JURISPRUDENCE

“In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal, we upheld the decision of the Court of
Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth
certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil
Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births. We ruled
therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera
and Hermogena Cariñosa, had the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the
entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another alleged child of the same spouses because she
is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.50

We likewise held therein that:

"x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close
reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes
that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other
words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child
of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all x x x.
''51

Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals52 that:

"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the
Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.

xxx           xxx           xxx

"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.
Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said
child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as
they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs
should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at
bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
 contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear
submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling
in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in
the impugned decision is apropos, viz:

'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of
the Family Code] is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action
to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is
an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's
child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is
not a legal heir of the deceased. "

—Marcelo Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001

“Although there are decided cases wherein the non–joinder of indispensable parties in
fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe
with the matter at hand. The better view is that non–joinder is not a ground to dismiss
the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded
on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non–joinder or
misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the
proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative.”
—Rebecca Pacana-Contreras vs. Rovila Water Supply G.R. No. 168979,
December 02, 2013

“It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a
special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108
is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates
the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by
the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make
orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss
the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.”
—The Republic of the Philippines vs. Virgie Tipay G.R. No. 209527,
February 14, 2018

 Failure to implead within the time given by the court will result in
dismissal
“It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the
door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching.”
—Republic of the Philippines vs. Dr. Lorna Lugsanay Uy, G.R. No. 198010
August 12, 2013

 Determination of simulated adoption

“Second, appellee’s birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing
as the informant, is highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente’s wife Isabel, who
was already 36 years old at the time of the child’s supposed birth, was truly the mother
of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not have
been born in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel’s
obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late
age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How
come, then, that as appearing in appellee’s birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly
born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or
even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in recent
times for people who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to
simply register the child as their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty.
Vicente O. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if
not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings by merely
putting himself and his wife as the parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or
perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did
not come around doing so either because he was too busy or for some other reason. But
definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of simulation of the
child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.”
— Marissa Benidez-Badua v. CA G.R. No. 105625. January 24, 1994

 Quantum of Proof: Preponderance of evidence

Rule 72, Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.
“Petitioners have argued that their evidence is of greater weight since private
respondents did not at all present any evidence, particularly, to prove the notarization of
the 1978 Deed and the genuineness of their parents' signatures thereon.

We are not convinced. Time and again, this Court has ruled that:

In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must
rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defense offered by their opponent. This rule holds true especially when the
latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a default order.
Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be granted can only be so
much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required
under Section 1 of Rule 133.

The same principle applies here where private respondents were considered to have
waived the presentation of their evidence at trial. "Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non
qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove." 104 "We have consistently
applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his
cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts on which he bases his claim,
the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense."

Thus, petitioners' evidence must stand on its own merit and must be scrutinized for
veracity and probative value. It is not rendered conclusive simply because it was not met
with evidence from the defense.”
—Rafael Almeda v. Heirs of Ponciano Almeda, G.R. No. 194189, September 14,
2017