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Fall 2019
Introduction
Among the numerous shocking outcomes of the Trump reign in the United States is one
that puzzles economists and advocates of free trade – the dissolution of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA is an Economic Integration Agreement (EIA) between
Canada, the United States and Mexico that dates back to 1994. Like most free trade
agreements, NAFTA was signed to eliminate trade barriers between the three countries and
ensure freer mobility within the region. Trade agreements are usually known to increase the
welfare of member countries due to the reduction of trade costs. However, President Donald
Trump has called for the US exit from NAFTA. This will be replaced by a more restrictive trade
agreement between the three countries called the United States Mexico Canada Agreement
(USMCA).
The consensus on the welfare effects of the removal of EIA’s is that it reduces the
scenarios of dissolution of NAFTA and often end at the same result – all parties will be worse off
after the exit. Furthermore, a similar case in Europe is the famous British-Exit out of the EU,
commonly referred to as “BREXIT”. Research on Brexit also show the negative effects of some
The outcome of pulling out of NAFTA is predicted to be negative for the three countries
involved (Baier, Bergstrand, & Bruno, 2019). To prepare for potential welfare effects of
dissolving NAFTA, it is important to consider the factors that may affect the extent of its
adverse effects on member countries. In my paper, I focus on how changes in price and wage
will affect welfare through the proportion of trade diversion post-dissolution. I focus on a case
where NAFTA ceases to exist to illustrate these effects. I conclude that the relative level of
intranational costs and nature of the domestic market in each country determines how badly
Reports show that NAFTA has been overall successful in increasing international trade
within the region and increasing economic welfare in member countries. The agreement called
for a removal for regional barriers to trade such as tariffs on most imports between the US and
Mexico, removal of export subsidies, etc. A study by Parro and Caliendo estimates that the pact
increased the volume of intra-bloc trade and real wages increased for all member countries as a
The movement from an overall positive EIA like NAFTA to a more restrictive one is
USMCA may seem counterintuitive. However, given the current political climate, the dissolution
of NAFTA seems inevitable. The rest of my paper will focus on the welfare effects of a total
dissolution of NAFTA and the factors that will determine who will be affected and to what
extent.
negative outcomes for all three members. A specific no-NAFTA case is studied by Baier et al in
their paper titled Putting Canada in the Penalty Box: trade and welfare effects of eliminating
NAFTA. Their estimates show that the standard of living falls in all three countries (Baier,
Bergstrand, & Bruno, 2019). Canada, however, is affected the most with its fall in real GDP per
capita twice as large as Mexico and eight times as much as the US (Baier, Bergstrand, & Bruno,
2019).
Baier et al study the effects of the no-NAFTA case and their results are summarized as
• Trade with countries outside the FTA increases for all countries with Canada increasing
• Intranational trade within each country increases with Canada increasing within-country
• Nominal wage decreases and price increases for all three countries with Canada facing the
Eliminating NAFTA will lead to diverting trade both internationally and domestically as
seen in the estimates presented by Baier et al. The ratio of how much trade is diverted
domestically, given the reduction in real wage, explains why each member country is affected
the way the study predicts. Specifically, in the domestic market, the nature of industries in the
market and the ease with which countries can divert trade domestically will determine welfare
A no-NAFTA situation will create loss in multilateral trade flows within the region. The countries
that trade the most with other members will potentially face the greatest welfare loss due to
imposition of tariffs within the region. Furthermore, domestic industries are highly dependent
on exports to other member countries will further intensify these welfare losses. Canada and
Mexico trade more with the US than vice versa (Baier, Bergstrand, & Bruno, 2019). Therefore,
in a no-NAFTA case, Canada and Mexico may face higher potential welfare losses.
Intranational Trade
When goods are produced in a country, a proportion of output remains in the domestic
and is traded between cities and states in the country. Intranational trade refers to the level of
in-country movement of goods. The volume of trade within the domestic market is then
determined by intranational trade costs such as distance between regions, transport costs,
Intranational trade costs refer to the barriers to trade that exist within the domestic
market. Such trade barriers could be due to physical distance, high intra-city shipping cost,
industry regulation, road transport corruption, etc. A popular measure of intranational trade
costs is the price gaps that exist for a good as it moves from its source to other regions in the
country. Higher price variation as the good travels from a remote location to its destination
Another way to think of intranational trade costs is the level of dispersion of economic
activity relative to the size of the economy. The free movement of goods across the country will
promote the dispersion of trade from a central hub where it is being produced to being more
spread across cities within the country. The concentration of trade in a central location could be
an indicator of high intranational costs. For example, Mexico would have low intranational
trade costs because it is a small country and trade is dispersed among major and heavily
populated metropolitan areas (Baier, Bergstrand, & Bruno, 2019). On the other hand, a country
like Canada is likely to have relatively higher intranational trade costs because its economic
activity is geographically concentrated in nearby provinces like Ontario and Quebec (Baier,
A third measure of intranational trade costs are province regulations for trade of goods.
Some countries have little or no regulation or restrictions that prohibit trade of certain goods in
some states or cities. A country that has little or no regulation will have lower intranational
costs. Therefore, lost bilateral flows can easily be diverted to the domestic market. Canada has
been known to have provincial regulation that prevents sale of goods in certain provinces and
countries lies in the level of intranational trade costs that exist in member countries. Upon
withdrawal from an FTA, some trade is deflected to the domestic markets within each country.
This substitution to domestic markets will then be affected if there are high intranational costs
that exist in that region or country. If it is easy to transmit goods within the country, deflecting
trade to domestic markets will not be difficult. The study by Baier et al already points out that a
no-NAFTA case will increase intranational trade in each country (Baier, Bergstrand, & Bruno,
2019). Therefore, eliminating NAFTA will result in lower welfare if there are significant trade
The link between intranational trade costs and welfare effects explains the results Baier
et al present in their paper. Mexico has low intranational costs when compared to regions
within the US and Canada. Therefore, it seems logical that Mexico will suffer a lower relative
reduction in economic welfare. Canada, on the other hand, suffers the most in terms of
economic welfare as a result of having the highest relative intranational trade costs.
Canada suffers the most welfare loss post-dissolution. This can be explained by its high
intranational trade costs and share of industries that will be affected post dissolution. These
provinces.
Canada has the highest relative intranational trade costs. These costs are influenced by
relative dispersion of trade compared to the other members and institutional barriers between
markets in different provinces. For example, Canadian brewers who suffer from higher tariffs
from other member countries after dissolving NAFTA, will be subject to high intranational trade
costs due to different provincial regulations that may prohibit sale of alcohol in certain cities in
some provinces (Find Law Canada, n.d.). Such tight inter-provincial regulations exist on sale of
other goods in Canada and contribute to high domestic trade costs. Other institutional barriers
Furthermore, domestic industries in Canada that are dependent on NAFTA trade flows
will suffer the most. An example is the automobile industry. NAFTA has created freer trade in
automobile parts and an integrated supply chain for the industry. Trump has threatened to
impose tariffs on automobile imports post dissolution. A report by the Canadian Conference
board anticipates that the Canadian automobile industry stands to lose suffer sharp declines
upon imposition of tariffs if NAFTA declines (Zivitz, 2018 ). This could lead to job losses of up to
100,000 and reduction in welfare for the Canadian economy (Zivitz, 2018 ).
Dissolving NAFTA entirely without replacement is the worst-case outcome of the threats made
by President Trump. This brings welfare loss to all countries most especially Canada. Varying
scenarios can be depicted such as only the US pulling out, replacement FTA’s between Canada-
Mexico and countries like China or the EU. However, important factors in determining how
welfare changes between member countries are a country’s level of exposure to the world
Conclusion
changes in price and wages will determine who wins and who loses with adjustments to NAFTA.
In negotiating trade agreements, countries should consider these factors when assessing how
Summary of Results from Baier et al: “Putting Canada in the Penalty Box: trade and welfare