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G.R. No. 169129             March 28, 2007

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and
TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO,  J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose Lumbao and
Proserfina Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F.
Santos and Tadeo F. Santos, dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, which granted the appeal filed by herein respondents
Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao (Spouses Lumbao) and ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and
Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos to reconvey to
respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, thus, reversing the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998 which dismissed the Complaint for Reconveyance with
Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao for lack of merit.

Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita
Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. The other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-
law of Rita.

Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the 107-square meter lot (subject
property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.

The facts of the present case are as follows:

On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her
share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978. On the first occasion,
Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mother’s estate through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa,"
dated 17 August 1979.4 Respondents Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures affixed therein. On the second occasion, an additional seven square
meters was added to the land as evidenced by a document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 9 January 1981.5

After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house
which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property,
respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners,
for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao
insofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed
respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her
and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.

On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,6 adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria,
which included the subject property already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. 817297 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.

On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter8 to petitioners but despite receipt of
such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages9 before the RTC of Pasig City.
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Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had been sold to the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
They likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed because the same was duly published
as required by law. On the contrary, they prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action because respondents
Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, which repealed Presidential Decree No. 150810 requiring first resort to barangay conciliation.

Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended their Complaint because they discovered that on 16 February 1990,
without their knowledge, petitioners executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana for the sum of
₱30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No. PT-81729 on 26 April 1991. Also, in answer
to the allegation of the petitioners that they failed to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law,
respondents Spouses Lumbao said that the Complaint was filed directly in court in order that prescription or the Statute of
Limitations may not set in.

During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented Proserfina Lumbao and Carolina Morales as their witnesses, while the
petitioners presented only the testimony of petitioner Virgilio.

The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of merit.

Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to protect their interest, [respondents spouses Lumbao] are hereby
directed to pay [petitioners], to wit: 1) the amount of ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and 2) costs of the suit.11

Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 8 June 2005, the appellate court rendered a Decision,
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated June 17, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 62175 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby
entered ordering [petitioners] to reconvey 107 square meters of the subject [property] covered by TCT No. PT-81729 of the Registry
of Deeds of Pasig City, Metro Manila, and to pay to [respondents spouses Lumbao] the sum of ₱30,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.

No pronouncement as to costs.12

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but it was denied in the Resolution of the
appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition.

The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:

I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, THEREBY CREATING
A VARIANCE ON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TWO COURTS.

II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO RECONVEY THE SUBJECT
[PROPERTY] TO THE RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE GUILTY OF LACHES, HENCE THEY
CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THEM.

III. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO BE IN GOOD FAITH IN
EXECUTING THE "DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT" DATED [2 MAY 1986].

IV. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO
COMPLY WITH THE SUPPOSED BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981] THAT WERE SUPPOSEDLY
EXECUTED BY THE LATE RITA CATOC.
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V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO’S] ACTION
FOR RECONVEYANCE WITH DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN UNENFORCEABLE DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE BILIHAN NG
LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981].

VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO’S]
COMPLAINT FOR RECONVEYANCE IS DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.] 1508, AS AMENDED
BY Republic Act No. 7160.

VII. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD
BE HELD LIABLE FOR PETITIONERS’ CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[‘]S FEES.

Petitioners ask this Court to scrutinize the evidence presented in this case, because they claim that the factual findings of the trial
court and the appellate court are conflicting. They allege that the findings of fact by the trial court revealed that petitioners Virgilio
and Tadeo did not witness the execution of the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa"; hence, this finding runs counter to the
conclusion made by the appellate court. And even assuming that they were witnesses to the aforesaid documents, still, respondents
Spouses Lumbao were not entitled to the reconveyance of the subject property because they were guilty of laches for their failure to
assert their rights for an unreasonable length of time. Since respondents Spouses Lumbao had slept on their rights for a period of
more than 12 years reckoned from the date of execution of the second "Bilihan ng Lupa," it would be unjust and unfair to the
petitioners if the respondents will be allowed to recover the subject property.

Petitioners allege they are in good faith in executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement because even respondents Spouses
Lumbao’s witness, Carolina Morales, testified that neither petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was present during the execution
of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Petitioners affirm that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was
published in a newspaper of general circulation to give notice to all creditors of the estate subject of partition to contest the same
within the period prescribed by law. Since no claimant appeared to interpose a claim within the period allowed by law, a title to the
subject property was then issued in favor of the petitioners; hence, they are considered as holders in good faith and therefore
cannot be barred from entering into any subsequent transactions involving the subject property.

Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa" because the same were null
and void for the following reasons: 1) for being falsified documents because one of those documents made it appear that petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and that they appeared personally before the notary public, when in truth and in
fact they did not; 2) the identities of the properties in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to
the subject property in litigation were not established by the evidence presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao; 3) the right
of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to lay their claim over the subject property had already been barred through estoppel by
laches; and 4) the respondents Spouses Lumbao’s claim over the subject property had already prescribed.

Finally, petitioners claim that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao was dismissible
because they failed to comply with the mandate of Presidential Decree No. 1508, as amended by Republic Act No. 7160, particularly
Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160.

Given the foregoing, the issues presented by the petitioners may be restated as follows:

I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao is dismissible for
their failure to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. No. 7160.

II. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and enforceable, thus, they can be the bases of the
respondents spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance with damages.

III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the "Bilihan ng Lupa" dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the subject property to herein respondents spouses Lumbao.

It is well-settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.13 But, the rule is not without exceptions. There are
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several recognized exceptions14 in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court. One of these exceptions is when the findings
of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. This exception is present in the case at bar.

Going to the first issue presented in this case, it is the argument of the petitioners that the Complaint for Reconveyance with
Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for failure to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings
as mandated by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160. This argument cannot be sustained.

Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No. 14-9315 provide that all disputes between parties actually residing in
the same city or municipality are subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a
complaint in court or any government offices. Non-compliance with the said condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the
same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where
the defendants failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction.16

While it is true that the present case should first be referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation because the parties involved
herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig City) and the dispute between them involves a real property, hence, the said dispute
should have been brought in the city in which the real property, subject matter of the controversy, is located, which happens to be
the same city where the contending parties reside. In the event that respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the said
condition precedent, their Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages can be dismissed. In this case, however, respondents Spouses
Lumbao’s non-compliance with the aforesaid condition precedent cannot be considered fatal. Although petitioners alleged in their
answer that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for their
failure to comply with the condition precedent, which in effect, made the complaint prematurely instituted and the trial court
acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case, yet, they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said complaint.

Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the
case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of doing so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer
seeking an affirmative relief from it. Worse, petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case by presenting their own witness
and by cross-examining the witnesses presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that the active participation
of a party in a case pending against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction.17 It is also well-settled
that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may
therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss.18 Hence, herein petitioners can no longer raise the
defense of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings to seek the dismissal of the complaint filed by the
respondents Spouses Lumbao, because they already waived the said defense when they failed to file a Motion to Dismiss.

As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are null and
void for being falsified documents as it is made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the execution of the
said documents and that the identities of the properties in those documents in relation to the subject property has not been
established by the evidence of the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Petitioners also claim that the enforceability of those documents is
barred by prescription of action and laches.

It is the petitioners’ incessant barking that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were falsified
because it was made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the executions thereof, and their allegation that
even respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness Carolina Morales proved that said petitioners were not present during the execution of
the aforementioned documents. This is specious.

Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in petitioners’ Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the
execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979.19 However, in order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa,"
petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not
remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed. Noticeably,
petitioner Virgilio did not categorically deny having signed the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and in support thereof, his
testimony in the cross-examination propounded by the counsel of the respondents Spouses Lumbao is quoted hereunder:
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ATTY. CHIU:

Q. Now, you said, Mr. Witness…Virgilio Santos, that you don’t know about this document which was marked as Exhibit "A" for the
[respondents spouses Lumbao]?

ATTY. BUGARING:

The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised the question that he does not have any knowledge but not that he does
not know.

ATTY. CHIU:

Q. Being… you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it not?

WITNESS:

A. No, sir.

Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the left hand margin of this document Virgilio Santos, will you please
go over the same and tell the court whose signature is this?

A. I don’t remember, sir, because of the length of time that had passed.

Q. But that is your signature?

A. I don’t have eyeglasses… My signature is different.

Q. You never appeared before this notary public Apolinario Mangahas?

A. I don’t remember.20

As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him, but this is not an
absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not
evidence.21 And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party’s pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider
other evidence presented.22 However, in the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision, "[herein petitioners] had
not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made in their [A]nswer that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] actually
signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the document, x x
x."23 Virgilio’s answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party in a pleading are
binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case.

On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness Carolina Morales, this Court adopts the findings made by the appellate
court. Thus -

[T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question during cross-examination if the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were
not with her and the vendor [Rita] during the transaction. It must be pointed out that earlier in the direct examination of said
witness, she confirmed that [respondents spouses Lumbao] actually bought the lot from [Rita] ("nagkabilihan"). Said witness
positively identified and confirmed the two (2) documents evidencing the sale in favor of [respondents spouse Lumbao]. Thus, her
subsequent statement that the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with them during the transaction does not automatically
imply that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not at any time sign as witnesses as to the deed of sale attesting to their mother’s
voluntary act of selling a portion of her share in her deceased mother’s property. The rule is that testimony of a witness must be
considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.24

Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were duly notarized before a notary
public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document25 that enjoys the presumption of
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regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due
execution.26 To overcome this presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence,
the presumption must be upheld.27 In addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed where one’s signature appears has the
burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed
to be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners’ denials without clear and convincing evidence to support their
claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned presumption; hence, the authenticity, due
execution and the truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.

The defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties described in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 in relation to the subject property were not established by respondents Spouses Lumbao’s evidence is likewise not
acceptable.

It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire property owned by
Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only
description that can be placed in the "Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981" because the exact metes and
bounds of the subject property sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time. Nevertheless,
that does not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and
jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their
respective aliquots or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them.28 The co-owner, however, has no right
to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is represented by
an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete
portion does not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner.
Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership.29

In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,
the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from the total
lot, inherited by them in representation of their deceased mother, which in this case measures 467 square meters. The 107-square
meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners because the same was no
longer part of their inheritance as it was already sold during the lifetime of their mother.

Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents was described as "a portion of a parcel of
land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674," while the subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the
property described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal in the name of
Maria is of no moment because in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear that there was only
one estate left by Maria upon her death. And this fact was not refuted by the petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax
Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the property mentioned in TCT No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, and almost have the same boundaries. It is, thus, safe to state that the property mentioned in Tax Declaration No.
A-018-01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one and the same.

The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise unjustifiable. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person’s name to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right. It is, indeed, true
that the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not absolute because it is subject to extinctive prescription. However,
when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, prescription cannot set in. Such an exception is based on the theory
that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.30

In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to seek reconveyance does not prescribe because the latter have
been and are still in actual possession and occupation as owners of the property sought to be reconveyed, which fact has not been
refuted nor denied by the petitioners. Furthermore, respondents Spouses Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches because from the
very start that they bought the 107-square meter lot from the mother of the petitioners, they have constantly asked for the transfer
of the certificate of title into their names but Rita, during her lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to do so on
the flimsy excuse that the lot had not been partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the entire estate of Maria, petitioners
still included the 107-square meter lot in their inheritance which they divided among themselves despite their knowledge of the
contracts of sale between their mother and the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
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Under the above premises, this Court holds that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are valid
and enforceable and can be made the basis of the respondents Spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance. The failure of
respondents Spouses Lumbao to have the said documents registered does not affect its validity and enforceability. It must be
remembered that registration is not a requirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration
serves chiefly to bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract
that a transaction involving the property had been entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is
unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of
registration as to him.31 Hence, the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, being valid and
enforceable, herein petitioners are bound to comply with their provisions. In short, such documents are absolutely valid between
and among the parties thereto.

Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case.
Article 131132 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent
have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations
of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs.33 Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a
transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting
their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what
rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does
not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the
personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party
has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.34

In the end, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound to comply with the provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa,"
dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently, they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-
square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners’ mother. And as correctly ruled by the appellate court, petitioners must
pay respondents Spouses Lumbao attorney’s fees and litigation expenses for having been compelled to litigate and incur expenses to
protect their interest.35 On this matter, we do not find reasons to reverse the said findings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners are ordered to reconvey to respondents
Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
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G.R. No. L-4963             January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA,
Jr., defendants-appellants.

Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.

Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador,
Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado,
Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino
Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his
common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino
Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their
separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other
property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).

After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore
to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants
interposed the present appeal.

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of
lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely
a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise
appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident
that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death
to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson
over the lands in question became vested.
 9

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced
to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered
into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract
nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co.,
41 Phil., 531).

But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda
and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in
June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords
to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in
the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the
prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall
have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so
only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right
should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto
may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any
vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson
over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative
provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil
Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be
asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to
assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their
mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact
that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property,
inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must
be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has
not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes,

 10

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE
BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, appellant. .

Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate
estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its
Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".

Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O.
Vda. de de Borja, Special Administratrix".

And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X,
in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise
agreement, as the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his
first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is under administrator in Special
Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.

It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the probate
of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was
probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja,
was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of
his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon
Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was
appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.
 11

The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and
counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate
estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations,
a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his
first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:

AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between

The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator
of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,

AND

The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja,
assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.

WITNESSETH

THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality, the various court litigations,
controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the administration, settlement,
partition, adjudication and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.

THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any reservations to enter into
and execute this agreement under the following terms and conditions:

1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently
under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described
as follows:

Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la
Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con
los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla

with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.

2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of
Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in
the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja
and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of
the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No.
7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by
Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of
full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."

3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular obligation incurred by the
late Francisco de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the
Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and
Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be
 12

deducted by the buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja
under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-
children of Francisco de Borja.

4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja the balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00)
and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants,
who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.

5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and
for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw,
waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause or causes of action, suits,
debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they
ever had, or now have or may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-
Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as
well as the case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to
completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability,
arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets
as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja, and
lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any
hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.

6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to
the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her
possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.

7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned under
paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the
Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND
VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th
of October, 1963.

On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special
Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise
agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja
appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed
the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.

The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is,
nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first
probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco
de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.

In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this
Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for
probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised
Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the
facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and
legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate
when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
 13

Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered
into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting
opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already
divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the
estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.

The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of
the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of
P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —

shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late
Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her
favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or
purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.

This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no
attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear
object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite
contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is
not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to
what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the
transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the
Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such
stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if
only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his
compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her
successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not
probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not
apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.

Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual
capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only
difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be
enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:

8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite period for its
performance, the same was  intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such
contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by
said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed
de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39-
46) and which contained the following clause:

III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of the property mentioned herein
and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of
 14

Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the
said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the purchase price thereof by the said
owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of
no further effect.

Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and
that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and
while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial
ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed
that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto,
Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that
circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was
designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days
resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise
with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty
days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and
ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share
formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality of the order
now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.

This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja
(Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she
was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her late
husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the
Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of
whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-
heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.

If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.

Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a compromise as to
her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the
agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the text of
the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only
made in consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights.

It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964,
in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October
1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its
order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja
himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".

It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion above-mentioned was the
compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly
notarized. What the record discloses is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from
the compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on
Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and
because the contract was not preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs.
Guevara  ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all
 15

of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to
reach a new settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step
might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from
the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it
is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties'
quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise
(Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from
the finality of the order, now under appeal.

We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order should be upheld, while the
contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.

In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while the
purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is
that her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify
the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the
devaluation de facto  of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates
would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties
of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.

Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco
de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse,
Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its
conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.

We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot and academic, in view
of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana
Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying
reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution
is still imperative.

It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja,
Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration
Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda
was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja,
and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).

The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —

Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja
O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal,
pages 7 and 105)

On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco
(Francisco de Borja's first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of Francisco,
while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja
and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407
of the Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:

Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
 16

Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco
de Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then
appealed to this Court.

The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question as owned by the conjugal
partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended
Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in
the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa
Tangco, submitted therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal
Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate
of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December,
1955, an inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa
Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").

Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against interest made by both Francisco
de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the
legal presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not
conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the following
evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951 (Exhibit "F") that —

He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi
terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).

and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure sale
for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon
receipt of a subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo
that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check for
P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the
Hacienda. The witness further testified that —

Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja when he was still a
bachelor  and which he derived from his business transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15)
(Emphasis supplied)

The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions in the inventories relied upon by
defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property,
but that the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his
private funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive property of the
buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.

We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source
of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely
repeating what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both
Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable, since
 17

there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the
P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.

As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not clearly demonstrate that the "mi
terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3
and 4) disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at
P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these
lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno
personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.

It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not conclusive on the
conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the
declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the
self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be
reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco.

No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should be ventilated in the
corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from
this Court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while
those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja in all three (3) cases. 

Footnotes

1 She died during the pendency of these appeals, being substituted by Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr., administrator of
the estate (S.C. Resolution, 27 February 1970).

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166236 : July 29, 2010

 18

NOLI ALFONSO and ERLINDA FUNDIALAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES HENRY and LIWANAG ANDRES, Respondents.

Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.

In the present petition for review, petitioners assail the August 10, 2004 Resolution1cralaw of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV. No. 78362, which dismissed the appeal before it for failure of petitioners to file their brief within the extended reglementary
period.

Factual Antecedents

The present case stemmed from a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag
Andres against Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlinda Fundialan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, San
Mateo, Rizal.

On July 8, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision2cralaw in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants and all persons claiming
rights under them who are ordered:

1. to vacate the premises located at 236 General Luna St., Dulongbayan 11, San Mateo, Rizal;

2. to jointly and severally pay the sum [of] P100.00 as reasonable compensation for the use of said premises commencing from 04
September 1995; [and]

3. to jointly and severally pay the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and to pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.3cralaw

Petitioners,4cralaw thus, appealed to the CA.

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

On November 5, 2003, petitioners' previous counsel was notified by the CA to file appellants' brief within 45 days from receipt of the
notice. The original 45-day period expired on December 21, 2003. But before then, on December 8, 2003, petitioners' former
counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance. Petitioners consented to the withdrawal.

On December 19, 2003, petitioners themselves moved for an extension of 30 days or until January 21, 2004 within which to file their
appellants' brief. Then on March 3, 2004, petitioners themselves again moved for a fresh period of 45 days from March 3, 2004 or
until April 18, 2004 within which to file their appellants' brief.

On March 17, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution:5cralaw a) noting the withdrawal of appearance of petitioners' former counsel; b)
requiring petitioners to cause the Entry of Appearance of their new counsel; and c) granting petitioners' motions for extension of
time to file their brief for a period totaling 75 days, commencing from December 21, 2003 or until March 5, 2004.

Petitioners themselves received a copy of this Resolution only on April 6, 2004. By that time, the extension to file appellants' brief
had already long expired.

On April 14, 2004, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), having been approached by petitioners, entered6cralaw its appearance as new
counsel for petitioners. However, on August 10, 2004, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners' appeal, to wit:

FOR failure of defendants-appellants to file their brief within the extended reglementary period which expired on March 5, 2004 as
per Judicial Records Division report dated July 26, 2004, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Sec. 1 (e), Rule 50 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
 19

SO ORDERED.

On September 6, 2004, the PAO filed their Motion for Reconsideration7cralaw which requested for a fresh period of 45 days from
September 7, 2004 or until October 22, 2004 within which to file appellants' brief. On October 21, 2004, the brief8cralaw was filed by
the PAO.

On November 26, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution9cralaw which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition
for review.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO FILE THEIR DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS' BRIEF, DESPITE THE ATTENDANCE OF PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING SUCH FAILURE, LIKE THE
GROSS AND RECKLESS NEGLIGENCE OF THEIR FORMER COUNSEL, THE ABSENCE OF MANIFEST INTENT TO CAUSE DELAY, THE
SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF LAW POSED FOR RESOLUTION BEFORE THE APPELLATE COURT, AND THE FACT THAT THE APPELLANTS'
BRIEF HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ALREADY FORMED PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II

THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS' APPEAL BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS HIGHLY UNJUSTIFIED, INIQUITOUS AND
UNCONSCIONABLE BECAUSE IT OVERLOOKED AND/OR DISREGARDED THE MERITS OF PETITIONERS' CASE WHICH INVOLVES A
DEPRIVATION OF THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS.10

Petitioners' Arguments

Petitioners contend that their failure to file their appellants' brief within the required period was due to their indigency and poverty.
They submit that there is no justification for the dismissal of their appeal specially since the PAO had just entered its appearance as
new counsel for petitioners as directed by the CA, and had as yet no opportunity to prepare the brief. They contend that appeal
should be allowed since the brief had anyway already been prepared and filed by the PAO before it sought reconsideration of the
dismissal of the appeal and is already part of the records. They contend that the late filing of the brief should be excused under the
circumstances so that the case may be decided on the merits and not merely on technicalities.

Respondents' Arguments

On the other hand, respondents contend that failure to file appellants' brief on time is one instance where the CA may dismiss an
appeal. In the present case, they contend that the CA exercised sound discretion when it dismissed the appeal upon petitioners'
failure to file their appellants' brief within the extended period of 75 days after the original 45-day period expired.

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Failure to file Brief On Time

Rule 50 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.-An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx
 20

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by
these Rules;

Petitioners plead for the suspension of the rules and cite a number of cases where the Court excused the late filing of a notice of
appeal as well as the late filing of the appellant's brief. They further cite Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals11cralaw where the late filing of the appellant's brief was excused because the Court found the case impressed with public
interest.

The cases cited by petitioners are not in point. In the present civil case which involves the failure to file the appellants' brief on time,
there is no showing of any public interest involved. Neither is there a showing that an injustice will result due to the application of
technical rules.

Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months to pass by before exerting the required
effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not a justification for delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution
of their case. Not only petitioners, but also the respondents, have a right to have the case finally settled without delay.

Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and not really due to poverty.
Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their poverty. They were able to get two other lawyers after they
consented to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late.

It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to continue the services of their original lawyer or consent to let him
go. They could also have requested the said lawyer to file the required appellants' brief before consenting to his withdrawal from the
case. But they did neither of these. Then, not having done so, they delayed in engaging their replacement lawyer. Their poor choices
and lack of sufficient diligence, not poverty, are the main culprits for the situation they now find themselves in. It would not be fair
to pass on the bad consequences of their choices to respondents. Petitioners' low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward
procedural requirements, which they camouflage with the cloak of poverty, has in fact contributed much to the delay, and hence
frustration of justice, in the present case.

No compelling reason to disregard technicalities

Petitioners beg us to disregard technicalities because they claim that on the merits their case is strong. A study of the records fails to
so convince us.

Petitioners theorize that publication of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Marcelino Alfonso is required before
their father, Jose Alfonso (Jose) could validly transfer the subject property. We are not convinced. In Alejandrino v. Court of
Appeals,12cralaw the Court upheld the effectivity of a deed of extrajudicial settlement that was neither notarized nor published.

Significantly, the title of the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is subject
to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this
does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs.13cralaw The deed of
extrajudicial settlement executed by Filomena Santos Vda. de Alfonso and Jose evidences their intention to partition the inherited
property. It delineated what portion of the inherited property would belong to whom.

The sale to respondents was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. The extrajudicial
settlement of estate, even though not published, being deemed a partition14cralaw of the inherited property, Jose could validly
transfer ownership over the specific portion of the property that was assigned to him.15cralaw

The records show that Jose did in fact sell to respondents the subject property. The deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of the
respondents being a public document, is entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of competent

evidence that its execution was tainted with defects and irregularities that would warrant a declaration of nullity. As found by the
RTC, petitioners failed to prove any defect or irregularities in the execution of the deed of sale. They failed to prove
 21

by strong evidence, the alleged lack of consent of Jose to the sale of the subject real property. As found by the RTC, although Jose
was suffering from partial paralysis and could no longer sign his name, there is no showing that his mental faculties were affected in
such a way as to negate the existence of his valid consent to the sale, as manifested by his thumbmark on the deed of sale. The
records sufficiently show that he was capable of boarding a tricycle to go on trips by himself. Sufficient testimonial evidence in fact
shows that Jose asked respondents to buy the subject property so that it could be taken out from the bank to which it was
mortgaged. This fact evinces that Jose's mental faculties functioned intelligently.

In view of the foregoing, we find no compelling reason to overturn the assailed CA resolution. We find no injustice in the dismissal of
the appeal by the CA. Justice dictates that this case be put to rest already so that the respondents may not be deprived of their
rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 10, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 78362 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 22

G.R. No. 172804               January 24, 2011

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the Court of Appeals dismissing a suit to recover a realty.

The Facts

Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs,3 sued respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco
(respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran (trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in Amambajag,
Culaba, Leyte (Property) and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1971 from
Casimiro Vere (Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in August 1970. Petitioner declared the
Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.

In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez
(Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The two-page deed of donation (Deed), signed at the bottom by
the parties and two witnesses, reads in full:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of Barrio Bool, municipality of Culaba,
subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte, Philippines, hereby depose and say:

That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan Arcillas, we begot children, namely: LUCIO, VICENTA, SEGUNDINA, and
ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and by reason of poverty which I suffered while our children were still young; and because my
husband Juan Arcillas aware as he was with our destitution separated us [sic] and left for Cebu; and from then on never cared what
happened to his family; and because of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who also suffered with our poverty,
obedient as she was to all the works in our house, and because of the love and affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of
land located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give (devise)
said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the improvements existing thereon,
which parcel of land is more or less described and bounded as follows:

1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico; and West, by Public land; 2. It has an area of 3,492
square meters more or less; 3. It is planted to coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of ₱240.00; 5. It is now in the
possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be
vested on her upon my demise.

That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May
21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but will
be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
 23

That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and
praying further for a longer life; however, I will give one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.4

Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes afterwards.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the Property, and ordered respondents to surrender possession to
petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of the Property’s produce since 1982 until petitioner’s repossession and the costs.5 The
trial court rejected respondents’ claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa  which Rodrigo effectively
cancelled by selling the Property to Vere in 1970.6 Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no
title to transfer.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing error in the trial court’s interpretation of the Deed as a testamentary
disposition instead of an inter vivos  donation, passing title to Rodriguez upon its execution.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the trial court’s ruling. While conceding that the "language of the [Deed is] x x x
confusing and which could admit of possible different interpretations,"7 the CA found the following factors pivotal to its reading of
the Deed as donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property as owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the
delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deed’s consideration was not Rodrigo’s death but her "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez
predeceases her, implying its inclusion in Rodriguez’s estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted the donation in the Deed itself, an act
necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos, not devises.8 Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez and respondents,
and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigo’s lack of title.

In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial court’s ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the
Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years.9

Respondents see no reversible error in the CA’s ruling and pray for its affirmance.

The Issue

The threshold question is whether petitioner’s title over the Property is superior to respondents’. The resolution of this issue rests, in
turn, on whether the contract between the parties’ predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise. If
the former, respondents hold superior title, having bought the Property from Rodriguez. If the latter, petitioner prevails, having
obtained title from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked the earlier devise to Rodriguez.

The Ruling of the Court

We find respondents’ title superior, and thus, affirm the CA.

Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a Perfected Donation

We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title to Rodriguez upon its execution or is effective only upon
Rodrigo’s death – using principles distilled from relevant jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically –

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing,
that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
 24

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.10

Further –

[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation
is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;]

[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to
take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the
rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and]

(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.11

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo
stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the
heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim
title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition12 which, being
reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its
essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.13 Indeed, had Rodrigo
wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor,
may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x"14 or used words to that effect. Instead,
Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.

In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation’s damning effect on his case, petitioner tries to profit from it, contending it is a
fideicommissary substitution clause.15 Petitioner assumes the fact he is laboring to prove. The question of the Deed’s juridical nature,
whether it is a will or a donation, is the crux of the present controversy. By treating the clause in question as mandating
fideicommissary substitution, a mode of testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to
preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance,16 petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will. Neither
the Deed’s text nor the import of the contested clause supports petitioner’s theory.

Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez’s undertaking to
"give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime."17 Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that "the ownership
shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s
beneficial title. We arrived at the same conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso18 where, as here, the donor, while "b[inding] herself to
answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall question or disturb [the donee’s] right," also stipulated that the donation
"does not pass title to [the donee] during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner" of the donated parcels of
land. In finding the disposition as a gift inter vivos, the Court reasoned:

Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same deed [the donor] guaranteed to [the donee] and her heirs and
successors, the right to said property thus conferred. From the moment [the donor] guaranteed the right granted by her to [the
donee] to the two parcels of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right; otherwise there would be no need to
guarantee said right. Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon which the appellants base their contention that the gift in
question is a donation mortis causa  [that the gift "does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner
of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of
said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of them freely.19 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over
it.20

Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s love and affection to the donee and the
services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos]
transfers."21 Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo’s statement of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her
niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.
 25

It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g. "the ownership shall
be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and "devise"). Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted
wholistically, to give effect to the donor’s intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa"
dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter vivos,22 consistent with the principle
that "the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at
the death of the donor’ are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order
to give effect to the real intent of the transferor."23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to favor inter
vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed."24

Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If
such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions,
this will give license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a
valid mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing such practice.25

Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke
the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another."26 Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation sale of the Property vested no
title to Vere. As Vere’s successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought
the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants, including
petitioner.

Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property

Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through his and Vere’s combined possession of the
Property for more than ten years, counted from Vere’s purchase of the Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner initiated his
suit in the trial court in February 1986.27 Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded legal assumption. The ten year ordinary
prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real property in the concept of an owner requires uninterrupted possession
coupled with just title and good faith.28 There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through
one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right.29 Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.30

Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the Property through sale, neither was a good faith
possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property "in the concept of an
owner" ("como tag-iya"31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s donation in 3 May 1965 and seven years before
Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property
through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed, petitioner’s insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982,
when she started paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo in 1970,
Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a buyer in good faith.

Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by prescription is to show open,
continuous and adverse possession of the Property for 30 years.32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this
requirement.1avvphil

Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant

Petitioner brings to the Court’s attention facts which, according to him, support his theory that Rodrigo never passed ownership over
the Property to Rodriguez, namely, that Rodriguez registered the Deed and paid taxes on the Property only in 1982 and Rodriguez
obtained from Vere in 1981 a waiver of the latter’s "right of ownership" over the Property. None of these facts detract from our
conclusion that under the text of the Deed and based on the contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and Rodriguez, the latter, already in
possession of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo admitted, obtained naked title over it upon the Deed’s execution in 1965. Neither
registration nor tax payment is required to perfect donations. On the relevance of the waiver agreement, suffice it to say that Vere
had nothing to waive to Rodriguez, having obtained no title from Rodrigo. Irrespective of Rodriguez’s motivation in obtaining the
waiver, that document, legally a scrap of paper, added nothing to the title Rodriguez obtained from Rodrigo under the Deed.
 26

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 6 June 2005 and the Resolution dated 5 May 2006 of the Court
of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2
 Decision dated 6 June 2005 and Resolution dated 5 May 2006 per by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap with Associate
Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring.

3
 Petitioner, who died while the case was litigated in the Court of Appeals, is represented by Isidra Kikimen Vda. De
Villanueva, Josephine Kikimen-Haslam, Fermin Kikimen, Victorio Kikimen, Merlinda Kikimen-Yu, and Fortunila Villanueva.

4
 Records, p. 18.

5
 In the Decision dated 18 August 2000 penned by Judge Enrique C. Asis, the dispositive portion of which provides (Rollo, p.
93):
 27

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds in favor of the plaintiff as against the defendants, hereby
declaring:

1. The plaintiff is the absolute owner of the property in question;

2. The defendants are directed to surrender possession of the property in question;

3. The defendants shall pay the plaintiff the value of the harvest or produce of the land from 1982 until
the land is actually vacated;

4. To pay the plaintiff:

1. ₱ 2,500.00 in litigation expenses; and

2. ₱ 5,000.00 in attorney’s fees; and

5. To pay the costs of the suit.

6
 Citing Article 957(2) of the Civil Code. ("The legacy or devise shall be without effect:

xxxx

(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being
understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus
alienated.")

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 168970 : January 15, 2010]

CELESTINO BALUS, PETITIONER, VS. SATURNINO BALUS AND LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
 28

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041  which set aside the February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lanao del Norte, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 3263.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6,
1978, while Rufo died on July 6, 1984.

On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of
Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The said property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and more
particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area of 3.0740 hectares, more or less, situated in the Barrio of
Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as follows: Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12,
by Dodiongan River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x [2]

Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole
bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale[3] was executed by the sheriff in favor of
the Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January
25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale[4] in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the
Bank.

On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate[5] adjudicating to each of
them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also
contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the
Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On
October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land[6] was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39,484(a.f.)[7] was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of
the subject lot.

On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint[8] for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they
had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused
to surrender possession of the same to them. Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all remedies for the amicable
settlement of the case, but to no avail.

On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[9] disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-third
share of the property in question, presently possessed by him, and described in the deed of partition, as follows:

A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly Original Certificate of Title No. P-788, now in the
name of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, bounded on the North by
Lot 5122; East by shares of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661,
consisting of 10,246 square meters, including improvements thereon.

and dismissing all other claims of the parties.

The amount of P6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered delivered to the plaintiffs, as
purchase price of the one-third portion of the land in question.

Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.

 29

SO ORDERED.[10]

The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the
provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot
from the Bank.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA.

On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and
ordering petitioner to immediately surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when
petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of
ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.

Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENTS OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED
TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK) BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE
THEREOF BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY REIMBURSING
THE RESPONDENTS OF HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE.[11]

The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even after
the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the
respondents from the Bank.

Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title over the disputed property was already in the
name of the Bank, they still proceeded to execute the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the intention of purchasing
back the property together with petitioner and of continuing their co-ownership thereof.

Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a contract between him and respondents, because it
contains a provision whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by "redeeming" or
"repurchasing" the same from the Bank. This agreement, petitioner contends, is the law between the parties and, as such, binds the
respondents. As a result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the Bank without notifying
him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing
respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.

The Court is not persuaded.

Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the
subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned
by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the
hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996.[12] Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale[13] was issued in favor of the
Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the
Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the
contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.[14] In addition, the inheritance of a person consists
of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto
since the opening of the succession.[15] In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it
only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay
claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.

Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue
arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of
 30

the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in
time.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete determination of the issues raised in the instant case to
look into petitioner's argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an independent contract which gives him the right to enforce his
right to claim a portion of the disputed lot bought by respondents.

It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts are perfected by mere consent; and from that
moment, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.

In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any express stipulation for
petitioner and respondents to continue with their supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.

On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioner's
contention that it was his and his sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they believed to
be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded
primordial consideration.[16] It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration
to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve.[17] Such intention is determined from the
express terms of their agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[18] Absurd and illogical interpretations
should also be avoided.[19]

For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him and his siblings to continue what they thought
was their ownership of the subject property, even after the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of
the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.

In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never
formed part of the estate of their deceased father.

Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of continuing with their supposed co-ownership is negated by
no less than his assertions in the present petition that on several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject property back,
but he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him but he
ignored such offer. How then can petitioner now claim that it was also his intention to purchase the subject property from the Bank,
when he admitted that he refused the Bank's offer to re-sell the subject property to him?

In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time of the execution thereof, the parties were
not yet aware that the subject property was already exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part
of petitioner and respondents that the mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was already transferred to the
Bank does not give them the right or the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of the disputed property;
otherwise, the disposition of the case would be made to depend on the belief and conviction of the party-litigants and not on the
evidence adduced and the law and jurisprudence applicable thereto.

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject
property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having
the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same.
Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance
of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to
enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.[20] In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-
ownership,[21] an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No.
58041, is AFFIRMED.
 31

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174489               April 11, 2012

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO
REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
 32

It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing
mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to
distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.1

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June 15, 2006 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979
which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special
Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala
(Paciencia), to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30
September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA
REGALA.

SO ORDERED.5

Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution6 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will
of Paciencia.

Factual Antecedents

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss
Paciencia Regala"7 (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino
G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on
page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado
(Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause10 and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary
public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and
his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:

xxxx

Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON
F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA
and CORAZON F. LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon
F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA
and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath since they are
the children of the spouses;

xxxx

[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I am
also bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command
them to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and
with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala in
accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x12

The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own
son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in Sasmuan,
Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September
19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on
January 4, 1996.
 33

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga
for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. G-1186.

There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13, 200015 allowing Lorenzo to
present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the
execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981.16 The Will was executed in her father’s (Judge Limpin)
home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.17 Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her
signatures on all its four pages.18 She likewise positively identified the signature of her father appearing thereon.19 Questioned by the
prosecutor regarding Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to
undergo brain surgery.20 The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that
her father can no longer testify in court.21

The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition22 to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio
averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence,
Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.23

Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A.
Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental
Opposition24 contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred
and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.25 Petitioners also opposed the
issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a
citizen and resident of the USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.27

Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition28 asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will
on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia
was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence
of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by
some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be
genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously,
petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation29 reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of
the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator
since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has
not yet been established.

Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the
petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of
Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. 31

Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his
father’s condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was
presented to the court to support this allegation. 32

For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his
family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996;
the relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took
him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencia’s
death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody
of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he was already residing in the USA when
the Will was executed.33 Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents and in the Will itself
and stated that he was familiar with Paciencia’s signature because he accompanied her in her transactions.34 Further, Lorenzo belied
and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the
 34

Philippines when the same was executed.35 On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will
shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.36

As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.

For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins.37 She claimed to have helped in the household
chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening and that during the period of her
service in the said household, Lorenzo’s wife and his children were staying in the same house.38 She served in the said household
from 1980 until Paciencia’s departure for the USA on September 19, 1981.39

On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for Paciencia to sign at the latter’s house.40 Rosie
admitted, though, that she did not see what that "something" was as same was placed inside an envelope.41 However, she
remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs them.42 A few days after or on September 16,
1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said envelope.43 Upon going home, however, the
envelope was no longer with Paciencia.44 Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because
she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.45 On cross examination, it was
established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was "magulyan" was based on her
personal assessment,46 and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court.47

In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt.48 He identified the Will and testified that he had seen the said
document before because Paciencia brought the same to his mother’s house and showed it to him along with another document on
September 16, 1981.49 Antonio alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned.50 According to
him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands,51 and it was he who explained that the
documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the
USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death.52 Upon hearing this, Paciencia
allegedly uttered the following words: "Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties?" Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only
[son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio
advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, "I know nothing about
those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them."54 After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio.
Antonio kept the unsigned documents

and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.55

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision56 denying the petition thus:

WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated September 13,
1981 of Paciencia Regala.

SO ORDERED.57

The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was
no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.58

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with
the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being
‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will."59 Moreover, the
oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no
concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.60

Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution62 dated August 31, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

Issues
 35

Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE
RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD;

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT
OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63

The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate proceedings.64 This is expressly provided
for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Rule 75

Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.65 These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to
wit:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of
the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the
attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the
 36

presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one
another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question
her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the
petitioners.

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her
of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only
"magulyan" but was actually suffering from paranoia.67

We are not convinced.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to
render him unfit to execute a Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil
Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind
be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or
otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find
more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s
house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental
condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent."69 More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of
sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New
Civil Code states:

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the
probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly,
thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier
mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners
failed to discharge such burden.

Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her
bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:

A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She specially requested that
the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and
the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the
execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee.70

Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be
used as basis to deny the probate of a will.

An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the document that will
distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under
duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it was
 37

obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on September
16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.

We are not persuaded.

We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even
extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old
maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and
accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a
testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different from her
relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if
the latter was already married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship
between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners’ allegations of
duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in
nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no
matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said
allegations.71 Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be
probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased]."72

Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not
complied with. It provides:

RULE 76

Allowance or Disallowance of Will

Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. – If the will is contested, all the subscribing
witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not
insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the
court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their
deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it,
or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other
witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.

If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses,
and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court since all but one witness,
Francisco, are still living.

We cannot agree with petitioners.

We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily explained during the
probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and
express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra.
Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin
could no longer talk and could not even remember his daughter’s name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her
father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any
objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and
purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary
public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony
 38

proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a]
testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be
necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is
convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was
not duly executed in the manner required by law."73 1âwphi1

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due
execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that]
ought to be before it that is controlling."74 "The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix]
has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable,
such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby."75 This, coupled with Lorenzo’s
established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of
evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25966             November 1, 1926

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO,
heir, appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.

Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo and Camus, Delgado and Recto for appellant.
Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.
 39

STREET, J.:

This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims
said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by
accredition and in the character of universal heir the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of controversy in favor of
Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.

The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and
testament, in the second clause of which he declared:

I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.

Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of
himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days after
the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924,
thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts
had been presented by him at the time of his death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will
referred to, and after having been contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs.
Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).

Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with
certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian
before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. This provision is of undoubted application to the situation before us; and
the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a
special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties.

We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion. It is there declared, in effect, that accretion take place in
a testamentary succession, first when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof
without special designation of shares; and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the
inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez
de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has
predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the
testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor,
Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive
and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court
declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.

The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate
which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole
heir at law of the decedent. In this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared, among
other things, that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit. Our attention is next invited
to article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also
when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. Upon these provisions an argument is planted conducting to the conclusion that
the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified
to take, and that as a consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to inherit the share of said disqualified heir.

We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that the appellee clearly has the better right. In playing the provisions of
the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as far as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict
between two provisions the more general is to be considered as being limited by the more specific. As between articles 912 and 983,
it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate succession while
the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the
provisions of the former article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with
respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is
 40

true that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule
of interpretation above referred to, by which the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies
the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent
proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.

The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that, under paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate succession occurs when
the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982,
accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de
recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take, and it is contended that the disability of
Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be
made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez
was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a
case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.

The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject, tend to the conclusion that the right of
accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left vacant by the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation
of the inheritance is governed by article 912, without being limited, to the extent supposed in appellant's brief, by provisions of the
Code relative to intestate succession (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, 4th ed., vol. VII, pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13 Mucius
Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287; 16 Mucius Scaevola, 186). Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs or
colegatees fails if nonexistent at the time of the making of the will, or he renounces the inheritance or legacy, if he dies before the
testator, if the condition be not fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. . . . (Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia,
vol. I, p. 225.)lawphil.net

In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the civil and in the common law a certain legal
intendment, amounting to a mild presumption, against partial intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known, partial testacy systems a
presumption against it, — a presumption which has its basis in the supposed intention of the testator.

The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981

 41

NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk
of Court, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because
it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the
attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?

That question arises under the pleadings filed in the testate case and in the certiorari case in the Court of Appeals which reveal the
following tangled strands of human relationship:

Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts), Fort McKinley, married Marcelina Salvador in
1923 (p. 150, Spec. Proc. No. 7816). They were childless. They reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who
considered them as his parents as shown in his 1945 marriage contract with Nenita de Vera (p. 15, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R; p.
148, Rollo of Testate Case showing that Agapito was 5 years old when Mauro married Marcelina in 1923).

Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran's widow, became a pensioner of the Federal Government. That explains why on her
death she had accumulated some cash in two banks.

Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist and went abroad. Agapito also became a soldier.
He was disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian in 1953 when he was declared an incompetent in Special
Proceeding No. 1807 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I (p. 16, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R).

In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz wanted also to be his guardian in another proceeding.
Arsenia tried to prove that Nenita was living separately from Agapito and that she (Nenita) admitted to Marcelina that she was
unfaithful to Agapito (pp. 61-63, Record of testate case).

Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second guardianship proceeding and confirmed Nenita's appointment as guardian of Agapito
(p. 16, Rollo of CA case). Agapito has been staying in a veteran's hospital in San Francisco or Palo Alto, California (p. 87, Record).

On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who, when a
few days old, was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of Agapito) and who was later delivered to Marcelina
Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R.
No.SP-08654-R). Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito. She married
Oscar Medrano and is residing at 7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati, apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668 J.B. Roxas
Street.

Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years old. That will which is in English
was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English to the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her
(pp. 38-39, CA Rollo). In that wig, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.

Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. At the time of her death, she was a resident of 7374
San Maximo Street, Olimpia, Makati, Rizal. She owned a 150-square meter lot and house in that place. She acquired the lot in 1966
(p. 134, Record of testate case).

On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina (P. 97, CA Rollo) and the executrix in her will (the
alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch 25, a petition for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.

As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado commissioned his deputy clerk of court, Evangeline S. Yuipco, to hear the evidence. The
transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at the hearing before the deputy clerk of court are not in the record.
 42

In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix. On the following day, April 1, Judge Honrado
issued two orders directing the Merchants Banking Corporation and the Bank of America to allow Marina to withdraw the sum of
P10,000  from the savings accounts of Marcelina S. Suroza and Marilyn Suroza and requiring Corazon Castro, the custodian of the
passbooks, to deliver them to Marina.

Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11, 1975, instructing a deputy sheriff to eject the
occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof.

That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina's estate. She and the
other occupants of the decedent's house filed on April 18 in the said proceeding a motion to set aside the order of April 11 ejecting
them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that
Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter (pp. 52-68, Record of
testate case). Later, they questioned the probate court's jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.

In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's estate, he
issued on April 23 an order probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress (pp. 74-77, Record).

On April 24, Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition
for administration and preliminary injunction". Nenita in that motion reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to
Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by Marina
and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick.

Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not
qualified to act as executrix (pp. 83-91, Record).

To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida A. Penaojas the housemaid of Marcelina, who swore that the alleged will was
falsified (p. 109, Record).

Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment order (filed on April 18) and her omnibus motion to set aside the
proceedings (filed on April 24), Nenita filed the next day, April 25, an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for
letters of administration. In that opposition, Nenita assailed the due execution of the will and stated the names and addresses of
Marcelina's intestate heirs, her nieces and nephews (pp. 113-121, Record). Nenita was not aware of the decree of probate dated
April 23, 1975.

To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio, Marcelina's niece, who swore that Marcelina never
executed a win (pp. 124-125, Record).

Marina in her answer to Nenita's motion to set aside the proceedings admitted that Marilyn was not Marcelina's granddaughter but
was the daughter of Agapito and Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito was not Marcelina's son but merely an anak-anakan who was
not legally adopted (p. 143, Record).

Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the issuance of letters of administration because
of the non-appearance of her counsel at the hearing. She moved for the reconsideration of that order.

In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her contention that
the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is written in English which is not known to
her (pp. 208-209, Record).

Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents "raised" by Nenita (p. 284, Record).

Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the wig, Nenita "filed a case to annul" the probate proceedings (p. 332,
Record). That case, Civil Case No. 24276, Suroza vs. Paje and Honrado (p. 398, Record), was also assigned to Judge Honrado. He
dismissed it in his order of February 16, 1977 (pp. 398-402, Record).

Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that
the estate tax had been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.
 43

About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978, filed in this Court, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with
having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. The complainant reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as
shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the win was
written. (In the decree of probate Judge Honrado did not make any finding that the will was written in a language known to the
testatrix.)

Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the testatrix had a son named Agapito (the testatrix's
supposed sole compulsory and legal heir), who was preterited in the will, did not take into account the consequences of such a
preterition.

Nenita disclosed that she talked several times with Judge Honrado and informed him that the testatrix did not know the executrix
Marina Paje, that the beneficiary's real name is Marilyn Sy and that she was not the next of kin of the testatrix.

Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina and her cohorts to withdraw from various banks the
deposits Marcelina.

She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco, the deputy clerk of court, for not giving her access to the record of the probate case by
alleging that it was useless for Nenita to oppose the probate since Judge Honrado would not change his decision. Nenita also said
that Evangeline insinuated that if she (Nenita) had ten thousand pesos, the case might be decided in her favor. Evangeline allegedly
advised Nenita to desist from claiming the properties of the testatrix because she (Nenita) had no rights thereto and, should she
persist, she might lose her pension from the Federal Government.

Judge Honrado in his brief comment did not deal specifically with the allegations of the complaint. He merely pointed to the fact that
Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion dated July 6, 1976 she asked for a thirty day period within
which to vacate the house of the testatrix.

Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit said that she never talked with Nenita and that the latter did not mention Evangeline in her
letter dated September 11, 1978 to President Marcos.

Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita's imputation that she (Evangeline) prevented Nenita from having access to the record of the
testamentary proceeding. Evangeline was not the custodian of the record. Evangeline " strongly, vehemently and flatly denied"
Nenita's charge that she (Evangeline) said that the sum of ten thousand pesos was needed in order that Nenita could get a favorable
decision. Evangeline also denied that she has any knowledge of Nenita's pension from the Federal Government.

The 1978 complaint against Judge Honorado was brought to attention of this Court in the Court Administrator's memorandum of
September 25, 1980. The case was referred to Justice Juan A. Sison of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation. He submitted a report dated October 7, 1981.

On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge Honrado a petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein
she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be declared void.

Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the will. He swore that the testatrix and the three
attesting witnesses did not appear before him and that he notarized the will "just to accommodate a brother lawyer on the
condition" that said lawyer would bring to the notary the testatrix and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his
commitment.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to
resort to the special civil action of certiorari (Suroza vs. Honrado, CA-G.R. No. SP-08654, May 24, 1981).

Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to dismiss the administrative case for having allegedly
become moot and academic.

We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate case which
might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void win
should have inherited the decedent's estate.

A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust
judgment or interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance (Arts. 204 to 206, Revised Penal Code).
 44

Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance for serious misconduct or inefficiency ( Sec. 67,
Judiciary Law). Misconduct implies malice or a wrongful intent, not a mere error of judgment. "For serious misconduct to exist, there
must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or
were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules" (In re lmpeachment of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214-215).

Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed to
observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any
public service (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119).

In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously
illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.

In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its
concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". (p. 16, Record of
testate case). That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is
void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect
known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop
vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is
repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".

Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also
that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed
father who was still alive.

Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary
was not presented as a witness.

In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will
so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.

WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S. Suroza, a fine equivalent to his salary for one month is
imposed on respondent judge (his compulsory retirement falls on December 25, 1981).

The case against respondent Yuipco has become moot and academic because she is no longer employed in the judiciary. Since
September 1, 1980 she has been assistant city fiscal of Surigao City. She is beyond this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction (Peralta vs.
Firm Adm. Matter No. 2044-CFI November 21, 1980, 101 SCRA 225).

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-13431            November 12, 1919

In re will of Ana Abangan.

GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this
decision the opponent's appealed.
 45

Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the
testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three
witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses.
Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these
omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the
opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate.

In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the
presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of
the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these
dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case),
their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the
statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which
the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute requires
that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these
signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the
bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be unneccessary; and if they do not
guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of
such importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures
written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient security.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is
likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the
dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet,
although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering whether or not this clause is an
essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the three
witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover,
referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as
its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.

Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions
and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed
also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and
the witnesses, or be paged.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution
of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such
a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of
the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends,
any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of
the testator's last will, must be disregarded. lawphil.net

As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the dialect in which the will is written.
But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where
the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which
this will is written.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
 46

G.R. No. L-19079 January 15, 1923

PRIMITIVO GONZALEZ Y LAUREL, applicant-appellee, vs. JOVITA LAUREL Y TAPIA, opponent-appellant.

By an order dated December 16, 1921, the Court of First Instance of Batangas allowed the document, Exhibit A, to probate as the
last will and testament of the deceased Maria Tapia, thus granting the petition of Primitivo L. Gonzalez and overruling the opposition
presented by Jovita Laurel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Jovita Laurel now appeals to this court from that ruling of the court below, alleging that court erred:
 47

1. In Holding that Exhibit A, the supposed will of the deceased Maria Tapia y Castillo, was executed with the solemnities prescribed
by the law, notwithstanding that there was no proof of the dialect known by the said deceased and of the fact that it was the same
in which said Exhibit A was written.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. In not holding that the signatures of Maria Tapia appearing in said Exhibit A had been obtained through deceipt, surprise, fraud,
and in an illegal and improper manner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. In not finding that said Exhibit A was obtained through unlawful pressure, influence and machinations of the applicant, Primitivo L.
Gonzalez, one of the legatees, in connivance with Attorney Modesto Castillo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

4. In not finding that the deceased Maria Tapia was physically and mentally incapacitated at the time she is said to have executed
Exhibit A.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

5. In declaring said Exhibit A valid and authentic and allowing it to probate as the will and testament of the deceased Maria Tapia y
Castillo.

Concerning the first error assigned, it appears that the deceased Maria Tapia was a resident of the Province of Batangas, a Tagalog
region, where said deceased had real properties for several years. It also appears that she requested Modesto Castillo to draw her
will in Tagalog. From the record taken as a whole, a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect, which
presumption is now conclusive for not having been overthrown nor rebutted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The three following errors have reference to the question whether or not the testatrix acted voluntarily and with full knowledge in
executing and signing the will. The preponderance of evidence in this respect is that said document was executed and signed by
Maria Tapia voluntarily and with full knowledge, without fraud, deceit, surprise, or undue influence or machinations of anybody, she
being then mentally capacitated and free. Such is the fact established by the evidence, which we have carefully
examined.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In connection with the evidence, our attention was called to an irreconcilable conflict between the transcript of an answer of the
witness Primitivo L. Gonzalez, presented by the appellant as "Annex 1" to his motion filed in this court (fol. 16 of the Rollo), and the
official transcript, in that while said answer is " Yes, sir," according to the transcript of the appellant, it is " Certainly, that is not true,"
according to the official transcript of the stenographic notes attached to the record. But it is to be noted that at the continuation of
the hearing held on a subsequent date, in which said witness Primitivo L. Gonzalez was examined on this contradiction, he said in the
course of the rebuttal evidence of the applicant: " No, sir. I did not answer in that way. I did not take her hand to make her sign. I did
not by any means answer that question to that effect. I very well remember that fact, because it affects much the probate of the
will." (Fols. 56 and 57 of transcript and documentary evidence.) chanrobles virtual law library

It appearing from the record that the document Exhibit A is the will of the deceased Maria Tapia, executed with all the formalities
and solemnities required by the law, the trial court did not commit any error in admitting it to
probate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the purposes of this decision, we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question raised by the appellee as to whether or not this
appeal was perfected within the time fixed by the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.