G.R. No.

15574 September 17, 1919

SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.)

vs.
JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD

Facts:

Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of thePhilippine Islands.
A majority of its stockholders are British subjects
. It is the owner of amotor vessel known as the
Bato
built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more thanfifteen tons gross The
Bato
was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose oftransporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made
atCebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippineregistry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate,
giving as his reason that all thestockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of thePhilippine Islands. The
instant action is the result.

On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761. The first section ofthis law amended section 1172 of the Administrative Code to
read as follows:

SEC. 1172.
Certificate of Philippine register.
— Upon registration of a vessel of domesticownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall beissued for it. If the
vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, thetaking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.

"Domestic ownership," as used in this section, means ownership vested in some one ormore of the following classes of persons: (
a) Citizens or native inhabitants of the PhilippineIslands;
b) citizens of the United States residing in the Philippine Islands;
c)any corporationor company composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States orof both
,
created under the laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, or of thereof,or the managing agent or master of the vessel resides in the Philippine
IslandsAny vessel of more than fifteen gross tons which on February eighth, nineteen hundred andeighteen, had a certificate of Philippine register under
existing law, shall likewise be deemeda vessel of domestic ownership so long as there shall not be any change in the ownershipthereof nor any transfer
of stock of the companies or corporations owning such vessel toperson not included under the last preceding paragraph.

The first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights of the Philippine Bill, repeated again in thefirst paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights as set forth
in the Jones Law, provides "That nolaw shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."

Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of thelaws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from
owning vessels, and becauseclassification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders iscapricious, and that Act No.
2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without dueprocess of law because by the passage of the law company was automatically deprived ofevery
beneficial attribute of ownership in the
Bato
and left with the naked title to a boat itcould not use .

Issue/: WON the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations
having alienstockholders.
-
Held :

YES, this is a valid exercise of police power. Common carriers which in thePhilippines as in the United States and other countries are, as Lord Hale
said, "affectedwith a public interest," can only be permitted to use these public waters as a privilege andunder such conditions as to the representatives
of the people may seem wise.
Act No.2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd.,the right to register vessels in the Philippines
coastwise trade, does not belong to thatvicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall withinauthorized exceptions,
notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does notoffend against the constitutional provision.

Ratio:
The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of thePhilippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to all person
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word"person" includes aliens.
Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope ofthe guaranties in so far as their property is concerned.
Classification with the end in view ofproviding diversity of treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based uponsome reasonable
ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection. Examples of laws heldunconstitutional because of unlawful discrimination against aliens could be cited.
Generally,these decisions relate to statutes which had attempted arbitrarily to forbid aliens to engagein ordinary kinds of business to earn their living.

Page 2
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence is,that neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, broad andcomprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with thepower of the State, sometimes termed its
`police power,' to prescribe regulations topromote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and legislateso as to increase the
industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth andprosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character,
havingthese objects in view, must often be had in certain districts." his is the same police powerwhich the United States Supreme Court say "extends to
so dealing with the conditions whichexist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people." For quitesimilar reasons, none of the
provision of the Philippine Organic Law could could have hadthe effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through
itsLegislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, thesovereign police power, in the promotion of the general
welfare and the public interest.Another notable exception permits of the regulation or distribution of the public domain orthe common property or
resources of the people of the State, so that use may be limited toits citizens. Even as to classification, it is admitted that a State may classify with
reference tothe evil to be prevented; the question is a practical one, dependent upon experience.

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
Facts:

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro.

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.

Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including
those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order
shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to
introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue:
Page 3
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law.

Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held:

The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement
in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of
the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for
the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General
adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady
requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances,
even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases.

The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is
shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the
country.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

G.R. No. L-15972 October 11, 1920

KWONG SING
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA
Facts:

Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing
Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and
dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese
nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an
act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Page 4
Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power

Whether or not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held:

Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444,
paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese
characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to
violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos,
Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is
based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a
few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are
subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of
the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.

G.R. No. L-20479 February 6, 1925

YU CONG ENG
vs.
W. TRINIDAD
Facts:

The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first instance of Manila, with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that (Section 1) it shall be unlawful for any person, company, or
partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account books in any language
other than English, Spanish or any local dialect. He was arrested, his books were seized, and the trial was about to proceed, when he and the other petitioner, Co Liam, on their own behalf, and on behalf of
all the other Chinese merchants in the Philippines, filed the petition against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and the collector of internal revenue engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge
presiding.

Issue:

Page 5
Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep proper records of their business transactions in English or Spanish or Filipino dialect by which an adequate
measure of what is due from them in meeting the cost of government can be had. But we are clearly of opinion that it is not within the police power of the Philippine Legislature, because it would be oppressive
and arbitrary, to prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in the Chinese language, and in the Chinese characters, and thus prevent them from keeping advised of the status of their
business and directing its conduct.

G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009

ANTONIO M. SERRANO
vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC

FACTS:

For Antonio Serrano, a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, does not magnify the
contributions of OFWs to national development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal
dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract “or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less” (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of
their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 5th paragraph of Section 10, RA 8042 violate the non-impairment of contract clause of the Constitution.

RULING:

Page 6
NO. The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts
already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment
clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and
respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties.
Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

G.R. No. 113911 January 23, 1998

VINTA MARITIME CO., INC.

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

Facts:

Leonides Basconsillo, private respondent, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration IPOEA) for illegal dismissal
against Vinta Maritime Co. Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. petitioners alleged that Leonides was dismissed for his gross negligence and
incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay.

The POEA ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA. Likewise, the NLRC denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent is illegally dismissed.

Held:

Page 7
The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent. For an employee’s dismissal to be valid, (1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause
and (2) the employee must be afforded due process. Petitioners allege that private respondent was dismissed because of his incompetence, enumerating
incidents in proof thereof. However, this is contradicted by private respondent’s seaman’s book which states that his discharge was due to an emergency
leave. Moreover, his alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners in the same book that private respondent’s services were “highly
recommended” and that his conduct and ability were rated “very good “. Petitioners’ allegation that such remark and ratings were given to private
respondent as an accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot consent to such an accommodation, even if the allegation
were true, as it is a blatant misrepresentation. It cannot exculpate petitioners based on such misrepresentation. When petitioners issued the
accommodation, they must have known its possible repercussions.

Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and hearing. Before the employee can be dismissed under Art. 282, the Code
requires the service of a written notice containing a statement of the cause/s of termination and giving said employee ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself. A notice of termination in writing is further required if the employee’s dismissal is decided upon. The employer must furnish the
worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss. The twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running
afoul of the constitutional guaranty.

Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment where the
employment is for a definite period. Conformably, the administrator and the NLRC properly awarded private respondent salaries for the period of the
effectivity of his contract.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The challenged decision and resolution are affirmed.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257 July 17, 2012

CRISELDA C. GACAD
vs.
JUDGE HILARION P. CLAPIS, JR

FACTS:Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint against Judge Clapis for Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, GraveAbuse of Discretion, Gross
Ignorance of the Law, and violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), andCanon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of Judicial Conduct
relative to a criminal case.Petitioner alleged that she met Judge Clapis at the Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City to talk about the case ofher brother. The
Page 8
prosecutor of the said case, Graciano Arafol, informed the petitioner that the Judge will do everythingfor her favor but on the pretext that in return she
has to give P50,000.00 to the Judge. During the meeting, the Judge,after being satisfied of the promise of the petitioner for that amount, told her "Sige,
kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato nisila." (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them.)When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of Hearings were
mailed to the petitioner only after the date ofhearing. Judge Clapis started conducting the bail hearings without an application for bail and granting the
same withoutaffording the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. He set a preliminaryconference seven months
from the date it was set, patently contrary to his declaration of speedy trial for the case.However, the judge claimed that notices were made verbally
because of time constraints. Nevertheless, he stressed thatboth sides were given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all proceedings, petitioner
was in court and theorders were done in open court. He admitted that his personnel inadvertently scheduled the preliminary conference of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of the charges

Held:

Yes. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with one’s performance of
official functions and duties.12 For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to
violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules.13 The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.14

Judge Clapis’ wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by the circumstances on record. First, the Notices of Hearings were
mailed to Gacad only after the hearing. Second, Judge Clapis started conducting the bail hearings without an application for bail and granted bail
without affording the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Third, Judge Clapis set a preliminary conference seven
months from the date it was set, patently contrary to his declaration of speedy trial for the case. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by shifting the
blame to his court personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are
not the guardians of the judge’s responsibility.15

The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct
constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

G.R. Nos. 187912-14 January 31, 2011

JOEY P. MARQUEZ
Page 9
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Through this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction,[1] petitioner Joey P. Marquez (Marquez) assails the 1] February 11, 2009 Resolution[2] of the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB-5th
Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905; and its 2] May 20, 2009

Resolution[3] denying his motion for reconsideration.

In the assailed issuances, the SB-5th Division denied Marquez's Motion to Refer Prosecution's Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

From the records, it appears that as a result of the Report on the Audit of Selected Transactions and Walis Ting-ting for the City of Parañaque for the
years 1996 to 1998, conducted by the Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit (COA), several anomalies were... discovered involving Marquez,
then City Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and Awards committee of Parañaque City; and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan), Head of the General Services
Office of said city.

It was found that, through personal canvass and without public bidding, Marquez and Caunan secured the procurement of several thousand rounds of
bullets of different calibers that were grossly overpriced from VMY Trading, a company not registered as an arms and ammunitions... dealer with either
the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).

Finding the transactions anomalous, the COA Special Audit Team issued Notices of Disallowances for the overpriced ammunitions. Marquez and
Caunan sought reconsideration of the findings of the team, but their plea was denied. Aggrieved, they elevated the matter to the COA... but their appeal
was denied.

At the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), in answer to the charges filed against them, Marquez and Caunan filed their Joint Counter Affidavit[4] with
the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of said office. In the said affidavit, the two... insisted on the propriety of the transactions and raised
the pendency of their appeal with the COA.

Page 10
Having found probable cause to indict them for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, the OMB, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), filed three (3) informations[5] against Marquez and Caunan. The cases were raffled... to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan
(SB-4th Division).

Before arraignment, on November 24, 2003, alleging discovery of the forged signatures, Marquez sought referral of the disbursement vouchers,
purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI and the reinvestigation of the cases against him.[6] These were denied by the OSP.

On May 20, 2008, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez recused themselves from further participating in the cases. The cases were then raffled to the SB-
5th Division.

Thereafter, on July 4, 2008, Marquez filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecution's Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of
the National Bureau of Investigation. In his motion, he again insisted that his purported signatures on the vouchers were... forged.

By way of Comment/Opposition to the motion, the prosecution argued that its documentary exhibits had already been formally offered in January 2006
and had been duly admitted by the anti-graft court. The prosecution added that, when confronted with the questioned transactions... during the COA
audit investigation, Marquez never raised the defense of forgery. Instead, he insisted on the propriety of the transactions. He did not claim forgery either
when he filed his Joint Counter-Affidavit with the OMB. Also, in his verified Motion for Reconsideration... dated May 29, 2003 and Supplemental
Motion dated July 1, 2003 filed with the COA, no allegation of forgery was made.

The prosecution pointed to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court[7] and posited that since Marquez alleged in his pleadings that he had
relied on the competence of his subordinates, there could be no "palpable mistake," thus, he was estopped... from alleging that his signatures on the
subject documents were forged. The prosecution accused Marquez of filing the motion merely to delay the proceedings.[8]

Issues:

THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN - 5TH DIVISION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTIONS RESPECTIVELY DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 AND MAY 20,
2009 DENYING THE

PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REFER PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE FOR EXAMINATION BY THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS SECTION OF
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WHICH DENIAL IS IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND HIS
TWIN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF

LAW.
Page 11
Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 11, 2009 and May 20, 2009 Resolutions of the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to allow the
petitioner Joey P. Marquez to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination as soon as possible and, after submission of... the results to the court and proper proceedings, to act on the case with dispatch.

Principles:

One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the Constitution is due process, which includes a fair and impartial trial and a
reasonable opportunity to present one's defense. Under Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided... that:

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public... trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been... duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
(emphasis supplied)

In this connection, it is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the... person of the accused; (c) that the
accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary implication, it means that the accused should be allowed reasonable
freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to... accord an accused reasonable
opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of due
process.

G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983

RICARDO VALLADOLID
Page 12
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG

G.R. No.L-53349 March 25, 1983

J.R.M. & CO., INC

vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG

FACTS:
Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner, in was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephoneswitchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of
clerk-collectorby the president of JRM. The transfer was motivated by the interception of business andconfidential matters to a competitor hotel by
(allegedly) Villadolid who was then workingas a switchboard operator and while serving in his capacity as clerk/collector, copies of Accounts
Receivables reached the competitor hotel (Tropicana Apartment- Hotel)although said copies were not referred to them. That to finally and fully
confirmedsuspicions that Ricardo Valladolid was the person responsible for the aforementioneddisclosures, a plan for the entrapment was conceived by
the Copacabana Apartment-Hotel. After the entrapment scheme had been effected, Valladolid filed a written requestfor a 5 day vacation leave which was
extended to 30 days. When he went back to work, JRM refused to admit him and instead asked him to resign. RM maintains that Valladolidleft the
office that same day and never returned, because he was reprimanded for hisunauthorized absences. Valladolid later on filed a Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal withvacation and sick leave pay. The Ministry ruled that the application for clearance with preventive suspension is deniedand respondent
(JRM) is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant (Valladolid) to hisformer position without backwages and without loss of seniority rights.
Valladolidappealed the foregoing order to the Minister of Labor seeking modification of the same,praying for the award of backwages from the time he
was illegally dismissed but theDeputy Minister of Labor (Inciong) dismissed both appeals after finding "no sufficient justification or valid reason to
alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from.

ISSUE:
1.WON the non-award of backwages raised by Valladolid claiming that the Orders of Deputy Minister of Labor are contrary to law and evidence.
2.WON JRM was deprived of due process when the Deputy Minister of Laborsustained the finding of respondent Regional Director that there is no
evidence tosupport the dismissal of private respondent.

HELD:

No. JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process considering that applications for clearance have to be summarily investigated and a decision
required to be rendered within ten days from the filing of the opposition. There is no violation of due process where the Regional Director merely
required the submission of petition papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter.
Page 13
Petitions for certiorari are DENIED.

G.R. No. 88709 February 11, 1992

NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly anddistinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
cralaw
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refuseddue course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
c

FACTS:

(1)

The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the aforementionedconstitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of
theConstitution. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly anddistinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court.
Petitioners complain that there was noanalysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to
thepronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. Therewas therefore no adequate factual or legal
basis for the decision that could justify its review and affirmance bythe Court of Appeals.

(2)

January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from private respondentUnited Coconut Planters Bank and to secure
payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcelsof land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-
payment of the loan,and the sheriff's sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the originaldate for the auction
was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.

Page 14
(3)

CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving much to bedesired, substantially complies with the rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court’s decision is unconstitutional

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of theCourt of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is REMANDED tothe Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan, Branch 10, for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order ofJune 6, 1986, conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14,
of the Constitution, subject to theappeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with law.

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.,
Facts:

There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers
in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case
and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue:

Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held:

To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is
more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive,
acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative
and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has
Page 15
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for
the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-49711 November 7, 1979

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO.

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, DirectorGozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960wherein he dismissed the case filed by thepetitioners. In
that case, they sought to be declaredthe rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales.Director Gozon
found that the petitioners did notdiscover any mineral nor staked and located miningclaims in accordance with law. Also in the order,Director Gozon
ruled that the mining claims of thegroups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabiloña, nowthe private respondents-appellees, were duly locatedand
registered.-The petitioners appealed from that order to theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.While the appeal was pending, Director
Gozon wasappointed Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources and therefore he was the one who decidedthe appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on
August 16,1963.-He ruled that the petitioners had abandoned thedisputed mining claims, while, on the other hand, theMartinez and Pabiloña groups had

Page 16
validly located thesaid claims. Hence, be dismissed the appeal from hisown decision.-On September 20, 1963, the petitioners filed acomplaint in the CFI
Zambales, assailing SecretaryGozon's decision and praying that they be declaredthe prior locators and possessors of the 69 mineralclaims in question.
Impleaded as defendants in thecase were the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources. the Director of Mines and the members of the Martinez and
Pabiloña groups.-CFI: dismissed complaint, held that disqualificationof a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec.1, Rule 137, Rules of Court)
does not apply toadministrative bodies; that there is no provision inthe Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
from deciding anappeal from a case which he had decided as Directorof Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground fordisqualification; that the petitioners
did notseasonably seek to disqualify Secretary Gozon fromdeciding their appeal, and that there was noevidence that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and
withbias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to thepetitioners.-Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (6
th
Division). CA reversed the judgment of the trial court,declared that the petitioners were the rightfullocators and possessors of the said 69 mining
claims,held as invalid the mining claims overlapping thesame; that the petitioners (Nava group) haddiscovered minerals and had validly located the
said69mining claims, that there was no sufficient basisfor Secretary Gozon's finding that the mining claimsof the Martinez and Pabiloña groups were
validlylocated.-The defendants (private respondents-appellees)filed a motion for reconsideration based on theground that CA should have respected the
factualfindings of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the theory thatthe facts found in administrative
decisions cannot bedisturbed on appeal to the courts, citing Republic ActNo. 4388 which amended section 61 of the MiningLaw effective June 19, 1965;
and several other cases. They also prayed that the appeal be dismissed,meaning that the decisions of the lower court and of Director and Secretary
Gozon be affirmed.-Petitioners opposed that motion for reconsideration.In their opposition, they reiterated the contentionthat Secretary Gozon's decision
was void andtherefore, the factual findings therein are not bindingon the courts.-same CA 6
th
Division in second decision of October13, 1978 set aside its first decision and granted themotion for reconsideration on the ground raised inpetitioners'
opposition, namely, that SecretaryGozon's decision was void because he wasdisqualified to review his own decision as Director of Mines.So CA in its
second decision remanded thecase to the Minister of Natural Resources for anotherreview of Director Gozon's decision. This was theprayer of the
petitioners in their brief but in theiropposition to the motion for reconsideration, theyprayed that the 1
st
CA decision be reinstated.-The parties filed motions for reconsideration. Thepetitioners in their motion reiterated their prayer thatthe first decision be
reinstated. On the other hand,the private respondents in their motion insisted thatthe trial court's decision be affirmed on the basis of the factual findings
of the Director of Mines and theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. CAdenied both motions.-Only the petitioners appealed from the 2
nd
CAdecision. While the
petitioners (Nava group)
intheir appellants' brief in the CA they prayed thatSecretary Gozon's decision be declared void and thatthe case be returned to the Secretary of
Agricultureand Natural Resources for another review of DirectorGozon's order, in their appellants' brief in SC, theynow pray that the 2
nd

Page 17
CA decision, referring this caseto the Minister of Natural Resources for anotherreview, be declared void and that its first decision beaffirmed.In contrast,
the
private respondents
, pray for theaffirmance of the trial court's judgment, sustainingthe decisions of Director and Secretary Gozon.

ISSUE
WON Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion

HELD
YES. In order that the review of the decision of asubordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce,the reviewing officer must perforce be other than
theofficer whose decision is under review; otherwise,there could be no different view or there would be noreal review of the case

G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA

vs
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY

Facts:
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of thePhilippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate
with honors as the class salutatorian,receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as anensign of the Navy.

Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two minutes in hisENG 412 class, other cadets were also reported late for 5
minutes. The DRs reached theDepartment of Tactical Officers and were logged and transmitted to the Company of TacticalOfficers (TCO) for
explanation. Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.
Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of the HonorCode. Lying that is giving statements that perverts the
truth in his written appeal stating that his4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class.

Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC constituted a team toconduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it
recommended the case be formalized.Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the Chairman,the HC reconvened
in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.

Page 18
The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted a formalreview and checking of findings. Special orders were issued
placing Cudia on indefinite leave ofabsence and pending approval of separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudiasubmitted a letter to the
Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. Thematter was referred to Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld
the decision.

Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of the CRAB.CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause for
Human Rights Violations.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cudia inutter disregard of his right to due process and in holding that he
violated the Honor Codethrough lying.

2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs

Ruling:

1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process, education,and property should be placed in the context of the Honor
Code. All the administrativeremedies were exhausted. A student of a military academy must be prepared tosubordinate his private interest
for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMAmay impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it deems fit and consistent withthe peculiar
needs of the institution. PMA has regulatory authority to administrativelydismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke academic freedom in the
enforcementof the internal rules and regulations.

2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated by Article VIII ofthe Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to Section 1,
Article 8) is expanded thatthe duty of the courts is not only to “settle actual controversies involving rights which arelegally demandable and
enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there hasbeen a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
theGovernment” even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerialfunctions. No one is above the law, including the military,
especially in violations ofConstitutionally guaranteed rights.

Dispositive:The petition is denied. The dismissal of Cudia from PMA is affirmed

Page 19