Mark Hunt Opening Brief

Case: 19-17529, 03/25/2020, ID: 11641285, DktEntry: 6, Page 1 of 56
No. 19-17529
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
MARK HUNT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ZUFFA, LLC, et al,

Defendants-Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada, No. 2:17-cv-00085-JAD-VCF
District Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT MARK HUNT’S

OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL
BRIAN W. BOSCHEE, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 7612
bboschee@nevadafirm.com
JESSICA M. LUJAN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 14913
jlujan@nevadafirm.com
HOLLEY DRIGGS
400 South Fourth Street, Third Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephone: (702) 791-0308
Facsimile: (702) 791-1912
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Mark Hunt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of authorities .................................................................................................. iv
I. Jurisdictional statement ..................................................................................... vi
II. Statement of the issues....................................................................................... vi
III. Statement of the case ........................................................................................1
IV. Summary of the argument ..............................................................................11
V. Standard of review .............................................................................................15
A. Motion to dismiss ...........................................................................................15

B. Summary judgment ........................................................................................16
VI. Argument ........................................................................................................17
A. The District Court erred in categorizing Hunt’s damages as “consequential”

damages for the purpose of dismissing Hunt’s breach of contract claim .............18
B. The District Court erred in dismissing Hunt’s claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for the same reason it erred in dismissing
the breach of contract claim ..................................................................................21
C. The District Court erred in dismissing Hunt’s fraud and aiding and abetting
fraud claims for lack of proximate causation .......................................................23
D. The District Court erred in dismissing Hunt’s battery and aiding and abetting
battery claims by finding that doping is within the “range of activity” typically
involved in the sport of MMA ..............................................................................26
E. Because the District Court erred in dismissing Hunt’s fraud and battery
claims, it also erred in dismissing Hunt’s civil conspiracy claim ........................32
F. The District Court erred in dismissing Hunt’s federal and state RICO claims
for lack of standing ...............................................................................................34
ii
G. The District Court prematurely dismissed Hunt’s unjust enrichment claim,

which he pled in the alternative to his breach of contract claim ..........................40
H. If Hunt failed to adequately plead one or more of his claims, the District
Court should have granted him leave to amend ...................................................43
VII. Conclusion ......................................................................................................44
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ...................................................................45
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ...................................................................46
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................47
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................48
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allum v. Valley Bank of Nevada, 849 P.2d 297 (Nev. 1993)...................................40
American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092 (9th
Cir. 2003) ..............................................................................................................17
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)…....... 16,
17, 18, 19, 38
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)
......................................................................................... 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 38, 40
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) .............................16
Certified Fire Prot. Inc. v. Precision Constr., 128 Nev. 371, 283 P.3d 250 (2012)
..............................................................................................................................43
Cliffton Equities, Inc. v. Summerlin Asset Mgmt. III, LLC, No. CV-12-08131-PCT-
PGR, 2012 WL 6570940 (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 2012) (unpublished) ......................41
Consol. Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 971 P.2d
1251 (1998)...........................................................................................................34
DFR Apparel Co. v. Triple Seven Promotional Prod., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-01406-
APG, 2014 WL 4891230 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2014) (unpublished) ......................41
Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003).......... 28, 43
Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2013) ................................................16
Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2014)........................................16
Humboldt Gen. Hosp. v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 132 Nev. 544, 376 P.3d 167 (2016) …
..............................................................................................................................27
In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL
3029783 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) (unpublished) ....................................... 19, 22
In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................39
iv
Jafbros, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 128 Nev. 908, 381 P.3d 627 (2012)
(unpublished) ........................................................................................................30
Las Vegas Dev. Grp., LLC v. Steven, No. 215CV01128RCJCWH, 2016 WL
3381222 (D. Nev. June 14, 2016) (unpublished) ................................................31
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348
(1986)....................................................................................................................17
McCrosky v. Carson Tahoe Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 Nev. 930, 408 P.3d 149 (2017)
..............................................................................................................................30
Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir.2009) ..........................................16
Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm.
Co. Ltd., 943 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................ 15, 17, 25, 34
SCC Alameda Point LLC v. City of Alameda, 897 F. Supp. 2d 886 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
..............................................................................................................................21
Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.
2003) .....................................................................................................................16
Rules
FRCP 201(b) ............................................................................................................29
FRCP 8(d)(2)............................................................................................................41
Other Authorities
State of Nevada Athletic Commission, THE OFFICIAL STATE OF NEVADA WEBSITE,
http://boxing.nv.gov/about/Mission/ ....................................................................30
v
I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, because Plaintiff-Appellant Mark Hunt (“Hunt”)
brought claims arising under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. [II ER 73-119].1 The District Court
had supplemental jurisdiction over Hunt’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367. Id.2 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291, as the District
Court issued final decisions with respect to each defendant in the action. [I ER 1-
36]. The District Court’s orders disposed of all of Hunt’s claims and therefore this
appeal is from a final decision under § 1291.
The District Court entered Judgment in the underlying matter on November
22, 2019. [I ER 1]. Hunt timely filed his Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2019
pursuant to FRAP 4(a)(1)(A).
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The principal issues on this appeal are:
1. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Hunt’s breach of
contract claim and granting summary judgment in favor of UFC on Hunt’s breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim simply because Hunt
1
Citations to the Excerpts of Record (“ER”) are formatted as [Volume No. ER
Page No.].
2
Additionally, because (1) the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00, (2)
Hunt is a citizen of New Zealand, and (3) no defendant-appellee in this matter is a
citizen of New Zealand, the District Court also maintained diversity jurisdiction
over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. [II ER 74-75].
vi
had been paid the full contract price for his participation in “UFC 200”,3 even
though Hunt alleged additional damages that are not specifically excluded under
the contract.
2. Under the standards set forth in Iqbal/Twombly,4 did the District Court
err in dismissing Hunt’s fraud and aiding and abetting fraud claims prior to
allowing the parties to engage in full discovery, based upon the District Court’s
skepticism regarding Hunt’s ability to prove facts later on at trial that would
support the element of proximate causation?
3. Did the District Court err in finding, without any supporting evidence,
that Lesnar’s use of prohibited substances prior to the UFC 200 bout between him
and Hunt did not exceed the ordinary range of activity in a professional mixed
martial arts fight? Did the District Court further err in relying upon that finding to
dismiss Hunt’s claims for battery and aiding and abetting battery on the grounds
that Hunt had consented to the “inherent” risks of competing in the UFC 200 bout,
even though Hunt had alleged various instances of his express refusal to consent to
fight a doping fighter?
4. Having erred in dismissing Hunt’s fraud, battery, and aiding and
3
“UFC 200” is the name of an Ultimate Fighting Championship bout that occurred
on July 9, 2016.
4
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
vii
abetting claims prior to allowing the parties to engage in full discovery, did the
District Court also err in relying upon those dismissals to justify its dismissal of
Hunt’s civil conspiracy claim against UFC, White, and Lesnar, which was
predicated upon the fraud and battery to which Hunt was a victim?
5. Under the standards set forth in Iqbal/Twombly, did the District Court
err in refusing to accept the facts alleged in Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint as true
in evaluating UFC, White, and Lesnar’s respective motions to dismiss Hunt’s
federal and Nevada RICO claims under FRCP 12(b)(6)? Did the District Court
further err in finding, based upon its own doubts as to the veracity of the facts
alleged, that it could not infer proximate causation sufficient to confer RICO
standing upon Hunt?
6. Did the District Court err in dismissing Hunt’s unjust enrichment
claim prior to allowing the parties to engage in full discovery, even though Hunt
pleaded his unjust enrichment claim as an alternative to his breach of contract
claim and sufficiently alleged each of the required elements thereunder?
viii
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a. Factual background leading to initiation of the underlying suit5
This appeal revolves around the District Court’s premature dismissal of
Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint to recover damages incurred as a result of
defendant-appellees Zuffa, LLC (“UFC”)6, Dana White (“White”), and Brock
Lesnar’s (“Lesnar”) concerted scheme to conceal Lesnar’s use of prohibited
substances prior to pitting him against Hunt, a clean fighter, in the UFC 200 bout
in July 2016.
UFC controls nearly ninety percent of worldwide revenue for Mixed Martial
Arts (“MMA”). [II ER 75]. In a purported attempt to protect its fighters, UFC has
adopted a comprehensive “Anti-Doping Policy,”7 which UFC touts as “the best
anti-doping program in all of professional sports.” [II ER 76-77]. Pursuant to the
UFC’s Anti-Doping Policy, all fighters who are not granted an exemption must
submit to pre-fight testing for illegal substances banned by the UFC, United States
Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”), the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”),
and the Nevada Athletic Commission (“NAC”). [II ER 83]. Retired fighters may
not return to compete in a UFC bout “until he/she has given UFC written notice of
5
The facts as stated herein are summarized and condensed from the factual
allegations as set forth in Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint (the operative pleading
at the time of 12(b)(6) dismissal and subsequent grant of summary judgment in
favor of UFC). [II ER 73-119].
6
Captioned in the underlying District Court action as “Zuffa, LLC d/b/a Ultimate
Fighting Championship”.
7
The term “doping” refers to a MMA fighter’s use of prohibited substances to gain
a competitive advantage over his/her opponents.
his/her intent to resume competing and has made him/herself available for Testing
for a period of four months before returning to competition” (the “Four-Month
Testing Requirement”). Id. The policy provides an exception to this rule only for
“exceptional circumstances,” or where the strict application of the rule would be
manifestly unfair to an athlete. Id.
Hunt is, and always has been, a clean (non-doping) fighter. [II ER 76].
However, on no fewer than four occasions, UFC and its agents, including White,
knowingly caused Hunt to fight cheating fighters who were later revealed to have
been doping prior to the bouts. [II ER 78, 99]. UFC and its agents have purposely
conspired with doping fighters to circumvent fair competition and the UFC’s own
Anti-Doping Policy for the purposes of (1) artificially inflating the fighter pool and
(2) avoiding lost revenue and reputational harm from bouts that should have been
cancelled due to a competitor’s doping. [II ER 77, 81-83]. UFC accomplishes this
by granting certain, preferred fighters therapeutic use exemptions (which permit
the fighters to use certain substances that are otherwise prohibited), drug testing
exemptions, or—in some instances—purposely delaying the announcement of a
bout in order to delay the required testing.8 [II ER 77, 81].
In or around April 2016, UFC executed an early renewal of its exclusive
8
Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint sets forth the specific details of a pattern of
other, known occasions in which UFC has conspired with cheating fighters to
conceal their doping and pit them against non-doping fighters. [II ER 81-83].
2
contract with Hunt, which foreclosed Hunt from seeking lucrative employment
with other promotions. [II ER 78-79]. Hunt entered this contract after expressly
informing White and UFC that he had competing offers that would advance his
business and property interests. Id. In conjunction with Hunt’s contract, UFC and
Hunt executed another contract titled the “Promotional and Ancillary Rights
Agreement” (“PARA”). [II ER 112]. Section 3.1 of the PARA provides that UFC
“shall comply with and be bound by the rules and regulations of the [Nevada]
Athletic Commission.” Id.
Soon after entering into his new contract with UFC, on April 20, 2016,
White informed Hunt that he was “working on something for” Hunt for UFC 200,9
which was scheduled to take place that July. [II ER 84]. White instructed Hunt to
“keep it quiet” that he was going to be featured in UFC 200, and declined to tell
Hunt who his opponent would be. Id. As the months went by, Hunt repeatedly
asked White who his UFC 200 opponent would be, and White consistently (and
falsely) reported that his opponent was not yet confirmed. [II ER 84-85].
In reality, UFC and White had known since March 2016 that Lesnar, a
former UFC champion who had retired from UFC in 2011, would return to fight
Hunt in UFC 200. [II ER 83, 86-87]. UFC, White, and Lesnar conspired to delay
the announcement of Lesnar’s return to UFC because Lesnar had been using
9
UFC titles its various events by number (although not necessarily in numerical
order); e.g., “UFC ###”.
3
banned substances and therefore needed to delay his entry into the testing pool
until such time as he could clear his system of the banned substances (or until it
was certain that UFC would not be able to obtain Lesnar’s testing results prior to
the bout). [II ER 84-85, 90].
On June 4, 2016, during the airing of UFC 199, UFC finally announced that
Lesnar would return from retirement to fight Hunt in UFC 200. [II ER 86]. UFC
would later admit on June 7, 2016, via public comment, that “. . . conversations
with Lesnar have been ongoing for some time.” [II ER 85-86]. Following the
announcement of Lesnar’s return to fight in UFC 200, Hunt expressed concerns to
White that Lesnar may not be receiving adequate drug testing, to which White
responded in writing that “[t]hey are all over him.” [II ER 86]. Hunt relied on
White’s representation in continuing to agree to go through with the UFC 200
bout, believing that UFC and White would take reasonable, non-evasive steps to
ensure that Lesnar would either be a clean fighter at the time of UFC 200, or would
be adequately tested and disqualified prior to the bout if he was not clean. [II ER
86, 88]. In light of the announcement of Lesnar’s return to UFC, Lesnar was
registered by USADA into the UFC Anti-Doping Policy testing pool on June 6,
2016. [II ER 87].
On June 8, 2016, Hunt continued to express concerns to White that Lesnar
might be cheating after learning that UFC had granted Lesnar an exemption from
4
the Four-Month Testing Requirement. [II ER 88-89]. In response to Hunt’s
concerns, White knowingly and falsely assured Hunt that “USADA is testing the --
-- outta him as we speak. We went after Brock [Lesnar]. He has no problem doing
whatever tests USADA wants.” [II ER 88]. The next day, Hunt expressed in
writing to White that he was concerned that Lesnar’s exemption from the Four-
Month Testing Requirement was a ploy to allow Lesnar to get the banned
substances “out of his system.” [II ER 88-89]. White again assured Hunt that “He
will be the most tested athlete on this card That [sic] are ALL OVER HIM.” [II ER
89]. White’s assertion was false. Id. Nevertheless, Hunt continued to reasonably
rely on White’s representations that he would be matched with a clean fighter at
UFC 200. Id.
On June 28, 2016, just ten days prior to the UFC 200 bout, Lesnar produced
his first drug test sample for UFC 200 to the USADA. [II ER 90]. Although
unknown to anyone at the time, the June 28, 2016 sample later tested positive for
Clomiphene, an anti-estrogenic substance, and 4-Hydroxyclomiphene. [II ER 91].
Clomiphene is not approved by the NAC and is a substance prohibited by the NAC
and by WADA. Id. In a further attempt to advance their conspiracy to allow a
doping Lesnar to fight Hunt, UFC and USADA declined to expedite Lesnar’s June
28 testing results, despite their knowledge that (1) Lesnar had been disciplined for
failing drug tests previously, (2) they could expedite the results for a nominal fee
5
and (3) if they chose not to expedite, the results would not be returned prior to the
UFC 200 bout. [II ER 90].
On July 9, 2016, Lesnar defeated Hunt in the UFC 200 bout in a three-round,
unanimous judges’ decision. [II ER 91]. Lesnar was paid a record-setting
$2,500,000.00 (not including his Pay-Per-View allocation) for his participation in
the bout. Id. Nearly a week following the UFC 200 bout, on July 15, 2016,
USADA and UFC received the positive results of Lesnar’s June 28, 2016 drug test.
Id. Thereafter, on July 19, 2016, USADA and UFC received a second set of
positive drug test results from a sample that Lesnar provided on the day of the UFC
200 bout. Id. He tested positive for the same illegal substances as he had on June
28, 2016. Id. As a result of his positive tests, Lesnar’s win at UFC 200 was
overturned to a “no contest.” Id. However, Hunt had already wasted approximately
$100,000.00 in training-camp expenses for UFC 200 and traveling to the United
States to participate in the bout, all of which could have been avoided had UFC,
White, and Lesnar not conspired to conceal Lesnar’s doping. [II ER 100].
Soon after Hunt’s loss to Lesnar in UFC 200, no fewer than six of Hunt’s
appearance engagements (which had been confirmed prior to UFC 200) were
cancelled by the events’ various promoters. [II ER 95-96]. Hunt stood to earn in
excess of $90,000.00 from these events, which Hunt learned were cancelled
because of the damage done to Hunt’s brand by virtue of his loss to Lesnar. Id.
6
Hunt also suffered decreased revenues from his social media advertising, book
sales, and apparel company, Juggernaut, following his loss to Lesnar. [II ER 96-
98].
b. Hunt’s initiation of the underlying suit and the retaliation that followed
Hunt initiated the underlying lawsuit against UFC, White, and Lesnar on
January 10, 2017, alleging (1) civil RICO violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (the
“Federal RICO Claim”), (2) conspiracy to commit crime related to racketeering
under NRS § 207.250 et seq. (the “Nevada RICO Claim”), (3) fraud, (4) false
pretenses, (5) breach of contract, (6) breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, (7) negligence, and (8) unjust enrichment. See [II ER 144] (Complaint at
ECF No. 1). Following his initiation of the lawsuit, Hunt authored a published
article detailing Defendants’ respective contributions to the RICO doping scheme.
[II ER 100]. In response to Hunt’s Complaint, UFC and White filed a joint Motion
to Dismiss Hunt’s claims under FRCP 12(b)(6). See [II ER 143] (UFC and White’s
Joint Motion to Dismiss at ECF No. 11). Lesnar filed his own Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss. See [II ER 141] (Lesnar’s Motion to Dismiss at ECF No. 30).
On May 22, 2017, the District Court held a hearing on Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss Hunt’s Complaint. See [II ER 138] (Minutes of Proceedings at ECF No.
63). At the close of the hearing, the District Judge ruled from the bench, dismissing
all of Hunt’s claims except for his claim for breach of the covenant of good faith
7
and fair dealing, which the District Court found was “sufficiently alleged.” [II ER
125]. The District Court granted Hunt leave to amend all of his claims, except for
his negligence claim, which the District Court dismissed with prejudice. See [I ER
9]. Therefore, with only one claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing left standing, Hunt took the opportunity to amend his Complaint
on June 1, 2017. See [II ER 138] (Amended Complaint at ECF No. 64).
In response to Hunt’s persistence in pursuing his lawsuit against UFC,
White, and Lesnar (and the article Hunt authored regarding the same), on October
10, 2017, UFC and White removed Hunt from his long-scheduled (and
contractually-sanctioned) participation in UFC 121, which was scheduled to occur
just weeks later.10 [II ER 99-100]. However, UFC and White’s citation to a
“medical concern” for Hunt’s removal from UFC 121 was knowingly false, as
Hunt’s October 4, 2017 medical assessment returned normal brain imaging results,
and cleared Hunt for a return to contact sports. [II ER 100]. UFC and White’s
decision to remove Hunt from the UFC 121 bout was solely a retaliatory response
to Hunt’s initiation of the lawsuit and authorship of the article. [II ER 99-100]. As
a result of Hunt’s removal from UFC 121, Hunt again suffered losses in excess of
$100,000.00 for expenses incurred in Hunt’s training, travel, and preparation for
10
UFC’s announcement of Hunt’s removal from UFC 121 specifically mentioned
the article that Hunt had published, and was carried about by wire, as contemplated
by 18 U.S.C. § 1343. [II ER 100].
8
UFC 121, in addition to his loss of the purse he expected to receive from that bout.
[II ER 100].
Therefore, on January 12, 2018, with the District Court’s permission, Hunt
filed a Supplemental Complaint, which incorporated the additional facts of UFC
and White’s impermissible retaliation against him.11 [II ER 73-119]. Hunt’s
Supplemental Complaint asserted ten claims for relief, providing additional facts in
support of six of his original causes of action, and incorporating four new claims
that he had not previously pled. Id. In his Supplemental Complaint, Hunt asserted
claims for (1) civil RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1961, (2) conspiracy to
commit crime related to racketeering under NRS § 207.350 et seq., (3) common
law fraud, (4) civil aiding and abetting fraud, (5) breach of contract, (6) breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (7) unjust enrichment, (8) battery, (9) civil
aiding and abetting battery; and (10) civil conspiracy. Id.
Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint set forth more than thirty new paragraphs of
factual allegations in support of his claims, specifically identifying the deficiencies
laid out by the District Court at the May 22, 2017 hearing. Id. Like they had in
response to Hunt’s original Complaint, Defendants filed 12(b)(6) Motions to
Dismiss Hunt’s claims.12 See [II ER 134-35] (Motions to Dismiss at ECF Nos. 111,
11
The Supplemental Complaint was the operative pleading at the time of the
District Court’s dismissal of Hunt’s action with prejudice and is therefore the
operative pleading for consideration in the instant appeal.
12
As before, UFC and White filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. Notably, neither
9
115). Thereafter, on February 14, 2019, after allowing only limited written
discovery in the case,13 the District Court granted UFC, White, and Lesnar’s
Motions to Dismiss, thereby dismissing with prejudice each of Hunt’s claims,
again with the exception of his claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. [I ER 36]. Thereafter, UFC filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on Hunt’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claim, which was fully briefed by the parties. See [II ER 132] (UFC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at ECF No. 154).
On April 4, 2019, the parties engaged in the court-ordered settlement
conference. See [II ER 130] (Minutes of Proceedings at ECF No. 167). No
settlement was reached as a result thereof. Id. Therefore, on November 22, 2019,
the District Court ruled on UFC’s Motion for Summary Judgment, granting
judgment in favor of UFC on Hunt’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing on the grounds that his alleged damages were
consequential and therefore unrecoverable under the terms of his agreement with
UFC and Nevada law. [I ER 2-8]. Therefore, having disposed of Hunt’s last-
remaining claim, the District Court entered judgment against Hunt on November
(continued)
Lesnar nor UFC/White moved to dismiss Hunt’s claims for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
13
Prior to dismissing Hunt’s claims, the District Court allowed the parties to
exchange requests for production and admission, but did not allow the parties to
conduct depositions. The parties also were unable to develop expert witness
testimony in support of their respective positions.
10
22, 2019. [I ER 1].
Thereafter, on December 16, 2019, Hunt timely filed his Notice of Appeal of
the District Court’s judgment. [II ER 37-72]. As will be discussed in greater detail,
infra, Hunt asserts that this District Court’s dismissal of his claims—after allowing
only limited written discovery between the parties—was premature and contrary
the law of this Circuit. Therefore, Hunt respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the District Court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings in
accordance with Ninth Circuit law.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Hunt’s claims were prematurely dismissed by the District Court after
allowing only limited written discovery to be conducted by the parties. At the
motion to dismiss stage—one of the earliest phases in litigation—the trial court is
bound by the Supreme Court’s seminal holdings in Twombly/Iqbal to accept the
facts alleged in the complaint as true. By factoring its own doubts as to the
provability of the facts underlying Hunt’s claims, the District Court erred in
dismissing a number of Hunt’s claims with prejudice in adjudicating UFC, White,
and Lesnar’s respective motions to dismiss. Moreover, the District Court’s
declining to accept Hunt’s allegations as true led to its rejecting and/or
mischaracterizing the nature of Hunt’s damages and theories of causation, which
11
ultimately resulted in the District Court’s misapplying the law and granting
dismissal of Hunt’s claims in error.
First, the District Court mischaracterized the nature of Hunt’s alleged breach
of contract damages, which he asserted as reliance damages resulting from UFC’s
material breaches of the PARA and UFC 200 Bout Agreement. By construing
Hunt’s damages as “consequential” damages that are expressly barred by the
PARA, the District Court foreclosed Hunt’s ability to recover the hundreds of
thousands of dollars he expended in reliance on his agreements with UFC
following its material breaches of those agreements; i.e., knowingly causing a
clean (non-doping) Hunt to fight a cheating (doping) Lesnar. For the same reason,
the District Court subsequently erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
UFC on Hunt’s then-sole remaining claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
With respect to Hunt’s common law fraud claim, the District Court
oversimplified Hunt’s theory as to how the fraud committed by UFC, White, and
Lesnar proximately caused his damages. By finding that the only way Hunt could
prove that the defendants’ fraudulent acts caused his damages would be to prove
that, but for Lesnar’s doping, Hunt would have won the UFC 200 bout (and by
finding, without allowing any discovery or expert testimony to be presented on the
matter, that this was an unprovable allegation), the District Court ignored the
12
myriad alternative factual scenarios under which Hunt could have avoided his
damages but for the acts of fraud he endured. Then, the District Court dismissed
Hunt’s claim for aiding and abetting fraud, finding that this claim could not be
sustained if the underlying tort claim failed. However, because the District Court
erred in dismissing Hunt’s fraud claim, it also necessarily erred in dismissing
Hunt’s aiding and abetting fraud claim.
Regarding Hunt’s battery claim against Lesnar, the District Court held that
Hunt had implicitly consented to fighting a doping Lesnar by concluding (again,
without entertaining any evidence or expert testimony on the matter) that a
fighter’s use of prohibited substances to gain a competitive advantage over his
adversary is within the “range of ordinary activity involved in the sport.” This
holding extends “assumption of the risk” doctrine beyond all reasonable bounds.
Regardless, the issue of whether Hunt consented to fight a doping Lesnar is an
issue of fact that should be left to a jury. Additionally, because the District Court
erred in dismissing Hunt’s battery claim, the District Court also erred in dismissing
Hunt’s aiding and abetting battery claim against UFC and White on the grounds
that this claim could not be sustained if the underlying tort claim failed.
Because the District Court dismissed Hunt’s civil conspiracy claim on the
sole basis that the tort claims underlying Hunt’s alleged conspiracy were
dismissed—the fraud and battery (and corresponding aiding and abetting) claims—
13
this Court need only find that either one of Hunt’s fraud and battery claims was
dismissed in error to similarly find that Hunt’s civil conspiracy claim was
dismissed in error. Because Hunt has demonstrated that the District Court erred in
dismissing the tort claims underlying his civil conspiracy cause of action, it
necessarily follows that the District Court also erred in dismissing Hunt’s civil
conspiracy claim.
Like some of Hunt’s other claims that were dismissed, the District Court
found that Hunt’s federal and state RICO claims must be dismissed on the
elements of causation and damages. Again, the District Court’s holdings stemmed
directly from its refusing to accept the facts alleged by Hunt as true, constituting
reversible error. The fraudulent acts perpetrated by UFC, White, and Lesnar, and
UFC’s subsequent retaliation against Hunt for his initiation of the underlying
lawsuit constitute predicate acts to support viable federal and state civil RICO
claims, and Hunt adequately pleaded causation and damages sufficient to confer
him with standing to assert such claims. Moreover, had Hunt been permitted to
depose key witnesses such as White14 and Lesnar, Hunt would have been able to
prove the causation and damages elements at trial. Therefore, the District Court
dismissed these claims in error.
14
White would also likely be designated as the Rule 30(b)(6) witness for UFC.
14
Finally, the District Court found that Hunt could not sustain a claim for
unjust enrichment because of the existence of a contract (the PARA) governing the
transaction. However, although Hunt acknowledges that he could not ultimately
recover under both claims, Hunt pleaded his unjust enrichment claim in the
alternative to his breach of contract claim, which is expressly permitted at the
pleading stage pursuant to FRCP 8. Therefore, the District Court erred in
dismissing this claim prior to allowing the parties to engage in full discovery.
Nevertheless, even if the District Court did not err in its dismissal of any of Hunt’s
claims, he should have been granted leave to amend to cure any deficiencies
therein, pursuant to this Circuit’s liberal amendment policy.
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. MOTION TO DISMISS
In the Ninth Circuit, a District Court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
reviewed de novo. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v.
Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Bain v. Cal.
Teachers Ass’n, 891 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2018)). In conducting its de novo
review, the Court “take[s] all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true,” and
“affirm[s] the dismissal ‘only if it appears beyond doubt that [Plaintiffs] can prove
no set of facts in support of [their] claim[s] which would entitle [them] to relief.’”
Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege “enough facts to
15
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Moss v. U.S.
Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.2009). A claim has facial plausibility
when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2009).
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Court reviews a District Court’s decision granting summary judgment
de novo. Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2014); see also
Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2003). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if, taking the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026
(9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations marks omitted). The moving party bears the
initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, together with
showing evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A
factual dispute is genuine when the evidence is such that a rational trier of fact
16
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, this
Court must determine “whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and
whether the District Court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.”
American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092,
1097 (9th Cir. 2003).
VI. ARGUMENT
It is well-established that, in considering a motion to dismiss under FRCP
12(b)(6), the facts alleged in the Complaint must be taken as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)
(hereinafter, “Twombly”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1950 (2009) (“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.”) (hereinafter, “Iqbal”). See also Painters & Allied Trades
Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund, 943 F.3d at 1248 (citing Bain v. Cal. Teachers
Ass’n, 891 F.3d at 1211). Therefore, while a plaintiff is obligated to provide “more
than labels and conclusions,” the Court “does not impose a probability requirement
at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” in support of the plaintiff’s claims.
17
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S. Ct. at 1964–65 (“And, of course, a well-
pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’”).
The United States Supreme Court held in Iqbal that its decision in Twombly
“governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United
States District Courts.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Though
Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the
decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8.”). Therefore,
despite the applicability of any other requirements under the federal and Nevada
RICO statutes (or the common law theories upon which Hunt asserted his
remaining claims), the District Court was required to put aside its doubts as to the
provability of the facts as alleged in support of Hunt’s various claims and assess
whether, accepting the alleged facts as true, Hunt stated plausible claims for relief.
Hunt respectfully asserts that the District Court failed to properly apply the
pleading standard as set forth under Twombly/Iqbal, and for that reason—among
others—Hunt appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his claims with prejudice.
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CATEGORIZING HUNT’S DAMAGES AS

“CONSEQUENTIAL” DAMAGES FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISMISSING
HUNT’S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
In his Supplemental Complaint, Hunt alleged that UFC breached the PARA
and the separately executed UFC 200 Bout Agreement, which provide that “Zuffa
18
[UFC] shall comply with and be bound by the rules and regulations of the
[Nevada] Athletic Commission.” [II ER 111-112]. Specifically, by knowingly
allowing a cheating Lesnar to compete and purposely concealing Lesnar’s doping
from Hunt and the NAC through fraudulent means, UFC violated several “rules
and regulations of the [Nevada] Athletic Commission.” Id. UFC also breached the
PARA by depriving Hunt of the opportunity to fight in subsequent bouts which
were promised to him under that agreement.15 Because of these material breaches,
Hunt suffered reliance damages in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Specifically, had UFC not concealed Lesnar’s doping in violation of the
PARA and UFC 200 Bout Agreement, Hunt would not have wasted the
approximately $100,000.00 he spent training and preparing for UFC 200 and UFC
Fight Night 121, traveling to the United States to participate in the bouts, and the
resources he expended in promoting the bouts to his followers on social media. See
In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL
3029783, at *42 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) (unpublished) (“Reliance damages are a
party’s ‘interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been
made.’”). Instead, Hunt could have (and would have) pulled out of the fight prior
15
UFC and White disputed Hunt’s allegation that he was denied subsequent fights
under the PARA, but such factual disputes are inappropriate on a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, as the District Court is bound to accept all allegations in the complaint
as true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129
S. Ct. at 1950.
19
to spending the money, or refused to fight Lesnar and spend the money preparing
to fight a clean, fair fight with a non-doping fighter. However, Hunt reasonably
relied on the contractual and verbal promises made to him by UFC and White (and
the rules and regulations of the NAC and other regulatory bodies), and as a result
was robbed of his money, his time, and his reputation as a top fighter in the UFC.
Moreover, had Hunt been permitted to depose witnesses such as White or a Rule
30(b)(6) witness for UFC, Hunt would have been able to demonstrate the extent of
the false promises made by White and UFC, upon which Hunt relied.16
The District Court dismissed Hunt’s breach of contract claim in the first
instance for the sole reason that Hunt had failed to identify the specific provisions
of the contracts that were breached. [II ER 125]. Following Hunt’s filing of the
Supplemental Complaint, which indisputably corrected that deficiency, the District
Court dismissed Hunt’s breach of contract claim with prejudice on the grounds that
Hunt received the full amount of the purse that he was promised for his
participation in UFC 200, and therefore was not damaged under the PARA or the
UFC 200 Bout Agreement. [I ER 30-31]. Moreover, the District Court summarily
16
Even if White and/or UFC did not know for certain that Lesnar had been doping
prior to the UFC 200 bout, they turned a blind eye to the likely possibility that
Lesnar had been cheating (given his known history of illegal doping) when they
refused to expedite Lesnar’s pre-bout testing results. [II ER 90]. For a nominal fee,
UFC/White could have confirmed what they had been promising Hunt all along—a
fair fight against Lesnar. Id. The fact that White/UFC ignored this opportunity only
highlights the reality that UFC (1) could have prevented Hunt’s damages and chose
not to, and (2) does not care if its fighters are cheating, because it knows it stands
to lose nothing as a result.
20
categorized Hunt’s alleged damages as “consequential damages” that were
specifically barred by the PARA. [I ER 30]. However, consequential damages are
not the same as reliance damages, and a contract’s barring recovery of one does not
necessarily bar recovery of the other. See, e.g., SCC Alameda Point LLC v. City of
Alameda, 897 F. Supp. 2d 886, 895–96 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (turning to extrinsic
evidence to determine whether reliance damages were still recoverable pursuant to
a contract that explicitly barred consequential damages).
As explained, supra, Hunt suffered various reliance damages beyond his
entitlement to his UFC 200 purse and had adequately alleged the same for purposes
of FRCP 8 and Twombly/Iqbal. Indeed, Hunt is seeking reimbursement for the
money he spent preparing for UFC Fight Night 121 in reasonable reliance on the
contract, but from which he was wrongfully removed under false pretenses. These
damages are not “consequential,” but rather fall squarely within the definition of
“reliance damages.” Moreover, the District Court ignored Hunt’s allegations that
UFC denied him the opportunity to fight in subsequent bouts to which he was
entitled under the PARA. The PARA specifically contemplates that a fighter may
“seek redress for any outstanding compensation owed to Fighter hereunder.”
Therefore, Hunt’s breach of contract claim should have survived UFC’s motion to
dismiss.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING HUNT’S CLAIM FOR

BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
21
DEALING FOR THE SAME REASON IT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE BREACH

OF CONTRACT CLAIM
Following the District Court’s adjudication of UFC, White, and Lesnar’s
Motions to Dismiss Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint, Hunt’s sole-remaining claim
was his claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [I
ER 36]. Like his breach of contract claim, the District Court found that Hunt’s
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must fail, as
Hunt’s asserted damages constituted “consequential damages” that were expressly
barred under the PARA. [I ER 5].
The District Court erred in ruling in favor of UFC regarding this claim for
the same reasons it erred in dismissing Hunt’s breach of contract claim—it
mischaracterized Hunt’s damages as “consequential” damages barred by the PARA
and summarily ruled against Hunt on that basis. Rather, Hunt’s damages constitute
recoverable reliance damages, which UFC offered no evidence to contradict in
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. See [II ER 132] (UFC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at ECF No. 154). See In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig.,
No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL 3029783, at *42 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016)
(unpublished) (“Reliance damages are a party’s ‘interest in being reimbursed for
loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract not been made.’”). As with his other claims,
Hunt should have been permitted to conduct full discovery to determine prior to
22
trial whether he would elect to pursue his breach of contract claim or his equitable
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING HUNT’S FRAUD AND

AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD CLAIMS FOR LACK OF PROXIMATE
CAUSATION
Hunt asserted his common law fraud and aiding and abetting fraud claims
against UFC, White, and Lesnar for their active participation in the scheme to
conceal Lesnar’s doping from Hunt prior to the UFC 200 bout (and the substantial
assistance and encouragement each Defendant lent the other in the commission
thereof). [II ER 109-111]. Indeed, Hunt alleged in his Supplemental Complaint that
White (acting on behalf of UFC) made repeated false representations to Hunt that
Lesnar was being tested in accordance with the Anti-Doping Policy, assuring Hunt
that Lesnar would be “the most tested athlete on this [UFC 200] card.” [II ER 89].
Lesnar also made the false representation that he was clean and abiding by the
Anti-Doping Policy by sheer virtue of his entering into the UFC 200 Bout
Agreement, and later by representing on a pre-fight questionnaire that he had not
used any illegal substances within the month prior to the UFC 200 bout.17 [II ER
89-90].
Hunt reasonably relied on UFC, White, and Hunt’s representations that
17
In addition to sufficiently alleging UFC, White, and Lesnar’s false
representations, if Hunt had been permitted to depose key witnesses and collect
pertinent written discovery, he could have proven at trial when Lesnar’s pre-bout
doping began and when White/UFC learned about it.
23
Lesnar was clean and being subject to all required testing prior to the bout. [II ER
110]. As discussed, supra, had UFC, White, and Lesnar not actively concealed
Lesnar’s doping, Hunt would not have wasted the approximately $100,000.00 he
spent training for UFC 200 and traveling to the United States to participate in the
bout, and the resources he expended in promoting the bout to his followers on
social media. Alternatively, and as previously discussed, had Lesnar’s doping been
revealed prior to the bout, Hunt could have pulled out of the bout with Lesnar and
opted to fight a different fighter who was not doping, as promised under the
PARA. In this alternate scenario, Hunt would not have wasted the $100,000.00 he
spent training for UFC 200, but would have simply applied those efforts and
resources to a different bout that was not impermissibly and unlawfully stacked
against him.
Either way, Hunt was not afforded the opportunity to make those important
decisions, because he reasonably relied on White, UFC, and Lesnar’s various
representations that Lesnar was not using prohibited substances prior to the bout
(and/or that Lesnar would be adequately tested and removed from the UFC 200
Bout if he was discovered to have been doping). Ultimately, had Hunt known of
Lesnar’s doping, he would not have been subjected to the unfair fight, which
resulted in reputational harm to his brand, decreased revenues from scheduled
appearances, book sales, apparel sales, and social media revenue. [II ER 95-98].
24
Finally, Hunt suffered damages relating to the personal injuries that he suffered as
a result of the UFC 200 bout. [II ER 77, 91].
The District Court dismissed Hunt’s common law fraud claim with prejudice
on the grounds that Hunt failed to show that the doping scheme was the proximate
cause of his damages. [I ER 29]. Then, having found that Hunt failed to adequately
allege the underlying tort, the District Court similarly dismissed with prejudice
Hunt’s aiding and abetting fraud claim, which requires a showing that the
underlying substantive tort was accomplished. Id.
The District Court’s holding with respect to causation appears to stem from
the District Court’s doubt that Hunt would be able to prove at trial that, but for
Lesnar’s doping, Hunt would have won the UFC 200 bout (thereby avoiding the
various categories of damages that followed). [I ER 10]. Even if the District Court
were permitted to inject its own doubts about a plaintiff’s ability to prove the
underlying facts supporting his claims at the motion to dismiss phase, which it is
not, the District Court ignored the other means by which Hunt could have avoided
his damages had Defendants not defrauded Hunt by concealing Lesnar’s doping.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S. Ct. at 1964–65; Painters & Allied Trades
Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund, 943 F.3d at 1248. Indeed, had Hunt known of
Lesnar’s doping, he would have turned down the bout, thus avoiding the
reputational harm to his brand (and decreased revenues from his book, apparel
25
company, social media revenue, and appearance engagements) stemming from his
UFC 200 loss.18 [II ER 98]. Hunt was not given that opportunity, as he reasonably
relied on UFC, White, and Lesnar’s representations that UFC 200 was going to be
a fair fight. As a result of that reliance and subsequent participation in UFC 200,
Hunt suffered damages that he would not have otherwise suffered had he not
participated in UFC 200.
Therefore, Hunt respectfully submits that the District Court erred in its
dismissal of Hunt’s fraud claim. It also follows that, if Hunt’s fraud claim was
improperly dismissed, Hunt’s aiding and abetting fraud claim was also dismissed
in error, as the District Court’s holding was based solely on its finding that the
underlying tort had not been accomplished. [I ER 29-30]. Thus, Hunt respectfully
requests that the District Court’s order granting dismissal (with prejudice) of
Hunt’s fraud and aiding and abetting fraud claims be vacated, and this action be
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING HUNT’S BATTERY AND

AIDING AND ABETTING BATTERY CLAIMS BY FINDING THAT DOPING IS
WITHIN THE “RANGE OF ACTIVITY” TYPICALLY INVOLVED IN THE
SPORT OF MMA
Hunt asserted his civil battery claim against Lesnar only, whom he alleged
intended to cause harmful and offensive contact to Hunt, causing him physical
18
Again, had Hunt been permitted to conduct further discovery, he would have
deposed the coordinators of the events for which Hunt’s post-bout appearances
were cancelled. These depositions would have confirmed that Hunt’s various
appearance engagements were cancelled due to his UFC 200 loss.
26
injury and damages. [II ER 116]. Relying on the PARA and UFC 200 Bout
Agreement, the rules of the NAC, and various representations made by Lesnar and
White that Lesnar was not doping prior to the UFC 200 bout, Hunt consented only
to fight a clean (non-doping) Lesnar. Because Hunt did not consent to fight a
professionally trained MMA fighter who was empowered with near-superhuman
strength due to the effects of doping, and because Lesnar caused Hunt physical
injury as a result of the UFC 200 bout, Hunt stated a viable claim against Lesnar
for civil battery. See Humboldt Gen. Hosp. v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 132 Nev. 544,
549, 376 P.3d 167, 171 (2016) (“A battery is an intentional and offensive touching
of a person who has not consented to the touching. . .”) (citation omitted).
The District Court dismissed with prejudice Hunt’s battery claim against
Lesnar, accepting Lesnar’s argument that Hunt consented to the bout, thus negating
“the existence of the tort . . .” [I ER 33]. The District Court found, relying on a
single case from California, that a sporting event participant consents to any
resulting injuries—even those caused by another participant’s flagrant and
intentional violation of the rules of the sport—so long as the aggressor’s conduct
does not fall “totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the
sport[.]” Id. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed Hunt’s battery claim for
Hunt’s failure to allege that Lesnar’s behavior “exceeded the ordinary range of
activity in an MMA fight.” [I ER 34].
27
First, if the District Court’s decision to dismiss Hunt’s battery claim turned
on his failure to specifically allege that Lesnar’s dangerous and life-threatening
conduct exceeded the range of ordinary activity typically involved in the sport, this
Circuit’s liberal amendment rules required the District Court to give Hunt an
opportunity to amend his complaint to make that simple change. See Eminence
Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing
that FRCP 15’s instruction that “leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires” is “to be applied with extreme liberality.”). Indeed, although doping is
sometimes an unfortunate reality in the sport of MMA, this does not preclude a
jury from finding that a fighter’s use of prohibited substances (which is expressly
forbidden by UFC, state, and federal law) in order to gain a monumental strength
advantage over his adversaries falls outside the range of activity involved in the
sport. To the contrary, the concept of pitting a doping fighter against a clean fighter
is expressly forbidden under the rules of the sport, the NAC, and by the agreements
the fighters enter into with UFC, as Hunt alleged in his Supplemental Complaint.
[II ER 83]. Lesnar’s defiance of these rules places his conduct outside the range of
“ordinary” activity involved or allowed in the sport, by definition.
Moreover, without having reviewed any evidence from the parties, the
District Court was not permitted to assume that doping falls within the range of
activity typically involved in the sport of MMA. See FRCP 201(b) (“The court
28
may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:
(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.”). To the contrary, had Hunt been permitted to proceed with
discovery, he would have retained an expert in MMA to provide a report and/or
testimony regarding the severity of the enhanced risks associated with pitting a
clean fighter against a doping fighter who is using prohibited substances that make
him stronger and help him recover faster. As Hunt would have demonstrated at
trial, these enhanced risks do not fall within the “range of activity” typically
involved in MMA.
Second, while Hunt did consent to fight in the UFC 200 bout against Lesnar,
Hunt’s consent extended only to fighting a clean Lesnar, as he had been promised
time and time again. [II ER 116]. Hunt has specifically alleged the repeated efforts
he undertook to gain assurance that Lesnar was abiding by the Anti-Doping Policy,
and consented to fight Lesnar based on those repeated assurances by White and
pursuant to the various agreements all fighters are required to enter prior to
participating in a UFC bout. Hunt’s efforts to assure himself of Lesnar’s
compliance with the Anti-Doping Policy is evidence of his steadfast refusal to fight
a doping fighter. Moreover, UFC’s own rules, the PARA, and the bout agreements
it executes with its fighters all subject UFC to the regulations and purview of the
29
NAC, which “administers the State laws and regulations governing unarmed
combat for the protection of the public and to ensure the health and safety of the
contestants.” State of Nevada Athletic Commission, THE OFFICIAL STATE OF
NEVADA WEBSITE, http://boxing.nv.gov/about/Mission/. Given that the entire
purpose behind the NAC is to monitor and enforce the rules and regulations
governing sporting events such as UFC’s MMA bouts, Hunt had no reason to
believe that he would be “assuming the risk” of his opponent’s concealed, flagrant
violation of UFC’s Anti-Doping Policy.
Finally, the issues of (1) whether Hunt consented to fight a doping Lesnar,
and (2) whether Lesnar’s use of prohibited substances falls outside the range of
activity typically involved in the sport, are questions of fact that should be reserved
for a jury. McCrosky v. Carson Tahoe Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 Nev. 930, 934, 408
P.3d 149, 153 (2017) (recognizing that questions of fact are reserved for the
factfinder). Moreover, the issue of whether Hunt consented to fight a doping
Lesnar is not a prima facie element of a battery claim (but rather an affirmative
defense that must be supported by adequate evidence) and therefore does not speak
to whether Hunt pleaded a claim sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Jafbros, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 128 Nev. 908, 381 P.3d 627 (2012)
(unpublished) (recognizing that affirmative defenses are arguments or assertions of
fact that, “if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s claim even if all allegations in the
30
complaint are true.”) (citing Douglas Disposal, Inc. v. Wee Haul LLC, 123 Nev.
552, 557–58, 170 P.3d 508, 513 (2007)) (internal citations omitted); Las Vegas
Dev. Grp., LLC v. Steven, No. 215CV01128RCJCWH, 2016 WL 3381222, at *2
(D. Nev. June 14, 2016) (unpublished) (“Whether the Property was insured by
HUD does not appear on the face of the Complaint; thus, the Court may not
dismiss the case based on these affirmative defenses. Although Defendants
attached evidence to their motion to dismiss, they do not invite treatment of the
motion under Rule 56 because they seek judicial notice of the public documents
they attached. The Court denies the motion to dismiss on the basis of Defendants’
Property Clause and Supremacy Clause arguments.”) (emphasis added).
Therefore, because (1) Hunt adequately pleaded a prima facie claim for
battery against Lesnar, (2) Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint expressly asserts that
Hunt did not consent to fight a doping Lesnar, and (3) Lesnar’s defense regarding
Hunt’s purported consent is an affirmative defense (rooted in a question of fact)
that must be supported by adequate evidence, the District Court erred by
prematurely dismissing Hunt’s battery claim prior to the parties’ engaging in full
discovery.
By extension, the District Court erred in dismissing Hunt’s aiding and
abetting battery claim against White and UFC, which it apparently dismissed for
the sole reason that Hunt purportedly failed to allege a viable claim for battery. [I
31
ER 34].
E. BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING HUNT’S FRAUD

AND BATTERY CLAIMS, IT ALSO ERRED IN DISMISSING HUNT’S CIVIL
CONSPIRACY CLAIM
The District Court summarily dismissed Hunt’s civil conspiracy claim
following its dismissal of Hunt’s fraud and battery claims—the underlying torts
that Hunt alleges UFC, White, and Lesnar conspired to commit. [I ER 35]; [II ER
117]. In dismissing Hunt’s civil conspiracy claim with prejudice, the District Court
held that a “conspiracy action must be based on the agreement to commit a viable
tort. Because I have dismissed Hunt’s underlying fraud and battery claims, I must
also dismiss his civil-conspiracy claim under count ten.” [I ER 35].
Because Hunt had already shown, supra, that the District Court dismissed
Hunt’s fraud and battery claims in error, it necessarily follows that the District
Court’s sole basis for dismissing Hunt’s civil conspiracy claim was also error. To
be sure, but for the District Court’s erroneous finding that Hunt failed to
adequately plead the underlying tort claims upon which his civil conspiracy claim
relies, Hunt adequately pleaded the required elements of a prima facie case of civil
conspiracy.
Specifically, Hunt alleged that “Lesnar, White, and UFC, acted in concert as
set forth fully above, to defraud Hunt and commit a battery against Hunt by a
scheme to knowingly pit Hunt, a clean fighter, against Lesnar, a doping fighter, to
32
the wrongful benefit of Defendants and to the detriment of Hunt.” [II ER 117]. He
further alleged that Lesnar, White, and UFC intended (by mutual agreement) to
accomplish this unlawful objective with full knowledge that Hunt would be
harmed, and in fact Hunt did suffer physical injury, damage to his brand,
marketing, and promotional opportunities. Id. The fact that UFC and White
ignored the one opportunity they had to make good on their continuous promises to
Hunt that he would be given a fair fight against a clean Lesnar—by failing to
expedite Lesnar’s pre-bout drug testing results—only highlights the reality that
UFC and White did not want to confirm that Lesnar was cheating prior to the bout,
as they had an unquestionable financial interest in allowing Lesnar to fight in UFC
200. See [II ER 90]. Once again, had Hunt been able to depose key witnesses and
collect pertinent documents and communications, Hunt would have been able to
prove that UFC and White knew of Lesnar’s pre-bout doping and actively
conspired with him to conceal it at Hunt’s sole expense.
Regardless, because Hunt adequately pleaded both the elements of a claim
for civil conspiracy, as well as the elements of viable claims for fraud and
battery,19 the District Court’s dismissal of this claim was in error. Consol.
Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 1311, 971 P.2d
19
This Court need only find that Hunt adequately pleaded a claim for fraud or
battery in order to save his claim for civil conspiracy, as either tort constitutes an
“unlawful objective” that could support Hunt’s civil conspiracy claim.
33
1251, 1256 (1998) (“An actionable civil conspiracy ‘consists of a combination of
two or more persons who, by some concerted action, intend to accomplish an
unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another, and damage results from
the act or acts.’”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Hunt respectfully requests that
this Court vacate the District Court’s order dismissing this claim and remand for
further proceedings.
F. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING HUNT’S FEDERAL AND

STATE RICO CLAIMS FOR LACK OF STANDING
“To allege civil RICO standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), a plaintiff must
show: (1) that his alleged harm qualifies as injury to his business or property; and
(2) that his harm was by reason of the RICO violation.” Painters & Allied Trades
Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943 F.3d 1243,
1248 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969,
972 (9th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted). In his initial Complaint, Hunt
asserted federal and state RICO claims against UFC, White, and Lesnar to recover
for the damages sustained to Hunt’s business and property interests as a result of
the defendants’ fraudulent scheme to conceal Lesnar’s doping and pit him against a
clean Hunt for their own financial gain. See [II ER 144] (Complaint, ECF No. 1 at
15-22).
///
i. Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint corrected all the deficiencies
34
noted by the District Court following its first dismissal of

Hunt’s RICO claims
The District Court dismissed Hunt’s RICO claims in the first instance
because it found that Hunt’s alleged damages amounted only to those grounded in
personal injury, reputational loss, and other expectancy damages that do not suffice
to confer RICO standing. [II ER 120-122]. Additionally, the District Court held
that it could not infer proximate cause from Hunt’s alleged facts; i.e., that the
“concealing of exemptions to cause clean fighters to fight doping fighters” caused
Hunt’s injuries. [II ER 121-122]. Finally, the District Court held that Hunt had not
pled sufficient racketeering conduct by White. [II ER 121]. Accordingly, the
District Court dismissed Hunt’s RICO claims for lack of standing. [II ER 120].
With these purported deficiencies in mind, Lesnar eventually filed his
Supplemental Complaint, which added more than thirty new paragraphs of factual
allegations in support of his various claims. See [II ER 72-119]. Specifically, Hunt
elaborated on the various damages that he suffered as a result of Defendants’
racketeering activity, which included:
(1) more than $90,000.00 worth of confirmed appearance fees for
engagements that were cancelled just following (and reportedly because of) Hunt’s
loss to Lesnar in UFC 200;
(2) damages related to reduced advertisement revenue resulting from a
decrease in online traffic to Hunt’s social media pages immediately following
35
Hunt’s loss to Lesnar in UFC 200 ;
(3) an immediate decrease in revenue drawn by Hunt’s apparel company,
Juggernaut, following UFC 200;
(4) an immediate decrease in sales of Hunt’s book, “Born to Fight,”
following UFC 200;
(5) depressed wages to Hunt caused by Defendants’ RICO scheme, which
“artificially increases the fighter pool and allows inferior competitors to succeed
who would otherwise be incapable of becoming professional mixed martial
artists”; and
(6) lost bout purses to which Hunt was entitled under his contracts with
UFC, but which were denied to him in retaliation for Hunt’s initiation of the
underlying lawsuit. [II ER 95-99].
Additionally, Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint set forth the details of
White’s direction and participation in the RICO scheme, including his negotiation
of Hunt’s exclusive renewal contract on behalf of UFC, and direct quotes of
White’s repeated assurances to Hunt that Lesnar would be tested in accordance
with the Anti-Doping Policy, despite his knowledge that such assurances were
false. [II ER 78-80, 84-89]. Finally, Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint alleged an
additional theory of RICO liability stemming from UFC and White’s retaliation
against Hunt (for his initiation of the underlying lawsuit) by removing him from
36
the UFC Fight Night 121 card under the false pretext of “medical concerns.” [II ER
99-101]. This unjustified act of retaliation cost Hunt the bout purse that he would
have earned had he not been removed from the fight, as well as $100,000.00 in
pre-fight training camp expenses that Hunt incurred to prepare for UFC Fight
Night 121. [II ER 100-101].
Despite Hunt’s rectifying the various deficiencies noted by the District Court
in his Supplemental Complaint, the District Court dismissed Hunt’s RICO claims
with prejudice on February 14, 2019, determining once again that Hunt had failed
to demonstrate civil RICO standing. [I ER 17]. This time, however, the District
Court impliedly accepted that Hunt had alleged damages sufficient to confer RICO
standing, and instead dismissed Hunt’s RICO claims for the sole reason that it
could not infer that “defendants’ actions proximately caused his damages.” [I ER
19]. Regarding Hunt’s retaliation theory as an additional predicate act to support
his RICO claims, the District Court rejected this theory because Hunt failed to
mention in his Supplemental Complaint the specific federal law provision that
criminalizes retaliating against a witness to “an official proceeding” and which is a
predicate act under the federal RICO statute. [I ER 27-28]. Additionally, the
District Court held that the damages Hunt alleged resulting from defendants’
retaliation—the approximately $100,000.00 Hunt wasted on training camp
expenses—does not constitute damage to “tangible property,” as required under the
37
statute. [I ER 28]. For various reasons, the District Court’s dismissal of Hunt’s
RICO claims for the reasons stated was in error.
ii. By failing to accept Hunt’s alleged facts as true, the District

Court erred in holding that it could not infer that Defendants’
conduct proximately caused Hunt’s damages
In evaluating UFC, White, and Lesnar’s motions to dismiss Hunt’s
Supplemental Complaint, the District Court was required to accept all of Hunt’s
alleged facts as true and determine whether those allegations plausibly give rise to
the cause of action alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S. Ct. at 1964–65.
Instead, the District Court proffered a variety of alternative factual scenarios (not
pleaded in Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint) that could have caused Hunt’s
damages, and essentially concluded that these alternative hypothetical scenarios
cast enough doubt upon Hunt’s theory of liability to preclude a finding that Hunt
stated a plausible claim for relief. [I ER 22-24]. Such treatment does not comport
with the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Twombly/Iqbal. Id.; Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
In his Supplemental Complaint, Hunt alleged that UFC, White, and Lesnar’s
various acts of fraud to conceal Lesnar’s doping prior to the UFC 200 bout caused
Hunt to fight a doping Lesnar without his knowledge or consent, which directly
and immediately damaged Hunt’s business and property interests. Moreover, UFC
and White’s retaliation (i.e., removing Hunt from UFC Fight Night 121 under false
38
pretenses) in response to his filing of the underlying lawsuit caused Hunt to lose
out on the purse he would have received from that fight, and also caused Hunt to
waste approximately $100,000.00 training for that bout. As Hunt alleged, he would
have avoided these damages but for his participation in UFC 200 against a doping
fighter (Lesnar).
Allowing the parties to proceed with full discovery (including depositions
and retention of experts) to collect evidence in support of the underlying factual
allegations would have solidified the causation element at issue. However, by
prematurely dismissing the action prior to of the parties’ having fully engaged in
discovery, the District Court impermissibly foreclosed Hunt’s ability to provide
evidence confirming that Hunt’s damages stemmed directly from UFC, White, and
Lesnar’s RICO enterprise. See In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057
(9th Cir. 2008) (“But so long as the plaintiff alleges facts to support a theory that is
not facially implausible, the court's skepticism is best reserved for later stages of
the proceedings when the plaintiff's case can be rejected on evidentiary grounds.”).
For example, Hunt expressed that, if the case were to proceed, he would
offer the testimony of the organizers of the events for which his appearances were
cancelled, who would confirm that the events were cancelled because of the
outcome of UFC 200. See [II ER 134] (Hunt’s Response to UFC/White’s Motion
to Dismiss, ECF No. 120 at 10, n. 5). Regardless, Hunt bore no duty to provide
39
evidence in support of his factual allegations at the motion to dismiss stage, as the
court must accept the alleged facts as true without injecting its own doubts as to the
provability of such claims. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S. Ct. at 1964–65. In
essence, Hunt was held to a summary judgment standard without being given the
opportunity to mount a proper summary judgment defense through the presentation
of evidence that would have been collected during discovery. This treatment does
not comport with the standards set forth by Iqbal/Twombly.
Ultimately, Hunt alleged that defendants RICO enterprise (carried out by
various fraudulent and unlawful acts) aimed at concealing Lesnar’s doping prior to
UFC 200 caused Hunt to fight a cheating fighter and suffer an unfair loss. As Hunt
alleged, this loss directly resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of
damages to Hunt’s business and property interests. These allegations were
sufficient to confer Hunt with civil RICO standing, and Hunt should have been
granted the opportunity to conduct the discovery he needed to pursue evidence to
support his claims.20
///
///
G. THE DISTRICT COURT PREMATURELY DISMISSED HUNT’S UNJUST
20
The Nevada Supreme Court has recognized that the Nevada “legislature
patterned Nevada RICO after” the federal RICO statutory scheme, and has
therefore relied on federal case law in interpreting Nevada RICO claims. Allum v.
Valley Bank of Nevada, 849 P.2d 297, 301 (Nev. 1993). Therefore, this argument
applies equally to both of Hunt’s civil RICO claims.
40
ENRICHMENT CLAIM, WHICH HE PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO HIS

BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
Hunt pleaded his unjust enrichment claim as an alternative to his breach of
contract claim. [II ER 114-116]. Pleading claims in the alternative is specifically
permitted by FRCP 8. See FRCP 8(d)(2). In this case, Hunt’s unjust enrichment
claim was a permissible alternative to his breach of contract claim, as “the mere
existence of [a contract] does not automatically invalidate [an] unjust enrichment
[claim] as an alternative pleading theory.” Cliffton Equities, Inc. v. Summerlin
Asset Mgmt. III, LLC, No. CV-12-08131-PCT-PGR, 2012 WL 6570940, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Dec. 17, 2012) (unpublished). While a plaintiff may not ultimately recover
under both a breach of contract and an unjust enrichment claim that are rooted in
the same transaction, at the early motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is free to seek
both contract and equitable remedies. DFR Apparel Co. v. Triple Seven
Promotional Prod., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-01406-APG, 2014 WL 4891230, at *3 (D.
Nev. Sept. 30, 2014).
Hunt’s position was that UFC, White, and Lesnar, by conspiring to
fraudulently cause Hunt to unknowingly fight a doping Lesnar, were unjustly
enriched at Hunt’s expense. [II ER 114-116]. Lesnar was enriched by his being
allowed to compete and retain his record-setting $2,500,000.00 purse (less a
$250,000.00 fine that he subsequently incurred as a result of his cheating), while
UFC and White were enriched by avoiding the lost revenues (from ticket sales,
41
pay-per-view viewers, merchandize, reputational harm to the organization, etc.)
that they would have incurred had they cancelled the UFC 200 bout as they should
have when they learned of Lesnar’s doping in advance of the bout.
Indeed, in causing Hunt to risk his health and safety under the false pretense
of promising him a fair fight, UFC never stood to lose a single dime. UFC was able
to reap the full monetary benefits regardless of their aiding Lesnar in his doping.21
This is further evidenced by UFC’s conscious failure to expedite Lesnar’s pre-bout
drug testing results, which it could have done for a nominal fee, and which could
have quelled Hunt’s concerns (if Lesnar had not been cheating, as UFC allegedly
believed). [II ER 90]. However, because UFC knew that Lesnar would not produce
a clean drug test and that cancelling the UFC 200 bout would cost it multiple
millions of dollars, UFC declined to expedite Lesnar’s test results and was unjustly
enriched at Hunt’s expense, as a result.
And Lesnar, despite having to forfeit a mere ten percent (10%) of his record-
setting $2.5 million purse, was enriched by being allowed to fight in a bout from
which he should have been disqualified. The only party who suffered any harm
whatsoever is Hunt. If Hunt is foreclosed from any remedy at law or equity, this
will remain the state of affairs in the UFC. See Certified Fire Prot. Inc. v.
Precision Constr., 128 Nev. 371, 382, 283 P.3d 250, 257 (2012) (explaining that
21
Additional discovery would have validated these assertions as well.
42
unjust enrichment claims may be premised on “services benefit to or at the request
of the other,” and is “not confined to retention of money or property,” serving to
“strip a wrongdoing of all profits gained . . .”).
Nevertheless, the District Court dismissed this claim on the basis that such a
claim is “inapplicable when, as here, a contract exists.” [I ER 32]. This holding
ignores the reality that Hunt was permitted to plead an unjust enrichment claim in
the alternative to his contract claims. In light of the District Court’s misapplication
of the law and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Hunt respectfully submits that the
District Court’s erred in dismissing his unjust enrichment claim prior to the start of
discovery.
H. IF HUNT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD ONE OR MORE OF HIS CLAIMS,

THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED HIM LEAVE TO AMEND
In the event that the District Court did not err in its determination that one or
more of Hunt’s causes of action failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, the District Court should have granted Hunt leave to amend his
Supplemental Complaint. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d
1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that FRCP 15’s instruction that “leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires” is “to be applied with extreme
liberality.”).
This is particularly true with respect to Hunt’s claims for aiding and abetting
fraud, battery, aiding and abetting battery, and civil conspiracy, as the District
43
Court’s February 14, 2019 Order granting dismissal of those claims was the first
instance in which the Court had the opportunity to review the same (because they
were not included in Hunt’s original complaint). See [II ER 144] (Complaint at
ECF No. 1). However, Hunt was not given even a single chance to amend these
claims to cure the purported deficiencies therein. This does not comport with the
extremely liberal amendment policy of the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, Hunt
respectfully requests the opportunity to amend his Supplemental Complaint as an
alternative form of relief.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Hunt respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
District Court’s February 14, 2019 order granting dismissal of all but one of Hunt’s
claims, as well as its November 22, 2019 order granting summary judgment in
favor of UFC, and remand this case back to the District Court for further
proceedings.
Dated this 25th day of March, 2020.
HOLLEY DRIGGS
/s/ Brian W. Boschee

Brian W. Boschee, Esq. (NBN 7612)
Jessica M. Lujan, Esq. (NBN 14913)
Attorneys for Appellant Mark Hunt
44
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.6, counsel for Mark Hunt states that
there are no known related cases involving closely related legal issues pending in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
DATED this 25th day of March, 2020.
HOLLEY DRIGGS

45
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
To the extent that this Court believes that the facts and legal arguments are
not adequately presented in the briefs and records, and the decisional process
would be significantly aided by oral argument, pursuant to FRAP 34(a), Hunt
respectfully requests oral argument for this appeal.
HOLLEY DRIGGS

46
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of
FRAP 32-1(a) in that the brief contains 11,613 words, excluding the parts of the
brief exempted by FRAP 32(f).
I further certify that this brief complies with the typeface requirements of
FRAP 32(a)(4)-(5) and the type style requirements of FRAP 32(a)(6) in that this
brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface on Microsoft 2010 with
one (1) inch margins and using Time New Roman – font size 14. This brief is 44
pages double spaced, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by FRAP 32(f).
HOLLEY DRIGGS

47
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT MARK HUNT’S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL with the
Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by
using the appellate CM/ECF system on the 25th day of March, 2020.
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by
the appellate CM/ECF system.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada and
the United States that the above is true and correct.
Dated this 25th day of March, 2020.
/s/_Madeline Van Heuvelen________

an employee of HOLLEY DRIGGS
48

Mark Hunt Opening Brief

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Mark Hunt Opening Brief

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Case: 19-17529, 03/25/2020, ID: 11641285, DktEntry: 6, Page 1 of 56

ZUFFA, LLC, et al,

On Appeal from the United States District Court

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT MARK HUNT’S

BRIAN W. BOSCHEE, ESQ.

I. Jurisdictional statement ..................................................................................... vi

II. Statement of the issues....................................................................................... vi

III. Statement of the case ........................................................................................1

IV. Summary of the argument ..............................................................................11

V. Standard of review .............................................................................................15

A. Motion to dismiss ...........................................................................................15

A. The District Court erred in categorizing Hunt’s damages as “consequential”

G. The District Court prematurely dismissed Hunt’s unjust enrichment claim,

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ...................................................................45

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ...................................................................46

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................47

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................48

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, because Plaintiff-Appellant Mark Hunt (“Hunt”)

appeal is from a final decision under § 1291.

The District Court entered Judgment in the underlying matter on November

pursuant to FRAP 4(a)(1)(A).

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Hunt’s breach of

support the element of proximate causation?

fight a doping fighter?

4. Having erred in dismissing Hunt’s fraud, battery, and aiding and

in evaluating UFC, White, and Lesnar’s respective motions to dismiss Hunt’s

standing upon Hunt?

6. Did the District Court err in dismissing Hunt’s unjust enrichment

pleaded his unjust enrichment claim as an alternative to his breach of contract

claim and sufficiently alleged each of the required elements thereunder?

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal revolves around the District Court’s premature dismissal of

Hunt’s Supplemental Complaint to recover damages incurred as a result of

defendant-appellees Zuffa, LLC (“UFC”)6, Dana White (“White”), and Brock

Lesnar’s (“Lesnar”) concerted scheme to conceal Lesnar’s use of prohibited

adopted a comprehensive “Anti-Doping Policy,”7 which UFC touts as “the best

anti-doping program in all of professional sports.” [II ER 76-77]. Pursuant to the

Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”), the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”),

for a period of four months before returning to competition” (the “Four-Month

“exceptional circumstances,” or where the strict application of the rule would be

manifestly unfair to an athlete. Id.

by granting certain, preferred fighters therapeutic use exemptions (which permit

exemptions, or—in some instances—purposely delaying the announcement of a

bout in order to delay the required testing.8 [II ER 77, 81].

In or around April 2016, UFC executed an early renewal of its exclusive

Athletic Commission.” Id.

the bout). [II ER 84-85, 90].

announcement of Lesnar’s return to fight in UFC 200, Hunt expressed concerns to

White’s representation in continuing to agree to go through with the UFC 200

2016. [II ER 87].

On June 8, 2016, Hunt continued to express concerns to White that Lesnar

the Four-Month Testing Requirement. [II ER 88-89]. In response to Hunt’s

rely on White’s representations that he would be matched with a clean fighter at

UFC 200. Id.

Clomiphene, an anti-estrogenic substance, and 4-Hydroxyclomiphene. [II ER 91].

and by WADA. Id. In a further attempt to advance their conspiracy to allow a

UFC 200 bout. [II ER 90].

unanimous judges’ decision. [II ER 91]. Lesnar was paid a record-setting

$2,500,000.00 (not including his Pay-Per-View allocation) for his participation in

“Federal RICO Claim”), (2) conspiracy to commit crime related to racketeering

article detailing Defendants’ respective contributions to the RICO doping scheme.

In response to Hunt’s persistence in pursuing his lawsuit against UFC,

contractually-sanctioned) participation in UFC 121, which was scheduled to occur