MACARIOLA v.

ASUNCION

Adm. Case No. 133-J May 31, 1982

MAKASIAR, J

FACTS:

The case at bar started with Civil Case No. 3010, a complaint for partition of properties
among the children of the deceased Francisco Reyes against Bernardita Macariola. Judge
Elias B. Asuncion was in charge of litigation and making the final decision on the said
inheritance case. The ruling on the Project Partition was only signed by the counsel of the
parties, who assured the judge that they were given authorization to do so.

Part of the Project Partition was property Lot 1184 that was divided into 5 lots denominated
as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. After the transfer certificates of title was awarded, some of the
lots were sold to Enrique Anota (stenographer in Judge Asuncion’s court) and Dr. Arcadio
Galapon. Part of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters was sold to Judge
Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion. A year after, the spouses Judge Asuncion and
Dr. Galapon sold their shares on lot 1184 to The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries Inc. During that period both Judge Asuncion and his wife were part of the
stockholders of the said corporation.

A couple of days after the corporation was registered to SEC, Judge Asuncion and his wife
withdrawn and sold their shares to a third-party person.

In August 9, 1968, the complainant Bernardita Macariola filed a complaint to Judge Elias
Asuncion with acts unbecoming a judge for the following accusations:

o Violation of Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce,

o Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
o Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
o Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics

In relation to his association with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as
a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the actions of Judge Asuncion merits for acts of unbecoming a judge for
violating paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce because of his
association with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.?

HELD:

NO. The court considered view that although the paragraph 1 and 5 of Article 14 is
incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the
Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the
relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices
and judges.
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law
because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to
engaging in business: hence, political in essence.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the
United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must
be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative
act of the new sovereign.

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge
of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in
commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.

In conclusion, Judge Asuncion, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of
land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he
should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his
conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but
must always be above suspicion.

HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v

G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997. COMELEC

DAVIDE, JR., J

FACTS:

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative".

As per Delfin and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution;
that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC

wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order:

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
LAMBINO v. COMELEC
LAUREL v. MISA

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

FACTS:

Laurel Anastacio filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was charged for
treason for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation.
Based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and
comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens was suspended during the Japanese belligerent?

HELD:

NO. An absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives,
and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. Absolute
and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby
to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and and
of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the
titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society
which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent
thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be
suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out
of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of
suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with
the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to
the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war.

An inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit
treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of
the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to
his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the
protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign
country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has
enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection
he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would
not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not
receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own.

A corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of
the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant, the political laws
which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are
suspended or in abeyance during military occupation, for the only reason that as they
exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not
applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national
security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile
country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion,
sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion
because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes
against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against
the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter; and that, while the
offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by
him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not
responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114
of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national
security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory
were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation
THE HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

QUIASON, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Holy See is the Papal Nuncio’s representative in the Philippines who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy. The petitioner filed certiorari to reverse
and set aside the orders from the RTC of Makati. 

This started with a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila which
was registered under petitioner’s name. The said lot was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D
under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The lots were sold to Ramon Licup through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to
the sellers. Who eventually transfer his right to Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

Dispute arose when the informal settlers refused vacate the said lot. Thus, the question of
who’s the responsible party for evicting and clearing the land from squatters. Without
proper resolution at hand, the said lot was sold to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc, filed a complaint for annulment of the sale of the parcels
of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal
Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and
Tropicana.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Holy See can invoke immunity from suits?

HELD:

YES. As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the
generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such
principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a
condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer
or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real
estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were
made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The
donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign
to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the
Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department
tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987,
Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this
case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic
mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all
the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country.
REPUBLIC v. VILLASOR

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

FERNANDO, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings, challenges the validity of the
Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the decision final and executory and subsequently
issuing an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.

A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J.

Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against
the petitioner, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of
Special Proceedings. The respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order
declaring the decision on July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal
Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute the said decision. The corresponding Alias Writ
of Execution was issued, thus,  the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment
with several Banks, specially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the
form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution";
the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. The funds of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine
Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank their branches are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of
military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writs of execution and notices of garnishment be sued against public
funds?

HELD:

NO. This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the
revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its
consent." A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that
public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case
of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was restated
in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that
the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public
funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law." Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had
accrued in favor of an employee. Thus: "A rule which has never been seriously questioned,
is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment.
One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts
except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to
garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing
officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may
be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the
foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it." 
SANDERS v. VERIDIANO

G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988

CRUZ, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in
Olongapo City, and petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base.
While Anthony Rose and Ralph Wyers (deceased) were both private respondents were both
employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA.

The private respondents were both advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion
and to institute grievance proceedings. Thus, the result was a recommendation from the
hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private
respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages.

A letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report
and asked for the rejection of the stated recommendation. 

The private respondent filed for damages against the petitioners and claimed that the letters
contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental
anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their
personal and proprietary rights. Furthermore, the respondents made it clear that the
petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity.

A motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts
complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that,
consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are performing their official duties when they did the acts for
which they are being sued for damages.

HELD:

YES. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are
being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not
disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the
other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents.
Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to
the hearing officer's criticism—in effect a direct attack against him—-that Special Services
was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."
As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for
concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even
before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the
question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the
immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters
involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the
financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for
their solution, including the re-designation of the private respondents. There was nothing
personal or private about it.

Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the
petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government.
As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it
is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts.
Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the
payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their
personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require
that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the
appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the
action a suit against that government without its consent.
BUREAU OF PRINTING v. BoP EMPLOYEES ASSOC

G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J

FACTS:

The respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula,

Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran — filed a complaint against herein
petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of
General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The
complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair
labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing
particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise of their
right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment
in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.

Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano
Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices, and that the Bureau of Printing has no
juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial
concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing
government functions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Bureau of Printing be sued?

HELD:

NO. The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative
Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under
the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged
with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes,
required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said
Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be
authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence,
and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet
the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not
engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.

As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of
Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding
against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding
against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued
without its consent, much less over its objection.
IMBONG v. OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
OPOSA v. FACTORAN

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:

There were 44 minors represented by their parents who filed a complaint against DENR
Secretary to stop issuing licenses to cut timber, invoking their right to a balance and
healthful environment. The petitioners seek to prevent the misappropriation or impairment
of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth through the cancellation of the issued
licenses.

The complaint originated with Civil Case No. 90-77 that was filed in Makati RTC. Their
petition to the court was (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
and (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.

On the other hand, the defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government.

The RTC respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion to dismiss. In the said
order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Hence, petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari to rescind and set aside
the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi to prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of the Philippine rainforests and have the defendant stop form receiving,
processing and approving timber license agreements?

HELD:

YES. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon
the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. The said right implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will
serve as the bases for policy formulation and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its
powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect
and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. After careful examination of the
petitioners' complaint, the court find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to
be adequate to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
CASIBANG v. AQUINO
RODRIGUEZ v. GELLA
YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

CRUZ, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A that was issued
by President Ferdinand E. Marcos regarding the prohibition of interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo and they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO No. 626. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. However, the Intermediate Appellate Court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond.

Hence the petitioner filed for a petition to review on certiorari, that the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries. He also claims that the penalty is invalid
because it was imposed without the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the purpose of E.O. 626-A is a valid exercise of police power?

HELD:

NO. The court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos
can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made
to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by
simply killing the animal. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we
would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under
the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his
failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary
fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the
exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to
a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and
the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as
to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice,
with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles,  Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in
nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a
court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty,
and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

The court finds that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons,
we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
PALAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL