EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

EVIDENCE
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES..................................................................................2
SASAN VS NLR.............................................................................................2
GSIS VS VILLA VIZA....................................................................................10
People of the Philippines vs ANDAN.........................................................15
II. JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS........................................24
People of the Philippines vs ALIDO...........................................................24
People of the Philippines vs AYONAYON..................................................28
People of the Philippines vs MADERA.......................................................30
People of the Philippines vs SISON ..........................................................33
SAGUID vs SECURITY FINANCE Inc.......................................................... 38
SIMON VS CANLAS....................................................................................46
ALFELOR VS HALASAN...............................................................................51
People of the Philippines vs umipang.......................................................55
ZAFRA VS People of the Philippines ........................................................66
People of the Philippines vs VALLEJO ......................................................70

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE, ALEJANDRO
ARDIMER, ELEUTERIO SACIL, WILFREDO JUEGOS, PETRONILO CARCEDO and CESAR
PACIENCIA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
4TH DIVISION, EQUITABLE-PCI BANK and HELPMATE, INC., respondents. (G.R. No.
176240 , October 17, 2008)
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Decision1 dated 24 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79912,
which affirmed the Decision dated 22 January 2003 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002 finding that Helpmate, Inc.
(HI) is a legitimate independent job contractor and that the petitioners were not
illegally dismissed from work; and the Resolution 2 dated 31 October 2006 of the
same court denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank), 3 a banking entity duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws, entered into a Contract for
Services4 with HI, a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of
providing janitorial and messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall
hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and
maintenance services. The contract was impliedly renewed year after year.
Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr.,5 Leonilo Dayday,6 Modesto Aguirre,7 Alejandro
Ardimer,8 Eleuterio Sacil,9 Wilfredo Juegos,10 Petronilo Carcedo,11 and Cesar
Peciencia12 were among those employed and assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch
along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the
Visayas.13
O 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu
City separate complaints14 against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims
for separation pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, damages, attorney’s
fees and costs. Their complaints were docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 07-1381-
2001 and raffled to Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez (Labor Arbiter Gutierrez) for
their proper disposition. Subsequently, on 22 August 2001, the
petitioners15 amended their complaints to include a claim for 13th month-pay.
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the
parties still failed to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez ordered that they submit their respective position papers.
In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular
employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were
employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the
bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

over the means and methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that
their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so
since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI,
an independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to
perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. It was HI that paid petitioners’
wages, monitored petitioners’ daily time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised
direct control and supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every
right to terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for
whatever misdeed HI had committed against its employees.
that the [petitioners] are employees of respondent Equitable-PCI Bank. And having
worked with respondent Equitable-PCI Bank for more than one (1) year, they are
deemed regular employees. They cannot, therefore, be removed from employment
without cause and without due process, which is wanting in this case. Hence, the
severance of their employment in the guise of termination of contract is illegal. 17
In the dispositive portion of his 7 January 2002 Decision, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez
awarded to petitioners the following amounts:
I. – CESAR PACIENCIA    
a) Backwages

HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged
July 15, 2001 to January 8, 2002
in the business of providing janitorial and related services to business
establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners were its
= ₱190.00 per day        = ₱25,840.00
employees, part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The
Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-PCIBank
no longer renewed said contract with HI and, instead, bidded out its janitorial = 5 months and 6 days
requirements to two other job contractors, Able Services and Puritan. HI designated
petitioners to new work assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the = 136 days x ₱190.00
same. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or constructively, b) Separation Pay       =₱12,350.00
thus, petitioners’ complaints before the NLRC were without basis. June 10, 1996 to July 15, 2001
= 5 years
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez focused on the following issues: (a) whether petitioners =₱190.00 x 26 days x 5 years / 2
were regular employees of HI; (b) whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00
their employment; and (c) whether petitioners were entitled to their money claims. = ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total   ₱43,130.00
On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties’ position papers and documentary II – Dominador Suico, Jr. (did not file    
evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a Amended Complaint)
legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required a) Backwages     = ₱25,840.00
substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under July 15, 2001 to January 15, 2002
its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. 16 HI is same as Paciencia
therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank
b) Separation Pay     = ₱6,175.00
which is held liable to petitioners. According to Labor Arbiter Gutierrez:
Feb. 2, 1999 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 2.5 years / 2
[T]he undisputed facts show that the [herein petitioners] were made to perform not
Total   = ₱32,015.00
only as janitors but also as messengers, drivers and one of them even worked as an
electrician. For us, these jobs are not only directly related to the main business of III – Roland Mosquera (did not file    
the principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in the conduct of respondent Amended Complaint)
Equitable-PCI Bank’s principal business. Thus, based on the above, we so declare a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

(same as Paciencia) = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 9 yrs. / 2

b) Separation Pay     = ₱7,410.00 c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00
March 8, 1998 to July 15, 2001 = ₱190.00 x 26 days
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 3 yrs. / 2 Total = ₱53,010.00
Total   = ₱33,250.00 VIII – Mario Juntilla    
IV – Petronillo Carcedo     a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00
a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00 (same as Pacencia)
(same as Paciencia) b) Separation Pay     = ₱34,580.00
b) Separation Pay     = ₱41,990.00 October 7, 1987 to July 15, 2001
Sept. 16, 1984 to July 15, 2001 = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 14 yrs. / 2
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 17 yrs. / 2 c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00
c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00 = ₱190.00 x 26 days
= ₱190.00 x 26 days Total   = ₱65,360.00
Total   = ₱72,770.00 IX – Wilfredo Juegos    
V – Rolando Sasan, Sr.     a) Backwages     = ₱25,840.00
a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00 (same as Pacencia)
(same as Paciencia) b) Separation Pay     = ₱27,170.00
b) Separation Pay     = ₱29,640.00 July 23, 1990 to July 15, 2001
October 1989 to July 15, 2001 = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 11 yrs. / 2
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 12 yrs. / 2 c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,840.00
c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00 = ₱190.00 x 26 days
= ₱190.00 x 26 days Total   = ₱57,950.00
Total   = ₱60,420.00 X – Modesto Aguirre    
VI – Leonilo Dayday     a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00
a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00 (same as Paciencia)
(same as Paciencia) b) Separation Pay    
b) Separation Pay     = ₱44,460.00
Feb. 8, 1983 to July 15, 2001 = Jan. 5, 1992 to July 15, 2001 = ₱23,465.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 18 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00 = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 9.5 yrs. / 2
= ₱190.00 x 26 days c) 13th Month Pay   = ₱4,940.00
Total   = ₱75,240.00 = ₱190.00 x 26 days
VII – Eleuterio Sacil     Total   = ₱54,245.00
a) Backwages   = ₱25,840.00 XI – Alejandro Ardimer
(same as Paciencia) a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00
b) Separation Pay     = ₱22,230.00
June 2, 1992 to July 15, 2001 (same as Paciencia)
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

b) Separation Pay   = ₱28,405.00 was a legitimate job contractor, HI submitted before the NLRC several documents
= Jan. 20, 1990 to July 15, 2001 which it did not present before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. These are:
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 11.5 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,940.00 1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing
= ₱190.00 x 26 days Amended Articles of Incorporation, and General Information Sheet Stock
Total = ₱59,185.00 Corporation of HI showing therein that it increased its authorized capital stock from
₱1,500,000.00 to ₱20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999 with the Securities and
Exchange Commission;
xxxx
2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets of
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
₱20,939,935.72 as of 31 December 2000;
directing the respondents Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate, Inc. to pay jointly and
solidarily the complainants as follows:
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-
00582 registered under the name of HI showing that it has a parcel of land with
1. Cesar Paciencia - P 43,130.00 Market Value of ₱1,168,860.00 located along Rizal Avenue (now Bacalso Avenue),
Cebu City, and
2. Dominador Suico, Jr. - 32,015.00
4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI
3. Roland Mosquera - 33,250.00 showing that it has a commercial building constructed on the preceding lot located
along Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City with market value of ₱2,515,170.00. 19
4. Petronilo Carceda - 72,770.00

5. Roland Sasan, Sr. - 60,420.00 The NLRC promulgated its Decision on 22 January 2003 modifying the ruling of
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary
6. Leonilo Dayday - 75,240.00 evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof,
declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which
7. Eleuterio Sacil - 53,010.00 cannot be considered engaged in "labor-only contracting."

8. Mario Juntilla - 65,360.00 On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that:

9. Wilfredo Juegos - 57,950.00 The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows that barely
eight (8) days from 15 July 2001 when the complainants were placed on a
10. Modesto Aguirre - 54,245.00
temporary "off-detail," they filed their complaints on 23 July 2001 and amended
their complaints on 22 August 2001 against the respondents on the presumption
11. Alejandro Ardimer - 59,185.00
that their services were already terminated. Temporary "off-detail" is not
TOTAL - ₱606,575.0018 equivalent to dismissal. x x x.20

Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI
appealed the same to the NLRC, 4th Division, stationed in Cebu City. Their appeals
were docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002. In support of its allegation that it
The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrez’s award of backwages and separation pay,
but affirmed his award for 13th month pay and attorney’s fees equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the 13th month pay, to the petitioners.21 Thus, the NLRC decreed in
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

its 22 January 2003 Decision, the payment of the following reduced amounts to
petitioners:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez
dated 7 January 2002 is MODIFIED, to wit:
Ordering respondents Helpmate, Inc. and Equitable PCI Bank to jointly and
severally22 pay the complainants of their 13th month pay and attorney’s fees in the
aggregate amount of Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Two and 00/100
(₱43,472.00), broken down as follows:
1. Aguirre, Modesto - P 5,434.00
In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the
NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss
petitioners:
As to the question of whether or not, as a legitimate independent job contractor,
respondent HI illegally dismissed the petitioners. We rule in the negative.
It is undisputed that the contract between respondent HI and its client E-PCIBank
expired on July 15, 2000. The record shows that after said expiration, respondent HI
offered the petitioners new work assignments to various establishments which are
HI’s clients. The petitioners, therefore, were not even placed on "floating status."
They simply refused, without justifiable reason, to assume their new work
assignments which refusal was tantamount to abandonment. There being no illegal
dismissal, petitioners are not entitled to backwages or separation pay. 26

2. Ardimer, Alejandro - 5,434.00 The fallo of the 24 April 2006 Decision of the appellate court reads:

3. Carcedo, Petronilo - 5,434.00 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the NLRC,
4. Dayday, Leonilo - 5,434.00 Fourth Division, in NLRC Case No. V-000145-2003 promulgated on June 22, 2003. 27

5. Juegos, Wilfredo - 5,434.00 Petitioners now come before us via the instant Petition raising the following issues:

6. Juntilla, Mario - 5,434.00

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF
THEIR JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
7. Paciencia, Cesar - 5,434.00
UPHOLDING THE NLRC 4TH DIVISION’S DECISION AND GRAVELY ERRED IN:
8. Sacil, Eleuterio - 5,434.00
I. ACCEPTING AND APPRECIATING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY
TOTAL   ₱43,472.0023 RESPONDENTS DURING APPEAL, ALL EXISTING DURING THE TIME THE NLRC RAB 7’S
TRIAL, CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S PREVIOUS ESTABLISHED
DECISIONS.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution
dated 1 July 2003.24
II. REVERSING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THE FACTUAL FINDING OF NLRC RAB 7
THAT THE RESPONDENT HI WAS LABOR ONLY CONTRACTOR.
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the Court
of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
III. RULING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THAT THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL COMPLAINTS
Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79912.
WERE PREMATURELY FILED.28

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the procedural issues
raised by petitioners.
Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence
presented by HI for the first time on appeal. This is not a novel procedural issue,
however, and our jurisprudence is already replete with cases 29 allowing the NLRC to
admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC
for the first time on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor
cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process.30
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New
Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity
are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest
of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC
may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties
for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does
not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence. 31
In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 we again
emphasized that:
[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on
appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.
The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal
as technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials
are mandated by the Labor Code to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of
law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services
v. NLRC, and Bristol Laboratories Employees’ Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that
even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly
introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious
in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said
evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action
would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners’ protestations against the
documentary evidence submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies.
Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section 3,
Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:
Section 3. – Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself. Notably, certified true copies of these documents, acceptable
under the Rules of Court33 were furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming that
petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before
the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as
observed in the regular courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the
decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well
as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other
documents.34
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to
this Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence to the documentary evidence
presented by HI. Having failed in this respect, petitioners cannot now be heard to
complain about these documentary evidences presented by HI upon which the
NLRC and the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI is a legitimate job
contractor.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side.
It is also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. It is not the denial of the right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be
heard that constitutes violation of due process of law. Petitioners herein were
afforded every opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration of the adverse
judgment against them. They had every opportunity to strengthen their positions by
presenting their own substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by E-
PCIBank and HI before the NLRC, and even before the Court of Appeals. It cannot
win its case by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of
the adverse parties’ evidence.
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We now proceed to the resolution of the substantive issues submitted by
petitioners for our consideration, particularly, whether HI is a labor-only contactor
and E-PCIBank should be deemed petitioners’ principal employer; and whether
petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment.
Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a
principal agrees to put out or farm out to a contractor or subcontractor the
performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or
predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be
performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. 35 A person
is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the
following conditions concur:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business
and undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own account and under
its own responsibility according to its own manner and method, and free from the
control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance
of the work except as to the results thereof;
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures
the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and
health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure,
and social and welfare benefits.36
In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the
contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a
job, work or service for a principal.37 In labor-only contracting, the following
elements are present:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment
to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and
responsibility; and
(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor
are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the
principal.38
In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only
contracting,39 we elucidated in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations
Commission,40 that it is not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment
in the form of tools, equipment, etc. Other facts that may be considered include the
following: whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business;
the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the
relationship; the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work; the
control and supervision of the work to another; the employer’s power with respect
to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor’s workers; the control of the
premises; the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and
the mode and manner or terms of payment. 41 Simply put, the totality of the facts
and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered. 42 Each case
must be determined by its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to
be considered.43
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
We take note that HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Certificate of Registration44 Numbered VII-859-1297-048. The said certificate
states among other things:
"CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
Numbered VII-859-1297-048
is issued to
HELPMATE, INCORPORATED
330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City
for having complied with the requirements as provided for under the Labor Code, as
amended, and its Implementing Rules and having paid the registration fee in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) per Official Receipt Number 9042769,
dated October 16, 1997.
In witness whereof, and by authority vested in me by the Labor Code, as amended,
and its Implementing Rules specifically Department Order No. 10 series of 1997, I
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Official on this 23 rd day of December
1997."45
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the
presumption that it was issued in the regular performance of official duty. 46 In the
absence of proof, petitioner’s bare assertion cannot prevail over this presumption.
Moreover, the DOLE being the agency primarily responsible for regulating the
business of independent job contractors, we can presume in the absence of
evidence to the contrary that it thoroughly evaluated the requirements submitted
by HI as a precondition to the issuance of the Cerificate of Registration.
The evidence on record also shows that HI is carrying on a distinct and independent
business from E-PCIBank. The employees of HI are assigned to clients to perform
janitorial and messengerial services, clearly distinguishable from the banking
services in which E-PCIBank is engaged.
Despite the afore-mentioned compliance by HI with the requisites for permissible
job contracting, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez still declared that HI was engaged in
prohibited labor-only contracting because it did not possess substantial capital or
investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account or
responsibility. Both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, and
we agree.
"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed
capitalization in the case of corporations, tools, equipments, implements,
machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor or
subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service
contracted out.47 An independent contractor must have either substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among
others. The law does not require both substantial capital and investment in the
form of tools, equipment, machineries, etc.48 It is enough that it has substantial
capital. In the case of HI, it has proven both.
We have expostulated that once it is established that an entity such as in this case,
HI has substantial capital, it was no longer necessary to adduce further evidence to
prove that it does not fall within the purview of "labor-only" contracting. 49 There is
even no need for HI to refute the contention of petitioners that some of the
activities they performed such as those of messengerial services are directly related
to the principal business of E- PCIBank.
In any event, we have earlier declared that while these services rendered by the
petitioners as janitors, messengers and drivers are considered directly related to the
principal business of a bank, in this case E-PCIBank, nevertheless, they are not
necessary in the conduct of its (E-PCIBANK’s) principal business. 50
HI has substantial capital in the amount of ₱20,939,935.72. It has its own building
where it holds office and it has been engaged in business for more than a decade
now.51 As observed by the Court of Appeals, surely, such a well-established business
entity cannot be considered a labor-only contractor.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, namely: (a) the manner of
selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of
wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or
absence of control of the putative employee’s conduct. Most determinative among
these factors is the so-called "control test." 52
The presence of the first requisite for the existence of an employer-employee
relationship to wit, the selection and engagement of the employee is shown by the
fact that it was HI which selected and engaged the services of petitioners as its
employees. This is fortified by the provision in the contract of services between HI
and E-PCIBank which states:
Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have exclusive discretion in the
selection, engagement, investigation, discipline and discharge of its employees. 53
On the second requisite regarding the payment of wages, it was HI who paid
petitioners their wages and who provided their daily time records and uniforms and
other materials necessary for the work they performed. Therefore, it is HI who is
responsible for petitioner’s claims for wages and other employee’s benefits.
Precisely, the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank reveals the following:
Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall be responsible for the salaries,
allowances, overtime and holiday pay, and other benefits of its personnel including
withholding taxes.54
As to the third requisite on the power to control the employee’s conduct, and the
fourth requisite regarding the power of dismissal, again E-PCIBank did not have the
power to control petitioners with respect to the means and methods by which their
work was to be accomplished. It likewise had no power of dismissal over the
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

petitioners. All that E-PCIBank could do was to report to HI any untoward act, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
negligence, misconduct or malfeasance of any employee assigned to the premises. Decision dated 24 April 2006 and Resolution dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of
The contract of services between E-PCIBank and HI is noteworthy. It states: Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

[HI] shall have the entire charge, control and supervision over all its employees who SO ORDERED.
may be fielded to [E-PCIBank]. For this purpose, [HI] shall assign a regular supervisor
of its employees who may be fielded to the Bank and which regular supervisor shall
exclusively supervise and control the activities and functions defined in Section 1
hereof. x x x.55

All these circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its account,
under its own responsibility, according to its own manner and method, and free
from the control and direction of E-PCIBank. Where the control of the principal is
limited only to the result of the work, independent job contracting exists. The
janitorial service agreement between E-PCIBank and HI is definitely a case of
permissible job contracting.

Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice in
private, as well as in government institutions and industries, of hiring an
independent contractor to perform special services, 56 ranging from janitorial,
security and even technical services, we can only conclude that HI is a legitimate job
contractor. As such legitimate job contractor, the law creates an employer-
employee relationship between HI and petitioners 57 which renders HI liable for the
latter’s claims.

In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in
employees of E-PCIBank regardless of how long they were working for the latter. 58 his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS, Petitioners, vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO,
We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE
termination of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank, petitioners LEGARDA, Respondents. (G.R. No. 180291 ,      July 27, 2010)
cannot insist to continue to work for the latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank did
not constitute illegal dismissal since, first, petitioners were not employees of E- MENDOZA, J.:
PCIBank; and second, they were pulled out from said assignment due to the non-
renewal of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time they filed
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
their complaints with the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not even dismissed by HI;
seeking to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of
they were only "off-detail" pending their re-assignment by HI to another client. And
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for certiorari of
when they were actually given new assignments by HI with other
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service
clients,59 petitioners even refused the same. As the NLRC pronounced, petitioners’
Commission's Resolution No. 062177.
complaint for illegal dismissal is apparently premature.

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
THE FACTS:
Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the
GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth
Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco,
and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative
Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to
Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987, committed as follows:
That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some
employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of
the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for
Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered
the GSIS premises;
x x x           x x x          x x x
That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS
management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was
barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from
appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees;
That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC
Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules
on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and
heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit
during office hours.2
This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum
dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD),
Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit
(GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7)
respondents requiring them to explain in writing and under oath within three (3)
days why they should not be administratively dealt with. 3
Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two
others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying
that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their act of
going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that
their former union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show
their support, they were interested in that hearing as it might also affect them. For
her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a
scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her
immediate supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing. These
letters were not under oath.4
PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct
and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against each of the
respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to submit
their written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt thereof. 5 None
was filed.
On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions
finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of
one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the
lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced
the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied their
right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,
x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to
witness a public hearing cannot be considered as constitutive of such offense.
Appellants' (respondents herein) assembly at the said office to express support to
Velasco, their Union President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression
by the GSIS management, can be considered as an exercise of their freedom of
expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right. 6 x x x
PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the
Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure.7 The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:
The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to be
punished hardly falls within the definition of a prohibited concerted activity or mass
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
action. The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the
respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public service.
Only about twenty (20) out of more than a hundred employees at the main office,
joined the activity sought to be punished. These employees, now respondents in
this case, were assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite
the belated claim of the petitioners that the act complained of had created
substantial disturbance inside the petitioner GSIS' premises during office hours,
there is nothing in the record that could support the claim that the operational
capacity of petitioner GSIS was affected or reduced to substantial percentage when
respondents gathered at the Investigation Unit. Despite the hazy claim of the
petitioners that the gathering was intended to force the Investigation Unit and
petitioner GSIS to be lenient in the handling of Atty. Molina's case and allow Atty.
Velasco to represent Atty. Molina in his administrative case before petitioner GSIS,
there is likewise no concrete and convincing evidence to prove that the gathering
was made to demand or force concessions, economic or otherwise from the GSIS
management or from the government. In fact, in the separate formal charges filed
against the respondents, petitioners clearly alleged that respondents "marched to
or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in
a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Mssrs. Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, the latter surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises." Thus,
petitioners are aware at the outset that the only apparent intention of the
respondents in going to the IU was to show support to Atty. Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, their union officers. The belated assertion that the intention of the
respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure the GSIS
administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, is only an
afterthought.8
Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review
presenting the following:
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I
WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY THE
PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY THE
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER, WHERE THE
RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DID NOT FILE ANY
RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.
II
WHETHER THE RULE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT BE EQUATED
WITH DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL SENSE AUTHORIZES AN ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNAL TO CONSIDER IN EVIDENCE AND GIVE FULL PROBATIVE VALUE TO
UNNOTARIZED LETTERS THAT DID NOT FORM PART OF THE CASE RECORD.
III
WHETHER A DECISION THAT MAKES CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS BASED ON EVIDENCE
ON RECORD BUT MAKES A CONCLUSION OF LAW BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF A
DOCUMENT THAT NEVER FORMED PART OF THE CASE RECORDS IS VALID.
IV
WHETHER FURTHER PROOF OF SUSBTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE OPERATIONAL
CAPACITY OF AN AGENCY, DUE TO UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN OFFICE HOURS, IS REQUIRED TO
HOLD THE SAID EMPLOYEES LIABLE FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE SERVICE PURSUANT TO CSC RESOLUTION NO. 021316.
V
WHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY EMPLOYEES, LASTING FOR
MORE THAN AN HOUR DURING OFFICE HOURS, INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND
WITHIN A UNIT TASKED TO HEAR AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, TO PROTEST THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR LEADER AS COUNSEL IN THE
SAID ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY.
VI
WHETHER THE CONCERTED ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYEES OF THEIR POSTS FOR
MORE THAN AN HOUR TO HOLD AN UNRULY PROTEST INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES
ONLY CONSTITUTES THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF REASONABLE
OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS.9
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters
of explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The
respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue
that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed
should have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.- Material
averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated
damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of
usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied
specifically and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to
Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election
cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient. (underscoring supplied)
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own
rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No.
178-04, specifically provides:
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of
the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be
considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of
Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the facts
and evidence submitted by the prosecution.
A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an
answer merely translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer." There is
nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done
away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and
convincing evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied
in a "suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies." 10 It
means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where
there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency
as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer.
What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may "render judgment as may be warranted
by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution."
Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this
case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not deemed
admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial allegations
and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint. 11 Thus, even if
respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in
the complaint will be considered as true and correct in their entirety, and that the
forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not
forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this
case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges. 12
A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case was
resolved against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents' evidence,
but on the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus, the CA wrote:
Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for resolution without the
respondents' respective answer to the separate formal charges in accordance with
Section 4, Rule XI of the RPAI. Being in full control of the administrative proceeding
and having effectively prevented respondents from further submitting their
responsive answer and evidence for the defense, petitioners were in the most
advantageous position to prove the merit of their allegations in the formal charges.
When petitioner Winston Garcia issued those similarly worded decisions in the
administrative cases against the respondents, it is presumed that all evidence in
their favor were duly submitted and justly considered independent of the weakness
of respondent's evidence in view of the principle that ''the burden of proof belongs
to the one who alleges and not the one who denies."13
On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question of
whether or not there was a violation of Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316.
Stated differently, whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005 amounted
to a "prohibited concerted activity or mass action." Pertinently, the said provision
states:
Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited concerted activity
or mass action'' shall be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
government employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order
to realize their demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their
respective agencies or the government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts,
pickets and acts of similar nature. (underscoring supplied)
In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office
wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity
or mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations can be
deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA
found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the
political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass
action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or
service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing
similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing
with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the
guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work
stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of
force concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No.
02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all
collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited.
Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the
government service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the
land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their
rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of
expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the
members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be
reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
A review of PGM Garcia's formal charges against the respondents reveals that he
himself was not even certain whether the respondents and the rest of the twenty or
so GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day marched there or
just simply appeared there simultaneously. 14 Thus, the petitioners were not even
sure if the spontaneous act of each of the twenty or so GSIS employees on May 27,
2005 was a concerted one. The report of Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which
was the basis for PGM Garcia's formal charges reflected such uncertainty. Thus,
Of these red shirt protesters, only Mr. Molina has official business at the
Investigation Unit during this time. The rest abandoned their post and duties for the
duration of this incident which lasted until 10:55 A.M. It was also observed that the
protesters, some of whom raised their clenched left fists, carefully planned this
illegal action as evident in their behavior of arrogance, defiance and provocation,
the presence of various recording gadgets such as VCRs, voice recorders and digital
cameras, the bad mouthing of the security guards and the PGM, the uniformity in
their attire and the collusion regarding the anomalous entry of Mr. Albert Velasco to
the premises as reported earlier.15
The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts. It did not show respondents'
unified intent to effect disruption or stoppage in their work. It also failed to show
that their purpose was to demand a force concession.
In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, 16 the Court
upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its employees, numbering between
300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest or
demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same for
the 20 or so employees in this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going
to the GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action
in Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same
manner would most certainly be unfair and unjust.
Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the
government's right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend
to lean towards a broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by
their First Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters. 17 In said case, the
New York Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York City's
mass transit service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or
buttons on their uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons
promoting their opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the
NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union members to
discipline. The court, though recognizing the government's right to impose
reasonable restrictions, held that the NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally
overboard."
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital
District,18 it was held that,
A county hospital employee's wearing of a "Union Yes" lapel pin during a union
organization drive constituted speech on a matter of public concern, and the
county's proffered interest in enforcing the anti-adornment provision of its dress
code was outweighed by the employee's interest in exercising his First Amendment
speech and associational rights by wearing a pro-union lapel button. 19
Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's
Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action
has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,
respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the assailed August 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals as well
as its October 16, 2007 Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 98952 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO ANDAN y
HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant. (G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997)
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the
crime of rape with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of Baliuag,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes against her will and without her
consent; and the above-named accused in order to suppress evidence against him
and delay (sic) the identity of the victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill the said Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack, assault
and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different parts of
her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her
death.
Contrary to Law.1
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in
Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age
and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her
school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final
examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded
denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some
personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his
house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother
should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was
her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant
then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His
lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the
house and left her there until dark. Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who
was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one
side by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant
stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over
the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with
a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After
silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it
towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. 2
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was
discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt
pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of
"traumatic injuries" sustained as follows:
1. Abrasions:
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from right to
left.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

2. Abrasions/contusions: 7. External genitalia

2.1 temple, right. 7.1 minimal blood present.

2.2 cheek, right. 7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and exposed
vaginal wall.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right. negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr.
Wilfredo S. de Vera).
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches in width, Traumatic Injuries, Face.3
from right MCL to left AAL.
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio
2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral. Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal.
Searching the place where Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered a
broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also
3. Hematoma:
found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as
Marianne's.4
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right. the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house
and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right. appellant also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma
surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair
4. Lacerated wounds: of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a
wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch. allegedly belonged to appellant.5

4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in Barangay
Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor
Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol
jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated.
Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the
police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the
bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors,
Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout.
He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of
Marianne.6 Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon,
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the police. Appellant
went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and
retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as
belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the
two other suspects holding the bags.7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The
following day, February 25, a physical examination was conducted on the suspects
by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
Patawaran.8 Appellant was found to sustain:
HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with abrasions
(scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index finger 1.5 cm.
in size Lt.9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police
headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and
proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant
approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led
appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and
said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed
Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist
appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor, the police,
representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed
his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the
place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom
he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. 11 He also
said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and
tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After his confession, appellant hugged his wife
and son and asked the mayor to help
him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media
nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26
and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Appellant was again
interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the
crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that
in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in Barangay
Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home
after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their one-year old son.
They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife
went to Manila to collect some debts while he and his son went to his parents'
house where he helped his father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined
them in the afternoon and they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he was
picked up by the police. 16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of
the rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him
repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and killed Marianne. When
he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and injected something into his
buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was
taken to his house where he saw two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was
ordered by the police to go to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two
bags from under the flower pot. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. 17
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and
sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also
ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby is
found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the
Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659
(Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the heinous
crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the
family of Marianne Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of Marianne
Guevarra and P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00
as moral damages. After automatic review of this case and the decision becomes
final and executory, the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED. 18
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND
THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION WHEN THE
EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED. 19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the
three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news
reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also
based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and
reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the
mayor and the news reporters because they were made during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) . . .
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. 20 Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is
inadmissible in evidence against him. 21 The exclusionary rule is premised on the
presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. 22 The
incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a
later judicial determination of what really transpired. 23
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person
under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when
it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating
or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged
offense. 24 As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers
"investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations
conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government." 25
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general
inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect
even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear from the
testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this act?
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the backyard of the
house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and third,
when we asked Romano Calma who were his other companions in the house, he
said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be found at that time and whose
whereabouts were unknown, sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then, what else did you do?
A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we learned
that his parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him there
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
and investigated him and in fact during the investigation he admitted that he was
the culprit. 26
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the
police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional
rights when he was investigated and interrogated. 27 His confession is therefore
inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's
house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags marked
as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he point these
bags?
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the canal
of the toilet.
Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2) bags were
located?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you
do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know
where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the
place where the bags were located?
A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really
showed where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir. 28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the
police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor
Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a
private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone
committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already many
people from the media, Andan whispered something to me and requested that he
be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I brought him inside the office of
the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of
Police, mayor?
A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo
ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So when he was
telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened the door to allow the
media to hear what he was going to say and I asked him again whether he was the
one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was even covered by a television camera. 30
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you
something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of
Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako
ang pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he told you?
A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the
second one was before the media people, sir.
Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police?
A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making
further admissions because I wanted the media people to hear what he was going
to say, sir. 31
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's
confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority
ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously,
freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not
know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked
with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it
has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was
correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on
Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded
on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly, openly and
publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. 38 Orlan Mauricio, a
reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February
25, 1994. He testified that:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place
where the body of Marianne was found, where did you start your interview, in what
particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the police
station of Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned earlier,
sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and
I also learned from him that the victim was his cousin.
Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for
raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was
voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed
on his person because I knew that there were five other suspects in this case and he
said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he
was under the influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle
beside him at the time that you asked the question?
A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall
anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the crime
scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra resides but . . . All throughout the
scene inside the office of the Station Commander, there was no air of any force or
any threatening nature of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is
why, I was able to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me
that he was the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of
accompanying me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment and everything
that transpired during the killing of Marianne Guevarra.
Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the
accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the Baliuag
PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who accompanied you?
A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor Trinidad and
some of the relatives of the accused.
Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was recovered.
Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?
A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at
that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion, Baliuag,
Bulacan, what transpired?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was
committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old house where
I tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how
he carried out the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra, sir.
Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP Baliuag
up to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?
A: Yes, sir. 39
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the
proceedings for three successive days. 40 His testimony is as follows:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation so
that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.
Q: Were there people?
A: The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief
of police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several other
persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after
the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. I reiterated the
question to the suspect. Are you aware that this offense which is murder with . . .
rape with murder is a capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this?
And he said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the one who did it and he
repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some pictures
of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the group of
Inday Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and the suspect
answered the same.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A: The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you
affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga and
gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam mo
ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and
gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?
A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped
his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the pornographic
magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost
everyday before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court
and the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body that he was really
down physically and I think he was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear
that fell on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 41
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February
26, 1994. 42 He also testified that:
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the
permission that you asked from him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?
A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag,
the chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of police was
suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the
accused?
A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There
were people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.
Q: How about the other representatives from the media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were people
from the radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q: How about Channel 7?
A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also
present?
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the
wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from the questions
that I asked from the people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.
Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people there, sir.
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we
know what question did you ask and the answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a
tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on the stomach.
Q: What was the next question that you asked him?
A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the
victim was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on
that?
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: "Ano iyon?"
A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.
Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of the
fence?
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 43
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any
undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news
reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting under the
direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession
to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact
the commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission before
interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant
protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even
supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family
and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant
by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They
confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental
grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government
has the duty to protect. 47 Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of
Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. 48
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical
evidence against him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the Provincial
Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no spermatozoa and no recent
physical injuries in the hymen. 49 Allegedly,
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her
menstruation. 50
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr.
Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His
findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen
had lacerations, thus:
Hymen — contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3
o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock. 51
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been
caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive,
indicating the possibility of penetration. 52 His testimony is as follows:
Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6
o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the
lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the cadaver
was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before
you did you re-autopsy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could have
been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the victim
which was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds
could produce blood because there is no more circulation, the circulation had
already stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor examined the victim with the
use of forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor, then I assumed that the victim was
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
already dead. So it is impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were
caused by those instruments because the victim was already dead and usually in a
dead person we do not produce any bleeding.
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with clotted
blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could have
been inflicted or could have been sustained while the victim was alive?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated wounds,
now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate the edges
of the lacerated wounds where you found the clotted blood?
A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at 6
o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the
edges of the lacerated wounds, sir.
Q: What could have caused those lacerations?
A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into that
small opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?
A: It is possible, sir. 53
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does
not negate the commission of rape 54 nor does the lack of complete penetration or
rupture of the hymen. 55 What is essential is that there be penetration of the female
organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda testified that the fact of penetration is
proved by the lacerations found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh
and could not have been caused by any injury in the first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are
supported by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an investigation
of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near
appellant's house; 57
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were not in
their house; 58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a
meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass nearby and at
the pigpen at the back of appellant's house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been
dragged over a flat rough surface. 60 This supports the thesis that she was thrown
over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in
his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found
positive for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type of the
victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood type was not determined but her parents had
type "A" and type "AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found to
be type "O," appellant's blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to explain; 64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident and
were later found at his parents' house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan; 65
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial
evidence justify the conviction of appellant.
Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi
cannot even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of the commission
of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away from Concepcion
Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an hour. 66
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos,
Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito
Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members
of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is
also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
II. JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESPIRIDION ALIDO, ET AL.,
defendants. INOCENCIO HERVAS and MARCELO HERVAS, defendants-appellants.
(G.R. No. L-12449, May 30, 1961)
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Hon. F. Imperial Reyes,
presiding, finding accused-appellants Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas guilty of
the murder of their cousin, Francisco Hervas, and sentencing each of them to
reclusion perpetua and to pay 1/3 of the indemnity of P6,000. Espiridion Alido was
also sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 10 years and 1 day of
prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Francisco Hervas 1/3 of the sum of P6,000, and to pay a
proportionate share of the costs, but he did not appeal.
On or before May 29, 1955, Francisco Hervas, his wife and their children were living
in their house on a land situated in the barrio of Dagami, Municipality of Maasin,
Province of Iloilo. At about 6:00 in the evening of that day, Francisco Hervas seemed
to have heard some noise coming from his cornfield near their house, so he went to
the batalan adjacent to their house to find out what was the noise about, but
suddenly a shotgun exploded from the neighboring field, and the shot from it hit
Francisco on the chest and he fell down dead. The following morning, the widow,
Concepcion Laserna sent her eldest child, Ofelia Hervas, to the house of Inocencio
Hervas, one of the accused, which was nearest their house, and to the house of the
brother of the deceased, Proceso Hervas, farther away, to inform them of the
incident. The brother of the deceased happened to be away from home and as
Ofelia returned, she passed by the house of Inocencio Hervas, informing him that
the brother of the deceased could not come, so Inocencio went to the house of the
victim, accompanied by three individuals who helped him dig the grave some
distance away from the house and there interred him.
No steps were taken by the family or by relatives of the deceased to Investigate
who the author of the crime was. But news of the killing came to the ears of the
Philippine Constabulary. So one day the Philippine Constabulary had the remains of
the deceased exhumed. Those present at the exhumation were the investigator of
the Constabulary, Sgt. Pelagio Agraviador the Chief of Police, the sanitary inspector
and the municipal mayor. They proceeded to the barrio of Dagami, passing first by
the house of Inocencio Hervas, and with the latter they went to the place where the
body of the deceased had been interred. The grave was dug and the dead body was
brought out. They found out that there were nine pellet holes.
Thereafter, the Constabulary began questioning the widow, Concepcion Laserna.
Her statement was taken at the municipal building and she declared that she was
able to recognize Espiridion Alido as the one who shot her husband, accompanied
at the time of the shooting by two persons whom she could not recognize. This
statement (Exhibit "1" Alido, 2 Hervas), of Concepcion Laserna was made on June
13, 1955. A similar statement was made by her daughter, Ofelia Hervas, and to the
same effect.
The municipal police of Maasin could not effect the arrest of Alido, but before July
13, 1955, he surrendered to the Philippine Constabulary at Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. He
surrendered to Sgt. Silverio Balmaceda at the barracks. Balmaceda referred him to
Cpl. Delfin de la Torre, who was then investigator of the company. Alido's statement
was taken down in writing and was presented in court during the trial as Exhibit "C".
According to this statement, Inocencio Hervas invited him on May 29, 1955 to the
house of one Carlos Camral, on the occasion of the killing of a pig that in the
afternoon of that day, Inocencio, he and Marcelo proceeded to the house of
Francisco Hervas, armed as follows: Inocencio, with a shot gun (paltik), Marcelo
with a rifle, and he with a bolo; that once near the house of Francisco Hervas, he
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
heard one shot and upon hearing it he ran away, returning to the house of Carlos
Camral that about 9:00 that evening, Inocencio Hervas came back to the house of
Camral with a shotgun, boasting that they could now live in peace because the
arrogant man is already dead (referring to the deceased Francisco Hervas.) .
As a result of this affidavit of Alido further investigation petitions were made.
Concepcion Laserna was again examined this time before the Justice of the Peace of
Maasin, and she then, declared in her affidavit (Exhibit I, Alido, 3 Hervas) dated July
20, 1955 that it was Inocencio Hervas who fired the shot that killed her husband,
and that Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido were with Inocencio at the time of the
shooting. On July 20, 1955, the information was filed in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Maasin, charging the three accused with the murder of the deceased. The
information charges the accused with having committed the crime with treachery
and evident premeditation.
Concepcion Laserna testified at the trial that three persons had approached their
house on the afternoon of May 29, 1955, namely, Inocencio Hervas, Marcelo Hervas
and Espiridion Alido that Inocencio was provided with a paltik, Espiridion had a rifle
and Marcelo had a bolo; that she actually saw that it was Inocencio who fired the
shot that killed her husband; and that as soon as her husband had fallen down after
the shot, the three persons ran away. She further declared that she saw the
assailant because she was at the time of the shooting at the window of their house.
Demetrio Hervas, a son of the deceased, also testified and declared that when his
father went to the batalan attracted by a noise in the cornfield, he (witness) was at
the door of the house; that when he heard the shot which felled his father, he
immediately directed his eyes towards the place where the explosion had come and
saw the aggressor, Inocencio Hervas, and his companions, Marcelo Hervas and
Espiridion Alido.
Upon being asked why in her statement made before the Municipal Mayor on June
13, 1955 (Exhibit "2" — Hervas; Exhibit "1" — Alido), she declared that she saw
Espiridion Alido fired the shot that killed her husband and that she did not recognize
Alido's companions, she explained that at that time she was under the influence of
fear of Inocencio Hervas. Explaining this, she declared that the morning after the
shooting she sent her daughter Ofelia to the house of Inocencio Hervas to tell him
that she should bury her husband; that Inocencio Hervas threatened to kill her if
she should disclose or point to him as the author of the death; that he just
suggested to her that she should explain that the cause of her husband's death was
his having bolo wounds, instead of gunshot wounds. Upon being asked the probable
reason why her husband was killed by the accused, she declared that it was because
the accused had taken away bamboos from the land which the deceased was taking
care of, and her husband had denounced them to the owner of the land, namely,
Eugenio Maquiling.
The Constabulary investigator, Sgt. Pelagio Agraviador, who had seen the
exhumation, corroborates this alleged fear of Inocencio Hervas of Concepcion
Laserna. He testified that at the time he was investigating Concepcion Laserna,
Inocencio Hervas was present, and that every time Concepcion was asked a
question she would first look at Inocencio before answering the question. Further
elaborating on the matter, this witness declared that when the investigation was
being made in the building of the puericulture center, the persons who were
present were Concepcion Laserna, her daughter Ofelia Hervas, Inocencio Hervas, a
policeman and himself, and that he observed that every time a question was
directed to Concepcion Laserna, she would look at Inocencio who, in turn would
look at her with sharp eyes; that he noticed such interest on the part of Inocencio
that in the middle part of the questioning of Concepcion, he had to ask Inocencio to
go out. He also declared that when Ofelia Hervas was investigated, Inocencio
Hervas again went inside the room where the investigation was being conducted
and again he had to ask him to go out of the room, because he wanted to have
secrecy in the investigation.
All of the three accused denied having participated in the commission of the crime,
including Espiridion Alido, who did not appeal from the decision. Inocencio Hervas
declared that he was always in good terms with Francisco Hervas and his wife; that
he was living at a distance of one-half kilometer from the house of Francisco Hervas,
and that the one carrying the work of the family was the wife, Concepcion Laserna,
because one of the hands of Francisco Hervas had been cut in a fight during the
Japanese regime; that about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the day of the
shooting, he had to go to the house of one Carlos to help in the slaughter of a pig,
and did not know of the death of Francisco Hervas until the following morning when
the daughter of the deceased, Ofelia, informed him thereof; that when she went to
the house of Francisco there was no one there except the wife and the children, and
when he asked her if she recognized the persons who killed her husband, she
answered she did not because it was very dark; that thereafter she left the house
and went home, with the instruction that when the brother of the deceased would
arrive he (the accused) would be called. Further testifying, he declared that he
returned at about 4:00 in the afternoon, and that since the younger brother of the
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

deceased, Proceso Hervas, did not come, they buried the deceased with the help of Fabian Resano had purchased a piece of land from Arcadio Maquiling, the son of
his children, namely, Carlos, Martin and Juan. Testifying on the exhumation, he Eugenio Maquiling and as Resano surveyed the land, he (Resano) tried to include
declared that the mayor, the Chief of Police and some policemen came on the the land belonging to him (Marcelo), and that he (Marcelo), did not agree to this. As
Sunday following the burial on Monday; that the Chief of Police and the mayor to the charge that he had been stealing bamboos, he answered that the bamboos
called for him at his house; that the son of Francisco Hervas, named Demetrio were not Maquiling's but his own.
Hervas, Juan and Martin were also called; that some Philippine Constabulary
A consideration of the circumstances brought out at trial both by the prosecution as
soldiers were also with the party, and that it was he and the son of Francisco that
well as by the defense, indicate that the probable cause of the killing is, as indicated
indicated to them where the body was buried; that they did not make any
by the widow, Concepcion Laserna, that is, Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas
investigation that afternoon because it was already very late when the exhumation
resented the act of Francisco Hervas in denouncing them for cutting bamboos on
was finished; that they passed the night at his house and the following morning the
the land of Maquiling. The land on which the house of Francisco Hervas is erected
party returned back to the poblacion together with the wife of the deceased. He
belonged to Eugenio Maquiling. Marcelo Hervas claimed that the bamboos that he
also testified that he, the widow and her children were brought to town, as the
cut were his own; that when the land of Maquiling was sold to Fabian Resano and
Mayor had asked him to accompany the widow. He denied that at the time the
the latter was trying to survey it, Marcelo objected to the survey on the ground that
widow was being investigated, he used to look at her with sharp eyes. On being
Resano was including a portion of his own land. Both accused-appellants Inocencio
asked the possible reason why he was being accused, he declared that he had an
and Marcelo, both surnamed Hervas, admitted that the relationship between them
altercation with one Estong Amorte and Fabian Resano, because when a certain
and the deceased and his family was cordial. There is, therefore, no reason why the
parcel of land was surveyed, he stopped them because his brother Marcelo was not
widow should point out to Marcelo and to Inocencio as the authors of the death of
present. (It is important to note that the land which was supposed to be surveyed
her husband, unless she and her children had actually seen them do the criminal
appears to be the cause of the trouble, as it is the very land occupied by Francisco
act.
Hervas. Francisco Hervas was the one named by the original owner, Eugenio
Maquiling, to cultivate and stay on the land. Later, Maquiling transferred it to Her statement when she was brought to the municipal building for investigation on
Estong Amorte and Fabian Resano.) June 13, 1955 pointing to Espiridion Alido as the one who killed her husband and
that his companions could not be recognized by her must have been due to the fact
The accused Marcelo Hervas also denied the imputation, declaring that on the day
that she was then under the influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas. The conduct of
of the shooting, he was away from his house, and that he learned of the death of
Inocencio Hervas, a first cousin of the deceased, in not initiating the move to have
Francisco Hervas only when he arrived home on Tuesday (killing occurred on
the authors of the death of his cousin investigated and his advice of a prompt burial,
Monday). He stated. that he had come from the poblacion because he was engaged
in locate a guilty conscience — he must have had part therein and he wanted to be
in the business of making gold teeth for his patients, so he had to go to the
saved from being held to account for he murder. His advice that the widow should
poblacion very often; that on the day following his arrival on Tuesday, he asked for
declare hat the deceased had been killed by a bolo wound, also attests to his
the wife of the deceased, and he inquired from her what was the cause of her
interest in suppressing the truth, certainly to save himself. The testimony of
husbands death, and she had answered that the deceased had stepped on a bolo;
Marcelo to the effect hat the widow had told him that the deceased died of a bolo
that she told him that at the time of the wounding of her husband she had heard a
wound is the very explanation that was taught by Inocencio Hervas to the widow.
sound similar to a falling can. Asked if there was any ill-feeling between Francisco
Both of them, Inocencio and Marcelo, must have thought of pretending that the
Hervas and his family, he declared that there was none and the deceased even
death of Francisco Hervas was due to a bolo wound, not from a gunshot wound, to
frequented his house to drink tuba, the deceased being his first cousin. Asked what
suppress or prevent the investigation of the crime. Marcelo Hervas was the barrio
the probable reason was why the widow had pointed to him as one of the authors
lieutenant. Why did he not take steps to have the matter reported to the authorities
of the death of her husband, he declared that she acted under the advice of their
for investigation? His only excuse was that the widow supposedly told him that he
enemies Estong Amorte and Fabian Resano. Explaining this matter he said that

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

lied of a bolo wound. If he was satisfied with this false explanation, it must have There was one other last incident which proves the consciousness of guilt of
been because he wanted to shelter he culprits from investigation, which fact in turn Marcelo Hervas. This is the fact that he pretended to be away and was not in his
shows also a guilty mind. house when Ofelia went to notify him of the death of her father. When the
Constabulary also went to his house, when the matter was investigated, after the
The statement of the widow on June 13, 1955, when examined by the municipal
surrender of Alido, he again was not at home. As a barrio lieutenant, he should have
mayor, is explained away by he testimony of the sergeant of the Constabulary who
been the first to make steps to report the crime, but he pretended to be away.
was resent at the time of the taking of the statement, to the effect that every time a
These are the circumstances which show consciousness of guilt on his part.
question was asked the widow, he would look at Inocencio for an answer. This
corroborates the story of the widow that she was then under influence of Inocencio With the above circumstances and the testimony of two witnesses identifying the
and her fear of him. two accused-appellants and the finding of the trial judge who heard the witnesses
and the appellants testify, that the appellants are guilty, we are forced to the
We are satisfied with the above circumstances and explanation of the widow that
conclusion that the said accused-appellants participated in the commission of the
her statement on June 13, was induced by her fear of Inocencio. Proceeding now to
offense charged, jointly with Espiridion Alido and are guilty thereof. The crime
the consideration of the direct evidence, we find that both Demetrio Hervas, 15
committed is that of murder, qualified by the circumstance of alevosia, as the attack
years old, and his mother, Concepcion Laserna, positively asserted that they saw
was unexpected and the victim was even no opportunity to defend himself. As to
the three accused Espiridion Alido, Marcelo Hervas and Inocencio Hervas near their
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, it is true that the confession
house on May 29, 1955 and that they recognized the latter as the one who fired the
of Espiridion Alido, Exhibit "C" is to the effect that Inocencio had invited Alido, to go
shot from the "Paltik", that killed Francisco Hervas. Demetrio Her was testified that
with them to kill the deceased, and that he provided his companions with requisite
it was in the afternoon when the assault was made. The statement of the widow
arms. However, this confession of Alido is not admissible in evidence against
before the mayor on June 13, 1955 placed the time of the assault at 6:10 in the
Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. We therefore had no sufficient evidence of
afternoon. We take judicial notice of the fact that in the month of May and June,
the evident premeditation.
the days are long and the sun sets after 6:00 in the afternoon, for which reason
even though it was actually 6:00 in the afternoon, when the assault was made, both WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of the court below finding the appellants
Demetrio Hervas and his mother could easily see and recognize the assailants of the guilty of murder and the sentence imposed upon each of them with costs of this
deceased because it was not yet dark. The assailants are well known to them, two appeal against the appellants.
of them being first cousins of the deceased; so was Alido known to them. It is not
that their faces were clearly seen a person can necessary easily be recognized from
his stature, by the way he stands and moves. We are, therefore, satisfied that the
two witnesses, — the widow and her son, actually recognized the assailants as
Espiridion Alido, Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. The testimony of the boy,
Demetrio, could not be impeached on the cross-examination. His testimony was
positive and direct, leaving absolutely no doubt as to the circumstances under
which he saw the shooting and the certainty of his identification of the accused-
appellants. As to the widow, the explanation given as hereinabove stated, to the
fact that she was under the influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas, sufficiently
explains why in her statement before the mayor on June 13, 1955, she pretended
not to have recognized the companions of Espiridion Alido on the evening of May
29, 1955.

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN AYONAYON and GASPAR
ACERADOR, defendants-appellants. (G.R. No. L-16664 , March 30, 1962)
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, Hon.
Felix Q. Antonio, presiding, finding Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar Acerador guilty of
murder, for the killing of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo and, frustrated murder, for
the wounding of Genoveva Lazo, and sentencing each of them to death for the
crime of murder, and to an indeterminate penalty of from 8 years of prision mayor
as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum,
for the frustrated murder, with the proper indemnities and the accessories of the
law, and to pay each his proportional part of the costs.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 5, 1959, while Florentino
Lazo and members of his family, namely, his wife, Juana Resuello, his children, Jose
Lazo, 25 years, Pergentino Lazo, 17 years, Genoveva Lazo, 21 years, Samuel Lazo, 7
years, and Juan Lazo, 12 years, were taking their supper around a low table in the
bamboo kitchen of their house at barrio Namalpalan, Municipality of Magsingal,
Ilocos Sur, their two dogs suddenly started barking and running to and fro, below
and near the house. Genoveva Lazo called the attention of her father to the unusual
behaviour of the dogs and commented that there must be some persons on the
ground. So she stood up and peeped thru the window of the kitchen and saw a man
dressed in dark green fatigue clothes, standing on the ground on the opposite end
of the kitchen, peeping at the southwestern part thereof in a semi-stooping
position, with his gun pointed thru the corner of the kitchen. The kitchen floor was
about four feet eight inches from the ground. The wall of the kitchen was made of
bamboo split and flattened as in "sawali". She heard a burst of gunfire (parac-pac-
pac) and she felt that she was hit on her left shoulder. She fell to the floor of the
kitchen wounded, and lying flat on the floor hid herself near the stove.
With the first burst of the gunfire, Jose Lazo was also hit and he fell dead on the
floor of the kitchen. Pergentino Lazo, upon observing the gunfire and what had
happened to his brother and sister, promptly ran away from the kitchen, crossing
the batalan that separated the kitchen from the sala, and to the sala, towards a side
beside a wardrobe. Here, behind the wardrobe, he hid himself. From this position,
behind the wardrobe, he heard gunfire from the batalan near the stairs of the
house, and, directed his eyes to the place where the gunfire came from, he saw
through the opening of the window just above the stairs, the accused Juan
Ayonayon and his companion, the other accused Gaspar Acerador. From the top of
the stairs, the accused fired at his father who had run to the sala, but who fell down
on the other side opposite the wardrobe.
Juana Resuello, got her two minor sons in her arms, Juan and Samuel, and tried to
run away from the kitchen also. It so happened, however, that her husband
Florentino was already ahead of her and was already crossing the batalan that
separated the kitchen from the sala, running to escape from the gunfire.
As she was about to cross the batalan to the sala, she saw towards the left the two
accused Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar Acerador. At that time, Ayonayon was already
on top of the stairs, while his companion was on the last rung of the stairs.
The prosecution also proved that, that same evening, upon receipt of news of the
murders in the barrio of Namalpalan, a group of Constabulary soldiers stationed in
the poblacion, together with the municipal health officers and others, went to the
scene of the murders. The soldiers found 30-calibre empty shells on the ground
near the kitchen, also on the batalan above the stairs. They also found that the
walls of the kitchen and a wall of the sala was pierced by bullet holes. The dead
body of Florentino Lazo was found lying on the floor of the sala, and that of Jose
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Lazo also in the kitchen, both of them riddled with bullets. Genoveva Lazo was
found near the stove. Pergentino Lazo, upon being questioned by the Constabulary
sergeant, gave details of the incident, also already described by the witnesses for
the prosecution, and pointed to the two accused herein as the ones responsible for
the assault.
It is also shown that paraffin casts were taken of the hands of both accused and the
casts, upon examination in the National Bureau of Investigation, had positive traces
of nitrate.
Various slugs were extracted from the body of the deceased Jose Lazo and another
was also extracted from that of Genoveva Lazo, and these, upon examination, were
found to have been fired from a semi-automatic or an automatic .30-caliber
carbine, from the same gun firing the empty shells.
It was further shown that upon learning who the assailants were, as per information
by Pergentino Lazo, two soldiers went to the house of accused Gaspar Acerador. He
was not in his house and as he was then wearing undershirt and drawers, he had to
be taken to his house so he could put on his clothes, before being brought to town
for examination. The constabulary men who accompanied him to his house saw
that a green fatigue suit and poncho were hanging on the wall. On the other hand,
Juan Ayonayon was arrested by a Constabulary captain and his company that same
evening in the house of Marcelino Uberita in Santo Domingo, about seven
kilometers from Magsingal.
As possible motive for the crime, it was shown that accused Gaspar Acerador had
been accused of the murder of Pablo Resuello, the brother of Juana Resuello, wife
of Florentino Lazo, the deceased. On the other hand, Florentino Lazo used to drive a
carromata where Hipolito Peralta, who was accused of the murder of a relative of a
cousin of Ayonayon, usually rode in going to court. While nobody could testify as to
the motive of the murder, it is apparent from these circumstances that enmity must
have existed between Florentino Lazo and his wife Juana Resuello on one hand, and
the accused Gaspar Acerador and Juan Ayonayon, on the other.
The defenses presented by the accused are alibis testified to by their respective
relatives. Juan Ayonayon stated that at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the day
in question, he was in the house of his cousin Engineer Uberita in Santo Domingo,
with whom he was living then. But the barrio of Santo Domingo is only seven
kilometers from the house of the Lazos, the victims, and he could easily have gone
from his place of residence to the house of the Lazos in 10 minutes by jeepney. For
his part, Acerador was living in a barrio of Panay, which is only a kilometer away
from the scene of the crime. The fact, therefore, that the relatives of the accused
stated that they were in their respective houses around 6:00 o'clock in the evening
of the day of the crime, does not discount the possibility that the accused
themselves had actually gone to the house of their victims at about the time of 6:
00 o'clock in the evening. It must be noted that the time given was merely a
calculation, and what may have been considered by one witness as six o'clock may
actually have been 5:30, etc. So that the defenses of alibis appear to Us as of very
little weight or value, especially in view of the fact that the witnesses for the
prosecution clearly identified the accused, such identification being positive and
immediate because given as soon as the officers of the Constabulary arrived.
We will now proceed to the principal issue, namely, whether the three witnesses
who testified to having identified the accused were really in a position to and did
actually identify them. The first witness was Genoveva Lazo who said that she
peeped out of the window and saw the face and figure of a man who later she
identified as Gaspar Acerador. The description that she gave at the trial coincides
with the physical features that the court saw in the person of the said accused at
the time of the trial. Gaspar Acerador was also identified by the wife of the
deceased, Juana Resuello, who declared that Acerador was seen by her on the last
rung of the stairs leading to their batalan. Pergentino Lazo also identified both
accused when, looking thru the window near the stairs, he saw them firing their
guns at the deceased Florentino Lazo.
With respect to Juan Ayonayon, his identification by Juana Resuello is beyond
question. As Juana was going to cross the batalan, she saw Juan Ayonayon already
on the batalan and was about to speak to him. He, Ayonayon, was known to her,
consequently, the identification was prompt and immediate. It is a fact that when
one meets a person known to him, identification takes place at first sight, so the
testimony of Juana Resuello that she identified Ayonayon, who was known to her,
should be accepted. The same fact of identification is true as to the accused Gaspar
Acerador, also known to Juana Resuello..
As to the testimony of Pergentino Lazo, which testimony is being attacked, it is to be
noted that he saw the two accused while the latter were already on the batalan.
From a diagram of the house, We note that place where the accused were standing,
while firing at the decease Florentino Lazo, was visible through a window from the
place beside the aparador where Pergentino Lazo, had stationed himself. But the
fact that Pergentino Lazo, when the officers came in the same evening, declared to
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

the Constabulary officers that the assailants were Ayonayon and Acerador, this accused-appellants were so perverse as to deserve the supreme penalty. Hence, no
readiness, shows that he was able positively identify them at the time of the sufficient number of Justices voted to affirm the imposition of the death penalty.
assault, the accused being known to him.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by imposing upon each
Counsel for Acerador argues that since at the time of the assault, which was 6:00 of the accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the murder of
o'clock in the evening, it was already dark, the accused could not have been Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo, but the judgment is hereby affirmed in all other
identified by Genoveva Lazo, Juana Resuello or Pergentino Lazo. We checked the respects. The judgment and sentence imposed upon them for the wounding of
time when the sun set on August 5, 1959 and We have been informed that the sun Genoveva Lazo is affirmed, with costs against accused-appellants. So ordered.
set on that date at about 6:38 in the evening, which shows that at 6:00 o'clock, the
surrounding of the house where the victims were shot, were not yet dark. The use
of a kerosene lamp inside a house does not mean that outside the house, where the
assailants were seen, was also dark. The inside of a house is necessarily darker than
the outside; so the use of a kerosene lamp while the inmates are taking supper,
does not mean that persons outside cannot be identified from within the house.

Capital is made of the fact that the witness Genoveva Lazo said that during the day
there were stars. She did not say that during the daytime there were stars; she must
have meant that during the time when the assault was made there were stars in the
sky at night. Beside we take judicial notice of the fact that while it is true that the
month of August is characterized by showers or rains, they generally are passing
showers and rains, after which the atmosphere becomes clear.
But as the most compelling reason why the witnesses for the prosecution must be
believed as to the identification of the accused by them, is the fact that they had no
cause or reason to charge or point out the accused as the ones responsible for the
offense, there being no strong reason why they should violate their oaths and
declare falsely.
After a review of all the evidence, We are convinced that the two accused were
really the ones who assaulted and fired at Genoveva, Florentino and Jose Lazo, and
killed Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo, and that their guilt has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The penalty that was imposed by the lower court is that of death
for the murders of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo. There is no question that the
murders were committed with the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation, and with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and dwelling of
the offended party. But while the penalty imposed appears justified by the
aggravating circumstances, there is no sufficient number of votes to affirm the
penalty of death for the reason that it does not appear from the evidence that the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAYMUNDO MADERA @
"Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO ANDRES @ "Ross",
defendants-appellant (G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974)
This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of the
Circuit Criminal Court 1 finding them guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost proportionately.
There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 20,
1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino Bana in
Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first
rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun at Elino
Bana who was then sleeping on the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot
wounds were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on
the abdominal region. Elino Bana did not die immediately. He stood up and told his
wife to call for his brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
victim's wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the wounded man was no
longer at home for he was already brought to the Municipal Building of Gabaldon.
He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of some
people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva Ecija General
Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20,1970.
We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired the
shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and that appellants
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at the time.
Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire and
saw the appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of their stairs
holding a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw the appellants Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2 meters
from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw Raymundo
Madem as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and appellants
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then with Madera.
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented
the dying, declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino
Bana to the Municipal Building took only about thirty minutes. On the way, they
were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from Gabaldon who was fetched from
his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look into the shooting
incident. Upon reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana
that he would have to take down his written statement regarding the shooting
incident, and the latter agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00
o'clock in the morning. In said dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and
the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he could not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of
Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on their way to the Municipal Building,
Elino Bana told him that he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said
policeman has been an investigator in the police force since 1964. He should have
asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration in the Municipal Building
why he said earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman Feliciano did
not do this. It must be noted that not only Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco
Viloria, a witness to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful execution.
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the
identities of the appellants to the Victim himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana
and Francisco Viloria, does not militate against their credibility. There is no evidence
on record that they were asked by their relatives about the identity of the
appellants. Had they been asked, they would have readily revealed appellants'
identities as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a
few hours after the fateful incident, during a formal investigation of the case in the
Office of the Chief of Police when and where they executed their respective sworn
statements.
In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and
sworn on the same date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito
Bana categorically stated that Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo,
while Ross and Totoy Andres were downstairs.
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with their house.
He testified on direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their house. On
cross examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That does not show any
inconsistency in his testimony, because on further questioning, he said that the
balcony referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that after he heard
the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back portion of their house. The
falsity of this statement has not been shown by the defense. The pictures presented
by it which apparently show that there was no such opening, can be explained by
the fact that the tall grasses could obscure the back portion of the house where the
kitchen door was located.
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of
gunfire. But that would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.
An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he would otherwise
have observed.
Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the attention to a keen
edge. In some other cases, it has been observed, in effect, that the emotion incident
to the impending peril may not be the kind of excitement which confuses, but that
which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize. the circumstance of the threatened
danger in order to avoid it.2
The appellants asserted in their briefs3 that "the evidence on record does not show
that there was a moon shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a moonless night;" hence, Juanito
Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized the appellants. This position is
untenable. Why?
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature"4 and, under this rule, of
the time when the moon rises or sets on a particular day.5 This not withstanding
and for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get a certification from the Weather
Bureau6 which shows that the moon was bright at the time of the shooting
incident. It reads:
To whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the following
astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and correct:
1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day, April
20, at 4:27 A.M.;
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34 degrees
above the western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees West;
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full moon
having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22,1970.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao Fernandez, Associate
Justice, Supreme Court, Manila.
For the Administrator:
(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong
SIMEON V. INCIONG Chief, Astronomical Division
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the
appellants for there is no doubt as to their identities.
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI,
appellant Raymundo Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra himself
admitted that, the paraffin test having been conducted fourteen days after the
incident, the test could have given a negative result even if the appellant had fired a
gun fourteen days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on his hands could have
been washed off by washing or could have been removed by perspiration.
The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of
appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the victim
Elino Bana.
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres
and Generoso Andres because the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal.
And We agree.
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when
the latter fired shots at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did,
there being no proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three appellants.
They were not armed. They did nothing to help Madera. Their mere passive
presence at the scene of the crime did not make them liable either as co-principals
or accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court, penned by Justice Felix
Q. Antonio, We held:
It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a
preconceived plan or agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a
circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or connected
with the same be present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be
established a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and the
supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate connection between
and among the latter, such as by their overt acts committed in pursuance of a
common design. Considering the far-reaching consequences, of criminal conspiracy,
the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support
a finding of its presence that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly
as the commission of the offense itself.
The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the other
hand, as an accomplice, it must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal
intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous
acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether
physical or moral. As aptly stated in People v. Tamayo: "It is an essential condition
to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the
acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the
criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral
aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way." ... From our view of the
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

evidence it has not been convincingly established that appellant cooperated in the
commission of the offense, either morally, through advice, encouragement or
agreement or materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of
supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. Such
circumstances being absent, his mere passive presence at the scene of the crime
certainly does not make him either a co-principal or an accomplice in the
commission of the offense.7

This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the prosecution of
criminal cases that the prosecutor's finest hour is not when he wins a case with the
conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocate's
natural obsession for victory, he stands up before the Court and pleads not for the
conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to
prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and
Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly recommended the acquittal of the
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES,
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the defendant-appellant. (G.R. No. L-45857 October 27, 1983)
appellant Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against
him; and it is hereby reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy"
and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby acquitted of the crime charged
with proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release from confinement is In her sworn complaint, complainant Violeta Begino y Aquino accused defendant-
hereby ordered unless they are held for another legal cause. appellant of forcible abduction with rape allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of July, 1973, in Quezon City Philippines, the above-
named accused with lewd design, and then and there wilfully, unlawfully appeal
feloniously, by means of force and intimidation abduct the undersigned, by then
and there forcibly dragging her into a tricycle, after which the undersigned was
brought to a house located at Novaliches. this City where said accused by means of
force and intimidation had carnal knowledge of the undersigned, all against the will
and without the consent of the undersigned, to her damage and prejudice in such
amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Contrary to law (p. 2, rec.).

The trial court convicted him of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with accessories of the law, to indemnify the complainant in
the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs, crediting him
however with the entire period of his temporary detention.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Complainant Violeta Begino, a native of Cabcab Catanduanes, was about 15 years
and 10 months old on July 15, 1973, a Sunday. About 4 feet and 7 inches tall and
weighing about 93 lbs., she was the housemaid of Jose Baruela of Galas, Quezon
City.
Between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, July 15, 1973, Violeta was
standing at the corner of Luzon Avenue and Union Civica St., Galas, Quezon City,
waiting for a ride to Quiapo, Manila to buy slippers for her employer. Appellant
Ernesto Sison, then about 23 years old, who was courting her, approached her and
invited her to take the tricycle then driving. When she refused, appellant allegedly
drew 7-inch knife and poked it at her abdomen, threatening to kill her if she did not
board his tricycle. He allegedly seized her and forced her to get into the tricycle.
This is quite incredible because on such Sunday afternoon, with many people
passing by or walking in the vicinity, as Galas is thickly populated by low-income and
middle-class groups - of which fact the Supreme Court can take judicial notice - she
could have resisted and shouted for help. It was not easy for appellant to grab her
and force her into the tricycle without being noticed by passersby and bystanders.
She claims that after she was seated inside the tricycle, appellant drove his tricycle
to the España Rotonda, a busy intersection of España St., Manila, Quezon Avenue,
España Extension (now E. Rodriguez Ave.), Mayon St., and Pulog St. going towards
Galas, Quezon City. Said rotonda is over one kilometer from Galas, with several
street corners to pass along the way.
With appellant driving the tricycle, complainant could have shouted for help while
seated in the rear compartment for passengers behind him, since as aforestated,
from the corner where she was allegedly forced to board the tricycle up to España
Rotonda is quite a distance, with so many houses and several persons along the
way. And children would be playing on the streets. Or she could have jumped out of
the tricycle for a tricycle does not run fast and the tricycle is always open at its right
side just behind appellant who was on the driver's seat. Appellant could not be
poking a knife with one hand at Violeta and driving the tricycle with the other hand.
From the España Rotonda, they took a passenger jeepney for Balintawak, Quezon
City. They were allegedly the only passengers of the jeepney, with appellant holding
her hands and telling her that he would kill her if she tried to go home. From España
Rotonda to Balintawak is a distance of about five kilometers. Being a passenger
jeepney, it presumably took the usual passenger jeepney routes. It would be
unbelievable that all throughout the distance of about five kilometers, a Sunday
afternoon, no other passenger boarded the jeepney between España Rotonda and
Balintawak. The route of said jeepney must pass through Mayon St. towards North
Cemetery beside Balintawak. But even assuming that they were the lone passengers
of the jeepney throughout the distance she could have shouted for help or created
a commotion to alert the jeepney driver. It is also possible that she must have seen
policemen along the route, especially near the gate of the North Cemetery. The
various jeepney routes from Quezon City to North Cemetery include Mayor
Norberto Amoranto St. (formerly Retiro), Del Monte Avenue, Dapitan, Laong-Laan
St., and from Manila to the North Cemetery then to Balintawak, via Dimasalang St.,
and coming from Rizal Avenue Extension and passing the Chinese General Hospital
via Blumentritt. Upon reaching the busy intersection in front of the North Cemetery
gate, with a lot of people around, including employees of the gas station just across
the gate of the North Cemetery, she could have screamed for help, but she did not.
At Balintawak, appellant allegedly brought her to the house of his aunt, to whom he
allegedly introduced her as his girlfriend. After talking to her aunt, he and
complainant left the house and rode in a passenger jeepney bound for Novaliches,
passengers inside the jeepney Quezon City. There were other pass but she did not
make any outcry nor ask help from the other passengers during that long trip from
Balintawak to Novaliches, which is a lot farther than from España Rotonda to
Balintawak. Balintawak is also a busy street all the way to Clover Leaf (the hub
connecting to Novaliches) and there are many houses' and shops along the way -
more so upon reaching the busy market near the Clover Leaf. And then from Clover
Leaf through Quirino Avenue towards Novaliches, there must have been numerous
persons that Sunday afternoon, because Quirino Avenue is likewise a busy avenue,
being the only route to Novaliches from the Clover Leaf and the traffic along that
thoroughfare is heavy at all hours of the day because of the numerous passenger
buses, jeepneys, cargo trucks, and private cars on the road. But she did not cry for
help.
At Novaliches, appellant led her to the house of another aunt, Maria Aviles Reyes
and took her purse containing P12.00. After eating their supper, appellant allegedly
brought her to a room and ordered her to lie down. She resisted and appellant
slapped her repeatedly. She became unconscious and upon regaining
consciousness, she found herself naked with appellant on top of her and his penis
inside her vagina "up to her stomach." If she resisted as she claimed, there should
have been some commotion and maybe pieces of furniture like chairs and tables
being pushed or the sound of shuffling feet, accompanied by her cries or screaming
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
indicating resistance. When he slapped her repeatedly, she must have shouted in
pain and even cursed him aloud with the usual vulgar rivectives With such
commotion, screaming, cries of pain and vulgar purses it is unthinkable that the
aunt and the rest of the inmates of the house would not have heard the same. They
could have been curious about the commotion and could have frustrated whatever
criminal Intention appellant might have towards her.
She alleged that he had sexual intercourse with her three times that July 15 even as
she was experiencing pain. The following day (July 16), he had sexual intercourse
with her four times. Then on the third day (July 17), he did the same to her. They
stayed in Novaliches from July 15 to July 21, 1973. .Never did she complain to his
aunt or to the other inmates of the house about what appellant did to her. During
those six days, she must have gone out of the room to eat or to attend to personal
necessities in the bathroom. During those six days too, his aunt and the other
members of the family would have noticed her painful expression or her moaning in
pain and would have asked her the cause of the same.
In the afternoon of July 21, 1973, appellant, with his mother and his aunt Maria,
brought Violeta to his house in Sampaloc, Manila, and from there, to Violeta's
mother at 11-B Luzon Avenue, Galas, Quezon City. All the mother did was to slap
her.
It should be stressed, as heretofore intimated, that this Court sitting in Metro
Manila, can take judicial notice of the geography of said metropolis, and the
approximate distance from Galas to España Rotonda, from España Rotonda to
Balintawak, and from Balintawak to Novaliches, the passenger routes to said place,
the nature of traffic along said routes, the heavy population in Metropolitan Manila,
and the habits of the residents therein.
There is nothing in the record to indicate as to why her mother and her employer
did not look for her during the six days that she was missing from the house of her
employer and why they did not report to the police authorities said fact of her being
missing for almost a week. Neither is there any intimation that her employer
inquired about the money he gave to her to purchase slippers, which is quite
unnatural.
All the foregoing circumstances not only negate the conclusion that she was
sexually assaulted by appellant against her will, but also affirm that she went
willingly with the appellant and submitted to his lewd design.
Consequently, the only possible conclusion is that she voluntarily went with
appellant on that six-day tryst with him. for which appellant could have been
convicted of consented abduction as Violeta was then over 12 but under 18 years of
age (Art. 343, R.P.C.), if the complaint included the essential elements of abduction
with consent Valdepeha vs. People, 16 SCRA 871, April 30, 1966; U.S. vs. Asuncion,
31 Phil. 614, Oct. 2, 1915). Unfortunately, the complaint as aforequoted does not
allege that the offended party was a virgin, over 12 years and under 18 years of age
Barba vs. People, 89 SCRA 112, March 28,1979; People vs. Castro, 58 SCRA 473,
Aug. 19, 1974; People vs. Samillano, 56 SCRA 573, April 22, 1974; People vs. Magat,
94 Phil. 118, Dec. 29, 1953).
Hence, the appellant should be acquitted of the charge.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES IS HEREBY ACQUITTED. WITH
COSTS DE OFICIO.
HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS HELD FOR SOME
OTHER VALID CHARGES.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Plana, Escolin, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
De Castro, J., on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. According to the prosecution's evidence, on Sunday, July 15, 1973,
between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, Violeta Begino, a fifteen-year-and-
ten-month-old housemaid (born in CabCab Catanduanes on September 14, 1957),
about four feet and eight inches tall weighing ninety-three pounds, was standing at
the corner of Luzon Avenue and Union Civica Street, Galas, Quezon City, waiting for
a ride to Quiapo, Manila because her master, Jose Baruela, had asked her to buy
slippers.
At that moment, Ernesto Sison, 23, who was courting Violeta (she had known him
for three days) approached her and advised her to take the tricycle which he was
driving. When Violeta rejected his offer, Sison whipped out a seven-inch long knife
and pointed it at her abdomen (Violeta making a demonstration as to the poking of
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

the knife), telling her that he would kill her if she did not board his tricycle. He Police. She narrated what Sison did to her from the afternoon of July 15 up to July
seized her and forced her to get into the tricycle. 21.*

Sison then drove the tricycle to the Espana rotunda (the intersection of Quezon On July 23, 1973, Violeta was examined by a medicolegal officer of Camp Crame. He
Avenue, España Extension and Mayon Street) and alighted. They took a passenger found "no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma" but her
jeepney for Balintawak, Quezon City. They were the only passengers. genitals showed "shallow, healed lacerations at 3, 7 and 9 o'clock positions" caused
possibly by sexual intercourse. Her vaginal orifice offered moderate resistance to
Sison held her hands. He told her that he would kill her if she tried to go home.
the introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin-sized speculum (Exh.
Sison took Violeta to the house of his aunt in Balintawak, introducing her to his aunt C).
as his girl friend. Sison talked with his aunt. Later, he and Violeta left the house and
In his defense, Sison denied that he forced Violeta to ride in his tricycle in the
rode in a jeepney bound for Novaliches, Quezon City. Although there were many
afternoon of July 15, 1973, that he brought her to Balintawak and Novaliches, and
passengers inside the jeepney, Violeta did not make any outcry allegedly because of
that he raped her in the house of his aunt. He declared that he got acquainted with
fear that Sison would kill her if she did.
Violeta at the Marilou Beer House at Luzon Avenue, Galas where she worked as a
In Novaliches, Sison took Violeta to the house of another aunt, Maria Aviles Reyes. waitress.
Sison got Violeta's purse containing twelve pesos. They ate their supper there.
He had sexual congress with Violeta in the later part of 1972 in the massage clinic at
Afterwards, Sison took her to a room and ordered her to lie down. She resisted but
Tetuan Street, Manila where her sister worked. He stayed with his aunt at
Sison slapped her repeatedly. She became unconscious. When she regained
Novaliches three or four months prior to July 21, 1973 because his mother was
consciousness, she realized that she was naked and Sison was on top of her and
angry with him.
that his penis was inside her vagina ("up to my stomach").
He allegedly did not give his earnings as a tricycle driver to his mother. He used to
She tried to extricate herself but she was not successful "because his sex organ was
give money to Violeta's mother in Violeta's presence. In the morning of July 21,
already inside her vagina and he was holding her arms and legs. He warned her that
1973 Violeta went to the Novaliches house of his aunt to ask Sison to marry her.
he would kill her if she did not submit to his desires. He made push-and-pull
After lunch, Sison and his aunt brought Violeta to her house in Galas. Violeta's
movements. He kissed her many times on the mouth. It was her first sexual
mother pulled her hair and scolded her.
intercourse.
On that occasion, Sison wanted to ask the consent of Violeta's parents in order to
She experienced much pain in her organ. Sison had sexual intercourse with her
marry her although Violeta's mother did not want him to be her son-in-law. Sison
three times on that occasion. The following day, he had sexual congress with her
and his aunt left the house after about twenty minutes because Violeta's mother
four times. He used her also on the third day He did not touch her on the fourth day
did not attend to them. The trial court did not believe the defense of Sison.
because her menstruation started at that time. They stayed in Novaliches up to July
21, 1973. In this appeal, appellant's counsel, who was not Sison's lawyer during the trial,
contends that the prior, contemporaneous and subsequent events showed consent
In the afternoon of that date, Sison, together with his mother and his aunt Maria,
on Violeta's part to the acts of sexual intercourse and that the trial court erred in
took Violeta to Sison's house in Sampaloc, Manila. Later, they delivered Violeta to
giving credence to Violeta's uncorroborated testimony, in finding that threats, force
her mother at her residence, 11-B Luzon Avenue, Galas. Upstairs, her mother
and intimidation were employed by Sison, in not finding that Violeta filed the
slapped Violeta. She told her mother she was abused by Sison. In the morning of
criminal action when her offer to marry Sison was rejected and in not giving weight
July 22, 1973, Violeta executed her statement at Precinct 4 of the Quezon City
to the testimony of Sison's aunt.

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Sison's counsel, like the trial court, did not believe Sison's defense. He ignored
appellant's version of the case (albeit in good faith) and, instead, set forth the "facts
of the case" sufficiently established" by both the prosecution and the defense.
Appellant's counsel, contradicting the denials made by accused Sison, admitted (1)
that Sison brought Violeta in his tricycle to the Espana rotonda, (2) that he was with
her in a passenger jeep going to Balintawak, (3) that Violeta was introduced to
Sison's aunt as his girl friend, (4) that Sison and Violeta rode in a jeepney in going to
the house of Sison's other aunt in Novaliches and (5) that Sison and Violeta had
sexual intercourse for three days in Novaliches. He theorized that she went with
Sison voluntarily.
Defense counsel disregarded the fact that Violeta, a fifteen-year-old, ninety- three
pound, four-feet-and-eight-inch teenager, during all the time that she was with
Sison, was afraid of him because of the threats to kill her which he had made and
because of his obvious physical superiority. See People vs. Bulaong, L-37836, July
31, 1981, 106 SCRA 344; People vs. Manguiat and Sanqui, 51 Phil. 406.
The case is really a matter of credibility: whether the testimonies of Violeta and the
medicolegal officer should prevail over the testimonies of Sison and his aunt.
My view is that the trial court did not err in finding that Sison is guilty of forcible
abduction with rape beyond reasonable doubt. A different holding would mean that
Violeta concocted an elaborate frameup against Sison. We cannot assume that her
testimony on the grievous outrage perpetrated against her was a fabrication.
Her version that she was under constant intimidation by Sison withstood the
gruelling cross-examination to which she was subjected in three hearings. It should
not be expected that she would have reacted like an adult or a mature person and
thus avoided the clutches of Sison if she did not want to be abducted and raped.
The findings of the medicolegal officer indicate that she was a virgin and support
her declaration that Sison had deflowered her.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed for the complex crime of
forcible abduction with ordinary rape.
Melencio-Herrera and Abad Santos, JJ., Joins the dissent of Justice Aquino.
Footnotes
* Ako po'y inutusan ng aking among lalaki na bumili ng tsinelas sa Quiapo, Maynila,
nanq ako ay nag-aabang ng jeep na sasakyan sa Union Civica kanto ng Luzon,
Quezon City, ngayon dumating si Ernesto Sison, dala-dala ang isang tricycle.
Huminto siya sa tapat ko, pilit niyang pinasasakay ako sa tricycle. Nuong hindi ako
pumayag ay bumaba siya ng tricycle sabay bunot ng kanyang lanseta o balisong at
itinutok sa tiyan ko sabay salya niya sa akin sa loob ng tricycle at sinabing kung hindi
ako sasama sa kanya ay papatayin niya ako.
Dinala niya ako sa Espanya Rotonda. Pagdating namin duon ay iniwan niya ang
tricycle at isinakay ako sa isang pampasaherong jeep patungong Balintawak.
Pagdating namin sa Balintawak ay itinuloy ako sa bahay daw ng kanyang tiyahin,
pilit niya akong hinila at dinala sa bahay na iyon. lpinakilala akong nobya niya sa
kanyang tiyahin.
Pagkatapos nuong hapon iyon ay umalis kami at dinala ako ulit sa isang bahay na
ipinakilala niyang tiya niya sa Novaliches, Quezon City. Ang pagkakilala sa akin si
Maria daw ang pangalan ng kaniyang tiya.
Nuong gabing iyon ay ibig ko ng umuwi, pero kinuha ni Ernesto ang pitaka kong may
laman na pera P12.00, at sabay sinabing "Kung uuwi ka ay papatayin kita," sabay
bunot din ng lanseta at itinutok sa akin.
Matapos kaining maghapunan ay dinala po ako sa isang kuwarto sa bahay na iyon at
pilit na pinahiga. Isinara ang pinto ng kuwarto sadya ini-"lock". Una siyang
naghubad, pinahubad din niya ang aking damit, pero hindi ako pumayag.
Nuong hindi ako pumayag ay sinampal ako ng tatlong beses, ako'y natumba at
hinimatay sa sampal kong tinamo. Nuong ako'y nagkamalay ay hubad na ang aking
damit at nakapatong na siya sa ibabaw ko, at naramdaman ko na lamang na makirot
at masakit ang pag-aari ko at iyong an ni Ernesto ay naramdaman kong nakapasok
na sa aking pag-aari.
Ang ginawa ko'y lumaban ako at wala akong lakas na kumalas sa mahigpit niyang
paghawak sa dalawa kong kamay at pigil sa dalawa kong paa at ulit- ulit binibigkas
na papatayin daw niya ako kung hindi ko ipagkakaloob ang nais niya. Matapos ang
ilang sandali ay natapos din ang makahayop niyang pagnanasa. Naramdaman kong
umaagos ang dugo galing sa aking pag-aari. Nuong matapos siya ay lalabas na sana
ako sa loob ng kuwarto pero pinigilan niya ako at hinatak papaloob.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

Makaraan ng ilan sandali ay ginawa niya ulit ang pagkuha sa aking pagkababae, pero
ako'y lumaban sa kanya, pero anomang laban ang ginawa ko ay nakamtan niya rin
ang ibig niya. Matapos ay natulog na siya. Ako'y umiiyak dahil sa kirot at sakit na
naramdaman ko sa aking pag-aari.

Ito'y nasundan ulit ng maraming beses, kaya nuong Lunes, petsa 16 ng Hulyo, 1973,
ay apat na beses niyang nakuha ang aking pagkababae. Nuong Martes, petsa 17 ng
Hulyo 1973 ay tatlong beses. Nuong araw ng Miyerkoles, petsa IS ng Hulyo, 1973, ay
tatlong beses din nakuha ni Ernesto ang aking pagkababae.

Lahat ang ginawa niyang ito ay sa gabi ginagawa sa loob ng kuwartong iyon abot ng
aking pagsusumamo na huwag na niya akong gawan ng ganoon. pero hindi rin
pinakinggan ang aking daing. Tuwing gagamitin niya ako ay tinatakot akong palagi
na papatayin daw niya ako. Sa loob ng araw na nagdaan ay hindi siya umaalis fig
bahay at palaging nakabantay sa akin.
Nuong petsa 19, 20 at 21, 1973 ay hindi niya ako ginalaw dahil niregla na ako. At
nuong hapon ng Sabado, petsa 21 ng Hulyo, 1973 ay umalis na kami at dinala ako sa
bahay nila sa kalye Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. Ako'y dinala nuong nanay ni
Ernesto at tiya daw sa amin at inintriga ako sa nanay ko. (Violeta's statement, Exh. D
).
SPOUSES NORA SAGUID and ROLANDO P. SAGUID, Petitioners, vs. SECURITY
FINANCE, INC., Respondent. (G.R. No. 159467 December 9, 2005)
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure are the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68129
dated 31 January 2003 reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 98-1803, dated 07 July 2000, ordering
respondent Security Finance, Inc. to pay petitioner Spouses Nora and Rolando
Saguid the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle as well as damages, attorney’s
fees and costs of suit, and its Resolution2 dated 10 June 2003 denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.

On 30 July 1998, respondent filed a case for Recovery of Possession with Replevin
with Alternative Prayer for Sum of Money and Damages against petitioners and one
John Doe in whose possession and custody the mortgaged property may be found.3
It alleged that petitioners, for value, jointly and severally executed in its favor a
Promissory Note4 in the amount of ₱508,248.00, payable in monthly installments
per schedule indicated therein. To secure payment of the Promissory Note,
petitioners executed a Chattel Mortgage5 over a motor vehicle particularly
described as follows:

MAKE : TOYOTA COROLLA XL

MODEL : 1996

ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
Respondent alleged that petitioners defaulted in complying with the terms and
conditions of the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage by failing to pay several
monthly installments on the Promissory Note. As provided for in the Promissory
Note and Chattel Mortgage, the failure of the petitioners to pay any installment
when due shall make the entire balance of the obligation immediately due and
payable. The total obligation of petitioners amounted to ₱756,634.64 as of 15 May
1998.6
Despite demand7 for payment or the surrender, if in good order and condition, of
the mortgaged motor vehicle, petitioners failed and refused to comply with the
demand. Thus, respondent was constrained to file the instant case praying that (1) a
Writ of Replevin be issued ordering the seizure of the afore-described vehicle,
complete with all its accessories, and that same be delivered to it; or (2) in the
event that manual delivery thereof cannot be effected, order the petitioners to pay
the amount of ₱756,634.64 exclusive of accruing interest and penalty charges
thereon at the rate of five percent (5%) per month until fully paid. In either case, to
order petitioners to pay respondent the amount of ₱189,158.66 as and for
attorney’s fees, replevin bond premium and other expenses incurred in the seizure
of the motor vehicle, and costs of suit.
On 03 August 1998, the Hon. Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge, Branch 135, RTC,
Makati City, issued an Order directing the branch sheriff to seize the
aforementioned vehicle upon filing of a bond in the amount of ₱1,513,270.00 which
is double the value of the property to be seized, and to take it into his custody upon
further orders from the court.8
Upon being informed by respondent in a Motion for Clarification9 that the
reasonable estimated value of the vehicle involved is ₱150,000.00, the RTC lowered
the Replevin Bond to be filed to ₱300,000.0010 which respondent filed on 12
August 1998.
On 12 October 1998, the RTC issued a Writ of Seizure ordering the Branch Sheriff to
seize the vehicle, to keep it in his possession for five (5) days, and then to deliver it
to respondent.11
On 13 October 1998, after service upon petitioners of the copy of the summons
with the complaint and annexes, affidavit, writ of seizure and bond, the vehicle
subject of this case was repossessed by the sheriff upon issuance of the
corresponding receipt. On 20 October 1998, the vehicle was delivered to
respondent.12
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 petitioners specifically denied the
allegations in the Complaint. They maintained they, whether individually or as
spouses, did not and never executed a Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage in
favor of respondent. They claimed they bought the car subject of the case in cash as
evidenced by the Vehicle Sales Invoice14 of Toyota Balintawak, Inc. dated 15 March
1996. Petitioner Nora Saguid alleged that she could not have physically executed
the Promissory Note on 23 April 1996 as she was in Australia when the same was
supposedly executed. On the part of petitioner Rolando Saguid, he admitted that he
signed the promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon the
request of one Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for the purchase
of another motor vehicle to be converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent.
As compulsory counterclaim, they ask that respondent be ordered to pay moral,
exemplary and actual damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
After pre-trial, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order containing the following stipulation
of facts:
1. The personal and corporate personalities of the parties;
2. That the promissory note dated April 23, 1996 in the amount of P508,248.00 in
favor of plaintiff was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid; and
3. That the chattel mortgage was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid; . . .15
Trial ensued. The respective evidence of the parties are substantially summarized in
the decision of the RTC.
Evidence of the Petitioners:
The plaintiff presented two (2) witnesses: 1] Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., 43 years of
age, married, Assistant Vice-President for Marketing of the plaintiff, and a resident
of No. 140 J. Molina Street, Marikina City; and 2] Antonio B. Placido, 37 years of age,
married, an employee of the plaintiff, and a resident of 263 Santo Cristo Street,
Angat, Bulacan.
It can be culled from plaintiff’s evidence that an application [Exhibit A] for a loan to
finance the purchases [of] a new car was filed with the plaintiff. The application was
not signed by any of the defendants. The signature appearing on the application
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
[Exhibit A] belongs to one David Garcia, a Marketing Assistant of the plaintiff. The
application was evaluated and investigated and was approved. The Promissory Note
No. 96-01447 dated April 23, 1996 [Exhibit B] and the Chattel Mortgage Contract
dated September 3, 1996 [Exhibit D] were signed. Submitted to the plaintiff were
postdated checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to E-12]. When deposited these checks were
dishonored for the reason that the account was already closed. The dishonored
checks were replaced with P27,137.67 cash for which O.R. No. 12467 dated June 27,
1996 [Exhibit F]. After the payment made on June 27, 1996, the checks that
subsequently bounced were not replaced. The case was referred to counsel for
collection. A demand letter was delivered by witness Placido to the residence of the
defendants. There being no response from the defendants this case was filed
against them. Placido conducted a surveillance of the place where the vehicle could
possibly be found. He accompanied the sheriff in implementing the writ of seizure.
After seizure of the vehicle it was stowed at the warehouse of plaintiff in Las Pinas.
On cross-examination of Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Assistant Vice-President for
Marketing of the plaintiff, it was established that the mortgage of subject motor
vehicle was not registered with the LTO because the dealer did not submit to
plaintiff the certificate of registration. In transactions of this nature, loan applicants
are required to submit the original certificate of registration and the official receipt.
The dealer, Toyota Balintawak, did not send to the plaintiff these documents.16
Evidence of the Respondent:
Defendants testified for and in their behalf. Zenaida Marquinez Maralit, 33 years of
age, single, a resident of Orlon Street, Litex Village, San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal, and
the Credit and Collection Head of Toyota Balintawak testified for the defendants.
Defendant Rolando bought in cash the subject motor vehicle from Toyota
Balintawak. He was issued Vehicle Delivery Invoice No. 7104 [Exhibit1] and Vehicle
Delivery Note No. 7104 [Exhibit 2]. The same vehicle was registered [Exhibit 3]. He
identified his signatures in the promissory note [Exhibit B] and in the chattel
mortgage [Exhibit D]. He was asked by one Sonny Quijano to sign these documents
in blank on the representation of the latter that he will help him secure additional
capital to enable him to purchase another taxi.
Rolando met for the first time Sonny Quijano sometime in January 1996 at Toyota
Quezon Avenue. Rolando was then planning to purchase two units of taxi colored
white. But at that time there was only one available unit at Toyota Quezon Avenue.
Quijano approached Rolando informing him that there are units colored white
available at Toyota Balintawak and that he will help him secure one. Rolando was
able to secure one. In the month of May, Quijano went to the house of defendants
and asked Rolando if he is still interested in getting additional capital to purchase a
taxi. Rolando was asked to sign documents in blank. The name of the plaintiff does
not appear in these documents. When Rolando asked Quijano why the documents
are in blank, Quijano told him just to sign and that he will take care of everything.
Nora did not sign the documents because at that time she was in Australia. Rolando
do (sic) not know what happened to the documents he signed. He read from the
papers that Quijano was shot. He denied the issuance of the checks [Exhibits E, E-1
to E-12]. Defendants received a letter [Exhibit 8] dated February 21, 1997 from De
Castro Law Office. Rolando went to this Law Office and presented his documents
evidencing payment of the subject motor vehicle. He was told by Atty. De Castro
that everything is okay and that he will take care of everything.
On October 28, 1998 at about 7:00 in the morning two [2] units of taxi including
subject motor vehicle were seized by the sheriff assisted by three [3] SWAT
members. The boundary of the subject motor vehicle, which is a taxi, is P750.00 for
every 24 hours. From October 28, 1998 to October 1999 defendants lost P180,000
in income. Defendants retained the services of counsel for P100,000 plus P1,500 per
appearance. With this incident on October 28, 1998, Rolando was embarrassed in
front of his neighbors. For his sufferings Rolando is praying for P1 Million in
damages plus P3 Million in exemplary damages.
Witness Maralit corroborated that testimony of Rolando that the subject motor
vehicle was purchased in cash and not through financing. Had subject vehicle been
purchased through financing the original Certificate of Registration and Certificate
of Registration would have been transmitted to the financing company marked by
the LTO "encumbered". This did not happen in this case. Security Finance, the
plaintiff in this case was not accredited by Toyota Balintawak not even in one
transaction. The appearance in both Exhibits 1 and 2 of "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid"
as purchaser of the subject motor vehicle was satisfactorily explained by witness
Maralit. The subject motor vehicle was initially reserved by SPQ Center but later on
it waived its right in favor of Nora. It is for this reason that "SPQ Center/Nora
Saguid" appears as the purchaser of the vehicle.17
In its decision18 dated 07 July 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff SECURITY FINANCE,
INCORPORATED to pay defendant-spouses ROLANDO and NORA SAGUID:
1. The total amount of the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle computed
from the date of its seizure on October 28, 1998 up to its return to the defendants,
at the rate of P750.00 daily;
2. The amount of P500,000 for moral damages;
3. The amount of P1,000,000 for exemplary damages;
4. The amount P200,000 for and as attorney’s fees; and
5. The Costs.
In reaching its verdict, the RTC ruled that the promissory note and the deed of
mortgage were not valid contracts and were not binding on petitioners. It explained
that respondent failed to show with convincing evidence that it loaned to
petitioners the money used in the purchase of the subject motor vehicle. On the
contrary, it found that there was preponderance of evidence showing that the
motor vehicle was purchased in cash by petitioners from Toyota Balintawak, Inc.
Respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.19
On 31 January 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of respondent. It
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-
appellant. Costs against the defendants-appellees.20
The Court of Appeals found the ruling of the trial court that there was no valid
contract entered into between the parties on the ground there was no cause or
consideration when they executed the same, and that respondent failed to show
with convincing evidence that it loaned the money to petitioners which was used to
purchase the subject motor vehicle, to be bereft of factual and legal basis. It relied
heavily on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid during pre-trial and during his
direct-examination that he signed the promissory note dated 23 April 1996 and the
chattel mortgage dated 03 September 1996. It did not give weight to petitioners’
bare denial that they never transacted with respondent for the subject loan and
that they never executed the promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage
because it belied the admission made by petitioner Rolando Saguid.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 dated 24 February 2003 while
respondent filed a Motion for Clarificatory Judgment22 dated 17 February 2003.
In a resolution dated 10 June 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and granted the Motion for Clarificatory Judgment. It amended the
dispostive portion of its 31 January 2003 decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-
appellant ordering the defendants-appellees:
1) To deliver to the plaintiff-appellant the motor vehicle described as follows:
MAKE : Toyota Corolla XL
MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
2) In the event the manual delivery of the above-described motor vehicle is not
feasible, to pay the plaintiff appellant the amount of ₱508,248.00 plus interest and
penalty charges at the legal rate per annum until fully paid, in line with the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Medel vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 481; and
3) To pay the costs of suit.23
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ENTERED INTO A TRANSACTION WITH RESPONDENT
CONCERNING THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE BASED ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE
AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER ROLANDO
SAGUID’S ADMISSION OF HAVING SIGNED THE DOCUMENTS WAS MERELY IN
PREPARATION FOR A LOAN APPLICATION PRESENTED TO HIM BY THE LATE SONNY
QUIJANO, A CAR SALES AGENT.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND THE DEED OF MORTGAGE ARE
NOT VALID AND NOT BINDING ON THE PETITIONERS CONSIDERING PETITIONER
ROLANDO SAGUID’S EXPLANATION REGARDING HIS ADMISSION AND THE SOLID
AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WIFE WAS NOT IN THE PHILIPPINES
AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE SAID DOCUMENTS BUT WAS IN
AUSTRALIA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT AND ORDERED PETITIONER TO DELIVER THE SUBJECT
MOTOR VEHICLE TO RESPONDENT AND TO PAY RESPONDENT THE AMOUNT OF
P508,248.00 PLUS INTEREST AND PENALTY CHARGES IN CASE MANUAL DELIVERY OF
THE VEHICLE WAS NOT FEASIBLE, OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT
MOTOR VEHICLE WAS ALREADY FORCIBLY CONFISCATED AND SEIZED BY THE
SHERIFF BY VIRTUE OF THE WRIT OF SEIZURE ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND
DULY ACKNOWLEDGED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE SHERIFF FROM THE
PETITIONERS.
Respondent would like to impress on the Court that there is a valid Contract of Loan
between it and petitioners, and that the proceeds of the loan were used to buy the
vehicle involved in this case. In support thereof, it offered, among other things, a
Promissory Note24 dated 23 April 1996 and Chattel Mortgage25 dated 03
September 1996 over the subject vehicle which served as security for the payment
of the amount indicated in the former. On the other hand, petitioners contend that
they neither entered into any contract with respondent nor did they receive any
money from it that was used to buy the subject car. Though petitioner Rolando
Saguid admitted that the signatures in the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage
are his, he clarified that when he signed said documents upon the prodding of
Sonny Quijano, he signed them in blank. Petitioner Nora Saguid, on her part, denied
signing said documents. She claimed that the signatures purporting to be hers are
forgeries since she was in Australia when said documents were executed.
Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that they entered
into a transaction with respondent based on the promissory note and chattel
mortgage despite petitioner Rolando Saguid’s explanation of the circumstances
surrounding his signing thereof, and in not holding that these documents are not
valid and binding on them.
To ascertain whether or not petitioners are bound by the promissory note and
chattel mortgage, it must be established that all the elements of a contract of loan
are present. Like any other contract, a contract of loan is governed by the rules as
to the requisites and validity of contracts in general. It is basic and elementary in
this jurisdiction that what determines the validity of a contract, in general, is the
presence of the elements constituting the same, namely: (1) consent of the
contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
and (3) cause of the obligation which is established.26 In this case, petitioners insist
the third element is lacking since they never transacted with respondent for the
proceeds of the loan which were used in purchasing the subject motor vehicle.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners transacted with respondent and are
bound by the promissory note and chattel mortgage they signed. It anchored its
ruling on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid that he signed said documents.
Citing Section 4, Rule 12927 of the Rules of Court, it reasoned out that petitioner
Rolando Saguid’s bare denial cannot qualify the admission he made during pre-trial
and during trial that they transacted with respondent and executed the aforesaid
documents. It brushed aside the explanation made by petitioner Rolando Saguid
that he signed the same in blank and only as preparation for a loan application
presented to him by Sonny Quijano.
From the record, it is clear that what petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted was only
his signatures in the aforementioned documents and not the contents thereof. In
petitioners’ Answer, Rolando Saguid admitted signing the promissory note in
preparation for an application for loan upon the request of Sonny Quijano who
promised to facilitate the same for the purchase of another motor vehicle to be
converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent. During trial, Rolando Saguid
explained the circumstances under which he signed the documents with emphasis
that he signed them in blank.
We find that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it closed its eyes to the
clarification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on the ground that same belied his
admission. The rule that an admission cannot be contradicted unless it can be
shown that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made will not apply under the circumstances obtaining in this case. It does not
follow that the admission of the signatures carries with it the admission of the
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
contents of the documents especially when the person who affixed his signatures
thereon questions its execution and the veracity of the details embodied therein.
Petitioners could have been bound by the terms and conditions of the promissory
note and chattel mortgage if petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted not only his
signatures but also as to what are contained therein. This is not to be in the case
before us. Petitioners can therefore adduce evidence that would nullify or
invalidate both the promissory note and the chattel mortgage. In other words, they
can show that the elements of the contract of loan are wanting.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not in a proper position to entangle itself in
resolving the matter as regards the qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid
on his admission because whatever the documents he signed in favor of Mr.
Quijano is not the concern of the court as the same is not one of the issues
presented before it, and that Mr. Quijano is not a party in the case. Petitioners
claim that if only the Court of Appeals ruled on the matter, it could have ruled in
their favor and sustained the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the same it being the primal defense of
petitioners. It should not have wholly disregarded the qualification made by
petitioner Rolando Saguid considering that said defense can easily be supported by
other competent evidence. Instead of relying heavily on the admitted signatures, it
should have evaluated other evidence that could have either bolstered or disproved
the defense of petitioners.
This did not happen in this case. The Court of Appeals conveniently did not mention
in its decision the testimony of Zenaida M. Maralit, an employee of Toyota
Balintawak, Inc., who testified as to the circumstances on how the subject car was
bought, and the documentary evidence that originated from Toyota Balintawak, Inc.
We consider her to be an impartial witness whose testimony is vital in the proper
resolution of this case.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the ruling of the
trial court that the promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are not valid
contracts and are not binding on them on the ground that the contracts did not
contain the essential element of cause. The Court of Appeals said the trial court did
not clearly declare in categorical terms the absence of cause in the aforesaid
contracts and that petitioners failed to disprove that they are debtors of
respondent since it is presumed that the cause exists in the contract.
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration28 exists and
is lawful unless the debtor proves the contrary.29 Moreover, under Section 3(r) of
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that there is a sufficient consideration
for a contract. The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot
be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration.30 To overcome the
presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by
preponderance of evidence.31
In proving that there is no consideration for the aforementioned documents,
petitioners proffered in evidence the following documents that showed that they
bought the subject vehicle in cash and not in installment basis: (a) Vehicle Sales
Invoice No. 7104;32 (b) Vehicle Delivery Note;33 (c) Official Receipts No. 20864634
and No. 208648;35 (d) Certificate of Registration No. 32862328;36 and (e) Official
Receipt No. 40459605.37 In addition, Ms. Zenaida Maralit of Toyota Balintawak, Inc.
confirmed that the subject car was indeed paid in cash and not through financing
for the reasons that the originals of the Certificate of Registration and the Official
Receipt of the subject vehicle have not been marked as encumbered by the Land
Transportation Office and are in the possession of the buyer. She added that
respondent is not accredited in Toyota Balintawak, Inc. She testified:
Q: Madam Witness, do you know if this vehicle was purchased in cash or through
financing?
A: It was purchased in cash.
Q: What proof do you have to show that it was purchased in cash?
A: There was an invoice cash return.
Q: By the way, being the head of the Credit and Collection, what are your duties and
functions?
A: We are in-charge of collection, we are in-charge of the documentation with LTO,
insurance and financing documents.
Q: As far as the purchase of vehicle through financing, what is your specific duty?
A: We are the one who asked the client to sign the documents.
Q: Will you tell the Honorable Court what is the procedure in case the vehicle is
purchased from your office through financing?
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
A: After the client signed the documents, we get all the requirements based on the
credit advice issued by the financing company. So together with the documents and
all the requirements, valid ID, post dated checks, we are the one transmitting them
to the financing company and after processing, the financing company gave us the
proceed two to four days after the release of the vehicle.
Q: As far as the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt are concerned, what
did you do with them if the vehicle was purchased through financing?
A: If it was through financing, the original Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration goes to the financing company. We are the one transmitting them.
Only the xerox copies of the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration go to the
client through financing transaction.
Q: As far as the security of the financing company, when it comes to purchase of
vehicle through financing, what do you do with the Official Receipt and Certificate
of Registration?
A: The LTO marked there encumbered. It means it was mortgaged to that particular
financing company.
Q: Where it was marked?
A: At the Certificate of Registration, it was marked encumbered.
Q: On the face?
A: On the face.
Q: Do you have any policy as far as your company is concerned with regards to the
purchase of vehicle through financing?
A: We have only the accredited financing companies.
Q: Is the plaintiff herein, Security Finance, accredited in your company?
A: No, not even in one transaction.
Q: What would be the significance if the original copy of the Certificate of
Registration and the corresponding Official Receipt is in the possession of the
buyer?
A: That means it was on cash transaction.38
On the other hand, respondent, through Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Vice-President
for Marketing, said that it paid the dealer in checks and that they have proof of
payment. He testified:
Q: Mr. witness, you said you paid the dealer. In what form did you pay the dealer?
A: In checks, sir.
Q: Do you have any proof of your payment?
A: Yes, sir. 39
It is thus clear that the subject car was bought in cash and not through financing via
respondent. We find the evidence presented by respondent to be unreliable and
erratic. The testimony of Rosauro Maghirang, Jr. that respondent paid Toyota
Balintawak, Inc. is simply unsubstantiated by competent evidence. If respondent
truly paid the dealer how come it never presented the checks it used to pay Toyota
Balintawak, Inc.? Even assuming arguendo that respondent released the loan
proceeds to petitioners, the same would be inconsistent with its allegation that it
was the one that paid the dealer. Furthermore, another telltale sign that
strengthens the claim of petitioners that they did not transact with respondent for a
loan was the fact that the alleged loan/credit application40 was not signed by any
or both of them.
Respondent’s contention that petitioners did not deny drawing postdated checks in
its favor is untenable. Petitioner Rolando Saguid categorically denied issuing the
check and claimed that the signatures appearing thereon were not his.41
As to the alleged signature of petitioner Nora Saguid in the promissory note,
evidence points that she could not have signed the document she being in Australia
when she allegedly executed said document on 23 April 1996 as established by a
certification42 from the Bureau of Immigration that she left for Sydney, Australia,
on 30 September 1995 and returned to the country on 15 June 1996.
From the foregoing, the Court is convinced that petitioners’ allegation of absence of
consideration has been substantiated and the presumption of consideration
disproved and overcome. We are of the mind that petitioners bought the car with
their own money. There being no cause or consideration in the contract of loan
allegedly entered into by the parties, the promissory note is not binding on the
petitioners.
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As regards the chattel mortgage, it is settled that a mortgage is a mere accessory
contract and its validity would depend on the validity of the loan secured by it.43
The chattel mortgage constituted over the subject vehicle is an accessory contract
to the loan obligation as embodied in the promissory note. It cannot exist as an
independent contract since its consideration is the same as that of the principal
contract. A principal obligation is an indispensable condition for the existence of an
accessory contract.44 Since it has been sufficiently established that there was no
cause or consideration for the promissory note, it follows that the chattel mortgage
has no leg to stand on. Hence, it must be extinguished and cannot have any legal
effect on petitioners.
Having ruled that both promissory note and chattel mortgage are not binding on
petitioners, the return of the subject vehicle to petitioners is in order. In case the
vehicle can no longer be delivered in the condition when it was seized, respondent
shall pay petitioners the amount of ₱150,000.0045 plus interest of 6% per annum to
be computed from 13 October 1998,46 the date when said vehicle was seized, until
finality of judgment after which interest rate shall become 12% per annum until
actual payment.
We now go to the award of damages.
It is well-settled that actual or compensatory damages must be proved and proved
with reasonable degree of certainty. A party is entitled only up to such
compensation for the pecuniary loss that he has duly proven.47 It cannot be
presumed.48 Absent proof of the amount of actual damages sustained, the Court
cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by
the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount
thereof.49
In the instant case, the trial court awarded as actual damages the amount of
₱750.00 per day as daily earnings of the seized vehicle from 28 October 1998 until
its return. Same should be deleted for lack of competent proof. The bare assertion
of petitioner Rolando Saguid that the subject vehicle was earning ₱750.00 a day
before it was seized is inadequate, if not speculative, and should not be accepted
because it is not supported by independent evidence. Petitioners should have at
least presented a record or journal that would clearly show how much the vehicle
earned in a specific period. This, petitioners failed to do. Instead, they relied on
mere allegations that do not prove anything.
Petitioners are entitled to moral damages having suffered undue embarrassment
when the subject vehicle was seized from their home. There is no hard-and-fast rule
in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each
case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. The yardstick should be that it is
not palpably and scandalously excessive.50 We find the amount of ₱500,000.00
awarded by the lower court to be excessive. In our view, the award of ₱50,000.00
as moral damages is reasonable under the facts obtaining in this case.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.51 When moral damages are awarded, exemplary damages may also be
granted.52 We, however, find the ₱1,000,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be
excessive and should accordingly be reduced to ₱50,000.00.
Moreover, attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or
incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other
party.53 Petitioners are entitled thereto because they were compelled to litigate in
order to protect their interest. Moreover, there being an award for exemplary
damages,54 it follows that there should be an award thereof. An award of
₱20,000.00 will be sufficient as the award of ₱200,000.00 by the RTC is too much.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68129 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Security Finance, Inc. is
ordered to deliver the possession of the subject vehicle to petitioners, or, in the
alternative if such delivery can no longer be made, to pay petitioners the amount of
₱150,000.00 plus interest of 6% per annum to be computed from 13 October 1998
until finality of judgment after which interest rate shall become 12% per annum
until actual payment. Respondent is also ordered to pay petitioners ₱50,000.00 as
moral
damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱20,000.00 by way of attorney’s
fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
MILAGROS SIMON and LIBORIO BALATICO, Petitioners, vs. GUIA W. CANLAS,
Respondent. (G.R. NO. 148273, April 19, 2006)
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated May 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62789 which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Tarlac City dated July 31, 1998
in Civil Case No. 7384.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On February 11, 1991, Edgar H. Canlas (Edgar) filed a complaint for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage against Milagros Simon (Milagros) and her
husband, Liborio Balatico (petitioners). In the complaint, Edgar alleges that: on
September 10, 1987, Milagros obtained a loan from him in the amount of
P220,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage2 over her paraphernal property, a
748-square meter parcel of land located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139884; the loan was payable within a period
of three years or until September 18, 1990; Milagros defaulted in the payment of
the loan and repeated demands for payment went unheeded, prompting the filing
of a case in court.3
On March 25, 1991, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that
Milagros never transacted any business with Edgar and she did not receive the
consideration of the alleged mortgage.4
On March 26, 1991, Edgar filed his Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, reiterating
validity and due execution of the real estate mortgage.5
On November 12, 1991, with leave of court,6 petitioners filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Virginia Canlas (Virginia) and Aurelia Delos Reyes (Aurelia),
claiming that they duped Milagros to part with her title and sign the mortgage
documents without giving her the consideration and refusing to return her title
when demanded.7
On November 18, 1991, Virginia and Aurelia filed their Answer with Counterclaim to
Third-Party Complaint, alleging that the complaint states no cause of action against
them since they are not privies to the real estate mortgage and Aurelia is only a
witness to the mortgage document.8
On November 28, 1991, petitioners filed their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim,
reiterating their claims in the third-party complaint.9
Edgar died during the pendency of the case. On December 4, 1991, upon proper
motion,10 the RTC ordered that Edgar be substituted by his wife, Guia W. Canlas
(respondent), as plaintiff.11
On August 12, 1996, the RTC issued a pre-trial order stating that the parties failed to
arrive at a settlement. However, they agreed to stipulate on the following: "[t]hat
the defendant executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of the plaintiff
involving a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 139884 located at San Nicolas,
Victoria, Tarlac."12
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with respondent presenting her witnesses,
namely: Nelson Nulud, the records custodian of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac;
Aurelia, the third-party defendant and one of the instrumental witnesses to the real
estate mortgage; and respondent herself. When petitioners’ turn came, they
presented Crisostomo Astrero, the other instrumental witness to the real estate
mortgage. 1avvphil.net
On April 15, 1998, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Norberto De Jesus, filed an Ex-Parte
Urgent Motion for Postponement since he is busy campaigning as a candidate in the
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
coming elections.13 There being no objection from respondent, the RTC reset the
hearing to May 28, 1998.14
On May 28, 1998, Atty. De Jesus and petitioners failed to appear in court. The RTC
reset the hearing on June 17, 1998 with a warning that if the petitioners will still fail
to appear on said date, they will be considered to have waived their right to present
further evidence.15
On June 17, 1998, Atty. De Jesus failed to appear in court but petitioners were
present. Milagros informed the RTC that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his appearance as
their counsel. In view thereof, the RTC directed petitioners to secure the services of
another counsel and the hearing was reset to June 24, 1998 with a warning that
should petitioners still fail to present evidence at said hearing, they will be
considered to have waived their right to present further evidence.16 On June 23,
1998, Atty. De Jesus filed his Withdrawal of Appearance as Counsel for the
Defendants with the conformity of Milagros.17
On June 24, 1998, Milagros informed the RTC that they have retained Atty. Alejo Y.
Sedico18 as new counsel. The hearing was again reset to July 2, 1998 with the final
warning that should petitioners’ witnesses fail to appear at the said hearing, they
would be considered to have waived their right to present further evidence.19
On July 1, 1998, Atty. Sedico formally filed his Entry of Appearance with Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Reset, praying that the hearing scheduled on July 2, 1998 be reset
to August 12, 1998 due to conflict of schedule and his trial calendar for July is fully
occupied, as well as to give him more time to study the case since he had just been
retained.20
On July 2, 1998, the RTC allowed, in the interest of justice, the resetting of the
hearing for presentation of petitioners’ evidence for the last time on July 15, 1998.
The RTC directed petitioners to secure the services of a counsel of their choice to
represent them in the said hearing considering that it postponed motu propio the
hearing in the interest of justice over the vigorous objection of the respondent due
to failure of petitioners’ counsel to appear for three successive times. It warned
petitioners that in case they would be unable to present evidence in the next
scheduled hearing, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present
further evidence.21
On July 9, 1998, Atty. Sedico filed an Urgent Motion to Reset the scheduled hearing
on July 15, 1998 due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date of Criminal
Case Nos. 6463 to 6510 for Estafa entitled "People of the Philippines v. Eddie
Sentero" before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela. He reiterated that
his trial calendar for the whole month of July is fully occupied and requested the
hearing be reset to August 10 or 19, 1998.22
At the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998, the RTC was apprised of the Urgent
Motion to Reset filed by petitioners’ counsel. In view of the vigorous objection of
respondent’s counsel on the ground that the case has been postponed several
times at petitioners’ instance, the RTC denied the motion to reset and petitioners
were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence. The case was then
considered submitted for decision.23
Sixteen days later, on July 31, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having substantiated her claim by a preponderance of
evidence, this Court hereby renders judgment in her favor, ordering the defendants
to pay the plaintiff within a period of ninety (90) days from the entry of judgment
hereof, the following sums of:
(1) P220,000.00, representing the principal obligation plus interest thereof of 12%
per annum from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
(2) P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
(3) The costs of suit.
It is further adjudged that in the event defendants default in the payment of the
above determined amounts, Lot No. 2763, with an area of 748 square meters
situated in San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 13984 – Tarlac Registry, particularly identified and described in the Real Estate
Mortgage contract (Exhibit "A"), shall be sold at public auction to satisfy this
judgment.
SO ORDERED.24
The RTC held that Milagros executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of
Edgar and she received the consideration for the mortgage in the amount of
P220,000.00; that petitioners’ inaction for three years before the filing of the
complaint against them to protest the alleged non-receipt of the consideration for
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
the mortgage casts serious doubts on their claim; and that the deed of real estate
mortgage was duly notarized and assumed the character of a public instrument.
On September 2, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that
they were denied due process when the RTC decided the case without petitioners’
evidence.25 On October 16, 1998, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,
holding that petitioners were given ample opportunity to hire a counsel, prepare for
trial and adduce evidence, which they took for granted and they should bear the
fault.26
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On May 23, 2001, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.27 The CA ruled that petitioners were not denied
due process since they were duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and
present evidence to substantiate their defense but they forfeited their right for not
appearing in court together with their counsel at the scheduled hearings; that since
Milagros admitted the existence, due execution, authenticity and validity of the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage during the Pre-Trial Conference on June 7, 1995,
absence of consideration is no longer an issue; that, in any case, the amount of
P220,000.00 was actually received by Milagros per the testimony of Aurelia; that
petitioners slept on their rights, if they had any, since they never lifted a finger to
protect and preserve their alleged rights and interests; and that the mortgaged
property is not conjugal property but the exclusive property of Milagros which she
could validly dispose of or encumber without her husband’s consent.
The CA merely noted that the RTC failed to dispose of petitioners’ third-party
complaint and without any further discussion, dismissed the third-party complaint
in the dispositive portion of its decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto as to the main
case. The third-party complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.28
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following
Assignment of Errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE QUESTIONED REAL ESTATE
MORTAGE EVEN AS THERE WAS LACK OF CONSIDERATION AND THAT THE SAME
WAS EXECUTED THROUGH FRAUDULENTLY [sic] SCHEME;
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DUE EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE WAS ADMITTED WHILE WHAT WAS ADMITTED ONLY IS ITS EXECUTION;
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS
PARAPHERNAL EVEN AS EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE HAD CONSIDERED IT
CONJUGAL OR ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY;
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT DESPITE OF [sic] HAVING DENIED PETITIONER
TO BE REPRESENT [sic] BY A COUNSEL OF CHOICE DUE PROCESS IS SATISFIED.29
Petitioners contend that the real estate mortgage was fraudulently executed and
there was lack of consideration but material facts relating thereto were not fully
ventilated because the RTC denied petitioners’ motion to reset the hearing. They
maintain that they never admitted the due execution of the real estate mortgage,
but only its execution or existence. They further insist that the mortgaged property
is conjugal, not paraphernal, and therefore, Milagros could not dispose of or
encumber without her husband’s consent; and the CA disregarded Article 9930 of
the Family Code which provides that all the property owned by the spouses at the
time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter forms part of the
community property. Lastly, they submit that while they were given the opportunity
to secure the services of a new counsel to defend them, the RTC’s apathy to the
plight of petitioners’ counsel on the latter’s conflict of schedule amounted to
stripping such right to counsel and denial of due process.
For her part, respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for
impleading the CA as respondent, despite the clear directive of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure against it. She further points out that the petition lacks verification,
a certification against forum shopping, a copy of the assailed CA decision, and it fails
to raise any specific question of law but only presents and discusses an "assignment
of errors."
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In any event, even if these procedural defects are disregarded, respondent argues
that petitioners were not denied due process when the RTC denied their motion for
postponement since they were duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and
to present their evidence to substantiate their defense but they forfeited this right
for not appearing in court together with their counsel at the scheduled hearings.
They also aver that the real estate mortgage is valid and duly executed and the
mortgaged property is the paraphernal property of Milagros such that she can
validly dispose of or encumber it without her husband’s consent.
Anent the procedural defects raised by respondent, the Court agrees that the
correct procedure, as mandated by Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, is not to implead the lower court which rendered the assailed
decision.31 However, impleading the lower court as respondent in the petition for
review on certiorari does not automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal but
merely authorizes the dismissal of the petition.32 Besides, formal defects in
petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered previous petitions for
review on certiorari that erroneously impleaded the CA. In those cases, the Court
merely called the petitioners’ attention to the defects and proceeded to resolve the
case on their merits.33
The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment in
this case. While unquestionably, the Court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal
for being defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on
the merits, rather than on technicality as the latter approach may result in
injustice.34 This is in accordance with Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure35 which encourages a reading of the procedural requirements in a
manner that will help secure and not defeat justice.36
As to respondent’s claim that the petition lacks verification, a certification against
forum shopping and a copy of the assailed CA decision, the Court has carefully
examined the rollo of the case and found them to be attached to the petition.37
Anent respondent’s submission that the petition failed to raise a question of law,
the Court disagrees. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any
of them.38 Petitioners’ contention that they were denied substantive due process is
a pure question of law.39
As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, which should always be predicated on the
consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties
in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. After all,
postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of
dispensing justice."40 When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to
delay is not manifest with the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having
been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end
that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated.41 Thus, in considering motions
for postponements, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the
postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.42 Unless grave abuse
of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by
mandamus or appeal.43
In the present case, there are circumstances that justify postponement of the July
15, 1998 hearing. Atty. Sedico had only been formally retained as petitioners’ new
counsel as of July 1, 1998, or merely two weeks before July 15, 1998. Atty. Sedico
also had a previously intransferable hearing in a criminal case before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela scheduled on the same date of July 15, 1998.
The distance factor, from Valenzuela to Tarlac, is enough consideration to call for
postponement. Moreover, Atty. Sedico twice informed the RTC that his entire
calendar for July is already full such that he requested specific dates in August for
the hearing.44 The motion to reset the hearing has not been shown to be
manifestly dilatory. Besides, except for the May 28, 1998 scheduled hearing,45
petitioners have always been present in court. They cannot be said to have lost
interest in fighting the civil case to the end; only that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his
appearance as their counsel and petitioners had to look for new counsel to take
their case on short notice. Absolutely wanting from the records is any evidence that
the change of counsel was intended to delay the proceedings. In fact, only 48 days
have lapsed from the time Atty. De Jesus failed to appear on May 28, 199846 to the
time when Atty. Sedico’s motion to reset was denied on July 15, 1998.47 Such
intervening time cannot be said to have greatly impaired the substantial rights of
respondent. Thus, absent unreasonable delay and manifest intent to employ
dilatory tactic prejudicial to the respondent and trifling court processes, Atty.
Sedico’s request for resetting should have been granted.
It cannot be disputed that the case has been pending since February 11 1991,48 or
more than seven years until petitioners were able to start their presentation of their
evidence on March 11, 1998.49
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

The Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of cases. It bears stressing that the matter of absence of consideration and alleged fraudulent
However, it must be emphasized that speed alone is not the chief objective of a scheme perpetuated by third-party defendants, being evidentiary, should be
trial. It is the careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice, a threshed out in a proper trial. To deny petitioners their right to present evidence
genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the requirements of procedural due constitutes a denial of due process, since there are issues that cannot be decided
process, and an adherence to this Court’s standing admonition that the disposition without a trial of the case on the merits.
of cases should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
Ordinarily, when there is sufficient evidence before the Court to enable it to resolve
convenience of the courts and of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and
the fundamental issues, the Court will dispense with the regular procedure of
fairness would be served thereby. These are more important than a race to end the
remanding the case to the lower court, in order to avoid further delays in the
trial.50 Indeed, court litigations are primarily for the search for truth, and a liberal
resolution of the case.54 However, a remand in this case, while time-consuming, is
interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to
necessary, because the proceedings had in the RTC are grossly inadequate to settle
adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.51
factual issues. Petitioners were unduly deprived of the full opportunity to present
Ironically, the precipitate action of the RTC prolonged the litigation and evidence on the merits of their defense and third-party complaint.
unnecessarily delayed the case, in the process, causing the very evil it apparently
Considering the foregoing, the Court need not delve on the other issues raised by
sought to avoid. Instead of unclogging dockets, it has actually increased the
petitioners. Suffice it to say that such matters are best decided by the RTC only after
workload of the justice system as a whole. Such action does not inspire public
full reception of petitioners’ evidence.
confidence in the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 23,
Moreover, it is noted that petitioners filed a third-party complaint which the RTC
2001 of the Court of Appeals and the Decision dated July 31, 1998 of the Regional
simply disregarded. On the other hand, the CA, while stating in its Decision that
Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 7384, are REVERSED and SET
"[a]ll thus told, we find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court, except
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the said Regional Trial Court for reception of
that it failed to dispose of the third-party complaint,"52 it simply proceeded to
petitioners’ evidence and further proceedings.
dismiss the third-party complaint in the dispositive portion of herein assailed
decision, without giving any reason or justification therefor. No pronouncement as to costs.
As to the effect of petitioners’ admission of the due execution of the real estate SO ORDERED.
mortgage during the pre-trial conference, it must be noted that in Benguet
Exploration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 53 this Court ruled that the admission of the
genuineness and due execution of a document simply means that the party whose
signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed
by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that
the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a
seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
However, it does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud,
mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of
consideration. Petitioners therefore are not barred from presenting evidence
regarding their claim of want of consideration.

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR, Petitioners, vs. JOSEFINA M.
HALASAN, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. (G.R. No. 165987, March
31, 2006)
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757, as well as the Resolution2 dated
June 28, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia
Alfelor filed a Complaint for Partition3 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Davao City. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children,
Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor,
one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses. The case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of said court.
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for
Intervention,4 alleging as follows:
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-entitled case for
partition between plaintiffs and defendants;
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor,
one of the children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate
estate is subject to herein special proceedings for partition;
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo from the share of
her late husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case and to
submit attached Answer in Intervention.5
Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention,6 claiming that she was
the surviving spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was void
ab initio for having been contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage.
Josefina further alleged that Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her husband’s
children. Josefina prayed, among others, for the appointment of a special
administrator to take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her pleading a copy
of the marriage contract7 which indicated that she and Jose were married on
February 1, 1956.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing.
Josefina presented the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in- Intervention8 filed
by the heirs of the deceased, where Teresita declared that she knew "of the
previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that of the herein intervenor" on
February 1, 1956.9 However, Josefina did not appear in court.
Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002.10 She narrated that she and
the deceased were married in civil rites at Tagum City, Davao Province on February
12, 1966, and that they were subsequently married in religious rites at the
Assumption Church on April 30, 1966. Among those listed as secondary sponsors
were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty. Margarito Halasan, her brother, and Valentino
Halasan, her father.11 While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that
her husband had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live
together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s
relatives consented to her (Teresita’s) marriage with Jose because there had been
no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few months after the marriage,
Josefina disappeared, and Jose even looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Despite his efforts, Jose failed to locate Josefina and her whereabouts remained
unknown.
Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to
Josefina annulled because he believed in good faith that he had the right to
remarry, not having seen her for more than seven years. This opinion was shared by
Jose’s sister who was a judge. Teresita also declared that she met Josefina in 2001,
and that the latter narrated that she had been married three times, was now
happily married to an Englishman and residing in the United States.
On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order12 denying the
motion and dismissed her complaint, ruling that respondent was not able to prove
her claim. The trial court pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify
in court to substantiate her claim. Moreover, no witness was presented to identify
the marriage contract as to the existence of an original copy of the document or any
public officer who had custody thereof. According to the court, the determinative
factor in this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the second marriage
with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been previously
married. Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof
required to allow the intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,13 the RTC
ruled that while Josefina submitted a machine copy of the marriage contract, the
lack of its identification and the accompanying testimony on its execution and
ceremonial manifestation or formalities required by law could not be equated to
proof of its validity and legality.
The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria
Katrina, were the legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering
that the latter referred to them as his children in his Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the oppositor did not present evidence to
dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina (sic) Halasan through
counsel, not sufficient to prove a preponderance of evidence and compliance with
the basic rules of evidence to proved (sic) the competent and relevant issues of the
complaint-in-intervention, as legal heir of the deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the
complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered dismiss (sic) with cost[s] de oficio.
On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor, oppositor
through counsel sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement of the Rules of Evidence,
in accordance with duly supporting and prevailing jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita
Sorongon Alfelor and her children, Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are
declared legal and legitimate Heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to
entitled (sic) them, in the intestate estate of the latter in accordance to (sic) law, of
all properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any testate or intestate
proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such inheritance, they
are legally entitled, along with the other heirs, as the case maybe (sic).13
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under Section 4, Rule
129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved. She pointed
out that Teresita admitted in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999 that
she (Teresita) knew of Jose’s previous marriage to her. Teresita also admitted in her
testimony that she knew of the previous marriage.16 Since the existence of the first
marriage was proven in accordance with the basic rules of evidence, pursuant to
paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the second marriage was void from
the beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of the
Civil Code provides that the person entitled to claim good faith is the "spouse
present" (thus, the deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the
validity of the second marriage were to be upheld, and at the same time admit the
existence of the second marriage, an absurd situation would arise: the late Jose
Alfelor would then be survived by two legitimate spouses.
The trial court denied the motion in its Order17 dated October 30, 2002.
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA,
alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to
Jose, in considering the bigamous marriage valid and declaring the second wife as
legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of the New
Civil Code provide for a presumption of law that any subsequent marriage is null
and void. She insisted that no evidence was presented to prove that she had been
absent for seven consecutive years before the second marriage.
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who claims to
be the legal wife must show proof thereof. They pointed out that Josefina failed to
present any of the following to prove the fact of the previous marriage: the
testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation
as husband and wife after the alleged wedding; the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children during such union, and other subsequent documents
mentioning such union. Regarding Teresita’s alleged admission of the first marriage
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was
mere hearsay, without probative value, as she heard of the alleged prior marriage
of decedent Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from other persons, not based on her own
personal knowledge. They also pointed out that Josefina did not dispute the fact of
having left and abandoned Jose after their alleged marriage in 1956, and only
appeared for the first time in 1988 during the filing of the case for partition of the
latter’s share in his parents’ estate. They further pointed out that Josefina does not
even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor. Contrary to the allegations of
Josefina, paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article 41 of the Family
Code, is applicable. Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to question her
claim that she had not been heard of for more than seven years.
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court.
It held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that
Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer requires proof.
Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the fact that Josefa was
married to the decedent. Citing Santiago v. De los Santos,18 the appellate court
ruled that an admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission, and is conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or
inconsistent proofs submitted by the party who made the admission should be
ignored whether objection is interposed by the other party or not. The CA
concluded that the trial court thus gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
dismissal of Josefina’s Complaint-in-Intervention. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed orders, having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Resultantly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to admit
petitioner’s complaint in intervention and to forthwith conduct the proper
proceeding with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling
of the appellate court.
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred in
ordering the admission of private respondent’s intervention in S.P. Civil Case No.
26,047-98. They insist that in setting aside the Orders of the trial court, dated
September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002, the CA completely disregarded the
hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence provides that an admission does not require proof, such admission may be
contradicted by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. Moreover,
Teresita’s statement in the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999,
admitting knowledge of the alleged first marriage, is without probative value for
being hearsay.
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this case fall
under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a
judicial admission which does not require proof. Consequently, the CA did not
commit any palpable error when it ruled in her favor.
Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose’s
previous marriage to private respondent in the said Reply-in- Intervention, Teresita
also testified during the hearing, for the purpose, that the matter was merely "told"
to her by the latter, and thus should be considered hearsay. They also point out that
private respondent failed to appear and substantiate her Complaint-in-Intervention
before the RTC, and only submitted a machine copy of a purported marriage
contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor.
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted
by the other party who claims to be the second wife, should be allowed to
intervene in an action for partition involving the share of the deceased "husband" in
the estate of his parents.
The petition is dismissed.
The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein,
admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in
the RTC, to wit:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the
late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married on February 1,
1956;20
Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that
her late husband had been previously married to another. To the Court’s mind, this
admission constitutes a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement; made as it
was in the course of judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

admission.21 A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as
judicial admissions are a waiver of proof;22 production of evidence is dispensed
with.23 A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy.24 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such
party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
whether objection is interposed by the party or not.25 The allegations, statements
or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party
cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was
pleaded.26
On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for intervention, the
pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court is Section 1, Rule 19, which
provides:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is
so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in
a separate proceeding.
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest
in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an
interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof.27 Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is
permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming
what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of
plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding
by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the
admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal
proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of
some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings."28
partition case. She has shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd. v. Court of Appeals:29
x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other
parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and
effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were allowed
to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and
interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The words "an
interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded,
one that would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the
complaint without the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.30
In Uy v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to be the
surviving legal spouse and the legitimate child of the decedent) to intervene in the
intestate proceedings even after the parties had already submitted a compromise
agreement involving the properties of the decedent, upon which the intestate court
had issued a writ of execution. In setting aside the compromise agreement, the
Court held that petitioners were indispensable parties and that "in the interest of
adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners’ inclusion in the action for partition,
given the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the proper
disposition of the case."32
Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals33 is
not in point, as the Court therein did not discuss the propriety of allowing a motion
for intervention, but resolved the validity of a marriage. In relying on the merits of
the complaint for partition, the Court ultimately determined the legitimacy of one
of the petitioners therein and her entitlement to a share in the subject properties.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is
ORDERED to admit respondent Josefina Halasan’s Complaint-in-Intervention and
forthwith conduct the proper proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that
respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. SAMMY UMIPANG y ABDUL,
Accused-Appellant. (G.R. No. 190321 April 25, 2012)
Before the Court is an appeal from the 21 May 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA)1 affirming the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision of the Pasig City Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG.2 The RTC
Decision convicted Sammy Umipang y Abdul (Umipang) for violation of Sections 5
and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the CA, are quoted as follows:
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was selling
drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust
team from the [Station Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special Operation Task Force (SAID-
SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in
the evening. [Police Officer (PO) 2] Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and
he was given a ₱ 500.00 marked money. The operation was coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered the
length of the street while the other members of the team strategically positioned
themselves. The confidential informant saw the man called Sam standing near a
store. The confidential informant and PO2 Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off,
the confidential informant said "Sam, pa-iskor kami." Sam replied "Magkano ang
iiskorin nyo?" The confidential informant said "Five hundred pesos." Sam took out
three (3) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with various price
tags–500, 300, and 100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the marked ₱
500.00 to Sam who received the same.
Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid took off his cap as the pre-
arranged signal that the sale had been consummated. Sensing danger, Sam
attempted to flee but PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and arrested Sam. In a few
seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team [comprised of their team leader, Police
Senior Inspector (PS/INSP.) Obong, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Mendiola, PO3
Hajan, PO3 Maglana, PO3 Salem, and PO1 Ragos] joined them. PO1 Ragos
handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline
substance were recovered from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials
"SAU" [which stood for Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the
middle initial, of accused-appellant]. Sam was forthwith brought to the police
station where he was booked, investigated and identified as accused-appellant
Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the confiscated items to the
crime laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous
drug.
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant himself and his
brother Nash Rudin Umipang. According to them:
In the evening of April 1, 2006, while they were sleeping, accused-appellant and his
family were awakened by loud knocking on the door. The persons outside shouted
"Mga pulis kami. Buksan mo ang pinto kung hindi gigibain namin ito." Accused-
appellant obliged and opened the door. Five (5) policemen barged into his house
and pointed a gun at him. Against his will and amid the screams of his wife,
accused-appellant was brought to a waiting vehicle and brought to the police
headquarters. At the Taguig Police station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him ₱
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
100,000.00 for his release. He denied the charges and that the alleged evidence
were all "planted" by the police.3
Consequently, the following charges were brought against Umipang:
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
having been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly sell deliver and give away to poseur buyer PO2 Ruchyl Gasid, one heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline
substance, which substance was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in consideration of the
amount of ₱ 500.00, in violation of the above-cited law.
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
having been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly possess and have in his custody and control five (5) heat sealed
transparent plastic sachets, each containing 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.04
gram and 0.04 gram with a total weight of 0.23 gram of white crystalline substance,
which substances were found positive to the tests for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-
cited law.
RTC Ruling
In its 24 July 2007 Joint Decision, the Pasig City RTC found accused-appellant guilty
of violating Section 5 (Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals) and Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II
of R.A. 9165. The RTC gave more weight to the testimonies of the arresting officers
on how they conducted the buy-bust operation than to accused-appellant’s claim of
frame-up by the police. Thus, for violating Section 5 (Criminal Case No. 14935-D-
TG), Umipang was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱
500,000. For violating Section 11 (Criminal Case No. 14936-D-TG), he was sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years one (1) day as maximum and to pay a
fine of ₱ 300,000.
CA Ruling
In its 21 May 2009 Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision
of the RTC. According to the appellate court, the elements necessary for the
prosecution of the illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs were present and
established. Thus, it no longer disturbed the RTC’s assessment of the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. Furthermore, the CA found that there was no showing of
improper motive on the part of the police officers. With the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, it ruled against the denials of
accused-appellant, and his defense of frame-up.
We have consistently declared that a review of the factual findings of the lower
courts is not a function that is normally undertaken in appeals before this Court.
However, after a careful scrutiny of the CA Decision, we find it proper to reevaluate
the factual issues surrounding the present case, especially since it is not clear from
the Decision whether the proper implementation of the strict procedural
safeguards laid down in R.A. 9165 was established.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the testimonial evidence of
the prosecution witnesses were sufficient to convict accused-appellant of the
alleged sale and possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which are
violations under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. 9165.
Discussion
Accused-appellant argues4 that since there were two versions presented during
trial – one, that of the prosecution; and the other, that of the accused – the latter
version must be adopted, because the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties should not take precedence over the presumption of
innocence of the accused. He also contends that a surveillance of just 30 minutes
was insufficient to establish that Umipang was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs.
Lastly, accused-appellant claims that the fact of possession of the confiscated
plastic sachets was not clearly established, and that the evidence allegedly
confiscated from him was merely planted.5 Alluding to the testimony of PO1 Ragos,
he points out that the former did not see him holding the drugs, and that the sachet
was shown only to PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the
affirmation of the RTC Joint Decision in all respects, as it was decided in accord with
law and evidence.6 The OSG argues7 that the necessary elements to convict a
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
person under Sections 5 and 11 were proven beyond reasonable doubt. It then
contends that, absent independent proof and substantiated evidence to the
contrary, accused-appellant’s bare-faced denial should be deemed merely as a self-
serving statement that does not hold merit. Finally, the OSG asserts that, where
there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to
testify falsely against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given full faith and
credence.
Substantive law requires strict observance of the procedural safeguards outlined in
R.A. 9165
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust
operation conducted by the SAID-SOTF. We thus recall our pronouncement in
People v. Garcia:
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has
been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are
otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant
downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is
susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion. In People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that "by the very nature of
anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin
can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the
secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus,
courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent
person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses."
Accordingly, specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have
been laid down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the police to strictly follow. The
prosecution must adduce evidence that these procedures have been followed in
proving the elements of the defined offense.8 (Emphasis supplied and citations
omitted.)
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards9 that are
applicable in cases of buy-bust operations:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. –
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be
submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be
done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-
four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the
volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within
the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued
stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the
forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on
the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-
four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72)
hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter
proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil
society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the
guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful
commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for
legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed
and recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or
burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in
the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the
case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum
quantity as determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to
personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not
constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails
to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her
counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of
the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the
public attorney's office to represent the former; x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Congress introduced another complementing safeguard through Section 86 of R.A.
9165, which requires the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine National
Police (PNP), and Bureau of Customs (BOC) to maintain close coordination with
PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related operations:
Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal
Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. – x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI
and the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws:
Provided, however, That when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or
any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of
this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force
shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI,
PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on
all drug related matters. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the 2002 Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 (IRR) set the
following procedure for maintaining close coordination:
SECTION 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal
Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. — x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies — The PDEA shall
be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other
law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support
of the PDEA: Provided, that the said agencies shall, as far as practicable, coordinate
with the PDEA prior to anti-drug operations; Provided, further, that, in any case,
said agencies shall inform the PDEA of their anti-drug operations within twenty-four
(24) hours from the time of the actual custody of the suspects or seizure of said
drugs and substances, as well as paraphernalia and transport equipment used in
illegal activities involving such drugs and/or substances, and shall regularly update
the PDEA on the status of the cases involving the said anti-drug operations;
Provided, furthermore, that raids, seizures, and other anti-drug operations
conducted by the PNP, the NBI, and other law enforcement agencies prior to the
approval of this IRR shall be valid and authorized; Provided, finally, that nothing in
this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests
and seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting preventive procedural
safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165, courts must tread carefully before giving full credit
to the testimonies of those who conducted the operations. Although we have ruled
in the past that mere procedural lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are
not ipso facto fatal to the prosecution’s cause, so long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved,10 courts must still
thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple
procedural lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate
disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law. Consequently, Section 21(a) of the
IRR provides for a saving clause in the procedures outlined under Section 21(1) of
R.A. 9165, which serves as a guide in ascertaining those procedural aspects that
may be relaxed under justifiable grounds, viz:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — x
x x:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items; (Emphasis supplied.)
We have reiterated that "this saving clause applies only where the prosecution
recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable
grounds" after which, "the prosecution must show that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized have been preserved."11 To repeat, noncompliance
with the required procedure will not necessarily result in the acquittal of the
accused if: (1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.12
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official
duties of law enforcers,13 we stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under
R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety
precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the
penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. In People v. Coreche,14 we explained
thus:
The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with
evidence found legislative expression in Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 on the inventory
of seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia by putting in place a three-tiered
requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of inventory by imposing on the
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs the duty to
"immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof". (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently, in a line of cases,15 we have lain emphasis on the importance of
complying with the prescribed procedure. Stringent compliance is justified under
the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government and
liberally in favor of the accused.16 Otherwise, "the procedure set out in the law will
be mere lip service."17
Material irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operations
In the recent case of People v. Relato, we reiterated the following:
In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy burden
of proving the elements of the offense of, but also bears the obligation to prove the
corpus delicti, failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does
not establish the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the
prosecution is missing or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the
prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited
substance presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State
less than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, Relato deserves exculpation, especially as we recall that his defense of
frame-up became plausible in the face of the weakness of the Prosecution’s
evidence of guilt.18 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with defects, which raises
doubts on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
from accused-appellant.
First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items.
According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the complete name,
including the middle initial, of accused-appellant in order to mark the confiscated
sachets. The marking was done immediately after Umipang was handcuffed.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

However, a careful perusal of the testimony of PO2 Gasid would reveal that his prior A: I noticed my companions approaching us.
knowledge of the complete initials of accused-appellant, standing for the latter’s full
xxx xxx xxx
name, was not clearly established. Thus, doubt arises as to when the plastic sachets
were actually marked, as shown by PO2 Gasid’s testimony: PROSEC. SANTOS: And what did your colleague Ragos do when he arrived at your
place?
A [PO2 Gasid]: We conducted a buy-bust operation on April 1, 2006.
A: When he arrived at the place, after arresting alias Sam, he was the one who
PROSEC. SANTOS: Against whom did you conduct this buy-bust operation?
handcuffed him.
A: Against alias Sam, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything more that was done in that place of
PROSEC. SANTOS: What prompted you to conduct this operation against this alias occurrence during that time, Officer?
Sam?
A: Yes, sir.
A: We received information from our confidential informant that one alias Sam is
PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us please?
selling shabu at Cagayan De Oro Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig.
A: After arresting alias Sam, I frisk [sic] him for the remaining items he showed me
PROSEC. SANTOS: Aside from this information that you received from your
and the buy-bust money I gave him.
informant, was there anything more that your informant told you about the real
identity of this alias Sam? xxx xxx xxx
A: Nothing more, sir, he gave us only his alias, sir.19 PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything that you and your team did in the items that
you confiscated from the possession of the accused during that time and the shabu
xxx xxx xxx
that you bought from him?
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after you have taken the item and paid alias Sam and then
A: I marked the items I confiscated at the place of incident.
you executed the pre-arranged signal that you have already purchased from him,
what happened then? PROSEC. SANTOS: How did you marked [sic] the item that you bought from this alias
Sam?
A: After I made the pre-arranged signal, mabilis po yung mata ni alias Sam, para ho
bang balisa, siguro napansin nya na hindi lang kami dalawa (2), aakma syang A: SAU, sir.
tatakbo, sinunggaban ko na po sya.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what does that stand for? That SAU?
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, you held Sam already during that time?
A: Stands for the initials of alias Sam.
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Is that the only thing that you placed on the plastic sachet
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened after that? containing the shabu that you bought from this alias Sam during that time?
A: I introduced myself as police officer and at that time I arrested him. A: I marked the shabu I bought as SAU-1.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What about your companions who serves [sic] as your immediate PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the other five (5) plastic sachets containing the
back up, what happened to them when you were already hold and arrested [sic] suspected shabu, what happened to that?
this alias Sam?
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

A: I marked them as SAU-2, SAU-3, SAU-4, SAU-5 and SAU-6.20 ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you arrived at the place, by the way, where was your
target area, Mr. Witness?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Cagayan De Oro Street, Barangay Maharlika, Taguig City.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after you have marked and inventoried the items that you
bought and confiscated from this alias Sam during that time, what else happened? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you were there, you did not buy [sic] anybody to buy
shabu from the accused?
A: After the inventory of the evidences, I turn [sic] them over to the investigator.
A: No, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Where did you turn these items to your investigator?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not conduct any test buy?
A: At the office, sir.
A: No, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that time?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Nor did you make any inquiry with Cagayan De Oro Street
A: PO1 Alexander Saez, sir.
regarding the accused?
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you turn these items to your investigator, where were
A: Not anymore, sir.
you?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: At that moment, you don’t have any idea regarding the identity
A: At the office, sir.
of the accused and also whether he was engaged in illegal activity?
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened to these items that you turn it over [sic] to your
A: Regarding the identity, he was described by the informant.
investigator?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: It was only the informant who knows the accused?
A: He made a request for laboratory examination of the items confiscated.21
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also your other members, they did not know the accused?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, Officer, this Sam when you have already arrested him, were
you able to know his real name? A: Yes, sir.23 (Emphasis supplied.)

A: Yes, sir. A clearer picture of what transpired during the buy-bust operation, from the
marking of the confiscated items to the arrest of accused-appellant, is provided by
PROSEC. SANTOS: What was his real name?
the testimony of PO1 Ragos:
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what is the effect to you of the act of Gasid taking off his
PROSEC. SANTOS: Is he present here in Court? cap?

A: Yes, sir.22 A: That is the sign that he already bought the shabu.

xxx xxx xxx PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid acting that way, being the back up of him
during that time, what did you do?

A: I run [sic] towards them.

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

PROSEC. SANTOS: Were you able to go near him when you run [sic] towards him? A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir. PROSEC. SANTOS: And together with this alias Sam?

PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened? A: Yes, sir.

A: I saw him holding Sam. PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened in your office?

PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid already holding Sam, what did you do? A: We turn [sic] over the evidence to the investigator.

A: I handcuffed Sam. PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that time?

PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened? A: PO1 Saez.

A: The items confiscated by Gasid were marked with his initials. xxx xxx xxx

PROSEC. SANTOS: Did you see Gasid marking those things that he took from this PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after the team has turn [sic] over the evidences to your
Sam during that time? investigator in the person of Officer Saez, was there anything more that transpired
in relation to this event, this incident?
A: Yes, sir.
A: We prepared an affidavit of arrest.24
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: What marked [sic] did he put on these plastic sachets?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information regarding the accused was relayed to you
A: SAU, sir.
by your immediate superior?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Do you know what SAU connotes?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information was the first information regarding the
PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us? accused, is that correct?

A: Sammy Abdul Umipang. A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: What was told you was that your target person was alias Sam?

A: He was apprising [sic] of his constitutional rights. A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: After this person was apprised of his rights, was there anything ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No photographs of alias Sam was shown to you?
more that was done?
A: None, sir.
A: We went back to the office.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no derogatory records of this alias Sam in your office?
PROSEC. SANTOS: All the members of the team went back to the office?
A: None, sir.

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no warrant of arrest? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that it was Officer Saez who
delivered the items to the crime lab?
A: None, sir.
A: No sir, it was Gasid.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: This alias Sam was not included in your watch list?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: But you were not with him when he delivered the specimen to
A: No, sir.25
the crime laboratory?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, the markings were placed on the plastic sachets?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No further question, Your Honor.
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: No re-direct, Your Honor. x x x26 (Emphasis supplied.)
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: After that Mr. Witness, you brought the accused together with
The circumstances surrounding the marking of the seized items are suspect. From
the items to your office?
their testimonies during the trial, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos both admitted that they
PROSEC. SANTOS: Already answered, Your Honor. We are just repeating the same only knew their target by the name "Sam." They both testified that, after accused-
pattern, Your Honor. appellant was handcuffed, frisked, and read his rights, they immediately brought
him to the police precinct. They then said that it was a certain PO1 Saez who
xxx xxx xxx investigated him. In fact, in their joint affidavit, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos stated
thus:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you investigated the accused?
Na dinala namin siya [accused] sa aming opisina para sa pagsisiyasat at pagtatanong
A: No more, it was PO1 Saez who investigated the accused.
tungkol sa detalye ng kaniyang pagkatao at sa layuning masampahan ng kaukulang
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not ask the full name of the accused? reklamo sa paglabag ng Section 5 and 11 of RA 9165.27 (Emphasis supplied.)

A: It was PO1 Saez who investigated him, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: It was PO1 Saez who got his full name and on you [sic] part, that
was the first time that you were able to learned [sic] the full name of the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Because you knew him only as alias Sam?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: How about Officer Gasid, it was also the first time that he
learned the full name of the accused?
Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge of the
complete name of accused-appellant, including the middle initial, which enabled
the former to mark the seized items with the latter’s complete initials. This
suspicious, material inconsistency in the marking of the items raises questions as to
how PO2 Gasid came to know about the initials of Umipang prior to the latter’s
statements at the police precinct, thereby creating a cloud of doubt on the issues of
where the marking really took place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items were preserved. All that was established was that it was PO1
Saez who asked accused-appellant about the latter’s personal circumstances,
including his true identity, and that the questioning happened when accused-
appellant was already at the police station. We thus reiterate:

A: Maybe not, sir. Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
contraband[s] are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves
to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of
at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting", or
contamination of evidence.
Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure
of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on
the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, the doctrinal fallback of every drug-
related prosecution. Thus, in People v. Laxa and People v. Casimiro, we held that
the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused
casts doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt.
These rulings are refinements of our holdings in People v. Mapa and People v.
Dismuke that doubts on the authenticity of the drug specimen occasioned by the
prosecution’s failure to prove that the evidence submitted for chemical analysis is
the same as the one seized from the accused suffice to warrant acquittal on
reasonable doubt.28 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
It is true that the failure of the arresting officers to mark the seized items at the
place of arrest does not by itself impair the integrity of the chain of custody and
render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.29 We have already clarified
that the marking upon "immediate" confiscation of the prohibited items
contemplates even that which was done at the nearest police station or office of
the apprehending team.30 We will analyze this possible seed of doubt that has
been planted by the unexplained marking of the shabu with the complete initials of
Umipang, together with the other alleged irregularities.
Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek the third-
party representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under the law,
the inventory and photographing of seized items must be conducted in the
presence of a representative from the media, from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and from any elected public official. The testimony of PO2 Gasid, as quoted below,
is enlightening:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you also made the certificate of inventory, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And since this is a drug operation, you are required by law to
make a certificate of inventory?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And that inventory, you are required by law that there should
be a signature of any representative from the media, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also representative from the Department of Justice, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also elected official, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: I’m showing to you Mr. Witness your certificate of inventory, do
you confirm that there are no signatures placed by any member of the media,
representative from the Department of Justice and any elected official?
A: Yes, sir, there is none, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And there appears to be an initial of RS above the type written
name Sammy Umipang, who wrote this initial RS?
A: That stands for refuse [sic] to sign, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Who refuse [sic] to sign?
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.31
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Why was the certificate of inventory not witnesses [sic] and
signed by any members of the media, the DOJ and elected officials, Officer?
A: That time there is no available representative, sir.
COURT: How did you exert effort to locate available representative of those officers
or persons in the certificate of inventory?
A: The investigator contacted representative from the media, Your Honor.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
COURT: What barangay this incident happened?
A: Barangay Maharlika, Your Honor.
COURT: Did you talk to the barangay captain?
A: No, Your Honor.
COURT: What about the barangay councilman?
A: No, Your Honor.32 (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the
marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF
did not even attempt to contact the barangay chairperson or any member of the
barangay council. There is no indication that they contacted other elected public
officials. Neither do the records show whether the police officers tried to get in
touch with any DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable
reason for failing to do so – especially considering that it had sufficient time from
the moment it received information about the activities of the accused until the
time of his arrest.
Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the
apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section
21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable –
without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to
look for other representatives, given the circumstances – is to be regarded as a
flimsy excuse. We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to
establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives
enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165,33 or that there was a justifiable
ground for failing to do so.34
Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to
take photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. As pointed
out by the defense during trial,35 the Certificate of Inventory did not contain any
signature, including that of PO2 Gasid – the arresting officer who prepared the
certificate36 – thus making the certificate defective. Also, the prosecution neither
submitted any photograph of the seized items nor offered any reason for failing to
do so. We reiterate that these requirements are specifically outlined in and
required to be implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.37
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted.38 This is
especially true when the lapses in procedure were "recognized and explained in
terms of [] justifiable grounds."39 There must also be a showing "that the police
officers intended to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some
justifiable consideration/reason."40 However, when there is gross disregard of the
procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious
uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution
presented in evidence.41 This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply invoking
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross,
systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively
produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.42 As a result, the
prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes
charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.43
1âwphi1
For the arresting officers’ failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to
conclude from the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the
arresting officers deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165.
These lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the
corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the
foregoing reasons, we must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, "as
every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt."44
As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities "to exert
greater efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our
lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our society."45 The
need to employ a more stringent approach to scrutinizing the evidence of the
prosecution – especially when the pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-bust
operation – "redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice system by protecting
civil liberties and at the same time instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors."46
WHEREFORE, the appealed 21 May 2009 CA Decision affirming the 24 July 2007 RTC
Joint Decision is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul is hereby
ACQUITTED of the charges in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG
on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE accused-appellant from custody, unless
he is detained for some other lawful cause.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
SO ORDERED.
VALENTIN ZAFRA y DECHOSA and EROLL MARCELINO y REYES, Petitioners, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. (G.R. No. 190749, April 25, 2012)
For review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31713 dated 30 October 2009,1 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 76, Malolos, Bulacan,2 which found petitioners Valentin Zafra y
Dechosa (Zafra) and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes (Marcelino) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Possession of Dangerous Drugs in violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and
imposing on each of them the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day as the minimum term, to thirteen (13) years as maximum, and of fine of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The Facts
The prosecution charged Zafra and Marcelino with violation of Section 11, Article II
of RA No. 91653 before the RTC of Bulacan under the Information below:
That on or about the 12th day of June, 2003, in the municipality of Balagtas,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession and control
dangerous drug consisting of two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) weighing 0.0614 gram, in conspiracy
with one another.5
The prosecution’s lone witness, SPO46 Apolinario Mendoza (SPO4 Mendoza), Chief
of the Investigation and Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police of
Balagtas, Bulacan, testified that on 12 January 2003, at around 4:30 in the
afternoon, he conducted surveillance in front of a sari-sari store at the corner of
Miraflor Subdivision and P. Castro Street in Balagtas, Bulacan, due to reported drug
trafficking in the area. SPO4 Mendoza found there the group of Zafra, Marcelino,
and a certain Marlon Daluz (Daluz) standing and facing each other.7 In that position,
he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu, while Daluz was holding an aluminum
foil and a disposable lighter.8 Seeing this illegal activity, SPO4 Mendoza single-
handedly apprehended them. He grabbed the shabu from the hands of Zafra and
Marcelino, and confiscated the drug paraphernalia from Daluz. Then, he ordered
the three to lie down; he frisked them. Boarding a tricycle, he brought them to the
Balagtas Police Station,9 where he personally marked the confiscated two (2)
sachets of shabu, one with VSD, the initials of Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and the
other with EMR, the initials of Eroll Marcelino y Reyes.10
On the following day, 13 June 2003, SPO4 Mendoza brought the accused and the
items to the crime laboratory for urine sampling and laboratory examination,
respectively.11 The test of the items resulted to positive presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.12
The RTC, Branch 76, Malolos, Bulacan, in a decision dated 11 June 2008, convicted
Zafra and Marcelino for the crime of possession of shabu:
WHEREFORE, finding guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case
No. 2297-M-2003, accused VALENTIN ZAFRA y DECHOSA and accused EROLL
MARCELINO y REYES are hereby CONVICTED for possession of sachets of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu, with a weight of
0.31 gram and 0.30 gram, respectively, which are classified as dangerous drugs in
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002" and are each SENTENCED to suffer
the IMPRISONMENT of, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TWELVE (12)
YEARS AND ONE DAY, AS THE MINIMUM TERM, TO THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, AS THE
MAXIMUM TERM, and to pay the FINE of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱300,000.00).13
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Daluz, on the other hand, who was charged of possession of drug paraphernalia in
violation of Section 12 of RA No. 9165 pleaded guilty to the charge and was released
after serving his sentence of eight (8) months.14
Zafra and Marcelino appealed; but the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the assailed 11 June 2008 Decision of the Court a quo STANDS.15
Hence, this appeal on the following grounds: first, the arrest was unlawful; second,
the prohibited drugs are inadmissible in evidence; third, Section 21 of RA No. 9165
was not complied with; and, finally, the prosecution failed to prove petitioners’ guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to ACQUIT petitioners Zafra and Marcelino on the following grounds:
First, the prosecution’s lone witness, SPO4 Mendoza,16 testified that, from a
distance, he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu by their bare hands,
respectively, while Daluz was holding an aluminum foil and a disposable lighter.17
Seeing this illegal activity, he single-handedly apprehended them.18 He grabbed the
shabu from the hands of Zafra and Marcelino, and confiscated the drug
paraphernalia from Daluz.
In his affidavit, however, SPO4 Mendoza stated, that:
Na, nitong nakaraang Hunyo 12, 2003 ng 4:30 ng hapon humigit kumulang, sa P.
Casto St., Barangay Borol-1, Balagtas Bulacan, habang ako ay nagsasagawa ng
surveillance sa Suspected Drug Pusher sa nasabing lugar ay aking nakita ang tatlo (3)
kalalakihan na nakatalikod sa isang corner ng tindahan sa P. Castro St., na nakilala
ko na sina Valentine D. Zafra @ Val, Eroll R. Marcelino @ Eroll, at Marlon B. Daluz @
Marlon na pawang mga residente ng Borol-1, Balagtas, Bulacan.
Na, ako ay lumapit na naglalakad kina Valentine Zafra, Errol Marcelino at Marlon
Daluz at sa aking paglapit sa kanilang tatlo ay aking nakita at naaktuhang inabot ni
Valentine Zafra kay Eroll Marcelino ang isang (1) plastic sachet ng shabu may
timbang na 0.30 grams, at isa pang plastic sachet ng shabu na si Marlon Daluz ay
hawak ang isang disposable lighter at 2 piraso ng aluminum foil na inaayos na
nilalagyan ng lupi at 7 piraso ng empty plastic sachet. (Emphasis supplied)19
xxxx
On cross examination, SPO4 Mendoza testified that it was Zafra and not Daluz, who
was holding the aluminum foil (contrary to his earlier testimony that Zafra was
holding shabu);20 that Daluz (whom he claimed during the direct examination to be
holding the aluminum foil) and Marcelino were holding handkerchiefs and on top of
them were shabu;21 When the defense confronted SPO4 Mendoza about the
inconsistency, he told the court that his version during his direct testimony was the
correct one.22
While, it is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility
of the witness and the testimony is entitled to great weight and is generally not
disturbed upon appeal,23 such rule does not apply when the trial court has
overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact of weight or substance.24 In
the instant case, these circumstances are present, that, when properly appreciated,
would warrant the acquittal of petitioners.
Certainly, SPO4 Mendoza’s credibility has to be thoroughly looked into, being the
only witness in this case. While in his affidavit, SPO4 Mendoza claimed that he saw
the sachet of shabu (0.30 gram) because Zafra was in the act of handing it to
Marcelino, his testimony during the direct examination reveals another version,
that is, from a distance, he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu, respectively,
hence, he approached them from behind and confiscated the shabu from both of
them and the paraphernalia from Daluz. How he saw a 0.30 gram of shabu from a
distance in a busy street, baffles this Court. Asked, however, on cross examination,
who among the three were holding the shabu and drug paraphernalia, SPO4
Mendoza failed to be consistent with his earlier testimony and pointed to Daluz as
the one holding shabu with a handkerchief in his hand and Zafra as the one in
possession of drug paraphernalia. These inconsistencies are not minor ones, and,
certainly, not among those which strengthens the credibility of a witness.
Possession of drug paraphernalia vis-à-vis shabu, are two different offenses under
RA No. 9165. That Zafra was holding drug paraphernalia and not shabu is material
to this case, to the accusation against him, and to his defense.
Second, a reading of the RTC decision on this matter reveals that the conviction was
arrived at upon reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
Mendoza’s official duty.25
It is noteworthy, however, that presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence.26 Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing
distrust on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his
culpability.27
Third, SPO4 Mendoza was the lone arresting officer, who brought the petitioners to
the police station,28 who himself marked the confiscated pieces of evidence sans
witnesses, photographs, media, and in the absence of the petitioners. His
colleagues were nowhere.29 And, worse, he was the same person who took
custody of the same pieces of evidence, then, brought them on his own to the
crime laboratory for testing.30 No inventory was ever done;31 no inventory was
presented in court.
The solo performance by SPO4 Mendoza of all the acts necessary for the
prosecution of the offense is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which
is the illegal object itself in serious doubt. No definite answer can be established
regarding the question as to who possessed what at the time of the alleged
apprehension. More significantly, we are left in doubt whether not the two sachets
of shabu allegedly seized from the petitioners were the very same objects offered in
court as the corpus delicti.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the
elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral
certainty.32 The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.33 Essential
therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond doubt.34 Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will
not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a
finding of guilt.35 More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to
make a finding of guilt.36 The chain of custody requirement performs this function
in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
are removed.37
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA No. 9165 reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
Section 21(a) Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9165
reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.38 It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.39
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same.40
The records readily raise significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from Zafra and Marcelino. SPO4 Mendoza’s claim that the two
sachets of shabu presented in court were the same ones confiscated from the
petitioners, cannot be taken at its face value, solely on the presumption of
regularity of one’s performance of duty. SPO4 Mendoza blatantly broke all the rules
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established by law to safeguard the identity of a corpus delicti. There was even no
mention about the details of the laboratory examination of the allegedly seized
drugs. To allow this to happen is to abandon everything that has been said about
the necessity of proving an unbroken chain of custody. SPO4 Mendoza cannot alone
satisfy the requirements in RA No. 9165 which is anchored on, expressly, the
participation of several personalities and the execution of specified documents.
And, while jurisprudence has refined the enumerated duties of an apprehending
officer in a drug case and has thus described the equivalent requirements for a
proper chain of custody of the corpus delicti, still, the case at bar cannot pass the
constitutional requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
We reiterate, that this Court will never waver in ensuring that the prescribed
procedures in the handling of the seized drugs should be observed. In People v.
Salonga,41 we acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to inventory and
photograph the confiscated items. We also reversed a conviction in People v.
Gutierrez,42 for the failure of the buy-bust team to inventory and photograph the
seized items without justifiable grounds. People v. Cantalejo43 also resulted in an
acquittal because no inventory or photograph was ever made by the police.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the
burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.49 The
rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the law
presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.50 In dubio pro
reo.51 When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on
reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.52
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 October 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 31713. Petitioners
Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes are hereby ACQUITTED for the
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined for
another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report to this Court the action taken within five (5) days
from receipt of this Decision.

We reached the same conclusions in the recent cases of People v. Capuno,44 SO ORDERED.
People v. Lorena,45 and People v. Martinez.46

The present petition is the sum total of all the violations committed in the cases
cited above.

Lest the chain of custody rule be misunderstood, we reiterate that non-compliance

with the prescribed procedural requirements does not necessarily render the
seizure and custody of the items void and invalid; the seizure may still be held valid,
provided that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are shown to have been properly
preserved.47 These conditions, however, were not met in the present case as the
prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of SPO4
Mendoza to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized
items.1âwphi1 As we held in People v. De Guzman,48 the failure to follow the
procedure mandated under RA No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations must be adequately explained. The justifiable ground for the non-
compliance must be proven as a fact. The Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist.

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite
City, sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering him to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages for the rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy
Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999.
The Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of Rape
with Homicide alleged:
"That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in Barangay Ligtong I, Municipality of
Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Trial Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with DAISY DIOLOLA Y DITALO, a nine-year old child against the latter's
will and while raping the said victim, said accused strangled her to death."
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 26, 1999 and, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon trial ensued.
Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola, the
victim's mother; Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, medico-legal officer of the NBI; Atty. Lupo
Leyva; Mayor Renato Abutan of Rosario, Cavite; Atty. Sikat Agbunag of the Public
Attorney's Office; Pet Byron Buan, NBI Forensic Biologist; Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, NBI
Forensic Chemist; SPO1 Arnel Cuevas of the Rosario, Cavite police station; and
Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, both neighbors of the victim.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-appellant. (G.R. No. 144656,
May 9, 2002)
The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of July 10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their
neighbor's house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the
sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her lessons. Aimee's house, where
accused-appellant was also staying, is about four to five meters away from Daisy's
house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of her tutor. She was wearing
pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came back with
accused-appellant. They were looking for a book which accused-appellant could
copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After
finding the book, Daisy and accused-appellant went back to the latter's house.
When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 o'clock after an afternoon nap, she noticed
that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and proceeded
to the house of Aimee, Daisy's tutor. Aimee's mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was
not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because
Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked for
Daisy in her brother's and sister's houses, but she was not there, either. At about
7:00 o'clock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her neighbor's house, and there
saw accused-appellant, who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house
to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had not
been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at
about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that
Daisy was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television
in her house, but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the whole evening of June
10, 1999, a Saturday, until the early morning of the following day, June 11, 1999, a
Sunday, but their search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter
was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta" by a
certain Freddie Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida
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saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt
tied around her neck. Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin
reported the incident to the Rosario police. The other barangay officers fetched
accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall. At the
barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the
probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last seen alive. 3
Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of that day, she saw Daisy playing with other children outside her house.
She asked Daisy and her playmates to stop playing as their noise was keeping
Jessiemin's one-year old baby awake. Daisy relented and watched television instead
from the door of Jessiemin's house. About five minutes later, accused-appellant
came to the house and told Daisy something, as a result of which she went with him
and the two proceeded towards the "compuerta."
Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 o'clock that afternoon, while she and her
daughter were in front of a store across the street from her house, accused-
appellant arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette. Accused-appellant had only
his basketball shorts on and was just holding his shirt. They noticed both his shorts
and his shirt were wet. After lighting his cigarette, accused-appellant left. 4
Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She said that at about
4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, while she and her husband and
children were walking towards the "compuerta" near the seashore of Ligtong,
Rosario, Cavite, they met a fisherman named Herminio who said that it was a good
day for catching milkfish (bangus). For this reason, according to this witness, they
decided to get some fishing implements. She said they met accused-appellant
Gerrico Vallejo near the seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked
troubled. Charito said that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was
unusual. She also testified that accused-appellant's shorts and shirt (sando) were
wet, but his face and hair were not.5
SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report, Rosario Police Chief
Ricardo B. de la Cruz, Jr. responded to the call together with his men, PO2 Garcia,
SPO1 Araracap and PO2 Lariza. When they arrived, Daisy's body was already in the
barangay hall. SPO1 Cuevas took photographs of the body. At that time, Daisy was
wearing pink short pants and a dirty white panty with a dirty white sleeveless shirt
wrapped around her neck. The body was afterwards taken to the Samson Funeral
Parlor in Rosario, Cavite. The inquiries conducted by the police showed that one
Freddie Quinto was fishing near the compuerta when he accidentally hit the body of
Daisy, which was in the mud and tied to the root of an aroma tree.
Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for questioning. Two others, a
certain Raymond and Esting, were also taken into custody because they were seen
with accused-appellant in front of the store in the late afternoon of July 10 1999.
Later, however, the two were released. Based on the statements of Jessiemin
Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, the policemen went to the house of accused-
appellant at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered the
white basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back, and
the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it, worn by accused-
appellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were
turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination.6
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that at about 9:00 o'clock
in the evening of July 11, 1999, he conducted a physical examination of accused-
appellant. His findings7 showed the following:
"PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
"Abrasions: thigh, right, antero-lateral aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 0.1 cm., knee, left, 7.0
x 6.0 cm. legs, right anterior aspect, 28.0 x 8.0 cms., left anterior aspect, 24.0 x 10.0
cms., feet, plantar aspects; right, 9.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 5.0 cms.
"Hematoma, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 1.0 x 0.5 cm.
"Lacerations, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 0.3 cm.
"(Living Case No. BMP-9902, p. 101, records)"
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Dr. Vertido went to the Samson Funeral
Parlor in Rosario, Cavite for an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim Daisy Diolola.
The autopsy revealed the following postmortem findings: 8
"Body in early stage of postmortem decomposition characterized by foul odor, eyes
and tongue protruding, bloating of the face and blister formation.
"Washerwoman's hands and feet.
"Contusion, (pinkish) face, right, 14.0 x 10.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 6.0 cms. Contused
abrasions, forehead, 13.0 x 5.0 cms. upper lip, 5.0 x 22.0 cms., lower lip, 3.0 x 2.0
cms., neck (nailmarks) anterior aspect, 8.0 x 5.0 cms., arms, right antero-medial
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
aspect, middle 3rd 3.0 x 15.0 cms. posterior aspect, upper 3rd, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left
posterior aspect, 20.0 x 9.0 cms., forearm, left, posterior aspect, 21.0 x 8.0 cms. left
thumb, anterior aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left middle, ring and little fingers, dorsal
aspect, .50 x 4.0 cms. knees, right, 3.0 x 2.0 cms. and left, 8.0- x 5.0 cms., legs, right
anterior aspect, upper and middle 3rd 3.0 x 2.5 cms. foot right, dorsal aspect.
"Hematoma, periorbital right, 5.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 4.5 x 3.0 cms.
"Fracture, tracheal rings.
"Hemorrhages, interstitial, neck, underneath, nailmarks. "Petechial hemorrhages,
subendocardial, subpleural.
"Brain and other visceral organs are congested.
"Stomach, contains ½ rice and other food particles.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: -Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation.
"GENITAL EXAMINATION: - Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, gaping
and congested. Hymen, moderately tall, thick with fresh lacerations, complete at
3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 o'clock positions, edges with blood clots." [Autopsy Report No.
BTNO-99-152]
Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that he was informed
of the rape and murder at past 10:00 o'clock in the evening of June 11, 1999. The
mayor said he immediately proceeded to the municipal jail, where accused-
appellant was detained, and talked to the latter. Accused-appellant at first denied
having anything to do with the killing and rape of the child. The mayor said he told
accused-appellant that he could not help him if he did not tell the truth. At that
point, accused-appellant started crying and told the mayor that he killed the victim
by strangling her. Accused-appellant claimed that he was under the influence of
drugs. The mayor asked accused-appellant if he wanted to have the services of Atty.
Lupo Leyva, a resident of Rosario, as his lawyer. When accused-appellant said he
did, Mayor Abutan fetched Atty. Leyva from his house and took him to the police
station about 11:00 o'clock that evening.9
Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutan's testimony. He said that upon
arriving at the police station, he asked accused-appellant if he wanted his services
as counsel in the investigation. After accused-appellant assented, Atty. Leyva
testified that he "sort of discouraged" the former from making statements as
anything he said could be used against him. But, as accused-appellant was willing to
be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he advised him to tell the truth. PO2 Garcia, the
investigator, informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to be assisted by counsel and warned him that any answer he gave could and
might be used against him in a court of law. PO2 Garcia asked questions from
accused-appellant, who gave his answers in the presence of Atty. Leyva. After the
statement was taken, Atty. Leyva and accused-appellant read it and afterwards
signed it. Atty. Leyva testified that he did not see or notice any indication that
accused-appellant had been maltreated by the police. In his sworn statement (Exh.
M), accused-appellant confessed to killing the victim by strangling her to death, but
denied having molested her.10
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took
blood samples from accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to
determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused-
appellant on the day the victim was missing and the victim's clothing were turned
over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario,
Cavite police for the purpose of determining the presence of human blood and its
groups.11
The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed accused-
appellant to belong to Group "O". The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13
athletic basketball shirt, with patches "Grizzlies" in front and "SAMARTINO" at the
back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white small
"Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4) one (1) "cut" pink short pants
with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) "cut" dirty white small panty with reddish
brown stains, were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the
reactions of Group "A".12
Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he had a
conversation with accused-appellant during which the latter admitted that he had
raped and later killed the victim by strangulation and stated that he was willing to
accept the punishment that would be meted out on him because of the grievous
offense he had committed. Mr. Buan observed that accused-appellant was
remorseful and was crying when he made the confession in the presence of SPO1
Amoranto at the NBI laboratory.13
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest Prosecutor Elpidia J. Itoc at
around noon of July 13, 1999 in Cavite City, accused-appellant had with him a
handwritten confession which he had executed inside his cell at the Municipal Jail of
Rosario. In his confession, accused-appellant admitted not only that he killed the
victim but that he had before that raped her. Accused-appellant said he laid down
the victim on a grassy area near the dike. He claimed that she did not resist when he
removed her undergarments but that when he tried to insert his penis into the
victim's vagina, she struggled and resisted. Accused-appellant said he panicked and
killed the child. He then dumped her body in the shallow river near the "compuerta"
and went home.14
Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office, testified that at
noon of July 13, 1999, while she was in their office in Cavite City, Prosecutor Itoc
came together with accused-appellant and some policemen. Prosecutor Itoc asked
Atty. Agbunag to assist accused-appellant about his confession. Atty. Agbunag read
the document, informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, and warned
him that the document could be used against him and that he could be convicted of
the case against him, but, according to her, accused-appellant said that he had
freely and voluntarily executed the document because he was bothered by his
conscience. Accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Agbunag, then affixed his signature
to the document and swore to it before Prosecutor Itoc. 15
At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic Biologist
Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well
as buccal swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida
Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of
the NBI for examination.
Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on the
specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim
taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of accused-
appellant and the victim.16
The defense then presented as witnesses accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo and his
sister Aimee Vallejo. Their testimonies show that at about 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of July 10, 1999, accused-appellant, Aimee, and their sister Abigail were
in their house in Barangay Talisay, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite when Daisy Diolola
came to ask accused-appellant to draw her school project. After making the
request, Daisy left.17 Accused-appellant did not immediately make the drawing
because he was watching television. Accused-appellant said that he finished the
drawing at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and gave it to the victim's aunt,
Glory. He then returned home to watch television again. He claimed he did not go
out of the house until 7:00 o'clock in the evening when he saw Ma. Nida, who was
looking for her daughter. Accused-appellant said he told her that he had not seen
Daisy. After that, accused-appellant said he went to the "pilapil" and talked with
some friends, and, at about 8:00 o'clock that evening, he went home.
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay officials fetched accused-
appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall, where he was asked
about the disappearance of Daisy. He claimed that he did not know anything about
it. Accused-appellant was allowed to go home, but, at 11:00 o'clock that morning,
policemen came and invited him to the police headquarters for questioning. His
mother went with him to the police station. There, accused-appellant was asked
whether he had something to do with the rape and killing of Daisy. He denied
knowledge of the crime.
At 4:00 o'clock that afternoon, accused-appellant accompanied the police to his
house to get the basketball shorts and shirt he was wearing the day before, which
were placed together with other dirty clothes at the back of their house. According
to accused-appellant, the police forced him to admit that he had raped and killed
Daisy and that he admitted having committed the crime to stop them from beating
him up. Accused-appellant claimed the police even burned his penis with a lighted
cigarette and pricked it with a needle.
Accused-appellant confirmed that Mayor Renato Abutan and Atty. Lupo Leyva went
to see him in the investigation room of the police station and told him that they
would help him if he told the truth. Atty. Leyva asked him whether he wanted him
to be his counsel, and accused-appellant said he answered in the affirmative. He
said Atty. Leyva informed him of his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant claimed
that, although he admitted to Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the commission of the
crime, this was because the police had maltreated him. Accused-appellant said he
did not tell the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured because the
policemen were around and he was afraid of them. It appears that the family of
accused-appellant transferred their residence to Laguna on July 12, 1999 because of
fear of reprisal by residents of their barangay. 18 According to accused-appellant,
Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not present when he gave his confession to the
police and signed the same. Accused-appellant claims that although Exhibit "N" was
in his own handwriting, he merely copied the contents thereof from a pattern given
to him by the police.19
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty
of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
accused Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Rape with Homicide, as charged in the Information, accordingly hereby sentences
him to the supreme penalty of DEATH. The accused is directed to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages.
"SO ORDERED."20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY AND WEAKNESS OF THE
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE
ALLEGED ORAL CONFESSIONS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS BEING
HEARSAY IN NATURE.
"III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING PROBATIVE
VALUE TO THE WRITTEN EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE
AND INTIMIDATION AND THAT THE LAWYER WHO ASSISTED HIM DURING HIS
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DID NOT AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY GIVE HIM
EFFECTIVE LEGAL ASSISTANCE."
We find accused-appellant's contentions to be without merit.
First. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. 21 In rape with homicide,
the evidence against an accused is more often than not circumstantial. This is
because the nature of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have
been present at the time of its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense
particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator.
Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence
proving the modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is
unreasonable.22
Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to sustain a conviction if:
"(a) there is more than one circumstance;
"(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
"(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt."23
In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant:
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejo's house, where accused-appellant was residing,
at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for tutoring.
2. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and Daisy went
together to the latter's house to get a book from which the former could copy
Daisy's school project. After getting the book, they proceeded to accused-
appellant's residence.
3. From accused-appellant's house, Daisy then went to the house of Jessiemin
Mataverde where she watched television. Accused-appellant thereafter arrived and
whispered something to Daisy, and the latter went with him towards the
"compuerta."
4. At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and Charito Yepes
saw accused-appellant coming out of the "compuerta," with his clothes, basketball
shorts, and t-shirt wet, although his face and hair were not. According to these
witnesses, he looked pale, uneasy, and troubled (balisa). He kept looking around
and did not even greet them as was his custom to do so.
5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a boat for catching
fish with dynamite) was docked by the seashore.
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
6. A little before 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde also saw
accused-appellant buying a Marlboro cigarette from a store. Jessiemen also noticed
that accused-appellant's clothes were wet but not his face nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for her daughter, she
was told by accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to her classmate Rosario's
house. The information proved to be false.
8. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near the
"compuerta."
9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had scratches on his feet
similar to those caused by the thorns of an aroma tree.
10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were bloodstained.
The bloodstains on accused-appellant's clothes and on Daisy's clothes were found
positive of human blood type "A."
11. Accused-appellant has blood type "O."
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body contained her DNA profile as well as that of
accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his garments were not
proven to have been that of the victim as the victim's blood type was not
determined.
The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by Forensic Biologist Pet
Byron Buan of both accused-appellant's and the victim's clothing yielded
bloodstains of the same blood type "A". 24 Even if there was no direct determination
as to what blood type the victim had, it can reasonably be inferred that the victim
was blood type "A" since she sustained contused abrasions all over her body which
would necessarily produce the bloodstains on her clothing. 25 That it was the victim's
blood which predominantly registered in the examination was explained by Mr.
Buan, thus:26
"ATTY. ESPIRITU
Q:         But you will agree with me that more probably than not, if a crime is being
committed, and it results in a bloody death, it is very possible that the blood of the
victim and the blood of the assailant might mix in that particular item like the t-
shirt, shorts or pants?
A:         It is possible when there is a huge amount of blood coming from the victim
and the suspect, Sir. It is possible. It will mix. Whichever is the dominant blood in it,
it will be the one which will register. For example, if there is more blood coming
from the victim, that blood will be the one to register, on occasions when the two
blood mix.
Q:         But in these specimens number 1 to 5, it is very clear now that only type A
and no type O blood was found?
A:         Yes, sir."
Accused-appellant also questions the validity of the method by which his
bloodstained clothes were recovered. According to accused-appellant, the
policemen questioned him as to the clothes he wore the day before. Thereafter,
they took him to his house and accused-appellant accompanied them to the back of
the house where dirty clothes were kept. 27 There is no showing, however, that
accused-appellant was coerced or forced into producing the garments. Indeed, that
the accused-appellant voluntarily brought out the clothes sought by the police
becomes more convincing when considered together with his confessions. A
consented warrantless search is an exception to the proscription in Section 2 of
Article III of the Constitution. As we have held, the consent of the owner of the
house to the search effectively removes any badge of illegality. 28
The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-Magsipoc is also
questioned by accused-appellant. He argues that the prosecution failed to show
that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated, considering
that these specimens were already soaked in smirchy waters before they were
submitted to the laboratory.
DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her
genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and
unique.29
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or
from the victim's body for the suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect
and the victim.30
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between
the evidence sample and the reference sample.31 The samples collected are
subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. 32 The test may
yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different
sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or
discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples
have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons
including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol.
Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different
sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source
(inclusion).33 In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst
proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity. 34
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of
accused-appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair
and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA, 35 because,
as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc explained:
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:         I noticed that specimens 1 to 5 consisting of bloodstains taken from the
clothing of the victim and of the accused gave negative results for the presence of
human DNA. Why is it so? What is the reason for this when there are still
bloodstains on the clothing?
A:         After this Honorable Court issued an Order for DNA analysis, serological
methods were already conducted on the said specimens. And upon inquiry from
Mr. Buan and as far as he also knew of this case, and we also interviewed the
mother who came over to the laboratory one time on how was the state of the
specimens when they were found out. We found that these specimens were soaked
in smirchy water before they were submitted to the laboratory. The state of the
specimens prior to the DNA analysis could have hampered the preservation of any
DNA that could have been there before. So when serological methods were done on
these specimens, Mr. Byron could have taken such portion or stains that were only
amenable for serological method and were not enough for DNA analysis already. So
negative results were found on the clothings that were submitted which were
specimens no. 1 to 5 in my report, Sir.
Q:         I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B consisting of the smears taken from the
victim also proved negative for human DNA, why is it so?
A:         Because when we received the vaginal smears submitted by Dr. Vertido, the
smear on the slide was very, very dry and could have chipped off. I already informed
Dr. Vertido about it and he confirmed the state of the specimen. And I told him that
maybe it would be the swab that could help us in this case, Sir. And so upon
examination, the smears geared negative results and the swabs gave positive
results, Sir.
Q:         How about specimen no. 7, the hair and nails taken from the victim, why did
they show negative results for DNA?
A:         The hair samples were cut hair. This means that the hair did not contain any
root. So any hair that is above the skin or the epidermis of one's skin would give
negative results as the hair shaft is negative for DNA. And then the nails did not
contain any subcutaneous cells that would be amenable for DNA analysis also, Sir.
Q:         So it's the inadequacy of the specimens that were the reason for this
negative result, not the inadequacy of the examination or the instruments used?
A:         Yes, Sir."
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the
possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the
negative results of their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim
yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they
showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant:36
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:         So based on your findings, can we say conclusively that the DNA profile of
the accused in this case was found in the vaginal swabs taken from the victim?
A:         Yes, Sir.
Q:         That is very definite and conclusive?
A:         Yes, Sir."
In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other
conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is
weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only
consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence,
such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its
effect upon the court.37 This is how it is in this case.
Second. Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and written
confessions presented as evidence against him. He alleges that the oral confessions
were inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay, while the extrajudicial confessions
were obtained through force and intimidation.
The claim is untenable. Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in pertinent
parts:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him."
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this
constitutional provision: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree
methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt
with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, given without
the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same
section.38
Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of
Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for
being violative of his constitutional rights as these were made by one already under
custodial investigation to persons in authority without the presence of counsel.
With respect to the oral confessions, Atty. Leyva testified: 39
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:         Upon meeting this Gerrico Vallejo at the police station were you able to
confer with him?
A:         Yes, Sir.
Q:         Did you ask him whether he really wants you to represent or assist him as a
lawyer during that investigation?
A:         I did, as a matter of fact, I asked him whether he would like me to represent
him in that investigation, Sir.
Q:         And what was his answer?
A:         He said "yes".
Q:         After agreeing to retain you as his counsel, what else did you talk about?
A:         I told him that in the investigation, whatever he will state may be used
against him, so it's a sort of discouraging him from making any statement to the
police, Sir."
Upon cross-examination, Atty. Leyva testified as follows: 40
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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

Q:         You stated that you personally read this recital of the constitutional rights of Q:         Did Atty. Leyva tell you that if you do not want, nobody can force you to give
the accused? that statement?
A:         Yes, Sir. A:         Yes, Sir.
Q:         But it will appear in this recital of constitutional rights that you did not Q:         And did he tell you that what you would be giving is an extra-judicial
inform the accused that the statement that he will be giving might be used against confession?
him in a court of justice? A:         Yes, Sir."
A:         I did that, Sir.
Q:         But it does not appear in this statement? Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the
consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the written confessions
PROSECUTOR LU he was to execute. Neither can he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva
The best evidence will be the statement, your Honor. who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an effective counsel, a
lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The
ATTY ESPIRITU presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which
The only thing that is stated here is that "Maaaring gamitin pabor o laban sa iyo." might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed,
COURT counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
Let the witness answer. truth.43

A:         I told him that, as a matter of fact, and I also told him to tell the truth and
nothing but the truth."
The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the testimony of Mayor
Renato Abutan,41 it is also confirmed by accused-appellant who testified as
follows:42
"ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the
services of Atty. Leyva before the latter acted as his defense counsel. 44 And counsel
who is provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where the
latter never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the
course of the investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to the
veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.45 Contrary to the assertions of
accused-appellant, Atty. Leyva was not the municipal attorney of Rosario, Cavite but
only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan. 46

Q:         Did Atty. Leyva explain to you the meaning and significance of that
document which you are supposed to have executed and signed?
A:         Yes, Sir.
Q:         What did Atty. Leyva tell you?
A:         That they are allowing me to exercise my constitutional right to reveal or
narrate all what I know about this case, Sir.
Accused-appellant contends that the rulings in People vs. Andan47 and People vs.
Mantung48 do not apply to this case. We disagree. The facts of these cases and that
of the case at bar are similar. In all these cases, the accused made extrajudicial
confessions to the municipal mayor freely and voluntarily. In all of them, the
extrajudicial confessions were held admissible in evidence, being the spontaneous,
free, and voluntary admissions of the guilt of the accused. We note further that the
testimony of Mayor Abutan was never objected to by the defense.

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 EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Indeed, the mayor's questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of an
interrogation, but rather an act of benevolence by a leader seeking to help one of
his constituents. Thus, Mayor Abutan testified:49
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:         And during the conversation you had with Accused Gerrico Vallejo, what
exactly did he tell you?
A:         At first he said that he did not do that. That was the first thing he told me.
Then I told him that I will not be able to help him if he will not tell me the truth.
Q:         And what was the reply of the accused?
A:         He had been silent for a minute. Then we talked about the incident, Sir.
Q:         And what exactly did he tell you about the incident?
A:         I asked him, "Were you under the influence of drugs at that time"?
Q:         What else did he tell you?
A:         I told him, "What reason pushed you to do that thing?" x x x
Q:         Please tell us in tagalog, the exact words that the accused used in telling you
what happened.
A:         He told me that he saw the child as if she was headless at that time. That is
why he strangled the child, Sir. ("Ang sabi niya po sa 'kin, nakita niya raw 'yung bata
na parang walang ulo na naglalakad. Kaya po sinakal niya.")
x x x           x x x           x x x
COURT:
Q:         When you told the accused that you will help him, what kind of help were
you thinking at that time?
A:         I told him that if he will tell the truth, I could help give him legal counsel.
Q:         And what was the answer of the accused?
A:         Yes, he will tell me the truth, Your Honor."
In People vs. Mantung,50 this Court said:
"Never was it raised during the trial that Mantung's admission during the press
conference was coerced or made under duress. As the records show, accused-
appellant voluntarily made the statements in response to Mayor Marquez' question
as to whether he killed the pawnshop employees. Mantung answered in the
affirmative and even proceeded to explain that he killed the victims because they
made him eat pork. These circumstances hardly indicate that Mantung felt
compelled to own up to the crime. Besides, he could have chosen to remain silent
or to do deny altogether any participation in the robbery and killings but he did not;
thus accused-appellant sealed his own fate. As held in People v. Montiero, a
confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience."
And in People vs. Andan, it was explained:
"Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation
do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth."51
For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to NBI
Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would have this
Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was uncounselled and that Mr.
Buan, who initiated the conversation with accused-appellant, was part of the NBI.
The issue concerning the sufficiency of the assistance given by Atty. Leyva has
already been discussed. On the other hand, the questions put by Mr. Buan to
accused-appellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity and clearly not as part
of his tasks. As Buan testified:52
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:         What was the subject of your conversation with him?
A:         It is customary when we examine the accused. During the examination, we
talk to them for me to add knowledge on the case, Sir.
Q:         What did you talk about during your conversation?
A:         I asked him if he was the one who did the killing on this victim, Daisy Diolola,
Sir.
Q:         And what was the reply of the accused?
A:         He said yes, Sir.
Q:         What else did you ask the accused?
A:         I remember that while asking him, he was crying as if feeling remorse on the
killing, Sir.
....
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Q:         And it was you who initiated the conversation? Q:         Who was doing the questioning?
A:         Yes, Sir. A:         The investigator, Sir.
Q:         Do you usually do that? Q:         How many were they inside that room?
A:         Yes, Sir. We usually do that. A:         Five, Sir.
Q:         Is that part of your procedure? Q:         They are all policemen?
A:         It is not SOP. But for me alone, I want to know more about the case, Sir. And A:         Yes, Sir.
any information either on the victim or from the suspect will help me personally. It's x x x           x x x           x x x
not an SOP, Sir." Q:         Until what time did they keep you inside that room?
A:         Up to 11:00 in the evening, Sir.
The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an Q:         Between 10:30 in the morning up to 11:00 o'clock in the evening, what did
ordinary individual and is, therefore, admissible as evidence. you do there?
A:         They were interrogating and forcing me to admit something, Sir.
Third. The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellant is also Q:         In what way did they force you to admit something?
attacked on the ground that these were extracted from him by means of torture,
A:         They were mauling me, Sir.
beatings, and threats to his life. The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police
Q:         The 5 of them?
authorities in extracting confessions from the accused are not sufficient. The
standing rule is that "where the defendants did not present evidence of A:         Yes, Sir.
compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain Q:         The 5 of them remained inside that room with you throughout the
to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any questioning?
criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for A:         Yes, Sir.
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; Q:         In what way did they hurt you?
and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
A:         They burned my private part with a lighted cigarette butt and pierced me
buttress their claim," all these will be considered as indicating
voluntariness.53 Indeed, extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary, with a needle, Sir.
and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarant's consent in Q:         Who did these things to you?
executing the same has been vitiated, the confession will be sustained. 54 A:         Mercado, Sir.
Q:         Who is this Mercado?
Accused-appellant's claim that he was tortured and subjected to beatings by A:         EPZA policemen, Sir.
policemen in order to extract the said confession from him is unsupported by any Q:         Did the other policemen help in doing these things to you?
proof:55 A:         No, Sir.
"ATTY. ESPIRITU: Q:         Were you asked to undress or you were forced to do that?
Q:         Did they further interrogate you? A:         They forced me to remove my clothes, Sir.
A:         Yes, sir. Q:         In what way did they force you to remove your clothes?
Q:         What else did they ask you? A:         They were asking me to take off the pants which I was wearing at the time,
A:         They were asking me the project, Sir. Sir.
Q:         What else? Q:         Did they do anything to you to force you to remove your pants?
A:         That is the only thing, Sir. A:         Yes, Sir.

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Q:         What?
A:         They boxed me, Sir.
Q:         What else, if any?
A:         They hit me with a piece of wood, Sir.
Q:         What did you feel when your private part was burned with a cigarette butt?
A:         It was painful, Sir.
Q:         In what part of your body were you pricked by a needle?
A:         At my private part, Sir."
These bare assertions cannot be given weight. Accused-appellant testified that he
was made to stay in the municipal hall from 10:00 o'clock in the morning until 11:00
o'clock that night of July 10, 1999, during which time he was boxed, tortured, and
hit with a piece of wood by policemen to make him admit to the crime. However,
accused-appellant was physically examined by Dr. Antonio Vertido at about 9:00
o'clock in the evening of the same day. While the results show that accused-
appellant did sustain injuries, the same are incompatible with his claim of torture.
As Dr. Vertido testified:56
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:         What were your findings when you conducted the physical examination of
the suspect?
A:         I found abrasions, your Honor, abrasions on the thigh, knees, legs and feet of
the suspect, and I also found hematoma on the left ring finger, posterior aspect and
at the same time, a laceration on the left ring finger.
x x x           x x x           x x x
Q:         In your findings, it appears that the accused in this case suffered certain
physical injuries on his person like this abrasion on the thigh, right anterior lateral
aspect lower third of the knee, what could have caused this injury?
A:         Abrasions are usually caused when the skin comes in contact with a rough
surface, Sir. Hematoma are usually caused by a blunt instrument or object and
laceration is the forcible contact of the skin from that blunt object.
Q:         I am particularly interested in your findings hematoma on the left ring finger,
posterior aspect and laceration left ring finger posterior aspect, what could have
caused those injuries on the accused?
A:         My opinion to these hematoma and laceration found on the said left ring
finger was that it was caused by a bite, Sir."
If the account of accused-appellant that he was beaten up is true, Dr. Antonio
Vertido would have found more than mere abrasions and hematoma on his left
finger. Dr. Vertido's findings are more consistent with the theory that accused-
appellant sustained physical injuries as a result of the struggle made by the victim
during the commission of the rape in the "compuerta."
At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his assailed confessions are
inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already shown, is sufficient to establish
his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution witnesses presented a
mosaic of circumstances showing accused-appellant's guilt. Their testimonies rule
out the possibility that the crime was the handiwork of some other evil mind. These
witnesses have not been shown to have been motivated by ill will against accused-
appellant.
On the other hand, no other witness not related to accused-appellant was ever
called to corroborate his claim. The defense presented only accused-appellant's
sister, Aimee Vallejo, to corroborate his story. We have held time and again that
alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and
not by credible persons.57 It is well settled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses as
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. For this reason, this Court looks with
caution upon the defense of alibi, especially when, as in this case, it is corroborated
only by relatives or friends of the accused.58
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that "When by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death."59 Therefore, no other penalty can be imposed on accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Gerrico
Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of DEATH and directing him
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages, is hereby AFFIRMED.
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In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the
pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

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