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Hintikka, Jaakko, "The Unambiguity of Aristotelian Being" (1981). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 238.
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J^ih4ikkA
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Jaakko Hintikka
predication and id en tity . For Aristotle they ex p ress ipso facto som ething's being
su ch -an d -su ch and its being identical with some one en tity . This is vividly shown
by the fact th a t Aristotle frequently used the v ery formula as a name for his firs t
categ o ry , substance, in spite of considering particu larity ("separability and
'th isn e ss'") as the main ch aracteristic of su b sta n c es. No wonder A ristotle could
th u s raise the question, which in our anachronistic ears may first sound paradoxical
(Ross confesses th a t it is for him "difficult to see the point of th is questio n "),
w hether o r not a substance is identical with its essence. (See Met. Z 6 .)
I shall not discuss here what kind of treatm ent of existence is p resupposed in (*)
and (**).
My in te rp retatio n gains some fu rth e r credence from the fact th a t according to
A ristotle necessity is "carried downwards" in a syllogistic chain in the same way as
I have arg ued existence does. (Cf. A ristotle’s theory of apodeictic syllogisms in P r .
A n. A 8-12 , especially 9 .) In the same w ay as in (**) it is only the major p r e
mise th a t has to c a rry an existential force in o rd er for the conclusion to do so, in
the same way we can obtain a necessary conclusion from a b a rb a ra ty p e syllogism if
and only if the major prem ise is a necessary one. I believe A ristotle’s treatm ent of
existence and necessity in the context of a syllogism are related to each o th er v e ry
closely, b u t I cannot tr y to find th e ir g rea te st common denominator h e re .
T here is plenty of collateral evidence th a t th is is what A ristotle in fact m eant.
Since th e whole argum entative stru c tu re of Gomez-Lobo’s p ap er is th u s m istaken,
th ere is little th a t apparently needs to be said of the re s t of his p ap er.
What I also find su rp risin g is th a t th e re is conclusive evidence against
Gomez-Lobo in th e v e ry passages he is add ressin g himself to.
I mean if one is o r is not sim pliciter and not if [one is] white o r not (89
b 33).
τδ ει ’έστιν μή απλωί λέγω, αλλ* ουκ ει λευκδΐ μη.
How could A ristotle possibly have explained more clearly b y the means he had
at his disposal th a t he was presupposing a p urely existential use of
ε\ ^στι? It seems to me th at we have to realize th a t A ristotle, like J . L. A ustin,
ordinarily means what he say s.
Ironically, A ristotle's v e ry usage in P o st. An. B 1-2 provides u s with fu r th e r
counter-exam ples to the ellipsis th esis. When Aristotle th ere asks w hether a middle
term is (ε ι ’έ στι μέσον, cf. 89 b 37-38, 90 a 6 ), he cannot b u t mean w hether the
middle e x ists, for he co n trasts this question in so many words with the question as
to what it is .
T here is elsew here, too, excellent direct evidence against th e ellipsis-
hypothesis. In discussing in De Soph. El. 5 the importance of distinguishing th e
The Unambiguity of A ristotelian Being 9
absolute and the relative uses of a term from each other A ristotle w rites (167 a
4-6):
On can scarcely ask for more direct evidence. At the same time the passage shows
th a t in sp ite of th e ir differences, the predicative and the absolute (existential) uses
o f ’€στιν are not u n related , for they are the relative and absolute uses of th e same
notion. The quoted passage hence also offers evidence against ascribing the
Frege-R ussell ambiguity to A ristotle.
Thus realizing A ristotle's failure to make the Frege-R ussell distinction does not
necessitate throw ing overboard all earlier views concerning A ristotle's treatm ent of
b ein g , even though it does necessitate a fresh look at the evidence. (T here seems
to me to be far too much of a fashion in the c u rre n t lite ra tu re to disparage earlier
in te rp retatio n s ju st because they did not take into account some im portant aspects
of A ristotle's treatm ent of "is". Such a failure may be reg re tta b le , b u t it does not
automatically invalidate all the in terp retatio n s of a scholar.) N evertheless,
dispensing with th e Frege-R ussell dogma opens the door to certain fu rth e r lines of
th o u g h t. In the same way as the Aristotelian ’έστι sometimes has existential force
and sometimes does n o t, in the same way it sometimes has the force of iden tity and
sometimes does not. The unm istakable upshot of such passages as Met. Γ 4, 1007 a
20-33, Met. Δ 18, 1022 a 25-26, or Post A n. A 22, 83 a 24-32; A 4, 73 b 5-8 is
th a t th e form er cases are of the n atu re of what is in the misleading
tw en tieth -century terminology known as "essential" predications and the la tte r as
"accidental" predications. The misleading ch aracter of these labels is due to th e fact
th a t they are easily taken to re fe r to a purely modal distinction. Indeed, they have
The Unambiguity of A ristotelian Being 10
been so taken in recent discussion, where the term "A ristotelian essentialism " is
used as a label for a position v is-à -v is the foundations of modal logic and modal
m etaphysics. What we have discovered is a prima facie nonmodal element in
A risto tle's essential-accidental distinctions, an element th at seems to have been
largely overlooked in tw en tieth -cen tu ry philosophy.
Of c o u rse , even if we tr y to s ta rt from a prima facie completely nonmodal
distinction betw een id en tity and predication, we will end up linking the distinction
with various modal considerations. I cannot discuss th is m atter here beyond
pointing out th a t in th is way A ristotle's distinction gets linked up much more with
recen t discussions of the n a tu re of the individuals presupposed in ou r use of modal
concepts and of th e n a tu re of th e identities which may hold betw een them th an with
discussions of so-called "A ristotelian essentialism ."
The non-modal ch aracter of A ristotle's distinction is heightened by th e fact
th a t th e whole possible-w orlds treatm ent of modalities, so popular and so p erv asiv e
in our d a y s , was completely foreign to A ristotle for whom th e only reality was th is
sequence of potential nows each of which will momentarily be actualized. Bence even
A ristotelian potentialities had to prove th e ir mettle within th is one actual world
h isto ry of o u rs, and so had his notions of form, essence, and o n e-n ess.
In spite of what I said of the mistakes of tw en tieth -cen tu ry philosophers, my
point h ere is not entirely new. M. J . Woods has argued "th at A ristotle held th a t a
statem ent like 'S ocrates is a man' was, despite appearances, to be c o n stru ed as a
statem ent of id e n tity ." In defense of his view. Woods re fe rs to such A ristotelian
p assag es as Met, Δ 18, 1022 a 26-27; Z 4, 1029 b 28; Z 7, 1032 b 1-2; Z 7 , 1032 b
1-2; Z 8, 1034 a 8. This is not th e place to evaluate his evidence. It seems to me
th a t Woods could have stren g th en ed his argum ent by a more general examination of
th e sta tu s of the "is" in A ristotle's "Socrates is a man" v is-à -v is the failure of th e
Frege-R ussell ambiguity th esis and of th e resu ltin g freedom for A ristotle to pick
and choose between different uses (not senses) of ’έστιν.
Moreover, Woods' diagnosis, rig h tly understood, p ertain s to A ristotle's problem
ra th e r th an to his solution. For what it is th a t follows from saying th a t in an
essential predication like "Socrates is a man" the "is" has th e force of identify?
Very little , for we are then faced with the next question: What is it about certain
p red icates th a t enable them to individuate th e ir b e arers in such a way th a t the "is"
of predication assumes the force of "is" of identity? And which predicates a re of
such a k in d , anyway? Clearly, these are among the main questions A ristotle
The Unambiguity of Aristotelian Being 11
ev ery
Y + wh-word + Z
some
where Z contains a "trace" to indicate where the wh-word was "moved away from .")
Now th e obvious way of form ulating instantiation ru les for such p h rases is to
legitimize a move from the sentence in which they occur to sentences like
. The Unambiguity of Aristotelian Being 13
where "_b" and "d" are the respective in stan tiatin g term s. In general, the output of
an instantiation step is of the form
(3) X - b - W
where _b_ is th e in stan tiatin g term and Z' is like Z except th at the trace has been
replaced by "b" with the appropriate preposition. (We have been assuming th a t Y
and Z aré here sin g u lar.)
The details need not detain us h e re . What is of in te re st to us here is an
im portant difference between the situation in formal firs t-o rd e r languages and
n atu ral languages. In the form er, a single domain of values for the su b stitu tin g
term s ( e .g . my "b" and "d") is given. In the la tte r, the entities re fe rre d to by the
su b stitution-values have to be chosen from different sub domains in different cases.
For in stan ce, in (1) b has to be a living c re atu re , whereas in (2) d has to be a
location in space.
It lies close at hand for a logician to say th a t the only novelty here is th a t
n a tu ra l languages employ m any-sorted quantification theory (more generally,
m any-sorted logic). And th is need not by itself introduce any complications
(co n trary to what is e .g . implied in J . M. E. Moravcsik 1976). Indeed, m any-sorted
logics do not involve any serious new difficulties over and above one-sorted ones.
Yet th ere is a new question p resen t h ere. In m any-sorted formal logics, the
sortal differences are indicated by notational conventions. How are these differences
marked in n atu ral languages? How can one tell what subdomain b o r d must belong
to?
Some clues are obvious, and the most obvious is the relative pronoun which
disappears in the process of instantiation. (These relative pronouns can be taken to
be question words in a new role, except th at "what" is replaced by " th a t." ) If th e
operative word is "who," the relevant subdomain consists of p erso n s, if "w here," of
locations in space, if "w hen,” of moments (an d /o r periods) of time, etc . F u rth e r
The Unambiguity of A ristotelian Being 14
(ni) The larg est classes of entities we have to recognize in the logic of our
language as domains of quantification.
(iv) C ertain semantically different cases of "is". (In them we of course cannot
distinguish from each other th e is of id en tity , existence, and
p redication.)
i
At th is point you are supposed to have a deja vu experience. For what I have
a rriv ed at by means of purely system atic (logical and semantical) considerations is
to all practical purposes tantam ount to A ristotle’s theory of categories. One of the
most fundam ental and most perplexing questions concerning A ristotle’s distinction
between different categories is: What is being distinguished from each other? What
is A ristotle classifying in separating the different categories from each other? He
uses different Greek question words o r question p h rases ( τ ί έ σ τ ι , ποσόν, ποιόν,
πρβ5 t i , που, ποτό) as names for six of the categories, and the o th er labels likewise
go naturally with certain types of questions in Greek. This is p re tty much how he
in fact p resen ts his categories in Top. I, 9. He envisages different kinds of
entities ’’put before one" and classifies the different th in g s th a t can be said (and
by implication asked) of it.
B ut when Aristotle introduces his categories in C at. 4, they appear as classes
of simple predicates o r ’’th in g s th a t can be said" of an e n tity . Which are they?
The plot is thickened fu rth e r by A ristotle’s deeply ingrained habit of
considering categories as th e widest genera of entities th a t can be logically
considered to g eth er. This is seen for instance from Met. Γ1 1003 b 19 ff. o r from
Post. An. A 22, 83 b 10-17.
Furtherm ore, A ristotle indicates repeatedly th a t the distinction between th e
d ifferen t categories goes to g eth er with a correlated distinction between d ifferent
uses of %στιν. What is more, occasionally he seems to ru n the two distinctions
to g eth er. For instance in Met. Z 1, 1028 a 10 ff. "th at which is" is said to signify
the different categories. See also Met. Δ 7, 1017 a 23-30.
Scholars have debated intensively which of these different th in g s A ristotle
"really" meant. For instance, one persuasion maintains th a t the categories rep re se n t
The Unambiguity of A ristotelian Being 16
what Ackrill su g g e sts, it is not at all clear th a t answ ers to different questions fall
into mutually exclusive classes which correspond to the widest classes of e n tities.
For in stan ce, it is perfectly legitimate to reply to the question "Who is the head of
th e Academy?" not only by saying "Plato" or "a man", b u t alternatively "a blond",
"the youngest b ro th e r of Potone", or even "he is sittin g th e re ", all of which have
to be pigeonholed in different categories. Only by means of a fu rth e r analysis can
one p erh ap s hope to eliminate some of these replies a*5 amounting only to p artial
answ ers (o r as supplying collateral information to back up the conclusiveness of an
an sw er). Worse still, AckrilTs account is intrinsically in co n sisten t. For if th e
appropriate answ ers to different questions belong to d ifferent categories, it is
impossible to construe A ristotle's categories as answ ers to one and the same
question "What is it?" as Ackrill also su g g e sts. Even if what he says can somehow
be salvaged in th e last analysis, it does not help us to u n d erstan d what A ristotle’s
categories really were in the lea st. Prima facie, it is fa r from obvious th at th e four
correlated distinctions we find in A ristotle should go to g eth er, and A ristotelian
scholars certainly have not supplied valid reasons why they should do so.
Now the b rie f analysis of the conditions of the conditions of instantiation which
I carried out above, p u ts both A ristotle's theory and discussions thereof into a new
p ersp ectiv e. Led b y purely topical (logical and semantical) argum ents, we have
a rriv e d a t a rem arkable reconstruction of A ristotle's th eo ry of categories. (My
argum ents have an even stro n g e r theoretical motivation th an I have spelled out
h e re , for they ensue from the basic ideas of the highly successful approach to
language analysis which I have called gam e-theoretical sem antics. For i t, see
Saarinen 1979.) We can now recognize all the apparently discrepant in g red ien ts of
A ristotle's doctrine in the system atic situation revealed b y my analysis. A ristotle's
use of question words and p h rases as labels for categories matches my use of
wh-words as a guide to th e subdomain involved in an in stantiation. His view of
categories as the different kinds of simple th in g s th a t can be said of an en tity
matches my classification of the meanings of simple predicates as guides to th e
logical "sort" inten d ed . His use of categories as the larg est classes of logically
comparable entities amounts to the focal point of my quest of the d ifferent larg e st
domains of quantification presupposed in a n atu ral language, and A ristotle's
correlation of d ifferent uses o f the word ^σ τι corresponds to the automatic
The Unambiguity of A ristotelian Being 18
alignment in my treatm ent of the o ther distinctions with certain differences in the
use of the word " is " .
What is more im portant, the correlation of these several distinctions is seen not
to be accidental o r artificial. Its reasons lie deep in the logic of th e situation.
C harles Kahn has suggested th a t the d ifferent A ristotelian distinctions rep re se n t
d ifferen t s tra ta in A ristotle's thinking. T hat may v e ry well be so, b u t we don't
u n d e rstan d A ristotle unless we also recognize the in trin sic logical connections
betw een th e d ifferent correlated classifications of his. No longer does it make any
sense to ask which of the several distinctions Aristotle "really" m eans, for th ey are
all inextricably intertw ined. The extensive controversies th a t have been prom pted
by th is question are simply otiose. (T his does not mean th a t differences of emphasis
are not called for here; c f . my comments below on those who stre s s the ties
betw een categories and question ty p e s .) The in te re stin g questions p ertain in stead
(in te r alia) to A ristotle’s aw areness of the connecting links between the differen t
d istinctions. Indeed, it is in spelling out th e main interrelations between th e
distinctions which converge in A ristotle’s theory of categories th at my
"tran scen d en tal deduction of th e categories" goes essentially beyond those earlier
scholars who have emphasized the m ulti-faceted ch aracter of A ristotelian categories.
Even though the reconstruction of A ristotelian categories which we have ju st
reach ed , perhaps does not ipso facto solve any major in terp retatio n al problem s, it
yields valuable clues which help to u n d e rstan d A ristotle and in many cases even
promise fu rth e r in sig h ts. For in stan ce, one problem we can now approach p e rta in s
to th e relation of A ristotle's theory to the facts of the Greek language.
T ren d elen b u rg , Apelt, and B enveniste have claimed th a t the A ristotelian
distinction betw een different categories reflects certain general featu res of th e
ancient Greek language. A ckrill's persuasive argum ents to the effect th a t what is
distinguished from each o th er in the category distinctions are not v erb al
expressions b u t entities may serve as an antidote to such excesses. However,
Ackrill’s th esis does not imply th a t A ristotle was not guided b y logical s tru c tu re s
which manifest them selves in the grammar of the Greek language. I cannot t r y to
w rite e ith er a transform ational grammar or a gam e-theoretical semantics for the
ancient Greek language. Suffice it merely to point out th a t the grammatical facts
which are highlighted by my treatm ent are less eye-catching b u t su b tler th a n those
flaunted by T rendelenburg and B enveniste. They p ertain to such th in g s as th e
id en tity (in form) of indefinite relatives with indirect in terro g ativ es in G reek, and
th e close relationship of both with quantifier w ords. These featu res of the Greek
The Unambiguity of Aristotelian Being 19
grammar serve to link the different correlated distinctions explained above to each
o th er especially closely, and th ereb y to motivate A ristotle’s th eo ry . If I had to find
linguistic evidence for my in terp retatio n of A ristotle, th a t is the direction in which
I could (and would) go. Even on the p resen t superficial level, it is not h a rd to see
th a t my treatm ent of instantiation works m utatis m utandis even b e tte r with Greek
th an with English.
Likewise, we are now in a position to draw an in te re stin g conclusion from o u r
observations. The different classés of questions with which A ristotle correlated his
o th er distinctions were prim arily in d irect questions. The correlation depends
crucially on an analogy between relative pronouns and question w o rd s, and th is
analogy (or near iden tity ) can obviously be b e st argued for b y comparing with each
o th er th e logical behavior of relative clauses and indirect questions. (An especially
useful Mittelglied here is the class of relative clauses without antecedents. T heir
logic is rem arkably similar to th a t of in direct q u estio n s.) A ristotle’s distinction
between different categories is less a distinction between d ifferen t question ty p es as
between question w ords, and it p ertain s to these words in so far as they are doing
du ty for th e ir relative clause tw ins.
This observation reflects somewhat unfavorably on those scholars who have
made much of the classification of questions as the alleged cornerstone of
Aristotelian categories. It seems to me th at th e ir th esis rem ains unproven.
Adm ittedly, the importance of the dialectical questioning games practiced in th e
Academy for A ristotle can scarcely be exaggerated. However, th e re is little
evidence in the Topics o r elsewhere th at th e theory of categories was developed for
(or from) such games.
as th e last and final word on the subject. Below -, I shall indicate one specific
limitation of my argum ent and consequently of our reco n stru cted theory of
A ristotelian categories. On a general theoretical level, another major shortcoming of
th e theory is obvious, connected with its relation to logical type distinctions. It is
in a wider logical and philosophical perspective clear th a t even Aristotelian category
distinctions must in the last analysis be based on type distinctions. The la tte r
distinctions may not coincide with Russell’s. Indeed, the ty p es (categories) of Frege
and R ussell seem to me too few and too fa r a p art to serve as a realistic basis of
our Sprachlogik. B ut, w hatever the requisite ty p es a re , they must serve as th e
foundation of any viable distinction betw een d ifferent categories. In o ther w ords,
some b rid g e has to be constructed from A ristotelian categories to logical ones to
vindicate them . How foreign modern type distinctions were for A ristotle is also
illu stra te d b y his deeply ingrained habit of brack etin g to g eth er the obtaining of
(what we would call) facts and the existence of individuals. (See e .g . Met. Z 17,
1041 a 14-16, b 4 -5 .)
This general problem is highlighted by th e more specific observation th a t ·.
A ristotelian categories tu rn out on my analysis to be quite different from logical
categories in the sense of logical ty p es. (T his point is relevant here among o th er
reasons because the contrary has been maintained by Gilbert Ryle; cf. Ryle
1937-1938.) Not only is i t the case th a t entities of a different logical type (in what
is roughly R ussell's sense) belong to the same category, as S o crates, man, and
animal all belong to th e so-called category of substance. T here is a sense in which
all categories come close to containing entities of the same logical ty p e. A fter all,
th ey all contain items which can be said of a substance like Socrates. For in stan ce,
th e members of the so-called category of relation are not relations for A ristotle, b u t
relatives (relational p red ic ates). This is amply shown by his discussion of th is
category in C at. 7, 8 a 35 f f . , especially his comments on correlatives and th e ir
epistemic and ontological interdependence. (C f. C at. 6, 6 a 35 f f . ;
De Soph. El. 31, 181 b 26-28; Top. VI, 4, 142 a 28-31; and VI, 8, 146 b 3 -4 .)
Likewise, quantities are not for A ristotle what we would mean by them ( e .g . a
le n g th ), b u t quantitative a ttrib u te s ( e .g . being of su ch-and-such le n g th ).
These observations are p erh ap s not v e ry su rp risin g . T here is a sense in
which the v e ry ’’category" of relation (as distinguished from relational pred icates)
came to its own only much late r in the histo ry of philosophy. (Cf. Weinberg 1965.)
However, the absence.of relations p ro p er from A ristotle's categorical scheme
highlights the problems it leads into. For where else can he put relations? The only
The Unambiguity of A ristotelian Being 21
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