Statcon-Case Digest

A.M. No.
RTJ -04-1868, August 13, 2004
*CHECK THE BOOK PAGE 7-9
JUST COPY
FACTS, ISSUES AND RULING (UNG HELD PALITAN MO NG RULING)

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 102858, July 28, 1997
Facts:
Teodoro Abistado, private respondent, Filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square
meters of land under P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro./ During the pendency of the case, Teodoro Abistado died and was substituted by his children -
Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold, and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, who were all represented by their
aunt Josefa Abistado, ad litem ( act in which a lawsuit has a representative in behalf of children not capable of
representation.)
Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction in compliance with the mandatory
provision requiring publication of initial public hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. Records show that
applicants failed to comply with P.D. No. 1529 Section 23 (1) requiring publication of notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Initial public hearing was only published in the Official Gazette.
/The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which granted the application and ordered the registration of
title to Teodoro Abistado, since publication in a newspaper of general Circulation is merely procedural, hence
dispensable. The Director of Land, represented by the Solicitor General, elevated this case to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Director of Land is correct that the publication of Notice of Initial hearing in a Land
Registration Case is mandatory.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 shall be followed requiring a publication once both in the Official Gazette and
newspaper of general circulation./ The Land Registration Case is an in Rem proceeding, meaning the applicant
must prove his title over the land against all persons concerned, who might have interest to right in the property
and should effectively be invited in the court to prove why the title should not be granted.
/Such provision used the term "shall" which indicated that it is mandatory.
fWhen the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation, or
equivocation, there is room only for application.
/Thus. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Lower Court dismissing the petition for registration of Land
Title to the respondents.
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS v. DANILO T. BOLOS, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated on
15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on 3 August 1988.
FACTS:
/Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Respondent
Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition
for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the
Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring the
marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by
Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital
obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
/The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the nullity of
marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration
as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between
Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of
the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the
Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his
Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was
solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.
Ruling:
/No, it does not.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
/Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule
sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the Family
Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, /the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to
respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
PEOPLE v. MARIO MAPA y MAPULONG, L-22301, August 30, 1967
Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was
discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the
court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused
further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of
appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must
acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police
which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal possession of
firearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is explicit that
except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."/ The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.
/The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the accused
is not exempted.
PEOPLE v. PATRICIO AMIGO, G.R. No. 116719, January 18, 1996
FACTS:
On or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, Patricio Amigo armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy,
thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his death and the consequent loss and damage
to the heirs of the victim. Amigo, beyond reasonable doubt was convicted of the crime of murder punishable
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance present, was sentenced to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
to death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not framers of Article III, section 19 is clear on the extinguishment of death penalty?
HELD:
Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein which expressly declares the
abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall
be reduced to reclusion perpetua./ It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under
consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the
constitutional convention, for its interpretation. Therefore, /the Supreme Court returns to its original
interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only in so far as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
reduces it to reclusion perpetua. /The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA v. COURT OF APEALS, ET AL., G.R. No. 125183, September 29,
1997
JUST COPY
]
LOUIS BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
FACT:
/E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said
PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. /However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences
gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt
or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
/Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O./ on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent
like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power
duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power
to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. /Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of
the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC
had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, ET AL., G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
Facts:
/The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). /The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
/Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court./
Issues:
/Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision./
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid
of the petitioner.
Ruling:
/In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision./
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
/A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,/ so that they can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. /Unless
it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words
the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces
itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which
have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And
if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to
give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given
factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the
foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its
mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion
while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines
and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian
firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, L-41012, September 30, 1976
FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of
Manila Bay. Subsequently Act No. 1657 amended the former act which states that the City of Manila was
authorized to sell or lease the set aside for hotel site. The City of Manila sells the land to Manila Lodge No. 761
then the latter sold the land to Tarlac Development Corporation. The City of Manila filed a petition for re-
annotation of its right to repurchased. The TDC then filed a complaint that the City of Manila was estopped from
repurchasing the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Manila was estopped from quetioning the validity of the sale.
RULING:
The Government is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the pan of its agents, and estoppel does not apply
to a municipal corporation to validate a contract that is prohibited by law or is against Republic policy, and the
sale executed by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited by law. /Moreover,
estoppel cannot be urged even if the City of Manila accepted the benefits of such contract of sale and the
Manila Lodge No. 761 had performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the
City of Manila in this case would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do directly.
The sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and
inexistent for lack of subject matter. It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified either by
lapse of time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the
said sale. Hence to consider now the contract inexistent as it always has seen, cannot be, as claimed by the
Manila Lodge No. 761, an impairment of the obligations of contracts, for there was it, contemplation of law, no
contract at all.
BERNABE v. ALEJO (GR # 140500, January 21, 2002)
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time
the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining
majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
Facts:
1. / The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo, of 23 years.
2. /The son, Adrian Bernabe was born on September 18, 1981./ Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, and
his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
3. / May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged a
legitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given share in Fiscal Bernabes estate.
4. RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code (took effect on 1988) as
well as the case of Uyguangco vs. CA, the complaint is now barred.
5. /RTC granted Ernestina’s Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. /Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred
the action.
6. /the trial court added that since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in
writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the
opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
Issues:
1. /W/N Family Code should be applied retroactively
W/N Adrian Bernabe, an illegitimate son, has a right to be recognized
Ruling:
1. / NO. FC should not be applied retroactively
a. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an
action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority./
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard
and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
a. Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition
within four years from attaining majority age.
b. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right. (FC did not apply retroactively
because it will impair this vested right)
2. RTC said that the father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing. The action for
recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either
affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent
died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a
period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the
passage of the Family Code.
Adrian was only 7 y/o when the Family Code took effect and only 12 when his alleged father died in 1993. The
minor must be given his chance to exercise his right.
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
SEBASTIAN v. MORALES(GR # 141116, February 17, 2003)
NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC., v. CA (GR # 86738, November 13, 1991)
FACTS:
/On February 21, 1983, the Authorized Capital Stock (ACS) of petitioner Nestle was increased from P300 million
divided into 3 million shares with a par value of P100 per share, to P600 million divided into 6 million shares with
a par value of P100 per share. Nestle underwent the necessary procedures involving Board and stockholders
approvals and the necessary filings to secure the approval of the increase of ACS. It was approved by respondent
SEC./
Nestle issued 344,500 shares out of its previously authorized but unissued capital stock exclusively to its
principal stockholders San Miguel Corporation and to Nestle S.A. San Miguel Corporation subscribed to and
completely paid up 168,800 shares, while Nestle S.A. subscribed to and paid up the balance of 175,700 shares of
stock.
/In 1985, petitioner Nestle filed a letter to SEC seeking exemption of its proposed issuance of additional shares
to its existing principal shareholders, from the registration requirement of Section 4 of the Revised Securities Act
and from payment of the fee referred to in Section 6(c) of the same Act /to wit:
“Sec. 6. Exempt transactions. — a) The requirement of registration under subsection (a) of Section four of this
Act shall not apply to the sale of any security in any of the following transactions: xxx xxx xxx
(4) The distribution by a corporation, actively engaged in the business authorized by its articles of incorporation,
of securities to its stockholders or other security holders as a stock dividend or other distribution out of surplus;
or the issuance of securities to the security holder or other creditors of a corporation in the process of a bona
fide reorganization of such corporation made in good faith and not for the purpose of avoiding the provisions of
this Act, either in exchange for the securities of such security holders or claims of such creditors or partly for
cash and partly in exchange for the securities or claims of such security holders or creditors; or the issuance of
additional capital stock of a corporation sold or distributed by it among its own stockholders exclusively, where
no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly in connection with the sale or
distribution of such increased capital stock.”
Nestle argued that Section 6(a) (4) of the Revised Securities Act embraces “not only an increase in the
authorized capital stock but also the issuance of additional shares to existing stockholders of the unissued
portion of the unissued capital stock“.
SEC denied petitioner’s requests and ruled that the proposed issuance of shares did not fall under Section 6 (a)
(4) of the Revised Securities Act, since Section 6 (a) (4) is applicable only where there is an increase in the
authorized capital stock of a corporation.
/MR was denied and appeal to CA was also denied. Thus this Petition for Review./
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Nestle’s application for exemptions should be granted.
RULING:
No. Under Sec 38 of the Corporation Code, a corporation engaged in increasing its authorized capital stock, with
the required vote of its Board of Directors and of its stockholders, must file a sworn statement of the treasurer
of the corporation showing that at least 25% of “such increased capital stock” has been subscribed and that at
least 25% of the amount subscribed has been paid either in actual cash or in property transferred to the
corporation. /The corporation must issue at least 25% of the newly or contemporaneously authorized capital
stock in the course of complying with the requirements of the Corporation Code for increasing its authorized
capital stock.
After approval by the SEC of the increase of its authorized capital stock, and from time to time thereafter, the
corporation, by a vote of its Board of Directors, and without need of either stockholder or SEC approval, may
issue and sell shares of its already authorized but still unissued capital stock to existing shareholders or to
members of the general public.
In the case at bar, since the 344,500 shares of Nestle capital stock are proposed to be issued from already
authorized but still unissued capital stock and since the present authorized capital stock of 6,000,000 shares
with a par value of P100.00 per share is not proposed to be further increased, the SEC and the CA correctly
rejected Nestle’s petition.
When capital stock is issued in the course of and in compliance with the requirements of increasing its
authorized capital stock under Section 38 of the Corporation Code, the SEC examines the financial condition of
the corporation, and hence there is no real need for exercise of SEC authority under the Revised Securities Act.
Thus, one of the requirements under the current regulations of the SEC in respect of filing a certificate of
increase of authorized capital stock, is submission of “a financial statement duly certified by an independent
CPA as of the latest date possible or as of the date of the meeting when stockholders approved the
increase/decrease in capital stock or thereabouts. When all or part of the newly authorized capital stock is
proposed to be issued as stock dividends, the SEC requirements are even more exacting; they require, in
addition to the regular audited financial statements, the submission by the corporation of a “detailed or Long
Form Report of the certifying Auditor.” Moreover, since approval of an increase in authorized capital stock by
the stockholders holding 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock is required by Section 38 of the Corporation Code,
at a stockholders meeting held for that purpose, the directors and officers of the corporation may be expected
to inform the shareholders of the financial condition and prospects of the corporation and of the proposed
utilization of the fresh capital sought to be raised.
On the other hand, issuance of previously authorized but theretofore unissued capital stock by the corporation
requires only Board of Directors approval. Neither notice to nor approval by the shareholders or the SEC is
required for such issuance. There would be no opportunity for the SEC to see to it that shareholders (especially
the small stockholders) have a reasonable opportunity to inform themselves about the very fact of such issuance
and about the condition of the corporation and the potential value of the shares of stock being offered.
An issuance of previously authorized but still unissued capital stock may be held to be an exempt transaction by
the SEC under Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds that the requirements of registration under the Revised
Securities Act are “not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of the investors” by reason, inter
alia, of the small amount of stock that is proposed to be issued or because the potential buyers are very limited
in number and are in a position to protect themselves.
Petitioner Nestle’s second claim for exemption is from payment of the fee provided for in Section 6 (c) of the
Revised Securities Act. Petitioner claims that to require it now to pay one-tenth of one percent (1%) of the
issued value of the 344,500 shares of stock proposed to be issued, is to require it to pay a second time for the
same service on the part of the SEC.
We think it clear that the fee collected in 21 February 1983 by the SEC was assessed in connection with the
examination and approval of the certificate of increase of authorized capital stock then submitted by petitioner.
The fee, on the other hand, provided for in Section 6 (c) which petitioner will be required to pay if it does file an
application for exemption under Section 6 (b), is quite different; this is a fee specifically authorized by the
Revised Securities Act, (not the Corporation Code) in connection with the grant of an exemption from normal
registration requirements imposed by that Act. We do not find such fee either unreasonable or exorbitant.
WHEREFORE, Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA ET AL. v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA ET AL. 146 SCRA 446 (1986) G.R. No. L-63915, December
29, 1986
Facts:
Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette the unpublished Executive Issuances such as; Presidential Decrees, Proclamations, Executive Orders,
general orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders. /In defense, respondents stated that the
petitioners have no legal personality in the case citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of the Rules of Court which lays-out the
requirement for filing for a Writ of Mandamus. Petitioners contended that the issue touches the public and
thereby does not require any special circumstance to institute an action. On the other hand, respondents stated
that publication of the mentioned issuances is not a sine qua non requirement as the Law provides its own
affectivity date as stated in Art. 2 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive Issuances.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents to publish the Executive Issuances of general
application, and further stated that failure for publication would render the Issuances no binding force and
effect./
It was explained that such publication is essential as it gives basis to the legal maxim known as ignorantia legis
non excusat. Thus, failure to publish would make create injustice as would it would punish the citizen for
transgression of the law which he had no notice.
The court declared that Presidential issuances with general application without publication would be inoperative
and null and void. However, some justices in their concurring opinions made a qualification stating that
publication is not an absolute requirement for the publication. As Justice Fernando stated that, publication is
needed but it must not only confined in the Official Gazette because it would make those other laws not
published in the Official Gazette bereft of any binding force or effect.
Philippine International Trading Corp. v. Angeles, G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996, 331 PHIL 723-752
Facts:
The Philippine Trading International Corporation (PITC) issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 which
commands that applications to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China (PROC) must be
accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the
importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the
importation from PROC being applied for at one is to one ratio./
The private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations, applied for authority to import
with the petitioner. However, they failed to comply with the mandates of AO SOCPEC 89-09-01 so that further
import applications were withheld by PITC. Because of this, Remington filed for a petition for prohibition and
madamus with prayer for the issuance of a TRO against PITC and was joined by Firestone later.
Hon. Zosimo Angeles, the judge handling the case at the trial court, granted the petitioners’ request and
declared as null and void and unconstitutional the administrative order issued by the PITC. Among his reasons
for the judgment was the fact that the AO was not published. Later on, President Fidel Ramos directed the
Department of Trade and Industry and the PITC to cease implementing the said AO.
The respondents contend that the case has been moot and moved for its early resolution. PITC, however,
disagreed that the case is moot because the respondents still have an outstanding liability.
Issues:
1. Does the administrative order have a binding effect even if it had not been published?
2. /Can the respondents be made liable for an unpublished administrative order?
Ruling:
1. No. As provided by Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws is an indispensable step in making the
law effective. The administrative order in question should have been implemented because its purpose is to
“enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.” Therefore, even before the president
has directed that the AO cease to be implemented, it had never been legally effective.
/2. No. The unpublished administrative order had no effect in pursuance to Article 2 of the Civil Code so any
liability incurred because of it is invalid.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing GR No. 165416, January 22, 2008
Facts:
/respondent Florita A. Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special School (DCISS) in
Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an office clerk in the... same school. In 1997,
respondents were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly
collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds/
Florita A. Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao
City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an office clerk in the... same school. In 1997, respondents were
administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly collecting
unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds.
On July 2, 1998, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over them. Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through
a committee to be constituted under Section 9 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers." The
motion was denied, as well as respondents' motion for reconsideration.
the Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a joint decision finding respondents Masing and Tayactac guilty
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the Ombudsman denied
Respondents sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court... the Court of Appeals granted the petition
On April 13, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman, which was not impleaded as respondent in the cases, filed an
Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration
The Court of Appeals denied the omnibus motion on the grounds that (1) intervention... is not proper because it
is sought by the quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on appeal, and (2) intervention, even if permissible, is
belated under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.[4] Hence, the petition before us by the Office of the
Ombudsman
The complainant-parents filed their own petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision... respondent
Florita A. Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed by
Erlinda P. Tan.[5] The charges were oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the... conduct of official
duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits.
/Court of Appeals set aside the assailed Ombudsman decision,... The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus
Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated
September 30, 2004.[7] Hence, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman/
Issues:
/whether the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees, or merely recommend
appropriate disciplinary action to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
Ruling:
/The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public officers and employees is explicit in
Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution/, viz:
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or... controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Article XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution delineates the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman as
follows:
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.- The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases... cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the Government, the investigation
of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty... required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct
any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance... therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority
as provided in Section 21 of this Act; Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with
an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee
who is at... fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its
rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by
his office involving the disbursement or use of... public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by is investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4)
hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided, That the Ombudsman under its rules
and regulations may determine what cases may not be... made public: Provided, further, That any publicity
issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Government,
and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or
inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein;
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the
effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed
after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. x x x x[27]
In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.[28] Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of
the past the powers of... which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the
Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who may file and prosecute criminal, civil or
administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of... justice, the Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of
laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees.[29] The
Ombudsman is to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive one.[30] He is vested with broad powers to
enable him to implement his own actions.
The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil.[40] As
the principal and primary complaints and action center[41] against erring public officers and employees, it is...
mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution.[42] In conjunction therewith, Section 19
of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints,[43]... viz:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts
or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process.
/The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act
on complaints against all public officials and... employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary/
US v. Hart, et al. 26 Phil.146
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People v. Hon. Purisima, et al., GR Nos. L-420050-56, November 20, 1978
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Paras v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 123169, November 4, 1996
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Bonifacio v. Judge Dizon GR No. 79416, September 5, 1989
Facts:
/OlimpioBonifacio as the owner of a land which the private respondent, Pastora San
Miguel, was an agricultural lessee. On July 1, 1968, Olimpio filed a complaint seeking the
ejectment of private respondent from Bonifacio’s 2-hectare agricultural land. The CAR
granted the ejectment of Pastora San Miguel. On appeal by the private respondent, the CA
modified the judgement with respect to her counterclaim by ordering Olimpio to pay her in
P1,376.00. Still dissatisfied, private respondent sought relief to SC./ During the pendency
of the case, Olimpio died andwas succeeded by his heirs. However, no notice of such
death was given to the Court, hence no order of substitution of his heirs was made. /SC
resolved to deny the petition of the private respondent for lack of merit, SC affirmed the
decision of CA./ Subsequently, petitioners (heirs of Olimpio) moved for the execution of the
decision by RTC of Bulacan. The Deputy Sheriff submitted his report stating in part that
except for a portion thereof occupied by the private respondent which the latter refused
the vacate. Private respondent moved to quash the execution. RTC held the decision of
the sheriff to be null and void, and that the motion for demolition was denied. Petitioners
contended that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion. They assert that the CAR
case, being an ejectment case survives the death of a party. /Private respondent, on the
other hand, stress on the fact that the action is not an ordiary ejectment but an agrarian
case for the ejectment of the agricultural lessee./
Issue:
Whether or not the compulsory heirs inherit the favorable judgment obtained by the
decedent, thereby vesting to the former, all rights conferred by the judgment to the
decedent.
Ruling:
/Petition is granted.
SC reads Sec. 36 (1), R.A. 3844, which provides, for the continuation in the enjoyment and
possession of an agricultural lessee of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory. Under such
provision, the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the
landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his
immediate family so desired./ The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner’s
immediate family members evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the
agricultural lessee who was (and still) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm
household. Whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term
“personal cultivation” cannot b given restricted connotation to mean a right personal and
exclusive to either the lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of
the lessor’s or lessee’s immediate family. The CAR case not being a purely personal right,
the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest.
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr. et al. v. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an
order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was
subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by
herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in
violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?
RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term
limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive
suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself
disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.
Joker Arroyo, et al. v. Jose De Venecia, et al., GR No. 127255, June 26, 1998
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Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD, GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG, specifically tasked to
monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257 otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003.”
Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty
percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior
citizens;
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private
property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit
and capital because according to them drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines,
and the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9257 is constitutional.
Ruling:
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been
described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of
the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to
the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in
the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no
basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly
oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a
financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme
really works greatly to their disadvantage.
In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur losses. However,petitioner’s
computation is clearly flawed.
For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount shall be deducted from gross
income, the amount of income derived from all sources before deducting allowable expenses, which will result
in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An
income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given
period could have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their income. Absent any financial
statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the
discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted
wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State,
in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment
of property rights in the process.
Romualdez v. COMELEC, GR No. 167011, December 11, 2008
Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and RA 8189 or
Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false information as to their residence in their applications as new
voters in Burauen, Leyte.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the

COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May 2000, they
took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and
if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Issue: WON due process was violated.
RULING: No.
First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language which
embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to
Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses charged
against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of
before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the
charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the
denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section
261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations
directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based
on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in
the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson,
we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as we
have said, the charges contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the
COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC,
pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were
not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC.
Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in
private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners
filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly
filed a Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the
circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners
were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing
that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their
defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, L- 72873, May 28, 1987
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the name of their
deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister
sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the
said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife
built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that
he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of
her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been
exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court
reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.
Ruling:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them.
And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in
question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to read
out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit
that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s will.
Luz v. Comelec, GR No. 172840, June 7, 2007
Paras v. Comelec, GR No. 123169, November 4, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, A
petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to
approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s opposition,
COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from
taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After
conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public
respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996.
Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government
code: “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall
election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local
Government Code.
Ruling:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not
accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its
construction. Hence, it was held that the “regular local election” refers to an election where the office held by
the local elective official sought to be recalled.
The City of Davao v. RTC, GR No. 127383, August 18, 2005
FACTS:
GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of its properties for
non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was,
however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline extension given by Davao City.
On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land it owned and
another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC.
During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government Code, which have
withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from
payment of realty tax.
RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC
Ruling:
Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend
to the levy of “taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and LGUs.”
However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical
persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a
GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been withdrawn.
Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption, Supreme Court
found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second paragraph.
Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on
the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal
laws.
Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. These
conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.
Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing
so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind
subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear
relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS.
Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that “any tax exemption, incentive or relief
granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming
it.”
The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec.
39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions
prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of Davao.
Mecano v. Comm. On Audit, GR No. 103982, December 11, 1982
FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th
Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated
nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991
by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate
in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the
enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.
Ruling:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on
the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence,
before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in
enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest;
otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute
for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws
on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari
materia.
Avon Cosmetics v. Luna, GR No. 153674, December 20, 2006
FACTS:
Luna began working for Beautifont, Inc. in 1972, first as a franchise dealer and then a year later, as a Supervisor.
Sometime in 1978, Avon Cosmetics, Inc. (Avon), herein petitioner, acquired and took over the management and operations
of Beautifont, Inc. Nonetheless, respondent Luna continued working for said successor company. Aside from her work as a
supervisor, respondent Luna also acted as a make-up artist of petitioner Avon’s Theatrical Promotion’s Group, for which she
received a per diem for each theatrical performance.
On 5 November 1985, petitioner Avon and respondent Luna entered into an agreement, entitled Supervisor’s Agreement
which later on made respondent Luna part of the independent sales force of petitioner Avon.
Paragraph 5 and 6 of the Supervisor’s Agreement states: The Company and the Supervisor mutually agree:
5) That the Supervisor shall sell or offer to sell, display or promote only and exclusively products sold by the Company.
(Exclusivity Clause)
6) Either party may terminate this agreement at will, with or without cause, at any time upon notice to the other.
(Termination Clause)
In 1988, Luna signed up as a Group Franchise Director of Sandré Phil. Inc. concurrent with being a Group Supervisor of
Avon. As a Group Franchise Director, Luna began selling/promoting Sandre products to other Avon employees and friends.
Avon then notified Luna of the termination or cancellation of her Supervisor’s Agreement wih Avon for the following
reasons: 1.) Luna signed up as Group Franchise Director of Sandré Phil. Inc (SPI); 2) She sold and promoted SPI products and
even to several employees of Avon; 3.)Luna have written letters to other members of Avon salesforce inducing them to
violate their own contracts with Avon.
Aggrieved, Luna filed a complaint for damages. RTC and CA rendered their decision in her favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not paragraph 5 and 6 of the Supervisor’s Agreement is void for being contrary to law and public policy;
HELD: The "exclusivity clause" as embodied in paragraph 5 of the Supervisor’s Agreement is valid and not against public
policy.Such prohibition is neither directed to eliminate the competition like SandréPhils., Inc. nor foreclose new entrants to
the market. In its Memorandum, it admits that the reason for such exclusion is to safeguard the network that it has
cultivated through the years. Admittedly, both companies employ the direct selling method in order to peddle their
products. By direct selling, petitioner Avon and Sandré, the manufacturer, forego the use of a middleman in selling their
products, thus, controlling the price by which they are to be sold. The limitation does not affect the public at all. It is only a
means by which petitioner Avon is able to protect its investment.
The termination clause of the Supervisor’s Agreement clearly provides for two ways of terminating and/or canceling the
contract. One mode does not exclude the other. The contract provided that it can be terminated or cancelled for cause, it
also stated that it can be terminated without cause, both at any time and after written notice. Thus, whether or not the
termination or cancellation of the Supervisor’s Agreement was "for cause," is immaterial. The only requirement is that of
notice to the other party. When petitioner Avon chose to terminate the contract, for cause, respondent Luna was duly
notified thereof.
Datu Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines (GR No. 196271, February 28, 2012)
FACTS:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for
Other Purposes” was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.
The history of ARMM instituted first by the provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the
creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras specfically Sections 15 to 22 wherein
the congress promulgated the Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 which is the organic act that established the ARMM
and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials.Following aforementioned arcticle is
the RA No. 9054 which amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to
November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected.
In these consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition and madamus filed directly with the Supreme Court,
the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
2.Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
1.YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections,
the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution,
all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections,
starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the elections
to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, the Supreme Court find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not
include the regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which refers to the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement.
Before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become law or statute they must pass through three
readings on separate days, with the EXCEPTION of when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s
certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the
bill on separate days.The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. Following the Tolentino ruling, the Supreme Court held the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
Meridian Assurance Corporation vs. Dayrit (GR No. L- 59154 April 3, 1990)
*CHECK THE BOOK PAGE 245
JUST COPY

Soccoro Ramirez vs. Hon. Court of Appeals (GR No. 93833 Sept. 25, 1995)
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that the
private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,
“contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay
City for violation of RA 4200, entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations
of Private Communication, and Other Purposes.” Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense particularly a violation
of RA 4200. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner. From the trial court’s Order,
the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the
case to the CA. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s order
null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.
Ruling: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an
injustice. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The
law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent
CA correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA 4200. The
unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent
court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes
no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Stat Con Principle: Legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of the statute. Legal Maxims: Verba Legis (the statute must be interpreted literally if the language of
the statute is plain and free from ambiguity)
Globe Mackay Cable vs. NLRC (GR No. 82511 March 3, 1992)
Facts:
Private Respondent, "Imelda Salazar" was employed as general systems analyst of Globe-Mackay Cable and
Radio Corp. (GMRC) While Delfin Saldivar, her close friend, was employed as technical operations' support
manager in May 1982.
Petitioner GMRC investigated Saldivar's activities due to the reports indicating that the company equipment and
spare parts were in custody of Saldivar. The internal audit report also indicated that Saldivar entered into a
partnership with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Eledon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier
often recommended by Saldivar to the petitioner. It also appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation
that Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions with conflict of interest
with the company. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao
and Saldivar, and that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the missing air conditioner but she
failed to inform her employer.
The Company placed Salazar under 1 month preventive suspension, allowing her 30 days within which to explain
her side. However, Salazar instead filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which was later
modified to illegal dismissal.
The Labor arbiter ordered the company to reinstate Salazar to her former and equivalent position and to pay her
full back wages and benefits, plus moral damages. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the
labor arbiter's decision but limited back wages for only two years and deleted the award of moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or Not the action of dismissal would constitute a violation of Art. 279 of the Labor Code, which protects
the security of tenure of an employee.
Ruling:
Positive. The Court did not agree on the petitioner's action of suspension and eventual dismissal of Salazar due
to lack of evidence to show that Salazar was involved with the malicious activities of Saldivar.
The wordings of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement and full back wages." Under the principle of Statutory Construction, if a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. The plain meaning rule or VerbaLegis derived from the maxim "Speech is the index of
intention" should be applied in this case.
Since there is no evidence to show an authorized or legal dismissal, and GMRC only relied to an internal audit
findings, Salazar, according to the Labor Code, is entitled to reinstatement and full back wages allowed by the
Court
Felicito Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary DOJ (GR No. 109445)
Facts:
Felicito Basbacio, with his son in law Wilfredo Balderrama, was convicted of the crome of murder and of two
counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of his wife and son, due to an
apparent land dispute between the Boyon's and the petitioner.
Petitioner appealed the matter and he was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
between him and his son in law. His mere presence was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Petitioner then filed a claim under RA 7309 section 3(a) which provides for the payment of compensation to any
person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal. However, his claim was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, there was
nevertheless bad blood between him and the Boyons. There was a basis in finding that he was "probably guilty."
Issue:
Whether or Not the provision of RA 7309 Section 3(a) using the term "unjustly accused" applies to the
petitioner?
Ruling:
No. Section 3(a) requires that the claimant be unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned. Through his
conviction was reversed, it is not a proof that his previous conviction was unjust. Section 3(a) does not refer
solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but the accused must have
been also unjustly accused.
There is the presence of "probable guilt" which does not make the petitioner unjustly accused because there is a
reason to believe that he was a part of the crime. The court explained that the term "unjustly convicted or
accused" has something to do with the manner of conviction, that there is malice in the judgment rendered,
that from the start of the prosecution, it must have been wrongful.
An accusation based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and unjust judgment, but only an erroneous
one correctable by appeal.
Elerna Salenillas vs. Hon. Court of Appeals et. al (GR No. 78687 January 31, 1989)
Facts:
Spouses Florencia and Miguel Enciso were grantees of free patent, they sold their property in favor of their
daughter Elena Salenillas and her husband Bernardino Salenillas though an absolute Deed of Sale
The Salenillas spouses mortgaged the property with the PNB
Failure to pay their loan, PNB foreclosed the property and sold at a public auction pursuant to RA No. 3135
where William Guerra won as highest bidder
A writ of possession was later issued but the Salenillas spouses refused to vacate and surrender the property
Petitioners contest that their right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed
Paris vs. Averia (GR No. L-22526, November 29, 1966)
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Sec. 119 of the Public
Land Act
Whether or not the right to repurchase had already prescribed.
Ruling:
Petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act
Reason behind the law is “to give the homestead/patentee every opportunity to work on the land and improve
their economic life”
Elena Salenillas is the daughter of the grantees… Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos Right to
repurchase has not yet prescribed under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act
Sps. Eduardo and ann agustin, petitioners, vs. Hon. Court of appeals and Labrador development
corporation, respondents G.R. No. 84751 [June 6, 1990]
Facts:
Labrador Development Corporation (LADECO), a subdivision developer, agreed to sell a parcel of land covered
under TCT No. 277209 to Spouses Agustin on a package deal together with a residential house yet to
be constructed thereon for the sum of P202, 980.00. Aside from payment of equity and for the down payment
and balance, P160,000.00 was to be funded through a Pag-Ibig Fund loan to be applied by the spouses. They
further agreed that failure to comply with any or all of the above stipulations shall ipso facto cancel the contract
and if title has been transferred already, such shall revert to LADECO.
A deed of sale over the lot was executed in favor of spouses Agustin. The latter applied for a P160,000.00
housing loan with the First Summa Savings and Mortgage Bank as an accredited financing institution. The bank
required them to fulfill some conditions needed for the approval of the loan amount. While LADECO sought to
enforce the contractual stipulations, the spouses sought time to buy the property. The latter failed to make
payment thus the private respondent demanded for reconveyance through institution of a civil case for
reconveyance and damages. The trial court ruled in favor of LADECO. On appeal, the decision was affirmed by
the respondent court but with the deletion of the award of exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a vaild rescission in the present case, which would justify the action for
reconveyance.
Ruling:
Petitioners were already barred from questioning the validity of the cancellation of the contract to sell by their
acquiescence thereto. Their acceptance and encashment of the checks representing the total amount paid by
them to private respondent as equity, coupled by their failure to object or file an action, despite due notice, to
question the validity of the extrajudicial cancellation of said contract and to ask for specific performance for
more than one year, clearly show that they assented to the same.
Furthermore, after receiving the check refunding their equity payment incident to the reconveyance desired by
private respondents, petitioners, disregarding the original agreement of the parties, offered to
purchase anew the property in question to which private respondent agreed. This novatory agreement,
however, was not consummated as petitioners again failed to raise and pay the purchase price despite two 30-
day extensions. They never at that juncture questioned the propriety of the rescission and reconveyance desired
by private respondent. Obviously, extrajudicial rescission produces legal effects where the other party does not
oppose it.The non-fulfillment by petitioners of their obligation to pay, which is a suspensive condition to the
obligation of private respondent to sell and deliver the house and lot, rendered the contract to sell and the
subsequent contract executed pursuant thereto ineffective and without force and effect.
Fiestan vs. CA (GR No 81552 May 28, 1990)
FACTS:
Petitioners spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada were the owners of a parcel of land wituated in Ilocos
Sur which they mortgaged to the DBP as security for their P22,400.00 loan. For failure of petitioners to pay their
mortgage indebtedness, the lot was acquired by the DBP as the highest bidder at a public auction sale after it
was extrajudicially foreclosed by the DBP. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued by the Provincial Sheriff
on the same day and the same was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. Earlier, petitioners executed
a Deed of Sale in favor of DBP which was likewise registered. Upon failure of petitioners to redeem the property
within the one-year period, petitioners’ TCT lot was cancelled by the Register of Deeds and in lieu thereof, it was
issued to the DBP upon presentation of a duly executed affidavit of consolidation of ownership. The DBP sold the
lot to Francisco and the same was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. Subsequently, the DBP’s title
over the lot was cancelled and in lieu thereof, the TCT was issued to Francisco Peria.
Francisco Peria secured a tax declaration for said lot and accordingly paid the taxes due thereon. He thereafter
mortgaged to the PNB as security for his loan of P15,000.00 as required by the bank to increase his original loan
since petitioners were still in possession of the lot, the Provincial Sheriff ordered them to vacate the premises.
On the other hand, petitioners filed on August 23, 1982 a complaint for annulment of sale, mortgage and
cancellation of transfer certificates of title against the DBP, PNB, Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds
before the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale is null and void by virtue of lack of a valid levy.
Ruling:
No. The formalities of a levy, as an essential requisite of a valid execution sale under Section 15 of Rule 39 and a
valid attachment lien under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, are not basic requirements before an extrajudicially
foreclosed property be sold at public auction. The case at bar, as the facts disclose, involves an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. In extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the property sought to be foreclosed need not be
identified or set apart by the sheriff from the whole mass of property of the mortgagor for the purpose of
satisfying the mortgage indebtedness. For, the essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a
property has been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for
the payment or fulfillment of the obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default of
payment. By virtue of the special power inserted or attached to the mortgage contract, the mortgagor has
authorized the mortgagee-¬creditor or any other person authorized to act for him to sell said property in
accordance with the formalities required under Act No. 3135, as amended. The Court finds that the formalities
prescribed under Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Act No. 3135, as amended, were substantially complied with in the
instant case.
Bagatsing vs. Ramires (GR No. 41636 December 17, 1976)
FACTS:
In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public markets and
prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof. The Federation of Manila
Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance, alleging among others the noncompliance to the
publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance
void. Thus, the present petition.
ISSUE:
1. What law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the Revised City Charter, which requires
publication of the
ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code, which only demands
publication after
approval?
2. Is the ordinance valid?
RULING:
1. The Local Tax Code prevails. There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a
special act since it relates only to the City of Manila whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because
it applies universally to all local governments. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a
general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a
situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in
particular. The Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the publication of “ordinance” in general,
while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the publication of “ordinance levying or imposing taxes
fees or other charges” in particular.
2. The ordinance is valid.

Chua vs. Civil Service Commission (GR No. 88979 February 7, 1992)
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government
service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are
those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the
benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,
however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month
basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing
that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the
enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or
regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.
Ruling:
YES. Petition was granted.
Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant,

like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are extended
benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683
expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But
specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can
be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine
of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed”.
[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s application for
early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had
filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said
law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government
not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4)
successive governmental projects.
Philippine British Assurance Co, Inc. vs. IAC (GR No. l-72005, May 29, 1987)
FACTS:
[P]rivate respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against
Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit,
private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the
posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru
petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent
Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent
Court. The respondent Court granted the petition of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner herein, raised
the issue to the Supreme Court. A temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the
order complaint of was issued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the counterbond of
the petitioner.
Ruling:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs against petitioner.
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general
words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule
requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the
other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction
in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the
law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find
it and without regard to consequences.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned
unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment pending
appeal.
Juanito Pilar vs. COMELEC (GR No. 115245 July 11, 1995)
FACTS:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of
candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement
of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to
the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition
for certiorari was subsequently filed to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures
because he was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing.
Petitioner posits that “it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and
should have either won or lost” under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized
National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other
Purposes”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their candidacy for
election.
Ruling:
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate
who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth paragraph of
Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that “[t]he filing or
withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a
candidate may have incurred.” Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the
administrative fine.
Cecilio de Villa vs. CA (GR No. 87416, April 8, 1991)
FACTS:
[P]etitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
(Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Information
on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no
offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and
void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency). A
petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs against the petitioner. A motion for
reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals,
thus elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
(1) The Regional Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case; and,
(2) The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, is covered by the
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
RULING:
YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
For the first issue: The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned, as
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide. The information under consideration
specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is
controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in
court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
For the second issue: Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the
law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not
make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British
Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that
the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The
discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.
Colgate-Palmolive Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro Jimenez (GR No. L-14787 January 28, 1961)
FACTS:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract,
sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as
stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the
petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for
the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as
amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three
applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of the Central Bank, refused to pass
in audit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory
that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank,
maintaining that the term “stabilizer and flavors” mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to
those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the
case to the Supreme Court thru the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and
flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601).
Ruling:
YES. The decision under review was reversed.
General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and flavors” as used in the
law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is
based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that “general terms may be restricted by specific
words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the
statute’s object and purpose.” The rule, however, is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term,
all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the case at bar, it
is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or
food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same
classification.
The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when
used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as
an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of
construction.
Dra. Brigada Buenaseda et al vs. Secretary Juan Flavior et al (GR No. 106719 September 21, 1993)
FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was
issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by
the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor
General, in his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension
and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend
a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and]
said conditions have not been met in the instant case”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in
offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed
against said officials and employees.
Ruling:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a public official
or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the
word “suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine,
censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other
words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials
and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive
suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the
administrative charges.
Manolo Fule vs. Honorable Court of Appeals (GR No. L-79094 June 22, 1988)
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered
into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. At the hearing
of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17,
1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum
confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals
erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold
fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on
August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedures:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his
counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]
Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the
Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling:
YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and
REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of
evidence.
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and
phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs.
Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory character and
means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-
35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or
procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).

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A.M. No.

RTJ -04-1868, August 13, 2004

*CHECK THE BOOK PAGE 7-9

FACTS, ISSUES AND RULING (UNG HELD PALITAN MO NG RULING)

/No, it does not.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

*CHECK THE BOOK PAGE 11-12

FACTS, ISSUES AND RULING (UNG HELD PALITAN MO NG RULING)

/Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O./ on the grounds that.

It violates the equal protection clause

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature

/In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

The Court agree.

There was grave abuse of discretion.

1. /W/N Family Code should be applied retroactively

W/N Adrian Bernabe, an illegitimate son, has a right to be recognized

1. / NO. FC should not be applied retroactively

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

Whether or not petitioner Nestle’s application for exemptions should be granted.

Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive Issuances.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the Ombudsman denied

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

*CHECK THE BOOK PAGE 47-48

FACTS, ISSUES AND RULING (UNG HELD PALITAN MO NG RULING)

*CHECK THE BOOK PAGE 46-47

FACTS, ISSUES AND RULING (UNG HELD PALITAN MO NG RULING)

*CHECK THE BOOK PAGE 50-52

FACTS, ISSUES AND RULING (UNG HELD PALITAN MO NG RULING)

*CHECK THE BOOK PAGE 87-89

FACTS, ISSUES AND RULING (UNG HELD PALITAN MO NG RULING)

WON RA 9257 is constitutional.

The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the

Issue: WON due process was violated.

RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.

1.Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

1.YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

*CHECK THE BOOK PAGE 245

FACTS, ISSUES AND RULING (UNG HELD PALITAN MO NG RULING)

The Salenillas spouses mortgaged the property with the PNB

Whether or not the right to repurchase had already prescribed.

2. The ordinance is valid.

YES. Petition was granted.

Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant,

NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

YES. The decision under review was reversed.

YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.

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