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A SPY IN ALBANIA:

THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN ALBANIA AND MORTON FREDERIC EDEN

Lampros Psomas

University of Winchester

lambrospsomas@yahoo.co.uk

Lampros.Psomas@unimail.winchester.ac.uk

https://winchesteruni.academia.edu/LamprosPsomas

Periohi Rendi

20007 Arhaia Korinthos

Greece

In 1921 Albania one major game was afoot: that of the first political elections, which took

place between February and April 1921. For Albanian officials it was absolutely necessary to

initiate an electoral process before the long anticipated international recognition of the

independence and integrity of Albania and the final delimitation of the Albanian-Greek

frontier. The main reason was the territorial disputes of Albania with Greece. The

participation of the inhabitants of the disputed Southern Albania (Gjirokastër and Korçë

regions) in the elections was to prove the Albanian national sentiment of the inhabitants.

Conversely, abstention from voting could be disastrous for the Albanian state, as it could

prove that the inhabitants of the region desired union with Greece. The then British envoy in

Albania Harry Eyres informed his government that the Muslims of the Korçë region

participated in the process, while their Christian compatriots mostly abstained from voting1.

However, he maintained that all the inhabitants of Gjirokastër region, across religion, took

part in the electoral process normally. To that the Foreign Office (FO) replied that a certain

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Morton Frederic Eden, who was known to London as Eyres’ informer, was probably a victim

of propaganda. Eyres, therefore, should be more careful with the information coming from

that source. Who was Morton Frederick Eden? What was he doing in Albania? Why did the

FO not seem to trust his information? These are the questions with which this article is

concerned.

In order to reply to these questions, this essay will firstly review the issue of Southern

Albania briefly and will analyse the importance of the first political elections in the area for

both Albania and Greece. It will then present the British involvement in the Albanian affairs,

especially those connected with the South of the country, and the role of the Anglo-Persian

Oil Company. Through the misleading information that reached Britain and the League of

Nations on the issue of the elections and the deportation of the Greek-speaking bishop Jacob

of Durrës, the essay, based on unpublished archival material, will reveal the role of Morton

Frederic Eden as an intelligence agent. Finally, this article will attempt to investigate his

motives setting also some questions for further examination.

THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN ALBANIA (NORTHERN EPIRUS) AND THE

BRITISH INVOLVEMENT

The issue of Southern Albania in the first quarter of the last century was a rather complex

one. The brief analysis that follows examines only the issues that concern the particular

interests of this article. Thus, Greece claimed that the regions of Korçë and Gjirokastër in

what is today known as Southern Albania – Northern Epirus for the Greeks – should not be

included in Albania, as they were areas, so the Greeks argued, inhabited by a Greek majority.

The truth is that a majority of Orthodox Christians inhabiting the regions in question

maintained pro-Greek sympathies, unwilling to be included in a predominantly Muslim

Albania. These sympathisers, nonetheless, were to be found mostly in the Gjirokastër region

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(west of the Vjosë River), where the Orthodox Christians formed a majority of the population

and where the Greek-speaking minority was also located. The majority of the inhabitants of

Korçë region (east of the Vjosë River), on the other hand, was Muslim – particularly

belonging to the Bektashi sect, which had championed Albanian nationalism; Korçë was also

the stronghold of a rather few, at the time, Orthodox Christian Albanian nationalists2.

In the troubled Balkans of the beginning of the 20th century, the notorious ‘tinderbox

of Europe’, such issues were thorny. Each side attempted to push forward with its claims in a

decisive, even violent, manner. Greece occupied these areas from the Ottoman Empire during

Balkan War I (1912-1913), but the Great Powers asked their troops to be withdrawn, upon

Italy’s special demand (Protocol of Florence, 1913). The inhabitants, who did not wish to be

included in the Albanian state, revolted, following the Greek troops’ withdrawal and the new

sovereign of the country, the 38-year-old German prince William of Wied (1876-1945)3,

granted autonomy to the Southern regions of Gjirokastër and Korçë (Protocol of Corfu,

1914). During World War I (1914-1918) and up to 1915 the Greeks had reasons to believe

that the area would be annexed by them, as they bargained with the Entente powers their

participation in the War. Greece’s dubious attitude, however, and the collapse of Serbia,

which was followed by the occupation of Northern and Central Albania by the Austro-

Hungarians, forced the Entente Powers to intervene in the Balkans. Italian troops landed in

the port of Vlorë, Southern Albania, and occupied the Greek-claimed Gjirokastër, whereas

French troops landed in Thessaloniki, Greece, and marched as far as Korçë in the disputed

Albanian territory (1916)4.

In the aftermath of World War I the Entente troops abandoned Southern Albania,

either forcefully (Italians) or peacefully (French) (1920). The Greeks prepared to replace the

Entente troops, as their belated entrance in the War on the part of the Entente Powers (1917-

1918) had placed them with the victors’ side at the Peace Conference of Paris. Greece’s

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greatest ally at the time, Britain, strongly advised the Greeks and Prime Minister Eleftherios

Venizelos, probably Britain’s closest friend in the Balkans, not to occupy the regions of

Korçë and Gjirokastër, until a final settlement concerning their fate was to be arranged.

Venizelos agreed. At exactly that point Greece had ultimately lost the case. On 17 December

1920, a month after Venizelos’ devastating electoral defeat (1 November 1920), Albania

entered the League of Nations with the support of Robert Cecil – essentially Britain – and by

the end of the year Britain was the first country to send an envoy in semi-official capacity:

Harry Eyres. We shall return to Cecil and Eyres below. It should be stated here, however, that

Eyres’ arrival was celebrated in Albania, as the presence of a British diplomat in their country

meant, for them, that the time of the official recognition of their country’s independence and

integrity was close.

With Eyres in Albanian soil, with Greek troops away from their Southern regions and

engaged in a major struggle against the Turks in Asia Minor (Greko-Turkish War 1919-

1922), the Albanians believed that the electoral process constituted an opportunity to prove

the Albanian character of the disputed areas. The very participation of the Southerners in the

electoral process would sufficiently prove their will to belong to Albania. It was, therefore,

vital for Albanian officials to see the vast majority of the Orthodox Christian minority of the

South to vote normally and peacefully for Albanian parties and Albanian politicians.

Conversely, the abstention from voting would prove the Christians’ Greek national sentiment.

This is why the Greek government, through the substitute governor of the governorate of the

Greek Southern Epirus – as opposed to the Albanian Northern Epirus –, Kotzonanos, asked

those who favoured union with Greece to abstain from voting5. The response of the

inhabitants to these conflicting calls is an issue which will be further discussed below. It is

necessary to underline here that the whole disputed area finally constituted part of the

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country, when the independence and integrity of Albania was officially recognised by the

Conference of the Ambassadors at Paris on 9 November 19216.

It is now important to examine some issues that emanate from the above account.

Indeed, apart from Albania and Greece, which were the main parties concerned with the

question of Southern Albania, and France, which got involved briefly during World War I

and withdrew voluntarily, two more players appear to have participated: Italy and Britain.

The former’s interests in the area go back to the 18th century and are connected with the

‘Adriatic Question’ and Italy’s antagonism with Austria-Hungary. Italy did not want to see

any foreign naval power controlling either the east coast of the Otranto Straits or the east

coast of the Corfu Channel – between the Greek island of Corfu and the opposite port of

Sarandë7.

Britain was a new player in the area; its pre-World-War-I pro-Greek attitude was

radically changed in the aftermath of the Great War. During the Peace Conference of Paris

Britain, together with France, supported the Greek claims over the region in question, though

not decidedly. Thus, the refusal of Italy to accept these claims brought the negotiations to a

deadlock8. The British Premier, the liberal Sir David Lloyd-George, officially supported the

Greek claims against the Italian demands. However, when the French troops withdrew from

Korçë and called for the Greeks to replace them, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, the

conservative Earl George Nathaniel Curzon of Kedleston, opposed it9. Moreover, the

Albanians were aware of this change in British attitude. The Greek governor-general of

Epirus Achilles Kalevras informed the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs accordingly10. Later

the same year Albania was admitted to the League of Nations. One of the most instrumental

personalities that worked to this end was the influential British conservative politician and

diplomat Sir Robert Cecil, representative of the British dominion of South Africa to the

League and the man who sponsored Albania’s admission11. Cecil was a very close friend and

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parliamentary collaborator with Aubrey Herbert, a conservative MP who headed a group of

MPs supporting the Albanian cause. On 10 February 1921 the FO appointed a temporary

representative (consul without exequatus), Sir Harry Charles Augustus Eyres (1856-1944), at

Durrës. The 65-year-old Eyres was a diplomat of the old Victorian school who relied mostly

on his own judgement and initiative rather than the FO directives. He was called from

retirement, as he had served as interpreter and later consul-general at the British embassy in

Istanbul (1877-1882, 1896-1914) and had spent some time in Shkodër in 188212. Upon his

arrival Eyres made clear, according to the unequivocal instructions of his superiors at the FO,

that his appointment did not imply official recognition of Albania and did not reveal British

views on the issue of the Albanian borders13. However, Eyres’ arrival profoundly satisfied the

Albanian government. Eyres was the first foreign diplomat, representing a great power, that

set foot on Albanian soil – even in semi-official capacity. For Albanians this was part of a

sequence of events, manifesting a u-turn in British politics on Albania. Indeed, in April 1921

Curzon informed the new Italian ambassador in London baron Giacomo de Martino that

Britain was ready to co-operate with Italy on the issue of Albanian independence and

integrity in clearly demarcated borders. This was the first direct and official demonstration of

the change of Britain’s attitude on Albania14.

The reason behind this change has often been associated with Venizelos’ electoral

defeat in Greece and the return of the anti-British King Constantine I (1913-1917, 1920-

1922) in the country (November-December 1920). However, the change of the British

political approach on Albania had already started and was initially expressed with Curzon’s

opposition to the perspective of the occupation of Korçë by Greek troops, as shown above.

More recently Nicola Guy expressed the view that the purpose to balance the Italian influence

in Albania by reinforcing the Greeks had ceased to exist after the departure of the Italian

troops. An independent Albania would more effectively contribute to the balance of power in

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the Balkans and the Adriatic15. However, William Bland and Ian Price expressed the view

that petroleum was found in Albania by the Italians during their occupation of Southern

Albania and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, partly owned by the British state, with

connections to the government and with considerable influence in the British Parliament, was

interested in it16. This study agrees with the suggestions made by Bland and Price and it is

going to further support this views. The British concern about the oil fields in Albania

manifests a more direct British interest in the area, than mere diplomatic considerations

concerning the international balance of power. This British special interest did not escape

Greek attention at the time17. Indeed, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had initiated

negotiations with Albanian officials to gain concessions in 1920. The negotiations reached a

first provisional agreement in January 192118. The company made specific financial offers to

the Albanian government and reached another more specific agreement through its affiliate

D’Arcy Exploration Company on 25 March 1921. The agreement would allow monopoly for

fifty years and the capital to be invested would reach £1.000.000 with a 20% profit for

Albania. Although the then Albanian government favoured the agreement, the newly formed

Albanian parliament kept postponing its ratification. Eyres informed his government

accordingly, assuring it that he was not directly involved, since this was an issue between a

private company and the Albanian State19. This was not true, however, as it appears from his

detailed reports on the matter, as well as the Italian accusations against him. Italy, the first

country that spotted oil fields in Albania, considered her interest in the case her prerogative

for political and financial reasons, but the right to pump oil had been denied to her. Eyres

was, therefore, accused for direct involvement, while Italian newspapers treated British

involvement in Albania as treason20. The delay of the ratification of the agreement by the

parliament allowed Italian and American companies to react and start competing with the

Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Eyres kept being involved in the case, proving the FO’s tactful

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interest. More specifically, when the company wanted to know which were the thoughts of

the Albanian government on the issue it made a relative request to the FO, which, in its turn,

asked from Eyres to collect the necessary information directly from the Albanian

government21. It is also worth noting that a man working for the interests of the Anglo-

Persian Oil Company in Albania was the Albanophile Major Julian Barnes, interested also in

other business activities such as tobacco. Barnes had worked on the Albanian issue during the

Paris Peace Conference together with another diplomat and Near-East-specialist Sir Harold

George Nicolson and for the delimitation of the Albanian frontiers in the summer of 1921,

together with Major Harold Temperley22. The issue of the delimitation of the Albanian

borders was strongly connected with the interests of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, for the

main oil concessions were located in Southern Albania, especially in the pro-Greek area west

of the Vjosë River and the mainly Greek port of Sarandë. Finally, in April 1921 the

representatives of the Anglo-Persian returned to England, being enthusiastic with the richness

of Albania in petroleum and minerals, as well as the agreement they had reached with the

Albanian government. Moreover,

‘Albania centred great hopes in the success of the Anglo-Persian, and that

British interest in the country might help to secure her international

position’23.

It is, therefore, clear that apart from Albania and Greece, as well as Italy with its special

interests in Albania, Britain too was directly involved. Robert Cecil effectively supported and

facilitated Albania’s admission to the League of Nations, while the British government tried

to help the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to gain petroleum concessions in Albania. As a

result, it was widely believed in Albania that Britain was her more honest and true ally. This

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encouraged Albanian initiatives in the South of the country in an effort to close the issue of

the Greek claims on the area. Pro-Albanian British were ready to provide help to this end.

THE FIRST ALBANIAN ELECTIONS AND BISHOP JACOB’S DEPORTATION

The participation of the inhabitants of Southern Albania in the first political elections was of

national significance, as it was explained above24. The Muslim inhabitants of the contested

area participated in the process unanimously. They belonged mostly to the Muslim Bektashi

sect, which had a pioneering role in the development of Albanian nationalism, the Albanian

awakening, as it is known in modern Albanian historiography25. The Orthodox Christian

population, however, in its vast majority abstained from voting; only very few Christians

from Korçë eventually took part in the process. In Gjirokastër region the people abstained

from voting as they were in close contact with Greece and followed the instructions of the

Greek authorities. This attitude caused the wrath of the Albanian authorities and the prefect

of Gjirokastër Kol Tromara, an Orthodox Christian Albanian nationalist, ex-emigrant to the

United States, who had previously been head of the Albanian nationalist ‘Vatra’ (Hearth)

Association in the USA and was later to become parliamentary deputy26. In Korçë Eyres

believed that the inhabitants abstained from voting, motivated and encouraged by bishop

Jacob of Durrës, stationed at Korçë at the time, who, in his turn, followed instructions from

Greece. The inhabitants of Korçë were also in favour of the ‘Manifesto’, initiated by the

mayor of the city Kostaq Kota, a native of Korçë and a notorious opportunist27, which

demanded the autonomy of Southern Albania in a cantonal form, following the example of

Switzerland28.

The above attitude of the Christians in the region, who constituted a majority of the

population in Gjirokastër and its surrounding area, as well as an important minority in Korçë

and its surrounding area, infuriated the Albanian authorities who reacted violently with

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threats, imprisonments etc.29 As Eyres’ temporary substitute, the Consul Sir Clifford Edward

Heathcote-Smith pointed out, the Orthodox of Southern Albania were considered by their

Muslim compatriots as ‘ “bad Albanians”, in the sense that they are opposed to the national

idea for an united Albania’30. In a major such reaction they started pressing the Greek-

speaking Orthodox bishop in Korçë Jacob of Durrës to abandon the country immediately

after the elections in April 1921. In September the notorious mayor of Korçë, who had

changed his allegiances and had turned to the government, issued a petition asking for the

bishop’s deportation. The petition, which had the support of the government, was to be

signed by the inhabitants of the city, many of whom did it unwillingly horrified by the

violence exercised against the supporters of the bishop31. Following the international

recognition of the independence and integrity of the Albanian state (November 1921) and

before the arrival of the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations under the

internationally acclaimed Finn geologist and politician Dr. Johannes J. Sederholm in Albania

(December 1921), the Albanian authorities, acting fast and without any warning, abducted

bishop Jacob in the early morning of 23 November 1921 and deported him, securing thus

minimum reaction from the Orthodox inhabitants of the city32. It is, however, certain that the

Orthodox Christians of Korçë demonstrated against the unforeseen and swift initiative of the

government immediately after realising what had happened33. The Albanian government

attempted to present a more favourable account of the events or to depreciate them by stating

that most of the Christians participated in the elections and that there were no important

reactions to Bishop Jacob’s deportation. Though the reports by locals that reached the League

of Nations refuted their assertions34, the Albanian government found some support from

Eyres and the newly arrived League of Nations Commissioner Dr. Sederholm.

Eyres was able to understand what was taking place in Korçë. Because of Jacob’s

presence, the ‘Manifesto’, the tension and the uncertainty in the area, he followed the

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developments there directly and carefully. However, he informed his government that in the

region of Gjirokastër the population participated in the electoral process normally35. As it was

shown here, Gjirokastër region, together with the town of Himarë, were strongly pro-Greek

and the Orthodox Christians abstained almost entirely from voting. The general picture that

Eyres provided was misleading: the inhabitants of Gjirokastër region, known for their

allegiance to Greece, participated in the electoral process, which meant, for Eyres, that their

supposed pro-Greek sympathies did not express the majority of the Orthodox Christians. In

the pro-Albanian city of Korçë a large part of the Christian population abstained from voting

‘owing to intrigues of Greek bishop and mayor’, as he cabled to the Earl of Kedleston36. The

abstention from voting, therefore, occurred only in Korçë and only due to the intrigues of

Jacob and Kota. Eyres, nonetheless, received a very revealing reply. Charles H. Tufton, FO

secretary and head of the Central Department, asked Eyres to be more careful, as his

informant on Gjirokastër region, Morton Frederic Eden, was probably a victim of Albanian

propaganda. It was known to the FO in London that Eyres’ information was misleading. The

FO was also aware of the source of such misleading information: Morton Frederic Eden37.

On the other hand, the League of Nations Commissioner in Albania Dr. Sederholm

was a man who travelled almost to every part of the country and came in contact with the

inhabitants. Based on the information he gathered on the spot, possibly from election

catalogues, he was able to point out that the Orthodox Christian inhabitants of Korçë

abstained from voting almost in their entirety (about 97%). He also accused the Albanian

government for the way it formed the electoral districts, in an effort to eliminate the Christian

representation in the newly formed Parliament and he came to the conclusion that the

Christians were ‘at the mercy of Mohammedan majorities’38. In the case of Jacob’s

deportation, however, he informed the Secretary General of the League of Nations, the

British aristocrat and diplomat Sir James Eric Drummond, wrongly. He presented the

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abduction of the bishop in very mild terms: an order to leave within three days, with a car

placed at his disposal. He also informed Drummond that there was no reaction ‘either hostile

or in his (Jacob’s) favour’. As it was shown above this was not true. Sederholm arrived in

Korçë about a month later on 1 January 1922. As a result, Sederholm depended on ‘a

foreigner in Albania’39, obviously considering him unbiased. There were very few foreigners

travelling around Albania at the time. The British journalist Joseph Swire, who visited

Albania a few years later (1923), mentioned as foreigners the members of the Commission of

Enquiry of the League of Nations, the British Minister at Durrës, the British advisor in the

Albanian Ministry of the Interior, Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Francis Stirling, and Eden40.

The latter was the only one reported by various sources as travelling around Albania at the

time, apart from Sederholm and probably a couple of Anglo-Persian Oil Company

representatives. The assumption, therefore, that it was again Eden the man who misinformed

Dr. Sederholm on the case of Jacob’s deportation should not be excluded. If this assumption

is true, Eden can be ‘guilty’ for misleading both, Eyres and Sederholm. His very presence and

his odd mysterious activity raise reasonable questions. Who was he? On whose behalf was he

acting? Why was he ready to misinform officials and influence their reports according to his

interests?

MORTON FREDERIC EDEN AND HIS ROLE IN ALBANIA

As it was noted above, in his report to Curzon, Eyres did not name his source. Tufton

however, in his reply, did not hesitate to reveal the source’s name and suggest, indirectly

admonishing, Eyres to be more cautious. This proved that the FO was very well informed on

Albania even through alternative sources. Apart from intelligence reports on Albanian affairs

coming from agents in Serbia and Greece, the FO was also well informed about Eden’s

activities. Thus, on 25 May 1921, the Swiss ambassador in London informed the FO that a

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British subject, ‘Mr. Morton Frederic Eden’, spent some time in the Chateau Märchlingen in

Bern canton, where he had ‘a pro-Albanian activity’. The Swiss diplomat, in his turn, was

instructed to ask the FO whether Eden was acting in (semi-)official capacity or not41. Before

replying that Eden was acting in his own individual interests42, the FO asked to be more

profoundly informed on Eden by Major Harold William Vazeille Temperley. Born in 1879 in

Cambridge, Harold Temperley was a historian profoundly interested in British and European

foreign policy and had extensively travelled to Austria-Hungary and the Balkans prior to

World War I. During the Great War Temperley worked at the War Office preparing reports

on the background of the Balkan territorial disputes. He repeatedly expressed his sympathy

and support for the emancipation of the peoples of both the Austro-Hungarian and the

Ottoman Empire, showing special interest for Serbia, on the history of which he published a

book in 1917. In 1918 he was in Thessaloniki, Greece, and later in Serbia as acting attaché at

the British Embassy. Between 1918 and 1920 he travelled to the area repeatedly, as member

of a mission for Montenegro, where he co-operated with Eden. Thus, in the aftermath of

World War I he supported the Yugoslav and Albanian causes against Italian pretentions,

while serving as an adviser to the Paris Peace Conference British delegation in 1919. A

month after the events described here, in July 1921, he was a member of the British

delegation for the demarcation of the Albanian frontiers, together with the aforementioned

Major Barnes, trying to balance between the British promises to Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia

during World War I and his will to support Albania. He was, therefore, a man deeply

involved with the Balkans – especially Serbia and Albania – interested in not only the past of

the region as an historian, but also its present and future. It is true that ‘he retained a

fascination with the “rejuvenating” qualities of the “Near East” for the rest of his life’43.

Evidently, Temperley was a rare specialist on the area.

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Temperley presented a brief report revealing Eden’s role, whom he had personally

known from his service in Montenegro. Morton Frederic Eden (1865-1948) was a member of

the British Adriatic Mission sent in Albania in 1915 in an effort to organise the British aid to

Serbia on the spot. As a member of the Adriatic Mission, Eden was employed by the War

Office. This is why another member of the Mission the notable pro-Albanian British MP

Colonel Aubrey Nigel Henry Molyneux Herbert (1880-1923) often referred to Eden in his

diaries as his friend and co-operative44. However, according to Temperley, Eden was also

‘employed as a civilian for intelligence report’ by the FO, initially in Korçë (1916 – 1919)

and then in Shkodër (1919 – 1920). From Aubrey Herbert we know that Eden worked in

Shkodër as secretary to the head of the British Military Mission to Albania and Montenegro

Brigadier-General George Fraser Phillips (1863-1921), where he collaborated with

Temperley. Phillips was a member of the Anglo-Albanian Association and had served as

commander of the international military mission in Shkodër prior to World War I (1913-

1914)45. Temperley reported that Eden had ceased to work for the FO since March 1920. It

was then that the British War Office withdrew its Military Mission and Eden departed from

Shkodër together with General Phillips and Temperley46. Informed about the communication

between Eden and Eyres – probably even indicating the recent misleading information the

latter sent to the FO on the Albanian elections – Temperley underlined that ‘Mr. Eyres has

recently reported him (Eden) travelling in Albania, where he appears to have shut his eyes to

anything he did not want to see’47. In Temperley’s report, Eden appears as a biased observer,

deliberately veiling facts. It is possible that when Tufton warned Eyres that Eden was

probably a victim of Albanian propaganda, what he really did was that he informed Eyres that

he himself was a victim of Eden’s propaganda and that the FO was aware of it.

Eden’s pro-Albanian bias was expressed even prior to the events described here. In

the Public Record Office (PRO) at Kew Gardens there is an unsigned ‘secret report’ on

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Albania dated 4 April 1919 from Shkodër, Northern Albania, and entitled ‘Present attitude of

the Orthodox Population of Southern Albania’. The report is concerned with the worries of

the inhabitants of Southern Albania in the aftermath of World War I, especially of those who

followed the Orthodox Christian rite48. The report started by stating that Orthodox Albanians,

together with their Muslim compatriots, disliked Italian protectionism49. It went on by

claiming that the solution of the partition of Albania between its neighbours (Greece and

Serbia) was not a realistic solution after World War I, since nationalism had grown

immensely among Albanians during the war. The only viable solution would be the formation

of a strong, independent and territorially extensive Albania. The report concluded that Britain

could intervene to this end and that locals were ready to welcome such an involvement50. The

report included information neither on the Greek claims nor on the inhabitants’ response to

them. It also encouraged a British intervention in favour of Albania, indirectly suggesting

thus the abandonment of Britain’s pro-Greek attitude.

The author of this report was clearly a pro-Albanian English. The date on, and the

place from, which the document was made (Shkodër, 4 April 1919) conveniently match the

information provided by Temperley. Although Shkodër is a northern Albanian city, the report

concerns the south of the country, indicating that its author had been there quite recently.

According to Temperley, Eden was ‘a civilian employed for intelligence report’ in Korçë,

Southern Albania, between 1916 and 1919 and in Shkodër from 1919 to March 1920. It can

be assumed, therefore, that Eden was the author of the above pro-Albanian intelligence report

and that it summed up his thoughts on Southern Albania in which he worked since 1916.

Aubrey Herbert probably had this pro-Albanian report in mind when he asked the Assistant

Under-Secretary of State and head of the political section of the British Delegation at the

Paris Peace Conference Sir Eyre Alexander Barby Wichart Crowe (1864-1925) to adopt a

more pro-Albanian attitude in the Conference51. At the same time, just before the beginning

15
of April 1919, he moved to the North and worked in Shkodër until March 1920, a year later.

Eden then moved to England but was back in Southern Albania before the end of 1920,

probably together with Eyres. He was present in the area during the events of 1921 described

here. Since he informed Eyres about the elections in Gjirokastër we can assume that he was

present there in March-April 1921. He then probably returned to Korçë, where in January

1922 he, possibly, misinformed Sederholm about Bishop Jacob’s deportation in November

1921. All this time between 1915, when he arrived in Albania with the British Adriatic

Mission, and 1921 he kept travelling back to England, as well as Switzerland, always

supporting the Albanian cause52. The image depicted here presents an individual with strong

pro-Albanian sympathies and with particular interest in Southern Albania. Even if the

assumptions made here – that Eden was the foreign eye witness who misinformed Sederholm

on bishop Jacob’s deportation and that he was the author of the 1919 secret report – are not

true, the image, based on Eden’s affirmed attitude and the documents by Tufton, Temperley

and the Swiss ambassador in London, remains the same: Eden was an ardent pro-Albanian,

who preferred to work on the spot and tried to push his country to a more consistent pro-

Albanian stance. In order to achieve this goal he did not hesitate to misinform and mislead his

country’s officials. It should also be noted that he did not abandon his role as ‘a civilian

employed for intelligence report’, even when he ceased to work for the FO. He kept showing

particular interest in Southern Albania, reporting to Eyres – probably even Sederholm –

though unofficially.

When Eden wrote his intelligence report of April 1919, he was already a member of

the Anglo-Albanian Association. Through this report, therefore, he not only expressed his

personal views, but also served the purposes of the Association. In 1920, when he ceased to

work for the FO, he published a booklet in London entitled Albania: Its Discontents and their

Origin, in which he further analysed his views expressed in the 1919 intelligence report. In

16
this booklet his profound knowledge of events and realities of Southern Albania is clearly

manifested, together with his views on Albanian dissatisfaction towards Italy and anticipation

of British – or American – involvement. He also accused Greece for trying to Hellenise the

Orthodox Albanians of the South and he repeated his view that the perspective of partition of

Albania was something achievable immediately after the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), when the

Balkan armies had the upper hand, but definitely unattainable in the aftermath of World War

I, when Albanian nationalism had effectively grown. In the very last sentence of his booklet,

Eden warned that if Albanians were disappointed, they would easily turn to other powers,

namely Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union53. Additionally, in an analysis of his on the Orthodox

population of Southern Albania, he categorised Christians into ‘three classes, the genuine

pro-Greeks, the indifferent and the Albanian Nationalists’54. This categorisation is also to be

found in the reports that Heathcote-Smith sent to the FO in 192155. It is possible that

Heathcote-Smith’s views were again influenced by Eden, as a man who studied the problems

‘impartially on the spot’56. This view was later adopted by Eyres too57. Finally, Eden repeated

his views and turned directly against Albania’s neighbours – Greeks and Serbs – in another

shorter booklet he published in 192158.

Since Eden’s pro-Albanian attitude reached the point of shutting his eyes ‘to anything

he did not want to see’, according to Temperley, it is interesting to examine the reason behind

Eden’s pro-Albanian attitude. Eden was a member of the Anglo-Albanian Association. The

Association was found by Aubrey Herbert, Mary Edith Durham and some others in 1913 to

support the interests of Albania at a time, when Greece, Montenegro and Serbia had occupied

much of its lands and the only supporters of the country were Austria-Hungary and Italy,

themselves with specific interests in the area. The Association intended to promote Albanian

interests and to influence British politics in favour of Albania. When Albania was territorially

defined in 1913 (Protocol of Florence) and her sovereign prince William arrived in Durrës in

17
1914, the Association considered its targets accomplished and was dissolute in 1914.

Nevertheless, during World War I the Albanian Question was once again raised and was to be

discussed in any post-war settlement. As a result, Aubrey Herbert re-established the Anglo-

Albanian Association on 28 February 1918, again with Mary Edith Durham’s help, and the

participation of Morton Frederic Eden, who had been in Albania since 1915, working closely

with Aubrey Herbert, and was now an ardent pro-Albanian59. In the following years Britain

took her turn in the Albanian issue, something that made the members of the Association

genuinely believe that their country was ‘the only disinterested promoter of the Albanian

case’. For them the Albanians depended a lot on the American and British ‘sense of fair

play’60. It is in this framework that Aubrey Herbert’s statement that Eden provided the War

Office with ‘impartial information’ has to be understood61. Sharing this mentality, Eden

proceeded by writing two booklets, as it was shown above, in order to promote the Albanian

cause in his country and America.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER QUESTIONS

The issue of the first political elections in Albania constituted a rather complicated problem.

Albania and Greece were particularly interested not in the results and the political powers that

were to emanate through the process, but in the very participation of the Orthodox Christian

inhabitants. Though Britain always appeared as an impartial and disinterested party, she too

was interested in the process and the problems of Southern Albania in particular, so that the

first diplomatic representative in Albania was Britain’s Harry Eyres. The Anglo-Persian Oil

Company had initiated negotiations with the Albanian government for the country’s

petroleum and it was particularly interested in seeing the Korçë and, more importantly,

Gjirokastër districts being secured for Albania.

18
This was the framework in which Eden –member of the Anglo-Albanian Association

and ardent pro-Albanian – acted. He worked officially for the War Office as member of the

British Adriatic Mission and was simultaneously employed by the FO as ‘a civilian for

intelligence report’. In this capacity he promoted Albanian interests and tried to influence in

favour of Albania not only the British public – through the publication of pro-Albanian

booklets, when he ceased to work for British authorities – but also the FO – through

‘impartial’ reports on Albania. He worked extensively for Southern Albania, though he did

not restrict his activities in the area. He did not quit his intelligence activities, even though he

ceased to work officially for the British government. He returned to Albania and showed

particular interest for Southern Albania passing misleading pro-Albanian information to

Ambassador Eyres and, probably, even Commissioner Sederholm.

Eden’s pro-Albanian, wholly partial, activity can be explained by his sympathies and

his membership to the Anglo-Albanian Association; only partly, however. His membership of

the Association cannot sufficiently explain even his very presence in Albania after March

1920, when he ceased to work for the British government. Moreover, it cannot explain his

frequent trips to Albania and back to England or even his presence in Switzerland and his

activities there, activities that attracted the attention of the Swiss authorities. This ceaseless

mobilisation and the continued trips required important financial resources, while his

activities in and outside Albania demanded important connections. The only reasonable

explanation is the he was sent to Albania to play his ‘impartial’ part – and obviously paid –

by the Anglo-Albanian Association, which probably considered its interests better served

through the on-the-spot presence of one of its members, in order to influence British decision

making.

Again, this answer does not seem to suffice. Why was Eden so profoundly interested

in Southern Albania? The Anglo-Albanian Association developed activities in Britain

19
concerning all the Albanian issues and the Question of Northern Albania affected Albanian-

Yugoslav relations and seemed of equal importance. Eden, however, seems to have restricted

his activities to the South of the country. Finally, did the Association possess the resources to

cover the expenses of an on-the-spot agent? And even if it did, why did Eyres, probably even

Sederholm, avoid revealing his identity to their superiors? These questions aim to shed light

on the other possibilities concerning Eden’s role, which should not be overlooked.

It is not unreasonable to think that maybe Eden was selected for the role of

misinforming and misleading the British government by a party more interested in,

particularly, Southern Albania than the British government itself: the Anglo-Persian Oil

Company. Despite its connections with the British government and the parliament, the

company needed to exclude the possibility that Southern Albania was to be annexed by

Greece. More specifically, the company needed to make sure that Gjirokastër region, where

the petroleum concessions were mainly to be found, was to constitute part of Albania. It was

not certain at all that the British government was to adopt such an attitude. Despite Britain’s

more favourable turn to Albania, there were influential British, who clearly held more pro-

Greek views, such as Lloyd-George, while specialists with important posts, such as Nicolson

or Temperley, believed, as late as September 1921 – i.e. some months after the Albanian

elections and the agreement of the Anglo-Persian with the Albanian government and few

months before the official recognition of Albania –, that some modifications to the 1913

borders of Albania were necessary and that at least Gjirokastër region should be granted to

Greece, owing to the Greek national sentiment of the inhabitants’ majority62. Since Eyres

adopted a pro-Albanian attitude and was himself involved in the negotiations of the Anglo-

Persian with the Albanians, it can be assumed that he shared Eden’s views; he maybe even

allowed himself to be misled by Eden... The Anglo-Persian had already sent a specialist on

Albania on the spot, Major Barnes, but Eden had already spent many years in Albania and

20
had established important connections with locals. Being a foreigner, he was to be considered

an impartial and disinterested observer, as the members of the Anglo-Albanian Association

believed and repeatedly exclaimed. As it was shown above, nevertheless, Eden was not

impartial or disinterested at all. As a personality, moreover, he possessed far more advantages

for the Anglo-Persian than Barnes, the latter often described as ‘quite straight, but stupid’ by

British officials, or an ‘idiot’ by Albanian ones63.

There is no sufficient evidence to prove that Eden worked for the Anglo-Persian Oil

Company – as his name does not appear in the relative FO documents – or any other

entrepreneur. Such a possibility, nonetheless, cannot be excluded, as part of the role of an

agent ‘employed for intelligence report’ is that his name should not appear in anything

written. Thus, the reasons behind Eden’s choice to continue working for intelligence report

after March 1920, his possible employers and their motives, remain obscure.

1
Eyres to the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in David Lloyd-George’s
government, Durrës, 22 April 1921. Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 141/669/10, C 9284/580/90.
2
For a relative study see Lampros Psomas, ‘The Religious and Ethnographic Synthesis of the Population of
Southern Albania (Northern Epirus) in the Beginning of the Twentieth Century’, Theologia, vol. 79:1, 2008, pp.
235-284, esp. pp. 261-272, available online at http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/press/theologia/material/2008
_1_9_Psomas.pdf Information on the population at the time were also included in the reports of the head of the
Commission of Enquiry Dr. Johannes J. Sederholm. See Sederholm to Sir Eric Drummond, ‘Report by the
Commission of Enquiry on its Work from 19 December 1922 to 1 February 1923: The Enquiry in Southern
Albania’, Geneva, 6 April 1923. FO 371/8531, C 7811/211/90. Part of this report was published by Basil Kondis
& Eleftheria Manda (ed.), The Greek Minority in Albania: A Documentary Record (Thessaloniki: Institute for
Balkan Studies, 1994), pp. 42 – 43.
3
For the prince William’s brief reign see Duncan Heaton-Armstrong, The Six Month Kingdom: Albania, 1914
(London: I. B. Tauris – Centre for Albanian Studies, 2005).
4
The most comprehensive account on the Question of Southern Albania in English remains Edith Pierpont
Stickney’s, Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International Affairs, 1914-1922 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1926), although it does not take into consideration the developments after 1922,
which however escape the scope of this study. See also Nicola Guy, The Birth of Albania: Ethnic Nationalism,
the Great Powers of World War I and the Emergence of the Albanian Independence (London: I. B. Tauris –
Centre for Albanian Studies, 2012), pp. 28-29, 53-55, 58-61, 74-76, 100-102, 104-106, 119-120, 134-140, 160-
161, 165-178, 183, 184-186, 187-189, 212-213, 222-223.
5
Kotzonanos to the Greek Foreign Office, Janina, 1 December 1920. Greek Foreign Office (hereafter GFO)
1921, A/5, no. 16167 in Basil Kondis, O Eλληνισμός της Βορείου Ηπείρου και οι ελληνοαλβανικές σχέσεις:
Έγγραφα από το ιστορικό αρχείο του Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών [The Hellenism of Northern Epirus and the Greek-
Albanian Relations: Documents from the Historical Archives of the GFO], vol. 2 (Athens: Estia, 1997), p. 290.
Bairas, Major-General, commander of the 8th Infantry Division, to the Greek War Ministry, Janina, 2 January
1921. GFO 1921, A/5, no. 5 in ibid., p. 293.
6
The Paris Ambassadorial Conference, of which Italy was, but Greece was not, a member stated that the borders
of the South of Albania should be those defined by the 1913 Protocol of Florence. See the decision made by the

21
Conference of the Ambassadors, Paris, 9 November 1921. FO 93/117/1-2. Guy, The Birth of Albania, pp. 235-
239.
7
The most comprehensive account on the Adriatic Question, prior to World War I, I have located is an old
booklet written in Greek: Ant. G. Kartalis, Η Ιταλική Πολιτική εν Αλβανία και τοις Βαλκανίοις [The Italian
Policy in Albania and the Balkans] (Athens, 1914). Italy’s particular interest over the Corfu Channel reached its
peak in 1923, when Italian troops temporarily occupied the island. James Barros, The Corfu Incident of 1923:
Mussolini and the League of Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965). For a brief account,
though mostly concentrating on financial issues, of Italy’s interest in Albania see Alessandro Roselli, Italy and
Albania: Financial Relations in the Fascist Period (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 1-12. See also Guy, The
Birth of Albania, 43-44, 155-156, 179-186.
8
Guy, The Birth of Albania, pp. 152-199.
9
Basil Kondis, Ευαίσθητες Ισορροπίες: Ελλάδα και Αλβανία στον 20ό αιώνα [Sensitive Balance: Greece and
Albania in the 20th Century] (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1994), pp. 125-144. See also Kondis, The Hellenism, vol.
2, p. 15.
10
Kalevras to the GFO, Janina, 22/24 May 1920. GFO 1920, A/5, no. 6797 in Kondis, The Hellenism, vol. 2, p.
198.
11
Bejtullah Destani and Jason Tomes (ed.), Albania’s Greatest Friend: Aubrey Herbert and the Making of
Modern Albania. Diaries and Papers, 1904-1923 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 321-326. See also Robert
Clegg Austin, Founding a Balkan State: Albania’s Experiment with Democracy, 1920-1925 (Toronto, ON:
University of Toronto Press, 2012), pp. 19-26. Guy, The Birth of Albania, pp. 222-230.
12
Robert Elsie, A Biographical Dictionary of Albanian History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), p. 136.
13
Curzon to Eyres, London, 10 February 1921. The FO to Eyres, London, 23 February 1921. Cypher to Eyres,
London, 15 March 1921. FO 369/1548, K 1961/1961/290. Eyres was officially appointed Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary at Durrës on 16 January 1922 and was welcomed with pomp and enthusiasm five
days later. Sydney Philip Perigal Waterlow, acting first secretary of the FO, to Eyres, London, 16 January 1922.
FO 371/7326, C 518/7/90. Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 30 January 1922. FO 371/7326, C 1884.
14
Guy, The Birth of Albania, pp. 230-232.
15
Ibid., p. 231.
16
William Bland and Ian Price, A Tangled Web: A History of Anglo-American Relations with Albania, 1912-
1955 (London: Albania Friendship Society of Southern California, 1986), p. 13.
17
Granville Leveson-Gower, 3rd Earl Granville, British Ambassador in Athens, Greece, to the FO, Athens, 22
September 1921. FO 371/5728, C 18506/580/90.
18
R. W. Ferrier, The History of British Petroleum Company: The Development Years, 1901-1932, vol. 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 548.
19
Minute by Major Temperley, London, 16 June 1921. FO 371/5737, C 12859/580/90. Financial Offer of the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company to the Albanian Government, London, 11 July 1921. FO 371/5737, C
14291/6478/90. Sir J. Milne C. Cheetham, British Minister in France, Paris, 20 July 1921. FO 371/5728, C
14969/580/90. Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 28 July 1921. FO 371/5737, C 15827/6478/90. See also Owen Pearson,
Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History. Vol. 1: Albania and King Zog. Independence, Republic and
Monarchy, 1908-1939 (London: I. B. Tauris – Centre for Albanian Studies, 2004), pp. 160-161.
20
Minute by Harold Nicolson, London, 5 September 1921. FO 371/5725, C 17740/580/90. Report by Nicolson
to the FO, London, 5 September 1921 and Waterlow to Eyres, London, 23 September 1921. FO 371/5729, C
17740/580/90. Department of Overseas Trade to the FO, London, 12 October 1921. FO 371/5737, C
19620/6478/90. Edward Caper Cure, Commercial Counsellor of the Department of Overseas Trade, to the FO,
London, 14 October 1921. FO 371/5737, C 19728/6478/90. Heathcote-Smith to Curzon, London, 23 November
1921. FO 371/5737, C 22707/22707/90.
21
The managing director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Tufton, London, 7 October 1921. Cypher to
Eyres, London, 14 October 1921. Tufton to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, London, 15 October 1921. FO
371/5728, C 19341/580/90.
22
Guy, The Birth of Albania, pp. 173-174. Austin, Founding a Balkan State, pp. 23-24, 170. Destani & Tomes,
Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 327.
23
Pearson, Albania in the Twentieth Century, vol. 1, p. 161.
24
For the first elections and political parties in Albania see the most recent Austin, Founding a Balkan State, pp.
9-17. Lampros Anast. Psomas, ‘Issues concerning the first political elections in Albania’, Theologia, vol. 80:1,
2009, pp. 217-233.
25
For the role of the Bektashis in Albanian nationalism see Nathalie Clayer, ‘Bektachisme et nationalisme
Albanais’ in Alexandre Popovic and Gilles Veinstein (ed.), Bektachiyya: Études sur l’ordre mystique des
Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995), pp. 277-308. She revised her
thoughts in a more recent work without doubting, however, the profound connection between Bektashism and

22
nationalism in the beginning of the 20th century. See her monumental Aux Origines du Nationalisme Albanais:
La Naissance d’Une Nation Majoritairement Musulmane en Europe (Paris: Karthala, 2007), pp. 474-493. For
the Albanian awakening from the point of view of Albanian nationalist historiography see Stavro Skendi, The
Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967).
26
Nicholas J. Cassavetes, head of the Pan-Epirotic Federation of the U.S.A., to Drummond, Boston, 18 April
1921. FO 286/762, C 11556/4280/90. For Tromara see Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 256, n.
142.
27
Kostaq Kota was portrayed as a Greek-speaking moderate Albanian nationalist, surrounded by fanatic
nationalists, who firmly controlled Korçë. Secret Intelligence Report, Athens, undated. FO 286/778, W
3458/3458/50, D 525. Eyres considered him a notorious personality, wanted for assassinations in Egypt. Eyres
to Curzon, Durrës, 22 April 1921. FO 141/669/10, C 9284/580/90. At any rate, Kota was effective in political
maneuvering. With the ‘Manifesto’ he turned against the Albanian government, but when the power of the latter
was solidified he supported it and became close collaborator of Ahmed bey Zogolli, later king Zog, whom he
repeatedly served as a Prime Minister.
28
For Korçë region see Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 22 April 1921. FO 141/669/10, C 9284/580/90. Sederholm to
Drummond, ‘Report by the Commission of Enquiry on its work from 19 December 1922 to 1 February 1923:
The Enquiry in Southern Albania», Geneva, 6 April 1923. FO 371/8531, C 7811/211/90 and in Kondis –
Manda, The Greek Minority in Albania, p. 39. For the ‘Manifesto’ see Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 18 March 1921
and the document attached. FO 371/5726, C 669/580/90. Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 20 April 1921. FO 371/5726,
C 8178/580/90. Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 22 April 1921. FO 141/669/10, C 9284/580/90. Eyres to Curzon,
Annual Report about Albania, p. 3, Durrës, 1 May 1922. FO 371/7332, C 6726/6726/90. About Gjirokastër
region see The Greek Community of Gjirokastër to the Greek prefect of Corfu, 17 February 1921. GFO 1921,
A/5, no. 401 – 22 in Kondis, The Hellenism, vol. 2, pp. 298 – 299. John Spyromelios, notable of the town of
Himarë, to the prefect of Corfu, 22 February 1921. GFO 1921, A/5, no. 22, in ibid., p. 301. Cassavetes to
Drummond, Boston, 18 April 1921. FO 286/762, C 11556/4280/90.
29
Psomas, ‘Issues concerning the first political elections in Albania’, pp. 220-221.
30
Heathcote-Smith to Curzon, Durrës, 10 January 1922. FO 371/7330 and FO 141/669/10, C 818/818/90.
31
Secret Intelligence Report, Athens, 13 October 1921. FO 286/778, W 3458/3458/50, D 566, 525. Eyres to
Curzon, Durrës, 18 October 1921. FO 371/5737, C 20786/4280/90. Chargé d' Affaires in Greece to the baron
Robert Gilbert Vansittart, Curzon’s principal private secretary, Athens, 20 September 1921. FO 371/5737, C
18477/4280/90.
32
Heathcote-Smith to Curzon, Durrës, 23 November 1921. FO 286/762, C 22310/4280/90. Alexander Rizos-
Rangavis, Greek Minister in London, to Curzon, London, 24 November 1921. FO 371/5737, C 22345/4280/90.
See also the demostrations: Themistokles Bamikhas, head of the Association of Epirotes of Corfu, to the GFO
and the Embassies of the United Kingdom, the USA, Italy and France in Athens, Corfu, 27 November 1921.
Jacob of Durrës to the Ministers of the United Kingdom, the USA, Italy and France in Durrës, Corfu, 27
November 1921. Jacob of Durrës to Eyres, Corfu, 20-23 December 1921. FO 286/762, C 22270/580/90. Rizos-
Rangavis to Curzon, London, 2 December 1921. FO 371/5737, C 22820/4280/90.
33
Basil Dendramis, Greek permanent representative at the League of Nations, to Drummond, Geneva, 29
November 1921. Circulated to the Council and the members of the League, Geneva, 6 December 1921. FO
371/5737, C 23361/4280/90.
34
A convincing account of the events was presented by Cassavetes to Drummond, Boston, 18 and 22 April
1922. FO 286/762, C 11556/4280/90.
35
Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 29 April 1921. FO 286/762, C 10079/4280/90.
36
Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 20 April 1921. FO 371/5726, C 8178/580/90.
37
Tufton to Eyres, London, 26 May 1921. FO 286/762, C 10079/4280/90.
38
Sederholm to Drummond, ‘Report by the Commission of Enquiry on its work from 19 December 1922 to 1
February 1923: The Enquiry in Southern Albania’, pp. 9-10, Geneva, 6 April 1923. FO 371/8531, C
7811/211/30.
39
The Commission of Enquiry to the League of Nations, ‘Commission of Enquiry in Albania: Report on
Southern Albania’, p. 5. Tiranë, 18 January 1922. FO 371/7328, C 2135/735/90.
40
Joseph Swire, King Zog’s Albania (London: Robert Hale & Co., 1932), p. 16-19.
41
The Swiss Minister in London to the FO, London, 25 May 1921. FO 371/5727, C 11576/580/90.
42
Tufton to the Swiss Minister, London, 6 June 1921. FO 371/5727, C 11576/580/90.
43
Brendan Simms, ‘Temperley, Harold William Vazeille (1879–1939)’, Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography available at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36449?docPos=1 accessed on 18 March 2014.
See also Austin, Founding a Balkan State, pp. 23-24.
44
From Aubrey Herbert we get scattered information for Eden’s activities in Albania in July-August 1918.
Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, pp. 240-241, 246.

23
45
Beytullah Destani (ed.), M. Edith Durham, Albania and the Albanians: Selected Articles and Letters, 1903 -
1944 (London: Centre for Albanian Studies, 2001), pp. 88, 131, 205.
46
Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 304, n. 110. Aubrey Herbert considered this an unfortunate
event that prevented Britain from getting direct information on the area and its issues.
47
See Temperley’s report, London, 3 June 1921. FO 371/5727, C 11576/580/90.
48
British Intelligence Secret Report, ‘Present Attitude of the Orthodox Population of Southern Albania’, FO
608/29 in Beytullah Destani (ed.), Albania and Kosovo: Political and Ethnic Boundaries, 1867 – 1946 (London:
Archive Editions, 1999), pp. 433 – 439.
49
Ibid., pp. 433 – 437.
50
Ibid., pp. 438 – 439.
51
Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 275.
52
Ibid., p. 340.
53
Morton F. Eden, Albania: Its Discontents and their Origin (London: J. Lovejoy & Son, [1920]), esp. pp. 5-8,
10-13, 16-19, 22-23.
54
Ibid., p. 16.
55
Heathcote-Smith to Curzon, p. 2, Durrës, 2 January 1922. FO 371/7328, C 506/506/90. See also Psomas, ‘The
Religious and ethnographic synthesis’, pp. 268 – 269. In Heathcote-Smith’s categorization Eden’s ‘indifferent’
Orthodox Albanians are branded ‘moderate’.
56
Eden, Albania, p. 15.
57
Eyres to Curzon, Annual Report about Albania, p. 3, Durrës, 1 May 1922. FO 371/7332, C 6726/6726/90.
58
An Australian [Morton F. Eden], Albania and Its Neighbours (London, 1921).
59
Destani, M. Edith Durham, p. 205. See also Joseph Swire, Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom (New York, NY:
The Times, 19712), p. 281.
60
Austin, Founding a Balkan State, p. 19. Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 275.
61
Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 325.
62
Austin, Founding a Balkan State, pp. 23-24. Nicolson had expressed similar views in 1919 and this was the
view of the British and the Americans at the Paris Peace Conference. Pearson, Albania in the Twentieth Century,
pp. 120, 126, 130.
63
Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 327.

24

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