Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism

Author(s): Jost Dulffer

Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No. 4, Special Issue: Theories of Fascism
(Oct., 1976), pp. 109-128
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260193
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Journal of Contemporary History, 11 (1976), 109-128

Bonapartism,Fascismand
National Socialism
Jost Dulffer

Bonapartism has frequently been cited in recent years as an explanatory

model for fascism. It does indeed seem to offer a means of relaxing
the inflexibility of a historical interpretation determined by a simple
class-struggle pattern. However, inherent in the application of this
concept, lies the danger of giving currency to a shallow slogan which
obscures more than it illuminates. At first sight, the use of a catchphrase
which has its sources in a specific historical situation and which is
then applied to fascism, may appear surprising. The concept of
Bonapartism derives, after all, from the family name of the two French
emperors, Napoleon I and Napoleon III. It was originally applied to
nineteenth century phenomena at a time when the industrial revolution
was taking place in France, whereas fascism is a twentieth century
phenomenon. If, therefore, Bonapartism is used, as it were, to describe
a timeless form of government, there is the danger of obtaining an
imprecise, undifferentiated model which embraces too much - and
at the same time too little.
The earliest and most fruitful model of Bonapartism stems from
the observations of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marx did not
however develop the theory of Bonapartism as such.1 But as a historian
he frequently dealt with contemporary political and social
developments in France, and made fundamental observations - in
themselves not always coherent - which served as points of departure
for a later systematization. With ironic precision Marx saw Napoleon
III's character as a much diminished copy of his great uncle, though
he also pointed out the parallels in their paths to power.
Marx's seminal essay, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
was written immediately after the coup d'etat of 2 December 1851
(the actual assumption of power of Louis Bonaparte) and describes
the inner logic of developments in France after the Revolution of

109
110 Journal of Contemporary History

February 1848. During the three years preceding the coup d'etat,
Marx observed a progressive self-exclusion of the social classes in
France in their battle for power. The proletariat, petit-bourgeois
democrats and big bourgeois Party of Order, one after the other,
put themselves hors de concours, until Louis Bonaparte finally
succeeded in his coup d'etat. The latter depended directly for support
on the Lumpenproletariat and on the mass of the apolitical
small-holding peasants. Under his rule the executive authority 'made
itself an independent power', 'all classes were equally powerless' and
France 'seems . . . to fall back beneath the despotism of an
individual . . .' Nevertheless, Bonaparte looked on himself, in Marx's
words, as 'the representative of the middle class and issues decrees
in this sense. But he is somebody solely due to the fact that he has
broken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks it
anew.'2
In the following years Marx did not supply any detailed analysis
of the political practice of Napoleon III in power, so that he can hardly
be considered a theorist of Bonapartism. However, in detailed
commentaries in newspaper articles and letters he followed the
continuing development of the Second Empire. After 1856 it had
initially seemed to him that the financial policy of the bank Credit
Mobilier, which was closely associated with Louis Napoleon, would
bring about the speedy end of his 'imperial socialism' through sheer
exploitation.3 Contrary to his expectations, however, the regime
survived the collapse of the bank. After the attempted assassination
of the Emperor in 1858, Marx again interpreted the severe wave of
repression as a sign of weakness and prophesied the collapse of
Bonapartism in the foreseeable future. The power of the state was
in his view supported only by the army as its instrument of repression.
This 'Rule of the Praetors' had already been hinted at in his earlier
diagnosis of an 'executive authority made independent' in 1852.
It now became a fundamental aspect of Marx's interpretations. Pure
rule by force was designed to overcome Bonaparte's difficulties and
would serve in a war as an external instrument of aggression. According
to Marx, Napoleon III was thus hoping to re-establish some sort of
minimal inner stability by successes abroad: 'War is the condition
under which he holds on to the throne.' Bonapartism became 'the
cause of periodical war'.4 Marx comes close here to an interpretation
which under the designation of 'social imperialism', has claimed
considerable attention in recent years in the study of German history.5
According to this concept, the diversion of internal difficulties
Dilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism 111

into foreign policy by various means is considered a conspicuous

feature of the Prussian monarchy and the German Empire. With respect
to social imperialism, the development of French 'imperial socialism'
into a pure military dictatorship under Napoleon III can be regarded
as an extreme special case. There seems little point in trying to derive
a broad concept of Bonapartism from this interpretation, especially
as Marx ignored the significant change in the character of Louis
Bonaparte's regime - from an authoritarian to a liberal empire.6
During the 1860s both Marx and Engels became increasingly
sceptical of the pacemaking role of French developments for the
international and proletarian revolution. We should not, therefore, be
surprised that in 1865, when Engels first adapted the concept of
Bonapartism to German conditions, he also attempted a new standard
definition:7

Bonapartismis the necessary form of governmentin a country in which

the working classes have reached an advancedstage of developmentin the
cities, but are outnumberedby the small peasantryand have been defeated
by the capitalist class, the petty bourgeoisie and the army in a great
revolutionarybattle.

The definition of the actual content of what constituted Bonapartism

was however left remarkably vague and was not taken any further
by Marx in 1871 in his Civil Warin France.8 He reiterated his previous
analysis in the Eighteenth Brumaire and took the Paris Commune
to be the complete antithesis of Bonapartism. As in Engels' definition,
Bonapartism was now endowed with the characteristic of being a
necessary stage of historical development as 'the only possible form
of government at a time when the bourgeoisie had already lost its
capacity to rule the nation and the working class had not yet acquired
that capacity.' Here too, situations were presented out of which
something was supposed to develop, not the analysis of what had
actually happened. This assessment of Marx and Engels which placed
Bonapartism at a certain stage of social and economic development
and of the class struggle, has become the subject of lively discussion
in recent years. H.-U. Wehler, in particular, attempted to expand
it into a comparative theory of European developments in the
nineteenth century.9 But it is more than questionable whether recent
intensive debates have made the prospects of a comprehensive theory
of Bonapartism seem any more tenable than in the past.10
The theory of Bonapartism first became an explanatory vehicle
in connection with fascism after the first world war. Though one
112 Journal of Contemporary History

can find elements of Marx's Bonapartist model in conservative and

liberal interpretations, it was essentially identified with the emerging
communist and socialist theory of fascism. For the Communist
International (Comintern) and consequently also for national
communist parties the tendency in the 1920s to make fascism and
capitalism synonymous became increasingly important. This view
reached its climax at the Sixth World Congress of the Executive
Committee of the Comintern in 1928.11 Fascism appeared as the
necessary form of bourgeois-capitalist rule and indeed as its last stage
in time. All states would therefore have to pass through this stage.
Social democracy, which was not prepared to wage the class war
with sufficient energy was deemed to have fascist tendencies. It was
to be fought just as intensely as were the fascists; indeed, it was viewed
as even more dangerous, since it vied with the Communist Party for
the favour of the working class. However, the Stalinization of the
communist line,12 which had a devastating effect on developments
in Germany and the assumption of power by the National Socialists,
did not remain unchallenged in the Communist Party and was the
cause of numerous splits.
August Thalheimer had been one of the leading theorists of the
German communists and of the Comintern. His different judgment
of fascism led in 1928 to his exclusion from orthodox communism.13
Since he continued to feel committed to Marx and still looked for
approval to his former colleagues, his use of the Bonapartist model
for the purpose must be regarded as a skilful move. The theory was
thereby endowed with the function of breaking up Stalinist orthodoxy
from within, in order to draw attention to the diversity of Marxist
thought in face of the acute political danger. In early 193014 in a
number of shorter contributions on fascism in the KPD opposition
journal, Gegen den Strom, he opposed an equation of Bonapartism
with fascism, but considered the particular class analysis in Marx's
interpretation of Bonapartism as significant. For example, in his Civil
Warin France (1871) Marx had written:

Imperialism is the most prostituted and at the same time the ultimate form
of the state power which nascent middle-class society had commenced to
elaborate as a means of its own emancipation from feudalism, and which
full-grown bourgeois society had transformed into a means for the
enslavement of labour by capital.

Precisely this interpretation of Bonapartism and thus also of fascism

as the 'ultimate' form of bourgeois state power might, if interpreted
Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism 113

literally, be considered an argument for the Comintern thesis, with

its theory of fixed phases.
Thalheimer accordingly corrected his model, pointing out that
Bonapartism in France was not followed by the proletarian revolution,
but by the 'bourgeois-parliamentary republic.' Since fascism also
represented 'the most prostituted and the ultimate form of the state
power', it seemed possible that, here too, it might not be regarded
simply as a direct precursor of the proletarian revolution. This would
depend on the stage of development of capitalism and bourgeois rule
in a given country.
In a concrete comparison, Thalheimer then cited examples of
Bonapartism and fascism. Of course, in 1930, only Italy could strike
him as fascist in the narrow sense; other than this, above all, Poland,
but also Bulgaria and Spain where, however, 'the nature of the class
structure is fundamentally different.' Thalheimer saw some
correspondence between the France of Louis Bonaparte and
contemporary Italy under Mussolini, as far as the method of taking
over power, the class structure, as well as the ideological aspect and
the personality of the leader were concerned. One cannot fail to
recognise an almost mechanistic method here. National differences
recede in spite of Thalheimer's efforts to the contrary.
Thalheimer dealt only briefly with German conditions although
they form the actual background to his theoretical analysis. As in
other parliamentary states, like England and France, developments
in Germany were moving 'in the direction of fascism.' This might
lead to 'forms of the open rule of capital', which again did not 'have
to be identical with fascism.'15 It was one of the chief aims of
Thalheimer's essay to prove that the political situation was, in principle,
open to various developments and therefore to different possibilities
of Communist Party action vis-a-vis fascism. Through his differentiated
representation of fascism, he hoped to canvass opinion to direct the
main force of the communists against the NSDAP.
Leon Trotsky, though with a similar purpose in mind, criticized
Thalheimer's conceptualizations on theoretical grounds. The latter
was looking at Bonapartism in isolation: but in just the same way
that the relationship of classes differed under Napoleon I and Napoleon
III in France, so 'Bonapartism' in Bismarck's Germany differed from
its predecessors. Trotsky's critique of Thalheimer contributed to
an inflation of the Bonapartist model by emphasizing that national
differences could give rise to entirely different phenomena.
Bonapartism becomes in his interpretation a warning-signal for the
114 Journal of Contemporary History

approach of fascism. As soon as this label has been applied to a political

system, the working class ought to be very much on the alert and to
prepare for revolutionary activity.
After Hitler came to power, it appeared to Trotsky that Bonapartism
had achieved 'its purest form' in the person of the last Chancellor
before Hitler, General von Schleicher.16 Trotsky now also designated
the regimes of other states as Bonapartist: Austria as early as 1933;
the French government of Doumergue in mid-1934; finally also the
regime of Marshal Petain in France, which he distinguished from
fascism itself as 'a senile form of Bonapartism.' Trotsky did not
conceptually deviate from earlier characterizations in his definition
of Bonapartism, namely, such characteristics included an antagonistic
position of two classes and a dictatorial regime. In mid-1933 he said:
'It now makes sense to speak of a fundamental legitimacy of the
"Bonapartist" transition period between parliamentarianism and
fascism.17 By the time of his last article in 1940, Trotsky had
abandoned his confidence in the outcome of this transition.18 He
now distinguished qualitatively between the Bonapartism of bourgeois
ascendancy, probably belonging to the nineteenth century, and the
present Bonapartism of the 'imperialist decline.'
A third writer, influenced by communism, who wrote about the
relationship between Bonapartism and fascism was Franz Borkenau,
a former official of the Comintern, who had cut loose from his origins.
His essay, 'The Sociology of Fascism',19 appeared at the time of
Hitler's accession to power. His most significant idea was that the
struggle of the working-class could be reactionary if it were fighting
against a little developed capitalistic evolution. Borkenau criticized
Thalheimer for believing, like the members of the KPD, to whom
they were both opposed, in too rapid a victory of the proletariat.
He admitted that the fascist party in Italy had made itself independent
and that it was supported by the petite-bourgeoisie, but objected
that 'the analogy between Mussolini and Napoleon III is open to
numerous objections.' On the other hand he emphasized that the
correspondence between (Italian) fascism and the 'first Bonapartism'
is 'unambiguous'. In this category he included William of Orange,
Cromwell, Bismarck, as well as contemporary Japan, Kemal Ataturk
and Chiang Kai-shek. These counted as 'revolutionary dictators' in
a line of development which could scarcely be distinguished from
fascism. Borkenau thereby interpreted fascism primarily as a
developmental dictatorship and in relation to this considered the role
of a 'Caesar' as unimportant: 'True fascism is a transitional
Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism 115

condition . . . like any dictatorship for the creation of industrial

capitalism.'20 Hence, Borkenau anticipated some aspects of the
present-day discussions of modernization. But he did not include
German National Socialism, whose rise to power he failed to anticipate,
although, by the time of the publication of his essay, it had already
been achieved.

It is not difficult to explain the fact that the Bonapartist model of

fascism has been much less intensively discussed in the 'bourgeois'
or pro-fascist camp, since both the Napoleonic regimes failed, making
it easy to draw analagous conclusions for fascist systems, however
different they might individually be. A second factor was that
references to the tradition of the 'hereditary enemy' (France) were
not exactly popular in inter-war Germany, as a result of the Versailles
treaty. There were, therefore, only isolated references to France in
Nazi publications, and.parallels between Napoleon and Hitler were in
general studiously avoided.21 Nevertheless, in 1928, the Berlin
historian, Peter R. Rohden, investigated 'fascist motives in the French
state ethos'22 and discovered a line of tradition which leads from
the Jacobins of the French revolution 'through the plebiscitarian
caesarism of Bonaparte', from the ' "Ultras" of the Restoration period
to the Patriotic League of Deroulede.' Ulrich Noack, on the other
hand, rejected the idea of Caesarism in the Second Empire, since
'it lacked an ideological foundation' though he left it open as to
whether the National Socialist regime contrasted positively with this.23
Only Wolfgang Windelband, in a sketch, 'The Historical Figure of
Napoleon III' (1936) adopted 'a method of writing history which
viewed the past under the aegis of certain historical events which
stand in the foreground today.'24 Without drawing any specific
parallels to Hitler, it was clear from Windelband's assessment that he
regarded Napoleon III as a 'leader personality', (Fuhrerpersonlichkeit),
both in the realm of domestic and in foreign policy. Positive
characteristics of the Second Empire are described in such a way
as to be direct allusions to the Third Reich.
In 1938, in the monthly journal, Die Tat, whose circle had been
the chief support of von Schleicher but which had subsequently
adapted itself to the Nazi regime, an article by Karl Heinz Bremer
appeared, entitled 'The Socialist Emperor'.25 This expert on Western
Europe, who belonged to the younger generation, confirmed, like
Windelband, Napoleon III's failure; nevertheless he took him to be
'the leading mind of his century.' The crux of the matter for Bremer
116 Journal of Contemporary History

was Napoleon's attempt to realize 'socialism and the principle of

nationalities.' He had 'established an authoritarian and total
dictatorship of the people's emperor' as the appropriate form of state,
which alone had the capacity to 'bridge the class interests and hitherto
existing party-political ideas.' Bremer did not establish a direct link
with the National Socialist regime, but, in view of his choice of words,
the parallels lay exposed for any reader to see. Thanks, however,
to the author's prudent style of expressing himself, it remains an
open question whether the causes cited by him which contributed
to Napoleon II's failure, also contained a hidden admonition to Hitler
to avoid similar mistakes. According to Bremer, the Emperor would
have had to take to heart Proudhon's warning against an 'opportunistic
coalition with the capitalist forces and the church'; however, he did
not have

the courageto strike out in a new direction in accordancewith his historical

principles,but wanted first to supportthe new dynasty with the 'old' pillars,
with the liberal bourgeoisie and the reactionarychurch. He believed there
was greatersecurityto be found herethanin the creativeVolk.Hewasmistaken
in this.

If this was indeed an indirect criticism of the Nazi regime, then

Bremer's assessment was a notable conservative attempt to remind
Hitler of his social promises and of domestic political instability,
as well as to warn him not to seek a solution through the 'social
imperialistic' export of tensions by means of war.26
For the Nazi self-image the problem of parallels with 'Bonapartism'
was still more evident. The historian Walter Frank, who in 1935 took
over the Reichsinstitut fur Geschichte des neuen Deutscblands, ventured
round the periphery of this sort of discussion while he was preparing
his major study on questions of the Third Republic in France.27
At the same time, he was working as a journalist for the NSDAP.
In 1931, in the polemical paper, Der Angriff, he had sharply rejected
the parallel suggested by the Jewish journalist, Bruno Weil, between
Hitler and the French General Boulanger, whose plebiscitarian position
placed him in the Napoleonic tradition.28
With the onset of German military expansion from 1939 onwards,
the idea of territorial acquisition and the formation of a new Empire
gained ground in the ideological self-image of Nazism. Nevertheless,
as already mentioned, comparisons with the efforts of Napoleon I
were risky. But precisely because the parallels between the war waged
against Russia by Napoleon in 1812 and by Germany in 1941 were so
Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism 117

obvious, they were made in the press. In the leading political and
cultural weekly, Das Reich, Eugen Miindler on 12.7.41 celebrated
the 'Campaign without Parallel'.29 Anticipating a certain military
victory, he considered all the mistakes and weaknesses of Napoleon's
campaign of 1812 as having been overcome, although he gave
predominantly military reasons for this. He did not, however, consider
either the political system or the personality of the two dictators.
Hitler also made a remark at this time to the effect that not he
but Stalin would suffer Napoleon's fate. After the failure of the
German Blitzkrieg plan outside Moscow in 1941, he found it
necessary to emphasize in public speeches the invalidity of any parallel
between the historical situations of 1812 and 1942: 'We have mastered
the fate which broke another man 130 years ago.'30 Hitler accepted
the parallel with Napoleon I's personality in so far as it was a question
of a 'unique military genius', who was in a position to achieve 'world-
historical victories', but saw the reason for the latter's failure in the
petit-bourgeois tendencies (Spiessertum) of most Frenchmen.
Hitler was probably familiar with the popular psychological level
of interpretation through a book by the NSDAP Reichsleiter, Philipp
Bouhler, Napoleon - Kometenbahn eines Genies, on which he had
shortly beforehand commented favourably.31 This work, surprising
in its choice of theme for a leading member of the party, was later
withdrawn from circulation in order to avoid any embarassing
comparisons between the defeats of Napoleon I and Hitler. Bouhler
had sought to understand Napoleon from the point of view of the
victories of the present; he endowed him, as well as Hitler, with the
halo of genius in accordance with the slogan: 'All great deeds are
the achievement of one individual', whose greatness manifested itself
in a fusion of comprehensive capacities uniting diverse vocations.
The differences between the history of the development of the
Napoleonic Empire and of the National Socialist Reich seemed to
him to be rather peripheral. In the end, he did discover a structural
difference between the 'iron foundation' of National Socialism and
Napoleon's regime in the fact that now provision had been made
for 'the unconditional execution of the commands of a leader, for
the penetration of his will to the very last cells.'32 This ideological
postulate which had little to do with social and political reality became
the ultimate criterion.
Heinrich Berl's attempt to combine 'political biography' and the
'historical novel' in the person of Napoleon III forms a counterpart
to Bouhler's biography of Napoleon I.33 Written during the second
118 Journal of Contemporary History

world war by a writer excluded from the official authors' union,

the book was intended to be a 'settling of accounts' with Hitler from
'the democratic point of view.' Berl juxtaposed a number of structural
resemblances with the similarity of personality of the two dictators:
'Bonapartism is dictatorship as an end in itself.' Plebiscitarian approval,
censorship, centralism, finance capitalism, the terror of the state as
well as the appeal to workers and peasants along with the simultaneous
extension of the army as an instrument of power are among his topics.
They appear side by side without connection and then added to them
are the teleological considerations of war and defeat. The differences
were of 'degree rather than method.' Although it was rather out of
context, Berl also dealt with the relationship between Bonapartism
and capitalism. 'Louis Napoleon' - and thus Hitler too - 'leaves
the facade of capitalism intact but its foundations are being
undermined . . . until a strong blast from outside will make the scenery
collapse.' Because its attack was indirect, Bonapartism - and National
Socialism too - was more successful than communism: 'It was a kind
of state communism with capitalist means.' Berl was approaching a
conservative interpretation of fascism, which, on the scale from
capitalism to communism, placed Nazi rule in the proximity of the
latter, and which brought into the foreground the revolutionary
features of the 'movement.'34
Like other interpretations of fascism and National Socialism
discussed in this section, Berl's views contrast sharply with the
socialist-communist model of Bonapartism indebted to Marx. Social
and economic factors as well as political events are overshadowed
by ideological and national considerations and by the significance
of the transcendent historical personality or genius.

After the second world war a connection with the structurally based
interpretation of Bonapartism became improbable for the time being,
since there were new factors, i.e. the politics of expansion and the
genocidal activities of the National Socialists, which invalidated
previous criteria. To regard fascism from the perspective of a nineteenth
century phenomenon and make comparisons with the history of
another state, meant rendering it comparatively harmless. Gerhard
Ritter, to support his view that Hitler was a revolutionary, had created
an ancestry for him which included Napoleon I but it was not until
1960 that another historian, Gustav Adolf Rein, made a direct
structural comparison of Bonapartism and fascism:35 'Just as
Bonapartism belongs to the first phase of the bourgeois-liberal
Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism 119

revolution, so fascism is connected with the second phase, the

proletarian-social revolution.' Both forms of rule are an expression
of the counter-revolution, i.e. 'they destroy the (jacobin or socialist)
revolution, while they allow their (own brand of) revolution to
triumph.' Until quite recently Rein did not adopt a differentiation
of content out of this general dictum about laws of social development;
he then indicated certain national peculiarities and saw a common
factor in the irrationality of the cult of the personality.36 Rein's
original interpretation of fascism was taken further by Ernst Nolte,
but he did not include Bonapartism among his philosophical
categories.37
Reference to Marx's criteria continues to be essential for any
interpretation made by historians in the GDR. But the direct use
of the 'Bonapartist' model is nevertheless impossible since the
Comintern theory of the inter-war years still has validity as a guideline,
according to which fascism is to be regarded as the agent of monopoly
capitalism. In 1956 Ernst Engelberg did attempt to make the
Bonapartist interpretation fruitful for a study of Bismarckian Germany
and was able to refer to Marx and Engels in this context, though
he avoided any reference to National Socialism.38 Right up to the
present time, interpretations of fascism in the GDR sometimes concede
empirically, as does Dietrich Eichholtz,the scope of action of 'fascist'
leaders, but finally retreat behind the cover of the 'agent' theory.
In West Germany, however, a number of writers, generally inclining
more towards a Marxist interpretation, felt themselves drawn back
to Bonapartism. Karl Heinz Tjaden and Riidiger Griepenburg revived
the debate about Thalheimer's model of fascism towards the end of
1966. In the following year, his 1930 text was reprinted for the first
time.39 In narrowing down Marx's assessment as well as Thalheimer's
interpretation, they brought out three central categories: firstly,
the concept of 'the apparent yet existing independence of the state
executive power in relation to social strata and classes; secondly,
the principle of the gradual form of the process' of transformation;
and finally, the assumption that 'the structural change . . . was a
function of a shift in the balance of forces among the classes in
bourgeois society.'
They expressly underlined that Thalheimer had given the best
prognosis for actual developments but at the same time they criticized
his assessment. They reproached him for not having 'made a
theoretically convincing connection' concerning the constants of
class relationships between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and,
120 Journal of Contemporary History

on the other hand, between the 'variable characteristics', according

to which the structure and function of public powers change. Where
Marx had given a provisional analysis without any theoretical
pretensions, Thalheimer was simply transferring his categories to a
different era. This, no doubt, justified criticism of every scholastic
Marxist interpretation of later historical phenomena might have
resulted in the abandonment of this theory or else in the effort to
achieve a more far-reaching compartmentalization both in theory
and practice. Numerous writers influenced by Marx attempted the
latter in recent years.
It must be stressed that only a part of the discussion of the
relationship between economic and political factors in fascism
developed with the aid of the 'Bonapartist' thesis. This discussion,
opened by Tim Mason in one of the most widely quoted essays of
the past decade about the primacy of politics over economics,40
took the independence of political decisions as its point of departure
and thus touched on Thalheimer's theory of Bonapartism without
using the concept.41 Since then, in numerous essays of the
non-orthodox left, the Bonapartist model, or at least the inclusion
of Bonapartist features as characteristic of fascism, has been widely
used. Sometimes only the independence of the executive is meant,
sometimes the difference between social basis and social function.
Since the social basis of fascism can be easily discovered by research
into elections, the stress on an 'objective' social function within the
framework of a capitalist society offers a favourable opportunity
to make the empirical situation coincide with the a priori assumptions
about bourgeois class rule.
Thus the theory of Bonapartism42 fulfils for a second time, as it had
already done in 1930, the function of overcoming and refining an official
interpretation of Marx with a claim to be binding, through a more flexible
assessment. The part once played by the Comintern line and that of the
KPD is now played by historiography in the GDR and by a few less
important offshoots in West Germany. In this regard it is no longer only a
question of the relationship between economics and politics but also a
question of achieving a comprehensive theory of fascism. This attempt is
chiefly motivated by the idea of obtaining a working model which will
provide criteria of orientation for the present, if not preclude the possi-
bility of a new trend towards fascism. What is being sought are cha-
racteristics which either by themselves or in specific connections will
make possible the identification of fascism; or, beyond this, which make
possible the recognition of trends towards fascism at an embryonic state,
Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism 121

whose further development could be prevented by counter-strategies.

Since capitalism and fascism are usually closely juxtaposed here,
there is evidence that the concept is being expanded into a political
battle-cry. The centre of gravity of the investigation tends usually
to focus on the process of 'fascist' seizure of power - and in this
respect coincides with Marx's interpretation of Bonapartism. Fascism
in power is, on the other hand, regarded as a largely unchanging
phenomenon. Axel Kuhn's contribution leans the most heavily on the
model of Bonapartism.43 According to him, the four crucial points
of this 'theory of counter-revolution in bourgeois society' concern
statements about the origin, social basis, class structure and foreign
policy of fascism. It is particularly to the credit of the author that
he has shown foreign policy to be part of the area of an 'independent
executive.' But, above all, his theory of fascism has taken from the
model of Bonapartism, its distinction between 'social basis' and 'social
function.' With this formula he solves the (apparent) contradiction
between the part played by electoral decisions and mass support in
the success of fascism and assumptions about its constant 'class
character', and the 'economic dominion of the bourgeoisie'. In other
words, fascism is interpreted as the coming together of a middle-class
mass movement and the big bourgeoisie to reinforce the monopoly
capitalist system through the forcible exclusion of workers'
organisations.

The model of Bonapartism has above all been fruitful for the
elucidation of the rise of power of fascism. However, 'fascism' only
rose to power in a few states. An analysis of the fascist movements
solely in the light of the theory of Bonapartism is not enough, even
if it reflects some important features. It might be thought that the
fascist movements resemble 'the Society of the 10th December', the
declasse Lumpenproletariat,the petty bourgeoisie and the small-holding
peasants as described in Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire. But research
to date into different fascist groupings has shown that Marx's
interpretation is hardly adequate and that its 'functional equivalents'
cast little light on the typology of fascist movements.44 But though
research in the direction of a comparative social history of fascist
movements has gone beyond the theory of Bonapartism, this is not
true of the other elucidatory factors of the model: the most neutral
way of restating them would be the postulation of a comparative
social history of all states which have been brought into contact with
fascism. There have been few attempts to do this for the important
122 Journal of Contemporary History

period between the late twenties and early forties of this century.
Attempts to co-ordinate research for the preceding period under
the headings 'Organised Capitalism' (Jurgen Kocka and others) or
'Corporatism' (Charles Maier),45 have exposed its limitations. The
formulated abstract concept either evaporates when applied to
particular societies or itself remains vague; the investigation, however,
produces numerous new isolated results.
A comparative social history of states with fascist movements
would have to deal with the different characteristics of social classes
in a comparative way. It would have to bring out the different role
of those groups which today are considered as the threatened middle
and lower classes. In particular, their relationship to fascist movements
seems important. Furthermore, such a history would have to
differentiate more forcibly between agrarian/traditional and
predominantly industrial regions, and to include, in relation to this,
the different social origins, homogeneity and aims of the
non-capitalistically orientated upper classes. Long-standing traditions
and structures of political behaviour would also require independent
if not greater attention in assessing the effective possibilities of fascism.
While the investigation of fascist movements may produce a wider
framework, a narrower theoretical structure would have to be
conceived for those states in which fascism actually came to power.
Only the Italian and German examples are ones that would fall
unambiguously within this category. How far Spain, Portugal, Poland,
Bulgaria, Turkey or Japan could be included in the period between
the two world wars has been, and still is, a matter for disagreement
as it was for earlier writers. This applies also to the inflated use of the
term fascism for post-1945 phenomena, especially in Soviet communist
historiography. Equally problematical, on account of war-time
conditions, is the extension of the concept to the dictatorial regimes
of west and especially east and south-east Europe, that came into
existence with the extension of German power during the war.
Moreover, a more detailed consideration of the increased part played
by physical and psychological terror, as well as bureaucratisation in
relation to the Marxist concept, would become necessary before clearer
criteria could be established about the fascist character of different
political systems.
But even for the German and Italian models, the use of the same
concept of fascism seems to obscure distinctive features of government
in its actual exercise of power; only National Socialism was in a
position to unleash an ever-increasing war. Italian fascism found itself,
Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism 123

at this stage of development, entirely dependent on German power.

Equally, only the National Socialist regime was so inflexibly directed
towards the alternatives of world domination or defeat that the collapse
of the state was the inevitable consequence, once victory was out
of the question. Furthermore, only Nazi Germany carried out
extermination policies in occupied European states and had millions
of Jews murdered.
Even if these phenomena could at a pinch be regarded simply as
an escalation of 'normal' fascism, the goals of National Socialism
can hardly be grasped by comparative categories and it thus appears
as a unique phenomenon.46 World domination based on racial
discrimination, the breeding of a new type of man and the apocalyptic
suspension of the traditional historical process are characteristic of
this. Although its utopian character is obvious, the actual policies
of National Socialism derived in their basic decisions and measures
from such goals. This differing Telos, with its concrete effect on
millions of lives as a result of the second world war and genocide,
makes National Socialism qualitatively different in its substance from
Italian fascism.
In using the model of Bonapartism in relation to National Socialism,
one would therefore have to supplement it by reference to aspects
of governmental practice. For the social history of the 'Third Reich'
(as of other fascist regimes), Marxist theory points above all to the
investigation of the role played by industrial elites. The following
distinctions might be made: if the big bourgeoisie is not too rigidly
conceived within a schema of homogeneous class activity, then,above
all in the first phase of Nazi rule until 1936, one can perceive a
far-reaching satisfaction of influential industrial groups with general
political developments, since their interests were well served by the
suppression of the whole of the 'left' political spectrum. After this
period of partial fascism (Arthur Schweitzer) one can observe a
limitation of power not only in politics but also in the economic
sphere. The war policy did lead to a wide expansion of activity for
individual enterprises like IG Farben and Krupp; but seen as a whole,
industry had to adapt to the existing political orientation as well
as occasionally to long-term policies which ran counter to profits
(for instance in export). In the third phase, under Albert Speer
(194244), it partly won back its freedom to make decisions, but
the establishing of general aims within the framework of war
production remained outside its power as before. In other words, the
surrender of political power by industry, implicit in the theory of
124 Journal of Contemporary History

Bonapartism, has to be differentiated in time. The maintenance of

social power, the destruction of the 'organized working class', although
it must be recognized as one of the basic facts of the Nazi system,
needs modification, bearing in mind the limited tightening up of
working conditions, achieved by Nazi organizations like 'German
Workers' Front', which correspond to the expediency of social
stabilization.4 7
The political power of the independent executive does not appear
moreover to be valid only for the transition period of the rise to power,
as in the original theory of Bonapartism but - and here is a very
-
important divergence from the history of the Second Empire it seems
to have extended further and further. The 'Bonapartist' executive
power may perhaps have lost some of the active support of the middle
classes in the course of its rule, but through the variety of its specific
National Socialist institutions - from Gauleiters to the SS - it was
able to build up an alternative state apparatus and, by means of terror,
to compensate for a lack of mass enthusiasm. The individual
constituents of the 'dual state' (E. Fraenkel) were by no means based
on a monolithic structure, but were marked by confusion over
competence and authority, which even Hitler as a 'Bonaparte' could
not and would not get rid of. But these constituents of power can
hardly be formulated as class categories. Hitler's support by the
Wehrmacht, unlike the part played by the SA before 1934, cannot
be interpreted in the sense of a Prdtorianerregiment - this instrument
of power from the beginning served predominantly for external
demonstrations of power and aggression. It might most easily be
subsumed under the category of the old ruling strata who had been
robbed of their political power.
Most surprising and most difficult to account for in terms of social
history is the extraordinary part which Hitler played in the key points
of the system and how it fitted in with the aims set by him. Though
he was also influenced by social imperatives in his armaments and
war policy, his unswerving tenacity in the service of an historical
utopia went far beyond this. Although he was always able to extend
his position of power with the partial consent of the old power elites
and never altogether lost this support, his gamble for world domination
or downfall was not in their interest. The theory of Bonapartism
can do little to explain the paralysis of the old power centres during
the course of the Third Reich in favour of bureaucratic and terrorist
National Socialist elites, which were in turn opposed to each other.
On the other hand, the historical analysis of Marx in the Eighteenth
Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism 125

Brumaire is a useful pointer as to how Hitler, partly through brutality

and also through patience and the seizing of favourable opportunities,
knew how to influence internal policies on a long term basis. By skilful
tactics he was able to evade all concerted efforts against him and
translate his efforts to achieve political supremacy of a new apocalyptic
kind, into a grim reality inextricably bound up with genocide and
world war.

NOTES

1. M. Rubel, Karl Marx devant le Bonapartisme (Paris 1960), 149 f. The

author would like to thank K. Hildebrand, A. Hillgruber, K. J. Miiller, E. Vollrath
and G. Wollstein for their stimulating criticisms of his first draft.
2. Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 8 (Berlin 1972), 192, 196, 204.
3. Rubel, op. cit., 31-36. Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 12, 20 ff, 31 ff, 202 ff.
4. Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 13, 447 ff; W. Wette, Kriegstheorien deutscber
Sozialisten (Stuttgart 1971), 44 ff.
5. Above all in the works of H.-U. Wehler, especially Bismarck und der
Imperialismus (Cologne 1969).
6. T. Zeldin, The political system of Napoleon III (Oxford 1958), also
his Ambition, Love and Politics, France 1848-1945 (Oxford 1973), 504-69.
M. Blanchard, Le Second Empire (Paris 1950).
7. 'Die preussische Militarfrage und die deutsche Arbeiterpartei',
Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 16, 71.
8. 'Der Biirgerkrieg in Frankreich', Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 17, 313-65,
especially 337 f.
9. Wehler, Bismarck, op. cit. See also his Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs
1871-1914 (Gottingen 1970), 12 ff.; M. Stiirmer, Regierung und Reichstag im
Bismarckreich 1871-1880. Casarismus oder Parlamentarismus (Diisseldorf 1974).
10. Conference in Cologne on the 65th birthday of Th. Schieder, 12.4.1973
(unpublished contributions by Wehler, E. Fehrenbach, W. J. Mommsen, H.-J.
Steinberg).
11. A. Kuhn, Das faschistische Herrscbaftssystem und die modeme
Gesellschaft (Hamburg 1973), 31 ff.
12. H. Weber, Die Wandlungen des deutschen Kommunismus. Die
Stalinisierung der KPD in der WeimarerRepublik (Frankfurt a.M. 1969).
13. K. H. Tjaden, Struktur und Funktion der KPD (0). Eine
organisationssoziologische Untersuchung des 'Rechtskommunismus' in der
126 Journal of Contemporary History

WeimarerRepublik (Meisenheim 1964).

14. Reprinted in W. Abendroth, ed., Faschismus und Kapitalismus. Theorien
uber die sozialen Ursprunge und die Funktion des Faschismus (Frankfurt a.M.,
Vienna 1967), 19-38, abridged; R. Kuhnl, ed., Texte zur Faschismusdiskussion,
I (Reinbek 1974), 14-29 abridged; Der Fascbismus in Deutschland. Analysen
der KPD-Opposition aus den Jahren 1928-1933, edited by the Arbeiterpolitik
group (Frankfurt a.M. 1973), 28-46 (complete, quoted as follows).
15. Ibid., 29, 34, 36, 43, 45. Passages from Diilffer's discussion of
Thalheimer and Trotsky have been cut here to avoid overlapping with the
contributions by Robert Wistrich and Wolfgang Wippermann (ed.).
16. L. Trotzki, Schriften uber Deutschland (Frankfurt a.M. 1971), 439
(Gesammelte Werke, I).
17. Ibid., 568.
18. Ibid., 732.
19. Originally published in Archiv fur Sozialwissenscbaften und Sozialpolitik
(February 1933). Quoted from E. Nolte, Theorien uber den Faschismus (Cologne
1970), 156-81. Another theory influenced by the concept of Bonapartism was
developed by Otto Bauer and is the subject of a separate article by Gerhard
Botz. See also Richard Saage, Faschismustheorien. Eine Einfuhrung (Munich
1976).
20. Ibid., (Nolte), 158, 165, 166 f., 178.
21. This is evident from a cursory review of the 'Nationalsozialistischen
Bibliographie' 1 (1936) ff. and the holdings of 'NS-Drucksachen' in the
Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
22. P. R. Rohden, 'Faschistische Motive im franzosischen Staatsethos'
in C. Landauer and H. Honegger, eds., Internationaler Faschismus (Karlsruhe
1928), 94-110. Rohden discussed in Aufstieg und Niedergang der franzosischen
Republik (Berlin 1940), 72 ff. the ambiguous 'Modernitat' of Napoleon III
without any topical references. J. Hartmann, Die Wirtschaftspolitik Napoleons
III, Diss. (Berlin 1938).
23. In a review in Historische Zeitschrift 161 (1939-40), 144 ff.
24. In Deutsche Rundschau, 248 (1936), 97-103.
25. In Die Tat. Deutsche Monatschrift, 30 (1938), 160-71; compare K.
Sontheimer, 'Der Tatkreis', Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, VII (1959),
229-60; H. Hecker, 'Die Tat' und ihr Osteuropabild 1909-1949 (Cologne 1974).
26. The temptations of such a course are made clear in Tim Mason,
Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft (Opladen 1975).
27. H. Heiber, Walter Frank und sein Reichsinstitut fur Geschichte des
neuen Deutschlands (Stuttgart 1966). See also Historische Zeitschrift, 153 (1936),
6-23.
28. W. Frank, 'Hitler-Boulanger?' in Der Angriff, 23 November 1931; See
also his article under the pseudonym, Werner Fiedler, 'Um Napoleon' in
Deutsches Volkstum XIII (1931), 432 ff.
29. E. Miindler, 'Feldzug ohne Beispiel' in Das Reich, II (1941), No. 28,
12 July 1941, 6 f.
30. Hitler to the Japanese ambassador, Oshima, 14 July 1941, in A.
Hillgruber, ed. Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei Hitler (Frankfurt a.M. 1970),
Vol. 2: 1942-44; cf. Hitler to Kvaternik, 21 July 1941, ibid., 552; Reichstag
speech of 26 April 1942, in M. Domarus, Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen
Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism 127

1932-1945 (Munich 1965). Also H. Picker, Hitlers Tischgesprdche, edited by

P. E. Schramm, A. Hillgruber, M. Vogt (Frankfurt a.M. 1965), No. 136, 29 May
1942. A. Speer, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt a.M. 1969), 187,378 and Spandauer
Tagebuch (Frankfurt a.M. 1975), 86, 100, 258 - mentions that Hitler also
compared himself with Napoleon, especially with respect to his plans for global
domination.
31. Picker, op. cit., 23 March 1942.
32. Ibid., 319, 320, 332 f., 402 f.
33. H. Berl, Napoleon III. Demokratie und Diktatur (Munich n.d.) (1946),
11, 14; quotations 7 f., 234.
34. Cf. Kuhn, op. cit. Note 11, 17 ff.
35. G. A. Rein, Bonapartismus und Faschismus in der deutschen Geschichte
(Gottingen 1960). See also his book Der Deutsche und die Politik. Betrachtungen
zur deutschen Geschichte von der Reichsgrundung bis zum Reicbsuntergang
1848-1945 (Gottingen 1974).
36. Rein, Bonapartismus, ibid., 1, 7, 24; Der Deutsche, ibid., 559, 447,
544, 615.
37. E. Nolte, DerFascbismus in seinerEpoche (Munich 1963).
38. E. Engelberg, 'Zur Entstehung und historischen Stellung des preussisch-
deutschen Bonapartismus' in Beitrage zum neuen Gescbichtsbild, Festschrift
f.A. Meusel (Berlin (East) 1956), 236-51. The GDR editions of Marx and Engels'
works refer of course to the significance of the '18th Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte' but avoid discussion ot specific traits in the Marxian interpretation
of Bonapartism, Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 8, 617 f. See, however, 'Kollquium zum
preussich- deutschen Bonapartismus' in Zeitschrift fiir Geschichts wissenschaft
XXIV (1976) 713 f.
39. R. Griepenburg and K. H. Tjaden, 'Faschismus und Bonapartismus'
in Das Argument, VIII (1966), 461-72, especially 463, 471 ff., Faschismus und
Kapitalismus, op. cit. (See Note 14).
40. T. Mason, 'Der Primat der Politik - Politik und Wirtschaft' in Das
Argument, VIII (1966), 473-94; see the adjacent discussion, ibid., 10 (1968)
(contributions from Czichon, Mason, Eichholtz/Gossweiler).
41. E. Hennig, 'Industrie, Aufriistung und Kreigsvorbereitung im deutschen
Faschismus. Anmerkungen zum Stand der neuen Faschismus diskussion' in F.
Forstmeier and H. E. Volkmann, Wirtschaft und Rustung am Vorabend des
Zweiten Weltkrieges (Diisseldorf 1974), 388-415, especially 405.
42. Without entering into details see the compilation by R. Kiihnl (Note
14), especially the controversy between G. Schafer and R. Opitz. Also H. C. F.
Mansilla, Faschismus und eindimensionale Gesellschaft (;icuwied 1971). J.
Schissler, 'Faschismus und Bonapartismus' in Neue Politische Literatur, XX
(1975), 23641. (Attempt at a synthesis of Trotsky and Thalheimer).
43. Kuhn (Note 11), 102, 104, 117 f.
44. See E. Nolte, Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischen
Bewegungen (Munich 1968); Journal of Contemporary History, I (1966), No.1;
F. L. Carsten, Der Aufstieg des Faschismus in Europa (Frankfurt a.M. 1968);
S. J. Woolf, ed., European Fascism (London 1968).
45. H. A. Winkler, ed., Organisierter Kapitalismus (Gottingen 1974); C. S.
Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe (Princeton 1975).
46. K. Hildebrand, 'Weltmacht oder Untergang: Hitlers Deutschland
128 Journal of Contemporary History

1941-1945' in Weltpolitik 1939-1945, edited by O. Hauser (Gottingen 1975),

286-322, especially 319 ff.; A. Hillgruber, 'Die"Endl6sung"und das deutsche
Ostimperium als Kernstick des rassenideologischen Programms des
Nationalsozialismus' in Vierteljahrshefte fir Zeitgeschichte, XX (1972), 133-53.
Also J. Thies, Architektur der Weltherrschaft. Die 'Endziele' Hitlers (Disseldorf
1976).
47. Mason, op. cit.

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