Viewing cable 08BANGKOK2977, AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES WITH FORMER PM SAMAK HIS

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08BANGKOK2977 2008-10-01 10:10 2010-12-14 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok

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Brazil
Sri Lanka C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002977
United Kingdom
SIPDIS
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Editorial EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2018
United States TAGS PGOV, KDEM, KJUS, PINR, TH
Latin America SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES WITH FORMER PM SAMAK HIS
DOWNFALL,
REF: BANGKOK 2778 (SAMAK UNDERCUT)
Browse latest releases BANGKOK 00002977 001.2 OF 002
2010/12/15
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b, d)
2010/12/14
2010/12/13 ¶1. (C) Summary: Former Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej resigned from his
2010/12/12 position as Party Leader of the People’s Power Party (PPP) September 30. He
2010/12/11 remains free on bail as he continues to appeal a years-old defamation
2010/12/10 conviction. Samak told the Ambassador September 26 that he believed Queen
Sirikit, working through Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda, supported
2010/12/09 the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protest movement. Samak viewed himself
2010/12/08 as loyal to the King, but implied that the Queen’s political agenda differened
2010/12/07 from her husband’s. Separately, XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed to the Ambassador
2010/12/06 October 1 that he had begun direct negotiations with the PAD and suggested that
2010/12/05 he and the current Somchai administration had 90 days to produce results.
2010/12/04 ¶2. (C) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX’s expectation that his term in office may be
2010/12/03 short-lived tracks with a widespread view among Thais that the PPP will be
2010/12/02 fighting against the odds for its survival in upcoming party dissolution
2010/12/01 proceedings. Although XXXXXXXXXXXX provides proof that senior Thai politicians
2010/11/30 can often revive careers, we believe Samak has lost virtually all of his
influence and has little prospect of staging a political comeback. PM Somchai
2010/11/29 Wongsawat appears likely to succeed Samak as PPP Party Leader. End Summary and
2010/11/28 Comment.

Browse by creation date SAMAK QUITS PPP POST, HEADS TO DISNEY WORLD
-------------------------------------------
66 72 75 79 86 88 89 90
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ¶3. (C) On September 30, a PPP official told the media that former PM Samak
08 09 10 Sundaravej had formally resigned from his position of PPP Party Leader. This
resignation followed an Appeals Court’s September 25 ruling upholding a previous
conviction of Samak on defamation charges, and affirming the two-year prison
Browse by origin sentence for Samak. In a September 26 lunch with the Ambassador, Samak explained
that he expected to remain free on bail while continuing to appeal this case
A B C D F G H I through other channels; he predicted his legal battle could continue for
J K L M N O P R approximately two years before he might have to face incarceration. Samak
S T U V W Y Z planned to join unnamed associates for an extended North American vacation
starting with Disney World, criss-crossing the United States and parts of Canada
Browse by tag by car.

A B C D E F G H ¶4. (C) Note: Once Samak lost face after PPP legislators signaled their
I J K L M N O P unwillingness to support his reelection as Prime Minister (reftel), it would
Q R S T U V W X have been awkward for Samak to retain the position of Party Leader. PPP
immediately named PM Somchai as acting party leader. Political parties typically
Y Z nominate their Party Leaders for the position of Prime Minister; it would be
logical to assume that Somchai will formally take the top job in PPP. Samak’s
Browse by classification resignation will not protect Samak from a five-year loss of political rights in
the event that PPP is dissolved. Party dissolution by the Constitutional Court
CONFIDENTIAL entails sanctions against the executive board that was in place at the time of
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN the dissolution-warranting offense.
SECRET
SECRET//NOFORN SAMAK DISCUSSES HIS DOWNFALL, CRITICIZES THE QUEEN
--------------------------------------------- -----
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR ¶5. (C) Samak described to Ambassador the political pressure against him during
OFFICIAL USE ONLY his seven months in office. He showed disdain for Queen Sirikit, claiming that
she had been responsible for the 2006 coup d’etat as well as the ongoing turmoil
Community resources generated by PAD protests. He alleged the Queen operated through Privy Council
President Prem Tinsulanonda who, along with others presenting themselves as
Follow us on Twitter royalists, worked with the PAD and other agitators. Citing his own regular
meetings with King Bhumibol, Samak claimed he -- rather than his opponents --
Check our Reddit was sincerely loyal to the King and enjoyed the King’s support. In his
Twitter this discussion of the
Digg this page BANGKOK 00002977 002.2 OF 002
monarchy, Samak made no mention of the Crown Prince.
courage is contagious
¶6. (C) Samak, a former journalist, lamented his opponents’ success in
manipulating media coverage of his administration. Samak noted that jockeying
for control over the media had often caused rifts within Thai
Rak Thai and, subsequently, the People’s Power Party.

¶7. (C) Samak’s eyes became misty as he recalled that, when he was contemplating
returning to the premiership after eviction from office by the Constitutional
Court, his wife and one of his daughters had pressed him to abandon this quest.
“I told them to get out,” he related. “I didn’t need to be betrayed by them.”
Out with the Old, Out with the New?
-----------------------------------
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated to Ambassador October 1 that he expected the
Somchai administration to be short-lived, though he hoped it could be extended
if it proved successful in addressing the serious challenges facing the country.
XXXXXXXXXXXX If Somchai’s administration were to prove effective, he hoped the
Constitutional Court might delay dissolution proceedings against various
coalition parties to allow the government more time in office (note: the
Attorney General announced later on October 1 that he had referred the first
case, against Chat Thai, to the Constitution Court for review).
¶9. (C) On the ongoing PAD occupation of Government House, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he
had twice spoken with PAD XXXXXXXXXXXX, most recently on the night of September
30. XXXXXXXXXXXX described his approach toward the PAD as similar to that which
he had taken toward communist insurgents in the 1970s and 80s: he would
initially stress commonalities while deemphasizing differences, which would be
sorted out later. (Septel will report XXXXXXXXXXXX’s views on mediating the
southern insurgency.) JOHN
 Viewing cable 08BANGKOK3317, PALACE INSIDER TELLS AMBASSADOR OF THE KING’S
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Articles S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003317

Brazil NOFORN
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Editorial EO 12958 DECL: 11/06/2018
United States TAGS PGOV, KDEM, MOPS, ASEC, TH
Latin America SUBJECT: PALACE INSIDER TELLS AMBASSADOR OF THE KING’S
OPPOSITION TO A COUP AND TO PAD PROTESTS
REF: A. BANGKOK 3289 (POLARIZATION TO PERSIST) B. BANGKOK 3280 (THAKSIN
Browse latest releases ADDRESSES UDD) C. BANGKOK 3226 (HOPES FOR MEDIATION) D. BANGKOK 3080 (QUEEN
2010/12/15 SHOWS SUPPORT)
BANGKOK 00003317 001.2 OF 003
2010/12/14
2010/12/13 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d).
2010/12/12
2010/12/11 SUMMARY AND COMMENT
2010/12/10 -------------------
2010/12/09 ¶1. (C) King Bhumibol explicitly told Army Commander Anupong Paojinda not to
2010/12/08 launch a coup, XXXXXXXXXXXX, an advisor to Queen Sirikit, told Ambassador
2010/12/07 November 4. XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that the Queen had not meant to signal
2010/12/06 support for the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) anti-government agenda
2010/12/05 when she presided over funeral ceremonies on October 13. XXXXXXXXXXXX said PAD’s
activities had irritated the King, who reportedly wants PAD protestors to leave
2010/12/04 Government House. XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke well of Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat,
2010/12/03 saying Somchai was open to compromising with the PAD, although XXXXXXXXXXXX
2010/12/02 guessed Somchai would be forced from office by the end of the year. Separately,
2010/12/01 a politically active businessman with strong connections to the palace told us
2010/11/30 that the Queen’s funeral appearance had hurt the monarchy’s image, thereby
serving the agenda of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This contact
2010/11/29 also discussed a possible assassination plot against Thaksin and PAD plans for
2010/11/28 violence. Both contacts claimed the King suffered from back pain and his
condition was frail.
Browse by creation date
¶2. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX’s claim that the King instructed Anupong not to
66 72 75 79 86 88 89 90 conduct a coup is the strongest account we have heard to date about the King’s
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 opposition to a coup and his communicating this to Anupong; it would explain why
08 09 10 Privy Counselors Prem and Siddhi, both seen as opponents of the current
government, gave recent assurances to the Ambassador that there would not be a
coup. While XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify how he heard of this exchange, the
Browse by origin purported instruction does appear consistent with Anupong’s actions, other high-
level military assurances to the Ambassador, and reporting in other channels. We
A B C D F G H I agree that the Queen’s funeral appearance was a significant blunder,
J K L M N O P R jeopardizing the public’s perception of the palace’s neutrality. PAD appears
S T U V W Y Z increasingly divided; this divide, as well as the intense and dynamic condition
of Thai politics, may make it appear realistic to hope for a PAD-government
Browse by tag compromise. Possible further violence, however, remains a concern. End Summary
and Comment.
A B C D E F G H
I J K L M N O P PALACE-PAD RELATIONS
Q R S T U V W X --------------------
Y Z ¶3. (C) Ambassador met privately at the Residence on November 4 with
XXXXXXXXXXXX, a close advisor to Queen Sirikit who in the past has also served
Browse by classification as a confidant of the King.XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that he regretted the Queen’s
October 13 appearance at the funeral of a PAD supporter (ref D). He claimed the
CONFIDENTIAL Queen had been emotionally affected when she learned that one victim of the
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN October 7 violence was a young lady about to be married, and that she had told
SECRET her father she was going to the protest to defend the monarchy. Initially, the
SECRET//NOFORN Queen had wanted to send Princess Chulabhorn to the funeral. It was only at the
request of Chulabhorn and Chulabhorn’s companion, Chaichon Locharernkul, that
UNCLASSIFIED the Queen decided to go herself. XXXXXXXXXXXX said there was no intention for
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR the Queen to involve either herself or the monarchy in political matters, but,
OFFICIAL USE ONLY unfortunately, some members of the public could interpret the funeral appearance
differently. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Queen later reached out to seriously injured
Community resources police officers in an attempt to show her neutrality, but this signal went
largely unnoticed.
Follow us on Twitter
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that King Bhumibol was highly irritated by PAD’s
Check our Reddit occupation of Government House and other disruptions caused by the anti-
Twitter this government group, but the King was unsure how best to ensure PAD would vacate
Digg this page the compound. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the King had instructed two of his loyalists to
convey his desire that PAD leave Government House. (One of these messengers was
courage is contagious well-known associate of the King Disathorn
BANGKOK 00003317 002.2 OF 003
Watcharothai, who said publicly on October 29 that Thais who love the King
should “go home”; see ref A.) XXXXXXXXXXXX considered XXXXXXXXXXXX to be
obstinate, however, saying Sondhi had become obsessed with his own sense of
mission. By contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that XXXXXXXXXXXX was reasonable and
willing to compromise.
POSITIVE VIEW OF SOMCHAI
------------------------
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed to have spoken to Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat
about the current standoff. XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that Somchai had
agreed that the government could meet with the PAD and reach a compromise, but
the time was not yet ripe. In his conversation with the Ambassador, XXXXXXXXXXXX
spoke highly of Somchai, saying he was “very good” and had many qualities that
made him suitable to be Prime Minister, including a sense of fairness and a
moderate temperament. Nevertheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that Somchai could
not remain long in office because he would likely be forced out by an adverse
Constitutional Court ruling in the People’s Power Party (PPP) dissolution case
(ref A), which XXXXXXXXXXXX believed the Court might issue before the King’s
birthday (December 5). XXXXXXXXXXXX guessed Somchai would dissolve the
parliament before being forced from office.

KING TO ANUPONG: NO COUP

------------------------

¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that the current turmoil would not result in a
military coup. He said that the King, speaking with Army Commander Anupong
Paojinda, had referred to the 2006 coup and made a statement to the effect that
there should be no further coups.

POLITICIZATION OF THE MONARCHY

------------------------------
¶7. (C) We also met on November 5 with XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect), the
well-connected scion of a wealthy family with close palace ties. XXXXXXXXXXXX
had a leading role in the XXXXXXXXXXXX; his wife, XXXXXXXXXXXX, has the royal
title of “XXXXXXXXXXXX” and works closely with the Queen. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed
that the Queen’s appearance at the October 13 funeral had highly negative
ramifications, saying that even politically neutral Thais felt she had
inappropriately brought the monarchy into politics. He also acknowledged
increasing semi-public criticism of the monarchy, focused on the Queen (septel).
XXXXXXXXXXXX stated with confidence that the King had sought to deter the Queen
from attending the funeral by questioning the wisdom of that plan, but had
stopped short of forbidding her to do so.
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed former Prime Minister Thaksin’s statement in his
November 1 address to supporters (ref B) that either “royal mercy or the
people’s power” could allow his return to Thailand. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this
juxtaposition, which he viewed as highly strategic, had the predictable effect
of energizing Thaksin’s opponents in the royalist camp. This reaction allowed
Thaksin to demonstrate publicly that many palace figures were aligned against
him, thereby eroding the prestige that the palace derived from its status as an
institution above politics. (Separately, after Thaksin’s remarks, a member of
Thaksin’s legal team told us that the sentence in question was part of a “very
refined product” and that she had heard this sentence “four or five times” in
Thaksin’s rehearsal of the speech.)

THAKSIN’S ENEMIES’ PLANS FOR VIOLENCE

-------------------------------------

¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX believed PAD continued to aim for a violent clash that
would spark a coup. He asserted that he had dined on October 6 with a leading
PAD figure (NFI), who explained that PAD would provoke violence during its
October 7 protest at the parliament. The unnamed PAD figure predicted (wrongly)
that the Army would intervene against the
BANGKOK 00003317 003.2 OF 003
government by the evening of October 7. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted to us that PAD
remained intent on a conflict that would generate at least two dozen deaths and
make military intervention appear necessary and justified.
¶10. (C) We mentioned to XXXXXXXXXXXX the claim by Thaksin associate
XXXXXXXXXXXX that Thaksin had been the target of an assassination plot (ref C).
(Note: Subsequent to the Ambassador’s meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX, another Thaksin
ally related the same claim, and said Thaksin himself had spoken of this plot.
End Note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested XXXXXXXXXXXX’s list of conspirators --
including two prominent judges -- was not credible, but XXXXXXXXXXXX said he
could confirm (presumably because of first-hand discussion with an organizing
figure) that certain enemies of Thaksin (NFI) had sought to kill him.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had been surprised to learn that the contract on Thaksin’s
life entailed a relatively low payment of only several hundred thousand Baht (in
the range of 10,000 USD), although it also entailed resettlement abroad for the
person(s) directly involved.

REMARKS ON THE KING’S HEALTH

----------------------------
¶11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX (late August/early September). At that time, he said, the
King’s complexion appeared healthy, but overall the King appeared frail. He
added that the King was upset with the Thai doctor who had organized the team
that performed back surgery on the King two years ago, as the operation had not
worked as well as the King had been led to expect. XXXXXXXXXXXX, in his meeting
with the Ambassador, also said the King was suffering from back pain, and his
activities were more limited than in recent years. JOHN
 Viewing cable 06BANGKOK5811, THAILAND: MY MEETING WITH GENERAL SONTHI
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06BANGKOK5811 2006-09-20 12:12 2010-12-14 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok

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Editorial SUBJECT: THAILAND: MY MEETING WITH GENERAL SONTHI
United States
Latin America Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b)(d)

¶1. (C) I met with General Sonthi privately directly after he addressed the
Browse latest releases diplomatic corps this afternoon. He thought the session had gone well (see
2010/12/15 septel for details; I doubt most of the Western diplomats, at least, will share
his assessment).
2010/12/14
2010/12/13 ¶2. (C) I began by asking Sonthi about the audience with the King last night.
2010/12/12 Who had attended? He said Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda had brought
2010/12/11 him, Supreme Commander Ruangroj and Navy Commander Sathiraphan in to meet the
2010/12/10 King. Sonthi stressed that they had been summoned to the palace; he had not
sought the audience. He said the King was relaxed and happy, smiling throughout.
2010/12/09 He provided no further details.
2010/12/08
2010/12/07 ¶3. (C) Turning to the US reaction, I reminded him of our conversation, August
2010/12/06 31, when I told him any military action would result in immediate suspension of
2010/12/05 assistance programs such as IMET, FMF and numerous others. I told him he could
expect us to announce such a measure shortly. He understood. I added that the
2010/12/04 restoration of such assistance could only come after a democratically elected
2010/12/03 government took office. In the meantime, I stressed that the coup group needed
2010/12/02 to make every effort to demonstrate a sincere intention to return to civilian
2010/12/01 rule as soon as possible. His announcement today that an interim constitution
2010/11/30 and civilian government would be installed within two weeks was a good example.
I reiterated these points several times.
2010/11/29
2010/11/28 ¶4. (C) Sonthi responded by saying the military had truly acted in order to
improve Thai democracy, not destroy it. The prevailing situation had become
Browse by creation date untenable. Had Thaksin only been willing to announce publicly that he would not
return as Prime Minister, this action could have been avoided. But his
66 72 75 79 86 88 89 90 unwillingness to do publicly what he had repeatedly told many privately had led
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 people to fear that his true intention was to seek a renewed mandate and return
08 09 10 to power. Thus the military had acted. But they did not seek sustained political
power and would return to barracks as soon as possible. The sooner the better, I
repeated. I told him to expect fairly broad international criticism, as military
Browse by origin coups were generally seen as a thing of the past.
A B C D F G H I ¶5. (C) Was he going to seize Thaksin,s assets? No, he stated flatly. Would
J K L M N O P R Thaksin and his family and colleagues be allowed to return to Thailand? Yes,
S T U V W Y Z unconditionally. What is the officially approved English rendition of the coup
group,s title? &Council for Democratic Reform Under Constitutional Monarchy,8 or
Browse by tag CDRM.

A B C D E F G H ¶6. (C) Why had the military chosen to act at this particular point in time?
I J K L M N O P Smiling slightly, he leaned forward. &Thaksin was at his weakest and we were at
Q R S T U V W X our strongest.8
Y Z ¶7. (C) Comment ) Sonthi was relaxed and calm. Clearly the royal audience was
the turning point last night. (Septel reports Thaksin,s defiant attitude
Browse by classification dissolving completely when he learned of the audience.) For now at least, the
CDRM appears to be taking the high road as far as how they will treat Thaksin.
CONFIDENTIAL We have ready access to this group and will press them to implement their
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN announced intention to return to civilian rule as soon as possible. Meanwhile, a
SECRET coup is a coup is a coup and we believe a strong U.S. statement announcing the
SECRET//NOFORN suspension of assistance and a call for an early return to civilian rule and
eventually elections is entirely warranted and will submit suggested text via
UNCLASSIFIED septel.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR BOYCE BOYCE
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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