Olmstead v.

United States
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), was a decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States, in which the Court reviewed whether the use of wiretapped private
telephone conversations, obtained by federal agents without judicial approval and
subsequently used as evidence, constituted a violation of the defendant’s rights provided by
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that neither the Fourth
Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment rights of the defendant were violated. This decision
was overturned by Katz v. United States in 1967.

Background information
Until 1914, the American judicial system, including the Supreme Court of the United States,
largely followed the precepts of English common law when it came to matters dealing with
the validity of introducing evidence in criminal trials. In most cases, the general philosophy
was that the process by which the evidence was obtained had little, if anything to do with
the permissibility of its use in court. The only limiting factor was that the police agents could
not break the law to seize the evidence;however, since what is now illegal seizure was then
permitted by the courts, it rarely presented a significant challenge.

In 1914, however, in the landmark case of Weeks v. United States, the Court held
unanimously that illegal seizure of items from a private residence was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and established the exclusionary rule that prohibits admission of
illegally obtained evidence in federal courts. It is important to underline that because the Bill
of Rights did not at the time extend to cover states, such a prohibition extended only to
federal agents, and covered only federal trials. It was not until the case of Mapp v.
Ohio (1961) that the exclusionary rule was extended to state courts as well.

The question here, then, was whether the recordings of wiretapped private telephone
conversations constituted impermissibly-seized evidence and thus constituted a violation of
the federal exclusionary rule.

Case details
The case concerned several petitioners, including Roy Olmstead, who challenged their
convictions, arguing that the
use of evidence of wiretapped private telephone conversations amounted to a violation of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

The petitioners were convicted for alleged conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition
Act by unlawfully possessing, transporting, and selling alcohol. Seventy-two additional
persons, aside from the petitioners, were indicted. The evidence provided by the wiretapped
telephone conversations disclosed "a conspiracy of amazing magnitude" to engage
in bootlegging, involving the employment of some fifty persons, use of sea vessels for
transportation, an underground storage facility in Seattle, and the maintenance of a central
office fully equipped with executives, bookkeepers, salesmen, and an attorney. According to
the record, even in a bad month, the sales amounted to some $176,000; the grand total for
a year probably came out to some $2,000,000.

Olmstead was the general manager of this business, receiving fifty percent of all the profits.
The information that led to the discovery of his involvement and the conspiracy itself was
largely obtained by four federal prohibition officers who were able to intercept messages on
his, and other conspirators' telephones. No laws were violated in installing the wiretapping
equipment, as the officers did not trespass upon either the homes or the offices of the
defendants; instead, the equipment was placed in the streets near the houses and in the
basement of the large office building.
The wiretapping went on for several months, and the records revealed significant details on
the business transactions of the petitioners and their employees. Stenographic notes were
made of the conversations, and their accuracy was testified to by the government
witnesses. The evidence disclosed full details of the operations of the bootlegging business;
in addition, it showed the relationship between Olmstead with members of the Seattle
police, which resulted in prompt release of some of the arrested members of the conspiracy
and promises to officers of payment.

Opinions
Chief Justice Taft
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft was joined by
Justices McReynolds, Sanford, Sutherland, and Van Devanter. After outlining the factual and
procedural history of the case, Chief Justice Taft lists the relevant amendments, Fourth and
Fifth, and proceeds to examine the legal matters and precedents in question.

Boyd v. United States concerned the Act of June 22, 1874 (19 USCA 535), which provided per
section 5, a United States attorney with the power to use a marshal to obtain evidence that
the defendant had refused to provide, in cases that were not criminal under the revenue
laws. The Court held that Act of 1874 was a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment,
even though it did not constitute a clear case of search and seizure.

Chief Justice Taft next examines the "perhaps the most important" case of Weeks v. United
States, which involved a conviction for using the mail to transport lottery tickets. The
defendant was arrested by a police officer without a warrant, and subsequent to the arrest,
the defendant’s house was searched and a number of papers and articles was seized despite
the lack of a search warrant. Although the defendant applied for and successfully obtained a
court order directing the return of his property, he was denied return of relevant evidence.
He appealed; the Court held that such taking of papers was in violation of the constitutional
rights of the defendant, and that the trial court could not permit their use at trial.

Chief Justice Taft cites several other cases (Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, Amos
v. United States, Gouled v. United States, andAgnello v. United States,) and concludes that
there is no permissible way to apply the Fifth Amendment to this case unless it could be
shown that the Fourth Amendment was first violated. In this instance, there is no evidence
that the defendants were in any way compelled to talk over their telephones, and were
voluntarily engaging in business. Thus, “our consideration must be confined to the Fourth
Amendment.”

Taft writes that the aggregate outcome of the Weeks case and those that followed it was
that the Fourth Amendment forbade the introduction of evidence in court if it had been
obtained in violation of the amendment. This is in compliance with the historical purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, as it was in part intended to prevent the use of governmental force
to search and seize a man’s personal property and effects.

While it may seem that the language of Justice Field in ex parte Jackson could be viewed as
an analogy to the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment qua wiretapping, Taft believes
that the analogy fails. The Fourth Amendment applies to sealed letters in the mail because
there exists a constitutional provision for the federal postal office and the relationship
between the government and those “who pay to secure protection of their sealed letters.”
However, the United States does not take such care with telegraphic and telephonic
messages as it applies to mailed sealed letters, and Taft is quite emphatic in drawing the
distinction:
"The amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was
no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."
He points out that one can talk with another at a great distance via telephone, and suggests
that because the connecting wires were not a part of either the petitioners’ houses or
offices, they cannot be held subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.

Taft, in keeping with his personal judicial philosophy, suggests that Congress may "of
course" extend such protections to telephone conversations by passing direct legislation
that would prohibit their use in federal criminal trials. Until such legislation is passed,
however, "the courts may not adopt such a policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual
meaning to the Fourth Amendment," as there are no precedents that permit the Fourth
Amendment to apply as a viable defense in cases where there had been no official search
and seizure of the person, his papers, tangible material effects, or an actual physical
invasion of property.

He concludes that such wiretapping as occurred in this case did not amount to a search or
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Associate Justice Brandeis

Associate Justice Louis Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion that in subsequent years became
very famous.

The government made no attempt to defend the methods employed by federal agents, and,
in fact, conceded that if wiretapping could be deemed a search or seizure, such wiretapping
as took place in this case would be unreasonable search and seizure and thus inadmissible
in court. However, it claimed that the protections of the amendment do not extend to
telephone conversations.

Brandeis attacks the proposition that expanding the Fourth Amendment to include
protection of telephone conversations was inappropriate. At the time of the adoption of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, he writes, “force and violence” were the only means by which
the government could compel self-incrimination. Thus, the protections offered by these
Amendments were necessarily limited to address only imaginable forms of such force and
violence.

However, with the technological advances, the government has received the ability to
invade privacy in more subtle ways; further, there is no reason to think that the rate of such
technological advances will slow down. “Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection
against such invasions of individual security?”, Brandeis asks. He answers that a clear
negative answer is evident in Boyd v. United States.

Brandeis argues that the mail is a public service furnished by the government, and the
telephone is "a public service furnished by its authority." He concludes that there is no
difference between a private telephone conversation and a sealed letter. In fact, he writes,
"the evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved
in tampering with the mails."

In its past rulings, the Court has refused to read a literal construction of the Fourth
Amendment, most notably in the Boyd case. Unjustified search and seizure violate the
Fourth Amendment, and it does not matter what type of papers were seized, whether the
papers were in an office or a home, whether the papers were seized by force, etc. The
protection guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are broad in scope. The framers
of the Constitution sought "to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions, and their sensations." It is for this reason that they established, as against the
government, the right to be let alone as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal
proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth."

Brandeis argues further that even independently of the constitutional question, the
judgment should be reversed. By the law of Washington, wiretapping is a crime, and a
federal court should not permit a prosecution that makes use of such crime to continue.
The Eighteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to authorize anyone, federal agents
or not, to violate the criminal laws of a state; nor has Congress ever purported to do so.
These unlawful acts were not directed by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Treasury;
they were committed by individual officers. Thus, the government was innocent from a legal
point of view, since it did not direct its agents to commit a crime on its behalf. However,
when it sought to "avail itself of the fruits of these acts" to convict the defendants, "it
assumed moral responsibility for the officers' crimes." If the Supreme Court were to permit
the government to punish the defendants by the sole means of its officers’ transgressions, it
would present all the elements of a ratification. "If so, the government itself would become a
lawbreaker."

Brandeis cites an old maxim of unclean hands, inherited from courts of equity, whereby a
court will not redress a wrong when he who has requested its aid has unclean hands. This
principle, he believes, is very much relevant here. The Court should deny its aid to maintain
respect for law to promote confidence in the administration of justice and preserve the
judicial process from contamination.

We must subject government officials to the same rules of conduct that we expect of the
citizen. The very existence of the government is imperiled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. As Brandeis puts it, "if the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare
that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal—would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should
resolutely set its face."

Justice Brandeis' opinion was quoted by Timothy McVeigh at his trial for the bombing of the
Federal Building in Oklahoma City. After remaining silent throughout his trial, he was asked
before sentencing if he would like to make a statement. He responded "I wish instead to use
the words of Justice Brandeis dissenting in Olmstead to speak for me. He wrote 'Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example.'"

Associate Justice Holmes

Citing the extensive dissent filed by Brandeis, Holmes says that he need "add but a few
words." While he is not ready to say that thepenumbra of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
covers the defendant, he does concur that even apart from the Constitution, the
government should be prohibited to use evidence obtained (and only obtainable) by a
criminal act. Holmes writes that in his opinion, it would be a less evil that some criminals
should escape prosecution than that the government "should play an ignoble part."

Associate Justice Butler

Justice Butler begins his dissent by registering his regret for being unable to support the
opinion and judgments of the Court. Because the writ of certiorari limited the counsel’s
arguments only to the constitutional question, he writes that it does not participate in the
controversy of the admissibility of evidence because "the mode of obtaining it was unethical
and a misdemeanor under state law."

The sole question that he considers is whether the government may direct its officers to
engage in wiretapping without violating the search and seizure clause of the Fourth
Amendment.

Butler writes that though there was no direct search and seizure in Boyd v. United States,
the Court still found such exercise as occurred in that case to be in violation of the
constitutional protections afforded to the criminal defendant. The Court does not limit its
decisions to the literal meaning of the words of the Constitution. "Under the principles
established and applied by this court, the Fourth Amendment safeguards against all evils
that are like and equivalent to those embraced within the ordinary meaning of its words."
Thus, when all these facts are evaluated, Butler concludes "with great deference," that the
petitioners should be given a new trial.

Associate Justice Stone

Justice Stone concurs in the opinions of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis, and also with
that of Justice Butler insofar as it deals with the merits. Though the order granting certiorari
did indeed limit the argument to a single question, Justice Stone does not believe that it
prevents the Court from considering any questions present in the record.

Aftermath
Mr. Olmstead spent his 4 year prison sentence at the McNeil Island Correctional Institute. He
then became a carpenter. On December 25, 1935, President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt granted him a full presidential pardon. Besides restoring his constitutional rights,
the pardon remitted him $10,300.00 dollars in costs. Eventually, Mr. Olmstead became a
well-known, full-time Christian Science practitioner, who also worked with prison inmates on
an anti-alcoholism agenda for decades until his death in 1966 at the age of 79.

Katz v. United States

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) is a United States Supreme Court case
discussing the nature of the “right to privacy” and the legal definition of a “search”. The
Court’s ruling adjusted previous interpretations of the unreasonable search and
seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment to count immaterial intrusion with technology as a
search, overruling Olmstead v. United States and Goldman v. United States. Katz also
extended Fourth Amendment protection to all areas where a person has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy".

Facts
Charles Katz used a public pay phone booth to transmit illegal gambling wagers from Los
Angeles to Miami and Boston. Unbeknownst to Katz, the FBI was recording his conversations
via an electronic eavesdropping device attached to the exterior of the phone booth. Katz
was convicted based on these recordings. He challenged his conviction, arguing that the
recordings were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals
sided with the FBI because there was no physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Constitutional Issues of the Case

 Does the right to privacy extend to telephone booths and other public places?
 Is a physical intrusion necessary to constitute a search?
Ruling
 "The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." – Justice Stewart [1]
 Regardless of the location, a conversation is protected from unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment if it is made with a “reasonable expectation of
privacy”.
 Wiretapping counts as a search (physical intrusion is not necessary).

Decision and Rationale

Representing the majority opinion, Justice Stewart wrote, “One who occupies [a telephone
booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.” [2] Certain details, such as shutting the door on the telephone booth, help determine
if a person intends for a conversation to be private. Thus, private conversations can be
made in public areas.

Justice Harlan’s Concurring opinion summarizes the essential holdings of the majority: “(a)
that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person
has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well
as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of
the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that an invasion of a constitutionally protected area by
federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence
of a search warrant.” [3]

The Katz case made government wiretapping by both state and federal authorities subject
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements.[4]

Justice Harlan's concurrence

In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan built upon the foundations of the majority opinion and
formulated the “reasonable suspicion” test for determining whether government activity
constitutes a search. Harlan's test, not the majority opinion, is the most common formulation
cited by courts. Later, this test was arranged into a two prong test for determining the
existence of privacy: If (1) the individual "has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy," and (2) society is prepared to recognize that this expectation is (objectively)
reasonable, then there is a right of privacy in the given circumstance. [5] This test was
adopted by the majority in Smith v. Maryland.

Justice Black's dissent

In his dissent, Justice Hugo Black argued that the Fourth Amendment, as a whole, was only
meant to protect "things" from physical search and seizure; it was not meant to protect
personal privacy. Additionally, Black argued that the modern act of wiretapping was
analogous to the act of eavesdropping, which was around even when the Bill of Rights was
drafted. Black concluded that if the drafters of the Fourth Amendment had meant for it to
protect against eavesdropping they would have included the proper language.

Griswold v. Connecticut
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),[1] was a landmark case in which
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Constitution protected a right to
privacy. The case involved a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives. By a
vote of 7–2, the Supreme Court invalidated the law on the grounds that it violated the "right
to marital privacy".
Although the Bill of Rights does not explicitly mention "privacy," Justice William O. Douglas
wrote for the majority that the right was to be found in the "penumbras" and "emanations"
of other constitutional protections. Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion in
which he used the Ninth Amendment to defend the Supreme Court's ruling. Justice John
Marshall Harlan IIwrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that privacy is protected by
the due processclause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Byron White also wrote a
concurrence based on the due process clause.

Two Justices, Hugo Black and Potter Stewart, filed dissents. Justice Black argued that the
right to privacy is to be found nowhere in the Constitution. Furthermore, he criticized the
interpretations of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to which his fellow Justices
adhered. Justice Stewart famously called the Connecticut statute "an uncommonly silly law",
but argued that it was nevertheless constitutional.

Since Griswold, the Supreme Court has cited the right to privacy in several rulings, most
notably in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court ruled that a woman's
choice to have an abortion was protected as a private decision between her and her doctor.
For the most part, the Court has made these later rulings on the basis of Justice
Harlan's substantive due processrationale. The Griswold line of cases remains controversial,
and has drawn accusations of "judicial activism" by many conservatives.

Prior history
Griswold v. Connecticut involved a drug issue with the police Connecticut law that prohibited
the use of "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception." Although the law was passed in 1879, the statute was almost never enforced.
Attempts were made to test the constitutionality of the law; however, the challenges had
failed on technical grounds.

In Tileston v. Ullman (1943), a doctor and mother challenged the statute on the grounds that
a ban on contraception could, in certain situations, threaten the lives and well-being of
patients. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the plaintiff
lacked standing to sue on behalf of his patients. A second challenge to the Connecticut law
was brought by a doctor as well as his patients in Poe v. Ullman (1961). However, the
Supreme Court again voted to dismiss the appeal, on the grounds that the case was
not ripe. It held that, because the plaintiffs had not been charged or threatened with
prosecution, there was no actual controversy for the judiciary to resolve. Thus, the
Connecticut statute had evaded judicial review until Griswold v. Connecticut.

In Poe, Justice John Marshall Harlan II filed one of the most cited dissenting opinions in
Supreme Court history. He argued, foremost, that the Supreme Court should have heard the
case rather than dismissing it. Thereafter he indicated his support for a broad interpretation
of the due process clause. He famously wrote, "the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and
religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." On the basis of this
interpretation of the due process clause, Harlan concluded that the Connecticut statute
violated the Constitution.

Shortly after the Poe decision was handed down, Estelle Griswold (Executive Director of
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut) and Dr. C. Lee Buxton (a physician and
professor at the Yale School of Medicine) opened a birth control clinic in New Haven,
Connecticut, in order to test the contraception law once again. Shortly after the clinic was
opened, Griswold and Buxton were arrested, tried, found guilty, and fined $100 each. The
conviction was upheld by the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court, and by the Connecticut
Supreme Court. Griswold then appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Griswold argued that the Connecticut statute against the use of contraceptives was
countered by the 14th Amendment, which states, "no state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...nor
deny any person the equal protection of the laws," (Amendment 14 Section 1). The U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that the Connecticut Statute was unconstitutional.

VILLAFLOR V SUMMERS

NATURE
Original action in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

FACTS
- Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with adultery. Court ordered
defendant Villaflor to submit her body to exam of one or two competent doctors to
determine if she was pregnant or not. She refused and was found in contempt of court and
was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should allow the exam.

ISSUE
WON the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to
determine if she is pregnant, violates Bill of Rights provision that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself

HELD
NO
- The constitutional limit was simply a prohibition against legal process to extract fr
defendant’s own lips against his will, an admission of his guilt. The kernel of the privilege as
disclosed was testimonial compulsion.
- The purpose of criminal laws is to purge community of violators. No accused should be
afraid of use of any method which will tend to establish the truth.
- An ocular inspection of the body of an accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture
or force shall be avoided. Examination by reputable and disinterested physicians will not
embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary.

Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-19550, 19 June 1967]

En Banc, Concepcion (CJ): 6 concur

Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D.
Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge
Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of Manila),
Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge
Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City) issued, on different dates, a total of 42
search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck,
and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search
the said persons and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to
seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: “Books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code.” Alleging that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the Supreme Court the
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the
Supreme Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However,
by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations are concerned;
but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al.

Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the contested warrants that
allowed seizure of documents, papers and other effects in the corporate offices, and other
places besides their residences.

Held: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and
void. No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and the warrant shall particularly describe the things to
be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized. The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of whether the transactions were legal
or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the corporate officers and the
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our
Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. However, the documents,
papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al. As regards the
first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality
of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of
them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al.
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the
right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. With respect to the
documents, papers and things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962
Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by the Court on the documents, papers and things seized in the
residences, in effect, restrained the prosecutors from using them in evidence against
Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the Court held that the warrants for the search of 3 residences are null
and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences is made permanent, that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the residences are
concerned; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the 29 places, offices and other
premises.

MORFE V MUTUC
FERNANDO; 1968

FACTS
- Congress enacted 1960 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public officials
and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in
public service.
- One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that
every public officer, either within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption of office
“and within the month of January of every other year thereafter”, as well as upon the
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he
belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement
of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses
and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year…”
- This provision was challenged for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise
of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in
the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition
against self-incrimination.
- The lower court held that such requirement of periodical submission of such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is
thus offensive to the due process clause.
- Petitioners assert that:
1. it is an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials,
premised as it is on the unwarranted and derogatory assumption that they are corrupt
at heart and unless thus restrained by this periodical submission of the statements of
their financial condition, income, and expenses they cannot be trusted to desist from
committing the corrupt practices defined.
2. it was further asserted that there was no need for such a provision as the income
tax law and the tax census law also require statements which can serve to determine
whether an officer or employee in this Republic has enriched himself out of proportion
to his reported income.
- Executive Secretary and Secretary of Justice denied the conclusion of law:
1. that when a government official accepts a public position, he is deemed to have
voluntary assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only
at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge
public trust. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated form his public life.
2. the provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it impairs
plaintiff’s normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision
merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest or general welfare
in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police
power

ISSUES
1. WON the presumption on legislative validity should prevail
2. WON by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical submission of sworn statement
of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty protected by the due process clause
3. WON it violates the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
4. WON it violates the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination

HELD
 1. Yes. In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption of validity must prevail. In
the present case, there was no factual foundation on which the nullification of this section of
the statute could be based.
2. No. The Anti-Graft Act of 1969 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights
is permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the
Constitution condemns, the statute allows. The standard of due process is responsiveness
to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. This act is only part of the
police powers of the State.
3. No. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give
freedom from testimonial compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every man is under
obligation to give testimony.
4. No. What the inhibition against self-incrimination seeks to prevent is compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts. Necessarily then, the protection it affords will have to
await the existence of actual cases. The issue on whether it is an insult to the personal
integrity of the official is a political question which the Court refuses to pass upon.

Lagunzad v Gonzales
Lagunzad was initially a newspaper man, who had engaged in the business of producing films for the
cinema under the business outfit MML Productions. He had acquired the rights to create a movie based on
a book by Rodriguez, entitled “The Long Dark Night in Negros” about Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate
in Negros in 1961, who was ambushed by Gov. Lacson of the Liberal Party (Padilla was with the
Nationalista). He purchased the rights to the movie based on the book from Rodriguez for 2,000.00php.
The mother of Padilla, Vda. De Gonzales, learned about this, and with her 2 daughters sought to stop the
filming of the movie. A Licensing agreement was entered into by the parties in the Law office of Jalandoni,
which stipulates that Lagunzad shall pay the mother 20k for the use of the story of her son and for
portraying her and her family in the movie. He is also to pay 2.5% of the profits from the movie. Thereafter,
the filming was completed and the movie was shown in cinemas. Lagunzad initially paid only 5,000.00, but
refused to pay the remaining 15k, thus, the widow instituted action for execution of the licensing
agreement and for Lagunzad to pay her. The lower court and the CA granted the petition. Lagunzad insists
that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and that he signed the same only
because private respondent threatened him with unfounded and harassing action which would have
delayed production; and that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 in October, 1961, only
because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. By way of counterclaim, petitioner demanded that
the Licensing Agreement be declared null and void for being without any valid cause; that private
respondent be ordered to return to him the amount of P5,000.00; and that he be paid P50,000.00 by way
of moral damages, and P7,500.00 as attorney's fees.

W/N the licensing agreement was void as petitioner’s consent was obtained by means of duress,
intimidation and undue influence.

No. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story,"
that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray
publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. Being a
public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to
invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. The Court found it difficult to
sustain petitioner's posture that his consent to the Licensing Agreement was procured thru duress,
intimidation and undue influence exerted on him by private respondent and her daughters at a time when
he had exhausted his financial resources, the premiere showing of the picture was imminent, and "time
was of the essence." It is necessary to distinguish between real duress and the motive, which is present
when one gives his consent reluctantly. A contract is valid even though one of the parties entered into it
against his own wish and desires, or even against his better judgment. In legal effect, there is no difference
between a contract wherein one of the contracting parties exchanges one condition for another because he
looks for greater profit or gain by reason of such change, and an agreement wherein one of the contracting
parties agrees to accept the lesser of two disadvantages. In either case, he makes a choice free and
untramelled and must accordingly abide by it. The Licensing Agreement has the force of law between the
contracting parties and since its provisions are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy (Art. 1306, Civil Code), petitioner should comply with it in good faith. The interests observable
are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by
petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered
into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of
freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.
Lower courts’ decision upheld.

AYER PRODUCTION vs. JUDGE CAPULONG

FACTS:
Petitioner Hal McElroy is an Australian filmmaker planning to reenact the “historic peaceful
struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA”, in a film. The motion picture is entitled “The Four Day
Revolution”. This would be done through the eyes of 4 fictional characters situated in the
Philippines during the days surrounding the revolution. The project was also to be done with
the help of Australian playwright David Williamson and American historian Al McCoy.

When discussed with local movie producer, lope V. Juban, Ayer Productions was told to get
the consent of certain government agencies, as well as that of Gen. Ramos and Sen. Enrile.
All the proper consent was given, except by Enrile who did not want his name, or that of his
family, to be used in the film. Ayer Productions decided to go on with the film, but delete the
name of Sen. Enrile.

During the filming, Sen. Enrile filed a complaint in Court for a TRO to enjoin petitioner Ayer
from filming, saying that the making of the movie without respondent’s consent as a
violation of his right to privacy. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued upon Ayer as
a result.

Ayer then filed with the SC through a petition of certiorari. The court granted a TRO on the
injunction, allowing Ayer to film those parts of the movie not related to Sen. Enrile.

Respondent invokes the right to privacy. Petitioner invokes freedom of expression.

ISSUE:
WON the media’s freedom of expression may encroach on the right to privacy of a public
figure.

HELD: Yes it may

RATIO:
The case is basically one of superiority of rights; the filmmaker’s freedom of expression vs.
Enrile’s right to privacy. In the case at bar, the Court decided that freedom of expression
must prevail.

(Some important things to note are that freedom of expression extends to local and foreign
filmmakers in the country. It also extends to public and private film companies.)

Now the court says that the right to privacy is not absolute. Allowable is a limited intrusion
where the person is a public figure and the information is of public interest. In this case, the
subject matter is of public interest as it was a historical event, and Sen. Enrile played a big
part in this event, thus making his character a public figure. Therefore, a limited intrusion is
allowable. Furthermore, the portrayal of Sen. Enrile is not the main focus of the film, but is
necessary, again, due to the large part he played in it. “Private respondent is a “public
figure” precisely because, inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the
culminating events of the change of government in February 1986”.

(This was contrasted to an earlier ruling regarding the life of Moises Padilla. But in that case,
Moises Padilla was the main focus of the film. Enrile is not so in this one.)

The Court also talks about the “privilege of enlightening the public”, which is the privilege of
the press. The Court said that this privilege is also extended to film.

Brought up were 2 doctrines. The “clear and present danger” doctrine and the “balancing of
interest” doctrine. These are seen as limitations upon the freedom of expression. However,
use of either would not matter as the result would be the same.

On the “balancing of interest” rule: The principle requires a court to take conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

Cortes, J.

Nature:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and family and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar
their return to the Philippines

Decision:
Petition DISMISSED (9- Cortes, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Grino-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Fernan CJ, Feliciano vs. 6 – Gutierrez Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Sarmiento,
Paras, Bidin)

Facts:
- Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the Presidency on February 1986 via People
Power and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquino was declared President
- 1987 Constitution was ratified, and enshrined the victory of the People Power despite
repeated challenges to the Aquino government.
- Coup d’ etat, communist insurgency, and the secessionist movement in Mindanao
continue to plague the stability of the government. Furthermore, accumulated
foreign debt and the plunder of the nation left the country devastated.
- House Resolution No. 1342 was passed by 103 Congressmen to appeal to the
President to allow a dying man to come home to die in his country.

Petitioners
Right of the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed under:
- Sec 1 and Sec 6 of the Bill of Rights1
- President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode because there is no law
permitting her to do so
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1
Respondents
The issue involves a political question
which is non-justiceable.
Primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights (Article II,
Sec. 4 and 5).
International precedents (Trujillo, Somoza
 (UDHR) Article 132 Jr., Ubico, Batista, among others)
- International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights3

- Parties agree that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power
and its limits.

Issues:
1. WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. WON the President acted arbitrarily when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar
their return.

Held:
1. YES
- Angara vs. Electoral Commission – separation of powers by actual division and
construction in the Constitution
- Ocampo vs. Cabangis – a grant of legislative power means a grant of all legislative
power (same with judiciary)
- However, the Constitution does not define “executive power” although it
enumerates certain powers in the same Article (Art VII Sec 14-23)
- Petitioners: Exclusio unius est exclusion alterius (what is not enumerated is excluded)
- Comments on the US Presidency (Corwin): “What the presidency is at any particular
moment depends…on who is President.”
- COURT: …executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive
(Springer vs. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands)

2. NO
- The rights invoked by the petitioners are subject to limits and must be adjusted to
the requirements of equally important public interests (Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan)
- To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of the individuals. It involved the
President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people, and
to keep the peace.
- The abovementioned is not limited to exercising commander-in-chief powers but also
with maintaining the peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility.
- The House Resolution does not question the President’s power to bar the petitioners
from returning, but appeals to the President’s sense of compassion
- The request or demand of the petitioners cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President.
- As such, the request is subject to the discretion of the President (a political
question).
- There exist factual bases for the President’s decision. The return of the Marcoses
would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and
instigate more chaos.
- The State is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its
existence if they are perceived to become serious and direct.
2

3
Fernan, Concurring
- Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuating, their limits depend on the
imperatives of events and implonderables than on abstract theories of law
- The power of the President to ban the return of the Marcoses should be viewed in the
light of her residual powers. By reason of its impact on national peace and order, the
question cannot be withdrawn from the competence of the Executive to decide.

Gutierrez, Dissenting

On Sec. 6, Article III

- Ex Parte Milligan – The Constitution protects all classes of men, at all times, and
under all circumstances
- Does the Government have the power to deny him his right to come home and die?
NO
- The ritual invocation of national peace and security was pleaded so often by
Ferdinand Marcos to justify his acts under martial law.

On the issue of political question

- Definition: Vera vs. Avelino, Tanada vs. Cuenco, Baker vs. Carr
- A political question are those questions which are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government (1). It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure (2). Essentially a function of the separation of powers (3).
- Art. VIII Sec. 1 was enacted to preclude the Court from using the political question
doctrine to avoid having to make decisions because they are too controversial,
displeasing to the President/Congress, unpopular, or which may be ignored and not
enforced

On the President’s abuse of discretion

- The authority implied on Sec. 6 Art III does not exist because there was no law
specifying circumstances when the right may be impaired in the interest of national
security or public safety. The closest resort would be the commander-in-chief powers,
but there is no showing that the followers of Marcos are engaged in a
rebellion or he is in a position to lead them.
- Section 6 may only be impaired only upon lawful order of a court, or as provided
by law.
- To determine whether there is grave abuse of discretion: (1) evidence –
considerations of national security does not readily lend to presentation of evidence;
(2) avail judicial notice – only bases for determining clear and present danger to
national security
- No declaration of President that there is a clear and present danger to national
security and safety if Marcos will return, and limited the reason for the ban to (1)
national welfare and interest, and (2) the need to preserve economic recovery and
stability. These cannot be equated with national security or public order.

The Court should view the return of Marcos in the light of the constitutional guarantee of
liberty of abode and right to travel against the contention that national security and public
safety would be endangered by a grant of the petition.

Cruz, Dissenting
- Issue: WON respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in barring Marcos from
his own country. YES
 - In holding that the President has residual powers granted by the Constitution, the
Court is taking a great leap backward and reinstating a discredited doctrine
(Planas vs. Gil).
- Like Ninoy Aquino, Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and the liberty of
abode that his adversary invoked.

Padilla, Dissenting
- Core issue: Right of a Filipino to return to the Philippines and the right of the
Philippine Government to bar such return in the interest of national security and
public safety >> colliding assertions of individual right and governmental power.
- The right of every Filipino to travel shall not be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law (Art III
Sec6).
- Petitioners are wrong in contending that in the absence of restricting legislation, the
right to travel is absolute. The restrictions in the section may justify and even require
restrictions on the right to travel.
- The respondents, however, did not present sufficient evidence to offset or override
the exercise of the right invoked by Marcos.
- The apprehensions by the respondents do not escalate to proportions of
national security or public safety. They are more speculative than real,
obsessive rather than factual.
- Deteriorating political, social, economic conditions are not to be used as a pretext to
justify derogation of human rights.
- This is one case where the human and constitutional right invoked by one
party is so specific, substantial and clear that it cannot be overshadowed or
nullified by simplistic generalizations.
- The theory of political question is a lame excuse for evading a clearly pressing and
demandable duty to the Constitution.

Sarmiento, Dissenting
- As to the distinctions made by the majority to the right to return to one’s country
pitted against the right of travel and freedom of abode: The Constitution makes no
distinctions, let no one make a distinction (Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemus.)
- Does the President have the power to deny a citizen of his right to travel? NO.
1. The Executive must yield to the paramouncy of the Bill of Rights.
- The lone deterrents to the right in question is (1) decree of a statute, (2) lawful
judicial mandate. Had the framers intended to include Presidential initiative, it could
have done so. None of the two bars exist.
- 1973 Constitution: The President has implied powers to moderate the movement of
the citizens (Article IV Sec. 5)
2. It has not been proven that the return of Marcos will interpose a threat to “national
security, public safety, or public health”
3. Protector of peace: Same falsehood Marcos foisted to justify authoritarian rule. It
means that we are no better than he was.
(Justice lost a son because of Marcos, was placed under house arrest, and was charged with
libel, inciting to sedition, and rumor mongering)
“We would have betrayed our own ideals if we denied Marcos his rights.”

People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991);

Marti was convicted for violating dangerous drugs act he sent 4 gift wrapped package to
Switzerland via men packing. When asked by owner to check, Marti refused and assured
that the items were gift of gloves and cigars. Before delivery to customs, the owner (Reyes)
opened the boxes for final inspection and the package of Marti had dried leaves inside.
 Reyes went to NBI and found out that the package was dried marijuana leaves. Marti can’t
be located because his address is a PO Box

Marti- Evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and privacy of communication.
-NBI used evidence for conviction

Issue:

SC: court strictly adhered to exclusionary rule but in this cases, in the evidence were seized
by agents of the state and not a private individual.
: in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by consti cant be
invoked against state
State vs. Bruan/Beranas vs US- search made by private individual is admissible in
prosecution
: In this case, search was made by Reyes, presence of NBI was only latter.
: Consti= Protection against state

HELD: conviction is affirmed

Ople vs. Torres

(July 23, 1998)

Ponente: J. Puno

FACTS:
· Petition for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Administrative Order(AO) No.
308, entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System (NCIRS)” on 2 grounds:
1. It is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate
2. It impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected ‘zone of privacy’
· AO 308 issued by FVR on December 12, 1996 (see p. 144-146 for the complete
citation of AO 308)

ISSUES:
1. WON AO 308 is a law and not a mere administrative order, the enactment of the former
being beyond the President’s power à YES
2. WON AO 308 violates the right to privacy à YES

RATIO:
1. AO 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects
the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly,
violates the right to privacy. It involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order.
The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws
and the power of the Executive to administer and enforce them will disturb the delicate
balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the Court will give stricter scrutiny to the
breach of exercise of power belonging to another by one branch of government.
· Legislative power: the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil gov’t.
· Executive power: vested in the President; the power to enforce and administer laws;
the power of carrying laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
· The President, as Chief Executive, represents the gov’t as a whole and sees to
it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.
 Thus, he is given ADMINISTRATIVE POWER, which is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.
· Administrative order: an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of gov’t. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy (Sec 3, Ch 2, Title I, Book III, Administrative Code of 1987).
AO 308 does not merely implement the Administrative Code of 1987; it establishes for
the first time a NCIRS, which requires an overhaul of various contending state policies. Also,
under AO 308, a citizen cannot transact business with gov’t agencies without the
contemplated ID card; without such, s/he will have a difficulty exercising his rights and
enjoying his privileges. Hence, AO 308 clearly deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.
2. The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution; hence, it is a
burden of gov’t to show that AO 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it
is narrowly drawn.
In the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, the ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut that there is a
constitutional right to privacy was adopted. “The right to privacy is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty… The concept of limited gov’t has always
included that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen… A system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to
the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the State can control.”
The right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of the Constitution,
namely: Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights. The zones of privacy are also
recognized and protected in several statutes, namely: Articles 26, 32 and 723 of the Civil
Code, Articles 229, 290-292 and 280 of the Revised Penal Code, The Anti-Wire Tapping Act,
the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.
The ponencia proceeds to discuss the dangers to the people’s right to privacy:
1. Section 4 of AO 308: provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a “common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies” through the use of
“Biometrics technology” and “computer application designs”
· AO 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular
biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. It does not
state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification
purposes. The indefiniteness of AO 308 can give the gov’t the roving authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his
PRN.
· AO 308 does not tell us how the information gathered shall be handled. It does not
provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what
purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of
the information.
2. The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave
dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic
threats of the computer revolution. The Court ruled that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology.
AO 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy,
regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
3. The need to clarify the penal aspect of AO 308 is another reason why its enactment should
be given to Congress.

DISCLAIMER: the Court, per se, is not against the use of computers to accumulate, store,
process, retrieve and transmit data to improve the bureaucracy. Also, the right to privacy
does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific
and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It
merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest to justify
such intrusions.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

One-liners:
 A statute cannot be considered void just because it fails to define some terms with
scientific precision (only a “reasonable degree of certainty” is required of the law).
 The overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech laws, and not
to penal laws.

Facts:
President Estrada is being prosecuted under RA 7080 (the Plunder Law), and challenges its
constitutionality in the instant case. He claims that [1] it is vague; [2] it dispenses with the
“reasonable doubt” standard for criminal prosecutions; and [3] it dispenses with the
requirement of mens rea (in crimes punishable under the RPC), thereby violating the rights
of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature & cause of the accusations
against him.

Specifically:
[1] Section 2 of RA 7080 provides those guilty of plunder: “Any public officer who, by himself
or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts....” Since the law
failed to define specifically the meaning of “combination” and “series”, this makes the law
overbroad and vague, violating the right of the accused to due process and the right to be
informed.
[2] Section 4 provides the rules of evidence: “...it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.” Since the law also failed to define “pattern”, RA 7080 is also
attacked for being vague.

Issues/Held:
[1] MAIN – Whether RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being overbroad and vague. (NO.)
[2] Whether RA 7080 requires less evidence for proving predicate crimes of plunder and
violates rights of the accused to due process. (NO.)
[3] Whether plunder under RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum. (NO; it’s a malum in se.)

Ratio:
A law is vague when it “lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.” Vagueness is repugnant
because [1] it violates due process by failing to give fair notice on what conduct to avoid;
and [2] considerable discretion is given to law enforcers.

The doctrine of “void-for-vagueness” (attacking a law as void because it’s vague) can only
be invoked against legislation utterly vague on its face, and cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction; in which case, the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice on the acts or omissions it seeks to penalize. The “overbreadth” doctrine,
meanwhile, provides that a government purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly as to invade protected freedoms. Both the void-for-vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines have special application only to free-specch cases, not in testing
the validity of penal laws (elaborated below in Justice Mendoza’s concurring opinion).

The Plunder Law already contains well-defined standards and parameters, sufficiently
explicit and particular to enable to accused to determine the nature of his/her violation. As
long as the law affords some comprehensible guide/rule to inform those subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, and as long as there is clear, adequate,
and unequivocal contrast between the innocent and prohibited acts (as in the instant case),
its validity will be sustained.

A statute is not rendered void, ambiguous, or uncertain merely because general terms used
therein are not defined (such as “combination” or “series”). Besides, there’s no positive
constitutional/statutory requirement on Congress to define each word in a statute – so long
as the legislative will is clear, or at least can be gathered from the whole act. Furthermore,
“vagueness” requires merely that the law have a reasonable degree of certainty, and not
absolute or mathematical precision. Flexibility in specifying the details is allowed, especially
where it’s impossible to provide all details.

That Congress intended such words “combination” and “series” to be used in their popular
meanings is evident from the respective legislative deliberations of RA 7080. Thus,
“combination” means at least 2 acts falling under different categories of enumeration in
Section 1, par. (d). Meanwhile, a “series” involves 2 or more overt/criminal acts falling under
the same category under Section 1, par. (d). “Pattern” as used in Section 4 is also
sufficiently defined.

In the end, where no ambiguity exists, it cannot be created by dissecting parts and words to
criticize the want of scientific precision in the law (which in itself, unless there lacks a
“reasonable” degree of certainty, does NOT create vagueness). Therefore, petitioner’s
reliance on the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine is misplaced.

*2+ The use of the “reasonable doubt” standard is indispensible in the application of
criminal law, and gives life to the due process clause protecting the accused. It is evident
from the deliberations that Congress did not in any manner refashion such standard in the
crime of plunder.
[3] Plunder is a malum in se, so proof of criminal intent is required. That RA 7659 considered
plunder as a heinous offense (and therefore involves the death penalty) implies that it is a
malum in se. Petitioner likewise assails the constitutionality of such RA 7659, but the case of
People v. Echegaray has already established the jurisprudential doctrine (by means of stare
decisis).

Disposition: RA 7080 is constitutional. Petition dismissed.

Concurring opinion (Mendoza):

Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application only to free speech cases
(First Amendment cases). They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.
Because when the law regulates free speech, society’s valuation of constitutionally
protected rights somehow justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes.
But penal laws (like RA 7080) cannot be attacked as easily, otherwise the State may find it
difficult to enact laws proscribing criminal actions. Also, penal laws must be scrutinized
based on how they affect the particular defendant only (and not how threaten the rights of
all other non-litigants, as with free speech cases).

Bayan et.al. vs. Ermita

Facts:

Petitioners come in three groups.

Bayan, et al, Jess del Prado, et al, , Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al, KMU, et al.,

The rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo
Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta
Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed,
causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested
in the case of Bayan, et al allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and
that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections
4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive Response".
They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the
CPR policy recently announced.

Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also
curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as
the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression
is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in
support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing"
suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase
"maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test.

Issue: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 volated their rights as
organizations and individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005

Held:
Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in
peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is
directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble
in the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies
without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required
without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have
challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without
the permit.

Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that
enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very
basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected

Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for
that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to
engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and
Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending
and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as a
"content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion,"
"protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they
can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances"
come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of
the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health the so-called
calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be
struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used
by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be
condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely
regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from
being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to
the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.

In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local
governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as
provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in
accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city
concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall
be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the
police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.

In Re Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Capt. Gary Alejano

Carpio, J.:

Facts:
- 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”) in
Makati City and publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for
the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
- Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later
defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to
their barracks.
- 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the
Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP
Detention Center.
- 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an information for coup d’etat with the
RTC of Makati City against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood
incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined
and penalized under Article 134-A of the RPC.
- The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers
Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (“Trillanes”) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the
Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
 - 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to
take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the
Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the
custody of ISAFP.
- 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme
Court.
- SC issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to
make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees
before the CA on the scheduled date for hearing
- Same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court
granted.
- 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their
Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the
Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing.
- 17 September 2003, the CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition and ordered
Gen. Cabuay to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with
Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen.
Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the
detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day

Issues:
1. WON habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy petitioners seek? NO
- The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the
proper remedy to address the detainees’ complaint against the regulations and
conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person.
- In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a
preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. The respondent must produce the
person and explain the cause of his detention. However, this order is not a ruling on
the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy.
- CA recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the
legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. CA held that
the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly
affect the detainees’ liberty and it ruled that the regulation of the detainees’ right to
confer with their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances.
- CA declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent
violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is
the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.

2. WON CA erred in asserting the legality of the conditions of the detained

Junior Officers’ detention? NO
- Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees’ right to
effective representation when petitioners’ visits were limited by the schedule of
visiting hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees’ rights entitle
them to be released from detention.
- The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the detainees’ indictment for
criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees’ release from detention. The
ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees’ right to counsel.
The purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to
secure the safety and security of all detainees
- Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention
centers allowable: “such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure
 the detainee’s safety and prevent his escape.” In the present case, the visiting
hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the
legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees.
- The fact that the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a
daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees’ right to counsel
- Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors
and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and
excessive punishment.
- Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably
interferes with a detainee’s desire to live comfortably. The fact that the restrictions
inherent in detention intrude into the detainees’ desire to live comfortably does not
convert those restrictions into punishment.
- Bell v. Wolfish: the Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and
order at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees.
Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining jail
security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they
are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced
had he been released while awaiting trial.
- Block v. Rutherford upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as this practice
was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of innocent individuals will
be jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are
awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal conviction.
Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff hostage
to effect escapes. Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in
weapons, drugs, and other contraband.
- In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees
from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron
bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but
still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical
contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive.
- Petitioners’ argue that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees’ right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters
handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for
mailing.
- SC do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the
detainees’ letters in the present case violated the detainees’ right to privacy of
communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the
folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of
sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
- Hudson v. Palmer: imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many
significant rights. These constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete
withdrawal of certain rights, are “justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system.” The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to
accommodate a myriad of “institutional needs and objectives” of prison facilities,
chief among which is internal security.
- State v. Dunn: loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of
confinement
- In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between
the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could
read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but
only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
 - That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy
rights[62] is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons
who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to
Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

MERCADO v. SECURITY BANK CORP.

Sandoval-Guttierrez, J.:

Facts:
- Jose Teofilo Mercado and wife, Agnes (petitioners) filed for review on certiorari
assailing CA’s judgment dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment and
denying their motion for reconsideration. SC denied their petition for reconsideration
due to failure of showing that a reversible error had been committed by the CA
- Petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration which the SC granted and
required SBC to comment on the petition. The second motion for reconsideration was
denied for being prohibited.
- Mercado wrote a letter addressed to Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. insinuating that
1.)the ponente succumbed to the tremendous pressure of Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr. in denying his petition, 2.)the respondent Security Bank Corp. financed the
ponente’s travel to the US and 3.) the ponente gave the respondent the “go-signal”
to sell his property.
- Chief Justice Davide required Atty. Villanueva to comment on the letter and show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. He also ordered Mercado to
personally appear and also show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court.
- Mercado, together with Atty. Macapagal, his new counsel, appeared and manifested
that he only stated what Atty. Villanueva told him, that his petition was denied for the
second time due to the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice and that during
the wake of Atty. Villanueva’s mother, he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed to Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez and bragging that she is a very good, close friend of his and that
she is the ponente
- Atty. Villanueva submitted his comment denying Mercado’s allegations in his letter
and testified that it was Mercado who informed him that Justice Gutierrez is the
ponente
- In a bid to escape liability from contempt, Mercado invokes freedom of speech and
privacy of communication

Issue: WON Mercado and Atty. Villanueva are liable for contempt of court

Held/Ratio:
- Yes. Mercado and Atty. Mercado are guilty of indirect contempt of court.
- A person charged with contempt of court for his utterances which clearly constitute
contempt may not ordinarily escape liability by merely invoking the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech. Liberty of speech must not be confused with abuse
of such liberty. When he attributed those contemptuous remarks to Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente, Mercado abused such liberty. His statements cast
aspersions to their reputation and integrity and create a distrust to the Judiciary.
- The fact that Mercado’s letter was addressed only to the Chief Justice does not rinse
it of its contemptuous character. In In Re Laureta,[20] we ruled that letters
addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial
functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the
entire court.
- Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
 “Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself
or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt: Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice”
- As for Atty. Villanueva, SC is inclined to believe that Atty. Villanueva gave such
information to Mercado and that he also revealed the name of the ponente (Justice
Gutierrez) and that he and the ponente had known each other since 1964 and she
was at the wake of his mother
- Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a
lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal
or legislative body.” Further, Rule 15.07 provides that “a lawyer must impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.” Atty. Villanueva
took the forbidden course. In informing Mercado that he was “a very very good,
close and long time friend” of the ponente, Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the
former that he can obtain a favorable disposition of his case.
- Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and
the judicial officers. Atty. Villanueva’s conduct, no doubt, degraded the integrity and
dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court as well.

Silahis International Hotel, Inc. vs Soluta

Carpio-Morales, J:
• Petitioner Panlilio was the VP for Finance of his co-petitioner Silahis International
Hotel while respondents Soluta, Santos, Edna, Vicenta, and Matilla were employees of
the hotel and officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union Chapter, the hotel employees
union
• Petitioner’s version of the case:
 Late 1987: Maniego, Gen. manager of the Rapier Enforcement Professional
Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA) which the hotel contracted to
provide its security force, had been receiving reports that sale/and or use of
marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were going on in the union office
at the hotel and that there existed a theft syndicate  he conducted a
surveillance, with the approval of Panlilio, of suspected members and officers
of the union
 Morning of Jan 11, 1988: Panlilio, his personal secretary Dizon, Maniego,
reporter Rosales, and REPISA security guard Villanueva entered the union
office located at the hotel basement with the permission of Union officer
Babay who was apprised about the suspected illegal activities, and searched
the premises in the course of which found a plastic bag under a table 
Panlilio then ordered Maniego to investigate and report the matter to the
authorities
• Respondents’ version:
 Jan 10, 1988: Loida, a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the
female locker room at the basement of the hotel
 Dawn of Jan 11, 1988: she heard pounding sounds outside, prompting her to
open the door of the locker room upon which she saw five men in barong
tagalong whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees
of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office
 She saw one hid something behind his back
 She then closed the door and went back to bed and soon after, heard the door
of the union office opened
  Morning of Jan 11, 1988: union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the
door of the union office then Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at
dawn.
 Soluta immediately filed a complaint before the Security Officer and asked
help from locksmith Guevarra
 Edna, Arnold Ilustrismo and Ed Bautista opened the door and the men in
barong armed with clubs started hitting Soluta and Co. drawing them to run to
the female locker room, and to thereafter proceed to the Engineering Office
where they called for police assistance
 While awaiting for the police, Panlilio asked Babay to meet with him
 At the meeting, Panlilio told Babay that they proceed to the Union office
where they would settle the mauling incident, to which Babay replied that the
door of the office could not be opened
 Panlilio ordered Villanueva to force open the door and the latter did
 Once inside, Panlilio and Co. began searching the office, over the objection of
Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant
 A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops
• The 13 union officers (Babay, Asuncion, Jr., Soluta, Gimpayan, Vicenta, Edna,
Ilustrisimo, Velarde, Santos, Lina, Meneses, Matilla, and Norman Agtani) were charged
for the presence of marijuana as a violation of RA 6425, as amended by BP blg 179 (The
Dangerous Drugs Act)
• RTC acquitted the accused [the marijuana tops found are inadmissible as
evidence, coupled by the suspicious circumstance of confiscation, for lack of sufficient
evidence]
• Soluta and the union officers filed a case against petitioners including
prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista and Atty Tutaan who assisted in the prosecution of the
case, for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional rights against illegal
search
• RTC held the hotel, Panlilio, Maniego and Villanueva jointly and severally liable
for damages (actual, moral, and exemplary) as well as atty’s fees as a result of
malicious prosecution and illegal search of the union office
• Complaint against Ilustrisimo and Ramos, Bautista and Tutaan was dismissed
for lack of merit
• Counterclaims of the defendants are likewise dismissed for lack of factual and
legal basis
• CA affirmed TC’s decision but with modification [civilly liable for damages fr
violation of individual respondent’s constitutional right against illegal search, not for
malicious prosecution, set aside the award of actual damages to respondent union, and
reduced the award of actual damages to individual respondents to P50,000]

Issue: WON CA gravely erred in its conclusion that petitioners are liable for
damages under Article 324 of the Civil Code in that:
1. application of People v Aruta and Sec 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure in the case is legally flawed
-contend that being private persons, they are not covered by the standards set forth
in Aruta as the constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures is not meant to
be invoked against private individuals

2. petitioners’ search of the union office in the instant case was entirely
reasonable under the circumstances

4
 -given that the hotel owns the room where the union holds office; the search was not
without probable cause as it was conducted precisely due to reports received by petitioners
that the union office was being used as a venue for illegal activities, particularly the sale
and/or use of prohibited drugs; and the search was conducted with the consent and in
presence of union officer Babay

Held: Petition failed

• Code Commission: The injured citizen will always have, under the new Civil Code,
adequate civil remedies before the courts because of the independent civil action,
even in those instances where the act or omission complained of does not constitute
a criminal offense
• Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also
private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the
Civil Code
• It is not necessary that the defendant under Article 32 should have acted with malice
or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights  suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional
right of the plaintiff
• Petitioners had allegedly known about the reports late 1987 but only searched the
area in January 1988 without search warrant  there was an ample time for them to
obtain one
• Course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any
of the exceptional cases when a warrantless search is allowed by law  petitioners’
violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search
thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Art 32 of the Civil Code
• MHP Garments, Inc. v. CA: a case for unfair competition; there was sufficient time for
the therein petitioners and the raiding party to apply a judicial warrant yet they did
not apply for one  court upheld the grant of damages by the trial court to the
therein private respondents for violation of their right against unreasonable search
and seizure
• As for petitioners’ contention that property rights justified the search of the union
office, the same does not lie  for respondents, being the lawful occupants of the
office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure
• The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may
be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There
must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to
constitute a waiver thereof.
• There must be proof of the ff: (a) the right exists, (b) person involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (c) said person had
an actual intention to relinquish the right  waiver must be voluntary, knowingly,
and intelligently made
• Violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the
basis for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219 (6) and
(10)5 of the New Civil Code
• Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person “directly or indirectly”
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another  not
the actor alone who must answer for damages

5
 • Aruta case was cited by the appellate court, not to justify petitioners’ liability but to
rule out the legality of the search in the union office as the search was not done as
an incident of a lawful arrest
• People v Marti: to support their thesis that determinants in the validity of the
constitutional right against searches and seizure cannot be invoked against private
individuals BUT the ruling in Marti was based on the issue WON the evidence
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity without the participation of
the State is admissible
• The issue in the case at bar is whether respondent individual can recover damages
for violation of constitutional rights  Art 32 in relation to Art 2219 (6) and (10) of
the Civil Code

PETITION DENIED

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD (DDB) AND

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA) [GR No. 257870 (November 3,
2008)]

En Banc Penned by J. Velasco, Jr

Facts:
- 3 cases were filed questioning the constitutionality of the provisions of RA 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
- Summary: UNCONSTITUTIONAL for requiring CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE and
PERSONS CHARGED BEFORE THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, but CONSTITUTIONAL for
requiring STUDENTS of secondary and tertiary schools, OFFICERS and EMPLOYEES of
public and private offices to submit themselves to random drug testing.

1. PIMENTEL v COMELEC
- Aquilino Pimentel Jr. is an incumbent Senator running for re-election. He is questioning the
validity of Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 which requires that all candidates for both local and
national elections be subjected to mandatory drug testing.
- And in accordance with this the COMELEC :

SECTION 1. Coverage.—All candidates for public office, both national and local, in
the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo
mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories
monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
- He says the RA and COMELEC resolution impose upon candidates additional qualifications
not provided for in the 1987 Constitution.

2. SJS v DDB and PDEA

- These provisions specifically pertain to students of Secondary and Tertiary level schools.
- SJS, a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the DDB and the PDEA from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm
- (1) Provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing; (2)they trench
in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable; and (3) a person‘s constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.

3. ATTY. LARSENA JR. v DDB and PDEA

- Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and
(g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-
incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
- Especially pertaining to persons charged for crimes before the Prosecutor‘s Office.

ISSUES:
1. WON Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 pertaining to persons
seeking public office is Constitutional. NO
2. WON provisions of RA 9165 pertaining to students and officers or employees of
public and private offices are Constitutional. YES
3. WON provisions of RA 9165 pertaining to persons charged before the prosecutor‘s
office are constitutional. NO

HELD/RATIO:
1. Sec 36 (g) of RA 9165 for persons running for public office is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the
constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for
one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
2. A. FOR STUDENTS:

The SC said that although it is mandatory, drug tests are random and suspicionless.
If the objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process “the well being of
[the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drug”s,.
Besides, the primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found
positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as
criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user
consent to undergo rehabilitation.
They cited the cases of Vernonia School District v Acton and Board of Education v
Earls (about random drug testing for students who are athletes and non-athletes
respectively) which are cases upholding the constitutionality of random drug testing in
schools.

What can be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1)
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2)
minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and
may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory.

Random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable
but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population are to be
promoted and protected.

B. FOR OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFICES:

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the
part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of
the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
3. The Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes. The constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities.
In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of
the drug test policy and requirement.

The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are ―randomness‖ and
―suspicionless.‖ In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor‘s
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons‘ right to privacy, worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.