EN BANC provisions in question, judicial power should assert itself.
Under the theory of
[G.R. No. L-25916. April 30, 1970.]
GAUDENCIO A. BEGOSA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAIRMAN, PHILIPPINE
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION; and MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION,
Defendants-Appellants.
Jose V . Rosales for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Solicitor General, for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PARTIES; DOCTRINE OF NON-SUABILITY OF STATE,
EXCEPTION.— It is well settled that where a litigation may have adverse
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of
property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal
capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no
application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted
because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating
public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner
2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDY UNNECESSARY WHERE QUESTION IS LEGAL; CASE AT BAR.—
It is well established that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable ‘where the question in dispute is purely a
legal one,’ or where the controverted act is ‘patently illegal’ or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a
department Secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or where there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. Where there is a
stipulation of facts, as in this case, the question before the lower court being solely
one of law and on the face of the decision, the actuation of appellants being patently
illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does not come
into play.
3. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF REGULATORY AGENCIES ENTITLED TO
RESPECT.— It has often been announced, and rightly so, that as much as possible
the findings of regulatory agencies which are expected to acquire expertise by their
jurisdiction being confined to specific matters, deserve to be accorded respect and
finality. There is a limit, however, to such a deference paid to the actuations of such
bodies. Clearly, where there has been a failure to interpret and apply the statutory
separation of powers, it is to the judiciary, and to the judiciary alone, that the final
say on questions of law in appropriate cases coming before it is vested.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
Plaintiff Gaudencio A. Begosa, now appellee, sought the aid of the judiciary to
obtain the benefits to which he believed he was entitled under the Veterans’ Bill of
Rights. 1 To such a move, there was an insistent objection, both vigorous and
persistent, on the part of defendants, the chairman and the members of the Philippine
Veterans Administration, now appellants. The lower court, then presided by the then
Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable Edilberto Soriano, found
for plaintiffs, after a careful and meticulous study of the applicable statutory
provisions. Not being satisfied with such a judgment, defendants appealed, relying
once more on the principal grounds raised below that plaintiff should have exhausted
his administrative remedies before coming to court and that he was in fact suing the
State without its consent having been obtained. As neither defense is sufficiently
meritorious, we affirm the lower court decision.
As noted in such decision, appellee’s complaint was predicated on his having been
"an enlisted man in good standing of the Philippine Commonwealth Army, inducted
in the service of the USAFFE" and having taken "active participation in the battle of
Bataan" as well as the "liberation drive against the enemy" thereafter having become
"permanently incapacitated from work due to injuries he sustained in line of
duty . . ." 2 It was likewise asserted in his complaint that after having submitted all
the supporting papers relative to his complaint, there was a disapproval on the part of
defendants on the ground of his having been dishonorably discharged, although such
an event did not take place until almost five years after the end of the war on
November 7, 1950 and while he was in the service of a different organization that
such a penalty was imposed on him. 3
Then came the allegation that there was an approval on his claim on September 2,
1964 but effective only as of October 5 of that year, and for amount much less than
that to which he was entitled under the law. 4 The relief sought was the payment, as
of the date to which he believed his right to pension should have been respected, of
the sums, which he felt were legally due and owing to him.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
The then Judge Soriano noted that there was an admission of certain allegations to
the complaint with others being denied, and that the following affirmative and
special defenses were interposed: "Defendants’ answer admits certain allegations of
said complaint, while denying others; set up the following affirmative and special
defenses: (1) payment of disability pension under Republic Act No. 65, as amended,
by the Philippine Veterans Administration commences from the date the proper
application therefor is approved; (2) plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative
remedies before resorting to court action, hence the present action is premature; (3)
inasmuch as the instant action pertains to money claim against the Government, it
must first be presented before the Auditor General as provided by existing law on the
matter (C.A. 327); and (4) plaintiff’s claim is in reality a suit against the Government
which cannot be entertained by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the
Government has not given its consent, . . ." 5 The case was then submitted on an
agreed statement of facts and the respective memoranda of the parties.
In the decision now on appeal, the question of when appellee is entitled to his
pension as well as how much it would amount to were fully discussed by the lower
court. Thus, as to the former: "From the facts just set out, it will be noted that
plaintiff filed his said claim for disability pension as far back as March 4, 1955; that
it was erroneously disapproved on June 21, 1955, because his dishonorable discharge
from the Army was not a good or proper ground for the said disapproval, and that on
reconsideration asked for by him on November 1, 1957, which he continued to
follow up, the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration,
composed of herein defendants, which took over the duties of the Philippine
Veterans Board, finally approved his claim on September 2, 1964, at the rate of
P30.00 a month." 6 After stating that in fairness and good conscience the said claims
could be made effective as of June 21, 1955, when it was erroneously disapproved
by appellants, and not on September 2, 1964 when it was approved on
reconsideration, as appellee should not for obvious reason be made to suffer for the
error of another, the then Judge Soriano observed further: "Had it not been for the
said error, it appears that there was no good ground to deny the said claim, so the
latter was valid and meritorious even as of the date of its filing on March 4, 1955,
hence to make the same effective only as of the date of its approval on September 2,
1964 — according to defendant’s stand —would be greatly unfair and prejudicial to
plaintiff. This is especially true in the light of the well-known intent of the legislature
in passing these pension laws of war veterans, and the no less well-known spirit in
which they should be construed or interpreted by the courts in favor of their
beneficiaries." 7
On the question of how much plaintiff should receive according to law, the appealed
decision contains the following: "The next question for resolution refers to the
monthly rate or amount to which plaintiff is entitled by way of pension. According to
plaintiff, he should be given a disability pension of P50.00 a month from June 21,
1955 (the effective date of his claim as above found by this Court) until June 21,
1957, and P100.00 a month for life from June 22, 1957 when Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 65, as amended by Republic Act No. 1362, was further amended by
Republic Act No. 1920). This contention is well taken because the very letter of the
Philippine Veterans Administration to plaintiff (Annex F of the [Agreed Statements
of Facts]) contains the following: ‘Note: Re-rating is not required, permanent
disability.’ By ‘permanent disability’, as this Court understands it, is meant that
plaintiff is permanently incapacitated from work. Under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 65, as amended by Republic Act No. 1362, which was the law in force when
plaintiff’s claim for pension should have been approved on June 21, 1955, he was
entitled to a pension of P50.00 a month as such permanently incapacitated person,
which monthly rate or amount was increased to P100.00 a month when the said
Section 9 was further amended by Republic Act No. 1920 on June 22, 1957." 8 Why
the action of appellants in the form of resolution could not prevail as against the law
was made clear by the decision in this wise: "For one thing, the said resolution may
not change or amend the meaning of the term ‘permanent disability’ as used by
Congress itself in enacting the said Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended.
For another, as of June 21, 1955 and as of June 21, 1957, plaintiff was already
entitled to the said pension of P50.00 and P100.00 a month respectively, and his said
right cannot be adversely affected by a resolution which was allegedly adopted only
in 1963." 9 Necessarily, there was in the decision likewise a recognition of the
monthly allowance for each of appellee’s unmarried minor children below 18 years
of age at the time he was entitled to the pension to which under the statute he could
validly lay claim.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After rejecting as untenable the defenses that there was no exhaustion of
administrative remedies, that the action is in the nature of money claim which should
first be presented before the Auditor General, and that said action is in reality a suit
against the Government without the latter’s consent, the decision concludes with the
following:" [Wherefore], judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the prayer
of plaintiff’s amended complaint, to wit, that defendants make plaintiff’s pension
effective June 21, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 at the rate
of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month each for his four unmarried minor children
below 18 years old from June 22, 1957 up to September 1, 1964; and the difference
of P70.00 a month, plus P10.00 for his one unmarried minor child below 18 years
old from September 2, 1954, and thereafter, with costs against said dependents." 10
Appellants elevated the matter to us. The careful and painstaking way in which the
controlling statutory provisions were considered and applied by the then Judge
Soriano must have impelled them to place their faith in the alleged failure to respect
the doctrines of non-suability and exhaustion of administrative remedies to obtain a
reversal. The appealed decision, however, as will now be shown is not subject to
such a reproach. The appeal then, as noted at the outset, is not to be attended with
success.
1. The fourth assignment of error assails what it considers to be the failing of the
lower court in not holding that the complaint in this case is in effect a suit against the
State which has not given its consent thereto. We have recently had occasion to
reaffirm the force and primacy of the doctrine of non-suability. 11 It does not admit
of doubt, then, that if the suit were in fact against the State, the lower court should
have dismissed the complaint. Nor is it to be doubted that while ostensibly an action
may be against a public official, the defendant may in reality be the government. As
a result, it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of
property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal
capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no
application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted
because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating
public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. Such is the present
case.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
The doctrine announced by us in Ruiz v. Cabahug 12 finds relevance: "We hold that
under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended complaint, which should
be taken on its face value, the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim
against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the
rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making
payment and recognition until the contending architects have established their
respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work
done." 13 As a matter of fact, in an earlier case where we sustained the power of a
private citizen claiming title to and right of possession of a certain property to sue an
officer or agent of the government alleged to be illegally withholding the same, we
likewise expressed this caveat: "However, and this is important, where the judgment
in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in
favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the
Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself,
and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except
with the consent of said Government." 14
2. Nor is the third assignment of error to the effect that the lower court did not
require appellee to exhaust his administrative remedies before coming to court any
more persuasive. An excerpt from the leading case of Gonzales v. Hechanova, 15 the
opinion being penned by the present Chief Justice, clearly demonstrates why
appellants’ argument in this respect is unavailing: "Respondents assail petitioner’s
right to the reliefs prayed for because he ‘has not exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him before coming to court.’ We have already held, however,
that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable ‘where the question in dispute is purely a legal one’, or where the
controverted act is ‘patently illegal’ or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts
as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter,
unless actually disapproved by him, or where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention." 16 The Gonzales doctrine, it is to be noted,
summarized the views announced in earlier cases. 17 The list of subsequent cases
reiterating such a doctrine is quite impressive. 18 To be more specific, where there is
a stipulation of facts, as in this case, the question before the lower court being solely
one of law and on the face of the decision, the actuation of appellants being patently
illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does not come
into play.
3. The other errors assigned, namely the alleged failure of the lower court to comply
with the law in fixing the amounts to which appellee is entitled instead of following
the rules and regulations on veterans’ benefits promulgated by appellants and the
alleged interference with the purely discretionary matter of a coordinate
administrative agent, the Philippine Veterans Administration, can easily be disposed
of. It is to be admitted that appellants as chairman and members of the Philippine
Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, are officials of an
administrative body. 19 Nor may exception be taken to the general principle that as
much as possible the courts should view with the utmost sympathy the exercise of
power of administrative tribunals whether in its rule-making or adjudicatory
capacity. It has often been announced, and rightly so, that as much as possible the
findings of these regulatory agencies which are expected to acquire expertise by their
jurisdiction being confined to specific matters, deserve to be accorded respect and
finality. There is a limit, however, to such a deference paid to the actuations of such
bodies. Clearly, where there has been a failure to interpret and apply the statutory
provisions in question, judicial power should assert itself. Under the theory of
separation of powers, it is to the judiciary and to the judiciary alone, that the final say
on questions of law appropriate cases coming before it is vested.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
When the then Judge Soriano, therefore, as he was called upon to do, saw to it that
there was strict compliance with the amounts of pension required by the law to be
granted plaintiff and disregarded the regulation promulgated under the rule-making
power of appellants, the effect of which would make appellee suffer the
consequences of an error committed by them, it cannot be truly said that his decision
may be assailed as being offensive to authoritative doctrines. On the contrary, it can
stand the test of the utmost scrutiny. Precisely because the commands of the law
were duly carried out, it cannot be set aside.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the then Judge Edilberto Soriano of the Court of First
Instance of Manila promulgated on January 22, 1966, is affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, J . is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27299 June 27, 1973
QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioner and appellee,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, respondent and
appellant.
Quirico del Mar in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, First Assistant Solicitor
General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Eulogio Raquel Santos for respondent
appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
On June 20, 1964, Quirico del Mar (hereinafter referred to del Mar) filed with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu petition for mandamus (civil case R-8465) against
the Philippine Veterans Administration (hereinafter referred to the PVA to compel
the latter to continue paying him monthly life pension of P50 from the date of its
cancellation in March 1950 to June 20, 1957, and thereafter, or from June 22 1957
his monthly life pension, as increased by Republic Act 1920, 1 of P100 and to pay to
him as well the monthly living allowance of P10 for each of his unmarried minor
children below eighteen years of age, 2 pursuant to the said Republic Act 1920
which took effect on June 22, 1957. Del Mar also asked for compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages.
In his petition below, del Mar averred that he served during World War II as chief
judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command (a duly recognized guerrilla
organization) with the rank of major; that he subsequently obtained an honorable
discharge from the service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total
physical disability; that upon proper claim presented and after hearing and
adjudication, the Philippine Veterans Board (the PVA's predecessor granted him a
monthly life pension of P50 effective January 28, 1947; that in March 1950, the said
Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on the ground that his
receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government, through the United
States Veterans Administration, by reason of military service rendered in the United
States Army in the Far East during World War II, precluded him from receiving any
further monthly life pension from the Philippine Government; that he wrote the said
Board twice demanding that it continue paying his monthly life pension, impugning
the cancellation thereof as illegal; and that his demands went unheeded.
The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension from the
United States Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from
the Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted him as well as the
monthly allowances he claimed for his five living unmarried minor children below
eighteen years of age. The PVA also asserted that it is discretionary on its part to
grant or discontinue the pension sought by del Mar. In addition, it alleged that the
action of del Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies before invoking judicial intervention, and that the court a quo was without
jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the
PVA — a mere agency of the Philippine Government — and, in effect, of a suit
against the Government which is not suitable without its consent. The PVA thus
prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment upholding del Mar claims. In its
decision dated February 27, 1965, the court (1) ordered the PVA to pay to del Mar
his monthly life pension corresponding to the period from April 1950 to May 1957 at
the rate of P50 a month, adding up to P4,334.86, and his monthly life pension
corresponding to the period from June 22, 1957 to February 1965 at the amount of
P100 a month totalling P9,200, and thereafter to continue to pay his monthly life
pension at the rate of P100. a month; (2) directed del Mar to file with the PVA the
corresponding written application for the payment to him of the monthly living
allowance of P10 for each of his five living unmarried minor children from June 22,
1957; and ordered the PVA to give due course to the written application as soon as
del Mar shall have filed the same with it, and once approved, to make the necessary
payment of the accumulated unpaid living allowances due to each of the said
children from June 22, 1957 as well as the current ones until each one of them ceases
to be entitled to the same; and (3 directed the PVA in the event of unavailability of
funds to pay the claims aforementioned, to set aside funds from such as intended to
pay the veterans' living pensions, or to cause the same to be appropriated in its
budget in order to comply with the judgment. For lack of basis, the court a quo
omitted to pass judgment on del Mar's claim for moral and exemplary damages.
Hence, the present appeal by the PVA.
The PVA alleges that the court a quo erred (1) in not holding itself without
jurisdiction to try civil case R-8465; (2) in no finding as premature the petition for
mandamus filed by del Mar due to the failure of the latter to exhaust available
administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention; (3) in declaring null
and void section 6 of PVA Regulation No. 2 relied upon by it in discontinuing the
monthly life pension of del Mar since March 1950; (4) in not finding it discretionary
on the part of the PVA to grant or discontinue the said suspension; (5) in ordering it
to pay to del Mar the amounts stated in the judgment; and (6) in ordering it to give
due course to and approve the application which the said court directed del Mar to
file for the payment to the latter of the monthly living allowance for each of his
living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age.
This appeal raises several questions which will be discussed in seriatim.
1. The PVA argues that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try civil
case R-8465 because it involves a money claim against the said PVA — a mere
agency of the Government performing governmental functions with no juridical
personality of its own — and, in reality, partakes of an action against the Philippine
Government which is immune from suit without its consent, citing this Court's
observation in Republic of the Philippine vs. Ramolete and Del Mar, 3 to wit:
....a charge against the Government where the money involved is part of the public
funds, is a suit against the Government, and the happenstance that the action is
directed against the PVA as an entity and not against the Republic of the Philippines
is of no moment. Perforce, the Republic of the Philippines, on matters of
administration of all benefits due to the veterans of revolutions and wars, and to their
heirs and beneficiaries, acts and has to act through its agency and instrumentality, the
PVA. The suit should therefore be regarded as one against the Republic of the
Philippines; the PVA is therefore exempt from the filing of an appeal bond.
The PVA labors under a muddled and mistaken appreciation of the aforecited
observation. This Court stated in precise language the sole issue for resolution in that
case, thus:
Is the PVA exempt from the filing of an appeal bond? To resolve this issue, we must
initially determine whether the PVA is an agency or instrumentality of the Republic
of the Philippines, and, in the affirmative, whether it exercises governmental
functions.
Indeed, the decisive point in the aforementioned case related to the status of the PVA
as an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines exercising
governmental functions as to be entitled to exemption from the filing of the appeal
bond per section 16 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, not to the nature of the claim
sought to be enforced by the private respondent therein (del Mar) against the said
PVA. Thus, in the said case, this Court made a lengthy disquisition on the history,
development and organization of the PVA to show conclusively that the same is an
entity or agency of the Republic of the Philippines performing governmental
functions. True, this Court referred to the claim of the private respondent therein as
"a claim for a sum of money against the Government, which claim, if adjudged
finally to be meritorious, would render the Republic of the Philippines liable
therefor," since the funds from which the claim was to be satisfied were funds
appropriated by Congress for the PVA; but this Court properly and advisedly omitted
any study and consideration of the question of suitability or non-suitability of the
Government in connection therewith.
As a general proposition, the rule — well-settled in this jurisdiction — on the
immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions
resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property." 4 Needless to state, in such actions,
which, in effect, constitute suits against the Government, the court has no option but
to dismiss them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application
where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with
his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already
appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. 5 As clearly discernible
from the circumstances, the case at bar falls under the exception.
2. The second question posed by the PVA relates to del Mar alleged failure to
exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to court action. Suffice it to state
that where a case as in the present controversy — involves a question solely of a
legal nature, there arises no need for the litigant to resort to all administrative
remedies available to him before seeking judicial relief. 6
3. The validity of section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of the "Rules and Regulations
on Veterans' Benefits" adopted by the PVA constitutes the core of the present
controversy. The said section 6 reads as follows:
SEC. 6. Effect of receipt of USVA pension benefit — termination, reduction. — An
award of a similar disability compensation from the US Veterans Administration
shall be a ground for the cancellation of a disability pension granted under the
Regulation: Provided, however, That if and while the disability compensation
awarded by the US Veterans Administration is less than the pension granted
hereunder, the difference in amount shall be assumed and paid by the PVA:
Provided, further, That upon proper application, the disability award previously
cancelled may be restored upon the termination of the US Veterans Administration
award if the cause of such termination is due to negative military service report of
the pensioner certified by the US Department of the Army and not for any other valid
cause: Provided, finally, That the veteran is medically determined to be still suffering
from the disability for which he was previously awarded a pension. Payment of
pension thus restored shall take effect or shall commence only from the date of
approval of restoration and when funds become available.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the PVA cancelled and discontinued the monthly life
pension of del Mar reasoning that the latter's receipt of a similar pension from the
United States Government precluded his enjoying any like benefit from the
Philippine Government. The PVA avers that it adopted the aforequoted section 6 in
order to carry out and implement section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, 7
particularly its excepting clause. Said section 9 reads:
SEC. 9. The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently
incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained in line of
duty, shall be given a life pension of one hundred pesos a month, and ten pesos a
month for each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, unless
they are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds, and shall
receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care. 8
The PVA reads the phrase "from other Government funds" in the excepting clause of
the aforecited provision as necessarily including funds of the United States
Government. And without question, the pension del Mar receives from the United
States Veterans Administration comes from the funds of the United States
Government.
On the other hand, del Mar avers that section 6 of Regulation No. 2 illegally effects
the suspension of the operation of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, and
argues that under section 20 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, the power suspend
the payment of the monthly life pension awarded to disabled veteran belongs
exclusively to the President of the Philippines, not to the PVA which, in the case at
bar, illegally arrogated unto itself the said power. Furthermore, del Mar states, the
PVA "deliberately misinterprets" the phrase from other Government funds" in
extending its scope to include United States Government funds.
The principle recognizing the necessity of vesting administrative authorities with the
power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to
effectual its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the terms and
standards prescribed by the statute as well purport to carry into effect its general
policies, constitutes well established doctrine in this jurisdiction. 10 In Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration,
suprea, this Court fittingly stated: .
... the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power
resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative
executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the
Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to
observe the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the
legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute requires adherence to,
not departure from, its provisions. No deviation is allowable.
Section 11 of Republic Act 2665 11 empowers the PVA to adopt rules and
regulations, thus:
SEC. 11.Policies, rules and regulations. — Subject to existing laws, the
Administration shall have the power to promulgate and issue rules and regulations as
may be found necessary to govern its operations and to carry out that aims and
purposes of this Act and of all other laws to be administered by the Administration.
Pursuant to this rule making authority, the PVA — allegedly' to implement section 9
of Republic Act 65, as amended promulgated its "Rules and Regulations on
Veterans' Benefits," section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of which cancels the disability
pension granted if the beneficiary receives a similar compensation from the United
States Veterans Administration. In effect, the PVA by adopting section 6 of
Regulation No. 2, suspended the operation of section 9' of Republic Act 65, as
amended. This, Republic Act 65, as amended, forbids the PVA to do for it expressly
authorizes only the President of the Philippines to suspend the operation of any of its
provisions "if and when the Congress of the United States approves the pending GI
Bill of Rights applicable to the Philippines the provisions of which are identical or
similar to the provisions of this Act." Clearly then, section 6 of Regulation No. 2 not
only negates the very spirit behind section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, but
also contravenes the express mandate of section 20 thereof.
The PVA's pretense that del Mar case falls under the clause of section 9 of Republic
Act 65, as amended, which excepts those who "are actually receiving a similar
pension from other Government funds" from the coverage of said section 9 —
predicated upon its interpretation that the phrase other Government funds" includes
funds of the United States Government — fails to persuade this Court as a valid
argument to justify its cancellation of del Mar monthly life pens Section 9 of
Republic Act 65, as amended, in providing for the excepting clause, obviously
intends to prevent the receipt the same beneficiary of concurrent or multiple pensions
benefits similar to each other in nature and basis, although coursed through different
departments or agencies, but paid out of the funds of the same Government. Any
contrary interpretation resulting in the derogation of the interests of the beneficiary
who likewise receives a similar pension paid out funds of other Governments,
conflicts with the establish axiom ordaining the construction of pension laws of war
veterans in favor of those seeking their benefits.
The record of the case at bar being completely bereft of any indication to show the
suspension by the President of the Philippines — pursuant to section 20 of Republic
Act 65, amended — of the operation of any of the provisions of the said statute, this
Court perforce must uphold del Mar claims.
4. The rest of the assigned errors relate to the allege undue interference by the
court a quo with the purely discretionary functions of the PVA in the matter of
granting discontinuing the pension benefits.
The law concedes to administrative bodies — like the PVA — the authority to act on
and decide claims and applications in accordance with their judgment, in the exercise
of their adjudicatory capacity. Because of their acquired expertise in specific matters
within the purview of their respective jurisdictions, the findings of these
administrative bodies merit not only great weight but also respect and finality.
"There is limit, however, to such a deference paid to the actuations or such bodies,
Clearly, where there has been a failure to interpret and apply the statutory provisions
in question, judicial power should assert itself. Under the theory of separation of
power it is to the judiciary, and to the judiciary alone, that the final say on questions
of law in appropriate cases coming before it is vested." 12
All told, no roadblock stands in the way of del Mar's demand for the continuance of
his monthly life pension.
In view, however, of the further amendment by Congress of section 9 of Republic
Act 65, as amended, through Republic Act 5753 — the provisions of which took
effect on June 21, 1969 — there arises the need to modify the judgment a quo in
order to make it conform to the said statute as it now stands. Republic Act 5753, in
further amending section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, grants every totally
disabled veteran of World War II "a life pension of two hundred pesos a month, and
thirty pesos a month for his wife and each of his unmarried minor children below
eighteen years of age."
ACCORDINGLY, this Court adjudges the appellee Quirico del Mar entitled to his
life pension (1) at the rate of P50 a month effective as of April 1950 to May 1957,
per Republic Act 65; (2) at the rate of P100 a month effective as of June 22, 1957 to
May 1969, per Republic Act 65 as amended by Republic Act 1920; and (3) at the
rate of P200 a month effective as of June 21, 1969, per Republic Act 65 as further
amended by Republic Act 5753. This Court directs the appellant Philippine Veterans
Administration to compute and then to pay to the appellee del Mar his past and
accumulated monthly life pension at the aforementioned statutory rates.
Regarding the monthly living allowance the appellee del Mar asks for each of his
five "living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age," it appearing that
he has not filed any proper application therefor with the appellant PVA but simply
included them in his claim for the restoration of his discontinued monthly life
pension, the appellee del Mar may, if he so desires, comply with section 15 of
Republic Act 65, as amended, which requires that "[A]ny person who desires to take
advantage of the rights and privileges provided for in this Act should file his
application" with the Philippine Veterans Administration, and the latter is hereby
ordered to consider and pass upon the merits of such application, if filed, particular
reference to the entitlement qualifications of intended beneficiaries. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee Barredo, and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Antonio and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91359. September 25, 1992.]
VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,
v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY and PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY SUPERVISORY
UNIT FOR SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCIES (PC-SUSIA),
Respondents.
Franciso A. Lava, Jr. and Andresito X. Fornier for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY CHIEF AND THE PC-SUSIA MAY NOT BE SUED
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE STATE. — The State may not be sued
without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this
rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the
national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the
organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard
agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued
without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s
complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way,
but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of
P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as
attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment
of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to
appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.
2. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICIAL MAY BE SUED IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY IF HE ACTS, AMONG OTHERS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS
AUTHORITY; CASE AT BAR. — A public official may sometimes be held liable
in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts
for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were
performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence,
or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSENT TO BE SUED MUST EMANATE FROM A
LEGISLATIVE ACT. — Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a
derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed
strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to
be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not
from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the public respondents.
4. ID.; ID.; REASONS BEHIND. — The state immunity doctrine rests upon
reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and danger which would flow from a
different rule. "It is obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of
every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means
required for the proper administration of the government" (Siren v. U.S. Wall, 152,
19 L. ed. 129, as cited in 78 SCRA 477).
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 11, 1989, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15990, entitled "The Chief of Philippine
Constabulary (PC) and Philippine Constabulary Supervisor Unit for Security and
Investigation Agencies (PC-SUSIA) v. Hon. Omar U. Amin and Veterans Manpower
and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI)," lifting the writ of preliminary injunction
which the Regional Trial Court had issued to the PC-SUSIA enjoining them from
committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of the license of
VMPSI to operate as a security agency.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On March 28, 1988, VMPSI filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court at Makati,
Metro Manila, praying the court to:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. Forthwith issue a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo,
enjoining the defendants, or any one acting in their place or stead, to refrain from
committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI’s
license;
"B. In due time, issue a writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect;
"C. Render decision and judgment declaring null and void the amendment of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 5487, by PD No. 11 exempting organizations like PADPAO
from the prohibition that no person shall organize or have an interest in more than
one agency, declaring PADPAO as an illegal organization existing in violation of
said prohibition, without the illegal exemption provided in PD No. 11; declaring null
and void Section 17 of R.A. No. 5487 which provides for the issuance of rules and
regulations in consultation with PADPAO, declaring null and void the February 1,
1982 directive of Col. Sabas V. Edadas, in the name of the then PC Chief, requiring
all private security agencies/security forces such as VMPSI to join PADPAO as a
prerequisite to secure/renew their licenses, declaring that VMPSI did not engage in
‘cut-throat competition’ in its contract with MWSS, ordering defendants PC Chief
and PC-SUSIA to renew the license of VMPSI; ordering the defendants to refrain
from further harassing VMPSI and from threatening VMPSI with cancellations or
non-renewal of license, without legal and justifiable cause; ordering the defendants
to pay to VMPSI the sum of P1,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation; and granting such further or other reliefs to VMPSI as may be
deemed lawful, equitable and just." (pp. 55-56, Rollo.)
The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487 (otherwise known as
the "Private Security Agency Law"), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its
complaint:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"SECTION 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. — Any
Filipino citizen or a corporation, partnership, or association, with a minimum capital
of five thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by
Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman agency: Provided, That no
person shall organize or have an interest in, more than one such agency except those
which are already existing at the promulgation of this Decree: . . ." (As amended by
P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.)
"SECTION 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. — The
Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with the Philippine Association
of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. and subject to the provision of
existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to
carry out the purpose of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in
restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of
Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic
because it has an interest in more than one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g)
of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private
Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued
by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring
that "all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members
of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are
located . . ." (pp. 5-6, Complaint in Civil Case No. 88-471). As such membership
requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and
constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in
restraint of trade.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the
PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8)
hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00
outside of Metro Manila (Annex B, Petition).
On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO
accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for
security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in
the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO
Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and
the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition).
The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of
VMPSI’s license (Annex E, Petition).
As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to
VMPSI when it requested one.
VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or
disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of
its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO (Annex F,
Petition).
As the PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSI’s license was expiring on March 31,
1988, VMPSI filed Civil Case No. 88-471 in the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, on
March 28, 1988 against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. On the same date, the court
issued a restraining order enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA "from committing
acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI’s license"
(Annex G, Petition).
The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the Temporary Restraining
Order," on the grounds that the case is against the State which had not given consent
thereto and that VMPSI’s license already expired on March 31, 1988, hence, the
restraining order or preliminary injunction would not serve any purpose because
there was no more license to be cancelled (Annex H, Petition). Respondent VMPSI
opposed the motion.
On April 18, 1988, the lower court denied VMPSI’s application for a writ of
preliminary injunction for being premature because it "has up to May 31, 1988
within which to file its application for renewal pursuant to Section 2 (e) of
Presidential Decree No. 199, . . ." (p. 140, Rollo.).chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
On May 23, 1988, VMPSI reiterated its application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction because PC-SUSIA had rejected payment of the penalty for
its failure to submit its application for renewal of its license and the requirements
therefor within the prescribed period in Section 2(e) of the Revised Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. 5487, as amended by P.D. 1919 (Annex M,
Petition).
On June 10, 1998, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a
bond of P100,000.00, restraining the defendants, or any one acting in their behalf,
from cancelling or denying renewal of VMPSI’s license, until further orders from the
court.
The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above order,
but it was denied by the court in its Order of August 10, 1988 (Annex R, Petition).
On November 3, 1988, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA sought relief by a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
On August 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA is hereby GRANTED, and the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, is ordered to
dismiss the complaint filed by respondent VMPSI in Civil Case No. 88-471, insofar
as petitioners PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are concerned, for lack of jurisdiction. The
writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 10, 1988, is dissolved." (pp. 295-296,
Rollo.)
VMPSI came to us with this petition for review.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.
The answer is yes.
The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being
instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental
function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen,
or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may
not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because
VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a
certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in
the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00
as attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the
payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not
consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that
purpose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus did we hold in Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA
713:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself
although it has not been formally impleaded." (Emphasis supplied.)
A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if
he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Shauf v.
Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of
their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may
be had against them in their private capacities.
We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State
to be sued:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into by the PC
Chief in relation to the exercise of a function sovereign in nature. The correct test for
the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but
the legal nature of the act. This was clearly enunciated in the case of United States of
America v. Ruiz where the Hon. Supreme Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its functions.’ (136 SCRA 487, 492.)
"In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief
and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the
salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a
governmental function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the
purpose of R.A. 5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and
operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies. (Emphasis
ours.)" (pp. 258-259, Rollo.)
Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not
be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano,
148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such
consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.
The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the
inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. "It is obvious that
public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme
authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and,
consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the
proper administration of the government" (Siren v. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129, as
cited in 78 SCRA 477). In the same vein, this Court in Republic v. Purisima (78
SCRA 470, 473) rationalized:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of nonsuability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be cause [by] private parties, the
loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned
and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss
of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a
basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacles, could very well be
imagined." (citing Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic, 29 SCRA
598.)cralawnad
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the judgment appealed from
is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.