Puerto Thesis Draft 3

You Can’t Fire Me.
It’s not on the List: Dispensing with the
Restriction Brought About By Department Order No. 147-15
Series of 2015 on the Causes Analogous to the Just Causes of
Employee Termination
DRAFT 3
Khenett Ramirez Puerto

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................0
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................1
Background of the Study..............................................................................................................1
Thesis Statement..........................................................................................................................9
Definition of Terms......................................................................................................................9
Objectives of the Study..............................................................................................................10
Significance of the Study...........................................................................................................11
Scope and Limitation.................................................................................................................13
Organization of the Thesis.........................................................................................................14
Research Methodology..............................................................................................................16
CHAPTER II - BALANCING OF INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER..............19
Rights of the Employee..............................................................................................................20
a. Right to a Decent Work...................................................................................................21
b. Right to Economic and Social Development...................................................................22
c. Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination.....................................................................23
d. Right to Privacy..............................................................................................................24
e. Right to Security of Tenure.............................................................................................24
Rights of the Employer..............................................................................................................29
a. Right to Manage..............................................................................................................30
b. Right to Transfer Employees...........................................................................................31
c. Right to Discipline..........................................................................................................31
d. Right to Dismiss..............................................................................................................32
CHAPTER III - JUST CAUSE OF TERMINATION...................................................................36
a. Serious Misconduct............................................................................................................37
b. Willful Disobedience or Insubordination...........................................................................39
c. Gross and Habitual Neglect................................................................................................40
d. Fraud and Wilful Breach of Trust and Loss of Confidence................................................41
e. Commission of a Crime or Offense....................................................................................43
CHAPTER IV - ANALOGOUS CAUSES...................................................................................46
When is a cause an Analogous Cause?......................................................................................47
What are Analogous Causes as Decided by the Supreme Court?..............................................48
a. Gross Inefficiency/Incompetence....................................................................................48
b. Crimes Committed Against Co-Employee.......................................................................53
c. Employee Banned by Employer’s Client.........................................................................56
d. Attitude Problems, Unreasonable Behaviour and Unpleasant Deportment...................59
e. Violation of Safety Requirements....................................................................................63
f. Violation of Code of Conduct..........................................................................................65
The List of Analogous Causes for Termination is Non-Exhaustive..........................................67
CHAPTER V - CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF SECTION 5.2 (g) OF DEPARTMENT
ORDER NO. 147-15, IN REQUIRING THE ENUMERATION OF ANALOGOUS CAUSES IN
THE COMPANY POLICY...........................................................................................................71
a. The last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order runs counter to the
jurisprudence on Analogous Causes as a “catch-all” provision..............................................76
b. The last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order negates the non-
exhaustive nature of the Just Causes of termination..................................................................78
c. The last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order is ultra vires to the Labor
Code provision...........................................................................................................................79
CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION..................................................82
BIBILIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................87
2
ABSTRACT
The Philippine labor laws are one of the most protective of labor. However, the fact that labor
laws are more often inclined towards the protection of the worker does not authorize the
oppression and self-destruction of the employer. The Constitutional and statutory protection
equally recognizes the employer’s right and prerogative to manage its operations according to
reasonable standards and the employee’s right to security of tenure.
The right to dismiss workers must only be pursuant to authorized and just causes of termination
as prescribed by the Labor Code. The last item under just causes of termination is analogous
causes. One is analogous to another if it is susceptible of comparison or has a relationship with
the latter. The determination of whether the cause for dismissal is analogous to any of those
enumerated as just causes by the Labor Code will depend on the circumstances of each case.
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued Department Order No. 147-15
imposing an additional requirement that no act or omission shall be considered as analogous
cause unless expressly specified in the company policies. By requiring grounds to be specified in
the company policies, D.O. No. 147-15 negates the reason why the law was so couched- for the
enumeration of just causes to remain non-exclusive.
This thesis will discuss and analyze how jurisprudence ruling in favor of dismissal on grounds of
analogous causes has been decided by the Supreme Court. From that analysis, this thesis will
propose a legal basis to delete the last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of DOLE D.O. No. 147-15
stating that no act or omission shall be considered as analogous cause if not expressly specified
in the company policies. Such a requirement is ultra vires and encroaches upon the policy
behind the law in maintaining the non-exhaustive character of just causes for termination.
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
“The fact that these overlapping claims of authority (labor and

management) exist is known to most persons who are connected with labor disputes.
Furthermore, both labor and management are anxious to present their views to the
interested bystander and for this purpose maintain research organizations. Their
theories on the surface seem generally to agree with each other; but, in practice,
these views can be interpreted so as to lead to lively arguments at the bargaining
table or before an administrative board.”
-Richard Clapp1
Background of the Study
Security of Tenure
A number of labor cases in the Philippines involve the very question of whether or not
the complainant, who is usually the employee, was dismissed from service for causes provided
by law and accorded with due process upon termination. This is based on the Constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure. Paragraph 2 of section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution
provides for the basis of security of tenure, which states:
Section 3. Labor x x x
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,

collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law.2 [emphasis supplied] x x x
1
Richard Clapp, Management’s Prerogative vs. Labor Rights, 4 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
169,170 (1953) available at https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
referer=https://www.google.com.ph/&httpsredir=1&article=3329&context=caselrev (last accessed January 2, 2018).
2
PHIL. CONST. art. XIII § 3.
1
Security of Tenure means that the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by the Labor Code. 3 An employee’s right
not to be dismissed without just or authorized causes as provided by law, is covered by his right
to substantial due process.4 The termination of an employee without a just or authorized cause
renders the dismissal invalid. On the other hand, an employee’s removal for just or authorized
cause but without complying with the proper procedure does not invalidate the dismissal. 5
However, it obligates the erring employer to pay nominal damages to the employee, as penalty
for not complying with the procedural requirements of due process.6 The Supreme Court already
abandoned the previous doctrine that both substantive and procedural facets must be present for
there to be a valid and legal termination. Only dismissals without compliance with substantial
due process will render the act an illegal dismissal.
The legality of the act of dismissal shall be determined under Articles 297 [282]
(Termination by Employer), Article 298 [283] (Closure of Establishment and Reduction of
Personnel) and Article 299 [284] (Disease as a Ground for Termination) of the Labor Code. In
dismissal cases, it is incumbent upon the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid
or authorized cause, provided that the employee must first establish the fact of dismissal from
service.7 The employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence, and not the
weakness of that adduced by the employee. 8 The quantum of proof in labor disputes shall be
substantial evidence, or that understood as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
3
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 95449, (1997).
4
Brown Madonna Press, Inc. v. Casas, G.R. No. 200898, (2015).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Canedo v. Kampilan Security and Detective Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 179326, (2013).
8
Deoferio v. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 202996, (2014).
2
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might
conceivably opine otherwise.9
It is also important to take note that the employee’s right to security of tenure is not
violated when the worker himself decides to terminate his employment. An employee may
terminate without just cause the employee-employer relationship by serving a written notice on
the employer at least one (1) month in advance.10 A contract of employment is a bilateral contract
where the employee has the obligation to provide services pursuant the nature of employment
defined in the contract, and the employer has the reciprocal obligation to pay the employee as
remuneration for the services rendered by the latter. Similar to all bilateral contracts, both parties
(employer and employee) have the liberty to enter into one, or rescind the same. An employee’s
act of terminating the contract of employment is called Resignation. However, for a resignation
to be valid, it must be made voluntarily. If said resignation is a forced one, then it is a clear case
of constructive dismissal equivalent to illegal dismissal.11
The guaranty of security of tenure is an act of social justice. 12 The ensuing jurisprudential
commitment to the cause and welfare of the working class proceed from the social justice
principles of the Constitution that the Court zealously implements out of its concern for those
with less in life, and thus the Court will not hesitate to strike down as invalid any employer act
that attempts to undermine workers’ tenurial security. 13 Not every person has a property and
there is a possibility that one’s job is his only source of livelihood. Therefore, one’s employment
9
Id.
10
A Decree Instituting a Labor Code, Thereby Revising and Consolidating Labor and Social Laws to Afford
Protection to Labor, Promote Employment and Human Resources Development and Insure Industrial Peace Based
on Social Justice [LABOR CODE], Presidential Decree No. 442, as Amended, § 300 (1974).
11
Hechanova Bugay Vilchez Lawyers v. Matorre, G.R. No. 198261, (2013).
12
Rance v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 68147, (1988).
13
Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation v. Alcon, G.R. No. 194884, (2014).
3
is considered as his property right, subject to the Constitutional protection that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of laws.14 When a worker loses his job as a livelihood, he and his family will
suffer deprivation. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his
job.15
Management Prerogative
Management has wide latitude to conduct its own affairs in accordance with the
necessities of its business.16 As a general rule, an employer has the discretion with respect to the
selection of its own employees. Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion
and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods,
time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal
and recall of workers.17 An owner of a business enterprise is given considerable leeway in
managing his own business.18
The law recognizes certain rights collectively called management prerogative as inherent
in the management of business enterprises. 19 By virtue of management prerogative, the Courts, as
a rule, cannot interfere with an employer’s discretion in regulating all aspects of employment,
which includes among others: work assignment, working methods, and place and manner of
14
PHIL. CONST. art. III, § 1.
15
Rance, G.R. No. 68147.
16
Julie’s Bakeshop v. Arnaiz, G.R. No. 173882, (2012).
17
Id.
18
Castillo v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 104319, (1999).
19
Id.
4
work.20 The rule is well settled that labor laws discourage interference with an employer’s
judgment in the conduct of his business.21
However, the exercise of management prerogative is not absolute as it must be exercised
in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor. 22 It must not be exercised beyond the
limits expressly provided by law under the authorized and just causes of termination. In most
cases involving labor disputes decided by the Supreme Court, the issue always lies on balancing
the interests of employees (right to security of tenure) and employers (management prerogative),
which varies on a case to case basis. The act of terminating an employee’s employment is an
exercise of the employer’s management prerogative- to retain the employ of workers who are
still competent and fit to render services, and terminate those who are not. This however must
not be exercised in violation of the employee’s right to security of tenure, where they can only be
dismissed for just and authorized causes provided by law.
Analogous Causes and Department of Labor and Employment’s (DOLE) Department Order No.
147-15, Series of 2015
Suppose you are an employer of an airline company. Provided in your Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual is a schedule of weight appropriate for the height and body structure of
the cabin crews, the purpose of which is primarily for flight safety. You received a notice that
one of your flight attendants failed to conform to the weight standards provided in the Manual.
20
Juris Bernadette Tomboc, Management Prerogatives and Employee Participation, CENTER FOR BUSINESS
AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 (2004) available at
http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/research/centers/cberd/pdf/papers/Working%20Paper%202004-04.PDF (last accessed
January2, 2018).
21
Id.
22
Julie’s Bakeshop, G.R. No. 173882.
5
Despite of a series directives and notice given to the latter, the employee has incessantly failed to
maintain his ideal weight, thereby causing him to be unfit for employment as a flight attendant.
As an employer, would you consider dismissing an employee who was considered
overweight for his job, as per the company manual? Stated differently, will the fact of being
overweight considering the circumstances of the case be a just cause for employee termination?
This question is answered in the case of Armando Yrasuegui v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
The Supreme Court ruled that the case would not fall under any of the grounds specified under
art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code, because the law does not expressly provide for obesity as a just
cause for termination. Nowhere in the law does it expressly provide that an employee’s obesity
by itself is a ground for the termination of employment. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court still
ruled on the validity of the ground based on art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code, under analogous
causes. Analogous causes are those susceptible of comparison to another in general or specific
detail.23 In resolving the case in favor of the employer, the Supreme Court ruled that:
The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as

flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e)
of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His
obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As
the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically means that the
just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any
external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element
runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in
the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual
neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although
it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).24
23
John Hancock Life Insurance v. Davis, G.R. No. 169549, (2008).
24
Yrasuegui v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 168081, (2008).
6
This has been the manner by which the Supreme Court decides labor disputes based on
past jurisprudence regarding analogous causes- by a determination which is highly dependent on
the factual circumstances and arguments presented by the parties. Grounds such as gross
inefficiency,25 theft of company property,26 ban against employee by the employer’s client 27 and
even attitude problems28 are not expressly provided under the enumeration in art. 297 [282] of
the Labor Code, yet the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the validity of such grounds as just
cause for employee dismissal.
The problem arises with the enactment of the Department of Labor and Employment’s
Department Order No. 147-15- amending the implementing rules and regulations of Book VI of
the Labor Code, particularly with respect to the application of just and authorized causes of
termination. Section 5.2 (g) states:
(g) Analogous Causes – To be valid ground for termination,

the following must be present:
1. There must be act or omission similar to those specified

just causes; and
2. The act or omission must be voluntary and/or wilful on

the part of the employees
No act or omission shall be considered as analogous cause

unless expressly specified in the company rules and regulations or
policies.29
25
Buiser v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. L-63316, (1984).
26
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-68212, (1985).
27
M.F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-56950-51, (1982).
28
Cathedral School of Technology v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 101438, (1992).
29
Department of Labor and Employment, Amending the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Book VI of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, As Amended, Department Order No. 147-15, §5.2 (g) (2015).
7
The policy behind the issuance is to depart from the subjective determination of causes of
termination by providing substantive and procedural standards for both the just and authorized
causes of termination provided by law. The intention behind such provision is to limit the broad
discretion that the management has with respect to the determination of the analogous causes of
termination. This is pursuant the general policy of the Labor Code to afford protection to labor 30
and the Constitutional guarantee that no employee shall be terminated from work except for just
or authorized cause and upon observance of due process.
However, the last paragraph creates an additional requirement which, based on previous
rulings of the Supreme Court, has not been applied in the determination of whether or not the
ground falls under analogous causes of termination. With the issuance of D.O. 147-15, it now
becomes prudent for employers to review and amend their company rules and regulations to
ensure an exhaustive list of acts and omissions that are considered analogous causes for
termination of employment, in order to afford employer more options and greater flexibility in
case an employee needs to be terminated.31 Otherwise, the absence of such grounds in the
company rules and regulations will render the same unjust, even if it were to be proven true and
actually inimical to the employer’s interest.
In effect, the additional requirement appears unreasonable, if not impossible, as it
demands an express specification on the employer of all analogous causes- an act tantamount to
anticipation of all things similar.32 It creates an additional burden to the employers as it would be
more difficult for them to terminate for a cause, which even if proven by substantive evidence to
30
LABOR CODE, art 3.
31
Kesterson T. Kua, Companies may Find it Harder to Terminate Employees for Cause, available at
http://www.accralaw.com/publications/companies-may-find-it-harder-terminate-employees-cause (last accessed
January 2, 2018).
32
2 CESARIO A. AZUCENA JR., THE LABOR CODE WITH COMMENTS AND CASES 862, (2016 ).
8
be injurious to the business of the employer, cannot be validly used as a just cause for
termination solely because of it not being stated in the company rules and regulations or policy.
Thesis Statement
The application of the last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of DOLE Department Order No.
147-15 will encroach upon the non-exhaustive character of just causes, through the analogous
causes of termination, and in effect, will be ultra vires to the Labor Code provision on just
causes of termination. The enumeration under art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code is and should
remain non-exclusive and subject to judicial determination.
Definition of Terms
A. Analogous Causes - One is analogous to another if it is susceptible of comparison with
the latter, either in general as in some specific detail, or has a relationship with the
latter.33
B. Authorized Causes – Refer to those instances enumerated under Article 298 [283]
(Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel) and 299 [284] (Disease as a
Ground for Termination) of the Labor Code. 34These are cases brought by the necessities
of the business, changing economic conditions and illness of the employee.35
C. Constructive Dismissal - Refers to the cessation of work because continued employment
has been rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely, as when there is a demotion in
rank or diminution in pay or both or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain
by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.36
33
Lim v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118434, (1996).
34
DOLE D.O. No. 147-15, §4 (a).
35
Id.
36
CRC Agricultural Trading v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 177664, (2009).
9
D. Just Causes – Refer to those instances enumerated under Article 297 [282] (Termination
by Employer) of the Labor Code.37 These are causes directly attributable to the fault or
negligence of employee.38
E. Management Prerogative – Refers to the right of employer to regulate all aspects of
employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods,
processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their
work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of work.39
F. Regular Employee – Refers to those who have been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.40
G. Security of Tenure – Means that the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by the Labor Code.41
Objectives of the Study
This study aims:
1. To provide an analysis of and commentary on the jurisprudence involving employee
dismissals using causes analogous to just causes as a ground and to show how these cases
have been decided by the Supreme Court;
2. To show and support the policy behind the law in making and maintaining the non-
exhaustive character of the just causes for termination using Supreme Court decisions;
and
37
DOLE D.O. No. 147-15, §4 (b).
38
Id.
39
SHS Perforated Materials, Inc. v. Diaz, G.R. No. 185814, (2010) (citing Baybay Water District v. COA, G.R. Nos.
147248-49, (2002).
40
Rockwell Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167714, (2007).
41
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., G.R. No. 95449.
10
3. To challenge the validity of and create a legal basis in dispensing with the requirement in
the last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
Department Order No. 147-15, mandating analogous causes to be expressly stated in the
company rules and regulations or policies for the same to validly take effect as just
causes of termination.
The proponent of this thesis aims to come up with a study, primarily relying on
jurisprudential data regarding employee termination using analogous causes of termination,
which will support the conclusion that the application of the last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of
DOLE Department Order No. 147-15 will encroach upon the non-exhaustive character of
analogous causes, and in effect, will be ultra vires to the Labor Code provision on just causes of
termination.
Significance of the Study
The significance of this thesis lies in balancing the employer’s right and prerogative to
manage its operation according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play 42 and the guaranty
to every employee of security of tenure. 43 In every case of labor disputes involving employee
dismissal, the Court is faced with the issue of which between the two rights should prevail: the
right of the employer to protect his business from the injury arising from the continued
employment of a worker who is unfit for the job, or the right of an employee to be secured in his
employment as a property right, against any arbitrary deprivation, absent any just or authorized
cause as provided by law. Both rights come with Constitutional, statutory and jurisprudential
protection. It is incumbent upon the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or
42
Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 194884.
43
Id.
11
authorized cause, provided that the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact
of dismissal from service.44
The Courts are guided by the statutory provision on just cause of termination under art.
297 [282] of the Labor Code. While the specific causes for dismissal have well defined elements
and standards prescribed by law or jurisprudence, the Just Cause of “analogous causes” was
widely considered as something of a “catch-all” provision since the only requirement for its
application is that complained acts or omissions must be analogous to any of the other Just
Causes mentioned in the art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code. 45 The balancing of employee and
employer rights comes into play in determining which grounds are analogous to the just causes
expressly specified by law, since the Court is given the power and discretion in considering all
the factual circumstances surrounding the dismissal. In such cases, the Court is faced with
question of whether or not an act which is not expressly provided under the Labor Code would
justify the employer’s management prerogative overcoming the employee’s tenurial security.
It is also a fact that the imposition of an additional requirement that no act or omission
shall be considered as analogous cause unless expressly specified in the company rules and
regulations or policies is an unreasonable, if not impossible burden on the part of the employer.
Such requirement, in effect demands an anticipation of all things similar to the just causes
provided.46 Prior to the Department Order, an act or omission shall be considered as analogous
cause, provided that contain an element similar to the specific just causes. 47 There is no such
requirement in the law that the same be expressly specified by the employers. As will be
discussed lengthily in the body of this thesis, the provision on just causes of termination is not a
44
Canedo, G.R. No. 179326, (2013).
45
Kua, supra note 30.
46
AZUCENA JR., supra note 31.
47
International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 97239, (1993).
12
complete and exclusive enumeration of grounds of dismissal since many other causes are
acknowledged by the Court to be in accordance with the law.48 This is made possible by the
inclusion of an item relating to “other causes analogous to the foregoing. 49’ Therefore, the
application of the last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of DOLE Department Order No. 147-15 will
negate the non-exhaustive character of analogous causes, and will be ultra vires to the Labor
Code provision. The proponent of this thesis wants to create a stable legal basis for dispensing
with the implementation of Section 5.2 (g) of DOLE D.O. No. 147-15 regarding the specification
of analogous causes in the company policies before the same may be effective in cases of
employee dismissal.
The proponent of this thesis also wants to provide an assessment of the analogous causes
provision in the Labor Code, and an analysis of and commentary on how it has been applied by
the Supreme Court in deciding cases involving employee termination. The proponent believes
that this will contribute to a better understanding of how the Supreme Court determines the
validity grounds to terminate employment, which are not expressly enumerated by law, yet are
still acknowledged to be just and in accordance with the based on jurisprudential precedence.
Scope and Limitation
The proponent of this thesis will limit the discussion on the just causes of termination
only, as expressly provided by art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code. This will include all the relevant
provisions in its implementing rules and regulations, as well as jurisprudence involving just
causes of termination, in order to provide a background and synthesis on what may constitute as
a cause analogous or similar to the foregoing. This thesis will not cover the authorized causes of
termination under art. 298 [283] of the Labor Code.

48
Id.
49
LABOR CODE, art 294.
13
This proponent of this thesis will also limit the discussion and application of the Just
causes of termination and those analogous to it on regular employees only. A discussion on the
application of the same causes to probationary, project, seasonal, fixed-term and casual
employees, as well as the peculiar grounds applicable to each type of employment will not be
included in this thesis. The ground of disease under art. 299 [284] of the Labor Code shall be
considered a separate and distinct ground for termination and will not be included in the
discussion as well.
The bulk of this thesis will focus on the what constitutes causes analogous to just causes
based on Supreme Court decisions, by looking into the framework and ratio used in deciding
termination cases involving grounds other than those expressly provided in art. 297 [282] of the
Labor Code.
Organization of the Thesis
This thesis shall be divided into seven parts. Chapter I will be the Introduction. This
chapter will give the readers a background of the issue which the proponent wants to resolve and
will tackle in general terms the recurring concepts in the succeeding chapters. This part will also
include the thesis statement, the definition of relevant terms used in the study, the objectives of
the study, the significance of the study, the scope and limitation, the organization of the thesis
and the research methodology to be employed by the proponent in the study.
Chapter II will provide a discussion of employer’s management prerogative as opposed to
the employee’s right to security of tenure. This portion will introduce the rights of an employer
to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner or work, tools to be used,
14
process to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, layoff of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers 50 subject the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of an employee. The chapter is entitled Balancing of Interests
of Employee and Employer because it will give the readers a discussion of the respective rights
of the parties to an employment contract and how these rights interplay in a labor dispute such as
in a case involving employee termination. The relevance of this chapter is that it will facilitate
the readers in understanding how the Courts, in every case of labor disputes involving employee
dismissal, is faced with the issue of which between the two rights should prevail: the right of the
employer to protect his business from the injury arising from the continued employment of a
worker who is unfit for the job, or the right of an employee to be secured in his employment as a
property right, against any arbitrary deprivation, absent any just or authorized cause as provided
by law.
Chapter III, as the title suggests, will give a discussion on the just causes of employee
termination, with the exclusion of analogous causes. This chapter will lay down the elements for
each ground and the corresponding cases decided by the Supreme Court falling under each of the
grounds. The purpose of this chapter is to give the readers an understanding of what constitutes
as just causes, and to facilitate them in understanding the concept of analogous causes, which is
basically a comparison of grounds to those falling under the former.
Chapter IV will contain the first part of the analysis, which will focus on the last item for
just cause of termination-the analogous causes. This chapter will include an exhaustive
assessment and analysis of Supreme Court decisions using analogous causes as a ground for
termination. The proponent will also provide a commentary on how the Supreme Court came up
50
San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union v. Ople, G.R. No. L-53515, (1989).
15
with the rulings on such cases. This chapter will basically aims to give the readers a deeper
understanding of what and how analogous causes are determined and justified in jurisprudence.
Chapter V will contain the second part of the analysis, which primarily consists of an
explanation of how last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of DOLE D.O. No. 147-15 amending the
implementing rules and regulations of Book VI of the Labor Code is ultra vires to the Labor
Code provision. The rule-making power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, as well as
the policy behind issuing the Department Order shall first be laid down in this chapter before
challenging the validity of the additional requirement proposed by the Department Order
regarding analogous causes, using the discussion provided in the preceding chapters.
Chapter VI will be the consolidation of Chapters I to V, and will serve as the synthesis to
what the study is all about. This will contain the conclusion of the proponent of this thesis. It will
also include the proponent’s recommendation calling to dispense with the last paragraph of
Section 5.2 (g) of DOLE Department Order No. 147-15 amending the implementing rules and
regulations of Book VI of the Labor Code.
Research Methodology
This thesis will first lay down a general discussion of the employer’s rights associated
with management prerogative and the countervailing right of employees to security of tenure.
The proponent will use Constitutional and statutory provisions, jurisprudence, and journal
articles related to management prerogative and security of tenure. This will help the readers
understand the interests of both parties involved in an employer-employee relationship before
going into the issue of employee termination.
16
In the discussion of the just causes of employee termination provided by the art. 297
[282] of the Labor Code, the proponent plans to rely heavily jurisprudential precedence showing
the application of each of the grounds specified under the law by the Supreme Court. This aims
to provide a review of what constitutes just cause of termination, the identification of the
elements of each ground and its application in jurisprudence. This will basically give the readers
a basis of what may potentially be considered as analogous causes of termination.
In the discussion of analogous causes, the proponent also plans to rely heavily on
jurisprudential precedence involving analogous causes as a ground of termination. This chapter
will serve as the bulk of this thesis as it will provide an enumeration of analogous causes, as
determined by the Supreme Court and analysis of the framework used in deciding whether or not
the grounds fall under the analogous causes of termination. The proponent will also provide a
commentary on how the Supreme Court decides and the propriety of ruling a ground as
analogous or not to the specific just causes. By this, the proponent aims to facilitate an
understanding among the readers of the policy behind the law regarding analogous causes as a
catch-all provision since the only requirement is for the complained act to be analogous to any of
those enumerated in art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code.51
Finally, the proponent will challenge the requirement that no act or omission shall be
considered as analogous cause unless expressly specified in the company rules and regulations or
policies is inconsistent with the policy behind the law to maintain the non-exhaustive character
of the just causes for termination, using the discussion in the preceding chapters and support the
amendment of the last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of DOLE Department Order No. 147-15
amending the implementing rules and regulations of Book VI of the Labor Code.
51
Kua, supra note 30.
17
18
Chapter II
BALANCING OF INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER
“It should be remembered that the Philippine Constitution, while inexorably

committed towards the protection of the working class from exploitation and unfair
treatment, nevertheless mandates the policy of social justice so as to strike a balance
between an avowed predilection for labor, on the one hand, and the maintenance of
the legal rights of capital, the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg, on the
other. Indeed, we should not be unmindful of the legal norm that justice is in every
case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in light of established facts, the
applicable law, and existing jurisprudence”
- Cebu Metal Corporation v. Roberto Saliling, G. R. No. 154463, (2006).
In every case involving employee dismissal, the Court is faced with the issue of which
between the two rights should prevail: the right of the employer to protect his business from the
injury arising from the continued employment of a worker who is rendered unfit for the job, or
the right of an employee to be secured in his employment as a property right-to be protected
against deprivation absent any just or authorized cause as provided by law. Both rights come
with Constitutional, statutory and jurisprudential protection.
The balancing of employee and employer rights comes into play in determining which
grounds are analogous to the just causes expressly specified by law because the Court is given
the discretion in what is analogous based on all the factual circumstances surrounding the
dismissal. In such cases, the Court is faced with question of whether or not an act not expressly
provided under the Labor Code would justify the employer’s management prerogative in
overcoming the employee’s tenurial security. Before going into the discussion of what analogous
causes are, this chapter will first lay down the interests involved in a contract of employment and
19
how the rights associated with these interests are affected when there is a termination of
employment.
This chapter on the balancing of employee and employer rights, particularly the
employee’s right to security of tenure versus the employer’s management prerogative will aide in
understanding the next succeeding chapters which will discuss causes of employee termination.
Rights of the Employee
The right to labor is both a Constitutional and statutory right. Section 18, Article II of the
1987 Constitution provides that the State affirms labor as a primary social economic force and it
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. 52 Under the Labor Code, it is the
policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employers.53 These resulted to a common conclusion in jurisprudence on labor: the job of a
worker is a property right, which no dispossession can take effect without due process of law. An
employee must be protected against arbitrary deprivation of his job.54
The State policy to favor labor rights is rooted in recognition of the inherent economic
inequality between labor and management: the supply has always exceeded the demand for labor
and the fact that the need for employment by labor has basically become a vital necessity. Even
though theoretically, the employers and employees ought to negotiate on equal footing in a
contract of employment, this is not always the case. Employees are usually at the employer’s
mercy. The surplusage of labor in relation to the demand creates a possibility where employees
are left with no choice but to secure jobs with conditions that are to their disadvantage.
52
PHIL. CONST. art. II, § 18.
53
LABOR CODE, art. 3.
54
Rance, G.R. No. 68147.
20
Therefore, it has become the duty of the State to promulgate and enact measure which will give
the workers a more or less equal standing with management. The following are the rights of
employees which are protected under existing labor laws:
a. Right to a Decent Work
The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines decent work as work which
“involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in
the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal
development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns,
organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity
and treatment for all women and men.”55
An essential aspect of decent work is fair income. Every worker has the right to
receive remuneration in the form of salary or wages, which is fair and proportionate to
the amount of labor that they supply to the employers. Also, employees must be working
in environments which have policies for prevention of and compensation for work-related
injuries, prevention of oppressive working conditions and protection in the form of social
security for sickness, old age, disability, unemployment, pregnancy and other conditions
that may limit the ability to work. They also have the right to demand respect for their
basic human rights in the work place: the right to free speech and expression and the right
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law. Under
Philippine labor laws, any acts which impede or interfere with the exercise of the
workers’ freedom to organize into unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law
55
International Labor Organization, Decent Work, available at http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--
en/index.htm (last accessed June 11, 2018).
21
shall be considered as unfair labor practices, which carries with it both administrative and
criminal liabilities.
b. Right to Economic and Social Development
The International Labor Organization (ILO) emphasizes that although economic
growth is not a sufficient condition for poverty reduction, it still plays an essential role in
achieving the same.56 Employment is one of the most common, if not default, source of
livelihood, especially to those who do not own any other property or business from which
they may earn income for their sustenance. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, it was held that:
a profession, trade or calling is a property right within the

meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be
deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living
because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and
unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an
actionable wrong.57
Depriving employers their job without due process is basically a deprivation of
their right to property without due process. The ILO has long recognized that “the best
way to avoid a life of poverty is to find decent work.” 58 Indeed, work is an instrumentally
valuable means to earn income in order for one to meet needs for food, housing,
education, and health care. Without a decent source of livelihood, a person is deprived of
the means to enjoy the rights formerly enumerated.
56
International Labor Organization, Economic and Social Development, available at
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/economic-and-social-development/lang--en/index.htm (last accessed June 11,
2018).
57
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, (1996).
58
Diane F. Frey & Gillian MacNaughton. A Human Rights Lens on Full Employment and Decent Work in the 2030
Sustainable Development Agenda, June 3, 2016, available at
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244016649580 (last accessed June 11, 2018).
22
c. Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination
Discrimination stifles opportunities, wasting the human talent needed for
economic progress, and accentuates social tensions and inequalities. 59 It is a violation of
basic human rights which unfortunately, is not only limited within the workplace. It is
rooted in people’s inherent belief of supremacy over others. Most work-related
discrimination occurs against women, older people and persons with disabilities.
Combating discrimination is an essential part of promoting decent work, and success on
this front is felt well beyond the workplace.60
d. Right to Privacy
An important aspect of the right to decent work is the protection of the worker’s
basic human rights, which includes the right to privacy. The rights to privacy of
communication and correspondence and to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose are expressly provided for under our Constitution. In the case of Pollo v.
Constantino-David, the Supreme Court held that in order to establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the workplace, there must be a legitimate expectation of
privacy, and in order to prove such legitimate expectation of privacy, it must be one that
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.61 An example of this is the privacy
that an employee enjoys with respect to personal messages sent and received by him
while inside the workplace. Also, management policies must not impede and encroach
59
International Labor Organization, Equality and Discrimination, available at
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/equality-and-discrimination/lang--en/index.htm (last accessed June 11, 2018).
60
Id.
61
Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, (2011).
23
upon their actions outside of work, provided that they do not affect the employer’s
interests.
e. Right to Security of Tenure
Prior to 1973, the worker’s right to security of tenure had only the protective
mantle of statutes. It is only under the 1973 Constitution that declared as a policy that the
State shall assure the right of workers to security of tenure. As a result, the causes for
dismissing employees were more defined and restricted, and the procedure of termination
was also more clearly delineated.
Constitutional provision
Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rights of workers. It
gives us the State’s obligation to protect labor, which provides in full:
SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor,

local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-

organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared

responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in
the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to
24
reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and
growth.62 [emphasis supplied]
Security of tenure is a constitutional mandate, and should be upheld together with
the guarantees of humane working conditions and utmost respect to basic human rights.
Statutory Definition
Article 294 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 294. [279] Security of Tenure. In cases of regular

employment, the employer shall not terminate the services
of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full back
wages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.63[emphasis supplied]
Security of tenure is defined by law as the right of employee not to be terminated
from service except for just and authorized causes provided by law. Management has the
prerogative to employ the services of a person and likewise to discharge him, but it is not
without limitations and restrictions. The termination of an employee without a just or
authorized cause renders the dismissal invalid. In De Guzman v. Comelec, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a
guarantee of perpetual employment- it only means that an employee cannot be dismissed
(or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law. 64 What the
provision seeks to address is the prevention of the capricious exercise of the power to
62
PHIL. CONST. art. XIII § 3.
63
LABOR CODE, art. 294.
64
De Guzman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129118, (2000).
25
dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for
the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as
the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.65
Security of tenure also covers the prohibition against constructive dismissal.
Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion
in rank or diminution of pay and other benefits. 66 In the case of Morales v. Harbour
Centre Port Terminal, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that Morales was constructively
dismissed without just cause when he was reassigned by HCPTI “from managerial
accounting to Operations Cost Accounting,” without any mention of the position to
which he was actually being transferred. 67 The reassignment was tantamount to a
demotion, evident from Morales’ new duties which, far from being managerial in nature,
were very simply and vaguely described as inclusive of “monitoring and evaluating all
consumables requests, gears and equipment related to HCPTI’s operations” as well as
“close interaction with its sub-contractor Bulk Fleet Marine Corporation.”68
The Security of tenure is a paramount right of every employee as held by the
Constitution and the reason for this is that labor is deemed to be “property” within the
meaning of constitutional guarantees.69 The guarantee of tenure is an act of social justice
because when a person has no property his job may possibly be his only possession or
65
Id.
66
Gan v. Gaderma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 177167, (2013).
67
Morales v. Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc., G.R. No. 174208, (2012).
68
Id.
69
Sagales v. Rustan’s Commercial Corporation, G.R. No. 166554, (2008).
26
means of livelihood and those of his dependents.70 One’s employment or profession is a
property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong.71
In view of security of tenure, the burden of proving that the employee’s dismissal
was for a just cause rests upon the employer. In Exodus International Construction
Corporation v. Biscocho, the Supreme Court in ruling on the illegal dismissal of five (5)
employees, mentioned that in cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of
proof to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, but before the
employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, employee must
first establish by substantial evidence that indeed they were dismissed.72 The mere fact of
dismissal is sufficient to shift the burden of proving the legality of employment to the
employer.
Rights of the Employer
Every business endeavors to perform well and increase its earnings. Almost any
business’s primary objective is to maximize its profits and minimize losses. In order to achieve
this objective, the management has full discretion to conduct the business as he pleases. It has the
power to formulate policies and regulations effective in the conduct of his business and shall be
binding to persons as a consequence of employment. This power includes the procurement of
labor from workers, as well as its cessation.
While as a general rule it is the State’s policy to uphold labor rights, it should not be
supposed that every labor dispute should be automatically decided in favor of labor. As long as
company’s prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s
70
Philips Semi-Conductors Inc. v. Fadriquela, G.R. No. 141717, (2004).
71
Texon Manufacturing v. Grace Milllena, G.R. No. 141380, (2004).
72
Exodus International Construction Corporation v. Biscocho, et. al., G.R. No. 166109, (2011).
27
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements, the Supreme Court will uphold them. 73 Benefits accorded
by the Constitution and statutes to labor do not include compelling an employer to accept nor
retain services of a worker who is shown to be a gross liability to the employer. Employer’s
rights include the following:
a. Right to Manage
The employer has the sole right to manage and control all aspects of business. He
is entitled to adopt and employ means and methods most advantageous for the enterprise,
provided these are not in violation of the law, morals, public order, public policy and
good customs. Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be
used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall
of work74 As the employer, he has full discretion in the formulation of company rules and
regulations that will govern employment within his establishment and the same shall
constitute an agreement between him and employee. Employees must have knowledge of
established rules for it to be binding.
However, the right to manage must not go beyond intruding employee’s personal
life. The employer cannot enforce policies and regulations which may encroach upon an
San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union, G.R. No. L-53515.

73
San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union, G.R. No. L-53515, citing National Labor Union v. Insular-Yebana
74
Tobacco Corporation, G.R. No. L-15363, (1961).
28
employees’ conduct outside of work. An exception to this is when such conduct is proven
to be inimical to the business and interest of the employer.
b. Right to Transfer Employees
Stemming from his right to manage, the employer has the right to assign an
employee in any place of work, or in any position, in pursuance of legitimate business
interests, and not motivated by bad faith or discrimination. The transfer must not be
implemented as a form of punishment or demotion of the employee. In Tinio v. Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that when a transfer is not unreasonable, or
inconvenient, or prejudicial to an employee, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or
a diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges, the employee may not
complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.75 Constructive dismissal exists
where there is cessation of work because "continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in
pay"76 The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave
abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play.77
c. Right to Discipline
It is within the employer’s prerogative to prescribe rules of conduct necessary for
the regulation of business concern. The constitutional protection afforded to labor does
not condone wrongdoings by the employee; and an employer’s power to discipline its
workers is inherent to it.78 Disciplinary powers must be pursuant to company rules and
regulations, with utmost respect to basic human rights. In recognizing the inherent right
75
Tinio v. Court of Apeals, G.R. No. 171764, (2007).
76
Morales, G.R. No. 174208, citing Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Flores, G.R. No. 150092, (2002).
77
Id.
78
Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., G.R. No. 163431, (2013).
29
of the employer to discipline its employees, it must be ensured that the employer
exercises the prerogative to discipline humanely and considerately, and that the sanction
imposed is commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. 79
The discipline exacted by the employer should further consider the circumstances such as
the employee’s length of service, the number of infractions during his employment and
not only his position but also his livelihood, and that he may also have a family entirely
dependent on his earning.80
d. Right to Dismiss
Every employee has the right to security of tenure. However, this is not an
absolute right for an employee can be dismissed for a cause. The power to dismiss an
employee is a recognized prerogative that is inherent in the employer's right to freely
manage and regulate his business.81 The determination of the qualification and fitness of
the workers for hiring, firing, promotion and reassignment, are considered management
prerogatives.82 Even if there is management prerogative, the right to dismiss must not be
exercised arbitrarily, as it will render the right to security of tenure nugatory. It must not
be done with abuse of discretion.
Dismissal is a measure of self protection against acts inimical to an employer’s
interest. In Yabut v. Manila Electric Company, an employee of MERALCO was
dismissed for shunting wires in his own residence. Such act is considered inimical to the
interest of the employer since it involves a fraudulent act directed against the employer
for the former’s personal gain. The Supreme Court in this case ruled that the dismissal of
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
82
National Federation of Labor Unions, et. al. v. National Labor Relations Commission et. al., G.R. No. 90739
(1991).
30
a dishonest employee is to the best interest not only of the management but also of
labor.83 An employer cannot be legally compelled to continue employment of a person
whose continuance in the service is clearly inimical to the former’s interest. In Shoemart
Inc. v. NLRC, the court upheld the dismissal of the employee who was grossly remiss in
her duties toward her employer, as shown by her frequent, prolonged and unexplained
absences.84 It is a proper exercise of the right to dismiss since the employee in this case is
already a liability to the business. Even though the law provides several protections
against employee dismissal, it still acknowledges the management’s right to respect and
enforcement of his interest of simple fair play. 85 In the case of Imasen Philippine
Manufacturing Corporation v. Alcon, the Supreme Court in justifying the termination of
Ramonchito Alcon on the ground of engaging in sexual intercourse with another
employee within the company premises, ruled that the constitutional and legal protection
equally recognize the employer’s right and prerogative to manage its operation according
to reasonable standards and norms of fair play.86 The need to defend Imasen’s
management prerogative and to maintain as well a high standard of ethics and morality in
the workplace was upheld over the employee’s tenurial rights.
Unlike in the US, the right to dismiss under Philippine jurisprudence does not
include employment “at will.” Employment “at will” avows that, when an employee does
not have a written employment contract and the term of employment is of indefinite
duration, the employer can terminate the employee for good cause, bad cause, or no cause
83
Yabut v. Manila Electric Corporation, G.R. No. 190436, (2012).
84
Shoemart, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 74229 (1989).
85
AZUCENA JR., supra note 31, at 783.
86
31
at all.87 In fact, it is directly in violation of the employee’s right to security of tenure
because under the former doctrine, an employee can be fired “at will” or for no cause at
all.
While a manager’s right to fire an employee is recognized as part of the position,
such right must be exercised with utmost prudence and with humane consideration. 88 In
Sibal v. Notre Dame of Greater Manila, the dismissal was attended with bad faith when
Sibal was terminated for her failure to heed the school director’s requests which were
beyond the scope of her employment contract. In this case, the termination was made
without just cause. The purpose of the law is to insure that the employer’s prerogative to
dismiss an employee is exercised without abuse of discretion or arbitrariness.89 While the
law recognizes and safeguards this right of an employer to exercise what are clearly
management prerogatives, such right should not be abused and used as a tool of
oppression against labor.90
While the law, in giving more to those less in life, is inclined to protect the rights
of the worker, it does not, however, authorize “oppression and self-destruction of the
employer.”91 While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and
protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor.92
Before going to the analysis of analogous cause decided by the Supreme Court, this thesis
will first introduce in the next chapter what the just causes of termination are, as stated in art. 297
87
Charles Muhl, The Employement-At-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, (2001) available at
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1full.pdf (last accessed June 12, 2018).
88
Sibal v. Notre Dame of Greater Manila, G.R. No. 75093 (1990).
89
Shoemart, Inc., G.R. No. 74229.
90
91
92
Id.
32
[282] of the Labor Code. This will facilitate in understanding the concept of analogous causes,
which is basically a comparison of the grounds falling under the specific just causes.
33
Chapter III
JUST CAUSE OF TERMINATION
“The employer's right to terminate for any cause has been seriously constrained.
Recent court rulings and discrimination legislation make employee termination a
hazardous undertaking. The prevailing logic is based on the concept of "just cause."
This concept attempts to balance employer, employee, and society's rights and fit
action to the situation. Recommended management action involves little more than
careful management of human resources as practiced by well managed firms for
many years.”
-Robert J. Paul & James B. Townsend93
The employee’s right to security of tenure means that an employee shall not be dismissed
from his job without a valid cause. This does not give him a right to perpetual employment
because the law actually provides for instances when the right to such employment may be
validly terminated. Under the Labor Code, the services of an employee can only be terminated
for a just cause or when authorized by the Labor Code. 94 Just causes refer to those grounds
attributable to acts or omissions of the employee. Authorized causes, on the other hand are those
which are subject to the discretion of management or for circumstances beyond the control of the
employee. The just causes of termination as laid down by the Labor Code include the following:
ART. 297. [282] Termination by Employer. An employer may

terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
a) Serious misconduct or wilful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work
b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
93
Robert J. Paul & James Townsend, Wrongful Termination: Balancing Employer and Employee Rights- A
Summary with Recommendations, 6 EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS JOURNAL 69,69 (1993)
available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01384758 (last accessed June 17, 2018).
94
34
c) Fraud or wilful breach by the employee of the trust reposed
in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representatives; and
e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.95
This chapter will discuss and introduce each of the just causes of termination, with the
exception of analogous causes which will be discussed thoroughly in the next chapter.
a. Serious Misconduct
Misconduct refers to the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action. It is a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, wilful in character and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error in judgment.96 For an employee to be validly terminated for
serious misconduct, the following must be present as provided by D.O. No. 147-15:
(a) Serious Misconduct – to be a valid ground for

termination, the following must be present:
1. There must be misconduct
2. The misconduct must be of such grave and
aggravated character
3. It must relate to the performance of the employee’s
duties; and
4. There must be showing that the employee becomes
unfit to continue working for the employer.97
Under the ground of serious misconduct, the act must be a wrong or dereliction in
itself. If misconduct is not serious, it will merely warrant a penalty lesser than dismissal.
To constitute a just cause for employee termination, it must be in connection with his
work. It is not sufficient that the act or conduct complained of has only violated some
established rules or policies. It is equally important and required that the act or conduct
95
96
DOLE D.O. No. 147-15, § 4(o).
97
Id. § 5.2 (a).
35
must have been performed with wrongful intent.98 The mere violation of a rule will not
render the act as serious if such is done inadvertently or in good faith.
The Supreme Court in Echevarria v. Venutek Medika, Inc. considered the
disparaging remarks made by an employee in a corporate meeting against one of the
senior officers as an act of serious misconduct. The utterance of obscene, insulting or
offensive words against a superior in the presence of others, such as in a corporate
meeting constitutes gross misconduct.99 However, in Samson v. NLRC, where an
employee who was heard uttering obscene remarks against his superiors like “bullshit
yang si EDT” while making “dirty finger” gesture in an informal Christmas party, the
Supreme Court did not consider the misconduct to warrant dismissal. The Court ruled
that in certain instances, employees in freely expressing their gripes against their
employers and the gestures, although made in bad taste, do not intend to malign or cast
aspersion on the person of the superiors.100 Such intention or the wilfulness of the act is
an important element under this ground.
Other instances which constitute serious misconduct are: fighting within company
premises, in the presence of the company President,101 challenging a superior to a fight,102
and pressuring a co-teacher to change the grade of one student from FAIL to PASS.103
98
Gurango v. Best Chemicals and Plastics, Inc., G.R. No. 174593, (2010), citing National Labor Relations
Commission v. Salgarino, G.R. No. 164376, (2006).
99
Echeverria v. Venutek Medika, Inc., G.R. No. 169231, (2007).
100
Samson v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 121035, (2000).
101
Hilton Heavy Equipment Corporation v. Dy, G.R. No. 164860, (2010).
102
Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Alonzo, G.R. No. 78090, (1991).
103
Padilla v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 114764, (1997).
36
b. Willful Disobedience or Insubordination
Willful disobedience or Insubordination refers to a willful and intentional
disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer.104 To be considered
as willful disobedience, the following elements must be present as provided by D.O. No.
147-15:
(b) Willful Disobedience or Insubordination – to be a valid

ground for termination, the following must be present:
1. There must be disobedience or insubordination
2. The disobedience or insubordination must be willful
or intentional characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude
3. The order violated must be reasonable, lawful and
made known to the employee; and
4. The order must pertain to the duties which he has
been engaged to discharge105
Disobedience is wilful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely,
without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly or
inadvertently.106The latter will merely be considered as an act of negligence. In BLTB v.
Court of Appeals, the employee was terminated for obtaining a cash advance in excess of
the amount allowed per payroll period as per company memorandum. The Supreme
Court ruled that the employee here has repeatedly abused the "vale" privilege and
therefore in this respect can be considered wilful.107
An order is lawful if it is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy. An employee cannot be dismissed for disobeying an unlawful order. It
must also be known to employees, for they cannot be expected to obey an unknown
104
D.O. No. 147-15, § 4 (l).
105
Id., §5.2 (b).
106
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, G.R. No. L-38482.
107
Id.
37
order. In Manila Broadcasting Company v. NLRC, the dismissal of an employee who
filed for a leave of absence to run for the local elections by virtue of a company policy
considering any employee who runs for public office resigned was held illegal. 108 In this
case, the policy concerning employees who wish to run for public office has never
been formally embodied in the rules and made known to the employees.
The reasonableness of order depends on the circumstances availing in each case,
and the act of disobedience must pertain to an order related to his duties. In Soco v.
Mercantile Corporation of Davao, an employee was dismissed for using the company
vehicle in attending his personal transactions, not just once, but for several instances. A
rule prohibiting employees from using company vehicles for private purpose without
authority from management is a reasonable one.109 Another common case of
insubordination is when an employee disobeys a transfer order, 110 or new assignment111
from management, provided such order does not constitute constructive dismissal.
c. Gross and Habitual Neglect
The obligation to give just compensation and treatment carries with it the
corollary right to expect from the employee adequate work, diligence and good
behavior.112 It is not necessary that the employer suffered damages or injury from such
neglect. Negligence must be both gross and habitual. A single or isolated act of
108
Manila Broadcasting Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 121975, (1998).
109
Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, G.R. No. L-53364-65, (1987).
110
Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 121621, (1999).
111
Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 97067,
(1996).
112
PAULINO UNGOS, JR. & PAULINO UNGOS, III, THE LAW ON LABOR RELATIONS, 287 (2015), citing Jacinto
v. Standard Vacuum Oil Company, G.R. No. 47425, (1940).
38
negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.113 D.O. No.
147-15 provides:
(c) Gross and Habitual Neglect of Duties – to be a valid

1. There must be neglect of duty; and
2. The negligence must be both gross and habitual in
character.114
Gross neglect refers to the absence of that diligence that an ordinary prudent man
would use in his/her affairs.115 Habitual Neglect refers to repeated failure to perform
one’s duties over a period of time, depending on the circumstances. 116 In Mansion
Printing Center v. Bitara Jr., an employee was dismissed for his habitual tardiness where
the timely delivery of the products to the clients is one of the foremost considerations
material to the operation of the business.117 In Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company v. Teves, the Supreme Court ruled that two unauthorized absences do not
constitute habitual absenteeism, and should not merit the penalty of dismissal. 118 Other
instances of gross and habitual neglect are: failure to report to and abandonment of work
after sickness,119 and the delivery of newly approved and unused credit cards to several
fictitious applicants on five separate occasions.120
113
St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. v. Estrelito Notario, G.R. No 152166, (2010).
114
DO No. 147-15, § 5.2 (c).
115
Id., § 4 (j).
116
Id,, § 4 (k).
117
Mansion Printing Center v. Bitara, Jr., G.R. No. 168120, (2012).
118
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Teves, G.R. No. 143511, (2010).
119
Wuerth Philippines, Inc. v.Ynson, G.R. No. 175932, (2012).
120
Citibank v. Jose Gatchalian, G.R. No. 111222, (1995).
39
d. Fraud and Wilful Breach of Trust and Loss of Confidence
Fraud refers to any act, omission of concealment which involves a breach of legal
duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, and is injurious to another 121 Loss of confidence
refers to a condition arising from fraud or willful breach of trust by employee of the trust
reposed to him by his employer or duly authorized representative. 122 The basic premise
for dismissal on ground of willful breach of trust is that the employee involved holds a
position of trust, and the breach of that trust results to the loss of employer’s confidence.
Not all employees can be dismissed under the ground of wilful breach of trust and loss of
confidence. This ground applies only to those employees with position of trust and
confidence. The two classes of position of trust and confidence123 are:
a) Managerial employees, with powers or prerogative to lay down management
policies, and effectively recommend managerial actions; and
b) Rank and file employees, who in the normal course of their functions, regularly
handle or is in custody of money, property or valuable information.
In the application of loss of trust and confidence, the treatment of managerial
employees differs from rank-and-file employees. The former is given more leniencies
because of the nature of their position, which generally requires the use of discretion.
For an employee to be validly terminated under this ground, the following
elements must be present, under D.O. No. 147-15:
(d) Fraud or Willful Breach of Trust – to be a valid ground

for termination, the following must be present:
1. There must be an act, omission or concealment
121
DO No. 147-15, § 4 (i).
122
Id., § 4 (n).
123
UNGOS, JR., supra note 120.
40
2. The act, omission, or concealment involves a breach
of legal duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed
3. It must be committed against the employer or his
representative; and
4. It must be in connection with the employee’s
work.124
The act of making false entries in time cards showing they reported to work on a
particular day, when in fact they did not, and punching in the time cards of co-employees
who were not present are considered acts of fraud which may validly warrant the
dismissal of an employee.125 In Philippine Airlines v. NLRC, the dismissal of a Materials
Manager for the irregular releases of auto parts for repairs and the irregular
withdrawal/order of high temperature non-melt grease without the approved purchase
order stealing company property was considered a willful breach of trust. Considering his
managerial position, he was charged with the acquisition, handling, maintenance, care
and protection of his employer’s property.126
Other instances which constitute breach of trust and confidence of the employer
are: bank employees engaging in informal lending activities- a business in direct
competition of the employer,127 and rendering of services to a competitor.128
e. Commission of a Crime or Offense
The commission of a crime or offense is straightforward; it must be committed
against the person of his employer, or any member of the latter’s family, or the
employer’s duly authorized representative.129 Prior conviction is not required. Mere
124
DO No. 147-15, § 5.2 (d).
125
San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82467, (1989).
126
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 124456, (1997).
127
Aboc v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 170542-43, (2010).
128
ABS-CBN Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 1112111, (1997).
129
DO No. 147-15, § 4 (d).
41
commission of crime justifies the dismissal. The following elements must be present for
an employee to be validly dismissed for commission of crimes or offenses:
(f) Commission of a Crime or Offence – To be a valid

1. There must be an act or omission
punishable/prohibited by law; and
2. The act or omission was committed by the
employee against the person of the employer, any
immediate member of his family, or his duly
authorized representative.130
In one case,131 a staff nurse was validly dismissed for libellous and slanderous
utterances directed against the Assistant Chairman of the Department of Pediatrics. The
employee need not be convicted of defamation against his employer nor such crime or
offense be related to his line of work before he can be terminated from service.
By looking at this enumeration, there seem to be other acts which cannot fall squarely
under any of the causes yet prove to be detrimental to the rights of the employer. As mentioned
earlier, an employer cannot be legally compelled to continue employment of a person whose
continuance in the service is clearly inimical or injurious to the business of the employer. The
provision under art. 297 [282] is so couched to show that the intention behind the law is to keep
the enumeration non-exclusive. This means that the just causes for termination are not limited
only to the ones expressly specified in the law. The use of the language “and other causes
analogous to the foregoing” allows the court to determine justifying grounds not exactly falling
under the specific causes, but has elements “analogous” by comparison with the latter. If the law
intended it to be otherwise, then the provision should have been couched in a different language,
without including an item which gives the court discretion in determining whether or not a cause
130
DO No. 147-15, § 5.2 (f).
131
Pasamba v. National Labor Relations, GR No. 168421, (2007).
42
is similar to the specific causes. What makes just causes non-exhaustive is basically the inclusion
of the phrase “and other causes analogous to the foregoing.”
These acts and omissions which justify the dismissal of an employee but cannot be
categorized in any of the just causes are called analogous causes. Theoretically speaking, the list
of “analogous causes” has no end since all the law requires is that the employee’s willful or
voluntary act or omission must be analogous to any of the other specific just causes. It is due to
this flexibility afforded to the application of analogous causes that it became that catch-all
provision for termination of employment based on just causes.132
This is a preliminary chapter for a better understanding and analysis of what may
constitute as a cause analogous to the just causes, which will be discussed in length in the
proceeding chapter.
132
Kua, supra note 30.
43
Chapter IV
ANALOGOUS CAUSES
“At its basis, the concept of just or good cause implies that employees have a degree
of job security provided that they continue to fulfil the obligations of the terms of
their employment. It also implies that they are to be treated fairly by their
employer, at least to the threat or fact of dismissal.”
-Stuart Henry133
The last item under art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code refers to “other causes analogous to
the foregoing.”134 While the specific causes for dismissal have well defined elements and
standards prescribed by law or jurisprudence, the Just Cause of “analogous causes” was widely
considered as something of a “catch-all” provision since the only requirement for its application
is that complained acts or omissions must be analogous to any of the other Just Causes specified
in the art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code. 135 These include cases which based on the factual
circumstances present, do not fall squarely under any of the enumerated causes, yet are
justifiable to cause the termination of employment. Prior to the enactment of Department Order
No. 147-15, the only additional requirement for analogous causes to apply is that the act or
omission complained of must be voluntary or willful on the part of the employee.
For an act or omission to be considered as analogous cause, it must have an element
similar to the specific just causes.136 In International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the
dismissal of an employee for conviction of homicide was not considered just cause by the
133
Stuart Henry, Legislating Just Cause,536 THE ANNALS OF AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 149, 150 (1994).
134
LABOR CODE, art. 297, (e).
135
Kua, supra note 30.
136
International Rice Research Institute, G.R. No. 97239.
44
Supreme Court.137 The petitioner’s contention that the act is analogous to sub-paragraph 1(d), on
commission of crimes and offenses should not be given merit. The commission of a crime by the
employee under Article 297 (d) refers to an offense against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. 138 Analogous causes must
have an element similar to those found in the specific just causes enumerated under the law. The
ground invoked by petitioner is clearly lacking of its relation to respondent’s work or to his
employer.
In this case, the respondent was convicted of homicide which was not work-related, nor
was committed within the company premises. The petitioner failed to show how the dismissal
would be in consideration of the safety and welfare of its employees, its reputation and standing
in the community and its special obligations to its host country. 139 Therefore, the act was not
justified as analogous to crimes or offenses committed against the person of the employer.
When is a cause an Analogous Cause?
By definition, a cause is analogous to another if it is susceptible of comparison with the
latter, either in general as in some specific detail, or has a relationship with the latter. 140 The
question of whether or not the cause of dismissal is analogous to the specific just causes
enumerated is a factual question, which involves consideration of the surrounding circumstance
present in the case. The succeeding discussion will provide cases of employee dismissal decided
by the Supreme Court using the ground of analogous causes and will show how the Court
concluded that the acts or omissions in question are analogous or not to the specific just causes
enumerated under the law.

137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Lim, G.R. No. 118434.
45
What are Analogous Causes as Decided by the Supreme Court?
One of the most commonly used cause for termination of employment is the just cause of
analogous causes.141 This is due to the uniqueness of facts of each case, which most of the time
do not fall on all fours with the lawful elements of specific just causes. The following are some
of the grounds considered as analogous causes of termination, among others according to
jurisprudence:
a. Gross Inefficiency/Incompetence
Gross inefficiency or incompetence means failure to observe prescribed standards
of work or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just
cause for dismissal.142 Such inefficiency is understood to mean failure to reach work
quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the period prescribed by
management, or by producing below-par results.
Gross inefficiency is closely related to gross neglect, for both involve specific acts
of omission on the part of the employee resulting to damage to the employer or to his
business.143 In the case of Lim v. NLRC, an employee was terminated from service on the
alleged ground of gross inefficiency. Petitioner held the position of Staff Accountant
whose job involves assisting and working closely with the Plant Accountant to carry out
the tasks necessary to ensure an accurate, timely, and coordinated compilation of data for
each accounting transaction. Basically, the job associated with the position involved the
preparation of cost production and cost accounting financial reports. Over the course of
her employment, petitioner received “BT” or Below Target rating in the management
141
Kua, supra note 30.
142
Buiser, G.R. No. L-63316.
143
Lim, G.R. No. 118434.
46
performance appraisal. The low ratings were alleged to be due to the erroneous
reconciliation of book and subsidiary balances of inventories in 1989 which were not
updated during the appraisal and the long unresolved discrepancies in the accounting
records.
The Supreme Court agreed with the respondent that gross inefficiency falls within
the purview of other causes analogous to the foregoing, and constitutes, therefore, just
cause to terminate an employee under art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code. 144 One is
analogous to another if it is susceptible of comparison with the latter either in general or
in some specific detail; or has a close relationship with the latter. 145 "Gross inefficiency"
is closely related to "gross neglect," for both involve specific acts of omission on the part
of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his business. 146|Both grounds
relate to the quality of the performance of the employee which is counter-productive to
the interest of the employer.
However, the Court ruled that the surrounding facts of the case do not actually
constitute gross inefficiency which could merit the petitioner’s dismissal. A “BT” or
Below Target rating in the management performance appraisal of the employer in the
present case was not the lowest rating an employee could receive. Undoubtedly, the
petitioner obtained an unfavorable rating, but not to the extent, under the company’s
standards, to warrant even a probationary measure which is given to the lowest rating of
Significantly Below Target (SB).147 If the employee in this case were instead given a
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
47
rating below “SB” indicating performance below position requirement margin, then the
dismissal would have been properly made based on gross inefficiency.
In Realda v. New Age Graphics, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that the failure to
observe prescribed standards of work or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to
inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal. 148 Such inefficiency is understood to
mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by failing to complete the same
within the allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. 149 The
petitioner in this case works as the operator of Graphics, Inc’s printer. His failure to
observe work standards and the procedures in printing, resulting to delays in delivery of
output, client dissatisfaction and additional costs to Graphics, Inc. shows that he is an
inefficient employee. The petitioner’s inefficiency was also aggravated by his
absenteeism and habitual tardiness. A careful perusal of the case shows that the petitioner
even wilfully incurred absences during times when the work load was heavy. In justifying
his eventual dismissal on the ground of inefficiency, the Court said:
Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight

little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct and ability separate and
independent of each other. x x x
Indeed, the employer cannot be compelled to retain a misbehaving
employee, or one who is guilty of acts inimical to its interests.150|
In another case,151 the petitioner who is a muffler specialist filed an illegal
dismissal case against his employer, alleging that his transfer to the Sucat plant and
withdrawing his supervisor’s allowance due to his failure to meet his sales quota was
148
Realda v. New Age Graphics, Inc., G.R. No. 192190, (2012).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Leonardo v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125303 (2000).
48
tantamount to a constructive dismissal, and that he was dismissed without just cause. The
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the legality of such demotion, stating that the
arrangement appears to us to be an allowable exercise of company rights. The Court said:
[t]he practice of a company in laying off workers because they failed to

make the work quota has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In the case
at bar, the petitioners' failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of
them constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the permanent
or probationary status of their employment. Failure to observe prescribed
standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to
inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal. Such inefficiency is
understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by
failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable period, or by
producing unsatisfactory results. This management prerogative of
requiring standards may be availed of so long as they are exercised in
good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest.152|||
The court in considering failure to meet sales quota as a just cause for
termination took into consideration that an employer is entitled to impose productivity
standards for its workers, and non-compliance of the same may be visited with a penalty
even more severe than demotion, such as dismissal. 153 In this case, the failure of the
petitioner to meet sales quota in five consecutive months in a company engaged in
marketing of auto parts is considered as gross inefficiency, analogous to the just cause of
gross neglect of duties.
Similarly, in the case of Aliling v. Feliciano, failure to achieve work quota was
considered by the Supreme Court as a just cause for termination, analogous to gross
inefficiency. In its decision, the Supreme Court said:
152
Leonardo, G.R. No. 125303, citing Philippine American Embroideries, Inc. v. Embroidery and Garment Workers
Union, G.R. No. L-20143, (1969).
153
Id.
49
An employee's failure to meet sales or work quotas falls under the concept
of gross inefficiency, which in turn is analogous to gross neglect of duty
that is a just cause for dismissal under Article 282 of the Code. However,
in order for the quota imposed to be considered a valid productivity
standard and thereby validate a dismissal, management's prerogative of
fixing the quota must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of its
interest.154
In the present case, even if the ground raised by the employer was considered by
the Court as an analogous cause, Aliling was held to be dismissed illegally due to the
employer’s failure to substantiate the former’s alleged failure to achieve his sales quota.
The decision in Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles lays down
the elements for a valid dismissal resulting from inefficiency:
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must

be shown that: 1) the employer has set standards of conduct and
workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the standards
of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the
employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior
to the employee's performance assessment.155
Neither of the elements requires the act or omission complained of to be gross or
habitual in character. Unlike gross and habitual neglect of duty, inefficiency in work or
incompetence is a form of neglect in duty but does not have the elements of grossness or
habituality. Poor or unsatisfactory performance of an employee does not necessarily
mean that he is guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duties.156
154
Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, (2012).
155
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170135,(2014).
156
Universal Staffing Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 177576, (2008).
50
b. Crimes Committed Against Co-Employee
The enumeration under art. 297 [282] expressly and explicitly provides as a just
cause the commission of crimes or offenses against the person of the employee, his
immediate family, or his duly authorized representatives. However, the law does not
expressly categorize crimes committed by the employee other than those directed against
the aforementioned persons.
In the case of John Hancock Life Insurance Corp. v. Davis, the respondent
employee was caught stealing the wallet of her co-employee; however she was never
convicted of the crime of theft because the case was dismissed. The labor arbiter found
respondent guilty of serious misconduct. However, upon appeal to the NLRC, the
decision was reversed since the theft was not committed against petitioner itself but
against one of its employees, and respondent’s misconduct was not work-related-
therefore, she could not be dismissed for serious misconduct.157
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the NLRC, saying that the Labor Code
talks of other analogous causes or those which are susceptible of comparison to another
in general or in specific detail.158 In this case, the Court likened the respondent’s act to the
ground of serious misconduct:
In this case, petitioner dismissed respondent based on the NBI's finding

that the latter stole and used Yuseco's credit cards. But since the theft was
not committed against petitioner itself but against one of its
employees, respondent's misconduct was not work-related and therefore,
she could not be dismissed for serious misconduct. x x x
A cause analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or willful act
or omission attesting to an employee's moral depravity. Theft committed
157
John Hancock Life Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 169549.
158
Id.
51
by an employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by
substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct.|||

Both the act of theft and ground of serious misconduct possess a common
element- an act or transgression which is willful and wrong in itself. The factual
circumstances show that the respondent was an Agency Administration Officer, and the
theft was committed against a Corporate Affairs Manager which is a position senior to
the former. This renders the respondent employee unfit to continue working for the
employer- an element present under serious misconduct. However, as what the Supreme
Court relied upon in ruling that the theft was an analogous cause, the absence of the
element of relation to work does not qualify the act as serious misconduct under the
Labor Code. The theft of the wallet was an act which is beyond the duties and
responsibility of the respondent, even if the same were committed within the company
premises. The theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer,
if proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct.159
In Oania v. NLRC, the employees were miners dismissed for having been accused
in the mauling another employee in the gasoline area within the company compound, in
violation of Article I, paragraph 1 of the company rules and regulations which states:
Inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily injury on the job-site on company

time or property for any reason, or attempting to inflict or inflicting bodily
injury anywhere at any time, in any dispute involving one's
employment.160
159
Id.
160
Oania v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 97162-64, (1995).
52
The Supreme Court in this case ruled that a violation of a company rule
prohibiting the infliction of harm or physical injury against any person under the
particular circumstances provided for in the same rule may be deemed analogous to
serious misconduct stated in art. 297 [282] (a).161 It was merely considered as analogous
to serious misconduct because the Court was not able to determine whether or not the
mauling incident was “work-related”- the lacking element for the act to fall squarely as
serious misconduct under the Labor Code.
However, in this case, the Court found the dismissal illegal because there was no
substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the petitioners were the actual
perpetrators of the mauling incident.
In another case,162 respondent employee was caught stealing cell phone of his co-
employee in violation of company rules and regulations. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in upholding the dismissal, saying that
the penalty of dismissal from service was improper on the ground that the said violation
did not amount to serious misconduct or wilful disobedience. 163 But the Supreme Court,
citing the case of John Hancock Life Insurance, said:
Theft committed against a co-employee is considered as a case analogous

to serious misconduct, for which the penalty of dismissal from service
may be meted out to the erring employee.164
161
Id.
162
Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. Fermin, G.R. No. 193676, (2012).
163
Id.
164
Cosmos Bottling Corporation, G.R. No. 193676, citing John Hancock Life Insurance Corporation, G.R. No.
169549.
53
The Court applied the similar reasoning in John Hancock Life Insurance in
justifying the theft of a co-employee’s cell phone as an act analogous to serious
misconduct. Again, the absence of work-related aspect of the act excludes the same from
falling under serious misconduct in art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code.
c. Employee Banned by Employer’s Client
An infraction committed by an employee against the employer’s client is a unique
cause for dismissal which is usually beyond the control of the employer. In dealing with
clients, an employee becomes a representative of his employer. This means that the
employee will be acting under the name of the employer and if the former commits an act
of grievance against the client, the same may be detrimental to the employer’s
relationship with the client. This justifies the dismissal even in the absence of its express
provision in the Labor Code, especially if the continuing employment would prove
inimical to the employer’s interest.
In the case of M.F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks v. NLRC, respondent employees
were hired as oiler tank truck drivers. The respondents were caught by the Petrophil
(client) authorities pilfering oil products by using a device to cheat in receiving and
delivering fuel from the compound to the points of delivery.165 By reason thereof, the
respondents were prohibited and banned from entering the Petrophil compound causing
them to abandon the trucks they were operating within the client’s premises. M.F.
Violago Oiler Tank Trucks hired new drivers, effectively replacing the respondents in
transacting with Petrophil.
165
M.F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks, G.R. Nos. L-56950-51.
54
In resolving the illegal dismissal case, the Supreme Court held that there was
nothing wrong with the replacement of the drivers. The factual circumstances show that
the petitioner employer has always insisted that it has nothing against its drivers, it wants
them to continue working, it does not suspect them of any wrong doing and it is ready to
resume their services as long as they can do the work for which they are employed.166
The respondents also demanded from the petitioner a formal investigation with
Petrophil, saying that the absence of the same would render their dismissal without cause.
However the Supreme Court noted:
The respondents were asking too much to have Violago produce the
results of a formal investigation by Petrophil that the private respondents
were found guilty of cheating in receiving oil products from Petrophil
depots and delivering the same to various delivery points. Petrophil had
no interest in expending time, money, and effort in conducting a full-
fledged investigation. It was wary of certifications that resulted in suits
against its officials. The complainants are not its employees. Assuming
that Violago and its four drivers could have demanded a formal
investigation under the arrangements with Petrophil and, if refused, gone
to court, Violago must have felt that it would be risking its entire hauling
contract with Petrophil if it went to that extent. Pressed for the kind of
evidence required by the respondent commission from Violago, Petrophil
may have cancelled the entire contract because of the formally proved
dishonesty of a few.167
The circumstances of the case show that had Violago demanded a formal
investigation with Petrophil, who has no interest in the employees involved, the same
could have caused Petrophil to cancel the entire contract with Violago due to the fault of
just a few. This was the impending danger to the company which caused Violago to
prevent the respondent employees from further dealing with Petrophil. In this case, the
employment was not terminated by the employer per se, but rather, it was due to the act
166
Id.
167
Id.
55
of the employer’s client which impeded the continuation of the employees’ rendering of
services.
In a similar case,168an employee driver of petitioner A. Marquez Inc. was found
guilty by the Coca-Cola management of theft consisting of cases of empty coke bottles.
The petitioner's act of assigning another driver to the cargo truck bound for the Coca-
Cola plant premises in replacement of the respondent employee was brought about by the
ban against the latter, prohibiting him from entering the Coca-Cola Plant premises. A
careful consideration of the circumstances shows that the employer has nothing to do
with the infractions committed by the employee against the client. Citing the M.F.
Violago Oiler Tank Trucks case, the Court said that the petitioner has been made
accountable for a predicament where it had no participation and to answer for
circumstances over which it had no control.169 Therefore, justice, fairness, and due
process dictate that the dismissal be considered as valid. The Supreme Court in this case
likewise upheld the legality of such assignment because by allowing the respondent to
continue driving to Coca-Cola on behalf the petitioner, the latter could have prejudiced
its hauling contract and the jobs of all other drivers for as far as Coca-Cola Plant was
concerned.170
In both cases, the Supreme Court did not expressly classify the ground as an
analogous cause. Neither did they categorize the grounds from each of the cases under
any of the specific just causes of dismissal under the Labor Code. The dismissals of the
employees were upheld primarily a measure of self-protection against an act which could
168
A. Marquez, Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 63227, (1984).
169
M.F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks, G.R. Nos. L-56950-51.
170
Id.
56
jeopardize the business of the employer. As can be gleaned from both cases, the acts of
the employees involved were considered prejudicial to the contractual relationship of
their employers with the clients. The continued employment of said employees proved to
be inimical to the employers’ interest.
d. Attitude Problems, Unreasonable Behaviour and Unpleasant Deportment
The attitude of the employees in the workplace can have a significant impact on
the business as a whole.171 Employees that have a negative attitude towards their
company are far more likely to be disengaged; fulfilling their jobs with the least amount
of work possible and at the lowest quality level. 172 As social beings, it is inevitable that
one employee’s positive or negative attitude can cause other employees to react and such
reaction can have a consequent effect on the quality of their performance. Jurisprudence
has long considered attitude problems as a just cause for termination. This is due to the
fact that an employee’s unreasonable behaviour may prove to be inimical to the
efficiency and work-dynamic of the workplace. Pursuant to the exercise of his
management prerogative, it is the right of an employer to protect his interests from such
adverse effect.
In Cathedral School of Technology v. NLRC, private respondent worked as a
library aide in a catholic institution. The administration began receiving complaints from
students and employees about private respondent's difficult personality and sour
disposition at work. When asked to settle her differences with the management, private
171
Linda Ray, The Effect of Employee Attitude on Productivity in the Workplace, available at
https://careertrend.com/effect-employee-attitude-productivity-workplace-3168.html (last accessed June 20, 2018).
172
Id.
57
respondent remained adamant in her refusal to submit to authority. As a result, she was
prevented from entering the school premises in view of her dismissal from service.
The Supreme Court in ruling for the just dismissal of private respondent said:
The reason for which private respondent's services were terminated,

namely, her unreasonable behavior and unpleasant deportment in dealing
with the people she closely works with in the course of her employment, is
analogous to the other "just causes" enumerated under the Labor Code. x x
x
As petitioner school is run by a religious order, it is but expected that good

behavior and proper deportment, especially among the ranks of its own
employees, are major considerations in the fulfillment of its mission.
Under the circumstances, the sisters cannot be faulted for deciding to
terminate private respondent whose presence "has become more a burden
rather than a joy" and had proved to be disruptive of the harmonious
atmosphere of the school.173
The complaints about her objectionable behavior were supported by her
actuations during her employ. Petitioner was informed of the negative reporst received by
her office regarding the latter’s frictional working relationship with co-workers and
students, yet she remained unreceptive of the advise. She even violently reacted to the
petitioner’s remarks and angrily offered to resign. In one instances when she was in a
meeting with the directress private respondent adversely reacted and unceremoniously
walked out on her superior upon being advised of the need to improve her working
relations with others, and arrogantly refused to clear up matters or to apologize therefore.
The conduct she exhibited on several occasion smacks of sheer disrespect and
defiance of authority and assumes the proportion of serious misconduct or wilful
173
Cathedral School of Technology, G.R. No. 101438.
58
disobedience or insubordination, any of which constitutes just cause for dismissal from
employment174 Under the circumstances, the school cannot be compelled to keep the
employment of the private respondent whose presence "has become more a burden rather
than a joy" and had proved to be disruptive of the harmonious atmosphere of the
school.175
In Citibank v. NLRC, private respondent was dismissed from service for not
being able to meet performance targets as a filing clerk under the Records Management
Unit. In addition to the poor performance appraisals, private respondent was found to
be very argumentative; have difficulty in working with others; is very hard to deal with
and that she never ceased being the subject of complaints from her co-workers. 176 The
appraisal reports consistently noted significant behavioral and attitudinal problems in
the private respondent. Her co-employees described her as “belligerent,” “had negative
presence which affects the morale of the entire unit,” and one who “pick[ed] fights with
peers and other employees even without provocation. She was informed of the fact that
her attitude needed reformation but the succeeding appraisal reports show no
improvement on her part.
In fact, an assessment of private respondent’s behavior by her superior revealed:
Less tangible but none the less real, are the common concerns raised by
her peers and supervisor, on the stress and tension created when Rose is
around. The conscious effort to 'get out of her way' and avoid conflict,
hinders productivity and efficiency and has adversely affected the morale
of the entire unit.177
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Citibank v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 159302, (2008).
177
Id.
59
The Supreme Court, citing the Cathedral School of Technology case, said:
The reason for which private respondent's services were terminated,

namely, her unreasonable behavior and unpleasant deportment in dealing
with the people she closely works with in the course of her employment, is
analogous to the other "just causes" enumerated under the Labor Code.178
It is respondent’s obstinate refusal to reform herself and the consequent effect of
such deportment to the overall productivity and efficiency of the unit which ultimately
persuaded the Supreme Court to find that her dismissal on the ground analogous to
serious misconduct was valid. When an employee, despite repeated warnings from the
employer, obstinately refuses to curtail a bellicose inclination such that it erodes the
morale of co-employees, the same may be a ground for dismissal for serious
misconduct.179
In another similar case,180 The Supreme Court also considered the respondent’s
attitude problem and poor deportment as a ground for termination. According to the
petitioner company, respondent’s attitude and strained relations with her co-workers
resulted to the decline in company’s efficiency and productivity. In this case, the
Supreme Court said:
An employee who cannot get along with his co-employees is

detrimental to the company for he can upset and strain the working
environment. Without the necessary teamwork and synergy, the
organization cannot function well. Thus, management has the prerogative
to take the necessary action to correct the situation and protect its
organization. When personal differences between employees and
management affect the work environment, the peace of the company is
affected. Thus, an employee's attitude problem is a valid ground for his
178
Citibank, G.R. No. 159302, citing Cathedral School of Technology, G.R. No. 101438.
179
Id.
180
Heavylift Manila Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154410, (2005).
60
termination. It is a situation analogous to loss of trust and confidence that
must be duly proved by the employer.181
Unlike in the first two cases, the decision in Heavylift Manila Inc. treated the
respondent’s attitude problem as a ground analogous to loss of confidence, instead of
serious misconduct. A careful examination of the facts shows that the respondent held the
position of an Insurance and Provision assistant. This fact is essential in understanding
why the Supreme Court ruled the way it did because the respondent held a position of
trust and confidence, such that the company considered that her unpleasant deportment
will render her unfit for the job.
e. Violation of Safety Requirements
A violation of safety requirements in the workplace is a cause analogous to
serious misconduct and willful disobedience or insubordination. Unlike serious
misconduct under just causes, not all violations constitute a misconduct or a wrong by
itself, nor they be considered grave or aggravated in character. Also, it is short of
becoming insubordination under the just causes because although it involves
disobedience of the rules, such omission is not necessarily inherent in the duties the
employer is engaged to discharge.
In Northern Motors v. National Labor Union, Respondent Alcantara was
dismissed by Northern Motors, Inc. for smoking in the painting booth of the petitioner,
on violation of its rules and regulations. The Supreme Court justified the dismissal by
saying:
181
Id.
61
Where the employer imposed and insisted in a regulation against smoking
in a painting booth to protect the very lives of its laborers, a violation
thereof by the latter is a just cause for outright dismissal.182
It is not disputed that Alcantara was an experienced painter and, having worked
with the petitioner for some time, he ought to know that smoking in a painting booth is
extremely hazardous and has been shown to be dangerous, because the painting booth
contained inflammable materials and there were painters who could proceed to take up a
spray gun and paint without warning, thereby multiplying the danger of conflagration
from any flame.183 In this case, the situation can neither be considered as serious
misconduct nor insubordination. Analogous to the ground of serious misconduct, the
violation consists of a transgression of some established and definite rule of action willful
in character, not implying mere error in judgment. 184 Analogous to the ground of
insubordination, the employee must be apprised of such safety requirements before he
could be dismissed for violating the same.
However, the proponent of this thesis finds fault in this ruling, such that the case
should have been decided as outright dismissal on the ground of serious misconduct. The
factual circumstances show that the safety requirement transgressed by the private
respondent was related to the performance of his duty as a painter. The gravity of such
transgression as earlier explained could have cost his life and that of his co-workers, in
case of conflagration. His inability to obey and understand a rule so basic and important
is sufficient to conclude that he is unfit for the job.
182
Northern Motors, Inc. v. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-10022, (1958).
183
Id.
184
DOLE D.O. No. 147-15, § 4(o).
62
f. Violation of Code of Conduct
Pursuant to the exercise of management prerogative, an employer has the right to
set standards and criteria for the qualification of employees before they can be hired.
These standards are also used to conduct continuing assessment of hired employees in
order to determine whether or not they are still fit for employment. An employer may
deny an applicant or terminate the employment of an employee if they do not possess
such qualification, as long as the standards set are reasonable, lawful and appropriate to
the circumstances of the job.
In the interesting case of Yrasuegui v. Philippine Air Lines, petitioner was an
international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the
weight standards of the airline company. The weight problem of the petitioner has been
incessantly addressed to him by the airline company, giving him several extended
vacation leaves for the same to be dealt with accordingly. However, despite the orders of
the airline company, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, so often that it was as if
he was willfully refusing to follow the directives.
The Supreme Court in ruling in favor of Philippine Air Lines said:
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other

conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an
employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as
prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would
thus fall under Article 282 (e) of the Labor Code. x x x
[T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the
employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must
maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the
company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing
qualifications for an employee's position. In this sense, the failure to
maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282 (a) whose express
63
terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for
dismissal. The failure to meet the employer's qualifying standards is in
fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is
therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) — the "other causes
analogous to the foregoing".
By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to
and after an employee is hired. They apply prior to employment because
these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be
hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet
these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this
perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can
be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can
be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job
irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or
intentional.185
In deciding the case, the Court took notice that an employee’s failure to meet the
employer's qualifying standards is a ground that does not squarely fall under serious
misconduct, because it does not amount to a dereliction in itself: being overweight by
itself is not a dereliction willful in character. Neither does it constitute willful
disobedience or insubordination because in this case, the element of willfulness is an
irrelevant consideration in arriving at the conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally
proper. The question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the
standard and whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this
standard.186 Therefore, the ground for dismissal must fall under analogous causes.
Also peculiar in this case is that the standard involved was in consideration of an
issue of flight safety. Therefore, prescribed weight standards are not discriminatory as
they are considered bona fide occupational qualification. Under the doctrine of bona fide
occupational qualification, an employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
185
Yrasuegui, G.R. No. 168081, (2008).
186
Id.
64
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that
sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. To
justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1)
that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the
job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the
job.187
The List of Analogous Causes for Termination is Non-Exhaustive
The grounds provided under this chapter is just a general enumeration since the
determination of what is analogous or not heavily relies on what the factual circumstances of
each case are, and the existence of some but not all of the elements of just causes. What is
analogous is often contested, thus giving the courts the power to rule on whether or not it is a just
cause for termination. The acts in issue may be similar in two separate cases, but the ruling of the
court is different, depending on the factual circumstances present in each case. For instance, in
both cases of Cathedral School of Technology v. NLRC and Heavylift Manila, Inc. v. CA, the
ground in issue was the attitude problem and unpleasant deportment of the employee to his co-
workers. However, in the first case, the court ruled that the respondent’s behavior is a cause
analogous to serious misconduct, being that the nature of the institution she was working in takes
good behavior and proper deportment, especially among the ranks of its own employees, as
major considerations in the fulfillment of its mission.188 On the other hand, the Court, in the
second case, ruled that the respondent’s behaviour constitutes a cause analogous to loss of
confidence. The facts of the case show that the respondent held the position of an Insurance and
187
Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774, (2006).
188
65
Provision assistant, a position of trust and confidence such that the company considered that her
attitude towards her work and her co-workers will render her unfit for the job.
In the list of jurisprudence discussed above, there seems to be a pattern which the
Supreme Court follows in deciding whether or not the ground at issue is an analogous cause.
First, the Court takes into consideration what the ground in issue is, in light of the factual
circumstances of the case. Then the court determines which specific just cause the ground in
issue is most analogous to. In doing so, the Court looks into the elements of the specific just
cause, and uses this in comparing the ground in issue, in light of the factual circumstances
surrounding it.
To illustrate, let us use the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Yrasuegui. The
first step is the Court to take into consideration the ground in issue, which in this case was
Obesity, in light of the factual circumstances of the case. Generally, Obesity is not aground for
termination by itself. A sales personnel who is obese cannot be legally dismissed from service
solely because of his obesity. However, the factual circumstances in Yrasuegui are different
because it involves an airline company, and flight attendants are subject to mandatory weight
standards. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. 189 Thus, airlines need
cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend
to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight
schedules.190 This is a bona fide occupational qualification.
Second, the Court determines which specific just cause the round in issue is most
analogous to. Obesity in light of the weight standards set by PAL is most analogous to Serious
Misconduct or Insubordination. Obesity is compared to Serious Misconduct and Insubordination,

189
Yrasuegui, G.R. No. 168081, (2008).
190
Id.
66
using their elements, respectively, as provided by the implementing rules and regulations. If the
ground in question fails to have at least one of the elements of the specific just cause to which it
is being compared to, the former shall be considered as a cause analogous to the latter.
In Yrasuegui, Obesity fails to fall squarely under Serious Misconduct because all the
elements are present except the first one, which requires that the ground must be misconduct by
itself. The tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food intake, is a
disease in itself, and as a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious
misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.191 Obesity also fails
to fall squarely under Insubordination because the element that the defiance must be wilful or
intentional is wanting. Given the circumstances of the case, the question to ask was not one of
willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and whether or not the employee qualifies
or continues to qualify under this standard. 192 Therefore, the ground in question-Obesity is an
analogous cause which justifies the dismissal of petitioner Yrasuegui,
From the discussion of the jurisprudence on analogous causes, it can be concluded that
validity of dismissals under analogous causes must be evaluated in the light of its background
and surrounding circumstances.193 Grounds falling under analogous causes are not limited to
those which have been discussed in this Chapter. The determination of what is an analogous
cause utilizes a contextual or a case-to-case basis approach. Therefore, it would be against the
intention of the law to make the enumeration exclusive, such that no dismissal may take effect
unless the ground used to cause the same is established or enumerated expressly. This argument
shall be further developed and explained in the next chapter, where the proponent will first lay
down the policy behind the Department of Labor and Employment’s Department Order No.
191
Yrasuegui, G.R. No. 168081, (2008).
192
Id.
193
Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor Union, G.R. No. L-15826, (1961).
67
147-15, before challenging the same, particularly the provision under section 5.2 (g) which has
the effect of making the list of just causes exclusive.
68
Chapter V
CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF SECTION 5.2 (g) OF DEPARTMENT ORDER
NO. 147-15, IN REQUIRING THE ENUMERATION OF ANALOGOUS CAUSES IN
THE COMPANY POLICY
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is the executive branch of the
Philippine government mandated to formulate and implement policies in the field of labor and
employment. It is tasked with the enforcement of the provisions of the Labor Code. Article 5 of
Labor Code provides for the rule making power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It
states:
Art. 5, Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and

Employment and other government agencies charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts
shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective
fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in
newspapers of general circulation.194
This specific provision of the Labor Code embodies the DOLE’s quasi-legislative power.
The Secretary is mandated to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations to
facilitate him in exercising his executive function. The administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies, such as the DOLE to interpret the law which they are entrusted
to enforce have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. 195 Pursuant to this rule-making
power, the Secretary of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 147-15, Series of
2015 to amend the rules and regulations governing the application of articles 297-299 of the
Labor Code.
LABOR CODE, art 5.

194
1 CESARIO A. AZUCENA JR., THE LABOR CODE WITH COMMENTS AND CASES 30 (2016), citing Rizal
195
Empire Insurance Group v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No, 73140, (1987).
69
The Guiding Principles under D.O. 147-15 state that the workers' right to security of
tenure is guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution and other laws and regulations, such that
no employee shall be terminated from work except for just or authorized cause and upon
observance of due process.196 The policy behind the issuance is to depart from the subjective
determination of causes of termination by providing substantive and procedural standards for
both the just and authorized causes of termination provided by law. Section 5.2 of the
Department Order specifically provides for the standards on the just causes of termination,
enumerating the elements which must be present to comprise a specific cause. Also present is a
provision pertaining to the standards to be applied in determining analogous causes under
Section 5.2 (g), stating:
(g) Analogous Causes – To be valid ground for termination, the

following must be present:
just causes; and
No act or omission shall be considered as analogous cause unless
expressly specified in the company rules and regulations or
policies.197 [emphasis supplied].
This section lays down the elements under the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) which make a certain ground analogous to the specific just causes under Art. 297 [282] of
the Labor Code. Similar to the other just causes, the ground cannot be considered as a cause
analogous to the foregoing if not all the elements are present. The intention behind such
provision is to limit the broad discretion that the management has with respect to the
determination of the analogous causes of termination. This is pursuant the general policy of the
196
DOLE D.O. No. 147-15, §1
197
DOLE D.O. No. 147-15, §5.2 (g).
70
Labor Code to afford protection to labor 198 and the Constitutional guarantee that no employee
shall be terminated from work except for just or authorized cause and upon observance of due
process.
Prior to the enactment of the Department Order, a cause is considered an analogous cause
if it (a) has an element similar to the specific just causes enumerated under art. 297 [282] 199 and
(b) it involves a voluntary or wilful act or omission of the employee. 200 To illustrate, suppose an
employee of an airline company rams an airplane to a wall where the plane was parked because
he was being grossly negligent. As a result, an essential part of the airplane was damaged,
rendering it unfit for flight. The rules and regulations of the airline provide for sanctions to erring
employees who have caused damage to company property. However the penalties range from
imposition of fines to suspension of work only; nothing in the company policy provides for the
termination of an employee for causing damage to property.
The employer wants to dismiss the erring employee for gross and habitual negligence.
However, the rules prescribe that in order for an employee to be terminated for gross and
habitual negligence; there must be a negligent act which is both gross and habitual. 201 In this
case, the employee cannot be terminated for such ground, since the act of negligence was
committed just once, despite the great damage that it has caused the airline company. Here, there
is no element of habituality.
198
LABOR CODE, art 3.
199
International Rice Research Institute, G.R. No. 97239.
200
Cosmos Bottling Corporation, G.R. No. 193676.
201
DOLE D.O. No. 147-15, § 5.2 (c).
71
However, given the circumstances in the case at bar, the employer alleges that the
employee can still be terminated under the ground of analogous cause. Taking into account the
loss resulting from the damaged aircraft, it would be impractical for the airline company to
require the employee to habitually ram the airplanes into the wall before the same can be validly
terminated. The element of a gross negligence arising from a willful or voluntary act performed
by the employee, even in the absence of habituality, may be considered as a cause analogous to
gross and habitual negligence. Therefore, the dismissal of the employee is legal.
The dismissal would be valid under the old rules. However, under the new department
order, the DOLE has set a new requirement in addition to the ones previously stated under the
IRR and jurisprudence. The last paragraph states that: “No act or omission shall be considered as
analogous cause unless expressly specified in the company rules and regulations or policies.”
This means before an employee can be legally terminated under an analogous cause, the same
must be expressly specified under the company rules and regulations or policies. Without
expressly specifying the analogous cause, the employee cannot be terminated under such ground
even if it has been proven by substantial evidence- the degree of proof required in cases of labor
disputes.202
Pursuant to this new rule, the employee in the hypothetical case cannot be dismissed,
based solely on the lack of employer’s express policy on termination of employees who have
caused damage to corporate property. This is regardless of the amount of damage caused to the
business of the employer. Such situation creates an impediment on the employer’s exercise of his
right to management prerogative.
202
Reno Foods, Inc. v. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa-KATIPUNAN, G.R. No. 164016, (2010).
72
Despite the policy behind the issuance in departing from subjective causes of termination
and the objective of imposing stricter standards in the determination of what may constitute as a
cause analogous to the just causes specified by law, the provision requiring that analogous causes
be expressly stated in the company rules and regulations or policies may be subject to abuse by
the employer. Generally, labor disputes such as cases of employee dismissals are subject to
judicial determination. However, the issuance in question allows the employer to include other
analogous causes for dismissal not usually accounted for as just causes, considering the nature
and circumstances of the employer’s business, and justify the same solely on account of it being
included in the company rules and regulations or policies. There is also the possibility that the
employer will just merely include in the company rules and regulations or policies a general
statement that “all cases analogous to the just causes of termination” shall be considered as a just
cause for employee dismissal to comply with the requirement of the issuance. Both of these
instances run counter to the objective of the Department Order, which is to impose a substantial
standard in the determination of analogous causes. Such abuse of the provision will have an
adverse consequence on the employee’s right to security of tenure which what the law aims to
uphold and protect in the first place, thereby allowing the employer to dismiss an employee for
an infraction solely because the same is expressly provided in the company rules and regulations
or policy as a ground punishable by dismissal.
This Chapter challenges the validity of section 5.2 of Department Order no. 174-15, in
requiring the enumeration of analogous causes to be expressly provided in the company policy,
for the following reasons:
73
a. The last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order runs counter to the
jurisprudence on Analogous Causes as a “catch-all” provision.
The discussion under Chapter IV shows how the Supreme Court applied
analogous causes in justifying the termination of an employee. A common theme in
the discussion of each of the cases is that the ground in issue is always short of an
element for it to qualify under any of the specific just causes of termination laid down
in art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code. Due to the absence of those elements, the
Supreme Court allows the same grounds to justify the dismissal but they are qualified
as analogous causes.
In this regard, the following grounds have been considered analogous causes
in jurisprudence: gross inefficiency,203 incompetence,204 employee banned by
employer’s client,205 attitude problem,206 and an unpleasant deportment at work, 207 a
violation of safety rules,208 and a violation of the code of conduct, 209 among others.
This is just a general enumeration of grounds since the determination of what is
analogous or not depends on what the factual circumstances of each case are, and the
existence of some but not all of the elements of just causes. Analogous causes, by
definition, shows that it is a catch all provision of all causes “susceptible of
comparison with the [just causes], either in general as in some specific detail, or has a
relationship with the latter.”210
203
Lim, G.R. No. 118434.
204
Leonardo, G.R. No. 125303.
205
A. Marquez, Inc., G.R. No. 63227.
206
207
Heavylift Manila Inc., G.R. No. 154410.
208
Northern Motors, Inc., G.R. No. L-10022.
209
Yrasuegui, G.R. No. 168081.
210
Lim, G.R. No. 118434.
74
For example, in the case of Cathedral School of Technology v. NLRC, the
ground of attitude problem and unreasonable work behavior is not a ground expressly
provided for by the Labor Code, and neither is it expressly provided as a ground for
dismissal in the school policy in the case. However, the Supreme Court took the
liberty to consider it as such and justify the dismissal of Vallejera under analogous
causes because her continued employment in the institution “has become more a
burden rather than a joy" and had proved to be disruptive of the harmonious
atmosphere of the school.211 In coming up with the decision, the Court took into
consideration the fact that Vallejera’s sour disposition and poor deportment in the
workplace; that the former librarian resigned because of Vallejera’s unreasonable
behavior and she always caused tension between her and her co-employees. The
school also received several complaints from both students and employees, which
materially affected the school. If it were not for the nature of analogous causes as a
“catch-all” provision for all other causes, then the school would have to be faulted for
not terminating an employee whose behaviour and deportment runs afoul against the
fulfilment of its mission as an institution run by a religious order.
The reason behind the inclusion of analogous causes as a ground is for the
protection of the rights of employers in instances where the acts or omissions of an
employee are by substantial evidence, proven to be to be inimical to the former’s
interest but do not fall squarely with the just causes of termination. It “catches” all
grounds which do not qualify as serious misconduct, insubordination, willful and
habitual neglect, breach of trust or crimes or offenses against the employer, as
provided by law and the rules.

211
75
b. The last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order negates the non-
exhaustive nature of the Just Causes of termination
As a consequence of analogous causes being a “catch-all” provision for just
termination, the enumeration under art. 297[282] of the Labor Code must therefore be
non-exclusive. Theoretically speaking, the list of “analogous causes” has no end since
all the law requires is that the employee’s willful or voluntary act or omission is
analogous to any of the other specific just cause.
The provision in art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code uses the term “and other
causes analogous to the foregoing” as the last item under the enumeration. The
language used in the law translates that the grounds should not be limited to just the
six items expressly stated. By inserting the “analogous causes” provision, the court is
given the discretion in determining whether or not a cause is similar to the specified
causes, in light of the factual circumstances present in the case.
As a rule of statutory construction, the legislative meaning and intention must
be sought first of all in the language of the statute itself. 212 The law is so couched to
show that just causes are meant to be non-exhaustive, because as supported by
jurisprudence, there are cases when the grounds used for dismissal do not fall
squarely with the elements provided for by the rules on the specific just causes- thus
the existence of the analogous causes. If the intention of the law were otherwise, then
the enumeration should have ended with item d.) Commission of a crime or offense
by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representatives.213
212
NOLI DIAZ, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 35 (4th ed. 2013).
213
LABOR CODE, art 297 (d).
76
With the issuance of D.O. 147-15, employers must first specify in their
company rules and regulations the specific acts and omissions that management
considers as an analogous cause for termination of employment before an employee
may be dismissed for the commission of such act or omission. This means that the
just causes of termination becomes exclusively limited only to those specified by the
law and the analogous causes expressly stated in the company rules and regulations or
policy. This has the effect of demanding from the employers an exhaustive list of all
possible analogous causes. Such a requirement appears unreasonable, if not
impossible. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The law must not require the impossible.
Lex injustitia non est lex. An unjust law is not a law.
c. The last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order is ultra vires to the
Labor Code provision.
The issuance of the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of a law is
pursuant to the quasi-judicial or rule-making power granted to the executive branch of
the government. The Secretary of Labor and Employment is granted the quasi-judicial
power to formulate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of the Labor
Code and other labor laws to facilitate his function in the execution of the same.
Department Order No. 147-15 was enacted pursuant to the rule-making power of the
Secretary of Labor to amend the rules governing just and authorized causes of
termination under arts. 297[282] to 299[284] of the Labor Code.
By rule of statutory construction, administrative rulings cannot be extended to
amend or expand statutory requirements. In Lokin Jr. v. COMELEC, the Supreme
Court mentioned that the rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not
77
subvert or be contrary to existing statutes.214 The function of promulgating IRRs is
solely for the purpose of carrying out the provision of the law.
As what has been discussed earlier, the enumeration of just causes of
termination is intended by the law to be non-exhaustive, corollary to its nature as a
“catch-all” provision for grounds of termination. However, D.O. 147-15 introduced a
new requirement that no act or omission shall be considered as analogous cause
unless expressly specified in the company rules and regulations or policies. As a
result, the list of just causes becomes limited only to those expressly provided by the
law and the analogous causes expressly provided in the company rules and regulation
or policies.
An act, provision, or law is ultra vires if it is performed or made beyond one’s
power or authority. D.O. 147-15, in requiring analogous causes to be expressly
specified by management is ultra vires to the provisions of the Labor Code. Nowhere
does the Labor Code require that analogous acts or omissions be expressly specified
in the company rules and regulation or policy. The requirement runs counter to the
intention of the law to keep the enumeration non-exclusive. D.O. 147-15 expanded
the statutory requirements in the Labor Code regarding analogous causes by requiring
the employers to anticipate all possible causes of termination. It is axiomatic that the
clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative
rule issued for its implementation.215 Administrative rules are valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws.216
214
Lokin Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, (2010).
215
Lokin Jr., G.R. Nos. 179431-32.
216
DAVID AQUINO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 239 (2015) citing CIVIL CODE, art 7.
78
The Supreme Court in one case217 laid down the requisites in which the
administrative IRRs must comply with to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable
Clearly, Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order No. 147-15 was promulgated
beyond the scope of the authority granted by the Legislature because it has the effect
of expanding the requirements set by the Labor Code with respect to analogous
causes. The rule is no longer consistent with the intention of the law: that is to keep
the list of just causes non-exclusive, subject to the Court’s determination. Also, the
requirement appears unreasonable, if not impossible. To demand an express
specification of all analogous causes is to demand anticipation of all things similar. 218
But the nature of analogous causes is something which cannot be preconceived
because its determination, as per jurisprudence, is highly dependent on the factual
circumstances of each case. It demands something the law does not require because it
borders on the impossible.
217
Lokin Jr., G.R. Nos. 179431-32.
218
AZUCENA JR., supra note 31.
79
Chapter VI
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
This study has set three specific objectives in mind: (1) to analyze cases of employee
dismissal using analogous causes as a ground and how these cases have been decided by the
Supreme Court; (2) to show the policy behind the law in maintaining the non-exhaustive
character of the just causes for termination using Supreme Court decisions; and (3) to challenge
the validity of the requirement set in the last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Department Order No. 147-15.
First, the proponent established the rights of the employer and employee; recognizing the
respective protection given by law and jurisprudence to both and showing how these rights clash
and interplay in a contract of employment. The discussion on the right to security of tenure and
management prerogative in light of employee dismissals highlights the fact that the State in
protecting the rights of employee authorizes neither oppression nor destruction of the employer.
Therefore, there is a need to strike a balance between the interests of employer employee.
This thesis succeeded in providing an analysis of jurisprudence involving analogous
causes, establishing that due to the uniqueness of facts of each case, which most of the time do
not fall on all fours with the lawful elements of specific just causes, the Supreme Court used the
ground of analogous causes to justify the dismissal of an employee regardless of whether or not
the same is provided for in the company rules and regulation or policies. The grounds which
have been considered analogous causes in jurisprudence such as gross inefficiency, 219
219
Lim, G.R. No. 118434.
80
incompetence,220 employee banned by employer’s client,221 attitude problem,222 and an unpleasant
deportment at work,223 a violation of safety rules,224 and a violation of the code of conduct,225
among others, are not limited by reason of the flexibility afforded to the application of analogous
causes that it became that catch-all provision for termination of employment based on just
cause.226
The provision under art. 297 [282] is so couched to show that the intention behind the
law is to keep the enumeration not exclusive to the ones expressly specified in the law. By
inserting the “analogous causes” provision, the court is given the discretion in determining
whether or not a cause is similar to the specified causes, in light of the factual circumstances
present in the case. As a rule of statutory construction, the legislative meaning and intention must
be sought first of all in the language of the statute itself. 227 What makes just causes non-
exhaustive is basically the inclusion of the phrase “and other causes analogous to the foregoing”
which makes the enumeration general in nature.
In challenging the validity of the Department Order, it is the stand of the proponent of
this thesis that:
First, the last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order runs counter the
jurisprudence on Analogous Causes as a “catch-all” provision. Analogous causes, by definition,
shows that it is a catch all provision of all causes “susceptible of comparison with the [just
causes], either in general as in some specific detail, or has a relationship with the latter.” 228 The
220
Leonardo, G.R. No. 125303.
221
A. Marquez, Inc., G.R. No. 63227.
222
Cathedral School of Technology, G.R. No. L-101438.
223
Heavylift Manila Inc., G.R. No. 154410.
224
Northern Motors, Inc., G.R. No. L-10022.
225
Yrasuegui, G.R. No. 168081.
226
Kua, supra note 30.
227
DIAZ, supra note 193.
228
Lim, G.R. No. 118434.
81
reason behind the inclusion of analogous causes as a ground is for the protection of the rights of
employers in instances where the acts or omissions of an employee are by substantial evidence,
proven to be to be inimical to the former’s interest but do not fall squarely with the just causes of
termination. It “catches” all grounds which do not qualify as serious misconduct,
insubordination, willful and habitual neglect, breach of trust or crimes or offenses against the
employer, as provided by law and the rules. The requirement imposed by the last paragraph of
Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order excludes all causes proven to be analogous but are not
specified in the company rules and regulations or policies.
Second, the last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order negates the non-
exhaustive nature of the Just Causes of termination. It is a rule of statutory construction that
verba non legis non est recendum. From the words of the statute, there should be no departure.
By requiring employers to specify all analogous causes before the same could be applied in
employee dismissal, renders the enumeration of just causes an exclusive one, which is a
departure from the intent of the law to keep the list open to accommodate all causes “analogous
to the foregoing (specific just causes).”
And finally, the last paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of the Department Order is ultra vires to
the Labor Code provision. By rule of statutory construction, administrative rulings cannot be
extended to amend or expand statutory requirements. The enactment of the paragraph in question
results to an expansion of the statutory requirements of analogous causes. . Nowhere does the
Labor Code require that analogous acts or omissions be expressly specified in the company rules
and regulation.
Therefore, it is the stand of the proponent of this thesis that the application of the last
paragraph of Section 5.2 (g) of DOLE Department Order No. 147-15 will encroach upon the
82
non-exhaustive character of analogous causes, and in effect, will be ultra vires to the Labor Code
provision on just causes of termination. The enumeration under art. 297 [282] of the Labor Code
is and should remain non-exclusive, subject to judicial determination.
It is therefore recommended that the last paragraph under section 5 (g) of Department
Order No. 147-15 should be deleted and amended to make it consistent with the true intention of
the law in making the list of just causes non-exhaustive.
The proponent of this thesis recommends that the rule should instead read as follows:
(g) Analogous Causes – To be valid ground for termination, the

following must be present:
just causes; and
An act or omission is analogous to another if it is susceptible of
comparison with the latter, either in general as in some specific
detail, or has a relationship with the latter. [emphasis supplied]
The amendment to the rule is an adoption of the jurisprudential principle in Lim v. NLRC
and others cases regarding the definition of what an analogous cause of termination is. One is
analogous to another if it is susceptible of comparison with the latter, either in general as in some
specific detail, or has a relationship with the latter. 229 This amendment aims to balance the
interests of both parties in an employment contract; that an employer shall be protected against
unreasonable impositions in the exercise of his management prerogative without compromising
the employees’ right to security of tenure. The last paragraph will serve as a standard on what
constitutes as analogous in addition to the first two elements provided by law: (a) that it must be
susceptible of comparison with any of the specific just causes; or (b) that it has a relationship
229
Id.
83
with any of the specific just causes. This is a better construction as it allows the employer to
exercise his right to determine the qualification and fitness of the workers, as well as the prudent
exercise of his right to dismiss pursuant to his right to freely manage and regulate his business
without having to burden him with the requirement of anticipating all possible grounds to
exhaustion, which is impractical and unreasonable. This will not in any way result to a
disadvantage on the part of the employees because the same measures of security will still apply
to them -they cannot be dismissed by the employer except only for just and authorized causes.
The question of what grounds shall be considered as analogous causes are still subject to judicial
determination. The advantage that this amendment will have on the part of the employers is that
they cannot be defaulted from dismissing an employee who is clearly unfit to continue
employment on the mere technicality that the same ground analogous to the specific just causes
was not expressly provided in the company rules and regulation or policies.
84
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92

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You Can’t Fire Me.

It’s not on the List: Dispensing with the

Restriction Brought About By Department Order No. 147-15

Series of 2015 on the Causes Analogous to the Just Causes of

Khenett Ramirez Puerto

“The fact that these overlapping claims of authority (labor and

Background of the Study

guarantee of security of tenure. Paragraph 2 of section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution

provides for the basis of security of tenure, which states:

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,

due process will render the act an illegal dismissal.

(Termination by Employer), Article 298 [283] (Closure of Establishment and Reduction of

conceivably opine otherwise.9

of constructive dismissal equivalent to illegal dismissal.11

and recall of workers.17 An owner of a business enterprise is given considerable leeway in

managing his own business.18

in the management of business enterprises. 19 By virtue of management prerogative, the Courts, as

judgment in the conduct of his business.21

However, the exercise of management prerogative is not absolute as it must be exercised

dismissed for just and authorized causes provided by law.

147-15, Series of 2015

As an employer, would you consider dismissing an employee who was considered

The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as

past jurisprudence regarding analogous causes- by a determination which is highly dependent on

cause for employee dismissal.

termination. Section 5.2 (g) states:

(g) Analogous Causes – To be valid ground for termination,

1. There must be act or omission similar to those specified

2. The act or omission must be voluntary and/or wilful on

No act or omission shall be considered as analogous cause

or authorized cause and upon observance of due process.

actually inimical to the employer’s interest.

In effect, the additional requirement appears unreasonable, if not impossible, as it

remain non-exclusive and subject to judicial determination.

A. Analogous Causes - One is analogous to another if it is susceptible of comparison with

(Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel) and 299 [284] (Disease as a

of the business, changing economic conditions and illness of the employee.35

C. Constructive Dismissal - Refers to the cessation of work because continued employment

has been rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely, as when there is a demotion in

rank or diminution in pay or both or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain

by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.36

E. Management Prerogative – Refers to the right of employer to regulate all aspects of

employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods,

processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their

work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of work.39

Objectives of the Study

This study aims:

1. To provide an analysis of and commentary on the jurisprudence involving employee

have been decided by the Supreme Court;

jurisprudential data regarding employee termination using analogous causes of termination,

Significance of the Study

of dismissal from service.44

Scope and Limitation

termination under art. 298 [283] of the Labor Code.

Organization of the Thesis

and the research methodology to be employed by the proponent in the study.

Chapter II will provide a discussion of employer’s management prerogative as opposed to

constitutionally guaranteed rights of an employee. The chapter is entitled Balancing of Interests

basically a comparison of grounds to those falling under the former.

regulations of Book VI of the Labor Code.

understand the interests of both parties involved in an employer-employee relationship before

going into the issue of employee termination.

a basis of what may potentially be considered as analogous causes of termination.