Stat Con Case Digest I

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
I. Introduction to Statutory Construction
1.1 Definition:
- Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and the intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given cases, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
1.2 Importance:
- it helps prepare the law freshmen for the task of studying, interpreting and constructing laws in the various law subjects.
1.3 Fundamental Rules of Construction:
- a statute should be expounded according to the intent of them that made it.
1.4 Distinction Between Construction and Interpretation -- When s Statute should be Construed
- Construction i s the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct expressions of text, from the
elements known and given in the text, while interpretation i s the process of discovering the true meaning of language used.
1.5 The Context of a Statute
● CALTEX v PALOMAR, GR. No. L-19650 (1966)
DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLE INVOLVED:
Statutory Construction
Statutes; Construction defined.—Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention
of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).
In the present case, the question of whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used
therein. This is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.
Provisions of Sections 1954(a), 1982, and 1983 of the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code), pertinent
portions of which read:
SEC. 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as first
class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or be deposited in or carried by the mails of the
Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
(a) Written or printed matter in any form, advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting
to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot
or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
SEC. 1982. Fraud orders. — Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery,
gift enterprise, or scheme or the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any
kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any
kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may
instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts to return to the person depositing the same in the
mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever
class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or company....
SEC. 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service. — Director of Posts may, upon
evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for
the distribution of money or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or
company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any
postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company, or to the agent of any such person or company,
whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by
regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such
person or company or its agent.... (Emphasis supplied).
JURISPRUDENCE:
Declaratory relief; Conditions sine qua non before relief can be availed of.—In order that a declaratory relief may be available,
the following conditions must be present: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking: declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs.Board of Accountancy, 93 Phil. 83; Delumen vs. Republic, 94 Phil.
287; Edades vs. Edades, 99 Phil. 675).
Same; Element of justiciable controversy.—The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed
contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privileged demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live
controversy. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on the part of the appellee and a denial thereof on the part of
appellant concerning a real question or issue. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud
order therefore if carried out, the contenders are confronted by. the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless
their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo Y. Sen vs.Republic, 96 Phil. 987). Doubt, if any there
was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when it was translated into a positive claim of right which: is actually contested (III
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac.
350).
Statutes; Construction defined.—Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the lawNo. Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if
Enrico Palomar simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest. For,
construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to
its application to a given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
( Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). In the present case, the question of whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is
within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the
words used therein. This is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.
Same; Weight of judicial decisions.—In this jurisdiction, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and,
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty-bound to enforce obedience thereto.
Gambling; Essential elements of lottery.—The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,
such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential
elements of a Lottery are: first, consideration; second, prize: and third, chance ("El Debate," Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil. 278, 283-284,
citing Horner vs.U.S., 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson, 30 Phil. 80; U.S.
vs. Olsen and Marker, 36 Phil. 395; U.S. vs. Baguio, 39 Phil. 962).
Same; Gratuitous distribution of property by chance; When element of consideration is not present.— I n respect to the element
of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or
indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind
is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra). U nder the rules of the proposed
contest there is no requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be
given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is
available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles, the contest fails to
exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery, The scheme is but a gratuitous distribution of property by
chance.
Same; Test to determine presence of consideration.—The Element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by
the proponent of the contest. The true test is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether
those conducting- the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the price (People vs, Cardas, 28 P. 2d.,
99, 137 Cal. App. [Supp.] 788). The standpoint of the contestant, not of the sponsor, is all that matters.
Same; Meaning of "gift enterprise"; When proposed scheme is not embraced by me term.—The term "gift enterprise" is
commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value, but by way of inducement each purchaser
is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S. 850; 84 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary
with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs.Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13;
Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs.State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5, Sneed 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term
clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar, where there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement
to the purchaser, and where the contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's
products;
Postal Law; Statutes; Term "gift enterprise" is used in association with the word "lottery"— In the Postal Law the term "gift
enterprise" is used in association with the word "lottery." Consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a
sociis, it is only logical that the term be accorded no other meaning then that which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so
construed. Significantly, there is not the slightest indicium in the law of any intent to eliminate the element of consideration from the
"gift enterprise” therein included.
Same; Purpose of mail fraud orders.—Mail fraud orders are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for
disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises
and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to
corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value
be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to
participate, the. reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain.
Same; When gift enterprises are condemnable.—Under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar
schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve: the element of consideration. Because there is
none in the contest herein ,in question, the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
FACTS:
● In 1960, Caltex (Phils) Inc. conceived a promotional scheme “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” calculated to drum up
patronage for its products, calling for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each
Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.
● For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid. Neither a purchase of Caltex products is
required. Entry forms were available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can was provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs.
● Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails, not only as amongst the mediator publicizing the contest but also for the
transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the
contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, in view of sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
● Such overtures were formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated 31 October 1960, in which the Caltex, thru
counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
● Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General Enrico Palomar opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the
provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance.
● Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief against the Postmaster General,
praying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public.
● The trial court ruled that the contest does not violate the Postal Code and that the Postmaster General has no right to bar the
public distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The Postmaster General appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not construction should be employed in the case.
2. Whether or not the contest is a lottery or a gift enterprise that violates the provisions of the Postal Law.
HELD:
(1) Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect
to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is
not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present case, (2) NO, Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if Enrico Palomar
simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest. The prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as much a
question of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order
to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.
“Lottery” extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts,
raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3)
chance. “Gift enterprise,” on the other hand, is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market
value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. Further, consonant to the well-known principle of
legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, the term under construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the
term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that
element of consideration from the “gift enterprise” therein included. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not
constitute ‘lottery’, if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the
party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. Thus, gift enterprises and similar schemes
therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. In the present case, there is no
requirement in the rules that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given
for the privilege to participate; for the scheme to be deemed a lottery. Neither is there is a sale of anything to which the chance
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser for the scheme to be deemed a gift enterprise. The scheme is merely a
gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment, without costs.
● PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION INC. v NTC and PLDT, GR NO. L-63318 (1984)
Statutory Interpretation
The word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest in the law itself.
Presidential Decree No. 217 June 16, 1973: ESTABLISHING BASIC POLICIES FOR THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 146, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PUBLIC SERVICE ACT, AS AMENDED, AND ALL INCONSISTENT LEGISLATIVE AND
MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE OF THE PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY UNDER ACT NO. 3436, AS
AMENDED, AND ALL INCONSISTENT LEGISLATIVE AND MUNICIPAL FRANCHISES INCLUDING OTHER EXISTING
LAWS
WHEREAS, telephone service is a crucial element in the conduct of business activity, the availability of which on a regular
and uninterrupted basis is essential for the smooth and efficient functioning of industry;
WHEREAS, efficient telephone service contribute directly to national development by facilitating trade and commerce;
WHEREAS, the telephone industry is one of the most highly capital intensive industries;
WHEREAS, the telephone industry has fundamentally different characteristics from other utilities in that capital
requirements per telephone unit installed increase as the number of customers serviced also increases instead of decreasing
in cost per unit as in power and water utilities;
WHEREAS, continued reliance on traditional sources of capital funds through foreign and domestic borrowing and through
public ownership of common capital stock will result in a high cost of capital, heavy cash requirements for amortization and
thus eventually in higher effective cost of telephone service to subscribers;
WHEREAS, the subscribers to telephone service tend to be among the residents of urban areas and among the relatively
higher income segment of the population; lawphi1.net
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of the national economy to encourage savings and to place these savings in productive
enterprises;
WHEREAS, it is announced policy of the government to encourage the spreading out of ownership in public utilities;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, as amended, do hereby decree and adopt, as
part of the law of the land the following:
Section 1. It is declared that in the interest of the social, economic and general well-being of the people, the state hereby
adopts the following basic policies of the telephone industry:
1. The attainment of efficient telephone service for as wide an area as possible at the lowest reasonable cost to the
subscriber;
2. The expansion of telephone service shall be financed through an optimal combination of domestic and foreign sources of
financing and an optimal combination of debt and equity funds so as to minimize the aggregate cost of capital of telephone
utilities;
3. Consistent with the declared policy of the State to attain widespread ownership of public utilities, the capital
requirements of telephone utilities obtained from ownership funds shall be raised from a broad base of investors, involving
as large a number of individual investors as may be possible;
4. In line with the objective of spreading ownership among a wide base of the people, the concept of telephone subscriber
self-financing is hereby adopted whereby a telephone subscriber finances part of the capital investments in telephone
installations through the purchase of stocks, whether common or preferred stock, of the telephone company;
5. As part of any subscriber self-financing plan, when the issuance of preferred capital stock is contemplated, it is required
that the subscriber be assured, in all cases of a fixed annual income from his investment and that these preferred capital
stocks be convertible into common shares, after a reasonable period and under reasonable terms, at the option of the
preferred stockholder; and
6. In any subscriber self-financing plan, the amount of subscriber self-financing will, in no case, exceed fifty per centum
(50%) of the cost of the installed telephone line, as may be determined from time to time by the regulatory bodies of the
State.
Section 2. The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications through its Board of Communications
and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately
implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated.
Section 3. The pertinent provisions of the Public Service Act, as amended, the franchise of the Philippine Long Distance
and Telephone Company under Act 3436, as amended, all existing legislative and/or municipal franchises and other laws,
executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations or parts thereof, as are in conflict with the provisions of this Decree
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Public Service Act

Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. - The Commission shall have power, upon proper
notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions
mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary :
(a) To issue certificates which shall be known as certificates of public convenience, authorizing the operation of public
service within the Philippines whenever the Commission finds that the operation of the public service proposed and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interest in a proper and suitable manner. Provided, That thereafter,
certificates of public convenience and certificates of public convenience and necessity will be granted only to citizens of the
Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, co-partnerships, associations or joint-stock companies constituted and
organized under the laws of the Philippines; Provided, That sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of any such
corporations, co-partnership, association or joint-stock company must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the
United States: Provided, further, That no such certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years.
(b) To approve, subject to constitutional limitations any franchise or privilege granted under the provisions of Act No. Six
Hundred and Sixty-seven, as amended by Act No. One Thousand and twenty-two, by any political subdivision of the
Philippines when, in the judgment of the Commission, such franchise or privilege will properly conserve the public
interests, and the Commission shall in so approving impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance,
service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require, and to issue certificates of public
convenience and necessity when such is required or provided by any law or franchise.
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls, charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as
commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed observed and followed thereafter by any
public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services
provisionally and without the necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days, thereafter, upon
publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service
equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business, the net profits of said
private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates.
(d) To fix just and reasonable standards, classifications, regulations, practices, measurement, or service to be furnished,
imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service. (emphasis supplied)
JURISPRUDENCE:
Public Utilities; Administrative Law; The National Telecommunications Commission cannot act on PLDT’S proposed Revised
Subscriber Investment Plan [SIP] in the absence of previously promulgated rules and regulations implementing Pres. Decree No.
217. — Respondent NTC admits the absence of rules and regulations referred to in PD 217. However, it contends that nowhere in
said decree is there any legal provision making the promulgation of rules a mandatory prerequisite to the establishment of SIP and
the determination of its schedules; that since respondent NTC is enjoined to implement the declared policies of the decree, for its
immediate implementation, it may rely on existing Rules of Practice; that under the same Rules of Practice all existing subscriber
investment plans were presented, considered and approved by the NTC; that the promulgation of the rules is inherently an internal
and administrative matters and therefore, is not a proper subject of litigation, much less a duty of the NTC to accomplish; and that
public respondent may or may not promulgate the rules in the immediate implementation of said decree as the word used there is
“may.” We are not persuaded.
Same; Same.—I n the absence of such rules and regulations, there is outright confusion among the rights of PLDT, the
consumers and the government itself. As may clearly be seen, how can the Decision be said to have assured that most of the
population will enjoy telephone facilities? Did the Decision likewise assure the financial viability of PLDT? Was the government’s
duty to provide telephone service to its constituents subserved by the Decision? These questions can never be answered unless such
rules and regulations are set up.
Same; Same.—F inally, it should be emphasized that NTC is estopped from claiming that there is no need to promulgate such
rules and obligations. In the case of PCFI vs. NTC, G.R. No. 61892, now pending resolution before this Honorable Tribunal, NTC
totally refused to act on a petition filed by PLDT precisely for the promulgation of such rules and regulations.
At
Same; There is no justification for the increase in telephone rates envisioned in the PLDT’s Subscriber Investment Plan.—
any rate, there is no justification for the rate increase of the revised schedule of PLDT’s Subscriber Investment Plan. It is to say the
least, untimely, considering the present economic condition obtaining in the country. The approved rate defeats the purpose of the
decree which is to spread ownership among the wide base of investors. The State, in Presidential Decree No. 217 promulgated on
June 16, 1973, adopted the basic policies of the telephone industry, which, among others, are: (1) the attainment of efficient
telephone service for as wide an area as possible at the lowest reasonable costs to the subscriber; (2) the capital requirements of
telephone utilities obtained from ownership funds shall be raised from a broad base of investors, involving as large a number of
individual investors as may be possible; and (3) in any subscriber self-financing plan, the amount of subscriber self-financing will, in
no case, exceed fifty per centum (50%) of the cost of the installed telephone line, as may be determined from time to time by the
regulatory bodies of the State.
Same; Expansion plans of PLDT should not be borne by the consumers but by the PLDT through its reported multi-million
profits.—Indeed, let us not aggravate the situation of the populace by raising the revised SIP schedule plan of PLDT. A rate increase
would be an additional burden on the telephone subscribers. The plan to expand the company program and/or improve its service is
laudable, but the expenses should not be shouldered by the telephone subscribers. Considering the multi-million profits of the
company, the cost of expansion and/or improvement should come from part of its huge profits.
Appeal; Certiorari; Certiorari may be resorted to where welfare of public is involved as in public utility rate issues, instead of
appeal.—Anent the question that petitioner should have appealed the decision of respondent NTC, instead of filing the instant
petition, suffice it to say that certiorari is available despite the existence of the remedy of appeal where public welfare and the
advancement of public policy so dictate, or the orders complained of were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction (Jose vs.
Zulueta, 2 SCRA 574.)
FACTS:
● Respondent NTC promulgated a decision (NTC decision) dated November 22, 1982 which approved a revised schedule of
rates (translation: phone bills went up) which was within the limits of P.D. No. 217, the law which regulated the telephone
industry. Petitioner, Philippine Consumer Foundation (PCF) filed this petition seeking to annul this decision.
● On November 25, 1983, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision annulling the NTC decision. This decision interpreted
the following phraseology of Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 as mandatory:
“The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate
agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose,
pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated” (italics supplied).
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 is mandatory.
HELD:
The basic canon of Statutory Construction is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary
intent is manifested. The phrase “may be promulgated” cannot be construed to mean “shall” or “must”. Section 2 must therefore be
interpreted in its ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary and not mandatory on the part of the delegate, NTC.
What is mandatory however, is the immediate implementation of the policies declared in P.D. No. 217.
Note that both words “shall” and “may be” are used in the same section which demonstrates that the ordinary, usual or normal
distinction between these words is preserved.
It must be emphasized that P.D. No. 217 [which is a special law] only repeals pertinent portions of Act 3436 and the Public Service
Act [which is a general law regulating all manner of public franchises] and that the Board of Communications, the immediate
predecessor of the NTC was adequately served by their own rules of procedure. This meant that the acts complained of by NCF, i.e.
the fixing of provisional rates without public hearing (Section 16 of the public service act), was a valid act.
● NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL) v EISMA, GR NO. L-61236 (1984)
Presidential Decree 1691
SEC. 3. Articles 217, 222 and 262 of Book V of the Labor Code are hereby amended to read as follows:
“Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Unresolved issues in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation,
separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation,
social security, medicare and maternity benefits;
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate-jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters, compulsory
arbitrators, and voluntary arbitrators in appropriate cases provided in Article 263 of this Code.”
JURISPRUDENCE:
Jurisdiction, The Labor Arbiter rather than a regular court has jurisdiction to entertain, a complaint for damages by an employer
against his employees arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. —Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The
exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first
instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when
he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the express terms of
the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been the constant ruling of this Court even prior to Lizarraga
Hermanos v. Yap Tico, a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call for obedience. Thus, “The
first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.” It is so even after the lapse of sixty years.
Same; Same. —The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that
the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if they
were not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was referred to by Philippine American
Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management &
Financing Co., Inc. as “the rather thorny question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn” between the power
lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus: “Increasingly, this
Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an
administrative agency].” Certainly, the present Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally
so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining
what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of disputes
or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.
FACTS:
● In 1982, the National Federation of Labor, certified by the Ministry of Labor as the sole exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., charged the respondent
firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment.
● Petitioners declared a strike against the respondent, after the latter terminated the president of the union. Respondent firm
filed a complaint before the respondent Judge against the members and officers of the union for obstruction and prayed for
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.
● The petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, and filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the labor arbiter can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer, respondent Zamboanga Woods
Products.
2. Whether or not the respondent judge has jurisdiction on labor related cases.
HELD:
Yes. The labor arbiter can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer, respondent Zamboanga Wood Products. It was held that
the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. By opinions of the Court, “Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never
presumed, must be conferred by laws in words that do not admit of doubt.”
Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should
be resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. The law in Presidential Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980,
amending Article 217 of the Labor Code returned the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the labor arbiter.
Provided for explicitly, it can only mean, that a court of first instance of judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts
beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit of damages, arising from picketing that
accompanied a strike that was squarely within the express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated.
The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and
original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. Hence, the respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction.
It has been the constant ruling of the Court and the words ponencia of Justice Moreland still call for obedience that “The first and
fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible for inadequate without them.”.
● PAAT v COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 111107 (1997)
Executive Order No.. 277 July 25, 1987: AMENDING SECTION 68 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE (P.D.) NO. 705, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PENALIZING POSSESSION OF TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS WITHOUT THE LEGAL DOCUMENTS
REQUIRED BY EXISTING FOREST LAWS, AUTHORIZING THE CONFISCATION OF ILLEGALLY CUT, GATHERED.
REMOVED AND POSSESSED FOREST PRODUCTS, AND GRANTING REWARDS TO INFORMERS OF VIOLATIONS OF
FORESTRY LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forest laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the
penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more
responsive to present situations and realities;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, removed timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations,
the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
"The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found."
Executive Order 277
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, removed timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations,
the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
"The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found."
Sec. 2. Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding Sections 68-A and 68-B which shall
read as follows:
"Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his
duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
"Sec. 68-B. Rewards to Informants. Any person who shall provide any information leading to the apprehension and
conviction of any offender for any violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, or confiscation of forest
products shall be given a reward in the amount of twenty per centum (20%) of the proceeds of the confiscated forest
products."
Revised Penal Code
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be
the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.chanrobles virtual law library
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.chanrobles virtual law library
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than
200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.chanrobles virtual law library
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is
over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.chanrobles virtual law library
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.chanrobles virtual law library
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.chanrobles virtual law library
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds
said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.chanrobles virtual law library
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5
pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for
the support of himself or his family.chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property
stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken
from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic erruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (As amended by R.A. 120 and B.P. Blg. 71. May 1, 1980).
JURISPRUDENCE:
The Court granted the petition for certiorari and set aside and reversed the decision of Court of Appeals and directed the Secretary of
DENR to resolve the controversy.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. —This Court in a long line of
cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still
be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the
court's intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of
dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal
reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned
every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exceptions. —However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land
in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Same; Same; A party cannot, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s intervention
by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings. —It was easy to
perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to
him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the
law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s intervention by
filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. —Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to
determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by
private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
Same; Same; Due Process; Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration.—To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant
controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases
heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private
respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23,
1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration, as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to
present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was,however, denied in an order of July 12,
1989 of Executive Director Baggayan.
Statutes; Statutory Construction; Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended. —The Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances
utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough to
cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.” In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to
the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to
be suppressed, and they should be given such a construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the
benefits intended.
Same; Same; When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization
of the law.—With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime
of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase “shall
be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code” and inserted the words
“shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.” When the statute is clear and
explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a
condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondent’s right of
action,is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.—From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not
be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private
respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of
assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in
the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of
private respondents’ right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
Remedial Law; Replevin; Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own
affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause
of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is
exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.—It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded
solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. “To detain” is defined as to mean “to hold or keep in custody,” and it has been held
that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it,
without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. Under the Rules of Court, it is
indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property,
that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax
assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the
property. Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the
instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the
required permit from the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. Section 68-A of P.D.
705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly
authorized representatives of conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or
detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention
exists in the case at bar.
Same; Certiorari; Courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition. —Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and
forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit
that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law
are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads: SECTION 8. REVIEW—All actions and decisions of the Director are
subject to review, motu propio o r upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be
final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the
President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by
the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
FACTS:
● On May 19, 1989, while on its way to bulacan from san jose Baggao Cagayan, private respondent’s truck was seized by the
DENR personnel because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in
the truck. Petitioner Layugan of CENRO issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days to submit
an explanation as to why the truck should not be forfeited. However, private respondents failed to submit an explanation.
● Thus, DENR Regional confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree
705, as amended by Executive Order 277.
● Private respondent then filed for reconsideration but was denied.
● Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondent’s letter for
reconsideration as an appeal to the secretary.
● However pending resolution, a suit for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed by Private Respondent against petitioners with
the RTC Branch 2 of Cagayan.
● Private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of
the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law.
● They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent
provision reads as follows:
SECTION 68.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
● Private respondent further contended that the seizure is illegal, as the truck was not used in the commission of the crime (of
qualified theft under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as allegedly admitted by
the Regional Executive Director, releasing the latter from criminal liability.
● Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia,
that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss.
● The trial court thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondent.
● Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the
respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts’ order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal
question.
● Hence, the petition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to
recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in DENR pursuant to
Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
2. Whether the authority to confiscate or to forfeit conveyances only belongs to the courts, in light of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705?
3. Whether the Secretary of DENR and his representatives are empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
HELD:
1. No. The court could not legally entertain an action for replevin. It is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry
laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
special responsibilities of the DENR. By the very nature of its function, it should be given a free hand unperturbed by
judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court,
therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. The court held that “while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases established the basic rule that
the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.”
2. No. The authority to confiscate or to forfeit does not only belong to the court. The provision of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 should
be read together with Sec. 68a to give way to the clear intention of the law which allows the DENR authority in cases of
violation of the code. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected
in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed,
and they should be given such a construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended.
3. Yes. The Secretary of DENR and his representatives are empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners
because it was transporting forest products without the required permit from the DENR in manifest contravention of Section
68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as
well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of conveyances used in violating
the provision of forestry laws. The court ruled that the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for
administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible.
● PEOPLE v MAPA, GR NO. L-22301 (1967)

REPUBLIC ACT No. 4: AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION TWENTY-SIX HUNDRED AND NINETY-TWO OF THE REVISED
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, AND TO EXEMPT FROM RESPONSIBILITY THOSE WHO SHOULD SURRENDER FIREARMS
UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Section twenty-six hundred and ninety-two of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act Numbered Fifty-six, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2692. Unlawful manufacture, dealing in, acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms, or ammunition therefor,
or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. — Any person who manufactures,
deals in, acquires, disposes, or possesses any firearm, parts of firearms, or ammunition therefor, or instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition in violation of any provision of sections eight
hundred and seventy-seven to nine hundred and six, inclusive, of this Code, as amended, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and one day nor more than five years, or both such
imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in the discretion of the
court. If the article illegally possessed is a rifle, carbine, grease gun, bazooka, machine gun, submachine gun, hand grenade,
bomb, artillery of any kind or ammunition exclusively intended for such weapons, such period of imprisonment shall not be
less than five years nor more than ten years. A conviction under this section shall carry with it the forfeiture of the
prohibited article or articles to the Philippine Government.
"The possession of any instrument or implement which is directly useful in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition on
the part of any person whose business or employment does not deal with such instrument or implemented shall be prima
facie proof that such article is intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition."
Section 2. The provisions of the foregoing section to the contrary notwithstanding, any person in possession of any of the
prohibited articles therein mentioned, may, without incurring any criminal liability, surrender the same to such officer and
within such period of time as the President shall by proclamation designate and fix immediately upon the approval of this
Act: Provided, however, That this section shall not be interpreted to mean as in any way exempting from such liability any
person, without the requisite license, found, within the aforementioned period of time, making use of any of said articles,
except in self-defense, or carrying them on his person except for the purpose of surrendering them as herein required:
Provided, further, That this section shall not in any way affect any case pending in court, on the date of the passage of this
Act, for violation of section twenty-six hundred and ninety-two of the Revised Administrative Code: And provided, lastly,
That the President may authorize any officer or agency of the Government to issue to the persons surrendering their
firearms temporary licenses therefor for periods not exceeding three months at a time.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Illegal possession of firearms; Being a secret agent of the governor is not a defense.—The fact that a person found in possession of
an unlicensed firearm, is a secret agent of a provincial governor does not exempt him from criminal liability. The law does not
contain any exception for a secret agent.
Courts; Statutes; Fundamental duty of courts.— The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." It is not within
the power of a court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision.
FACTS:
● Defendant Mario Mapa, was accused of a violation of Sec. 878 in connection with Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code as amended by C.A. No. 56 and as further amended by R.A. No. 4 which is the illegal possession of firearm of one
home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six rounds of ammunition.
● Defendant admitted the possession of firearms, provided evidence for his appointment as secret agent of Hon. Feliciano
Leviste, Governor of Batangas, and cited the case of People v. Macarandang as his defense.
● The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentencing
him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years.
● The appeal was elevated to the Supreme Court for the question of law.
ISSUE(S):
Whether an appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient
defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition?
HELD:
No. The court held that the law is explicit and clear. No provision is made for a secret agent to legally possess a firearm. The accused
reliance on People v. Macarandang is misplaced since Macarandang was a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaign which sufficiently put him within the category of a “peace officer” covered by the exemption. It is not within the
power of the Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision for the first and fundamental duty of courts is
to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. Thus, the conviction of the accused must stand.
● DAOANG v MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, GR NO. L-34568 (1988)
Civil Code, Article 335 Adoption
Art. 335. The following cannot a dopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction;
(2) The guardian, with respect to the ward, before the final approval of his accounts;
(3) A married person, without the consent of the other spouse;
(4) Non-resident aliens;
(5) Resident aliens with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations;
(6) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, when the penalty imposed was six months'
imprisonment or more.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Adoption; Children mentioned in Art. 335(1) of the Civil Code enumerating the persons
who cannot adopt, do not include grandchildren.— We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil
Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly
defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Rule that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be
interpreted.—Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not
be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In enacting the Civil Code, the legislator obviously intended that only those persons who
Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the
have certain classes of children are disqualified to adopt.—
Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil
Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in
its Article 174. disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses
Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein.
But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word “descendants” was changed to “children”in paragraph (1) of
Article 335.
Same; Same; Same; Adoption is now geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and enhancement of his
opportunities for a useful and happy life.—Adoption used to be for the benefit of theadopter. It was intended to afford to persons
who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation
where none exists by blood relationship. The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the
child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intention is sustained to promote that objective.
Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction is no longer a
ground for disqualification to adopt.
FACTS:
● This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the respondent judge: "In re Adoption of the Minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners".
● The minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an
opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a
legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses
were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.
● Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a
foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legitimes.
● It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law. The
respondent court ruled in favour of spouses Agonoy.
ISSUE(S):
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil
Code.
HELD:
No. The words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and
unambiguous. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not
be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do
not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim “that
what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included".
The intention of the law is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities
for a useful and happy life, and every intention is sustained to promote that objective. Under the law now in force, having legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.
The petition is denied.
● PARAS v COMELEC, GR NO. 123169 (1996)
RA 7160: Local Government Code
Section 74. Limitations on Recall.
(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
JURISPRUDENCE:
(not available on ESCA)
FACTS:
● A petition for recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of Barangay Pula, Cabanatuan City against
petitioner, Danilo Paras, who won in the 1994 barangay elections. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14,
1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well
above the 25% requirement provided by law.
● However, Comelec deferred the recall election to December 16, 1995 in view of petitioners’ opposition.
● To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction
(Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order.
● After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required
petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without Comelec approval.
● In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re- scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996;
hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.
● The petitioner contends that the recall election is now barred as there would be a Sangguniang Kabataan elections on the
first Monday of May 1996; citing Sec. 74 (b) of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states
that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
● Petitioner also cited the case of Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument, in which the Court
considered the SK election as a regular local election.
ISSUE(S):
Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is a regular local election.
HELD:
No. The Sangguniang Kabataan election is not a regular local election construing so would defeat the purpose of the law for there
will never be recall election rendering the provision inutile. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, must be considered
together with the other parts, and must be kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
Petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the court cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made
the following admonition: We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose
and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but the spirit that vivifies. The
spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit
and intent.
However, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for having become moot and academic. The recall is no longer possible because
of the limitation stated under Sec. 74(b) of the Local Government Code considering the next regular election involving the barangay
office officials was scheduled for May 1997, seven months away.

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

I. Introduction to Statutory Construction

1.3 Fundamental Rules of Construction:

1.5 The Context of a Statute

● CALTEX v PALOMAR, GR. No. L-19650 (1966)

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment, without costs.

Public Service Act

Whether or not Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 is mandatory.

Presidential Decree 1691

● PAAT v COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 111107 (1997)

Executive Order 277

Revised Penal Code

● PEOPLE v MAPA, GR NO. L-22301 (1967)

Civil Code, Article 335 Adoption

Art. 335. The following cannot a dopt:

The petition is denied.

● PARAS v COMELEC, GR NO. 123169 (1996)

RA 7160: Local Government Code

Section 74. Limitations on Recall.

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Stat Con Case Digest I

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Stat Con Case Digest I

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

I. Introduction to Statutory Construction

1.3 Fundamental Rules of Construction:

1.5 The Context of a Statute

● CALTEX v PALOMAR, GR. No. L-19650 (1966)

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment, without costs.

Public Service Act

Whether or not Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 is mandatory.

Presidential Decree 1691

● PAAT v COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 111107 (1997)

Executive Order 277

Revised Penal Code

● PEOPLE v MAPA, GR NO. L-22301 (1967)

Civil Code, Article 335 Adoption

Art. 335. The following ​cannot a​ dopt:

The petition is denied.

● PARAS v COMELEC, GR NO. 123169 (1996)

RA 7160: Local Government Code

Section 74. ​Limitations on Recall.

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Art. 335. The following cannot a dopt:

Section 74. Limitations on Recall.