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MUNAH V FATIMAH
The beneficiaries of a land of an estate who had contracted to sell the land but failed to
transfer the land legally to the plaintiff were ordered by the court to effect the transfer.
Although the beneficiaries owned the estate legally, the court recognised the plaintiff as the
equitable owner of the land after signing the contract and going into possession.
The COA emphasised that the plaintiff by their refusal to undertake to refrain from disruptive
action during an industrial dispute, had not shown themselves willing to perform their side of
contracts of employment and could not seek equitable relief when they were not prepared to
act equitably.
A father had owned a large piece of rubber land allowed under the regulation at that time. In
order to avoid tax assessment over ownership of an extra 40 acres of land, the father
transferred the 40 acres to his son as nominee. A receipt of $7000 was obtained from his son
when actually no money was involved. Subsequently, the father contracted to sell this land
but the son refused to give him the power of attorney. The father brought an action for a
declaration that the son held the land on trust for him. The Privy Council dismissed the
father’s action on the ground of ‘unclean hand’ as the transfer was made for a fraudulent
purpose.
4. OVERTON V BANISTER
A minor fraudulently misrepresented her age and persuaded trustees to pay money to her.
Later, when she came of age, she sued them for the payment of the sum again but her claim
BHD
Gopal Sri Ram JCA explained ––“… there are certain basic threads that have been woven
into the fabric of equitable doctrine through the pronouncements in the leading cases on the
subject. One of these is that a supplicant who prays in aid of equitable assistance must
himself or herself be not guilty of equitable misconduct. This is sometimes put in the form of
the maxim: He who comes to equity must come with clean hands. So, a contract breaker
A lease which is not registered is void as a lease under the law but is good and valid as an
agreement for a lease and may be enforceable in equity by a decree of specific performance.
7. PAUL V CONSTANCE
The court held that the absence of the word “trust” was not fatal to the findings of an express
declaration of trust, taking into account the unsophisticated character of the deceased and his
relationship with the plaintiff. The words used by Constance to assure Paul of her joint
entitlement to the moneys in the account were sufficient to constitute a declaration of trust.
8. RE KAYFORD
Megarry J held that ‘it is well settled that a trust can be created without using the word “trust”
Romilly MR said: ‘If [a court of equity] finds that, by insisting on the form the substance will
be defeated, it holds it inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form and thereby defeat
the substance’.
10. AHMAD SHAHRIR BIN NAZI V NASHRUL HAZIMIE BIN AB HALIM &
ORS
The court considered the plaintiff’s action in not protecting his interest in the disputed
property as leisurely paced. He should be more vigilant and the relevant equitable maxim
applicable would be ‘equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights’. Based
on the evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff’s action did not in any way reflect his urgency to
11. GOH HENG KOW V RAJA ZAINAL ABIDIN BIN RAJA HUSSIN
Long, a registered proprietor of three piece of land sold the land to the defendant in 1993.
the land in 1994, which prevented the D from registering the transfer. When the P applied to
extend the caveat, D sought to set aside the order of extension. The court found that the P had
acquiesced to Long’s title for almost thirty years and they were thus, estopped and barred by
laches from asserting their alleged interest. Where a beneficiary under a trust entered a
private caveat instead of a trust caveat and failed to state in his statutory declaration
concerning the existence of the trust, he is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches from
relying on the existence of the trust. The order was set aside.
12. NELSON V RYE
It was held that a musician could not claim an account of earnings wrongfully restrained by
his manager in breach of fiduciary duty because he had waited for more than six years before
commencing an action.
The parties had signed a ten years lease of the respondent’s premises with a provision for
renewal if the appellant made a request, three months before the expiration of the lease.
When the appellant requested for a renewal of lease for ten years, the respondens refused.
The appellant sued for specific performance and succeeded. The court held that the appellant
always had an equitable right to renewal of the lease as equity looks upon as done what ought
It was further explained that the maxim implies that the fiduciary who receives an
unauthorised profit in breach of his duty of loyalty will hold the profit on constructive trust
for his principal because he is subject to an equitable duty to account for the profit he
received. In other word, the question is what would be the position if what should have been
done had been done? Since equity acts on the conscience of a person, the court’s order will
it was held that where any court orders a person to transfer property, equity treats the transfer
as having already been executed. Hence, once the order is made, ‘the beneficiary’ of the order
immediately becomes entitled to an equitable interest in the property ordered to be
transferred. The husband in this case, became a constructive trustee of the property for the
wife.
The P filed a suit in the Court of Chancery for specific performance of an agreement in
respect of property situated in North America. The D challenged the jurisdiction of the court
to grant the remedy as the property was outside England. The court held that the conscience
of the party was bound by this agreement. Being within the jurisdiction of this court, which
The appellant was the wife of the respondent. During marriage they bought the matrimonial
house in Singapore. Later, the appellant instituted divorce proceedings on the ground of
cruelty. She brought an actin under section 55 of the Women’s Charter 1961 for equal share
of the matrimonial house. She contended that she had contributed a sum of $13000 towards
the purchase price of the house and the balance of the payment was paid by mortgage by the
respondent. She also contributed to the running of the matrimonial home. The court held that
the appellant had made substantial financial contribution towards the acquisition and the
running of the matrimonial home which justified the conclusion that it was the common
intention of both spouses that they should share even though the transfer was in the name of