GUILLERMO M. TELMO, Petitioner, - versus - LUCIANO M. BUSTAMANTE, Respondent. G.R. No.

182567, July 13, 2009

FACTS:

 Respondent is a co-owner of a real property of 616 square meters in Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite,
known as Lot 952-A. 
 Petitioner and Elizalde Telmo (Telmos) are the owners of the two (2) parcels of land
denominated as Lot 952-B and 952-C, respectively, located at the back of respondents lot. 
 When his lot was transgressed by the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road,
respondent offered for sale the remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused because they
said they would have no use for it, the remaining portion being covered by the roads 10-meter
easement.
 On May 8, 2005, respondent caused the resurvey of Lot 952-A in the presence of the
Telmos. The resurvey showed that the Telmos encroached upon respondents lot.
 On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However, around 7:00 p.m. of
the same day, the Telmos and their men allegedly destroyed the concrete poles. The following
day, respondents relatives went to Brgy. Chairman Consumo to report the destruction of the
concrete poles. Consumo told them that he would not record the same, because he was present
when the incident occurred. Consumo never recorded the incident in the barangay blotter.
 Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any just compensation
from the government when it took a portion of their property for the construction of the
Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could not enjoy the use of the remaining part of their
lot due to the abusive, Illegal, and unjust acts of the or Telmos and Consumo. 
 Respondent charged the latter criminally for violation of Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code.
 The Ombudsman held Consumo to be administratively liable

ISSUE: Whether or not Consumo may abate nuisance

HELD:
 A careful reading of the foregoing provisions would readily show that they do not apply to the
respondents situation. Nowhere was it shown that the concrete posts put up by respondent in what he
believed was his and his co-owners property were ever declared dangerous or ruinous, such that they
can be summarily demolished by petitioner.
 
What is more, it appears that the concrete posts do not even fall within the scope of the provisions of
the National Building Code. The Code does not expressly define the word building. However, we find
helpful the dictionary definition of the word building, viz: 
[A] constructed edifice designed usually covered by a roof and more or less completely enclosed by
walls, and serving as a dwelling, storehouse, factory, shelter for animals, or other useful structure
distinguished from structures not designed for occupancy (as fences or monuments) and from structures
not intended for use in one place (as boats or trailers) even though subject to occupancy.
A nuisance per  se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Evidently, the concrete posts summarily
removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which would
have necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an
inconvenience to the public by blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.
Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City and MMDA – July 18, 2006 (G.R. No. 177807) MMDA vs.
Gancayco – May 10 2007 (G.R. No. 177933)

FACTS:
 The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City Government of Quezon City
and the Metro Manila Development Authority stemmed from a local ordinance pertaining to
Construction of Arcades, and the clearing of Public Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of
which he was able to obtain a building permit for a two-storey commercial building, which was
situated along EDSA, in an area which was designated as part of a Business/Commercial Zone by
the Quezon City Council.
 The Quezon City Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which orders the construction of
Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was amended to not require the properties
located at the Quezon City - San Juan boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle
Street to construct the arcades, moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have
his property, already covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the ordinance.
 MMDA on April 28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under Ordinance no. 2904, part of his
property had to be demolished, if he did not clear that part within 15 days, which Gancayco did
not comply with, and so the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or “wing walls.” Gancayco
then filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of
Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the demolition of his property, without due process and just
compensation, claiming that Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and selective. He sought
the declaration of nullity of the ordinance and payment for damages.
 MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot seek nullification of an ordinance that he already
violated, and that the ordinance had the presumption of constitutionality, and it was approved
by the Quezon City Council, taking to note that the Mayor signed the ordinance. The RTC,
however, declared that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio.
 CA partly granted the appeal, with the contention that the ordinance was to be modified; it was
constitutional because the intention of the ordinance was to uplift the standard of living, and
business in the commercial area, as well as to protect the welfare of the general public passing
by the area.

ISSUES: Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be constituted as a public nuisance.

HELD:
NEGATIVE.
The court decided that the wing wall of Gancayco’s building was not a nuisance per se, as under Art. 694
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures of endangers the health or safety of the others;
(2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstruct or
interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or
impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens. A nuisance
per se are those which affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be
abated under the undefined law of necessity. As Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to
construct the building, it was implied that the city engineer did not consider the building as such of a
public nuisance, or a threat to the safety of persons and property. The MMDA was only to enforce
Authoritative power on development of Metro Manila, and was not supposed to act with Police Power
as they were not given the authority to do such by the constitution, nor was it expressed by the DPWH
when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore, MMDA acted on its own when it illegally demolished
Gancayco’s property, and was solely liable for the damage.
[G.R. No. 132964. February 18, 2000]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-
Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN
BRANCH, respondents.

FACTS:
 David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman
(naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died
leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan.
 In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and
adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and registered it to the RD a year after.
 In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying her ½ share
of the properties to David. But since it was not registered, she executed another Deed of
Quitclaim to confirm the first.
 In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with documents showing that David’s
ownership of ½ of the estate was defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only
allows Filipinos to acquire private lands in the country. The only instances when a foreigner may
acquire private property are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born
citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim
executed by Helen were really donations inter vivos.
 Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that ½ of David’s interest be forfeited in its
favor. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos.

HELD:
NEGATIVE.
Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties by virtue of a Deed of
Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2) consequent increase in the
patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen’s (3) intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of
David was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey to her son
certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her rights over
these properties. It is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the
lands in favor of David, not a donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration to make the
donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but
an acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell
the same in his name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accept the
donation.

However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen in favor David valid.
There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance
when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and
adjudicating between them all the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the properties were
registered in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2
Quitclaims have no legal force and effect. Helen still owns ½ of the property.
Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112230. July 17, 1995

FACTS:
 In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU together with the
following conditions:

a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus” and any income from that land shall be
put in the fund to be known as “Ramon Lopez Campus Fund”.
 On May 31, 1989, the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation,
reconveyance & damages against CPU for not complying with the conditions. The heirs also
argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another
land owned by the latter.
 Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at the back of
petitioner’s certificate of title without a fixed period when to comply with such conditions? YES

HELD:

Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well the extinguishment or loss
of those already acquired shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the
condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build
upon the land a school is such a resolutory one. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of
the condition. If there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case, the
donation may be revoked & all rights which the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost &
extinguished.

More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the
opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor
forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a
term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve
no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.

Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the
time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner
has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to
declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as
donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by
means of reconveyance.
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,  vs. SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA
BRANOCO, Respondents. G.R. No. 172804               January 24, 2011

FACTS:

 Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva represented by his heirs, sued spouses Froilan and Leonila
Branoco, in the RTC of Naval, Biliran to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in
Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property
through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere, who, in turn, bought the Property from
Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes
soon after acquiring it.
 In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in
July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May
1965.
 RTC ruled for petitioner, rejected respondents’ claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a
donation mortis causa  which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere in
1970. Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to
transfer.
 CA reversed RTC decision finding that Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property as
owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the
Deed’s consideration was not Rodrigo’s death but her "love and affection" for Rodriguez,
considering the services the latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in
case Rodriguez predeceases her, implying its inclusion in Rodriguez’s estate; and (4) Rodriguez
accepted the donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos,
not devises. Further held that the sale to Vere is void for lack of title.

ISSUE: Whether the contract between the parties’ predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was
a donation inter vivos or mortis causa.

HELD:
The donation was inter vivos.
Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a Perfected Donation
We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title to Rodriguez upon its execution or
is effective only upon Rodrigo’s death – using principles distilled from relevant jurisprudence. Post-
mortem dispositions typically –
Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;
That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed;
That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that
the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa;
That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the
donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria; such statements are to
be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the
transferor.
That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa,
in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Insular v Ebrado G.R. No. L-44059 October 28, 1977

FACTS:
 Cristor Ebrado was issued by The Life Assurance Co., Ltd., a policy for P5,882.00 with a rider for
Accidental Death. He designated Carponia T. Ebrado as the revocable beneficiary in his policy.
He referred to her as his wife.
 Cristor was killed when he was hit by a failing branch of a tree. Insular Life was made liable to
pay the coverage in the total amount of P11,745.73, representing the face value of the policy in
the amount of P5,882.00 plus the additional benefits for accidental death.
 Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds as the designated beneficiary
therein, although she admited that she and the insured were merely living as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
 Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured. She asserts
that she is the one entitled to the insurance proceeds.
 Insular commenced an action for Interpleader before the trial court as to who should be given
the proceeds. The court declared Carponia as disqualified.

Issue: Whether a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married
man can claim the proceeds in case of death of the latter?

HELD:

NEGATIVE.
Article 739 provides that void donations are those made between persons who were guilty of adultery
or concubinage at the time of donation.
There is every reason to hold that the bar in donations between legitimate spouses and those between
illegitimate ones should be enforced in life insurance policies since the same are based on similar
consideration. So long as marriage remains the threshold of family laws, reason and morality dictate
that the impediments imposed upon married couple should likewise be imposed upon extra-marital
relationship.
A conviction for adultery or concubinage isn’t required exacted before the disabilities mentioned in
Article 739 may effectuate. The article says that in the case referred to in No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of the donee
may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
The underscored clause neatly conveys that no criminal conviction for the offense is a condition
precedent. The law plainly states that the guilt of the party may be proved “in the same acting for
declaration of nullity of donation.” And, it would be sufficient if evidence preponderates.
The insured was married to Pascuala Ebrado with whom she has six legitimate children. He was also
living in with his common-law wife with whom he has two children
ZAMBOANGA BARTER TRADERS KILUSANG BAYAN, INC., Petitioner, -  versus  - HON. JULIUS RHETT J.
PLAGATA, Respondents. G.R. No. 148433, September 30, 2008

FACTS:
 Pursuant to the PD No. 93 by President Marcos, ZBKTBI and the RPH entered into a Deed of
Donation whereby ZBTKBI donated to the Republic a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6 of
consolidation subdivision, situated in the Barrio of Canelar, City of Zamboanga. Which contains
the provision: That in the event barter trading shall be phased out, prohibited, or suspended for
more than one (1) year in Zamboanga City, Philippines, the afore-described parcel of land shall
revert back to the DONOR without need of any further formality or documentation, and the
DONOR shall have the first option to purchase the building and improvements thereon.
 Pursuant to condition of the Deed of Donation, (DPWH) constructed
a Barter Trade Market Building worth P5,000,000.00 at the said Lot No. 6. The building was
completed and was occupied by members of ZBTKBI, as well as by other persons engaged in
barter trade.
 Before the Donation, Teopisto Mendoza was hired as clerk by ZBTKBI and was subsequently
terminated.
 Mendoza filed before (DOLE), a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with payment of backwages and
separation pay. 
 Labor Arbiter Abdulwahid rendered his decision finding the dismissal of Mendoza illegal and
ordered ZBTKBI to reinstate Mendoza to his former position or any equivalent position, and to
pay him backwages.
 ZBKTKBI appealed with the NLRC which dismissed the appeal. Execution was issued but the
same was unsatisfied for the Inc has no money or savings.
 The Decree was subsequently phased out by the president, which cancels the donation of
ZBTKBI and paved way for the sheriff to levy some assets of the ZBKTBI.
 Mendoza was issued a writ of possession by Plagta thru which, Mendoza was able to possess the
property.
 Upon appeal to CA, CA denied ZBKTBI’s appeal.
 CA granted Canelar Trading Storeholders motion for intervention

ISSUE: Who is the owner of the property at the time of the auction sale?

HELD:
ZBKTBI.
It is clear from condition number 4 that the property donated to the Republic, in the event that barter
trading was phased out, prohibited or suspended for more than one year in Zamboanga City, shall revert
to the donor without need of any further formality or documentation.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. 
When a deed of donation, . . . expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property
donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of
the Civil Code.  Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such
stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the
very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation,
without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of
the rescission sought.  Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
ALFONSO QUIJADA, ET AL, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGALADO MONDEJARET.
AL, respondents. [G.R. No. 126444. December 4, 1998]

FACTS:
 "Plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners) are the children of the late Trinidad Corvera Vda. de
Quijada. Trinidad was one of the heirs of the late Pedro Corvera and inherited from the latter
the two-hectare parcel of land subject of the case, situated in the barrio of San Agustin,
Talacogon, Agusan del Sur. On April 5, 1956, Trinidad Quijada together with her sisters Leonila
Corvera Vda. de Sequea and Paz Corvera Cabiltes and brother Epapiadito Corvera executed a
conditional deed of donation of the two-hectare parcel of land subject of the case in favor of the
Municipality of Talacogon, the condition being that the parcel of land shall be used solely and
exclusively as part of the campus of the proposed provincial high school in
Talacogon. Apparently, Trinidad remained in possession of the parcel of land despite the
donation. 
 On July 29, 1962, Trinidad sold one (1) hectare of the subject parcel of land to defendant-
appellant Regalado Mondejar. Subsequently, Trinidad verbally sold the remaining one (1)
hectare to Regalado Mondejar without the benefit of a written deed of sale and evidenced
solely by receipts of payment. 
 In 1980, the heirs of Trinidad, who at that time was already dead, filed a complaint for forcible
entry against Regalado Mondejar, which complaint was, however, dismissed for failure to
prosecute. 
 In 1987, the proposed provincial high school having failed to materialize, the Sangguniang Bayan
of the municipality of Talacogon enacted a resolution reverting the two (2) hectares of land
donated back to the donors
 Eventually, the Municipality, failing to construct the high school, reverted ownership to the
donors. Petitioners filed an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession and
ownership. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, but CA reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether the deed of donation had a suspensive condition or a resolutory condition

HELD:
When a person donates land to another on a condition. The condition imposed is not a condition
precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one.
When the donation was accepted, the ownership was transferred to the school, only subject to a
condition that a school must be constructed over the lot. Since ownership was transferred, and failure
to fulfill the condition reverts the ownership back to the donor, it is a resolutory condition.
When Trinidad sold the parcels of land to Mondejar, she was not the owner of the land. Petitioners also
did not sleep on their rights to recover the possession and ownership over the property since they
immediately filed the action when the municipality passed the resolution, reverting the ownership of
land to the donors. However, a sale being a consensual contract, it can be perfected upon meeting of
the minds, and completing the three essential elements of a valid contract of sale. Even when Trinidad
was not the owner when the sale was perfected, tradition through delivery is only important upon the
consummation stage. Such transfer of ownership through actual or constructive delivery only happened
when the lands reverted back to petitioners. Art 1434 is applicable, stating that seller's "title passes by
operation if law to the buyer," and therefore making the sale valid. The donated lots cannot be
considered outside the commerce of man, since nowhere in the law states that properties owned by
municipality would be as such.