Special Proceedings Doctrine - Loti Notes

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Tan vs Del A final judgment rendered against the judicial administratrix of an intestate estate in a case where
Rosario she is plaintiff and the administratrix of another intestate estate is the defendant, in which she
seeks to secure an accounting of funds alleged to have been delivered in trust by the deceased
represented by the plaintiff administratrix to the other deceased represented by the defendant
administratrix, constitutes res judicata in another case where the heirs of the alleged donor are
plaintiffs and the administratrix of the supposed trustee is defendant, and in which the partition of
the same funds and the products thereof is sought between the heirs of both, under the same
allegation of trust, the alleged trustee being the adopted child of the donor.
Gatmaitan vs
Medina - 1960 partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate or intestate
proceedings should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases,
such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is
that courts should guard with utmost zeal the estate of the decedent to the end that creditors be
adequately protected and rightful heirs assured of their shares in the inheritance.
The order of partial distribution appealed from is unwarranted. Firstly, because it was prematurely
issued, the period for the presentation of claims not having as yet elapsed; and secondly, because
no bond was fixed by the court as a condition precedent to the partial distribution ordered by it.
Lim vs CA Rules on ordinary civil actions apply to SPECPRO
Ventura vs Rule 17 Sec 3 on failure to prosecute = not RES JUDICATA on subsequent refiling of petition to
Ventura submit a will to probate - since submission of will to probate is imprescribtible
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise declared by the court.
Matute vs CA Demurrer to Evidence = applicable in SPECPRO
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.
The jurisdictional amount is determined by the total value of the estate, not by the value of the
particular property or portion of the estate subject to administration, since the question of
administration is merely incidents to the principal proceeding for the settlement and distribution of
the whole estate.
The scope of a co-administrator's trust encompasses the entire estate and is co- extensive in effect
with those of the other administrators; consequently, the value of the entire estate should be the
proper basis of the jurisdictional amount irrespective of the value of the particular property or
assets of the estate which are the objects of a separate administration pending the settlement
proceedings.
Where a co-administrator is designated to administer a portion of the estate, he is no less an
administrator of the whole because his judicious management of a mere parcel enhances the value
of the entire estate, while his inefficient or corrupt administration thereof necessarily diminishes
the value of the whole estate. Moreover, when two or more administrators are appointed to
administer separate parts of a large estate they are not to discharge their functions in distant
isolation but in close cooperation so as to safeguard and promote the general interest of the entire
estate.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 1

Probate judge enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the matter of the removal of executors and
administrators and he can cause their ouster at his own instance. However, before they are
deprived of their office they must be given the full benefit of a day in court, an opportunity not
accorded to the respondent herein.||| (Matute v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-26751, L-26085 &
L-26106, [January 31, 1969], 136 PHIL 157-208)
DEFECT IN ACCOUNTING WHICH IS PENDING APPROVAL IS NOT A GROUND FOR
REMOVAL OF ADMINISTRATOR WITHOUT PROOF OF WILLFUL NEGLIGENCE.
FAILURE TO PAY TAXES DUE FROM THE ESTATE IS PER SE NOT A COMPELLING
REASON FOR THE REMOVAL OF AN ADMINISTRATOR. In the case at bar there is no
evidence that the nonpayment of taxes was willful
HEARING AND NOTIFICATION TO ALL KNOWN HEIRS AND INTERESTED PARTIES IS
ESSENTIAL FOR PROCEEDINGS IN THE APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR
The provision of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court that if "there is no remaining executor or
administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person," cannot be used to justify the
institution of Jose S. Matute even without a hearing because such institution has no factual basis
considering that there was a general administrator (Carlos V. Matute) who remained in charge of
the affairs of the Matute estate after the removal of Matias S. Matute.
Rule 83 of the Rules of Court evidently envisions a situation when after the removal of the
incumbent administrator no one is left to administer the estate, thus empowering the probate court,
as a matter of necessity to name a temporary administrator (or caretaker), pending the appointment
of a new administrator after due hearing.
ALAN JOSEPH
A. SHEKER vs.
ESTATE OF Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints
ALICE O. and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the
SHEKER payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate
proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was
initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all
persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the
estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to
certain exceptions.
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's
estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate
action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being
an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.z
Trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services
rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even
without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the
judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the
payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower
court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it
is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v.
Court of Appeals, 12 the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not
been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its
discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest
of substantial justice

The filing of a money claim against the decedent's estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we
held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: . . . This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the
affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the
decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue.
VENUE
QUIAZON VS
BELEN In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. As thus
defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;(b)
If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty
(30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration
be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings,
the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
San Luis vs San From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
Luis of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court0 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
FRIANELA VS Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises's estate. Thus, from a
BANAYAD JR reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. 18 The RTC therefore committed gross error when it
had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it
did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu
proprio by the courts. 19 Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the same
ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or
may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.

Clearly, then, in Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has only been raised during the execution
stage, specifically when the matter of the trial court's denial of the surety's motion to quash the
writ of execution has been brought to the appellate court for review. Here, the trial court's
assumption of unauthorized jurisdiction over the probate proceedings has been discovered by the
Court during the appeal stage of the main case, not during the execution stage of a final and
executory decision. Thus, the exceptional rule laid down in Tijam cannot apply.
CUENCO VS CA Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will
has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and
resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate
petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to
take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer
to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss
Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal
motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate
before that court
Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to
the Quezon City court.
Testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. If in the course of intestate proceedings pending
before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the
probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and
turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is
understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. Proceedings for the probate of a will
enjoy priority over intestate proceedings."
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
= The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could
probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City
court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken
cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15,
1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court
concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become
final and can not be overturned in a special civil action of prohibition.
DE BORJA VS CFI in its capacity as a probate Court is clothed with a limited jurisdiction which cannot expand to
DE BORJA Collateral matters not arising out of or in anyway related to the settlement and adjudication of
the properties of the deceased for it is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a probate Court is
limited and special. Although there is a tendency now to relax this rule and extend the
jurisdiction of the probate Court in respect to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers, this should be understood to comprehend only cases related to those powers
specifically allowed by the statutes.
A counterclaim for moral damages demanded by an administrator against the heirs for alleged
utterances, pleadings and actuations made in the course of a proceeding, is an extraneous matter in
a testate or intestate proceedings. The injection into the action of incidental questions entirely
foreign in probate proceedings should not be encouraged for to do otherwise would run counter to
the clear intention of the law.7)

MAGBANUA VS If the claimant in Sikat vs. Viuda de Villanueva was held guilty of laches for failing to institute the
AKOL proper intestate proceedings within the period of three years, there is more justification for ruling
that the herein appellants cannot recover upon their claim, it appearing that more than eighteen
years had elapse after the death of their debtor, Julio Magbanua, and before the institution of the
latter's intestate proceedings.
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
A creditor to institute an intestate proceeding through the appointment of an administrator for the
purpose of collecting his credit.
Uy vs CA It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the
preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased
spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint
another person. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a
great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such
judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below
was in error.
In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court. Instead of
removing petitioner, it appointed private respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator since the
estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it alone.
A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular
administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. 15 The practice of appointing co-
administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited.
The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons
either summarily or through the process of administration.
Heirs of Reyes vs The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of
Reyes the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of
administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is as a rule, an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve
title.
Respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject properties to the
estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudiced to the outcome of any action to be brought
thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the subject properties are
still titled under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which
under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner
indicated in the law. The declaration of the provisional character of the inclusion of the subject
properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate
Court.
RTC acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to
the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property
consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.

The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the
rule. It bears stress that the purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on
ownership was for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be
included in the inventory which is within the probate court's competence. Thus, when private
respondent Cesar Reyes was appointed as administrator of the properties in the court's Order dated
July 26, 1989, he was ordered to submit a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal
properties of the estate which may come into his possession or knowledge which private
respondent complied with. However, petitioner Oscar Reyes submitted his objection to the
inventory on the ground that it included the subject properties which had been forfeited in favor of
the government on April 21, 1975 and which he subsequently redeemed on August 19, 1976.
Notably, the Probate Court started, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for the
merits of accounting and inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Oscar Reyes
to the inventory as well as the respective evidence of the parties to determine the purpose of
inventory alone if they should be included therein or excluded therefrom. In fact, the probate court
in its Order stated that "for resolution is the matter of the inventory of the estate, mainly to
consider what properties should be included in the inventory and what should not be included."
There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for its final
resolution. Thus the respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
pass upon the issue of ownership conclusively.)
BAGAYAS VS ISSUE: whether or not the dismissal of the earlier complaint on the ground that it is in the nature
BAGAYAS of a collateral attack on the certificates of title constitutes a bar to a subsequent petition under
Section 108 of PD 1529.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is
not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often
than not, represented by that document.
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. 41 (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically
pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title
issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack.
Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for annulment of sale on the
ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando's
title to the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate of title over the same.
While the RTC may have made a definitive ruling on petitioner's adoption, as well as the forgery
of Eligia's signature on the questioned deed, no partition was decreed, as the action was, in fact,
dismissed. Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the legally adopted child of Maximino
and Eligia did not amount to a declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which
petitioner may institute an action for the amendment of the certificates of title covering the
subject land. More importantly, the Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make
a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action, for matters relating to the rights of filiation
and heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. ||| (Bagayas v. Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, [September 18,
2013], 718 PHIL 91-104)
IGNACIO VS Corollarily, in the case of Agtarap v. Agtarap, et al., the Court enumerated the instances when the
REYES intestate court may pass upon the issue of ownership, to wit: First, the probate court may
provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate
court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination
of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.
The co-ownership of the said properties by virtue of the certificates of title is a common issue in
the complaints for partition filed before the Baguio RTC. Thus, the intestate court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it asserted jurisdiction over the subject properties since its
jurisdiction relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. Any decision that the intestate court would render on the title of the properties would at
best be merely provisional in character, and would yield to a final determination in a separate
action.
Camaya v.
Following Cuizon vs Ramolete, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further
Patulandong
declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the effect of
depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties
and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third
parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no
authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property
Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which reads: SECTION 48.
Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law, petitioners' titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and void
Luy Lim vs CA Where the parcels of land are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, the
jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs. ALCID is of great essence and finds applicability,
thus: "It does not matter that respondent administratrix has evidence purporting to support her
claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens Title in their favor, which
under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner
indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere
incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of
such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until
his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case
at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. . . ." A perusal of the
records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner to
bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties.
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are
in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which
under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness
of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed.
Natcher vs CA The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, was devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in
favor of herein petitioner. In this case, the RTC of Manila was not properly constituted as a
probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent to his
wife, herein petitioner. The petition was, therefore, dismissed.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. While it may be true that the Rules
used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court
when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".

This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules
and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its
limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as
well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.
Nittscher v. The authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound
Nittscher mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. 12 Thus,
petitioner's claim of title to the properties forming part of her husband's estate should be settled in
an ordinary action before the regular courts.
VALERA VS QUICK FACTS = complaint in intervention // Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the
INSERTO Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond, based on a
contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 But Judge Adil
dismissed his complaint
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely
provisional, not binding on the property with any character of authority, definiteness or
permanence, having been made only for purposes of inclusion in the inventory and upon evidence
adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as against
its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose
right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These
considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in
the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to
rule.
If the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court
would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by the
administrator to recover the property. Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the
Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention,
after obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the
question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It
dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge.
RODRIGUEZ VS Lastly, noteworthy is the fact that even if the probing arms of an intestate court is limited, it is
RODRIGUEZ = equally important to consider the call of the exercise of its power of adjudication especially so
Exception applied when the case calls for the same, to wit: While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting
in this case in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue
orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less true
that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised
judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
The facts obtaining in this case call for the determination of the ownership of the funds contained
in the BPI joint account; for the intestate estate of Reynaldo has already been extrajudicially
settled by his heirs. The trial court, in this case, exercised sound judiciousness when it ruled
out the inclusion of the BPI joint account in the estate of the decedent.
Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional
question. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be
waived."

Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate court exercises
limited jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to ownership when the claimant and all other
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of
the question to the probate court for adjudgment. Such waiver was evident from the fact that the
respondents sought for affirmative relief before the court a quo as they claimed ownership over
the funds in the joint account of their father to the exclusion of his co-depositor. Said affirmative
relief is embodied in respondents' claim of ownership over the funds in said joint account to the
exclusion of Anita, when in fact said funds in the joint account was neither mentioned nor
included in the inventory of the intestate estate of the late Reynaldo. Therefore, respondents
impliedly agreed to submit the issue of ownership before the trial court, acting as an intestate
court, when they raised an affirmative relief before it. To reiterate, the exercise of the trial court of
its limited jurisdiction is not jurisdictional, but procedural; hence, waivable.
COCA vs
BORROMEO =
exception to the
general rule that
questions of title As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or
should be intestate proceedings but should be ventilated in a separate action except when justified by
ventilated in a expediency and convenience, as when the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
separate action collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired.
When the probate court had already received evidence on ownership of land and the only
interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding, the just
expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the parties claiming ownership to file in the
intestate proceeding a motion in the form of a complaint, setting forth their claim and stating the
ultimate facts in support of their claim, copies of which should be served to the opposing parties
who should answer the same within 15 days from receipt. After the issues had been joined and no
amicable settlement had been reached, a full-dress hearing should be held. The decision of the
issue as to what constitutes the estate of the deceased should include the partition thereof.
ROMERO VS CA While it is true that a probate court's determination of ownership over properties which may form
= exception part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is applicable only as between the
applied representatives of the estate and strangers thereto. There is also authority abroad that where
the court is without jurisdiction to determine questions of title, as for example, as between the
estate and persons claiming adversely, its orders and judgments relating to the sale do not
render the issue of title res judicata.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 19 the Supreme Court declared that the determination of whether
a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests
with the probate court
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the allegedly illegal sale are
conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory
of the estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can
competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the
probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the heirs, after
the debts of the estate have been paid.
Again, petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or ownership. They are, in effect,
questioning the validity of the sales made by the administrator, an issue that can only be properly
threshed out by the probate court.

Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present action. Thus, the validity of the
sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by petitioners' co-heir, Vittorio, can only be
determined by the probate court, because it is the probate court which is empowered to identify
the nature of the property, and that has jurisdiction over Aurora's actions and dispositions as
administrator. In Peñaverde v. Peñaverde, 26 the Court even adjudged the petitioners guilty of
forum-shopping for filing a separate civil action despite the pendency of the said petitioners' own
case seeking that letters of administration be granted to them. Similar to the case at bar, the
petitioners in Peñaverde also sought the annulment of titles in the name of their co-heir: The two
cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, which seeks letters of administration
for the estate of Mariano Peñaverde; and (2) Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which seeks the
annulment of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Peñaverde and the
annulment of titles in his name as well as the reopening of the distribution of his estate.
Pereira vs CA ISSUES: Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate
without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as
the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main
questions which need to be resolved in this case.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one,
should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in Section 1
of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due
from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do
not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1
allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an
ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good
reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an
administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have
good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in
or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good
and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to
be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for
her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these
properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently.
We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira,
which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been
extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar
nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly
ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected
in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending
was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the
estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding.

Heirs of Ypon vs In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that
Ricaforte matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court
in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the
case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be
an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this
case, was for the recovery of property.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case
had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, 23 or
when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence,
there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of
the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Republic vs There is no showing that Doña Demetria left any other property that would have required special
Mangotara = administration proceedings. In the spirit of thePortugal, Gabatan, and Fidel cases, the Court deems
exception applied it more practical and expeditious to settle the issue on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship in Civil
Case No. 4452.
Heirs of Gabatan Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
vs CA = exception contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense
applied with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir
of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and
consequently rendered judgment thereon.
Spouses Fidel vs While respondents' principal action was for the annulment of the sale and not an action to
CA = exception impugn one's legitimacy and that one's legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action
applied seasonably filed by the proper party, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of respondents to
the deceased Vicente for the purpose of determining what legal rights respondents have in the
property. In fact, the issue of whether or not respondents are heirs of Vicente was squarely raised
by petitioners in their Pre-Trial Brief filed on April 26, 1995, before the trial court, hence they
are now estopped from assailing the trial court's ruling on respondents' status
Rebusquillo vs Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed
Spouses Galvez = by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal
exception applied teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of
petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses
Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of
Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject
land. As confirmed by the RTC in its Decision, respondents have stipulated and have thereby
admitted the veracity of the following facts during the pre-trial:
Heirs of Sandejas The procurement of the court approval is a suspensive condition that gave birth to the subject
vs Lina contract upon its fulfillment. However, as petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal
shares in the disputed lots, the sale only affected the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro, Sr. On the
collateral issues, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the intestate court in approving the subject
contract as it will settle the decedent's obligation to respondent. That it was Lina, as intervenor,
who filed a motion for the approval of their contract, is not material. He is a proper party as
he stands benefited or injured by the judgment.

Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court. Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of
heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership. In other
words, they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A
stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale
as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia
legis, but only with the court's permission.
Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and
the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal
of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise
encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the
estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be
immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries. In the present case, the Motion for
Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation
clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate
action — on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed
realty — will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides: "SECTION 8.
When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice.
Effect of deed. — Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed
real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application
for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property according to
such contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the
court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of
the court shall execute the deed.
Section 8, Rule 89 should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically
requiring only the executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage
or otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section
2); or for authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and
other interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or
expenses of administration (Section 4). Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize the
conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased entered into while still alive. While this
Rule does not specify who should file the application, it stands to reason that the proper party
must be one who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to
the avails of the suit.
Union Bank of the In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
Philippines vs will has been probated. In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
Santibanez after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person
to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides
no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with
those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.

Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-
judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just
divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the
instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of
the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and
the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and
respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature
act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against
the estate of the deceased.
remedy of bank after debtor's death = file money claim
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a
creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate
court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 — All claims for money against the decedent, arising
from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator
commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime,
the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due,
or contingent, may be approved at their present value)
As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of
course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the
matter further.
Hilado vs CA = ISSUE: Evidently, the merits of petitioners' claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil
cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for
damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the
estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate
proceedings?
While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant". We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as
set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
contingent claims.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any
persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which
recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and
to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice
of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any
other persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a
"person interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87,
which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the
decedent's title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time
and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator's account "to persons interested;"
(6) Section 7 (b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested"
before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of
the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition
for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are
either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to
creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and
published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. However, it appears
that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection
with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not
fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records
indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully
impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case 21 was already pending review
before this Court at the time of Benedicto's death.
"[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their
interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action"
Petitioners' interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable
interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just
creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified
capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based
on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the
time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been
distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate
proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in
those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect
their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such
interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by
petitioners

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is
an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings
upon them Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to
any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice.
The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule
85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7 (b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and;
(3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the
estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal
of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while
Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within
one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that
there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose
claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the
administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets
of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the
interests of those with contingent claims against the estate. C
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is
to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the
provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not
doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief.
After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to
answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to
fulfill such purpose.
RULE 74
Buot vs Dujali in We have reviewed the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of her petition for letters
re Pereira vs CA of administration and rule that these do not suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio's estate
to administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover
Gregorio's entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of
the estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether an
extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the entire estate may be considered valid do not
automatically create a compelling reason to order the administration of the estate. Parties
seeking to challenge an extrajudicial settlement of estate possess sufficient remedies under the law
and procedural rules.
An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot's entitlement to participate in the
proceedings as an heir. 33 Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to the
properties that ought to be included in the partition and the true heirs entitled to receive their
portions of the estate, it is also the appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may be
necessary to ascertain if partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.
Cua vs Vargas The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will
not be bound thereby. 18 It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed
of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed 19 as what happened in the instant case with the publication
of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to
third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in the
execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro
indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are
given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code.The right
to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified in writing of the actual
sale by their co-heirs.
Heirs of Teves vs With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial settlements, it is noted that the
CA extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were never registered. However, in the case of Vda.
de Reyes vs. CA, the Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld the
validity of an oral partition of the decedent's estate and declared that the non-registration of
an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity. It was held in this case that —
[t]he requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that
the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into
play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such
rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. Thus, despite its
non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A are legally effective and
binding among the heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca since their mother had no creditors at the
time of her death.
Notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the settlement, the action which Pedro and Cresenciano
might have brought for the reconveyance of their shares in the property has already prescribed. An
action for reconveyance based upon an implied trust pursuant to article 1456 of the Civil Code
prescribes in ten years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title. Asuncion
Teves acquired title over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case was only filed by plaintiffs-
appellants in 1984, which is more than 10 years from the issuance of title
Hernandez vs The required public interest is not constitutive of the contract of partition BUT merely an evidence
Andal thereof. There may be ORAL PARITITON of estate.
Segura vs Segura The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were
entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extra-judicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As
the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the
trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years
from its execution in 1941.
The deed of partition being invalid as to the other heirs, the vendors could dispose only of their
respective shares in the land, or one-third only of the property and not the other two-thirds as well
which did not belong to them
The general rule is that no one can give what he does not have - nemo dat quod non habet. Hence,
even if it be assumed that Amojido had bought the land in good faith from the parties to the
extrajudicial partition, only so much of their share could be validly acquired by him, with the rest
of the property remaining under the ownership of the six excluded co-heirs. In other words,
Amojido became pro indiviso co-owner of the land with the other six heirs, who retained title to
their respective shares although he had possession of the entire property. The portion pertaining to
the herein appellants should be deemed held by Amojido under an implied trust for their
benefit, conformably to the ruling in Bargayo v. Camumot.

An action for reconveyance of property held in implied trust is imprescriptible. However, this is
true only as long as the trustee continues to acknowledge the title of the cestui que trust, or,
otherwise stated, provided he does not repudiate such title. The moment he does so, the
prescriptive period will begin to run and may eventually operate to divest the real owners of their
right to the property after the lapse of the applicable statutory period. Under the provision above-
quoted, that period is fixed at ten years, whether the claim be based upon an obligation created
by law under Article 1144 or covered by Article 1134 on rights over immovable property.
INTERESTING = When Amojido secured the registration of the land in his name following the
deed of sale executed in his favor by the parties to the extrajudicial partition, his certificate of title
carried an express reservation of whatever rights might pertain to the other heirs. This annotation
constituted an acknowledgment of the possibility that a portion of the land might not belong to
him and the commitment that he would be holding such part as impliedly conveyed to him in trust
by and for its true owners. However, when Amojido himself sold the land to Mirope Mascareñas
vda. de Elison on March 13, 1953, the transfer certificate of title issued in her name no longer
carried the said encumbrance. By the deletion of this annotation, Mirope, as the new
transferee, repudiated as of the date of registration the claim of the other heirs to their
shares in the property. From then on her assertion of ownership over the whole land became
adverse even as against the appellants herein. And as the certificate of title was notice to the whole
world of her exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the said heirs and started as
against them the period of prescription.
Guevarra vs We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no
Guevarra debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must
first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will.
They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law.
Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such
suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy.
Divina vs CA
The extra-judicial settlement agreement is a contract, wherein the parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided that the legitime of
the compulsory heirs are preserved. In the absence of fraud and provided all requisites are met, the
same should be upheld as valid and binding between parties.93])
In proceeding with the actual partition of the properties mentioned in the deed, the parties, of
course, are duty bound to abide by the mutual waiver of rights agree upon in the document. A
party can not, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition,
agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him.
Heirs of Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured creditor
Magsalang vs has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness.
Manila Banking In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate
Corp = of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the
REMEDIES OF deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and
CREDITOR IF foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any
DEBTOR DIES deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the
others
Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under
Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency
amount as earlier discussed.
REMEDIES OF AGGRIVED APRTY AFTER EJ SETTLEMENT
Heirs of Teves vs 1-RECONVEYANCE = PRESCRIBED NGA LANG IN THIS CASE = Notwithstanding their non-
CA = 1999 inclusion in the settlement, the action which Pedro and Cresenciano might have brought for the
reconveyance of their shares in the property has already prescribed. An action for reconveyance
based upon an implied trust pursuant to article 1456 of the Civil Code prescribes in ten years from
the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title. Asuncion Teves acquired title over
Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case was only filed by plaintiffs-appellants in 1984, which is
more than 10 years from the issuance of title.

Segura vs Segura An action for reconveyance of property held in implied trust is imprescriptible .However, this is
true only as long as the trustee continues to acknowledge the title of the cestui que trust, or,
otherwise stated, provided he does not repudiate such title. The moment he does so, the
prescriptive period will begin to run and may eventually operate to divest the real owners of their
right to the property after the lapse of the applicable statutory period. Under the provision above-
quoted, that period is fixed at ten years, whether the claim be based upon an obligation
created by law under Article 1144 or covered by Article 1134 on rights over immovable
property.
PEZA vs Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, will show that persons unduly deprived of their lawful
Fernandez = participation in a settlement may assert their claim only within the two-year period after the
exception to action settlement and distribution of the estate. This prescription period does not apply, however, to
for reconvenyance those who had no part in or had no notice of the settlement. Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, is not meant to be a statute of limitations. Moreover, by no reason of logic can one contend
that an extrajudicial partition, being merely an ex parte proceeding, would affect third persons
who had no knowledge thereof. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied, either, that by its
registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be known actually or
constructively.
In the present case, private respondents are deemed to have been constructively notified of the
extrajudicial settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over
the subject lot. From the time of registration, private respondents had two (2) years or until July 8,
1984, within which to file their objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate.
BEAUTIFUL CASE = The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is when the title
remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the partition of the subject
property or in those of their transferees who cannot be considered innocent purchasers for
value. In this regard, title to the property in the present case was no longer in the name of
the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value — the
government. Moreover, the government is presumed to have acted in good faith in the acquisition
of the lot, considering that title thereto was obtained through a Compromise Agreement
judicially approved in proper expropriation proceedings. Even assuming that there was in fact
fraud on the part of the other heirs, private respondents may proceed only against the
defrauding heirs, not against petitioner which had no participation in or knowledge of the
alleged fraud. The fact that the co-heir's title to the property was fraudulently secured cannot
prejudice the rights of petitioner which, absent any showing that it had knowledge or participation
in the irregularity, is considered a purchaser in good faith and for value. The remedy of an
owner alleged to have been prejudiced or fraudulently deprived of property that was subsequently
sold to an innocent purchaser for value is an action for damages against the person or persons
who perpetrated the fraud.
Reillo vs San Jose 2-ANNULMENT WHICH IS IMPRESCRIBTIBLE. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed
without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is
fraudulent and vicious. 16 The deed of settlement made by petitioners was invalid because it
excluded respondents who were entitled to equal shares in the subject property. Under the rule, no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had
no notice thereof. Thus, the RTC correctly annulled the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights dated January 23, 1998 and TCT No. M-94400 in the
name of Ma. Teresa S.J. Fernando issued pursuant to such deed
As the RTC nullified the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of
Rights executed by petitioners and the title issued in accordance therewith, the order of partition
of the land subject of the settlement in accordance with the laws on intestate succession is
proper as respondents' action filed in the RTC and respondents' prayer in their complaint asked
for the partition of the subject property in accordance with intestate succession||| (Reillo v. San
Jose, G.R. No. 166393, [June 18, 2009], 607 PHIL 446-464)

Bautista vs The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled
Bautista = similar does not prescribe. Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to
with Segura vs Teofilo's co-heirs. 24 Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of 1/2 of the
Segura property to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of 1/2 of the property to Cesar
Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights upon the transferees under the principle of
nemo dat quod non habet.
Macababbad Jr vs
ISSUE: What then is the effect of the issuance of TCTs in the name of petitioners? In other words,
Masirag = 2009
does the issuance of the certificates of titles convert the action to one of reconveyance of titled
land which, under settled jurisprudence, prescribes in ten (10) years?
Precedents say it does not; the action remains imprescriptible, the issuance of the certificates of
titles notwithstanding.
As the nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale has been raised and is the primary
issue, the action to secure this result will not prescribe pursuant to Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
In actions for reconveyance of the property predicated on the fact that the conveyance
complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim of prescription of action would be unavailing.
"The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe
NOTE: In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property sought to be recovered are
indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance were the only relief prayed for, impleading
petitioners Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say would suffice. On the other hand, under
the claim that the action is for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial settlement of
estate and sale, all of the parties who executed the same should be impleaded for a complete
resolution of the case. This case, however, is not without its twist on the issue of impleading
indispensable parties as the RTC never issued an order directing their inclusion. Under this legal
situation, particularly in light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, there can be no basis for
the immediate dismissal of the action.
ART 1104 Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded,
unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons
interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share
which belongs to him.
RULE 38
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. — When a judgment or
final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and
in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
MARQUEZ VS When Rafael Marquez, Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit
CA that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to
secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was
established. Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They
arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or
holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE BASED THEREON PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS FROM
ISSUANCE OF TORRENS TITLE.
75
804 Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the
testator.

805
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.The attestation shall state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof,
or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another.If the attestation clause is in a language not
known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
806 Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the Office of the Clerk of Court. (n)
Ajero vs CA
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the
house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. As a general rule, courts in
probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation
constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench,
decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in
the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her
conveyance of the same in its entirety.). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot
validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
Maninang vs CA The cases of Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449 [1966]), and Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez (64
SCRA 452 [1975]), provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills
in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical consideration" so
demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the
intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether
or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of
the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will
demanded. Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as
it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for
resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been
preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance.
Nepomuceno vs Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation
CA between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes
void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of
the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in concubinage
Palaganas vs ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
Palaganas although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executeD
our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same
have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can
be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an
alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country.

Section 1, Rule 73 provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of
the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections
1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any
other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or
is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known
to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will
has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province
where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in
such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution.
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will
before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and
allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the
first time before a competent court.
Besides, petitioners' stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the
means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their
inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the
will has been proved and allowed by the proper court
76
De Aranz vs Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shall
Galing 1988 also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to
the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the
Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon
prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy
of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not the
petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be
known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing
shall be equivalent to mailing."
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance
of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing
in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no
question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate
court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the
legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not
cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance
of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Joson vs Nable N/A = Under the provision abovequoted, individual notice upon heirs, legatees
and devisees is necessary only when they are known or when their places of residence are known.
In other instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction
simply upon the publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation ***The case of
Joson vs. Nable 8 cited by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision to support its theory is not
applicable in the present case. In that case, petitioners Purificacion Joson and Erotita Joson failed
to contest the will of Tomas Joson because they had not been notified of the hearing of the petition
for probate. While the petition included the residence of petitioners as Dagupan Street No. 83,
Manila, petitioners claimed that their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila.
Leriou vs Longa Contrary to petitioners' argument that personal notice under Section 4 of Rule 76 is a jurisdictional
2018 requirement, the Court, in Alaban v. Court of Appeals, explained that it is just a matter of
personal convenience.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity
is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of
procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite
The instant case is analogous to Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones 32 where some of the
heirs did not receive any personal notice about the intestate proceedings, yet they were deemed
notified through publication since the intestate proceeding is in rem.
It should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding
in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date
set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of
the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the
publication.
Baltazar vs Laxa
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. — If the will
is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the
Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and
examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the
court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province
where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against
the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of
doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the
testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed
and attested in the manner required by law. If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be
allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare
that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any
competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the
incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court.
Because of this the probate of Paciencia's Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin's
testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her
handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the
attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed
just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that
the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although
they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law."
839
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary
or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his
will at the time of affixing his signature thereto
78

Ozaeta vs Pecson Rule 81 of the Rules of Court grants discretion to the probate court to appoint, or not to appoint, a
= MANDAMUS special administrator. It is silent as to the person who may be appointed as special
administrator, unlike section 6 of Rule 79, which expressly gives the order of preference of
the persons who may be appointed regular administrator. The appointment of special
administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators.
But the fact that a judge is granted discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make
his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. And there is no
reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular
administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of the special administrator.
When a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the probate court to issue letters
testamentary to the person named as executor in the will upon the latter's application, even if the
order of probate is on appeal. Mandamus lies to compel such appointment. As the rights
granted by will take effect from the time of the decedent's death (Art. 777, Civil Code of the
Phil.), the management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as
practicable, when no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed.
Executor can be In the case at bar, the will has already been admitted to probate, and respondent judge himself has
appointed as SA expressly appointed petitioner as administrator. The only reason or ground, therefore, for
during pendency suspending his appointment, and for the appointment of a special administrator, who is not the
of appeal from petitioner himself, is a very technical one. It also appears that the Philippine Trust Company,
order admitting a which had acted as special administrator for a period of only a few months, has submitted a bill
will to probate for P90,000. This would cut deep into the income of the estate, and if the new special
administrator appointed by the respondent judge takes office, it is not improbable that the estate
may again be subjected to the same expensive cost of administration. Under these circumstances,
it would seem unreasonable to refuse to appoint the petitioner as special administrator. To do so
would be delaying the fulfillment of the wishes of the testator and subjecting the estate to
unnecessary expense. Petitioner has cited precedents in the surrogate courts of the State of
New York to support his claim that as the will appointing him regular administrator has
been admitted to probate by the trial judge, he should now be appointed special
administrator during the pendency of the appeal against the order admitting the will to
probate.
Ventura vs Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
Ventura compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering
the previous appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic. This would now
necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the following provision:
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while
the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of
kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to
the decedent's property .
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the
late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to
preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura.
Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to
be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion
of the Court, in order to represent both interests.
Tavera vs El The requirement that the probate court should enter an order directing the next of kin to the ward
Hogar Filipino and all persons interested in the estate to appear before the court was not necessary in the present
case because the next of kin to the ward and all persons interested in the estate were her mother
and guardian, uncles and aunt who agreed to make the transfer of their respective shares in the
property to the corporation to be organized. Moreover, "next of kin" are those whose
relationship in such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.

Angeles vs
A BIRTH CERTIFICATE TO BE CONSIDERED AS VALIDATING PROOF OF PATERNITY
Maglaya
AND AS AN INSTRUMENT OF RECOGNITION MUST BE SIGNED BY THE FATHER
AND MOTHER JOINTLY, OR BY THE MOTHER ALONE IF THE FATHER REFUSES
I]t should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law
speaks of the "next of kin", the difference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of
distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share
in the estate as distributed, or in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an
applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result
in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it
looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco
Angeles. (Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, [September 2, 2005], 506 PHIL 347-365)
Uy vs CA Co administrator was appointed
Sioca vs Garcia Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind
or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate to such an extent as to render the
appointment inadvisable.
Silverio vs CA Petitioner's Respectful Urgent Manifestation and Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Early Resolution on the Petition to Allow Claim against the Estate and
for the Annotation of Attorney's Lien filed by counsel for private respondent, which was favorably
acted upon by the respondent court, is impressed with merit. The respondent court is not vested
with the power to order the special administrator to sell real properties of the estate pending
determination of the validity of the regular administrator's appointment, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court.
De Guzman vs The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of
Limcolioc a deceased person is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as such administrator.
This is the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference of
the widow to administer the estate of her husband, upon the latter's death, because she is
supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. But this
preference established by law is not absolute, if there are other reasons justifying the appointment
of an administrator other than the surviving spouse. If the interest in the estate is what principally
determines the preference in the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, and if, under the circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another who has
more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the preference established in the latter's favor
becomes untenable.
The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for her appointment alleges that during the marital
life of the deceased with his first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutual labor, acquired
all the properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any property during his second
marriage with Angela Limcolioc. The court bore these allegations in mind. It is true that the case
was not heard for the purpose of establishing these allegations, but when Angela asked for the
reconsideration of the appointment of Nicolasa, she did not deny these allegations and merely
stated that they do not justify her appointment as administratrix. For failure of Angela to deny
these allegations, thus taking them for granted, the court was justified in considering them when it
denied the reconsideration of its resolution and when it sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.
If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired during his marriage with
Agatona Santos, his children, among them Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now
widow, Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of usufruct, to a portion equal
to that corresponding to one of the children who has received no betterment.

Gonzales vs In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
Aguinaldo consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator. 8 This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The
underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy,
economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly.
Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with
harmonious relations between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements between such
joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. 12 Conflicts of opinion and
judgment naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the
same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the co-administrators, can be resolved by the probate
court to the best interest of the estate and its heirs.
ffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the
estate.
San Pedro vs CA A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what
shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue
of the validity of wills. We held in the case of Maningat v. Castillo, that "the main function of a
probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through
the process of administration." Thus, its function necessarily includes the examination of the
properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether or not the inventory of the
estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net assets of the estate of the
deceased to the lawful heirs.
lower court did not commit any reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17,
1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title
from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro
De Borja vs Tan It can be seen from the record that the haste of the judge in making the appointment of Jose de
Borja without previous notice or hearing was due to his apparent desire to have the amended
account promptly acted upon by the court, with a view to terminating the administration as soon
as possible. It is true that there was no previous notice of the court's intention to appoint him and
thus give the other interested parties opportunity to express their objection thereto. But this
procedural defect was cured when the said interested parties presented their motions to reconsider
the appointment. When the court, therefore, overruled their objection and confirmed the
appointment, the interested parties were given their day in court, and the previous objection of
lack of notice or opportunity to be heard fully met. What the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. There
was an opportunity given in this case when the petitioners presented their motions for
reconsiderations.
Gabriel vs CA
true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or next
of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of
administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered
opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of
the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow
from the administration. In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify
Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just
as the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause despite the
mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period
be likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides
that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors."

Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the
surviving spouse and the next of kin. In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency
which may arise when there is only one administrator but which may easily be remediable
where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-
administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the widow
in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may further be expected from
private respondent for the same estate.
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been
upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times
to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties
or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is
large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons
satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5)
when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.
As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment
and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this
proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the
estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with the
representatives working in harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate court.
Uy vs CA Thus, petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot re-open the issue of the appointment
of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator is erroneous. In probate
proceedings, considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or revoking its own
orders as long as the proceedings are pending in the same court and timely applications or motions
for such modifications or revocations are made by the interested parties. 18 In the instant case, the
estate of the deceased has not yet been settled and the case is still within the jurisdiction of the
court.
79
Eusebio vs May nagpanggap na ampon e di naman. We, therefore, find that the error imputed to the trial court
Valmores in oppositor-appellant's brief that the court has failed to comply with the provisions of Sections 3
and 5 of Rule 80 had not been complied with, was actually committed. The requirement as to
notice is essential to the validity of the proceedings in order that no person may be deprived of his
right or property without due process of law. The absence of notice to heirs becomes the more
apparent in the case at bar, where evidently a stranger has been able to railroad the proceedings in
court without opportunity of the person most interested in the estate of the deceased to appear and
contest in due time the right of the petitioner or the appointment of the person recommended as
administrator.
80
Ramirez vs Butte Referring, now, to the merits of the appeal from the order appointing BPI as regular
administrator, the question raised is whether said order contravenes Rule 81, section 1, of the
Rules of Court, reading: "Appointment of special administrator. — When there is delay in
granting testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, or from any other cause the court may appoint a special administrator to
collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators thereupon appointed."
What is more, the authority therein given for the appointment of a special administrator, "when
there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration, occasioned by an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will" — which is precisely the situation obtaining in the case at
bar — "or from any other cause", implies necessarily a denial of the power to appoint a regular
administrator during the pendency of said appeal. Indeed, what need would there be to appoint
a special administrator, if, at any rate, a regular administrator could, in the meanwhile, be
properly appointed?

The legacy constituted in the will suffices to grant the legatee the personality necessary to ask that
appropriate measures be taken for the preservation of such rights as the legatee may have, should
the will be eventually probated. This includes the right to intervene in the matter of
appointment of an administrator, whether special or regular.
Liwanag vs Reyes Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special administratrix.
The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant
in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of
limitations running against them in cases where the appointment of a regular administratrix is
delayed. So that if We are now to deny the present action on this technical ground alone, and the
appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage
was constituted will be defeated.
De Gala vs
Gonzales - 1929 Serapia's appeal requires but little discussion. The burden of the argument of her counsel is that a
special administrator cannot be removed except for one or more of the causes stated in section
653 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that section can only apply to executors and regular
administrators, and the office of a special administrator is quite different from that of regular
administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of
the court; the function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any
debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special
administrator indicates that both his appointment and his removal are purely discretionary,
and we cannot find that the court below abused its discretion in the present case. In removing
Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor of the property, pending the final
determination of the validity of the will, the court probably prevented useless litigation.
Gurrea vs de The preference, accorded by Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court to the surviving
Gurrea spouse, for appointment as administrator or administratrix of the estate of the deceased, exists "if
no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains in the
case at bar.
The right of preference under the aforementioned section refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator.
The order appointing a special administrator lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is
not appealable.
GR = Roxas vs The administrator appointed to administer and liquidate the exclusive property of a deceased
Pecson = 1948 spouse shall also administer, liquidate and distribute the community property, because the estate
of a deceased spouse which is to be settled, that is, administered, liquidated and distributed,
consists not only of the exclusive properties of the decedent, but also of one- half of the assets of
the conjugal partnership, if any, which may pertain to the deceased, as determined after the
liquidation thereof in accordance with the provisions of articles 1421 to 1424 of the Civil Code.
Matias vs
Gonzales SA for the conjugal estate + SA for estate of deceased spouse = POSSIBLE
here it appeals that there are, at least, two factions among the heirs of the deceased, representing
their respective interest in the estate, and the probate Court deems it best to appoint more than one
special administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased.
The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson (supra), to the effect that "only one special administrator
may be appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of the deceased, must be considered in
the light of the facts obtaining in said case. The lower court appointed therein one special
administrator for some properties forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other
properties thereof. Thus, there were two (2) separate and independent special administrators. In
the case at bar there is only one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall be
exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. In short, the Roxas case is not squarely in
point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint several special
co-administrators)
De Guzman vs It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which transpired in the instant
Guadiz case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters
testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special
administrator.
Taga gapan si There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment of such deed of donation in behalf
Judge of the estate. Precisely, the petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1080 in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Branch V, against the herein private respondents. The case was dismissed by the
respondent judge in an order dated June 9, 1978 on the ground that the petitioner has no
personality to file the action because although he is named heir in the will, the said will is not yet
probated. 20 In the meantime there is nobody to sue in order to protect the interest of the estate
considering that the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor will take time.
It appears that the estate the properties registered under the Torrens system in the name of the
deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It is
claimed that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year.
Obviously there is an immediate need for a special administrator to protect the interests of the
estate as regards the products.
The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the appointment of a special administrator
in this case because the respondents are already in possession of the properties covered by the
will. The respondent judge has failed to distinguish between the partisan possession of
litigants from that of the neutral possession of the special administrator under the Rules of
Court. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded, not as a representative of the agent of
the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact,
as an officer of the court.
the only way to test the validity of the alleged donation in favor of the private respondents is to
appoint a special administrator who will have the personality to file the corresponding action
Valarao vs WITTY = The probate court had ample jurisdiction to appoint petitioner Valarao as special
Pascual administratrix and to assist her in the discharge of her functions, even after respondents had filed a
notice of appeal from the Decision disallowing probate of the holographic will of Felicidad C.
Pascual. This is because the appeal is one where multiple appeals are allowed and a record
on appeal is required. In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the
subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the
appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties may avail of, including the
appointment of a special administrator.
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, 12 Corona v. Court of
Appeals 13 and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, 14 cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their
claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint
special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather,
the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but
also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the probate court
exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to
its sound discretion.

Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances
other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case.
In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the
applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we considered to
be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly,
since the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one special
administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the
applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special administrator. ScEaAD
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator,

considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix
in her will," 16 for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also
manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the heirs
therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator as this
fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the
objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship." 17
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-
administrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-
half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive
her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair
to her proprietary interests." 18 The special status of a surviving spouse in the special
administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals 19 where we held that
the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in the proper administration of the
entire estate since she possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad
administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership
thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals 20 we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving
spouse applying as regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the
probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
administration."
Finally, respondents cannot disobey the reasonable exercise of the authority of a special
administrator on the dubious ground that the order appointing petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix had not in the meantime become final and executory because of a pending motion
for reconsideration filed by them. The fallacy of this reasoning is apparent, for an interlocutory
order is not instantly appealable and therefore there is no period nor action to suspend or interrupt
by a motion for reconsideration; 24 it is even well settled that a special civil action for certiorari
does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory order absent a temporary
restraining order or an injunction. 25 In the same manner, the appointment of a special
administrator being an interlocutory order is not interrupted by a motion for reconsideration and
thus must be obeyed as the proceedings in the probate court progress
Heirs of Castillo vs
The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an administrator, and such
Lacuata-Gabriel
appointment is allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by
any cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves.

Appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court. 27 A
special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to care for
and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed. 28 When
appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a representative of the agent of the parties
suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an
officer of the court. 29 As such officer, he is subject to the supervision and control of the probate
court and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth
administration and earliest settlement. 30 The principal object of appointment of temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to
administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs. 31 In many instances, the appointment of
administrators for the estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigations,
thereby exposing such estates to great waste and losses unless an authorized agent to collect the
debts and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed. The occasion for such an appointment,
likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the
will, regular administration is delayed.
The deceased Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel left a document purporting to be her will where her adopted
son, Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her properties. However, pending probate of the
will, Roberto died leaving his widow, the respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the respondent
has much stake in Crisanta's estate in case the latter's will is allowed probate. It needs to be
emphasized that in the appointment of a special administrator (which is but temporary and subsists
only until a regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not determine the shares in
the decedent's estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to administer the estate. The issue of
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 36 Thus, the
preference of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or
legal principle.
Tan vs Gedorio Private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special administrator due
to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-
appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still appointed
special administratrix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her
defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the
defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with
the court the income of Gerardo's estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of the fact
that Gerardo's estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and insufficient justification
for petitioner Vilma's non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners
should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the
court's orders.
81
Estate of Burt vs
Luzon Surety Co A probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring but also in fixing
the amount, and executing or forfeiting an administrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of
an administrator's bond is deemed to be a necessary part and incident of the administration
proceedings as much as its filing and the fixing of its amount
From the nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an administrator's bond — which
makes him privy to the proceedings against his principal — he is bound and concluded, in the
absence of fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though said surety was
not a party to the proceeding. In the case of De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil., 135, the sureties
on the administrator's bond were held liable thereon altho they were not parties to the
proceeding against the administrator, nor were they notified in connection therewith prior
to the issuance of the court order for the confiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to Section
11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the account of an executor or
administrator, his sureties "may, upon application, be admitted as a party to such
accounting". The import of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be
allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or administrator if they ask
for leave to do in due time.

Warner Barnes vs Although the probate court has jurisdiction over the forfeiture or enforcement of an administrator's
Luzon Surety Co bond, the same matter may be litigated in an ordinary civil action brought before the Court of
First Instance
Although an administrator's bond is executed in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, as it is
expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors, a creditor may directly in his name
enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned.
Where there are no proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased
administrator, the creditor may enforce his bond against the surety which bound itself jointly and
severally in the case where the bond was filed.
Under the fifth assignment of error, it is alleged that the plaintiff should have first filed a claim
against the Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga, in conformity with section 6 of
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court providing that "Where the obligation of the decedent is joint and
several with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only
debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the other debtor."
Apart from the fact that his defense was not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
and was therefore waived (section 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court), it appears that even as late as
September 17, 1952, when the present complaint was filed, (more than two years after the death of
Agueda Gonzaga), there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate, with the result
that section 6 of Rule 87 loses its applicability. Moreover, it is to be noted that the appellant
had also chosen to file a third-party complaint in the present case against Romualdo
Araneta, joint and several counter-guarantor of the deceased administratrix, instead of
presenting a claim against the latter's estate.
The plaintiff, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental against the defendant, Luzon Surety Co., Inc., for the recovery of the sum of
P6,000, plus the costs and P1,500 for attorney's fees. The basis of the complaint was a bond in the
sum of P6,000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Agueda
Gonzaga on or about January 6, 1951, in Special Proceedings
82
Lim vs Diaz- In this jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he
Millares = widow has adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. (Sioca
vs pamangkin = vs. Garcia, 44 Phil., 711; Arevalo vs. Bustamante, 69 Phil., 656.) In the case at bar, petitioner has
widow tayo been shown to have some liabilities to the widow of the deceased and to the estate as a whole;
hence, he can not compatibly perform the duties of an administrator.
On February 26, 1954, Cirilo Lim, claiming to be a nephew of the late Jose Millarez who died
intestate on October 22, 1953, filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
petition for his appointment as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased. The petition
alleged that the deceased left no relatives such as descendants, ascendants or surviving spouse,
except collaterals. To the said petition, Basilisa Diaz-Millarez, claiming to be a widow of the late
Jose Millarez, filed an opposition on two grounds: that the petitioner has an adverse interest in the
estate; and that the properties of the estate are the subject matter of a litigation between her
as plaintiff and Cirilo Lim as defendant in Civil Case No. 2986.
84
Vasquez vs Porta The mortgage and sale in favor of the mortgagee being fictitious, simulated and without
consideration, they were not merely voidable but totally void ab initio, and in existent in law.
Consequently, the lands involved remained the property of the late mortgagor, as the mortgagee
himself ostensibly acknowledged by his inertia in allowing the mortgagor to exercise dominical
power thereon without any protest on his part. Wherefore the administratrix of the mortgagor's
estate and as liquidator of the conjugal partnership, had the right to use for recovery of the
mortgaged land, in consonance with her duty to marshall his assets

Layague vs De Under section 3, Rule 85, of title Rules of Court, the executor or administrator shall have the right
Ulgasan to take possession of the real or personal property of the deceased so long as it is necessary for
the payment of debts and expenses of administration. Where there are no debts, however, to be
paid, there is no reason for the executor or administrator taking possession of the estate which
should pass to the heirs
WHEN PURCHASERS NOT BOUND TO PAY VALUE OF THE FRUITS TO THE
ADMINISTRATOR. — The sale made by the heirs of their right, interest or participation in the
lands under administration in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees having been declared valid, and
there being not even an intimation that the estate is indebted, the payment for the value of the
fruits gathered by them as purchasers to the administratrix is not necessary.
In Re: Intestate
Estate of Pacioles ISSUE: Whether or not the order of release of funds from a joint foreign currency deposit account
vs Pacioles without securing the consent of a co-depositor is proper.
Sec. 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. — All foreign currency deposits authorized under
this Act, as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under PD
No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and,
except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency
deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office
whether judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or private;
Provided, however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
It is apparent that in ordering the branch manager or any representative of BPI to release the
money contained in a foreign currency deposit account, the intestate court committed a violation
of the law, which expressly provides that all foreign currency deposits as defined by applicable
laws are not subject to any form of attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body.
In an "and" joint account, as in this case, the depositors are joint creditors of the bank and the
signatures of all depositors are necessary to allow withdrawal. Thus, it is indispensable that all the
persons named as account holders give their consent before any withdrawal could be made.
Considering the nature of a joint account, we cannot but adhere to banking laws which requires
the consent of all the depositors before any withdrawal could be made. However, since
Emmanuel no longer has a right over the subject joint account in view of his removal as a
co-administrator, it is necessary that his name should be removed as an account holder and co-
depositor of Emilio in a proper forum for Emilio to be able to completely perform his functions
and duties as an administrator.
On this note, emphasis must be made on the jurisdiction of a trial court, sitting as an intestate
court, as regards the proper disposition of the estate of the deceased. Such jurisdiction continues
until after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. 32 Thus, proper proceedings must be had before the intestate court so that the
subject joint account should be administered solely by Emilio, who is the lone administrator.
85
Sato vs Rallos This is a case for the collection of attorney's fees, instituted in the CFI of Cebu by plaintiff
Primitivo Sato, against Simeon Rallos in his capacity as administrator and distributor of the
Testate Estate of Numeriana Rallos (Sp. Pr. No. 49-V) and the Intestate Estate of Victoria Rallos
Pr. No. 1893).
Nature of fee for the attorney of an executor or administrator is personal. IF BENEFICIAL TO
ESTATE, payment should be included in his account and reimbursement therefor should be
settled upon notice

"The correct procedure for the collections of attorney's fees, is for the counsel to request the
administrator to make payment and file an action against him in his personal capacity and not as
an administrator should he fail to pay . If judgment is rendered against the administrator and he
pays, he may include the fees so paid in his account to the Court. The attorney also may, instead
of bringing such action, file a petition in the Testate or Intestate Proceeding asking that the
Court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as
an expense of administration." (Escueta vs. Sy Juelling). Where the complaint to collect attorney's
fees for services rendered to an estate under administration was not only filed against the
administrator as such and as a distributee but also against the other distributees, such a
procedure is even more than the legal procedural requirements.
An award for attorney's fees for services rendered to an estate may still be made despite the fact
that the estate has already been distributed and the heirs had already received their
respective shares, on the theory that the provisions of Article 2142 of the Civil Code which
enunciates that no one should unjustly enrich and/or benefit himself at the expense of another
come into play.
The administrator of the estate of Simeon Rallos, therefore, is ordered to pay the sum of
P12,500.00 to the herein appellant and to collect in turn, from the distributees of the estates of
Numeriana Rallos and Victoria Rallos, their proportionate shares of the obligation, based
upon their corresponding participation in the said estates
86
In re: DE Rama vs The petition of claimant-appellee, for permission to file a claim in the proceeding, was based on
Palileo the fact that the award of damages in her favor, against the deceased Beatriz C. de Rama, was
contained in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 22556-R which was
promulgated on May 6, 1961 or after the 6-month period provided in the notice to creditors had
already elapsed. It is her contention that she could not have failed a money claim against the estate
before the promulgation of said decision because although the lower court in that case upheld her
right to the ownership and possession of the building subject thereof, no damages were adjudged
in her favor. Considering this argument, the lower court found it sufficient to justify the relaxation
of the rule and extension of the period within which to file her claim. In the circumstances, the
action taken by the lower court cannot be considered an abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction to justify its reversal by this Court.
It is clear from the foregoing that the period prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive;
money claims against the estate may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is
entered, at the discretion of the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. 1 This
extension of the period shall not exceed one month, 1 from the issuance of the order authorizing
such extension.
Barredo vs CA
The one-month period for filing late claims mentioned in Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of
Court, begins to run from the order authorizing the filing of the claims, and not from the
expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims
The probate court's discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims but
before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only a claim of apparent merit but also
that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim.
Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late
Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground is
insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back
of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim, as well as the payment of
P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities.
Rio vs Maslog CJ MORAN = The fact that the obligation arose from a written contract, with a prescriptive period
of ten years is irrelevant to the policy of speedy liquidation of decedent's estates. Chief Justice
Moran, has noted that Sec. 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, constitutes a special limitation that
overrides the ordinary rules of prescription

The appellant company, in spite of its knowledge of the debtor's death and the existence of the
latter's obligation, did not take steps to institute administration proceedings or collect the debt
until more than 12 years had elapsed from the death of the decedent. Held: In consonance with the
aforesaid policy, appellant company is guilty of laches and its claim prescribes.|
In re: Estate of De
The decision of the trial court as to whether the period fixed by law for the presentation of claims
Dios
against an estate shall be extended will not be disturbed upon appeal, unless it clearly appears
that in deciding the question there has been an abuse of discretion.
The record in the case at bar does not show the nature of the claim, how it originated, or when.
The appellant had knowledge of the period within which claims should be presented, and the only
reason alleged for failure to act is that he was negotiating with one of the heirs for payment. Such
excuse held to be insufficient to justify an extension of the time; the claim should have been
regularly presented, notwithstanding any negotiations with an heir.
MAGBANUA VS
AKOL Death of debtor insofar as CAE is concerned will not suspend Statute of Limitations
If the claimant in Sikat vs. Viuda de Villanueva was held guilty of laches for failing to institute the
proper intestate proceedings within the period of three years, there is more justification for ruling
that the herein appellants cannot recover upon their claim, it appearing that more than eighteen
years had elapse after the death of their debtor, Julio Magbanua, and before the institution of the
latter's intestate proceedings.
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
A creditor to institute an intestate proceeding through the appointment of an administrator for the
purpose of collecting his credit.
Gabin vs Melliza In his lifetime M contracted the services of G to administer certain haciendas belonging to M for a
period of thirty years at a compensation of 350 cavans of palay per agricultural year, with the
stipulation that G cannot be dismissed from the service without just and legal cause during the
time she cared to serve within the said period of thirty years, and in case of dismissal she shall
have the right to be indemnified for the rest of the period at the rate of 150 cavans of palay for
each agricultural year. After M's death his executrix took from G the administration of said
haciendas, and G filed a claim against the estate for the payment of 150 cavans of palay per
agricultural year for twenty-nine years. Held: That the claim is not allowable, first, because it
arose after the death of the decedent and, second, because it is not a claim for money falling under
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
By money claims, is meant any claim for 'money, debt, or interest thereon,' according to section
21 of Rule 3 and section 1 of Rule 88. Not all money claims may, however, be presented, but only
those which are proper against the decedent, that is, claims upon a liability contracted by the
decedent before his death. Accordingly, claims arising after his death cannot thus be presented,
except funeral expenses.
Tan vs Republic
With Genoveva's death, Civil Case No. 02-102639 need not be dismissed. The action against her
survives as it is one to recover damages for an injury to the State. Rule 87, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court 17 enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and
they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a
lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property.
De Paula vs Escay There is no question that the claim does not fall under the provisions of section 5 of Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court, because the same is not a debt or money claim incurred by the deceased during his
lifetime and collectible after his death. It is an ordinary demand or claim for the payment of
the balance of an account due under a contract of lease entered into by the administratrix
under the court's approval. There is no express provision of the Rules governing the method by
which the demand for payment may be made. May the claim be enforced by a simple motion in
the administration proceedings, or by an ordinary action?

The practice has been foe demands against administrators (not by these against third parties) to be
presented in the court of first instance where the special proceeding of administration is pending,
if the demand has relation to an act of administration and in the ordinary course thereof. This is
because the administration is under the direct supervision of the court and the administrator is
subject to its authority. When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party
against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's jurisdiction, the demand
can not be by mere motion by the administration, but by an independent action against the
third person. For obvious reasons, the demand can not be made because third persons not under
the jurisdiction of the court are involved.
Certainly, the estate would only be responsible for the amount which she is legally entitled to
receive as rentals; it can not be held responsible for the excess of the amount collected over and
above the rentals due under the lease. For this excess the administratrix will have to be personally
responsible and the court in ordering payment of the said excess would order the administratrix to
be personally responsible therefor.
Under these circumstances, we are constrained to find that the court did not abuse its discretion in
approving the claim, there being no specific denial of any of the items of the claim or specific
offer of proof by her of the incorrectness of any of the items of the claim
Gaskell vs Tan Sit A contingent claim, being provable in insolvency proceedings, is barred by the discharge granted
in such proceedings to the same extent as an absolute claim.
Where it happens that both insolvency proceedings and administration proceedings are conducted
over the estate of a deceased insolvent, no claim that is provable in bankruptcy can be allowed
against the estate in administration
There can be no question that the claim of Gaskell & Co. against Dy Poco is properly designated
as a contingent claim, which may be defined as a claim in which liability depends on some future
event that may or may not happen, and which makes it uncertain whether there will ever be any
liability. The expression is used in contradistinction to the absolute claim, which is subject to no
contingency and may be proved and allowed as a debt by the committee on claims. The absolute
claim is such a claim as, if contested between living persons, would be proper subject of
immediate legal action and would supply a basis of a judgment for a sum certain. It will be noted
that the term "contingent" has reference to the uncertainty of the liability and not to the
uncertainty in which the realization or collection of the claim may be involved.
The most common example of the contingent claim is that which arises when a person is bound as
surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of
suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays something
by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly
arises in favor of the surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the
surety has contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured
obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action against anybody — no claim that could be
reduced to judgment.
But, although it is thus evident that this claim in favor of Gaskell & Co. against Dy Poco is a
contingent claim, it by no means follows that said claim can now be allowed against Dy Poco's
estate in administration; for a contingent claim is effected by a discharge in bankruptcy the same
as an absolute claim, and that this claim has in fact been so barred is easily demonstrable, by
reference to section 56 of the Insolvency Law: "Any person liable as bail, surety, or guarantor, or
otherwise, for the debtor, who . . . has not paid the whole of said debt, but is still liable for the
same, or any part thereof, may, if the creditor shall fail or omit to prove such debt, prove the same
in the name of the creditor.

It necessarily follows that, the claim in question having been discharged in bankruptcy, it cannot
serve as the basis of recover against the estate of Dy poco in administration. When it happens,
as here, that both bankruptcy proceedings and administration proceedings are simultaneously
conducted over the estate of a deceased bankrupt, no claim can be proved against the
administrator which is provable in bankruptcy From what has been said it follows that there was
no error on the part of the trial court in disallowing the claim of Gaskell & Co. against the
administratrix of Dy Poco.
Metropolitan
Bank vs Absolute Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed under Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules
Management of Court. In Maclan v. Garcia, the Court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses
Corporation spent as previous possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben v. O'Brien,
40 it explained that the term "implied contracts," as used in our remedial law, originated from the
common law where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are both considered as
implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is included in the concept "implied contracts" as
used in the Rules of Court.
Metrobank's fourth-party complaint is based on quasi-contract. In its fourth-party complaint,
Metrobank claims that Chua's estate should reimburse it if it becomes liable on the checks
that it deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardware's account upon Chua's instructions. This
fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. First, Metrobank acted in a manner akin to a mistake
when it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber and Hardware's account. Second, Ayala
Lumber and Hardware had no right to demand and receive the checks that were deposited to its
account; despite Chua's control over AMC and Ayala Lumber and Hardware, the two entities are
distinct, and checks exclusively and expressly payable to one cannot be deposited in the account
of the other. This disjunct created an obligation on the part of Ayala Lumber and Hardware,
through its sole proprietor, Chua, to return the amount of these checks to Metrobank.
A distinctive character of Metrobank's fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature — the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that
may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one
that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court
Manila Surety & Where two persons are bound in solidum for the same debt and one of them dies, the whole
Fidelity Co., Inc. indebtedness can be proved against the estate of the latter, the decedent's liability being absolute
v. Villarama and primary; and if the claim is not presented within the time provided by the rules, the same will
be barred as against the estate
Section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure should the creditor desire to go
against the deceased debtor, but there is nothing in the said provision making compliance with
such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving solidary
debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the
extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allows or
some or all of them simultaneously. Hence, there is nothing improper in the creditor's filing of an
action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed
Boston Equity It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter.
Resources Inc vs Said provision gives the creditor the right to "proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or
CA some or all of them simultaneously." The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary
debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors
without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for
him to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim against the estate
of the deceased solidary debtor

Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party and the case can
proceed as against respondent only. That petitioner opted to collect from respondent and not
from the estate of Manuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss
asserting that the case, as against her, should be dismissed so that petitioner can proceed against
the estate of Manuel.
Heirs of Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured creditor
Magsalang vs has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness.
Manila Banking In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate
Corp = of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the
REMEDIES OF deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and
CREDITOR IF foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any
DEBTOR DIES deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the
others
Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under
Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency
amount as earlier discussed.
When writ for execution may issue
Heirs of Fran vs
Salas ANNEXING OF THE ORIGINAL WILL TO THE PETITION NOT A JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENT. — In Santos vs. Castillo and Salazar vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna,
decided six (6) months apart in 1937, this Court already ruled that it is not necessary that the
original of the will be attached to the petition. In the first, it ruled: "The original of said document
[the will] must be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the nonpresentation of said
original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof." In the second case, this Court was
more emphatic in holding that: "The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the
jurisdictional allegations before the court, by practice the jurisprudence have established that they
should be made in the form of an application and filed with the original of the will attached
thereto. It has been the practice in some courts to permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to
the application, without prejudice to producing the original thereof at the hearing or when the
court so requires. This precaution has been adopted by some attorneys to forestall its
disappearance, which has taken place in certain cases." That the annexing of the original will to
the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person named therein regardless
of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed.
DECREE OF PROBATE IS CONCLUSIVE AS TO DUE EXECUTION OF THE WILL; CAN
BE IMPUGNED ONLY ON GROUNDS OF FRAUD
The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by the petitioners, is not a
ground for the re-opening of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for execution should
have been filed. In De Jesus vs. Daza, this Court ruled that if the executor or administrator has
possession of the share to be delivered, the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same
estate proceeding to order him to transfer that possession to the person entitled thereto. This is
authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However, under Section 1, Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court. However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary
period, a separate action for the recovery of the shares would be in order. As We see it, the
attack of 10 September 1973 on the Order was just a clever ploy to give a semblance of strength
and substance to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting therein a probate court
committing a series of fatal, substantive and procedural blunders, which We find to be imaginary,
if not deliberately fabricated.

RULE 88 Section 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legalitees, or heirs have been
possession. — Where devisees, legalitees, or heirs have entered into possession of portions of
the estate before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid, and have become liable
to contribute for the payment of such debts and expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the
estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities,
and order how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution as
circumstances require.
RULE 90 Section 3. By whom expenses of partition paid. — If at the time of distribution the executor or
administrator has retained sufficient effects in his hands which may lawfully be applied for the
expenses of partition of the properties distributed, such expenses of partition may be paid by
such executor or administrator when it appears equitable to the court and not inconsistent
with the intention of the testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to
their respective shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall be settled and
allowed by the court, and, if any person interested in the partition does not pay his proportion or
share, the court may issue an execution in the name of the executor or administrator against
the party not paying the sum assessed.
RULE 142 To satisfy costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings

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GENERAL PRINCIPLES

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 1

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 2

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 3

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 4

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 5

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 7

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 8

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 9

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 10

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 11

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 12

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 13

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 14

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 15

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 16

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 17

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 18

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 19

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 20

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 22

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 23

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 24

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 25

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 26

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 28

In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator,

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 29

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 30

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 31

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 32

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 33

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 34

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 35

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 36

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 37

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DOCTRINES | VILLAROMAN 38

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