AMADO I.
SARAUM, just committed an offense in the presence
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 
Facts
Saraum was charged with violation of Section
12, Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act (R.A.)  No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.  within the view of the arresting officer
That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at
about 12:45 A.M.,
One (1) lighter, One (1) rolled tissue paper, One
(1) aluminum tin foil
Having possession of instruments and/or
equipments (sic) fit or intended for smoking,
consuming, administering, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
Arraignment- pleaded not guilty
Prosecution- telephone received regarding illegal
drug activities in Cebu. Buy bust operation was
formed against certain PATA. Poseur-buyer,
informant and back up coordinated with PDEA.
Pata eluded arrest as he run towards his shanty.
Saw holding drug paraphernalia apparently in
preparation of Shabu Pot Session. And recovered,
from Saraum (holding) (were incidentally
caught in possession of the illegal items. )
possession a lighter, rolled tissue paper and
aluminum. Confiscated and marked turned over
to Office of City Prosecutor.
RTC- Guilty and ordered forfeiture in favor of
government.
CA- sustained judgment of conviction,
Considering that Saraum failed to show any
arbitrariness, palpable error, or
capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial
and appellate courts, such findings deserve
great weight and are deemed conclusive
and binding
SC- deny appeal
Elements of Illegal Possession of equipment1.
Possession or Control. 2. Not authorized by law.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a
crime, which instance does not require a warrant
in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In
arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is
apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has
of the arresting officer.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto  arrest,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
Case indicating a hot pursuit of Pata who is in
eluding of arrest.
No need of laboratory examination, possession
itself is punishable act.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the
right to search the shanty for objects relating to
the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they
found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they
inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia.
As these items were plainly visible, the police
officers were justified in seizing them.
Considering that Saraum’s arrest was legal, the
search and seizure that resulted from it were
likewise lawful.
Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum
is deemed to have waived any objection thereto
when he did not raise the issue before entering
his plea.(legality of arrest). Any objection
involving the arrest or the procedure in the
court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea.
In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its
objection to the admission of the seized drug
paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and search,
only during the formal offer of evidence by the
prosecution.
There was an unbroken link (not perfect link) in
the chain of custody with respect to the
confiscated items.
The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance
with said section, is not of admissibility, but of
weight
Saraum’s mere denial cannot prevail over the
positive and categorical identification and
declarations of the police officers. The defense
of denial, frame-up or extortion, like alibi,
has been invariably viewed by the courts
with disfavor for it can easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in
most cases involving violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y 
GONZALES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,  person may, without a warrant, arrest a
Commerciante charged with violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165- custody and
control Two (2) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet (sic) each containing 0.15
gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white
crystalline substance with a total of 0.43
grams which was found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly
known as "shabu", a dangerous drug
At around 10pm, in Madaluyong, Narcotics
group and Police, were aboard a motorcycle,
patrolling the area, while on their visit to a
friends, cruising at a speed of around 30
kilometers per hour spotted 10meters
away, 2 men standing and showing
improper and unpleasant movement.
Thinking that sachet may contain shabu,
immediately stop and approached and
introduced himself as polce officer.
Confiscated 2 sachet, laboratory examination
confirmed it was shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla
filed a demurrer to evidence, which was
granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal
Commerciante failed to file DOE, ordered to
present evidence. They were standing and
police demand money for their release. Failed
to accede to the demand. Undergoes Inquest
proceeding.
RTC- commerciante- guilty, as Police
conducted a valid warrantless arrest, there
was probable cause to justify the arrest, saw
in plain view, approach and apprehended.
Absence of malicious motive, presumed to
have properly performed his duty.
CA - affirmed conviction. Commiting a crime
in flagrante delicto.
ISSUE- Did PO3 Carag effect a valid
warrantless arrest and validly made
pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule,
especially considering that he was
caught in flagrante delicto in possession
of illegal drugs.
 SC- No not valid warrantless arrest.
 Constitution - evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded
for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree ( inadmissible in evidence)
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule
112.
3-INSTANCES
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b)
arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment
or temporarily confined during the pendency
of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5
(a) to operate, two (2) elements must
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.27 On the other
hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application
that at the time of the arrest, an offense had
in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal
knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is absolutely required. Under Section
5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime;
while in Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that
a crime has just been committed
Warrantless arrest section 5(a)
Cannot recall which hands(left or right)
holding the sachet, small plastic. No
overt acts should properly attributed as
to rouse suspicion. Verily, the acts of
standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter
cannot in any way be considered
criminal acts. . In fact, even if Comerciante
and his companion were showing "improper
and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3
Calag, the same would not have been
sufficient in order to effect a lawful
warrantless arrest.
Warrantless arrest- Section 5(b), Rule
113.
Verily, it is not enough that the arresting
officer had reasonable ground to believe that
the accused had just committed a crime; a
crime must, in fact, have been committed
first, which does not obtain in this case.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the
requirement further. It does not have to be
probable cause, but it cannot be mere
suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason
to serve the purposes of the "stop and
frisk" exception. A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions,
to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about
him.
These circumstances are not enough to create
a reasonable inference of criminal activity
which would constitute a "genuine reason"
for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk"
search on the former. In this light, the "stop
and frisk" search made on Comerciante
should be deemed unlawful.
RODEL LUZ y ONG,  under the belief and impression that
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PO2 Alteza assigned as traffic enforcer in
Naga. He saw accused driving motorcycle
without helmet, prompted to flag down the
accused almost in front of sub station,while
issuing a citation in ticket, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket; that he was
alerted and so, , he told the accused to
take out the contents of the pocket of
his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it; that the accused obliged
and slowly put out the contents of the pocket
of his jacket. which was a nickel-like tin or
metal container about two (2) to three (3)
inches in size, including two (2) cellphones,
one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss
knife, asked the accused to open the
container , and notice inside there is cartoon
cover and something beneath, turned over 4
sachets, 2 were empty and 2 contained a
suspected shabu.
Charged of illegal Possession
Pleaded not guilty
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel
Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the
prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner
testified for himself and raised the defense of
planting of evidence and extortion
RTC- convicted petitioner of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs5 committed on 10 March
2003. It found the prosecution evidence
sufficient to show that he had been lawfully
arrested for a traffic violation and then
subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets
later found to contain shabu.
CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner.
When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody
in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense.10 It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making
the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be
an intention on the part of one of the parties
to arrest the other, and that there be an
intent on the part of the other to submit,
submission is necessary
 Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest
of the offender, but the confiscation of the
driver’s license of the latter and fine.
Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police
station may be characterized merely as
waiting time. Hence, it was only for the sake
of convenience that they were waiting there.
There was no intention to take petitioner into
custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the
warrantless search that resulted from it was
likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when
warrantless search is allowed:
(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest;
(ii) search of evidence in "plain view;"
 was not in "plain view." It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside
petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence
was not immediately apparent
(iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search;
 the RTC found that petitioner was merely
"told" to take out the contents of his
pocket
(v) customs search;
(vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and
 While the rule normally applies when a
police officer observes suspicious or
unusual conduct, which may lead him to
believe that a criminal act may be afoot,
the stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for
weapons
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None
of the above-mentioned instances, especially a
search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable
to this case.
While he may have failed to object to the
illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity,
a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during
the illegal warrantless arrest
SC- ACQUITTED
GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
 Charged with illegal ·possession of
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Since
the accused Cruz jumped bail, the court
tried her in absentia. 
 Conducting a police visibility patrol on
David Street, Pasay City, when they saw
a two unidentified men rush out of house
number 107-C and immediately boarded a
jeep,
 Suspecting that a crime had been
committed, the police officers approached
the house from where the men came and
peeked through the partially opened door.
PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw
accused Antiquera holding an
improvised tooter and a pink lighter.
Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz,
who was holding an aluminum foil
and an improvised burner. They sat
facing each other at the living room. This
prompted the police officers to enter the
house, introduce themselves, and arrest
Antiquera and Cruz.
 While inspecting the immediate
surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a
wooden jewelry box atop a table. It
contained an improvised burner, wok,
scissors, 10 small transparent plastic
sachets with traces of white crystalline
substance, improvised scoop, and seven
unused strips of aluminum foil. The police
officers confiscated all these and brought
Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Philippine
National Police in Pasay City for further
investigation and testing.
 A forensic chemical officer examined the
confiscated drug paraphernalia and found
them positive for traces of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu."
RTC- found accused and CRUZ- Guilty.
CA- Affirmed in full the decision.
The police officers did not notice anything amiss
going on in the house from the street where they
stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its
partially opened door, they saw no activity that
warranted their entering it.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the
view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera
without warrant under the above-mentioned rule.
Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search
and seizure that resulted from it was likewise
illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly
found in the house and seized are inadmissible,
having proceeded from an invalid search and
seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia
is the very corpus delicti  of the crime charged,
the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused
SC- Acquitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, , vs. DONALD
VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," 
FACTS:
Consolidated case of sell or offer to sell and
possession or use of Drugs .
Insp. Fajardo- confidential informant (Reynaldo
Siscar and Sonny San Diego }went to office and
reported that Varquez was engaged in illegal drug
activity. Alias Don alleged to be employee of NBI
and promised the informant a good commission
if he would present a potential buyer. Form a buy
bust operation. Informant was able to set up a
meeting with don in Welcome Rotonda. Introduce
Fajardo as buyer, agreed to close a deal to buy in
following day. Sales was made in front of Don’s
apartment. Scratch of head is the signal- signify
that deal is consummated. Don gave brown
envelope,and gave buy-bust money(five genuine
₱500.00 bills together with the boodle play
money- with Fajardo initias) Fajardo identified as
narcotics agent. Two accused tried to flee but
able to stop them. Identfied accused as Donald
Vasquez. 6 plastic bag in enveloped and upon
body search yielded 12 more plastic sachet on
Donal Vazquez- varied in sizes.
Crystalline substances were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Defense-(Vazquez)- Donald Vasquez was a
regular employee of the NBI, working as a
Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry
Division. Heard knocking in the door, The door to
Donald’s room was kicked down and they entered
his room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see
P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw
that there were six (6) policemen searching his
room, picking up what they could get. One of
them opened a cabinet and got drug specimens
in [Donald’s] possession in relation to his work as
a laboratory aide.
The drug specimen contained in the envelope
marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for
presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug
specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a
VHS player, and his wallet containing ₱2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donald’s neighbor, witnessed
the policemen entering the apartment and
apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from the
apartment terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)
 RTC convicted the appellant of the
crimes charged. The RTC gave more
credence to the prosecution’s evidence
given that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty on the
part of the police officers was not
overcome.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the
appellant was merely framed up by the police,
the trial court pointed out that:
 [T]he accused should have reported the
said incident to the proper authorities, or
asked help from his Acting Chief [Idabel]
Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and
identify in Court the xerox copy of the
Disposition Form which she issued to the
accused and the Affidavit dated April 17,
1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or
from Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting Deputy
Director, Technical Services of the NBI to
testify and identify the Letter issued by
the said Acting Deputy Director in order to
corroborate and strengthen his testimony
that he was indeed authorized to keep in
his custody the said shabu to be
presented or turned over to the Court as
evidence, and he should have filed the
proper charges against those police
officers who were responsible for such act.
But the accused did not even bother to do
the same.

Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
the appellant, prosecution sufficiently proved
the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and
illegal possession of shabu.
Vazquez contention - police officers did not have
a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the
time he was arrested, despite the fact that the
police officers allegedly had ample time to secure
a warrant of arrest against him.
SC-
Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that
the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of
selling illegal drugs to an undercover police
officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus,
falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule
11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
when an arrest made without warrant is deemed
lawful.
The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for,
while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate
[if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto,
(2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3)
arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation
omitted.)
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant
can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We
reiterated in People v. Tampis 52 that "[a]ny
objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters
his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move
for the quashing of the information against them
before their arraignment, appellants are now
estopped from questioning the legality of their
arrest.
Being a regular employee of the NBI, the
appellant could have easily sought the help of his
immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his
office to extricate him from his predicament.
Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence
were mere photocopies of documents that
supposedly showed that he was authorized to
keep drug specimens in his custody.
SC- Affirmed the CA
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R.
ZUÑO, complainant,
vs. JUDGE ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, RTC
Ilocos Norte
FACTS: The instant administrative case stemmed
from the sworn complaint of Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño of the Department
of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C.
Cabebe, then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Batac, Ilocos Norte. The charges are
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross
ignorance of the law and partiality in a case
where: The accused filed a motion to dismiss
invoking as ground the right of the accused to a
speedy trial; Respondent judge motu propio
issued an Order granting bail to the accused;
Respondent judge issued the Order without the
accused’s application or motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for
reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon,
respondent judge issued an order inhibiting
himself from further proceeding with the case,
realizing that what he did was patently irregular.
Complainant thus prays that respondent judge be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and be disbarred from the practice of
law. In his comment, respondent denied the
charges. While admitting that he issued the Order
granting bail to the accused without any hearing,
“the same was premised on the constitutional
right of the accused to a speedy trial.” There
was delay in the proceedings due to
complainant’s frequent absences and
failure of the witnesses for the prosecution
to appear in court, resulting in the
cancellation of the hearings.
ISSUE 1: Is the Judge correct in granting bail
sans the application or motion for bail and
without conducting a hearing
HELD : NO, the Judge is not correct.
- In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O.
Bugtas, we held that jurisprudence is
replete with decisions on the procedural
necessity of a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail,
especially in cases involving offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, where bail is a
matter of discretion. Under the
present Rules, a hearing is
mandatory in granting bail whether it
is a matter of right or discretion. It
must be stressed that the grant or the
denial of bail in cases where bail is a
matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination
of whether or not the evidence is
strong is a matter of judicial
discretion which remains with the
judge. In order for the latter to properly
exercise his discretion, he must first
conduct a hearing to determine whether
the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact,
even in cases where there is no petition
for bail, a hearing should still be held.
- There is no question that respondent
judge granted bail to the accused without
conducting a hearing, in violation of
Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure xxx.
- [T]he court’s order granting or refusing
bail must contain a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution and based
thereon, the judge should formulate his
own conclusion as to whether the
 evidence so presented is strong enough to
indicate the guilt of the accused.
Respondent judge did not follow the above
Rules and procedure enumerated in
Cortes. He did not conduct a hearing
before he granted bail to the accused,
thus depriving the prosecution of an
opportunity to interpose objections to the
grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on
the strength or weakness of evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused, he should
have conducted a hearing and thereafter
made a summary of the evidence of the
prosecution. The importance of a bail
hearing and a summary of evidence
cannot be downplayed, these are
considered aspects of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the
grant or denial of bail
- then forwarded the request to the National
ISSUE: Is the contention of the Respondent
Judge, in granting bail on the ground that the
accused were entitled to their right to a
speedy trial, meritorious?
HELD : NO. Respondent’s contention is bereft
of merit.
There is no indication in the records of the
criminal case that the prosecution has
intentionally delayed the trial of the case.
Even assuming there was delay, this does not
justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This
is utter disregard of the Rules. The
requirement of a bail hearing has been
incessantly stressed by this Court. In the
same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins judges to be conversant with the law
and the Rules and maintain professional
competence; and by the very nature of his
office, should be circumspect in the
performance of his duties. He must render
justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly
uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to
live up to these standards
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by
the Philippine Department of
Justice, Petitioner,
vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and
JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the
Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of
Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted
Persons."
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the
People’s Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before
the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as
agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of
the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap.
201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7)
counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of
Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October
25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against
him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7)
to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed
with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of
Arrest against private respondent. That same
day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
CA Question validity of arrest and declared it
void, SC sustained validity of arrest and decision
become final and executory.
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed
with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10,
presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his
part, private respondent filed, in the same
case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner. Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is
no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that private respondent is a high "flight
risk." Judge Bernardo inhibited himself and raffled
to respondent judge- subsequent allowed private
respondent to post bail.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the
above Order, but it was denied
ISSUE: trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to
bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution
or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
And not to extradition proceeding where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
HELD: No, The provision in the Constitution
stating that the "right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract
from the rule that the constitutional right to bail
is available only in criminal proceedings.
The modern trend in public international
law is the primacy placed on the worth of
the individual person and the sanctity of
human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the
individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root.
The Philippines, along with the other members of
the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person.
While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise
of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international
treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life
and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s
ruling in Purganan is in order
- If bail can be granted in deportation
cases, we see no justification why it
should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering
that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there
is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained
is not in issue.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of placing
him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the
right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or
convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other
state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It
is not a criminal proceeding. 9 Even if the potential
extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding
is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty
obligations between different nations.11 It is not
a trial to determine the guilt or innocence
of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-
blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character.13 Its object is to
prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to
the state from which he fled, for the purpose of
trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding,
it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to
attain the purpose of extradition is also
"the machinery of criminal law." This is shown
by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) which mandates the
"immediate arrest and temporary detention
of the accused.
In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been
convicted of any crime. By any standard, such
an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty.
While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a
motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it
entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.
However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines
should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to
life, liberty, and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of
his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
. While administrative in character, the standard
of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan,
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled
to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas,
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the
lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six years and one
day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and
one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal,
citing his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of
flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
application for bail. It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending
appeal, that the discretion to extend bail
during the course of appeal should be
exercised “with grave caution and only for
strong reasons.” Petitioner now questions as
grave abuse of discretion the denial of his
application for bail, considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
more than six years but not more than 20 years
and the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal
by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a
penalty of imprisonment for more than six
years, does the discretionary nature of the
grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any
of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court?
HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned
in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean automatic
grant of bail in case of appeal.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is discretionary. The application for bail
may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application
for bail can only be filed with and resolved by
the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the
accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the
appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court
is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his
bail shall be cancelled upon a showing
by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
- (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
- (b) That he has previously escaped
from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without a valid
justification;
- (c) That he committed the offense
while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
- (d) That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
 - (e) That there is undue risk that he
may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case.
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial
Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
years is imposed, and not one of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any
other similar circumstance is present and
proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial
Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
years, and any of the circumstances
stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, no
bail shall be granted by said court (Sec.
5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court
to use the less stringent sound discretion
approach.
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court
(the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on
applications for bail pending appeal must
necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on
the part of the court. The court must be allowed
reasonable latitude to express its own view of the
case, its appreciation of the facts and its
understanding of the applicable law on the matter
After conviction by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail
ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to
judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious,
such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Considering
that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial
court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be
guided by a stringent-standards approach. This
judicial disposition finds strong support in the
history and evolution of the rules on bail and the
language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial
court’s initial determination that the accused
should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the
accused out on bail despite his conviction may
destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws.
This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing in
the trial court and appellate review. In addition,
at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a
certain prison sentence and thus may be more
likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other
release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too
freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery
of our criminal justice system and court
processes.
 Bail, the security given by an accused who is in
the custody of the law for his release to
guarantee his appearance before any court as
may be required
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar
with respect to future as well as pending cases
before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays
down the following policies concerning the
effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an
offense which under the law existing at
the time of its commission and at the time
of the application for bail is punishable
by a penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail, and after
trial is convicted by the trial court of
the offense charged or of a lesser
offense than that charged in the
complaint or information, he may be
allowed to remain free on his original
bail pending the resolution of his
appeal, unless the proper court directs
otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a)
of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a
capital offense or an offense which under
the law at the time of its commission and
at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and is
out on bail, and after trial is convicted by
the trial court of a lesser offense than that
charged in the complaint or information,
the same rule set forth in the preceding
paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a
capital offense or an offense which under
the law at the time of its commission and
at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and is
out on bail and after trial is convicted by
the trial court of the offense charged, his
bond shall be cancelled and the
accused shall be placed in
 confinement pending resolution of his
appeal.
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. — All persons
in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule.
(3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 Ombudsman charged ENRILE Enrile and
several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion
and misuse of appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF).
 Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion and Supplemental Opposition,
praying, among others, that he be allowed
to post bail should probable cause be
found against him.
 Sandiganbayan issued its resolution
denying Enrile’s motion, particularly
on the matter of bail, on the ground of
its prematurity considering that Enrile had
not yet then voluntarily surrendered or
been placed under the custody of the
law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the arrest of Enrile.
 Warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG)
in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was
later on confined at the Philippine National
Police (PNP) General Hospital following his
medical examination.
 Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for
Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,
11
 and his Motion to Fix Bail ,which were
heard by the Sandiganbayan. In support of
the motions, Enrile argued that he should
be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that
the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b)
although he was charged with plunder, the
penalty as to him would only be reclusion
temporal , not reclusion perpetua ;
(because he was then 70 years old
( already 90 years old) and voluntary
surrender- MC) and (c) he was not a flight
risk, and his age and physical condition
must further be seriously considered.
SB Denied-
[A]t is only after the prosecution shall have
presented its evidence and the Court shall have
made a determination that the evidence of guilt
is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only
then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the
amount of his bail.
[F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating
circumstance/s is not taken into consideration.
These circumstances will only be appreciated in
the imposition of the proper penalty after trial
should the accused be found guilty of the offense
charged.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition
and his being a flight risk are among the factors
that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount
of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of
bail without an anterior showing that the
evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is
not strong.
Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a capital
offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory
that a bail hearing be conducted to determine
whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or
the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail
considers the imposable penalty, regardless of
the attendant circumstances.
SC
In People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing
is mandatory before bail can be granted to an
accused who is charged with a capital offense
 Certain guidelines in the fixing of a
bailbond call for the presentation of
 evidence and reasonable opportunity for
the prosecution to refute it. Among them
are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence
against him, the probability of the accused
appearing at the trial, whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and
whether or not the accused is under bond
in other cases.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who
is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v.
Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of
right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion,
conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused
is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond (Section 19, supra)
Otherwise petition should be denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a
matter of right unless the crime charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua where the
evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that
if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be
punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that
petitioner's guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because
he is not a flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right – due process and
presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by
the constitutional right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at trial and so
the amount of bail should be high enough to
assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but no higher than what may be
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the
1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of
any criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong. Where evidence of guilt is not
strong, bail may be granted according to the
discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The application for bail may be filed and acted
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a
notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted
the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the
accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the
appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by
death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua  subject to judicial discretion.
In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held:
“[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after
the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt
of the accused for the purpose of whether or not
he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail
hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs.
Belmonte). The hearing should primarily
determine whether the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described
in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or
of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his
admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's
responsibility to the international community
arising from its commitment to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process
and for detainees to avail of such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong
SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
“The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective
of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused
during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded
the clear showing of the fragile health and
advanced age of Petitioner. As such the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying the Motion to Fix Bail.  It acted
whimsically and capriciously and was so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
LEONEN DISSENT
Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a
very weak legal basis – the grant of bail over
mere humanitarian grounds. He also claims that
the court has no authority to use humanitarian
grounds. Leonen argues that “[Petitioner's]
release for medical or humanitarian reasons was
not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix
Bail before the Sandiganbayan,” nor were these
grounds raised in the petition in the Supreme
Court.
“Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither
presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found
in any statute or provision of the Constitution.”
Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only
granted bail as a special accomodation for the
petitioner and he goes on to criticize the decision
to wit:
[This decision] will usher in an era of truly
selective justice not based on their legal
provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial
and solely grounded on the presence or absence
of human compassion.
xxx
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the
Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged
with motions to fix bail on the basis of
humanitarian considerations. The lower courts
will have to decide, without guidance, whether
bail should be granted because of advanced age,
hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded diseases.
They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to Senators and former Presidents
charged with plunder and not to those accused of
drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, … and
other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua  or
life imprisonment...
Procedure for granting bail
Leonen's dissent also examines the procedure
outlined for the lower courts in bail cases in order
to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan did not
err in denying Petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail.
In Cortes vs. Catral the Supreme Court held:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that
the Court should be besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed against erring judges
involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of
jurisprudence on the basic principles involving
bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through
its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been
including lectures on the subject in the regular
seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may,
we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge
in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or
of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and
8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.
With such succinct but clear rules now
incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are
enjoined to study them as well and be guided
accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to
account for an erroneous decision rendered in
good faith, but this defense is much too
frequently cited even if not applicable. A number
of cases on bail having already been decided, this
Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their
duties assiduously. For judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles. Faith in the administration of justice
can only be engendered if litigants are convinced
that the members of the Bench cannot justly be
charge with a deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles.
Petitioner in this case, insisted that the
Sandiganbayan grant his bail without any hearing
for the purpose of determining whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. At the Motion to Fix
Bail, the prosecution had no opportunity to
present any evidence because of the prematurity
of Petitioner's Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the
dissent asserts that the Sandiganbayan was
correct in denying the Motion based on
prematurity.
Medical or humanitarian grounds
inappropriate
Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based
on humanitarian reasons at the Sandiganbayan.
Neither petitioner nor the prosecution were able
to develop their arguments as to this point to
establish legal and factual basis for this kind of
bail.
The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for
the court to grant bail merely on the basis of the
certification of the attending physician, Dr.
Gonzales, stating that the Petitioner was suffering
from numerous debilitating conditions. The
dissent states that:
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow
the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a
doctor's certification. In doing so, we effectively
suspend our rules on evidence by doing away
with cross-examination and authentication of Dr.
Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a
hearing whose main purpose is to determine
whether no kind of alternative detention is
possible.
xxx
The better part of prudence is that we follow
strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and
canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the
matter to determine is whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a
hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after
petition for bail is filed by accused. The medical
condition of the accused, if any, should be
pleaded and heard.
Version of the decision submitted by
Ponente was not the version deliberated
upon
This section of the dissent reveals that the
Justices voted to grant bail based on a
substantially different version of the opinion, one
which did not use humanitarian considerations as
a ground for the granting of bail. The dissent
explains that the Justices voted 8-4 solely on the
issue of whether or not bail is a matter of right
and reveals that the copy offered for signature
was substantially similar to an earlier draft
which used humanitarian considerations as the
basis for the granting of bail. The dissent makes it
clear that this was an irregularity.
The majority opinion offers no “guidance”
The dissent argues that the main opinion is
unclear whether the privilege (humanitarian
considerations, right to bail, etc.) will apply to
those who have similar conditions. Whether or
not this privilege will only apply to those
undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not this
privilege can be granted to those of advanced
age only. “The majority has perilously set an
unstated if not ambiguous standard for the
special grant of bail on the ground of medical
conditions.”
There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan
as to if, when and how bail can then be canceled.
Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced
The reliance of the majority on the case
of Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia is
misplaced because this case referred to
extradition cases, hence its increased emphasis
on international law. As applied to crimes charged
under Philippine law, the remedies under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be
qualified by the Constitution's rules regarding
bail.
Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed
of it by remanding the case back to the lower
court for factual determination of whether or not
the accused was a flight risk.
JANET LIM
NAPOLES,, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION), Respondent.
Office of ombudsman received report from NBI,
recommended to prosecute Napoles, Enrile and
Reyes (chief of Staff of ENRILE) for the crime of
plunder for misappropriating PDAF through NGO’s
that were selected without the required bidding
procedures. Ombudsman Special Panel of
Investigators found probable cause and
recommend immediately to file information’s
against all accused.
After the conclusion of the prosecution's
presentation of evidence, Napoles manifested
that she is not presenting any evidence for her
bail application.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In the first assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution
dated October 16, 2015, the Petition for Bail of
Napoles was denied for lack of merit. 16 The
relevant portions of this Resolution reads:
It is true that none of the prosecution witnesses
testified that Senator Enrile directly received the
kickbacks/commissions/rebates from accused
Napoles. Based on the DDRs of Luy, accused
Napoles repeatedly gave
kickbacks/commissions/rebates to Senator
Enrile's middlepersons. Also, prosecution
witnesses Suñas and Luy categorically testified
that they were the ones who prepared the
documents and money in paying the
kickbacks/commissions/rebates for Senator
Enrile. These kickbacks/commissions/rebates
were given by them or by accused Napoles to
Ruby Tuason and other middlepersons for
Senator Enrile.
A FINAL WORD
The Court stresses, however, that in resolving this
petition for bail of accused Napoles, it is not
passing judgment on the culpability or non-
culpability of Senator Enrile, Atty. Reyes,
accused Napoles, Lim[,] and de Asis. Again,
in a petition for bail, the Court is only mandated
to determine whether based on the pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution, proof
evident exists or the presumption of guilt is
strong. As above discussed, the prosecution
had presented clear and strong evidence
which leads to a well-guarded dispassionate
judgment that the offense of plunder has
been committed as charged; that accused
Napoles is guilty thereof, and that she will
probably be punished capitally if the law were
administered at this stage of the proceeding
SB- MR is denied.
Despite the arrest of the accused, or his/her
voluntary surrender as the case may be, the
accused may be granted provisional liberty under
certain conditions. This right to bail is guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, except when the accused is
charged with a capital offense
In exercising this discretion, the trial court
should receive the parties' evidence at a
hearing duly scheduled for this purpose. The
prosecution and the accused are granted
reasonable opportunity to prove their respective
positions: on the part of the prosecution, that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong,
and on the part of the defense, the
opposite.29 The hearing is summary and limited to
the determination of the weight of evidence for
purposes of granting or denying bail. The denial
or refusal must be supported by a summary of
the prosecution's evidence.
ince Napoles was charged with the crime of
Plunder, which carries the imposable penalty
of reclusion perpetua,33 she cannot be admitted
to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong.
This was the burden that the prosecution
assumed in the subsequent hearings that
followed the filing of Napoles' Petition for Bail
before the Sandiganbayan. As a trial court, the
Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the
jurisdiction to hear and weigh the evidence
of the prosecution and the defense.
At that stage of the proceedings, the bail
hearings are limited to the determination of
whether there is a strong presumption of
Napoles' guilt.34It is merely a preliminary
determination, and the Sandiganbayan may
deny admission to bail even when there is
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Napoles
"Proof evident" or "Evident proof” in this
connection has been held to mean clear, strong
evidence which leads a well-guarded
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that
the offense has been committed as charged, that
accused is the guilty agent, and that he will
probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered.. 
As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the Sandiganbayan may deny
the application for bail on evidence less than that
required for the conviction of Napoles.
It should not be forgotten that the purpose of the
bail hearing is to determine whether the accused
is entitled to provisional liberty before conviction.
To require more from the prosecution, as well as
from the trial court, effectively defeats the
purpose of the proceeding
The Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its

discretion in denying Napoles' Petition for
Bail.
Upon receiving Napoles' Petition for Bail, it
scheduled hearings to allow the parties to submit
their respective pieces of evidence. The
prosecution submitted numerous testimonial and
documentary evidence, endeavoring to establish
evident proof of Napoles' guilt. Napoles, on the
other hand, opted not to submit any evidence on
her behalf and relied instead on the supposed
weakness of the prosecution's evidence.39
It was therefore unnecessary for the
Sandiganbayan to find direct proof of any
agreement among Napoles, former Senator
Enrile and Reyes. The conspiracy may be
implied from the intentional participation in the
transaction that furthers the common design and
purpose. As long as the prosecution was able to
prove that two or more persons aimed their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and
a concurrence of sentiment, the conspiracy
may be inferred even if no actual meeting
among them was proven
The prosecution was able to establish with
evident proof that Napoles participated in
the implied conspiracy to misappropriate
public funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth.
Here, the implied conspiracy among Napoles and
her co-accused was proven through various
documentary and testimonial evidence showing
that they acted towards the common goal of
misappropriating the PDAF of former
Senator Enrile.
The Sandiganbayan may rely on the
testimonies of the whistleblowers,
especially since these were corroborated by
other available evidence
SC Petition dismissed.
TEODORA ALTOBANO-
RUIZ, Complainant, v. HON. RAMSEY
DOMINGO G. PICHAY, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 78, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
PARAÑAQUE CITY,  Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the
Complaint1 of Teodora Altobano-Ruiz (Ruiz)
against respondent Judge Ramsey Domingo G.
Pichay (Judge Pichay), Presiding Judge,
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78,
Parañaque City for gross ignorance of the law and
gross misconduct in connection with the latter's
act of granting bail in favor of Francis Eric Paran
(Paran).
Ruiz and Paran are the accused in an adultery
case, pending before MTCC, Cavite. accused
Paran was apprehended at his residence in
Quezon City by police authorities from
Parañaque City by virtue of the Warrant of
Arrest3 dated March 12, 2014 issued by Judge
Mapili. He was detained for several days at the
Parañaque City Police Station.
Accused Paran filed an application for bail before
Branch 78, MeTC, Parañaque City, which was
promptly approved by respondent Judge Pichay
after the accused posted a cash bond of
P12,000.00,
On the other hand, Ruiz voluntarily surrendered
before Judge Mapili and was temporarily released
on bail upon posting a cash bond of P12,000.00.
Ruiz alleged that Judge Pichay had no authority to
approve Paran's application for bail since the
latter already had a pending criminal case for
adultery in another court, and he was actually
arrested in Quezon City which was outside Judge
Pichay's territorial jurisdiction.
OCA directed to submit his comment .
In comment of Pichay, in good faith, since PARAN
detained on the Parañaque City Police Station. He
further averred that he acted on the bail
application on the same date that it was filed,
which was a Saturday, in order to give effect to
the accused's constitutional right to bail.
It further found Judge Pichay guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and recommended that he
be meted the penalty of a fine in the amount of
P5,000.00 with stern warning
SC Adopt findings of OCA.
Section 17 (a) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94
which governs the approval of bail bonds for
criminal cases pending outside the judge's
territorial jurisdiction is instructive, to wit:
amount fixed may be filed with the court where
the case is pending, or in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with any
regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case is
pending, bail may also be filed with any
Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no
judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.
In the second situation, the accused has two (2)
options. First, he may file bail in the court
where his case is pending or, second, he may
file bail with any regional trial court in the
province, city or municipality where he was
arrested.
Indeed, the only circumstance where Judge
Pichay can exercise authority to rule on Paran's
bail application is if the latter, who was detained
in Parañaque City, was not yet charged with a
criminal offense in another court, pursuant to
Section 17(c),9 Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure
SC- GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW, and a FINE equivalent to the amount of
P40,000.00 is hereby imposed upon him
RULE ON PRECAUTIONARY HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDER
Section 1. Precautionary Hold Departure
Order. – is an order in writing issued by a court
commanding the Bureau of Immigration to
prevent any attempt by a person suspected of a
crime to depart from ·the Philippines, which shall
be issued ex-parte in cases involving crimes
where the minimum of the penalty prescribed by
law is at least six (6) years and one (I) day or
when the offender is a foreigner regardless of the
imposable penalty.
Section 2. Where filed. – The application for a
precautionary hold departure order may be filed
by a prosecutor with any regional trial court
within whose territorial jurisdiction the alleged
crime was committed: Provided, that for
compelling reasons, it can be filed with any
regional trial court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known; Provided,
further, that the regional trial courts in the City of
Manila, Quezon City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao
City, and Cagayan de Oro City shall also have the
authority to act on applications filed by the
prosecutor based on complaints instituted by the
National Bureau of Investigation, regardless
where the alleged crime was committed.
Section 3. Finding of probable cause. – Upon
motion by the complainant in a criminal
complaint filed before the office of the city or
provincial prosecutor, and upon a preliminary
determination of probable cause based on the
complaint and attachments, the investigating
prosecutor may file an application in the name of
the People of the Philippines for a precautionary
hold order (PHDO) with the proper regional trial
court. The application shall be accompanied by
the complaint-affidavit and its attachments,
personal details, passport number and a
photograph of the respondent, if available.
Section 4. Grounds for issuance. – A
precautionary hold departure order shall not issue
except upon determination by the judge, in
whose court the application is filed, that probable
cause exists, and there is a high probability that
respondent will depart from the Philippines to
evade arrest and prosecution of crime against
him or her. The judge shall personally examine
under oath or affirmation, in the form of
searching questions and answers in writing, the
applicant and the witnesses he or she may
produce on facts personally known to them and
attaching to the record their sworn statements.
If the judge finds that probable cause exists and
there is a high probability that the respondent will
depart, he or she shall issue the PHDO and direct
the Bureau of Immigration to hold and prevent
the departure of the respondent at any Philippine
airport or ports. Otherwise, the judge shall order
the dismissal of the application.
Section 5. Preliminary finding of probable
cause. – Since the finding of probable cause by
the judge is solely based on the complaint and is
specifically issued for the purpose of issuing the
PHDO, the same shall be without prejudice to the
resolution o f the prosecutor of the criminal
complaint considering the complaint-affidavit,
counter-affidavit, reply- affidavit, and the
evidence presented by both parties during the
preliminary investigation. If the prosecutor after
preliminary investigation dismisses the criminal
complaint for lack of probable cause then the
respondent may use the dismissal as a ground for
the lifting of the PHDO with the regional trial
court that issued the order. If the prosecutor finds
probable cause and files the criminal information,
the case with the court that issued the PHDO, on
motion of the prosecutor shall be consolidated
with the court where the criminal information is
filed.
Section 6. Form and validity of the
precautionary hold departure order. – The
precautionary hold departure order shall indicate
the name of the respondent, his or her alleged
crime, the time and place of its commission, and
the name of the complainant. (See Annex “A”
herein). A copy of the application, personal
details, passport number, photograph of the
respondent, if available, shall be appended to the
order. The order shall be valid until lifted by the
issuing court as may be warranted by the result
of the preliminary investigation.
The court shall furnish the Bureau of Immigration
with a duly certified copy of the hold departure
order within twenty-four (24) hours from
issuance.
Section 7. Lifting of the Order. – The
respondent may file a verified motion before the
issuing court for the temporary lifting of PHDO on
meritorious ground; that, based on the complaint-
affidavit and the evidence that he or she will
present, there is doubt that probable cause exists
to issue the PHDO or it is shown that he or she is
not a flight risk: Provided, that the respondent
posts a bond; Provided, further, that the lifting of
the PHDO is without prejudice to the resolution of
the preliminary investigation against the
respondent.
Section 8. Bond. – Respondent may ask the
issuing court to allow him or her to leave the
country upon posting of a bond in an amount to
be determined by the court subject to the
conditions set forth in the Order granting the
temporary lifting of the PHDO.
Section 9. Effectivity. – This Rule shall take
effect within fifteen (15) days following its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY
CASTILLO, Petitioner,
\vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Pursuant to the confidential information that
petitioner was engaged in selling shabu,, after
conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at
the house of the petitioner, secured a search
warrant from RTC, same police officer serve the
search warrant to RTC.
Upon arrival somebody shouted raid which
prompted them to immediately disembark from
jeep. Went to two storey, but before
implementation of SW, SPO3 Masnayon, saw
petitioner run towards the small structure a nipa
hut in front of house. Chased the petitioner but to
no avail. Went back to house and closely guarded
the place and requested assistance of two
barangay tanod.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson
Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner
named Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of
petitioner including the nipa hut where the
petitioner allegedly ran for covertwo barangay
tanods.
One of the barangay tanods was able to
confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. The contents of the four (4)
heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were
subjected to laboratory examination, the result of
which proved positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride,  or shabu
Information was filed before the RTC against
petitioner, charging him with violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended-
possession of regulated drug.
During arraignment, with assistance of his
counsel pleaded not guilty.
Defense, was installing the electrical wiring and
air conditioning units in canteen and beauty
parlor. And able to finish at 6pm and able to go
home at 8:30-9pm. Learned from his wife,
according to him a small structure, confiscated
items was his brother and storage owned by his
father.
RTC found guilty.
CA Affirmed the decision. MR denied, certiorari
under rule 45 In SC.
3 ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER.
1ST- Petitioner insist that there was no
probable cause in issuing SW, and police
officer who applied had no personal
knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of
drugs.
 SC- No merit on First Arguments –
 The requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant are:
 (1) probable cause is present;
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched
  (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3)
the judge must examine, in writing and
under oath or affirmation, the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce;
 (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify
on the facts personally known to them;
and
 (5) the warrant specifically describes the
place to be searched and the things to be
seized
2nd Petitioner asserts that the nipa hut
located about 20 meters away from his
house is no longer within the "permissible
area" that may be searched by the police
officers due to the distance and that the
search warrant did not include the same
nipa hut as one of the places to be
searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues
that the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable
only against government authorities and not to
private individuals such as the barangay
tanod who found the folded paper containing
packs of shabu inside the nipa hut.
 warrant issued must particularly describe
the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized in order for it to be
valid. A designation or description that
points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness. ]
 The confiscated items, having been found
in a place other than the one described in
the search warrant, can be considered as
fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an evidence is a
violation of petitioner's constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches
and seizure
 Contention of OSF devoid of merit .
 Having been established that the
assistance of the barangay tanods was
sought by the police authorities who
effected the searched warrant, the
same barangay tanods therefore acted as
agents of persons in authority.
 A person who, by direct provision of law or
by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with
the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and
property, such as barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay
leader, and any person who comes to
the aid of persons in authority, shall
be deemed an agent of a person in
authority.
 The Local Government Code also contains
a provision which describes the function of
a barangay tanod as an agent of persons
in authority. Section 388 of the Local
Government Code
 Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items
are inadmissible in evidence.
Petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, because he could
not be presumed to be in possession of the same
just because they were found inside the nipa hut.
 This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such,
criminal intent is not an essential element.
However, the prosecution must prove that
the accused had the intent to possess
(animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when
the drug is in the immediate physical
possession or control of the accused. On
the other hand, constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the
dominion and control of the accused or
when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where
it is found.
 The records are void of any evidence to
show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in
question nor was it established that he
used the said structure as a shop. The
RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed
that petitioner used the said structure due
to the presence of electrical materials, the
petitioner being an electrician by
profession
in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. 36 Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who
act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,  Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to
FACTS- Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other
local officials3 of Koronadal City, South Cotabato
filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)4 charging
the petitioner, among others,5 with violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with
the consultancy services for the architectural
aspect, the engineering design, and the
construction supervision and management of the
proposed Koronadal City public market
Ombudsmna directed petitioner to file counter
affidavit
Ombudsman found Probable Cause. against the
petitioner and some private individuals for
violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against the
petitioner alone for Falsification of Public
Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Ombudsman file Information to SB.
SB ordered Office of Special Prosecutor to
conduct reinvestigation. 10 days for counter
affidavit in OSP. Petitioner asked for 30 days and
another 30 days extension, and asked anew 20
days extension period. Despite the extension
period asked and given, the petitioner failed to
file his counter-affidavit, prompting Prosecutor
Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner
had waived his right to submit countervailing
evidence.
Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the
arraignment and trial of the petitioner and of the
other accused private individuals.
Petitioner asked motion to quash, and SB denied
because of pending OSP reinvestigation. and not
question the denial of motion,
Upon request of Prosec. Ruiz, petioner arraigned
and pleaded not guilty.
OSP filed a Motion to Suspend petioner
pendete lite, Petitioner filed his Vigorous
Opposition SB granted and hereby orders
suspension from any public position FOR
PERIOD OF 90 Days. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration.
Petioner question the issuance of suspension
order despite no hearing. Nowhere n record to
show cause at specific date of hearing. For the
petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension
hearing can only be satisfied if the
settle the "defect" in the information.
1. Whether the information, charging the
petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, is valid; and
 In deference to the constitutional right of
an accused to be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusation against
him,31 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Rules)32 requires, inter alia, that the
information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute and the
acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged.
Additionally, the Rules requires that these
acts or omissions and its attendant
circumstances "must be stated in
ordinary and concise language" and
"in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged x
x x and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
 The test of the information’s
sufficiency is whether the crime is
described in intelligible terms and with
such particularity with reasonable
certainty so that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged.
 In particular, whether an information
validly charges an offense depends on
whether the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information shall establish
the essential elements of the offense
charged as defined in the law. The raison
d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense In arguing against the validity of
the information, the petitioner appears to
go beyond the standard of a "person of
common understanding" in appreciating
the import of the phrase "acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality."
A reading of the information clearly
reveals that the phrase "acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality"
was merely a continuation of the prior
allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and
 that he ultimately acted with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality in giving
unwarranted benefits and advantages to
his co-accused private individuals. This is
what a plain and non-legalistic reading of
the information would yield.
 Given the supposed ambiguity of the
subject being qualified by the phrase
"acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality," the remedy of the
petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a
bill of particulars and not for the quashal
of an information which sufficiently alleges
the elements of the offense charged
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an
actual pre-suspension hearing renders
invalid the suspension order against the
petitioner
 The pre-suspension order is valid
 upon the filing of such information, the
trial court should issue an order with
proper notice requiring the accused officer
to show cause at a specific date of hearing
why he should not be ordered suspended
from office pursuant to the cited
mandatory provisions of the Act. Where
either the prosecution seasonably files a
motion for an order of suspension or the
accused in turn files a motion to
quash the information or challenges
the validity thereof, such show-cause
order of the trial court would no
longer be necessary. What is
indispensable is that the trial court duly
hear the parties at a hearing held for
determining the validity of the
information, and thereafter hand down its
ruling, issuing the corresponding order of
suspension should it uphold the validity of
the information or withholding such
suspension in the contrary case.
 d) No specific rules need be laid down for
such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to
state that the accused should be given a
fair and adequate opportunity to challenge
the validity of the criminal proceedings
against him,
 The purpose of the law in requiring a
pre-suspension hearing is to
determine the validity of the
information so that the trial court can
have a basis to either suspend the
accused and proceed with the trial on
the merits of the case, withhold the
suspension and dismiss the case, or
correct any part of the proceedings that
impairs its validity. That hearing is similar
to a challenge to the validity of the
information by way of a motion to quash
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-
suspension hearing held to determine the
validity of the Informations that had been
filed against petitioners, we believe that
the numerous pleadings filed for and
against them have achieved the goal of this
procedure. The right to due process is
satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by
the filing and the consideration by the court
of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and
other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due
process requirement, when an accused public
official is given an adequate opportunity to be
heard on his possible defenses against the
mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then
an accused would have no reason to complain
that no actual hearing was conducted. 47 It is well
settled that "to be heard" does not only
mean oral arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no
denial of procedural due process exists.
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his
Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion to
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after
receiving an adverse ruling from the
Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of
the suspension order issued against him, and (iii)
filed a Reply to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea
for reconsideration.49 Given this opportunity,
we find that the petitioner’s continued
demand for the conduct of an actual pre-
suspension hearing – based on the same
alleged "defect in the information," 50 which
we have found wanting – has legally nothing
to anchor itself on.
 
The suspension required under this provision is
not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the
accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during his suspension. It’s a mere
preventive measure.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs.ARTURO LARA y
ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
TOPIC- RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Facts: Lara charged with Robbery with Homicide.
Armed with gun conspiring with unidentified
person who is still at large with intent to gain by
mean of force, violence and intimidation steal
230,000 belonging to SAN SEBASTIAL ALLIED
SERVICES INC on occasion of such robbery,shoot
Joselito Bautista.
Lara pleaded not guilty.
3 witnesse. 1 st
Sumulong- accounting staff-
withdraw amount of 230K in METROBANK Pasig to
defray salaries of employees, while in the
intersection, LARA then suddenly appeared at the
front of passenger side of pick up and pointed a
gun at him stating” akin na ang pera, iyong bag,
nasaan? Buatista shouted, wag mong ibigay.
Threw bag to Bautista alight from the pickup,
LARA ran after him while firing his gun, Sumulong
then called the office, he went to rear potion of
vehicle and sale blood ,informed by bu stander
that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken
away from him. 6 days thereafter he saw LARA in
Pasig Walking, alerted the police and thereafter
arrested. Ati and Manocob identified him(LARA)
who shot and rob.
2nd witness SPO1 Cruz- approach LARA and
invited for questioning. Place in line-up and
positively identified by SUMULONG, MANACOB
AND ATIE. LARA informed his right and
subsequently detained.
3RD WITNESS- PO3 Calix, was able to interview
Bautista before died.
Defense- he was digging a Sewer Trench working
form 8-3pm. Corroborated with his neighbor, saw
Lara working at sewer trench from 9-5pm. His
Sister, he is working for the whole day.
RTC- convicted of Robbery with Homicide. As
repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For alibi
to prosper, an accused must show he was at
some other place for such a period of time that it
was impossible for him to have been at the crime
scene at the time of the commission of the
crime"  There are in same Barangay, not
physically impossible for him to be in the crime
scene. Positive Identification of the eyewitness
should prevail over the alibi and denial of the
accused whose testimony was not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence.
On appeal, LARA questioned that there is
1. no warrant
 Belated invocation. Any objections to the
legality of the warrantless arrest should
have been raised in a motion to
quash duly filed before the accused
enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed
waived. Further, that the accused was
illegally arrested is not a ground to set
aside conviction duly arrived at and based
on evidence that sufficiently establishes
culpability:
2. not assisted by the counsel. The police line-up
is part of custodial investigation and his right to
counsel had already attached.
 CA ruled that there was no legal
compulsion to afford him a counsel during
a police line-up since the latter is not part
of custodial investigation.
 An exception to this rule is when the
accused had been the focus of police
attention at the start of the
investigation. In the case at bench,
appellant was identified in a police line-up
by prosecution witnesses from a group of
persons gathered for the purpose.
However, there was no proof that
appellant was interrogated at all or that a
statement or confession was extracted
from him.
 The accusatory process had not yet
commenced. Assuming ex hypothesi that
appellant was subjected to interrogation
sans counsel during the police line-up, it
does not in any way affect his
culpability. Any allegation of violation
of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material
only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis
of their conviction. Here, appellant was
convicted based on the testimony of a
prosecution witness and not on his alleged
uncounseled confession or admission.
3. Prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution
failed to present a witness who actually saw him
commit the alleged acts. The physical description
of Lara that Sumulong gave to the police was
different from the one he gave during the trial,
indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of
the perpetrator.
 Based on circumstantial evidence.
CA confirmed LARA conviction.
SC- So-called Miranda rights, may be invoked
only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. The right to be assisted by counsel
attaches only during custodial investigation and
cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not
part of the custodial investigation process. This is
because during a police line-up, the process has
not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the
complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in the course of the line-up
JOSE “PEPE” SANICO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER SON-
TENIO, Respondent.
FACTS: The petitioner and Marsito Batiquin were
criminally charged for trespassing and theft of
minerals. MCTC Cebu- convicted. The truck with
Plate No.GAX-119, as an instrument of the crime
is hereby ordered confiscated in favour of the
government. And not guilty on trespassing.
Sanico Counsel filed notice of appeal in MCTC,
RTC ordered to file hos memorandum on appeal.
RTC dismissed the appeal with prejudice( as it is
the gorund) . MR was filed(another counsel Atty.
Cañete) because the supposed sickness of
Sanico’s wife and the lapses of Atty. Baring were
not justifiable reasons. Filed Petition for review in
CA, but was denied based on no docket fees, no
proper proof of service, not furnish RTC a copy of
petition for review and etc, MR was denied.
 Jurisprudence is replete with
pronouncements in regard to the
mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the
legal requirement to pay docket and
appeal fees. Without such payment, the
appellate court does not acquire   a
jurisdiction  over the subject matter of the
action and the decision sought to be
appealed from becomes final  and
executor.  Further, the other infirmities of
the Petition, insofar as the lack of proper
proof of service and failure to append
material portions of the record,
necessarily warrant the dismissal of the.
 Petitioner invoked that it could not be
bound by the gross and inexcusable
negligence of his counsels.  However, a
client is generally bound by the acts, even
mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique
On motion for reconsideration, the CA denied
it, assuring that Jose was bound by the
mistakes of his counsel.  In the meantime, the
RTC granted Jennifer Tenio moved for
issuance of writ of execution, and the record
of the case indicated that it was granted and
several properties of Jose were levied on
execution.
Jose elevated his case to the Supreme Court. 
He argues that the RTC erred in dismissing his
appeal for non-filing of he memorandum on
appeal.  The CA erred in not reversing the RTC
orders, and in finding him liable for the
mistakes of his counsels.
I: Whether or not the non-fling of the
Memorandum of Appeal by Jose merits the
dismissal of his appeal by the RTC.
No.
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal
is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal
only in civil cases. The same rule does not
apply in criminal cases, because Section
9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to
decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire
record of the case and of such memoranda or
briefs as may have been filed” upon the
submission of the appellate memoranda or
briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to
file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the
petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly
premised on the failure to file the
memorandum on appeal.
Having timely perfected his appeal by filing
the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the
petitioner was entitled to expect that the RTC
would resolve his appeal in due course,
whether he filed his memorandum on appeal
or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the
appeal by the RTC was, therefore, an
outright denial of due process to him in
manner that occasioned severe
prejudice because his conviction was not
reviewed despite his first-time appeal
being a matter of right, and because his
conviction was then declared to have attained
finality, causing the execution of the decision
as to its civil aspect.
If the incompetence of counsel was so great and
the error committed as a result was so serious
that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his
day in court, the litigation ought to be re-opened
to give to the client another chance to present his
case. The legitimate interests of the petitioner,
particularly the right to have his conviction
reviewed by the RTC as the superior tribunal,
should not be sacrificed in the altar of
technicalities.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly
vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding
over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE
RAMOS,  investigation
FACTS: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of
the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its
Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to
light that he was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets,
The PAL management notified him of an
investigation to be conducted into the matter of
February 9, 1986. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the
Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA)
to which Ramos pertained.
At investigation, informed the finding of Audit
Team, answers the the proceeds had been
misused, although he had planned in paying back
the money, prevented from doing so, he still
willing to settle the obligation as compromise to
pay staggered basis. No compromise agreement
was reached.
2 months after, information charging for the
crime of ESTAFA, HAVING ENTRUSRED for fare
tickets, and obligation to remit all, misappropriate
misapply, and converted.
Felipe entered a plea of Not Guilty. The
prosecution of the case was undertaken by
lawyers of PAL under the direction and
supervision of the Fiscal.
Private Prosecutor made a written offer of
evidence on statement of accused (answer on
audit team) and his handwritten admission.
Defendant attorney, filed objections/Comment
that said documents, which appears to be a
confession, was take without the accused being
represented by a lawyer.
Respondent Judge, declared inadmissible un
evidence,(investigation conducted by branch
manager and handwritten admission- since it
does not appear that the accused was reminded
of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have counsel, and that when he waived the same
and gave his statement, it was with the
assistance actually of a counsel.") Private
Prosecutor filed MR,and was denied. He
pointed out that the investigation of Felipe
Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one
"for the offense of allegedly
misappropriating the proceeds of the
fell "within the coverage of the
constitutional provisions;" and the fact that
Ramos was not detained at the time, or the
was administrative in
character could not operate to except the
case "from the ambit of the constitutional
provision cited."
The right against self- incrimination, "No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in
custodial interrogation, which have been made
more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of
the same Article III.13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination,
mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who
gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to
"be compelled to be a witness against himself"
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the
procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being
regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings
have been given, such opportunity afforded him,
the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such warnings
and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution
at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case
that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, as the term should be
properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared
to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial interrogation under
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did
not therefore come into play, were of no
relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed
to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that
the proceedings should be recorded, the record
having thereafter been marked during the trial of
the criminal action subsequently filed against him
as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note
(later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his
superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the
investigation, offering to compromise his liability
in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even
spontaneous act on his part. They may not be
excluded on the ground that the so-called
"Miranda rights" had not been accorded to
Ramos.
the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was
filed against 35 Aquilans.
The case however did not proceed until 2002. The
unexplained length of time in which the case
remained dormant caused the dismissal of the
case for being in violation of the accuseds’
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
trial.
ISSUE/S: Whether the CA correctly dismissed the
case for violation of the accuseds’ right to speedy
trial

Petition is granted RTC judge ordered to admit HELD: Yes. The SC did not see any grave abuse
the evidence. of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case
against accused Escalona,
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the
violation of their right to speedy trial.
FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law
The absence of the records in the trial court [was]
students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the due to the fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the
Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of
the court a quo requiring it to secure certified
The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were
true copies of the same. What is glaring from the
subjected to initiation rites. After the second day
records is the fact that as early as September 21,
of initiation rites has ended, accused non-resident
1995, the court a quo already issued an Order
or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon
requiring the prosecution, through the
(Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
Department of Justice, to secure the complete
demanded that the rites be reopened. The
records of the case from the Court of Appeals.
head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
The prosecution did not comply with the said
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence
Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated
of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
by the court a quo in an Order dated December
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including
27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the
Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes
part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such
to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical
order was complied with. It appears, however,
pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of
that even until August 5, 2002, the said records
which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
were still not at the disposal of the trial court
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of
because the lack of it was made the basis of the
intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their
said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed
last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
by co-accused Concepcion.
longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27,
the day was officially ended, and the neophytes
started eating dinner. They then slept at the 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of
almost seven years, there was no action at all on
carport.
the part of the court a quo. Except for the
pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were
petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29,
suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and
set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the
Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought
court did not act upon, the case remained
he was just overacting. When they realized,
dormant for a considerable length of time. This
though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the
of the Aquilans started helping him. They
kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon.
removed his clothes and helped him through a
sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his
condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs. MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE, accused-
appellant.
RULE 116 – ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
PEOPLE VS ESTOMACA 256 SCRA 421
DOCTRINE: Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires
that the arraignment should be made in open
court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court
furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses stated
therein, then reading the same in the language or
dialect that is known to him, and asking him what
his plea is to the charge. The requirement that
the reading be made in a language or dialect that
the accused understands and knows is a
mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said
Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial
courts. This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right
of an accused to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation leveled at him and
is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able
to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof.
It is an integral aspect of the due process clause
under the Constitution.
FACTS: Estomaca is an illiterate laborer accused
of raping his own daughter, Estelita. 5 complaints
were filed (committed on 5 separate occasion)
and 2 of them are being challenged. These
instances happened sometime in 1993 and 1994
which both took place in their residence in Iloilo.
(melita is the eldest daughter of the accused, the
second husband of Melita's mother. Melita has a
full-blood younger brother around twelve (12)
years old. She has two (2) half-blood sisters
(from) the first marriage of her mother who are
residing in Manila.
Melita claims that she was first
raped in July 1993, at their
residence at Barangay Tiolas, San
Joaquin, Iloilo. This is now the
subject of Criminal Case No. 43567.
The offense was repeated by her
father before Christmas of
December, 1993 (Criminal Case No.
43568); January 1994 (Criminal
Case No. 43569); February 1994
(Criminal Case No. 43570); and on
March 6, 1994 (Criminal Case No.
43571).5
The court imposed the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for the sexual assault in 1993 and the
penalty of death for the alleged rape in 1994.
The records show, however, that there was an
irregularity in his arraignment where the
complaints were supposed to have all been read
to him in the Ilonggo/local dialect. In this said
arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty to all 5
complaints but subsequently stated the he wasn’t
guilty of the other 3 cases against him
ISSUE/S: Whether the arraignment was valid or
not
HELD: No. The transcript of the arraignment
shows that it merely consisted of the bare
reading of the 5 complaints. It was reported in
the transcript that “Reading the
information/complaint to the accused in
Ilonggo/local dialect”. Since it was stated in the
singular, the court speculates whether all 5
complaints were actually ready, translated or
explained to him on a level within his
comprehension considering his limited education.
Parenthetically, there was no statement of record
that appellant fully understood that medium of
expression. This assumes added significance
since Ilonggo, or properly called Hiligaynon, is a
regional language, spoken in a major part of Iloilo
province, Negros Occidental and, with variations,
in Capiz. Within a province or major geographical
area using a basic regional language, there may
be other local dialects spoken in certain parts
thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted
portion of the transcript intended to convey that
Ilonggo is merely a local dialect and was also the
idiom referred to, the same is egregious error; it
would be different if local dialect was used to
denote an alternative and different medium but,
inexplicably, without identifying what it was. The
significance of this distinction is found right in the
provision of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which,
cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations,
deliberately required that the complaint or
information be read to the accused in the
language or the dialect known to him, to
ensure his comprehension of the charges.
The Court takes judicial notice, because it is
either of public knowledge or readily capable of
unquestionable demonstration, that in the central
and northwestern part of Iloilo province and all
the way up to and throughout Antique, including
necessarily San Joaquin where the offenses were
committed and of which appellant and his family
are natives, the local dialect is known as kinaray-
a. Barring previous exposure to or as a
consequence of extended social or commercial
intercourse, kinaray-a is not readily
understandable to nor spoken by those born to
the Hiligaynon regional language or who have
lived in the areas under its sway for an
appreciable period of time. The converse is true
for those whose native tongue is the dialect of
kinaray-a,since they are generally not well-versed
in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints
are not only in English but in technical legal
language, we are again at sea as to whether and
how the indictments were translated to Ilonggo
and/or to kinaray-a, or that the appellant was
truly and honestly made aware of the charges
and, especially, the consequences of his guilty
plea thereto. The records are silent and do
not reveal anything on this point, nor how
the dialogue between the presiding judge
and appellant was translated. Yet a mans life
is at stake while this Court wrestles with that
dilemma created by an omission of official duty.
Since no valid judgments can be had upon an
invalid arraignment, the cases were set aside and
were remanded to the trial court.
Able to finish grade 1, 42 yrs old, according to
him he perform only 2 acts,
PEOPLE VS PANGILINAN 518 SCRA 359
DOCTRINE: Procedural defect of belated
arraignment was cured when the counsel of the
accused participated in the trial without raising
any objection that his client had yet to be
arraigned.
FACTS: Alfredo Pangilinan was charged with 2
informations for the rape of his daughter, AAA. He
was arrested and detained with no bail
recommended. He then filed a petition for bail.
The petition for bail was heard and prosecution
presented evidence. The Regional Trial Court
denied petition Defense then presented its
evidence.
The RTC after having discovered that Pangilinan
was not yet arraigned, scheduled his
arraignment. Pangilinan pleaded not guilty. RTC
convicted him and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the arraignment was
valid.
HELD: YES.
Pangilinan assails his conviction because he was
not properly arraigned. Since he was arraigned
only after the case was submitted for decision,
said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error
which is prejudicial to the appellant and is
tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to
be informed of the accusation against him. He
claims that his subsequent arraignment did not
cure the defect in the trial proceedings because
at the time the petition for bail was heard, the
trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
his person.
The accused is mistaken. When the hearings for
his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court
had already acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his
arrest or voluntary appearance. In the case at
bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the appellant when he was arrested on
19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment,
conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his
person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of
implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The
purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the
accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of
his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him
of why the prosecuting arm of the State is
mobilized against him.
Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the
case was submitted for decision. The question is:
Were appellant’s rights and interests prejudiced
by the fact that he was arraigned only at this
stage of the proceedings? We do not think so.
Appellant’s belated arraignment did not
prejudice him. This procedural defect was
cured when his counsel participated in the
trial without raising any objection that his
client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his
counsel even cross-examined the
prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active
participation in the hearings is a clear
indication that he was fully aware of the
charges against him; otherwise, his counsel
would have objected and informed the court
of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was
made when appellant was subsequently
arraigned. The parties did not question the
procedure undertaken by the trial court. It
is only now, after being convicted and
sentenced to two death sentences, that
appellant cries that his constitutional right
has been violated. It is already too late to
raise this procedural defect. This Court will
not allow it.
In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where
the same issue was raised under similar
circumstances, we held that while the
arraignment of appellant was conducted after the
cases had been submitted for decision, the error
is non- prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since
appellant’s rights and interests were not
prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only
follows that his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him was not violated.
DAAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN 560 SCRA 233
DOCTRINE:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval—it usually involves the
defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offense or
to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than
that for the graver charge.
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the
pre-trial stage of the proceedings but it may also
be made during the trial proper and even after
the prosecution has finished presenting its
evidence and rested its case.
FACTS: Daan (together with other co-accused)
was charged for three counts of malversation of
public funds and three counts of falsification of
public document by a public officer or employee
before the Sandiganbayan.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to
withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute
the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the
mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of
guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated
in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal
is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead
to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime
of falsification of public document by a public
officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to
the lesser crime of falsification of a public
document by a private individual. On the other
hand, in the malversation cases, the accused
offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty"
thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser
crime of failure of an accountable officer to
render accounts.
Prosecution found this acceptable. Insofar as the
malversation cases are concerned, the
prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of
said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime
of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts.
The Sandiganbayan, however, denied petitioner’s
Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable
recommendation by the prosecution, on the main
ground that no cogent reason was presented to
justify its approval.
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied the ensuing
Motion for Reconsideration. Daan filed a Rule 65
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not The Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Daan’s motion to plea bargain.
HELD: YES.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval. It
usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty
to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a
lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2,
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At
arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. After arraignment but before
trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his
plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir.
38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the
pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and
2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea
bargaining to be considered by the trial court at
the pre-trial conference,viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In
all criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and
within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in
special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court,
order a pre-trial conference to consider the
following:
(a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the
parties;(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence;(e) modification of the order of trial if
the accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and (f) such matters as will
promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they
cannot be used against the accused. The
agreements covering the matters referred to in
section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the
court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper
and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus,
the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial
stage or that it was made only after the
prosecution already presented several
witnesses.9
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
presents the basic requisites upon which
plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it
should be with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor, and that the plea
of guilt should be to a lesser offense which
is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The rules however use word may
in the second sentence of Section 2,
denoting an exercise of discretion upon the
trial court on whether to allow the accused
to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted
to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a
lighter offense than that actually charged is
not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused.
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, the Court
ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by
the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion
of the trial court. However, Villarama involved
plea bargaining after the prosecution had already
rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial
stage, as in the present case, the trial court's
exercise of its discretion should neither be
arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and
whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it
must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected
petitioner's plea offer on the ground that
petitioner and the prosecution failed to
demonstrate that the proposal would redound to
the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan
believes that approving the proposal would "only
serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges
against them and send the wrong signal to
potential grafters in public office that the
penalties they are likely to face would be lighter
than what their criminal acts would have merited
or that the economic benefits they are likely to
derive from their criminal activities far outweigh
the risks they face in committing them; thus,
setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws
intended to curb graft and corruption in
government."
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered
valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer.
However, subsequent events and higher interests
of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's
plea offer should be accepted. The present case
calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's
equity jurisdiction.
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted
the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official
receipt issued by the provincial government of
Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already
been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN
voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases.
Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind,
merits consideration.
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states
when an offense includes or is included in
the other, to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. — An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of
the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include
another when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former as alleged in
the complaint or information constitute the
latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to
be necessarily included in another when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential
elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner
may plead guilty to such lesser offenses
SC- Petition was granted.
PEOPLE VS Khadaffy JANJALANI etc., 639
SCRA 157
TOPIC: Valentine’s Day Bombing by Abu Sayyaf;
Trinidad and Baharan plead guilty for multiple
murder but plead not guilty for frustrated
multiple murder.
DOCTRINE:
All trial judges must refrain from accepting with
alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for while
justice demands a speedy administration, judges
are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to
it that when an accused pleads guilty, he
understands fully the meaning of his plea and the
import of an inevitable conviction; The
requirement for a judge to conduct a searching
inquiry applies more so in cases of re-
arraignment.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry
should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which
it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused—
the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the
duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules
to satisfy themselves that the accused had not
been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the
significance, effects, and consequences of their
guilty plea.
1. Convictions based on an improvident plea of
guilt are set aside only if such plea is the
sole basis of the judgment.
FACTS: An RRCG bus was plying its usual route,
from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang
bus terminal via EDSA. Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the
evening, while they were about to move out of
the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the
bus conductor noticed two men running after the
bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so
the conductor obliged and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor,
he immediately became wary of the two men,
because, even if they got on the bus together,
the two sat away from each other—one sat two
seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the
back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15
passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that
the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When
he approached the person near the driver and
asked him whether he was paying for two
passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by the
question. He then stuttered and said he was
paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew
more concerned when the other man seated at
the back also paid for both passengers. At this
point, Andales said he became more certain that
the two were up to no good, and that there might
be a holdup.
Andales said he became more suspicious because
both men kept on asking him if the bus was going
to stop at Ayala Avenue.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the
corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men
insisted on getting off the bus. According to
Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let
them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance
prohibited unloading anywhere except at
designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver
gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight.
The two immediately got off the bus and ran
towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales
felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly
engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards
a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to
where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers
either lying on the ground or looking traumatized.
A few hours after, he made a statement before
the Makati Police Station narrating the whole
incident.
Shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of
the Abu Sayyaf Group—Abu Solaiman—
announced over radio station DZBB that the
group had a Valentine’s Day “gift” for former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of
more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad
gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive
interview sometime after the incident, confessing
his participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing
incident. In another exclusive interview on the
network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his
role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused
Asali gave a television interview, confessing that
he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14
February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor
identified the accused Baharan and
Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the
two men who had entered the RRCG bus on
the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group—namely
Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo
Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali,
Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky,
and other “John” and “Jane Does”—were then
charged with multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad,
Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other
accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder
charge, Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered
a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon
arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder
charge, accused Asali pled guilty. Accused
Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat
pled not guilty to both charges.
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial
court asked whether accused Baharan and
Trinidad were amenable to changing their “not
guilty” pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder, considering that they pled “guilty” to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an
apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense
counsel conferred with accused Baharan and
Trinidad and explained to them the consequences
of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness
for re-arraignment. After the Information was
read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to
the charge of multiple frustrated murder.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the trial court gravely
erred in accepting accused-appellants’ plea of
guilt despite insufficiency of searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the
said plea.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the trial court
judges are required to observe the following
procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital of ense; reception
of evidence.—When the accused pleads guilty to
a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea and shall require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present
evidence in his behalf.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry
applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In
People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since
accused-appellant’s original plea was “not guilty,”
the trial court should have exerted careful effort
in inquiring into why he changed his plea to
“guilty.”
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching
inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in
which it was the defense counsel who explained
the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the
accused, as it appears in this case. In People v.
Alborida, this Court found that there was still an
improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused
had already signified in open court that his
counsel had explained the consequences of the
guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of
his counsel; that the accused understood that the
penalty of death would still be meted out to him;
and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or
threatened.
The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the
duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules
to satisfy themselves that the accused had
not been under coercion or duress;
mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance,
effects, and consequences of their guilty
plea. This requirement is stringent and
mandatory. Nevertheless, the High Court is not
unmindful of the context under which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual
milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the
accused. The Court observes that accused
Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to
another charge— multiple murder—based on the
same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated
murder charge. The Court further notes that prior
to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused
Baharan and Trinidad made two other
confessions of guilt—one through an extrajudicial
confession (exclusive television interviews, as
stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and
the other via judicial admission (pretrial
stipulation). Considering the foregoing
circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to
rule on the sufficiency of the “searching
inquiry” in this instance. Remanding the case
for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the
accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of
the condemnatory judgment under consideration.
ABS-CBN CORP. VS GOZON 753 SCRA 1
TOPIC: SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.—
Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following
cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering
from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a
prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review
of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of
the President; provided that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days
counted from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office.
DOCTRINE: The rule therefore in this jurisdiction
is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
FACTS: The controversy arose from GMA-7’s
news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino
overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo dela
Cruz.
As summarized by the CA: Overseas Filipino
worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi
militants and as a condition for his release, a
demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino
troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he was released
by his captors and was scheduled to return to the
country in the afternoon of 22 July 2004.
Occasioned by said homecoming and the public
interest it generated, both GMA Network, Inc. and
petitioner made their respective broadcasts and
coverage of the live event.
Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or
was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of
ABS-CBN. GMA-7’s news control room staff saw
neither the “No Access Philippines” notice nor a
notice that the video feed was under embargo in
favor of ABS-CBN.
ABS-CBN filed the Complaint for copyright
infringement against Dela Pena-Reyes and
Manalastas to which the prosecutor found
probable cause to indict the latter. Respondents
filed the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. DOJ Secretary Raul
Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents and held
that good faith may be raised as a defense in the
case. Both parties moved for reconsideration of
the Gonzalez Resolution. The trial court granted
the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed earlier
by Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas. The Motion
to Suspend was granted.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Trial Court is
correct in granting the Motion to Suspend.
HELD: The trial court should have proceeded
with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60-day period
from the filing of the Petition for Review before
the Department of Justice.
The trial court erred when it did not act on the
criminal case during the interim period. It had full
control and direction of the case.
The suspension of the arraignment should always
be within the limits allowed by law. The doctrine
in Crespo v. Judge Mogul was reiterated in Mayor
Balindong v. Court of Appeals where this court
reminded the Department of Justice Secretary to
refrain from entertaining petitions for review
when the case is already pending with this court:
In order to avoid a situation where the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action
of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial
court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far
as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in the
Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court. The trial court should
have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-
Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60-
day period from the filing of the Petition for
Review before the Department of Justice on
March 8, 2005. It was only on September 13,
2010 that the temporary restraining order was
issued by the Court of Appeals. The trial court
erred when it did not act on the criminal case
during the interim period. It had full control and
direction of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in
denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure
to proceed with the arraignment “disregards the
requirements of due process and erodes the
Court’s independence and integrity.”
ENRILE VS PEOPLE 766 SCRA 1
DOCTRINE: The grant or denial of a motion for
bill of particulars is discretionary on the court
where the Information is filed. As usual in matters
of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not
be reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a
manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave
abuse of discretion is shown.
The rule requires the information to describe the
offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the
accused of the crime charged with and to enable
the court to pronounce judgment. The
particularity must be such that persons of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what
the Information means. The general function of a
bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, is to guard against surprises during
trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the
accused with the evidence of the prosecution.
Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to
include in the bill of particulars matters of
evidence relating to how the people intend to
prove the elements of the offense charged or how
the people intend to prove any item of factual
information included in the bill of particulars.
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an
Information for plunder against Enrile, Napoles,
et. al before the Sandiganbayan. Enrile
responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1)
an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for
lack of evidence on record to establish probable
cause and ad cautelam motion for bail), and (2) a
supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of
arrest and for dismissal of Information,. The
Sandiganbayan heard both motions. Thereafter,
the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to
both motions.
The Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the
plunder case against the accused. Soon after,
Enrile received a notice of hearing informing him
that his arraignment would be held before the
Sandiganbayan. The day before his arraignment,
Enrile filed a motion for bill of particular as well as
a motion for deferment of arraignment since he
was to undergo medical examination at the PGH.
The Sandiganbayan denied his motion for Bill of
Particulars on the following grounds:
2. the details that Enrile desires are “substantial
reiterations” of the arguments he raised in
his supplemental opposition to the
issuance of warrant of arrest and for
dismissal of information; and
3. the details sought are evidentiary in nature and
are best ventilated during trial.
4. Enrile then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was
denied.Thus, he filed a petition for
certiorari before the High Court claiming
that the Sandiganybayan gravely abused
its discretion in denying his motion for bill
of particulars.
5. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the
Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in
denying Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars;
6. HELD: YES. The grant or denial of a
motion for bill of particulars is
discretionary on the court where the
Information is filed. As usual in matters of
discretion, the ruling of the trial court will
not be reversed unless grave abuse of
discretion or a manifestly erroneous order
amounting to grave abuse of discretion is
shown.In the light of all these
considerations, we hold that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s
motion for a bill of particulars, on the
ground that the details sought to be
itemized or specified are all evidentiary
without any explanation supporting this
conclusion constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Some of the desired details are
material facts that must be alleged to
enable the petitioner to properly plead
and prepare his defense. The
Sandiganbayan should have diligently
sifted through each detail sought to be
specified, and made the necessary
determination of whether each detail was
an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly
after Enrile stated in his Reply that the
“desired details” could not be found in the
bundle of documents marked by the
prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate
that he is feigning ignorance of the
presence of these desired details; neither
can we put on him the burden of
unearthing from these voluminous
documents what the desired details are.
The remedy of a bill of particulars is
precisely made available by the Rules to
enable an accused to positively respond
and make an intelligent defense.
7. A bill of particulars guards against the
taking of an accused by surprise by
restricting the scope of the proof; it limits
the evidence to be presented by the
parties to the matters alleged in the
Information as supplemented by the bill. It
is for this reason that the failure of an
accused to move for a bill of particulars
deprives him of the right to object to
evidence which could be lawfully
introduced and admitted under an
information of more or less general terms
which sufficiently charges the defendants
with a definite crime.
8. Sec, 9 Rule 116, Bill of particulars.—The
accused may, before arraignment, move
for a bill of particulars to enable him
properly to plead and prepare for trial. The
 motion shall specify the alleged defects of
the complaint or information and the
details desired.
9. In general, a bill of particulars is the
further specification of the charges or
claims in an action, which an accused may
avail of by motion before arraignment, to
enable him to properly plead and prepare
for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of
particulars has been defined as a
complementary procedural document
consisting of an amplification or more
particularized outline of a pleading, and is
in the nature of a more specific allegation
of the facts recited in the pleading. The
purpose of a motion for bill of particulars
in civil cases is to enable a party to
prepare his responsive pleading properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars
details items or specific conduct not
recited in the Information but nonetheless
pertain to or are included in the crime
charged. Its purpose is to enable an
accused: to know the theory of the
government’s case; to prepare his defense
and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead
his acquittal or conviction in bar of
another prosecution for the same offense;
and to compel the prosecution to observe
certain limitations in offering evidence.
10. In dealing with a motion for a bill of
particulars in a criminal case, judges
should observe that: (a) the remedy is
distinct from a motion to quash in the
sense that it presupposes that the acts or
offenses constituting the offense (or the
ultimate facts that comprise the crime’s
component elements) are already stated
in the Information, albeit may be couched
in vague language; (b) the remedy is, as
mentioned, not meant to supply evidential
information (or evidentiary facts); and (c)
the particulars to be allowed are only
those details that would allow a man of
ordinary intelligence, as may be
reasonable under the circumstances, to,
again, properly plead during his
arraignment and to prepare his defense
for trial. Accordingly, the analysis involved
in motion for bill of particulars should go
beyond a simple ultimate facts-evidentiary
facts dichotomy.
11. If the Information is lacking, a court should
take a liberal attitude towards its granting
and order the government to file a bill of
particulars elaborating on the charges.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of
granting the bill to give full meaning to the
accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed
rights. Notably, the government cannot
put the accused in the position of
disclosing certain overt acts through the
Information and withholding others
subsequently discovered, all of which it
intends to prove at the trial. This is the
type of surprise a bill of particulars is
designed to avoid. The accused is entitled
to the observance of all
the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case
where the crime charged carries with it the
severe penalty of capital punishment and entails
the commission of several predicate criminal acts
involving a great number of transactions spread
over a considerable period of time.
RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH
PEOPLE VS LACSON 400 SCRA 267
DOCTRINE: The interpretation of Sec. 8 of Rule
117 to the effect that in the event that the
accused is prosecuted anew with the same
offense, albeit under an identical information, the
new proceedings being conductedas if the
accused has been charged afresh has in its favor
the soundest policy considerations based no less
on the fundamental objectives of procedural rules
Section 1 (g) of Rule 116—Unless a shorter period
is provided by special law or Supreme Court
circular, the arraignment shall be held within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The
time of the pendency or a motion to quash or for
a bill of particulars or other causes justifying
suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded
in computing the period.
FACTS: Before the Court is the petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
81, for the determination of several factual issues
relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117
on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the
respondent and his co-accused with the said
court. The respondent and his co-accused were
charged with multiple murder for the shooting
and killing of eleven persons bandied as
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The
respondent opposed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be
reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99- 81679 to Q-99-81689
were with the express consent of the respondent
as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal
when he filed his motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for
examination of witnesses. The Court also held
therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be
given retroactive effect, there is still a need to
determine whether the requirements for its
application are attendant.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the requirements for
valid motion to quash were attendant; HELD: NO.
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable
by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a
fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-
panel of prosecutors and before the Court of
Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish
the essential requisites of the first paragraph
thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of
the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or
both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case;2. the offended
party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case;3. the court issues an order
granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of
the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine
qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d’
etre for the requirement of the express consent
of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is to bar him from subsequently
asserting that the revival of the criminal case will
place him in double jeopardy for the same
offense or for an offense necessarily included
therein.
Although the second paragraph of the new rule
states that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof
without the case having been revived, the
provision should be construed to mean that the
order of dismissal shall become permanent one
year after service of the order of dismissal on the
public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution6 without the criminal case having
been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is
served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is
given either viva voce or in writing. It is a
positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no
inference or implication to supply its meaning.
Where the accused writes on the motion of a
prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case
No objection or With my conformity, the writing
amounts to express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of the case. The mere
inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for
a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure
to.
A motion of the accused for a provisional
dismissal of a case is an express consent to such
provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused, the case may be revived only
within the periods provided in the new rule. On
the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed without the express consent of the
accused or over his objection, the new rule would
not apply. The case may be revived or refiled
even beyond the prescribed periods subject to
the right of the accused to oppose the same on
the ground of double jeopardy or that such
revival or refiling is barred by the statute of
limitations.
The case may be revived by the State within the
time-bar either by the refiling of the Information
or by the filing of a new Information for the same
offense or an offense necessarily included
therein. There would be no need of a new
preliminary investigation. However, in a case
wherein after the provisional dismissal of a
criminal case, the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted
their testimonies or may have died or may no
longer be available and new witnesses for the
State have emerged, a new preliminary
investigation must be conducted before an
Information is refiled or a new Information is filed.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove
that the first and second requisites of the first
paragraph of the new rule were present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the
prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases.
For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion
for judicial determination of probable cause and
for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging
that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
and the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno,
among other cases, there was a need for the trial
court to conduct a personal determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against respondent and to have the
prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the
court for its examination. The respondent
contended therein that until after the trial court
shall have personally determined the presence of
probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be
issued against the respondent and if one had
already been issued, the warrant should be
recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein
that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution be conducted by this Honorable
Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued
directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at a hearing
scheduled therefor; and2) warrants for the arrest
of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued,
recalled in the meantime until the resolution of
this incident. Other equitable reliefs are also
prayed for.
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal,
provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever
agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere
provisional dismissal of the cases.
PANAGUITON VS DOJ 571 SCRA 549
DOCTRINE: The prescriptive period is interrupted
by the institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused. Petitioner’s
filing of his complaint-affidavit before the office of
the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified
the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the
offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg.
22.
FACTS: Cawili borrowed money from petitioner.
As payment for the loan, Cawili and Tongson
jointly issued three checks in favor of petitioner.
The checks were dishonored, either for
insufficiency of funds or by closure of the
account. Petitioner filed a complaint for violation
of BP 22. The prosecutor found probable cause
only with respect to Cawili as Tongson’s defense
that his signatures on the checks had been
falsified. Petitioner then filed a partial appeal
before the DOJ even while the case against Cawili
was already filed in court. The Chief State
Prosecutor directed the city prosecutor to
conduct a reinvestigation and to refer the falsified
document to the NBI. After reinvestigation, still
only probable cause with respect to Cawili was
sustained. In the city prosecutor’s resolution, it
was held that the case with respect to Tongson
had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326
which provides that violations penalized by B.P.
Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. n this
case, the four (4)-year period started on the date
the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January
1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the
complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on
24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates
judicial, and not administrative proceedings.
Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more
than four (4) years had already elapsed and no
information had as yet been filed against
Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22
imputed to him had already prescribed.
Ultimately, the DOJ held that the action on the
crime has prescribed.
In justifying its resolution, the DOJ explained that
Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts
that do not provide for a prescriptive period for
the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a
special act, does not provide for the prescription
of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No.
3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised
Penal Code which governs the prescription of
offenses penalized thereunder.
ISSUE/S: WON the running of the prescriptive
period tolled upon the filing of the information in
court or upon the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
HELD: Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to
offenses under special laws which do not provide
their own prescriptive periods. Act 3326 provides:
“Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.”
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326
was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted
by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in
the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment," and the prevailing
rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed
with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is
halted. “the term ‘proceedings’ should now be
understood either executive or judicial in
character”. To rule otherwise would deprive the
injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.
PEOPLE VS DUMLAO 580 SCRA 409
DOCTRINE: Insufficiency of evidence is not one
of the grounds of a Motion to Quash—
insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal
of an action only after the prosecution rests its
case.
FACTS: An Amended Information was filed before
the Sandiganbayan charging respondents Dumlao
and Lao, Aber P. Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave, Roman
A. Cruz, Jr. and Fabian C. Ver with violation of
Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.The accusatory portion of
the information reads:
“That on or about May 10, 1982, or for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Hermenegildo C.
Dumlao, Aber Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave, Roman A.
Cruz, Jr., and Fabian C. Ver, being then the
members of the Board of Trustees of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
which is a government corporation and therefore
all public officers, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, while
in the performance of their official functions, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
enter into contract of lease-purchase with Emilio
G. Lao, a private person whereby the GSIS agreed
to sell to said Emilio G. Lao, a GSIS acquired
property consisting of three parcels of land with
an area of 821 square meters together with a 5-
storey building situated at 1203 A. Mabini St.,
Ermita, Manila, known as the Government
Counsel Centre for the sum of P2,000,000.00 with
a down payment of P200,000.00 with the balance
payable in fifteen years at 12% interest per
annum compounded yearly, with a yearly
amortization of P264,278.37 including principal
and interest granting Emilio G. Lao the right to
sub-lease the ground floor for his own account
during the period of lease, from which he
collected yearly rentals in excess of the yearly
amortization which contract is manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government.”
Respondent Dumlao, with the assistance of
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. A Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Admission of Exhibits was submitted to the court
on 10 January 2005; after which the court issued
Pre-Trial Order; Respondent Dumlao then filed a
Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. He
argued that the allegedly approved Board
Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS
Board of Trustees, contrary to the allegations in
the information. Since the signatures of Fabian
Ver, Roman Cruz, Aber Canlas and Jacobo Clave
did not appear in the minutes of the meeting held
on 23 April 1982, he said it was safe to conclude
that these people did not participate in the
alleged approval of the Lease- Purchase
Agreement. This being the case, he maintained
that there was no quorum of the board to
approve the supposed resolution authorizing the
sale of the GSIS property. There being no
approval by the majority of the Board of Trustees,
there can be no resolution approving the Lease-
Purchase Agreement. The unapproved resolution,
he added, proved his innocence. He further
contended that the person to be charged should
be Atty. Luis Javellana, who sold the subject
property to respondent Lao without the proper
authority.Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of
respondent; the People through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing
the case against respondent Dumlao, arguing
that it was denied its right to due process when
the court a quo dismissed the case against
respondent Dumlao after pre-trial and before it
could present its witnesses and formally offer its
exhibits.
ISSUE/S: WON facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essentials elements
of the crime defined by law.
HELD: Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the
grounds of a Motion to Quash. Insufficiency of
evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action
only after the prosecution rests its case. Section
23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the
prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss
the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2)
upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against
respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even
without giving the prosecution the opportunity to
present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the
prosecutions right to due process. It deprived the
prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its
case and to prove the culpability of the accused.
It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan
to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only
did it not consider the ground invoked by
respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case
on a ground not raised by him, and not at the
appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without
basis and untimely.
SORIANO VS PEOPLE 591 SCRA 244
DOCTRINE: The fundamental test in considering
a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a),19
Rule 117 of the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
is the sufficiency of the averments in the
information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the offense charged as
defined by law.20 The trial court may not
consider a situation contrary to that set forth in
the criminal complaint or information. Facts that
constitute the defense of the petitioners against
the charge under the information must be proved
by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances
do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the
material averments do not constitute the offense.
FACTS: State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia
charged Soriano in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malolos, Bulacan, with violation of Section 83
of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the
General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1795, or Violation of the Director,
Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI)
Rules (DOSRI Rules)
An information for estafa thru falsification of
commercial document was also filed against
Soriano and Ilagan. The informations were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and
1720-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to
Branch 14, presided by Judge Petrita Braga Dime.
Another information for violation of Section 83 of
R.A. No. 337, as amended, was filed against
Soriano, this time, covering the P15,000,000.00
loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Mañaol.
Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa
thru falsification of commercial document for
obtaining said loan. The cases were docketed as
1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively, and
were raffled to Branch 77, presided by Judge
Aurora Santiago-Lagman.
Petitioners Soriano and Ilagan filed an MQ before
both salas. Petitioners argued that the prosecutor
charged more than one offense for a single act.
Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI rules
and estafa thru falsification of commercial
document for allegedly securing fictitious loans.
They further argued that the facts as alleged in
the information do not constitute an offense.
Both salas of RTC denied the MQsPetitioners filed
a Rule 65 before the CA but it was dismissed.
Petitioners filed a Rule 45 before the SCISSUE/S:
: Whether the 2 judges correctly denied the
Motion to Quash HELD: YES.
Petitioners assail the validity of the informations
against them on the ground that more than one
(1) offense is charged. They point that Soriano
was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules and
with estafa thru falsification of commercial
document for allegedly obtaining loans from
RBSM. Thus, they claim that the informations
were duplicitous; hence, they should be quashed.
Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single
information is a ground to quash the Information
under Section 3(e), Rule 11713 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the
filing of a duplicitous information to avoid
confusing the accused in preparing his defense.
By duplicity of charges is meant a single
complaint or information that charges more than
one offense.15 Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information
must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses.
Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or
multiplicity) of charges when a single Information
charges more than one offense.
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with
one information charging more than one offense,
but with more than one information, each
charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI
rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on
the other hand, was charged with estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents in separate
informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously
invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash
the Informations.
Petitioners also contend that Soriano should be
charged with one offense only, because all the
charges filed against him proceed from and are
based on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans.
Thus, Soriano argues that he cannot be charged
with estafa thru falsification of commercial
document, considering that he is already being
prosecuted for obtaining a DOSRI loan.
The contention has no merit.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a
single act or incident might offend two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
thus justifying the filing of several charges
against the accused.
In Loney v. People, this Court, in upholding the
filing of multiple charges against the accused,
held: As early as the start of the last century, this
Court had ruled that a single act or incident might
offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense. The only limit to this rule is the
Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the
same offense." In People v. Doriquez, we held
that two (or more) offenses arising from the same
act are not "the same" —
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does
not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different
laws (or articles of the same code) define two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same facts, if each
crime involves some important act which is not
an essential element of the other.
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges
against petitioners, although based on the same
incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its
memorandum, there are differences between the
two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the
failure to observe and comply with procedural,
reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by
law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer,
stockholder and other related interests in the
bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority
of the directors of the bank and failure to enter
such approval into corporate records and to
transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising
department. The elements of abuse of
confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and
damage, which are essential to the prosecution
for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation.
The filing of several charges against Soriano was,
therefore, proper.
Petitioners next question the sufficiency of the
allegations in the informations, contending that
the same do not constitute an offense.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to
quash anchored on Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of
the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information;
that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the offense charged as
defined by law. The trial court may not consider a
situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal
complaint or information. Facts that constitute
the defense of the petitioners against
the charge under the information must be proved
by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances
do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the
material averments do not constitute the offense.
We have reviewed the informations and find that
they contain material allegations charging
Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa
thru falsification of commercial documents.
In Criminal Case Nos. 1719 & 1980 for violation of
DOSRI rules, the informations alleged that
Soriano was the president of RBSMI, while Ilagan
was then its general manager; that during their
tenure, Soriano, with the direct participation of
Ilagan, and by using the names of Virgilio Malang
and Rogelio Mañaol, was able to indirectly obtain
loans without complying with the requisite board
approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements, in
violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 37722 as
amended.
Similarly, the informations in Criminal Case Nos.
1720 & 1981 charge petitioners with estafa thru
falsification of commercial document. They allege
that petitioners made it appear that Virgilio J.
Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans and
received the proceeds thereof when they did not
in fact secure said loans or receive the amounts
reflected in the promissory notes and other bank
records.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1720 further
alleges the elements of estafa under Article 315
(1)(b)23 of the RPC to wit: (i) that money, goods
or other personal property be received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same; (ii) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (iii)
that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (iv) that
there is demand made by the offended party to
the offender.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1981, on the
other hand, further alleged the following essential
elements of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)24 of
the RPC: (i) that there must be a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (ii) that such
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(iii) that the offended party must have relied on
the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means—that is, he was induced to part with his
money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (iv) that,
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage. The informations in Criminal Case Nos.
1720 & 1981, thus, charge petitioners with the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents.
Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of
the Information filed against petitioners. The RTC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motions.
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a
special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash
an information. The proper procedure in such a
case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial
without prejudice on his part to present the
special defenses he had invoked in his motion to
quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law.25 Thus, petitioners
should not have forthwith filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they
should have gone to trial and reiterated the
special defenses contained in their motion to
quash. There are no special or exceptional
circumstances in the present case that would
justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for
certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any
reversible error, much less, grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition.
CEREZO VS PEOPLE 650 SCRA 222
DOCTRINE: Well-entrenched is the rule that once
a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it
rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thus
resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to
withdraw an Information, the trial court should
not rely solely and merely on the findings of the
public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is
the court’s bounden duty to assess independently
the merits of the motion, and this assessment
must be embodied in a written order disposing of
the motion. While the recommendation of the
prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice
is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
FACTS: In 2002, Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint
for libel against Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr.,
and Vicente Afulugencia, as well as Oscar Mapalo
(Mapalo). Finding probable cause to indict
Yaneza, et al., the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office
(OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information
against them before the RTC. Yaneza, et al.
thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecution’s
Evidence before the OP-QC. In its resolution, the
OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and
recommended the withdrawal of the Information.
Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw
Information was filed before the RTC.During the
intervening period, Yaneza, et al. were arraigned.
All of them entered a "not guilty" plea. In
deference to the prosecutor’s last resolution, the
RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed.
Aggrieved, Cerezo moved for reconsideration of
the said Order, arguing that the OP-QC resolution
has not yet attained finality, considering that the
same was the subject of a Petition for Review
filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The
RTC deferred action on the said motion to await
the resolution of the DOJ. In 2006, the Secretary
of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing
and setting aside the OP-QC’s resolution, and
directing the latter to refile the earlier Information
for libel. The RTC issued its Order granting
Cerezo's motion for reconsideration, conformably
with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. Yaneza,
et al. moved for reconsideration, but the motion
was denied by the RTC. Relentless, Yaneza, et al.
elevated their predicament to the CA through a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. The CA annulled the impugned RTC
Orders. Cerezo interposed the appeal when his
motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was
denied.
ISSUE/S: .
12. Whether the dismissal of the case by the
RTC was valid.
13. Whether double jeopardy set in after the
RTC's dismissal of the case.
HELD:
1. No, because there was independent
assessment of the merits of the motion on
the part of the RTC.
2. No. The elements of double jeopardy are not
attendant in the present case.
Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is
filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on
the sound discretion of the court. In thus
resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to
withdraw an Information, the trial court should
not rely solely and merely on the findings of the
public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is
the court’s bounden duty to assess independently
the merits of the motion, and this assessment
must be embodied in a written order disposing of
the motion. While the recommendation of the
prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice
is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the
public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ
Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial
power and refused to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus
stained with grave abuse of discretion and
violated the complainant’s right to due process.
They were void, had no legal standing, and
produced no effect whatsoever.
This Court must therefore remand the case to the
RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of
the case to determine if a prima facie case exists
and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss
and Withdraw Information anew.
It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set
in. Double jeopardy exists when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused has
been acquitted or convicted, or the case
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
Since we have held that the Order granting the
motion to dismiss was committed with grave
abuse of discretion, then respondents were not
acquitted nor was there a valid and legal
dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the
fifth requisite which requires the conviction and
acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the
case without the approval of the accused, was
not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
CO VS NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC
PRODUCTS 727 SCRA 503
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: Respondent New Prosperity Plastic
Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the
private complainant in Criminal Case Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against
petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to
the MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City.
In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the
cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9,
2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Rules).
On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen
B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch
49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and
denied Co’s motion for reconsideration.
On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before
the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival
of the criminal cases.
It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on
May 23, 2005. Co’s motion for reconsideration
was, subsequently, denied on December 16,
2005. Co then filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme
Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096.
We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated
February 13, 2006.There being no motion for
reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final
and executory on March 20, 2006.
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case
Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-
raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed
a “Motion for Permanent Dismissal” on July 13,
2006. Uy opposed the motion, contending that
the motion raised the same issues already
resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No.
171096. In spite of this, Judge Esteban V.
Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4,
2006 granting Co’s motion. When the court
subsequently denied Uy’s motion for
reconsideration on November 16, 2006, Uy filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan
City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion
G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably
on the petition, annulling and setting aside the
Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November
16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to
proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.Co
then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and
denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.
Petitioner’s contention: Co argues that the June 9,
2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case
Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 should
be considered as a final dismissal on the ground
that his right to speedy trial was denied. He
reasons out that from his arraignment on March
4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9, 2003, there
was already a “vexatious, capricious and
oppressive” delay, which is in violation of Section
6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998)
and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandating
that the entire trial period should not exceed 180
days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is
deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its
jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire
jurisdiction over the same based on a mere
motion because its revival would already put him
in double jeopardy.
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard
to constitutional and legal safeguards is
undertaken.
FACTS: Rodante de Leon was charged with
violation of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002).A buy-bust team was formed
to act on the illegal activities of De Leon upon the
report of a confidential informant at the Anti-
Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Force at the
Novaliches Police Station in Quezon City. De Leon
was arrested upon selling to PO2 Magcalayo,
posing as buyer, shabu for P200. The seized drug
was identified as a prohibited drug and
subsequently presented in evidence.
The RTC and CA both found De Leon guilty of the
crime charged.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the dismissal of the ISSUE/S: Whether or not the buy-bust operation,
criminal cases against petitioner on the ground of allegedly full of irregularities was legal.
denial of his right to speedy trial constitutes final
dismissal of these cases; HELD: YES. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment whereby ways and means are
HELD: The petition is unmeritorious. resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of
Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the
violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show operation is legal and has been proved to be an
any evidence that the alleged “vexatious, effective method of apprehending drug peddlers,
capricious and oppressive” delay in the trial was provided due regard to constitutional and legal
attended with malice or that the same was made safeguards is undertaken.
without good cause or justifiable motive on the
part of the prosecution. This Court has The Court upheld the presumption of regularity in
emphasized that “‘speedy trial’ is a relative term the performance of official duties and ruled that
and necessarily a flexible concept.”In determining the elements of the crime were sufficiently
whether the accused's right to speedy trial was established, thereby affirming the decision of the
violated, the delay should be considered in view CA.
of the entirety of the proceedings.The factors to
balance are the following: (a) duration of the
delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the
right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice
caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not suffice
as the realities of everyday life must be regarded
in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not
exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard
must be given to the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. “While the Court
recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and
adheres to a policy of speedy administration of
justice, we cannot deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute
criminals. Unjustified postponements which
prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of
time are what offend the right of the accused to
speedy trial.”

PEOPLE VS DE LEON 754 SCRA 147

DOCTRINE: A Buy-bust operation is legal and has

been proved to be an effective method of