

4
Plaintiff’s contention that the depositions of Warren McShane and/or a corporate representative from RTC are urgent
and time sensitive is not credible considering Plaintiff waited four months to even issue the Notice. That Plaintiff
continues to insist that the depositions proceed on March 19 (when the RTC and counsel are not available) and within
a week of declaration of global pandemic and state of emergency, particularly in and around the Los Angeles area, is
reckless and evidence of Plaintiff’s unabashed efforts not to gather facts but to abuse and harass RTC. Plaintiff has
even balked at the proposal from RTC to schedule depositions for the first week in April (by insisting that the
depositions must proceed prior to March 31) is further ground to question Plaintiff’s motivations.

10
jurisdictional discovery and excusing RTC witnesses from appearing at the noticed depositions

should be granted unless and until Plaintiff submits an affidavit or other evidence addressing the

jurisdictional averments in the McShane Declaration at which time the Court can assess whether

jurisdictional discovery is appropriate.

ARGUMENT

A. Standard for Obtaining a Motion for Protective Order.

A court has broad discretion in overseeing discovery, and protecting the parties that come

before it. To that end, Rule 1.280(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, for

good cause, the trial court may make any order to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense that justice requires. Fed. R. Civ. P.

1.280(c). Protective orders may be entered to excuse parties from complying with discovery

requests while a motion to dismiss the case is pending. See e.g., Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv.,

Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987) (“The discovery rules also confer broad discretion on the

trial court to limit or prohibit discovery in order to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”) (citations omitted). “[C]ourts have

held good cause to stay discovery exists wherein resolution of a preliminary motion may dispose

of the entire action.” Varga v. Palm Beach Capital Mgmt., No. 99-82398-CIV, 2010 WL 8510622,

*1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2010); see also Cheshire v. Bank of Am., N.A., 351 Fed. App’x 386, 388

(11th Cir. 2009) (“a plaintiff has no right to discovery upon the filing of a motion to dismiss that

raises a purely legal question”).

B. Broad Merits-Based Discovery is Not Appropriate.

When a defendant has challenged personal jurisdiction, courts will typically preclude a

plaintiff from burdening the defendant with broad-based and unlimited merits-based discovery

11
until the jurisdiction issue is resolved. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353

(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that discovery should be stayed pending ruling on motion to dismiss and

narrowing of issues); McCullough v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 16-cv-20194, 2017 WL

6372619, *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2017) (staying all merits-based discovery pending ruling on motion

to dismiss).

Plaintiff seeks unlimited, merits-based discovery despite RTC’s meritorious personal

jurisdiction challenge that, if granted, would eliminate the need for any such discovery. As set

forth above, more than three (3) months after RTC filed its Motion to Dismiss challenging personal

jurisdiction, Plaintiff requested an open-ended deposition of Warren McShane. Moreover, the

Notice directed to the RTC corporate designee sets forth twenty-six (26) separate intrusive topics

and two (2) of which explicitly seek merits-based discovery:

 “All allegations involving Jane Doe as described in Plaintiff’s Complaint,” (Topic 1);

 “[RTC’s] investigation and/or analysis of the allegations described in Plaintiff’s


Complaint,” (Topic 2).

(Ex. A, ¶¶ 1, 2.)

The Notice further contains requests that have no bearing on the issues in this case and/or

seek information that is not discoverable under any circumstances,5 including privileged and work

product information, to wit:

 “[RTC’s] investigation and/or analysis of the allegations described in Plaintiff’s


Complaint,” (Topic 2);

 “All documents sent to Florida (electronic or otherwise) by [RTC] from January 2005
to the present,” (Topic 7);

5
As discussed below, at § D, many of the topics in the Notice violate First Amendment protections against excessive
entanglement and intrusion into internal church affairs. Insofar as those matters are sought in furtherance of merits
discovery, RTC incorporates by reference the arguments advanced therein as further basis for foreclosing such
discovery attempts here.

12
 “All financial institutions in Florida used or consulted by [RTC] and/or on its behalf,
for the time period of January 2005 to the present,” (Topic 10);

 “All debts owed to or by [RTC] to any person or entity in Florida from January 2005
to the present,” (Topic 12);

 “All jurisdictions where [RTC] has filed tax returns, from January 2005 to the present
date,” (Topic 15);

 “Any Florida law firms employed by [RTC] for any matter other than this lawsuit, from
January 2005 to the present,” (Topic 19);

 “All payments made by Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. to


[RTC] for any other reason, from January 2005 to the present,” (Topic 24); and

 “All payments made by any Florida person and/or entity to [RTC] for any reason, from
January 2005 to the present,” (Topic 25).
(Ex. A, ¶¶ 2, 7, 10, 12, 15, 19, 24, 25.)

Furthermore, all but one topic in the Notice seeks information spanning over a 15-year

period and/or are temporally unlimited. Nothing could be more indicative of a fishing expedition.

In addition, Plaintiff appears to be misusing this litigation to discover any and every piece of

sensitive and internal information about RTC that is irrelevant to any claim asserted by Plaintiff.

In addition, the Notice is being interposed for the purpose of abuse and delay. RTC’s

Motion to Dismiss has been pending since November 18, 2019, and is set for hearing on April 20,

2020—a date agreed to by Plaintiff more than five (5) weeks ago. After rejecting earlier requested

dates for the hearing, and taking no action for over three months, Plaintiff now seeks to embark on

extensive discovery without even meeting and conferring with undersigned counsel on dates and

scope. This eleventh hour discovery is clearly designed to frustrate RTC’s efforts to proceed with

the hearing on April 20 on its Motion to Dismiss on jurisdiction, venue and the multitude of other

challenges raised in the Motion.

For the foregoing reasons, discovery should be stayed pending a ruling on the Motion to

Dismiss.
13
C. Jurisdictional Discovery is Not Appropriate Because Plaintiff Has Failed to Respond
to the Motion to Dismiss and Failed to Submit Competing Evidence on Personal
Jurisdiction.

Insofar as Plaintiff maintains she is at some point entitled to limited jurisdictional

discovery, her Notice is procedurally defective.6 In particular, Plaintiff has not complied with the

procedure governing disputes over personal jurisdiction in Florida, set forth in Volkswagen

Aktiengesellschaft v. Jones, 227 So. 3d 150, 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). There the court held that a

defendant may challenge the jurisdictional allegations in a plaintiff’s pleading by filing a motion

to dismiss supported by affidavits. Id. at 155 (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.

2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989).) The burden then shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate by affidavit or other

sworn statement grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Jones, 227 So.

3d at 155. If the affidavits can be harmonized, the trial court can resolve the jurisdictional dispute

“based on the undisputed facts” without the need for any jurisdictional fact finding. Id. at 155

(citations omitted).

If, on the other hand, the parties’ affidavits cannot be harmonized—a decision made after

informed review by a Court at the hearing on a Motion to Dismiss, not preemptively by a

plaintiff—“the trial court must hold a limited evidentiary hearing,” during which the court should

receive testimony and evidence, and based on such evidence resolve the jurisdictional challenge.

See Jones, 227 So. 3d at 155; see also Dickinson Wright, PLLC v. Third Reef Holdings, LLC, 244

So. 3d 303, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018); Estes v. Rodin, 259 So. 3d 183, 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)

(“Because Appellants failed to rebut Appellees’ affidavits with [a] counter-affidavit, the trial court

6
Plaintiff’s failure to move for leave to seek jurisdictional discovery in and of itself warrants entry of a protective
order. See Peruyero v. Airbus, S.A.S., 83 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff’s failure to move for
leave to seek jurisdictional discovery renders discovery request procedurally flawed); see also United Techs. Corp. v.
Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 2009) (denying jurisdictional discovery where “plaintiff never formally
moved the district court for jurisdictional discovery . . . .”); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd, 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th
Cir. 1999) (finding that district court did not err in denying jurisdictional discovery and dismissing complaint on, inter
alia, personal jurisdiction grounds where plaintiff was dilatory in seeking jurisdictional discovery).

14
did not abuse its discretion by denying limited jurisdictional discovery.”); Thompson v. Carnival

Corp., 174 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (holding the party is not entitled to

jurisdictional discovery as “no genuine dispute on a material jurisdictional fact to warrant

jurisdictional discovery.”); Peruyero, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 1289-90 (jurisdictional discovery not

warranted where plaintiff failed to submit a rebuttal affidavit creating a genuine dispute of material

jurisdictional fact).

Jurisdictional discovery is improper unless and until a court determines that there is a

material conflict between competing affidavits from the plaintiff and defendant that cannot be

reconciled. Here, there are no competing affidavits, nor any other form of competing evidence to

be evaluated and harmonized. As of the filing of this Motion, more than four (4) months have

elapsed since RTC filed its Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff has yet to respond to RTC’s legal

arguments, let alone submit evidence rebutting RTC’s factual assertions regarding jurisdiction,

despite the undersigned counsel’s invitation to do so following Plaintiff’s initial request for

deposition dates. Accordingly, any effort by Plaintiff to take jurisdictional discovery of Warren

McShane or an RTC corporate representative, either by deposition or written discovery, is

categorically premature and should not be countenanced unless and until Plaintiff comes forth with

competing evidence demonstrating to the Court a need for such discovery, which would then

permit the Court to make an appropriate and informed decision based on the evidence before it.7

It is not for Plaintiff to unilaterally determine her entitlement to jurisdictional discovery.

That is entirely the Court’s province. For the foregoing reasons, RTC’s Motion for Protective

Order should be granted and all jurisdictional discovery must be denied unless and until Plaintiff

7
Gleneagle Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Leondakos, 602 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1992) does not support Plaintiff’s position. Although
Gleneagle envisions very limited “pre-affidavit” jurisdictional discovery, it expressly predicates such a proposition
on the premise that a Court should not countenance a Plaintiff filing a frivolous complaint alleging personal
jurisdiction with no basis whatsoever in fact. Id. at 1284.

15
files her competing affidavit, and the Court determines that affidavit presents competent material

evidence that cannot be harmonized with RTC’s affidavit. Even then, as discussed below, Plaintiff

has the burden of establishing jurisdiction and she should be subject to deposition first.

D. The Notice Infringes on RTC’s Constitutional Protections Against Excessive


Entanglement and Invasive Discovery of a Church.

The Notice is constitutionally objectionable as an affront to RTC’s protections against

excessive entanglement and intrusive involvement under the First Amendment religion clauses.

It is well-settled that courts should endeavor to remain neutral and outside of religious disputes,

particularly between former members and the religious organizations to which they once belonged.

The Supreme Court has expressly limited inquiry and required disclosure of internal church

matters, reasoning that “[i]t is not only the conclusions that may be reached . . . which may impinge

on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to

findings and conclusions.” NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979).

Understanding discovery ordinarily is intended to be liberally construed, in a case such as

this, the customary liberality attendant to discovery is fundamentally at odds with the

constitutionally mandated non-entanglement principle and repeated warnings by courts that the

“very process of inquiry” can seriously impinge First Amendment rights. Courts must therefore

eschew their traditional notions of open discovery when confronting discovery demands against

church organizations that necessarily implicate “matters of discipline, faith, internal organization,

or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law,” all of which are beyond the acceptable reach of judicial

scrutiny. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976); see also

Church of Scientology Flag Service Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1537-38 (11th Cir.

1993) (ruling City ordinance requiring disclosure of use of funds resulted in excessive

entanglement because, among other things, it “subjects religious organizations to the continuous

16
surveillance of their own members by requiring disclosure of all records underlying the statements

upon request.”)

Churches are entitled to a degree of privacy and non-entanglement with respect to their

internal affairs and actions that is not accorded to businesses. See U.S. v. Church of Scientology

of Boston, 933 F.2d 1074, 1075 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying Church Audit Procedures Act to limit

IRS administrative summons only to those matters “necessary,” and not merely “relevant,” to IRS

inquiry); Church of Scientology FSO v. Williams, 671 So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)

(“petitioner is a religious institution and the court should exercise special care that such discovery

is legitimately needed for litigation, not desired for some other purpose”). Moreover, as with First

Amendment rights of speech and association:

Where discovery demands threaten First Amendment rights of privacy or association, the
party seeking the discovery must show that the information sought is highly relevant to the
claims or defenses in litigation — a more demanding standard of relevance than that under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). The request must be carefully tailored to avoid
unnecessary interference with protected activities, and the information must be otherwise
unavailable.

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1126, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009). A court should thus not permit

such discovery unless and until the Court has reached a “conclusion that the discovery request, as

framed, is the means least inclusive and intrusive for gathering the information . . .” Adolph Coors

Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The concern for the misuse of such

information is particularly acute in a litigation context such as this. See Britt v. Superior Court,

20 Cal. 3d 844, 855 (Cal. 1978) (“the threat to First Amendment rights may be more severe in a

discovery context, since the party directing the inquiry is a litigation adversary who may well

attempt to harass his opponent. . . .”).

In this case, Plaintiff’s sweeping deposition topics far exceed any legitimate inquiry into

the question of jurisdiction and are the very paradigm of abusive and harassive discovery. In

17
particular, the Notice not only seeks to elicit testimony related to any person or entity that has

made a financial payment, including charitable or other contributions of any amount, to RTC since

2005, (see, e.g., Ex. A., ¶¶ 6, 25), but also information about outreach efforts to parishioners and

parishioner involvement, (see, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 3, 4, 8, 11, 20), as well as internal RTC operations and

church matters (see, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 5, 21, 22, 23, 24). Plaintiff’s effort to obtain virtually unbounded

discovery into internal Church matters must be rejected. For the foregoing reasons, RTC’s Motion

for Protective Order should be granted and all discovery delineated in the Notice should be denied.

E. The Notice Provides No Valid or Appropriate Basis for Pursuing Limited and
Narrowly Tailored Jurisdictional Discovery.

1. Plaintiff concedes RTC is not subject to general jurisdiction and should not be
permitted to burden RTC with discovery demands purportedly in furtherance of
general jurisdiction.
Even if Plaintiff’s Notice were not premature, Plaintiff is entitled to no discovery on the

issue of general personal jurisdiction. As stated above, her allegation that “RTC is a California

corporation with its principal place of business in California,” (Compl. ¶ 7), is a judicial admission

and conclusively establishes that RTC is “at home” in California. Under the Daimler framework,

then, RTC is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Florida and Plaintiff is estopped from

now taking a contrary position or pursuing discovery in furtherance thereof. RTC’s Motion for

Protective Order should be granted as to any discovery into general jurisdiction.

2. Plaintiff’s Notice topics are not appropriate for seeking discovery on general
jurisdiction under Daimler’s framework.
If the Court determines the issue of general jurisdiction is not definitively foreclosed by

Plaintiff’s judicial admission, it should nonetheless reject any effort by Plaintiff to conduct general

jurisdiction discovery pursuant to the Notice that is misplaced and misdirected at a pre-Daimler

framework and, thus, immaterial to a Daimler “at home” analysis. As discussed in RTC’s Motion

to Dismiss, the controlling test for whether a state may exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign

18
defendant consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is established by

Daimler. General jurisdiction arises where the defendant is “at home.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138-

39. A defendant is “at home” and may be subject to general personal jurisdiction only in the state

of its principal place of business, or its state of incorporation, except in the “exceptional case.” Id.

at 137. This is not an exceptional case.

Following Daimler, courts have noted the “heavy burden” that a plaintiff now must meet

to establish that a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction. See Waite v. All Acquisition Corp.,

901 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2018). The Notice topics are directed to seeking discovery in a

pre-Daimler framework and are improper. Whether or not RTC does business or has been

qualified to do business in Florida, maintains an office, property, a telephone, a bank account or

employees in Florida or who travel to Florida, has hosted an event in Florida, has entered into

contracts in Florida or with a Florida entity, or has derived revenue or income from Florida as

requested by Topics 3-6, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 20-25 of the Notice, (see Ex. A, ¶¶ 3-6, 10, 11, 14, 16,

17, 20-25), is legally immaterial to whether RTC is “at home” in Florida or whether any additional

contacts make RTC an “exceptional case” under Daimler. In Daimler, the seminal case on general

personal jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court held that having multiple facilities in California and

being “the largest supplier of luxury vehicles” to the state which accounted for 2% of Daimler’s

worldwide sales, was not sufficient to confer general personal jurisdiction. Daimler, 571 U.S. at

123, 139 (2014). Post-Daimler cases from Florida are instructive.

In Waite, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant was not subject to general

personal jurisdiction in Florida despite having a distributor in Florida, doing business with several

customers in Florida, having once registered to do business in Florida, and even having built a

plant in Florida. See Waite, 901 F.3d at 1317. In Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., the 11th

19
Circuit held a defendant, a Belize corporation, was not subject to general personal jurisdiction as

an “exceptional case” under Daimler despite having contacts in Florida, including a Florida bank

account and two (2) Florida addresses, purchasing insurance from Florida companies, filing a

financing statement with the Florida Secretary of State, joining a non-profit trade organization

based in Florida, and even consenting to jurisdiction in the Southern District of Florida for all

lawsuits arising out of its agreement with Carnival Corporation. 789 F.3d 1201, 1204-06 (11th

Cir. 2015). And, in Thompson, the court was confronted with facts very similar to those in

Carmouche. Relying on the reasoning in Carmouche, the district court held a defendant was not

subject to general personal jurisdiction despite having contractual relationships with Carnival

Cruise lines and other cruise lines in Florida, having bank accounts in Florida, a relationship with

the Florida Caribbean Cruise Association, agreements to indemnify Carnival, a consent to

jurisdiction in the Southern District of Florida for any lawsuit that Carnival is a party to concerning

the shore excursion. See Thompson, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 1335.

Based on the foregoing, Notice Topics 3-6, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 20-25 are irrelevant and

inappropriate, are not grounds for general personal jurisdictional discovery and should be rejected.

The Motion for Protective Order should be granted and discovery into general jurisdiction relating

to matters implicated by these topics must be prohibited.

3. Plaintiff’s Notice does not establish grounds for engaging in discovery as to specific
jurisdiction over RTC.
A plain reading of the Notice makes clear that none of the Topics are directly related to the

issue of specific personal jurisdiction over RTC. Only Topic 26 (“all issues addressed by or raised

in the Declaration of Warren McShane made in support of RTC’s Motion to Dismiss”) could be

construed as remotely seeking information on specific jurisdiction given the averments in the

McShane Declaration that denied any affiliation with Plaintiff or involvement in any underlying

20
act pleaded in the Complaint. Florida courts are very clear, however, that merits-discovery in the

face of a jurisdictional challenge is off-limits and not appropriate. See, e.g., Gleneagle, 602 So.

2d at 1284 (Jurisdictional discovery, if ordered, “should not be broad, onerous or expansive, nor

should it address the merits of the case” and, “where possible, the discovery should be carried out

so as to minimize expense to the defendant.”)

Plaintiff cannot conduct merits discovery under the guise of conducting discovery into a

basis for asserting specific jurisdiction over RTC. Permitting Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct

merits discovery masquerading as jurisdictional discovery would eviscerate the bright line

distinction courts have been vigilant in preserving between the two. Plaintiff’s failure to conduct

sufficient investigation prior to commencing an action and lodging accusations against RTC in this

Court should not now serve as grounds to dismantle the entire jurisdictional discovery framework

so that she can engage in the futile exercise of remedying the irremediable. The Court must find

that Plaintiff is not entitled to conduct any discovery on the issue of specific jurisdiction due to the

patent risk that such discovery would open the floodgates for Plaintiff to conduct unbounded merits

discovery.

F. If, Notwithstanding the Foregoing, the Court Remains Inclined to Grant Limited and
Narrowly Tailored Jurisdictional Discovery of RTC, RTC Should be Permitted
Jurisdictional Discovery of Plaintiff First.

Should the Court conclude that, despite Plaintiff’s procedurally defective Notice and

failure to provide competing evidence to the McShane Declaration, jurisdictional depositions

would be appropriate, the precise parameters thereof should be ordered with specificity to ensure

Plaintiff does not abuse the process and exceed the bounds in a discovery frolic and detour—a

distinct possibility given the expansive scope of the Notice topics and Plaintiff’s (and her

counsel’s) questionable tactics to date. See Gleneagle, 602 So. 2d at 1284 (jurisdictional discovery

21
is intended to be as narrow as necessary, impose as little burden on the responding party as possible

and under no circumstances involve discovery into the merits of the action).

Moreover, without waiving any defenses or objections, if limited jurisdictional discovery

is ordered by the Court, such discovery should be reciprocal. See Rizack v. Signature Bank, N.A.,

267 So. 3d 24, 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (holding the “parties,” not just plaintiff, may conduct

jurisdictional discovery); Mason v. Hunton, 816 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); McMillan v

Troutman, 740 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“the parties are entitled to take discovery,

limited to the facts relevant to the issue of jurisdiction”). Plaintiff’s counsel rejected this proposal

after it was offered as an accommodation by RTC. Yet, it is abundantly reasonable and appropriate

to compel Plaintiff to provide sworn testimony first about the factual bases (or lack thereof) for

her jurisdictional allegations in the Complaint as to RTC, all of which are verifiably false. (See

generally McShane Decl.) After such deposition, the Court could then revisit the issue of whether

any jurisdictional discovery of RTC is warranted.

G. It is Reckless and Irresponsible to Proceed with a Non-Emergency Deposition in Los


Angeles During a Public Health Crisis.

Having waited four (4) months to issue deposition notices, Plaintiff clearly has waived any

argument that the noticed depositions constitute an emergency and must occur on March 19 or

even before March 31, as demanded by Plaintiff’s counsel in her last email. Given the current

public health crisis, RTC’s counsel should not be forced to travel from Miami to Los Angeles in

the immediate future given the admonitions to avoid all unnecessary travel and social contact.8

The responsible course of action is for any non-emergency travel and meetings related to this case

to be suspended until the risk has abated. For all of the foregoing reasons, the April 20 hearing

8
See http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/phcommon/public/media/mediapubhpdetail.cfm?prid=2261expose (Los
Angeles County Public Health Department advising against all non-essential travel).

22
should proceed based on the record to which Plaintiff may submit a competing affidavit. Plaintiff’s

demand that counsel for RTC travel to Los Angeles now to defend an improper and non-emergency

deposition should be rejected by this Court on both legal and public safety grounds.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, RTC respectfully requests that this Court issue a protective order

excusing Mr. McShane and RTC’s corporate representative from appearing for depositions, as set

forth herein.

Dated: March 16, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

DLA PIPER LLP (US)

/s/ Christopher Oprison _


Christopher Oprison, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 0122080
Primary Email: chris.oprison@dlapiper.com
Secondary Email: monica.tucker@dlapiper.com
Ardith Bronson, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 423025
Primary Email: ardith.bronson@dlapiper.com
200 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2500
Miami, Florida 33131
Tel.: (305) 423-8522
Fax: (305) 675-6366

Counsel for Defendant Religious Technology


Center

23
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was furnished

electronically upon filing with the e-Filing Portal this March 16, 2020 to all entitled parties and

counsel of record.

/s/ Christopher Oprison _


Christopher Oprison, Esq.

24
Exhibit A
Filing # 104419912 E-Filed 03/05/2020 03:36:57 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 11TH


JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CIVIL DIVISION

Case No.: 19-27633 CA 05


JANE DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG


SERVICE ORGANIZATION, INC., a Florida
corporation; CLEARWATER ACADEMY,
INC., a Florida corporation; THE CHURCH
OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a
California corporation; RELIGIOUS
TECHNOLOGY CENTER, a California
corporation; and DAVID MISCAVIGE, a
California resident;

Defendants.
_____________________________________/

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF TAKING VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITIONS

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff will take the videotaped depositions of the

following individuals at the indicated date, time, and location:

Name of Deponent Date and Time Location


Warren McShane, as a March 19, 2020, at 9:00 a.m. Orange Legal Veritext Company
director and officer of 888 S. Figueroa Street, #840
Religious Technology Los Angeles, CA 90017
Center (“RTC”)
Lynn Farney, as an March 19, 2020, at 11:00 a.m. Orange Legal Veritext Company
officer of Church of 888 S. Figueroa Street, #840
Scientology Los Angeles, CA 90017
International (“CSI”)
RTC— its officer, March 19, 2020, at 1:00 p.m. Orange Legal Veritext Company
managing agent, 888 S. Figueroa Street, #840
director, or such other Los Angeles, CA 90017
person designated to
testify on its behalf
pursuant to Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure
1.310(b)(6) to provide
testimony on the matters
set forth in the attached
Exhibit A.
CSI— its officer, March 19, 2020, at 3:00 p.m. Orange Legal Veritext Company
managing agent, 888 S. Figueroa Street, #840
director, or such other Los Angeles, CA 90017
person designated to
testify on its behalf
pursuant to Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure
1.310(b)(6) to provide
testimony on the matters
set forth in the attached
Exhibit A.

upon oral examination before Orange Legal Veritext Company, Notary Public, or any other officer

authorized by law to take depositions in the applicable state. The oral examination will continue

from day to day until completed. The videotaped deposition will be conducted by Orange Legal

Veritext Company. This deposition is being taken pursuant to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure

for the purposes of discovery, for use at trial, or for such other purposes as are permitted under the

rules of Court.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREFY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was e-mailed on this

5th day of March, 2020, to all parties of record identified on the Service List.

PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.


SunTrust International Center
One SE Third Avenue, Suite 2300
Miami, FL 33131

2
Telephone: (305) 358-2800
Fax: (305) 358-2382

By: /s Ricardo M. Martinez-Cid


RICARDO M. MARTÍNEZ-CID
Florida Bar No. 383988
Email: RMCTeam@podhurst.com
LEA P. BUCCIERO
Florida Bar No. 84763
Email: RMCTeam@podhurst.com

-&-

Brian D. Kent, Esq.


Gaetano D’Andrea, Esq.
M. Stewart Ryan, Esq.
Helen L. Fitzpatrick, Esq.
Lauren Stram, Esq.
LAFFEY, BUCCI & KENT, LLP
1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19102
(215) 399-9255/Fax: (215) 241-8700
(Pro Hac Vice admission pending for
all attorneys)

-&-

Jeffrey P. Fritz, Esq.


SOLOFF & ZERVANOS, P.C.
1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
(215) 732-2260/Fax: (215) 732-2289
(Pro Hac Vice admission pending)

-&-

Marci Hamilton, Esq.


University of Pennsylvania1
Fox-Fels Building
3814 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(215) 353-8984/Fax: (215) 493-1094
(Pro Hac Vice admission pending)

1
This address is solely for delivery purposes. It does not indicate support for any lawsuit or case
by the University of Pennsylvania.
3
-&-

Robert W. Thompson, Esq.


Kristen A. Vierhaus, Esq.
THOMPSON LAW OFFICES, P.C.
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
Burlingame, CA 94010
(650) 513-6111/Fax: (650) 513-6071
(Pro Hac Vice admission pending)

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

4
SERVICE LIST

Mark F. Raymond, Esq.


Amy Steele Donner, Esq.
Nelson, Mullins, Broad and Cassel Christopher Oprison, Esq.
200 So. Biscayne Blvd., Ste 2100 Ardith Bronson, Esq.
Miami, Florida 33131 Janelly Crespo, Esq.
Mark.raymond@nelsonmullins.com DLA Piper LLP
Stacy.smith@nelsonmullins.com 200 So. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2500
Amy.steeledonner@nelsonmullins.com Miami, Florida 33131
Janel.gonzalez@nelsonmullins.com Chris.oprison@dlapiper.com
Monica.tucker@dlapiper.com
Ardith.bronson@dlapiper.com
Elaine D. Walter, Esq. Janelly.crespo@dlapiper.com
W. Todd Boyd, Esq.
Boyd Richards Parker & Colonnelli, PL Brian J. Stack, Esq.
100 SE 2nd Street, Suite 2600 Robert Harris, Esq.
Miami, Florida 33131 Sammy Epelbaum, Esq.
ewalter@boydlawgroup.com Stack Fernandez & Harris, PA
tboyd@boydlawgroup.com 1001 Brickell Bay Drive, Suite 2650
Miami, Florida 33131
bstack@stackfernandez.com
John H. Richards, Esq. rharris@stackfernandez.com
Boyd Richards Parker & Colonnelli, PL sepelbaum@stackfernandez.com
1600 West Commercial Blvd., Ste 201 gmartich@stackfernandez.com
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33309 mwolf@stackfernandez.com
jrichards@boydlawgroup.com

5
EXHIBIT A

Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310(b)(6), deponent is requested to testify

regarding the following matters through a designated representative of the named deponent with

information known or reasonably available to the organization:

1. All allegations involving Jane Doe as described in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

2. Defendant’s investigation and/or analysis of the allegations described in Plaintiff’s

Complaint.

3. Defendant’s employees, representatives, members, delegates, and/or agents, in any

capacity whatsoever, in Florida, from January 2005 to the present.

4. Defendant’s employees, representatives, members, delegates, and/or agents’ travel

to Florida for the purpose of engaging in business for Defendant or for Defendant’s benefit or on

Defendant’s behalf, from January 2005 to the present.

5. Defendant’s relationship, whether formal or informal, with Church of Scientology

Flag Service Organization, Inc., Clearwater Academy, Inc. and/or the Sea Organization.

6. Defendant’s revenue or income earned as a result of activities in Florida, from

January 2005 to the present, and what percentage of Defendant’s total revenue or income this

represents.

7. All documents sent to Florida (electronic or otherwise) by Defendant from January

2005 to the present.

8. All marketing materials, recruiting materials, brochures, pamphlets, leaflets, and/or

videos provided by Defendant (electronic or otherwise), and/or authorized to be provided by

Defendant, to any person or entity in Florida, from January 2005 to the present.

6
9. All advertising, marketing, and/or printing expenses incurred in Florida by

Defendant, from January 2005 to the present.

10. All financial institutions in Florida used or consulted by Defendant and/or on its

behalf, for the time period of January 2005 to the present.

11. All Florida residents and/or entities employed, retained, hired, or contracted by

Defendant for any work or job whatsoever, from January 2005 to the present.

12. All debts owed to or by Defendant to any person or entity in Florida from January

2005 to the present.

13. Any legal or administrative action in Florida commenced by or against Defendant,

from January 2005 to the present.

14. All information related to Defendant being or having ever been qualified to do

business in Florida, from January 2005 to the present.

15. All jurisdictions where Defendant has filed tax returns, from January 2005 to the

present date.

16. All real property owned, leased, controlled, and/or otherwise occupied or used by

Defendant, jointly and/or individually, in Florida, from January 2005 to the present.

17. Any telephone, including cellular phone, maintained by Defendant in Florida, from

January 2005 to the present.

18. Any agreements, contracts, and/or other binding documents to which Defendant is

a party that provide for application of Florida law, from January 2005 to the present.

19. Any Florida law firms employed by Defendant for any matter other than this

lawsuit, from January 2005 to the present.

7
20. All landmark events, ceremonies, celebrations, holidays, seminars, conferences,

meetings, conventions, and/or other events hosted by Defendant and/or its employees,

representatives, members, delegates, and/or agents on Defendant’s behalf in Florida, from January

2005 to the present.

21. All management and/or licensing agreements between Church of Scientology Flag

Service Organization, Inc. and Defendant, from January 2005 to the present.

22. All management and/or licensing agreements between Defendant and any Florida

person or entity, from January 2005 to the present.

23. All payments made by Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. to

Defendant pursuant to any management or licensing agreements, from January 2005 to the present.

24. All payments made by Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. to

Defendant for any other reason, from January 2005 to the present.

25. All payments made by any Florida person and/or entity to Defendant for any reason,

from January 2005 to the present.

26. For RTC only, all issues addressed by or raised in the Affidavit of Warren McShane

made in support of RTC’s Motion to Dismiss.

27. For CSI only, all issues addressed by or raised in the Affidavit of Lynn Farny made

in support of CSI’s Motion to Dismiss.

8
Exhibit B
Oprison, Chris

From: Oprison, Chris


Sent: Tuesday, February 25, 2020 8:44 PM
To: (RMC Team)
Cc: cperez@podhurst.com; Bronson, Ardith; Crespo, Janelly; Tucker, Monica C.
Subject: RE: Doe v. Church of Scientology, et al.

Importance: High

Dear Mr. Martinez-Cid,

As you know, I represent Religious Technology Center (RTC), one of the defendants in the Jane Doe action. This
responds to your below request to depose Mr. McShane. A deposition is not appropriate and your request is
rejected. As you know, RTC has raised threshold jurisdictional and venue challenges, each of which is meritorious and,
we believe, will be successful. Insofar as you intend to conduct jurisdictional or venue discovery, your client’s allegations
are false and frivolous and do not warrant discovery. They do, however, provide grounds for seeking sanctions against
your client. Your client is not now, nor has she ever been, a resident of Miami-Dade County and the complaint lacks any
allegation that would make venue appropriate here. The only link to Miami-Dade is her selection of your firm to
represent her which, as you know, is not a basis for establishing venue. When you respond to our Motion to Dismiss
with a declaration from your client, the court will then have the discretion to determine whether the declarations can be
harmonized and whether venue or jurisdictional discovery should proceed. That is the process that should be
followed. We seriously doubt the court will order any discovery given that your client’s complaint is pure fiction and
part of an orchestrated shakedown. I trust that RTC’s position is clear. Please contact me if you wish to discuss further.

Regards,

Chris Oprison

From: Carmen Perez <cperez@podhurst.com>


Sent: Friday, February 21, 2020 3:39 PM
To: Oprison, Chris <chris.oprison@us.dlapiper.com>; Tucker, Monica C. <Monica.Tucker@us.dlapiper.com>

1
Cc: (RMC Team) <RMCTeam@PODHURST.com>
Subject: RE: Doe v. Church of Scientology, et al.

Good afternoon,
Following up on our previous request. Please see below. Thank you.

Carmen R. Perez
Legal Assistant to Ricardo M. Martinez-Cid, Esq. & Lea P. Bucciero, Esq.

Email: cperez@podhurst.com

From: Carmen Perez


Sent: Tuesday, February 18, 2020 4:06 PM
To: chris.oprison@dlapiper.com; monica.tucker@dlapiper.com
Cc: (RMC Team) <RMCTeam@PODHURST.com>
Subject: Doe v. Church of Scientology, et al.

We would like to schedule the deposition of Warren McShane. Please provide us with your dates of availability so we
may coordinate same. Thank you.

Carmen R. Perez
Legal Assistant to Ricardo M. Martinez-Cid, Esq. & Lea P. Bucciero, Esq.

Email: cperez@podhurst.com

2
Exhibit C
Oprison, Chris

From: Lea P. Bucciero <LBucciero@podhurst.com>


Sent: Saturday, March 14, 2020 3:23 PM
To: Oprison, Chris
Cc: RICARDO M. MARTINEZ-CID; (RMC Team); Robert Harris; Bronson, Ardith; Brian D.
Kent
Subject: Re: Jane Doe v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc., et al. - FOLLOW
UP RE DEPOSITIONS (CONFIDENTIAL)

Hello Chris:

Our client’s deposition is not warranted or required before we are able take the depositions we have noticed for this
week. If you provide dates on Monday on which we are able to reschedule the depositions of McShane and the
corporate rep. before March 31, 2020, we will renotice them. If we are able to set those depositions to occur before
March 31, we can agree to postpone Mr. Miscavige’s deposition, take the deposition of McShane and the corporate rep
first, and then reevaluate whether we will seek to take Mr. Miscavige’s deposition at this stage.

Although it is is not my practice to take unnecessarily long depositions, we also do not agree to any limitation on the
length of the depositions.

If we can agree to this approach, we will reset the depositions; otherwise, we will leave them on the schedule as they
are currently set.

Thank you,
Lea

On Mar 14, 2020, at 11:12 AM, Oprison, Chris <chris.oprison@dlapiper.com> wrote:

Ricardo – thanks for the email. I am available this weekend if we need to discuss.

Chris

1
From: RICARDO M. MARTINEZ-CID <RMartinez-Cid@PODHURST.com>
Sent: Saturday, March 14, 2020 11:10 AM
To: Oprison, Chris <chris.oprison@us.dlapiper.com>; (RMC Team) <RMCTeam@PODHURST.com>
Cc: Robert Harris <rharris@stackfernandez.com>; Bronson, Ardith <Ardith.Bronson@us.dlapiper.com>;
Brian D. Kent <BKent@laffeybuccikent.com>
Subject: Re: Jane Doe v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc., et al. - FOLLOW UP RE
DEPOSITIONS (CONFIDENTIAL)

Thanks Chris. Your notes are close to my recollection of our conversation and I don't take issue
with them. Lea will get back to you on substance but i am confident we can reach agreement.

From: "Oprison, Chris" <chris.oprison@dlapiper.com>


Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 4:46 PM
To: RICARDO M. MARTINEZ-CID; (RMC Team)
Cc: Robert Harris; Bronson, Ardith; Brian D. Kent
Subject: RE: Jane Doe v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc., et al. - FOLLOW UP RE
DEPOSITIONS (CONFIDENTIAL)

Ricardo – thank you for the email back. We are nearing 5pm so please do let us know as soon as you
can on the deposition proposal. As you know, the clock is ticking and we need to assess options before
moving into the weekend. If the proposal is agreeable in principle, let me know. I am happy to work
with you over the weekend to set new dates for the depositions.

On the other matter, our notes of the call relating to the deposition notice to Mr. Miscavige (in his
capacity as Chairman of the Board for my client, RTC) reflect what is encapsulated in my email to you
below. I take issue with the accusation that I would misrepresent any communication, even
inadvertently but definitely not blatantly as you indicate. We discussed the deposition in the context of
other jurisdictional discovery you sought from RTC’s and CSI’s corporate rep and our view that Mr.
Miscavige’s deposition was not appropriate. Indeed, as I mentioned in my earlier email, other
jurisdictions faced with the same issue have resoundingly rejected the notion that Mr. Miscavige should
be deposed on a jurisdictional issue, in particular because the attempt to do so was viewed as
unnecessary at best, and harassing and abusive at worst (i.e., as an end run around service issues and as
an effort to avoid serving a third party subpoena on him). Mr. Miscavige does not have unique or
superior knowledge of facts relevant to this case and deposing him would not be a less intrusive means
of discovery. My point of raising this during our call was to determine whether you had any expectation

2
to the contrary; Mr. Miscavige has no information not obtainable through the depositions of Mr.
McShane (the declarant) and/or the corporate representative that, subject to our reservation of rights,
we offered to make available at a time convenient for all parties weeks before the April 20 hearing, as
you requested. And, if noticing him in his official capacity was intended to compel him as our corporate
rep, that is also inappropriate. We select who our corporate rep is. Viewed in that context, then, there
is no reason that Mr. Miscavige should be deposed in furtherance of jurisdictional discovery, which is
necessarily supposed to be limited, least burdensome, non-redundant or duplicative and certainly not
harassing, to the party having to provide the discovery. That is why I raised the issue on the call, and
why I mentioned it in my email to you.

As for our recollection of the call (which myself, Bob and Ardith are in agreement about), you indicated
initially you would assess whether to withdraw the notice to Mr. Miscavige. Later in the call, however,
after we discussed the other depositions, you mentioned you would be inclined to take his deposition
off calendar if the “other issues” were resolved and then added you may be willing to do that
anyway. That is what our notes reflect. So, to be clear, we do not make it a practice to mischaracterize
discussions with opposing counsel. That is not how we practice law. And, avoiding issues where
recollections may differ after a meet and confer call concludes is precisely why we have someone taking
copious notes during all calls. I trust that puts this issue to rest.

Back to the issues at hand. The real objectives of my email are:

To reach agreement on dates for the RTC/CSI depos currently noticed for March 19 (when we
are not available), which you wanted to take before April 20 and which you mentioned you
would be amenable to moving if we offered other dates;
To reach agreement on a jurisdictional deposition of your client, which we want to take first
and need to get dates from you; and
To withdraw the deposition notice to Mr. Miscavige in his capacity as Chairman of the Board
for my client, RTC (for the reasons discussed above).

As I said, we need to at least have an agreement in principle so that we know what course of action to
take in the near term. Thanks very much.

Best regards

Chris

3
From: RICARDO M. MARTINEZ-CID <RMartinez-Cid@PODHURST.com>
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 12:45 PM
To: Oprison, Chris <chris.oprison@us.dlapiper.com>; (RMC Team) <RMCTeam@PODHURST.com>
Cc: Robert Harris <rharris@stackfernandez.com>; Bronson, Ardith <Ardith.Bronson@us.dlapiper.com>;
Brian D. Kent <BKent@laffeybuccikent.com>
Subject: Re: Jane Doe v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc., et al. - FOLLOW UP RE
DEPOSITIONS (CONFIDENTIAL)

Chris, we will get back to you on substance soon although I don't know if it will be by close of
business today. Initially, I will note that your email contains a blatant misrepresentation that I
hope was in error:

"you indicated on our call that you would withdraw your deposition notice for Mr. Miscavige
because there is no basis to take his deposition for jurisdictional purposes."

All I said as to the deposition of Miscavige was that I would be happy to evaluate our need for
the deposition at this time to see if we could cancel as a courtesy to you, regardless of our
discussion on the other depositions. That is still the case and I will let you know what we
decide. I did not agree to withdraw the deposition yesterday and this was not remotely
unclear. Please be careful not to misrepresent my statements in the future.

From: "Oprison, Chris" <chris.oprison@dlapiper.com>


Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 12:33 PM
To: (RMC Team)
Cc: Robert Harris; Bronson, Ardith
Subject: Jane Doe v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc., et al. - FOLLOW UP RE
DEPOSITIONS (CONFIDENTIAL)

Ricardo:

Thank you for talking with Bob and me yesterday about the deposition notices to Church of Scientology
International (CSI), Lynn Farny, Religious Technology Center (RTC), and Mr. McShane. As we explained
during our call, and in our prior emails, it is our strong position that any discovery at this juncture is not
appropriate. Your client has an obligation to produce an affidavit attesting to facts supporting
jurisdiction, and then it is for the Court to decide whether any jurisdictional discovery is appropriate. I
understand you have a different view, which we discussed. We also explained to you that neither
counsel nor our clients are actually available on March 19 for the depositions.

We are mindful that the Court has before it several motions, and the parties should work to reduce the
matters that come before it. Therefore, without prejudice to or waiver of our objections to proceeding
4
with discovery, and in the spirit of trying to reach a resolution without burdening the Court, we would
be willing to agree to the following:

1) Depositions of Lynn Farny and Warren McShane: these depositions would be limited to the
statements in the declarations submitted in support of the RTC and CSI jurisdictional challenge
in the Motions to Dismiss and we will work with you to narrow the jurisdictional depositions of
the corporate representatives as discussed. These depositions would each be limited to the
original 2 hours noticed, and would be set in advance of April 20 as you requested (but which
would need to proceed in California), so as to permit the special set hearing on April 20 to
proceed as scheduled.

2) Deposition of Ms. Marsh: we will Notice Ms. Marsh for deposition here in Miami and intend to
depose her regarding the bases for asserting jurisdiction over CSI and RTC, and for venue in
Miami-Dade. As Ms. Marsh has the initial burden of establishing jurisdiction and venue, we
would insist that her deposition occur before those of Mr. Farny and Mr. McShane.

We acknowledge your stated willingness to discuss alternative dates for the depositions and will work in
good faith to schedule the foregoing at times that work for everyone.

3) Deposition of David Miscavige: you indicated on our call that you would withdraw your
deposition notice for Mr. Miscavige because there is no basis to take his deposition for
jurisdictional purposes. He is not RTC’s corporate representative and, although named in this
suit as an individual, has not been served. Your deposition notice of him, now, as a corporate
representative appears to be an attempt to do an end-run around service and other procedural
requirements and further supports the view that this case named Mr. Miscavige solely to
generate media interest and to harass. There have been similar unsuccessful attempts to do so
in other jurisdictions. (See, e.g., In re David Miscavige and Religious Technology Center, 436
S.W.3d 430 (Tx. App. July 17, 2014).) In any event, thank you for agreeing to withdraw your
deposition notice for Mr. Miscavige.

If you are amenable to this proposal, we will provide you with a new date for the depositions of Mr.
Farny and Mr. McShane and the corporate reps and expect you will provide a date for Ms. Marsh, all in
the first week of April. Due to the current public health crisis, it would be irresponsible to hold
depositions that require travel to California within the next two weeks.

In summary, we strongly disagree that any depositions or discovery should go forward before the
hearing on the jurisdictional motions, when the Court can determine whether the affidavits submitted
by the parties require discovery. We are making this offer without waiver of that position, and in the
interests of reaching a solution that will not burden the Court.

Please advise us of your position by close of business today, Friday March 13, 2020.

Best regards,

Chris

5
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The information contained in this email may be confidential and/or legally privileged. It has been sent for the sole use of
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The information contained in this email may be confidential and/or legally privileged. It has been sent for the sole use of
the intended recipient(s). If the reader of this message is not an intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
unauthorized review, use, disclosure, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication, or any of its contents,
is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please reply to the sender and destroy all copies of
the message. To contact us directly, send to postmaster@dlapiper.com. Thank you.