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* Wayward biweekly journal focusing on not yet established intelligence news * * Editor: Roger Vleugels - roger.vleugels@planet.nl * * Donations are very welcome, see colophon * * Year 10 - No. 219 Dec 16 - 2010 *

Content minus NARINT & The Netherlands

Colour = WikiLeaks related articles

02Private Guards Outnumber Policemen 02Clumsy Vatican Diplomacy 04Taking Stock of WikiLeaks 07JASON: Science of Cyber Security … 08How Many Security Clearances? 08The Shadow War in Iran 11Islamic FBI Set-Ups 13WikiLeaks Cables on Litvinenko 14Sweden Military Knew about Attacks 14Focus on the Policy, not Wikileaks 15WL Iimplications for "the Cloud" 16Targeted Sanctions 16European Investigation Order 16Jailed Afghan Drug Lord Was US Spy 19The CIA's El-Masri Abduction 20België & VS akkoord: vingerafdrukken 21Leaks: Military Treatens Courts-Martial

21Govt Response to WikiLeaks Problematic 22Ex-Intel Officers See WikiLeaks Plusses

24Criminal Prohibitions WikiLeaks

25US Pressed Germany on CIA Kidnapping

26Publishing Classified Info 26Guidance on Using Leaked Docs 27Selling Classified US Docs 28Call to Probe Sweden-US Intel Contact 28The Many Headed Hydra 31US Used Israel Intel … Arms Trade 32US Govt Forced to Release Spy Docs

33Washington Fights to Rebuild Reputation

38Iran: Elite Security Unit after Stuxnet 38CRS Blocks Access to Wikileaks 39National Security: The Limits Change 40More Foreign Fighters … Back in Iraq 41Mossad: Was this the Chief's last Hit? 43Vast Hacking by a China that Fears … 45Russian Mole inside NSA 47Norwegian Firm Wins NATO Contract 47WikiLeaks War Room - Revisited 49JTF2: Canadian Secret Unit 49Syrian Spies Deployed to … Capitals 05Govt Reports Violations of Limits

51The Middle East Fallout Could Be Grave 52Obstructionists Hinder WikiLeaks Probe

53The Not So Secret US War in Pakistan 56Army withholds Lewis Spy Probe

57Is Killing our only Option for Terrorists? 58Attacks on Nuclear Scientists in Tehran 60Anti-terror Expert to Prevent new Leaks

61WikiLeaks and Rendition 63Sifting Through The Wikileaks Fallout

63Kim Philby on Truth in Diplomatic Cables

64US Focuses on Pakistan's Nuclear … 65Doubt on Iran Missile Cache 66Haftstrafe für Telekom-Mitarbeiter

Content on NARINT: Natural Resources Intel

[Co-editor Laetitia Baars -More info in colophon]

67Conference: The Future of Intelligence

68US Monitors Aggressive China in Africa 69Somalia's Pirates Take to the high Seas

Content on The Netherlands

70Why Holland Is so Important to US 75Conference: The Future of Intelligence 76► OM hield stukken achter … 76Boston Child Abuse - Netherlands 77Foute jurist blijkt lek FIOD 78NCTb krijgt ook rampen en crises erbij

Content ’in the Fringe’

79De Roy van Zuydewijn in het gelijk

80Fringe Colophon


EU Observer / by Andrew Rettman

Stringer: Frank Slijper / Campaign Against Arms Trade / Groningen NL / frank.slijper@hetnet.nl

Dec 15 2010 Dec 14. Private-sector security guards outnumber policemen in seven mostly post- Communist EU countries according to the latest figures from the CoESS, the Brussels-based private security lobby. Hungary tops the list with 104.97 private guards per 10,000 inhabitants compared to 39.94 police officers. The pro-private ratio is the second heaviest in Romania (49.84 private guards versus 25.62 policemen), followed by Ireland, Poland, Finland, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Italy, Spain, Malta, Denmark, Belgium and Lithuania have the lowest levels of private policing. The most populous EU countries tend to have the largest private security 'armies' overall, with 170,000 private guards in Germany, 165,000 in Poland, 160,000 in France and 120,000 in the UK. Romania (107,000) and Hungary (105,121) give the big countries a run for their money. But Turkey has the biggest private security corps in Europe with 257,192 personnel. "It is mostly the new EU member states that have a high private security force ratio," the study, entitled Third White Paper, says. "This trend confirms a continued and sustained choice for new economic aims, which are closer to the free market than the 'old' Europe, with the exception of Luxembourg and Ireland." The sector currently employs 1,630,524 people in Europe, up by 176,888 compared to 2009, and is dominated by men. In one trend: "Companies, individuals and a growing number of public authorities are asking the private security industry for personal protection [bodyguards]." CoESS is keen for the EU to roll out universally-recognised vocational qualifications for private guards to help them move jobs from country to country. But on the other hand, "in line with intensive lobbying by CoESS," the sector was kept out the EU's Services Directive, which obliges 'old' EU countries to let in workers from newcomers. Zooming in on Belgian legislation, bodyguards and guards accompanying consignments of valuables are allowed to carry guns. But most guards who protect buildings such as cinemas or shopping malls and night watchmen may not. Belgian law also forbids the vast majority of guards from using force. They can perform citizens' arrest using handcuffs in special cases, however. EU buildings in Brussels are currently protected by the UK-based G4S company, which famously failed to stop an armed robbery inside the European Parliament in 2009. Meanwhile, the EU's new diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS), is drawing up new guidelines on how to protect its 136 foreign delegations. An EU official told this website that Brussels tends to borrow soldiers from member states which already have heavily-guarded embassies in given hotspots, such as the UK in Iraq and France in Chad. "It is envisaged that there will be 'public sector' soldiers providing security for some delegations. In some cases it will be too politically sensitive to have physical security provided exclusively by private companies. So we are in this debate," the contact said. The official added that there are "different cost and legal implications" of using private security forces:

"If a guard killed somebody, unfortunately it is the company that provides the services that is responsible for those services." In one example, the EU compound in Kabul is guarded by an outer ring of foreign-trained Afghan police, an inner ring of Nepalese Gurkhas and close protection bodyguards from the private London- ased company Page Group.

The specialist Paris-based publication, Intelligence Online, reported in October that France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security is trying to help French companies break Anglo-Saxon firms' dominant position in the sector. It named the French ambassador in Baghdad, Boris Boillon, as promoting services by AICS Protection, Gallice Iraq Services and Anitcip.


EU Observer / by Andrew Rettman

Stringer: Frank Slijper / Campaign Against Arms Trade / Groningen NL / frank.slijper@hetnet.nl

Dec 14 2010 Dec 13. Freshly-published cables from the US mission to the Vatican have shed light on the inner workings of Europe's most secretive diplomatic corps, including the Pope's opposition to Turkey's EU membership, hopes for Polish influence inside the EU and church ideas on how to

undermine the Castro administration in Cuba. The 15 cables published by WikiLeaks on Friday (10 December), covering the period from 2001 to 2010, highlight US belief in the Vatican's global clout. "The Vatican is second only to the United States in the number of countries with which it enjoys diplomatic relations (188 and 177 respectively), and there are Catholic priests, nuns and lay people in every country on the planet. As the spiritual leader of 1.3 billion Catholics worldwide and enjoying respect as well from non-Catholics, the Pope wields an unparalleled moral megaphone," a 2009 US note ahead of President Barack Obama's meeting with the pontiff says. "Private comments from Vatican officials to European diplomats also carry some weight - particularly in the traditionally Catholic countries," a 2006 cable says. The cables praise Pope Benedict XVI's broad support for the Middle East Peace Process and his handling of a tricky encounter with the Socialist Zapatero government in Spain in 2006. "The pope's tack in Spain [on same-sex marriages] was milder than some expected," a 2006 US cable says. "Benedict has used tact and persuasion rather than fire and brimstone in his battle against relativism and secularism." The rest of the material indicates that the Vatican has fumbled almost every diplomatic crisis in recent years, however. The cables note that in 2004 the church stood back while media depicted private remarks by the then Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, that Turkey should not join the EU as being sofficial Vatican policy. In 2009, the church angered the international Jewish community by failing to denounce the holocaust- denying views of a renegade bishop and proposing to canonize Nazi-collaborator Pope Pius XII. "The Pope welcomed him [Bishop Williamson] back into the Church, but they waited days to do so [speak out on the holocaust], and then did it weakly," a 2009 US cable says. "Church officials did not expect the criticism and were annoyed by it," the cable adds on Pius XII. The same year, Pope Benedict XVI's announcement that disgruntled Anglican bishops should join the Roman Catholic church raised concerns in Washington. "There is still latent anti-Catholicism in some parts of England and it may not take much to set it off. The outcome could be discrimination or in isolated cases, even violence, against this [Catholic] minority," a US diplomat remarked. The church in 2009 also caused a "public furore" in Ireland by complaining that a major sex-abuse inquiry violated "Vatican sovereignty." "The Nuncio in Ireland made things worse by simply ignoring the requests [to appear before national commissions]," the related cable says. The US links the failures to Pope Benedict XVI's inner circle of septuagenerian advisors, who are out of touch with the modern world, do not speak English and act as "Yes-men" to the pontiff. "Most of the top ranks of the Vatican - all men, generally in their seventies - do not understand modern media and new information technologies. The blackberry-using Father Lombardi remains an anomaly in a culture in which many officials do not even have official email accounts," another 2009 cable says. Turkey: in or out? The cables indicate that the Vatican is ambiguous about the prospect of Turkish EU entry. On one hand, Cardinal Ratzinger said in 2004 that "Turkey had always been 'in permanent contrast to Europe' and that linking it to Europe would be a mistake." "Ratzinger has been a leading voice behind the Holy See's unsuccessful drive to secure a reference to Europe's 'Christian roots' in the EU constitution, and he clearly understands that allowing a Muslim country into the EU would further weaken his case for Europe's Christian foundations," the 2004 cable adds. On the other hand, senior Vatican officials believe: "Turkey could help to ease tensions between the Western and Muslim worlds, illustrating how a secular state with a Muslim population could co-operate with countries with a Judeo-Christian heritage." But a 2009 US cable says: "The Vatican might prefer to see Turkey develop a special relationship short of membership with the EU." Meanwhile, the Vatican hopes that Poland will help it to steer EU policy-making on social issues. "The Holy See's attention to Poland is not simply customer service or 'taking care of the troops.' As was clear under Pope John Paul II, the Vatican has high hopes that Poland will serve as a counter- weight to Western European secularism," a 2006 US note says. "Certainly the Holy See hopes that Poland will hold the line at the EU on 'life and family' issues that arise." Handling the Castro brothers Not all of Pope Benedict XVI's lieutenants are as ignorant of communications issues as the 2009 cable on his inner circle suggests, however. In a 2010 cable, one Monsignor Nicolas Thevenin told Washington that the Vatican supports Spain's

failed push to lift EU sanctions on Cuba. "He

over that of Poland or the Czech Republic as being more conducive to a positive response from the

Cubans," the US note says. Monsignor Thevenin also advised the US to "lean on telecommunications

implied a preference for the soft approach of Spain

companies to make sure that rates for Cubans to call the US would be very low. This, he thought, could have a positive impact in promoting political change." The Vatican in a statement released at the weekend tried to undermine the value of the WikiLeaks material. "These reports reflect the perceptions and opinions of the people who wrote them and cannot be considered as expressions of the Holy See itself, nor as exact quotations of the words of its officials," it said. "I am very proud to be described as a 'Yes-man'," one of the Pope's top advisors, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, told Italian media.


http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101213-taking-stock-wikileaks Stratfor / by George Friedman Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Dec 14 2010 Julian Assange has declared that geopolitics will be separated into pre-"Cablegate" and post-"Cablegate" eras. That was a bold claim. However, given the intense interest that the leaks produced, it is a claim that ought to be carefully considered. Several weeks have passed since the first of the diplomatic cables were released, and it is time now to address the following questions: First, how significant were the leaks? Second, how could they have happened? Third, was their release a crime? Fourth, what were their consequences? Finally, and most important, is the WikiLeaks premise that releasing government secrets is a healthy and appropriate act a tenable position? Let's begin by recalling that the U.S. State Department documents constituted the third wave of leaks. The first two consisted of battlefield reports from Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking back on those as a benchmark, it is difficult to argue that they revealed information that ran counter to informed opinion. I use the term "informed opinion" deliberately. For someone who was watching Iraq and Afghanistan with some care over the previous years, the leaks might have provided interesting details but they would not have provided any startling distinction between the reality that was known and what was revealed. If, on the other hand, you weren‘t paying close attention, and WikiLeaks provided your first and only view of the battlefields in any detail, you might have been surprised. Let's consider the most controversial revelation, one of the tens of thousands of reports released on Iraq and Afghanistan and one in which a video indicated that civilians were deliberately targeted by U.S. troops. The first point, of course, is that the insurgents, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, did not go into combat wearing armbands or other distinctive clothing to distinguish themselves from non-combatants. The Geneva Conventions have always been adamant on this requirement because they regarded combatants operating under the cover of civilians as being responsible for putting those civilians in harm's way, not the uniformed troops who were forced to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants when the combatants deliberately chose to act in violation of the Geneva Conventions. It follows from this that such actions against civilians are inevitable in the kind of war Iraqi insurgents chose to wage. Obviously, this particular event has to be carefully analyzed, but in a war in which combatants blend with non-combatants, civilian casualties will occur, and so will criminal actions by uniformed troops. Hundreds of thousands of troops have fought in Iraq, and the idea that criminal acts would be absent is absurd. What is most startling is not the presence of potentially criminal actions but their scarcity. Anyone who has been close to combat or who has read histories of World War II would be struck not by the presence of war crimes but by the fact that in all the WikiLeaks files so few potential cases are found. War is controlled violence, and when controls fail - as they inevitably do - uncontrolled and potentially criminal violence occurs. However, the case cited by WikiLeaks with much fanfare did not clearly show criminal actions on the part of American troops as much as it did the consequences of the insurgents violating the Geneva Conventions. Only those who were not paying attention to the fact that there was a war going on, or who had no understanding of war, or who wanted to pretend to be shocked for political reasons, missed two crucial points: It was the insurgents who would be held responsible for criminal acts under the Geneva Conventions for posing as non-combatants, and there were extraordinarily few cases of potential war crimes that were contained in the leaks. The diplomatic leaks are similar. There is precious little that was revealed that was unknown to the informed observer. For example, anyone reading STRATFOR knows we have argued that it was not only the Israelis but also the Saudis that were most concerned about Iranian power and most insistent that the United States do something about it. While the media treated this as a significant revelation, it

required a profound lack of understanding of the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf to regard U.S. diplomatic cables on the subject as surprising. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' statement in the leaks that the Saudis were always prepared to fight to the last American was embarrassing, in the sense that Gates would have to meet with Saudi leaders in the future and would do so with them knowing what he thinks of them. Of course, the Saudis are canny politicians and diplomats and they already knew how the American leadership regarded their demands. There were other embarrassments also known by the informed observer. Almost anyone who worries about such things is aware that Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is close to the Russians and likes to party with young women. The latest batch of leaks revealed that the American diplomatic service was also aware of this. And now Berlusconi is aware that they know of these things, which will make it hard for diplomats to pretend that they don't know of these things. Of course, Berlusconi was aware that everyone knew of these things and clearly didn't care, since the charges were all over Italian media. I am not cherry-picking the Saudi or Italian memos. The consistent reality of the leaks is that they do not reveal anything new to the informed but do provide some amusement over certain comments, such as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev being called "Batman and Robin." That's amusing, but it isn't significant. Amusing and interesting but almost never significant is what I come away with having read through all three waves of leaks. Obviously, the leaks are being used by foreign politicians to their own advantage. For example, the Russians feigned shock that NATO would be reassuring the Balts about defense against a potential Russian invasion or the Poles using the leaks to claim that solid U.S.-Polish relations are an illusion. The Russians know well of NATO plans for defending the Baltic states against a hypothetical Russian invasion, and the Poles know equally well that U.S.-Polish relations are complex but far from illusory. The leaks provide an opportunity for feigning shock and anger and extracting possible minor concessions or controlling atmospherics. They do not, however, change the structure of geopolitics. Indeed, U.S. diplomats come away looking sharp, insightful and decent. While their public statements after a conference may be vacuous, it is encouraging to see that their read of the situation and of foreign leaders is unsentimental and astute. Everything from memos on senior leaders to anonymous snippets from apparently junior diplomats not only are on target (in the sense that STRATFOR agrees with them) but are also well-written and clear. I would argue that the leaks paint a flattering picture overall of the intellect of U.S. officials without revealing, for the most part, anything particularly embarrassing. At the same time, there were snarky and foolish remarks in some of the leaks, particularly personal comments about leaders and sometimes their families that were unnecessarily offensive. Some of these will damage diplomatic careers, most generated a good deal of personal tension and none of their authors will likely return to the countries in which they served. Much was indeed unprofessional, but the task of a diplomat is to provide a sense of place in its smallest details, and none expect their observations ever to be seen by the wrong people. Nor do nations ever shift geopolitical course over such insults, not in the long run. These personal insults were by far the most significant embarrassments to be found in the latest release. Personal tension is not, however, international tension. This raises the question of why diplomats can't always simply state their minds rather than publicly mouth preposterous platitudes. It could be as simple as this: My son was a terrible pianist. He completely lacked talent. After his recitals at age 10, I would pretend to be enthralled. He knew he was awful and he knew I knew he was awful, but it was appropriate that I not admit what I knew. It is called politeness and sometimes affection. There is rarely affection among nations, but politeness calls for behaving differently when a person is in the company of certain other people than when that person is with colleagues talking about those people. This is the simplest of human rules. Not admitting what you know about others is the foundation of civilization. The same is true among diplomats and nations. And in the end, this is all I found in the latest WikiLeaks release: a great deal of information about people who aren't American that others certainly knew and were aware that the Americans knew, and now they have all seen it in writing. It would take someone who truly doesn‘t understand how geopolitics really works to think that this would make a difference. Some diplomats may wind up in other postings, and perhaps some careers will be ended. But the idea that this would somehow change the geopolitics of our time is really hard to fathom. I have yet to see Assange point to something so significant that that it would justify his claim. It may well be that the United States is hiding secrets that would reveal it to be monstrous. If so, it is not to be found in what has been released so far.

There is, of course, the question of whether states should hold secrets, which is at the root of the WikiLeaks issue. Assange claims that by revealing these secrets WikiLeaks is doing a service. His ultimate maxim, as he has said on several occasions, is that if money and resources are being spent on keeping something secret, then the reasons must be insidious. Nations have secrets for many reasons, from protecting a military or intelligence advantage to seeking some advantage in negotiations to, at times, hiding nefarious plans. But it is difficult to imagine a state - or a business or a church - acting without confidentiality. Imagine that everything you wrote and said in an attempt to figure out a problem was made public? Every stupid idea that you discarded or clueless comment you expressed would now be pinned on you. But more than that, when you argue that nations should engage in diplomacy rather than war, taking away privacy makes diplomacy impossible. If what you really think of the guy on the other side of the table is made public, how can diplomacy work? This is the contradiction at the heart of the WikiLeaks project. Given what I have read Assange saying, he seems to me to be an opponent of war and a supporter of peace. Yet what he did in leaking these documents, if the leaking did anything at all, is make diplomacy more difficult. It is not that it will lead to war by any means; it is simply that one cannot advocate negotiations and then demand that negotiators be denied confidentiality in which to conduct their negotiations. No business could do that, nor could any other institution. Note how vigorously WikiLeaks hides the inner workings of its own organization, from how it is funded to the people it employs. Assange's claims are made even more interesting in terms of his "thermonuclear" threat. Apparently there are massive files that will be revealed if any harm comes to him. Implicit is the idea that they will not be revealed if he is unharmed - otherwise the threat makes no sense. So, Assange's position is that he has secrets and will keep them secret if he is not harmed. I regard this as a perfectly reasonable and plausible position. One of the best uses for secrets is to control what the other side does to you. So Assange is absolutely committed to revealing the truth unless it serves his interests not to, in which case the public has no need to know. It is difficult to see what harm the leaks have done, beyond embarrassment. It is also difficult to understand why WikiLeaks thinks it has changed history or why Assange lacks a sufficient sense of irony not to see the contradiction between his position on openness and his willingness to keep secrets when they benefit him. But there is also something important here, which is how this all was leaked in the first place. To begin that explanation, we have to go back to 9/11 and the feeling in its aftermath that the failure of various government entities to share information contributed to the disaster. The answer was to share information so that intelligence analysts could draw intelligence from all sources in order to connect the dots. Intelligence organizations hate sharing information because it makes vast amounts of information vulnerable. Compartmentalization makes it hard to connect dots, but it also makes it harder to have a WikiLeaks release. The tension between intelligence and security is eternal, and there will never be a clear solution. The real issue is who had access to this mass of files and what controls were put on them. Did the IT department track all external drives or e-mails? One of the reasons to be casual is that this was information that was classified secret and below, with the vast majority being at the confidential, no- foreign-distribution level. This information was not considered highly sensitive by the U.S. government. Based on the latest trove, it is hard to figure out how the U.S. government decides to classify material. But it has to be remembered that given their level of classification these files did not have the highest security around them because they were not seen as highly sensitive. Still, a crime occurred. According to the case of Daniel Ellsberg, who gave a copy of the Pentagon Papers on Vietnam to a New York Times reporter, it is a crime for someone with a security clearance to provide classified material for publication but not a crime for a publisher to publish it, or so it has become practice since the Ellsberg case. Legal experts can debate the nuances, but this has been the practice for almost 40 years. The bright line is whether the publisher in any way encouraged or participated in either the theft of the information or in having it passed on to him. In the Ellsberg case, he handed it to reporters without them even knowing what it was. Assange has been insisting that he was the passive recipient of information that he had nothing to do with securing. Now it is interesting whether the sheer existence of WikiLeaks constituted encouragement or conspiracy with anyone willing to pass on classified information to him. But more interesting by far is the sequence of events that led a U.S. Army private first class not only to secure the material but to know where to send it and how to get it there. If Pfc. Bradley Manning conceived and executed the theft by himself, and gave the information to WikiLeaks unprompted, Assange is clear. But anyone who assisted Manning or encouraged him is probably guilty of conspiracy, and if Assange knew what was being done, he is probably guilty, too. There was talk about some people at MIT helping Manning. Unscrambling the sequence is what the Justice Department is undoubtedly doing now. Assange

cannot be guilty of treason, since he isn't a U.S. citizen. But he could be guilty of espionage. His bestdefense will be that he can't be guilty of espionage because the material that was stolen was so trivial. I have no idea whether or when he got involved in the acquisition of the material. I do know - given the material leaked so far - that there is little beyond minor embarrassments contained within it. Therefore, Assange's claim that geopolitics has changed is as false as it is bold. Whether he committed any crime, including rape, is something I have no idea about. What he is clearly guilty of is hyperbole. But contrary to what he intended, he did do a service to the United States. New controls will be placed on the kind of low-grade material he published. Secretary of Defense Gates made the following point on this: "Now, I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it's in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments - some governments - deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation." "Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest." I don't like to give anyone else the final word, but in this case Robert Gates' view is definitive. One can pretend that WikiLeaks has redefined geopolitics, but it hasn't come close.


Source: Steven Aftergood / Secrecy News / FAS / Washington / www.fas.org Dec 14 2010 Dec 14. "Cyber security is now critical to our survival but as a field of research [it] does not have a firm scientific basis," according to the Department of Defense. "Our current security approaches have had limited success and have become an arms race with our adversaries. In order to achieve security breakthroughs we need a more fundamental understanding of the science of cyber security." To help advance that understanding, the DoD turned to the JASON defense advisory panel, which has just produced a new report on the subject. "There is a science of cyber security," the JASONs said, but it "seems underdeveloped in reporting experimental results, and consequently in the ability to use them." The JASON report began by noting that "A science of cyber security has to deal with a combination of peculiar features that are shared by no other area of study." "First, the background on which events occur is almost completely created by humans and is digital. That is, people built all the pieces. One might have thought that computers, their software, and networks were therefore completely understandable. The truth is that the cyber-universe is complex well beyond anyone's understanding and exhibits behavior that no one predicted, and sometimes can't even be explained well [after the fact]," the report said. "Second, cyber security has good guys and bad guys. It is a field that has developed because people have discovered how to do things that other people disapprove of, and that break what is thought to be an agreed-upon social contract in the material world. That is, in cyber security there are adversaries, and the adversaries are purposeful and intelligent."

The JASON report went on to discuss the importance of definitions (including the definition of cyber security itself, which is "imprecise"), the need for a standard vocabulary to discuss the subject, and the necessity (and difficulty) of devising experimental protocols that would permit development of a reproducible experimental science of cyber security. "There are no surprises in this report, nor any particularly deep insights," the JASON authors stated modestly. "Most people familiar with the field will find the main points familiar." Also, "There may be errors in the report, and substantive disagreements with it." In fact, however, the report is full of stimulating observations and is also, like many JASON reports, quite well written. While cyber security fundamentally requires an understanding of computer science, the report explained that it "also share aspects of sciences such as epidemiology, economics, and clinical medicine; all these analogies are helpful in providing research directions." An analogy between cyber security and the human immune system, with its "innate" and "adaptive" components, was found to be particularly fruitful. "At the most abstract level, studying the immune system suggests that cyber security solutions will


adaptive solutions are expensive in terms of needed resources. Approximately 1% of human cells are

lymphocytes, reflecting a rather large commitment to immune defense. [By analogy,] one should

need to be adaptive, incorporating learning algorithms and flexible memory mechanisms

therefore expect that significant amount of computational power would be needed to run cyber security for a typical network or cluster." The report recommended DoD support for a network of cyber security research centers in universities

and elsewhere. With barely a hint of irony, the JASONs also endorsed an April 2010 statement by Wang Chen, China's chief internet officer, that "Leaking of secrets via the Internet is posing serious threats to national security and interests."

A copy of the new JASON report was obtained by Secrecy News. See "Science of Cyber-Security,"

November 2010.


Source: Steven Aftergood / Secrecy News / FAS / Washington / www.fas.org

Dec 14 2010 Dec 14. How many government employees and contractors hold security clearances for access to classified information? Remarkably, it is not possible to answer that question today with any precision. But it should be possible by next February, officials said at a House Intelligence Subcommittee hearing on December 1. Currently there is no precise tally of the number of cleared persons, and there is no way to produce one, said John Fitzpatrick, Director of the ODNI Special Security Center.

"We can find definitively if any individual has a clearance at any one point in time," he told Rep. Anna Eshoo, the subcommittee chair. But "to take that point in time and define the number of all the people that do takes a manipulation of data in databases that weren't intended to do that." "To give a precise [answer] requires, I think, due diligence in the way we collect that data and the way that data changes." And in fact, "we have a special data collection to provide a definitive answer on that in the February 2011 IRTPA report," referring to an upcoming report required under the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.

In the meantime, Mr. Fitzpatrick said, "To give a ballpark number [of total security clearances] is not

difficult." Well then, Rep. Eshoo asked, "What would a ballpark figure today be?" "Oh, I'd like to take that one for the record," Mr. Fitzpatrick replied. "It's -- you know, I'd give you -- I'd

like to take that one for the record." Based on prior reporting by the Government Accountability Office, the ballpark figure that we use is 2.5 million cleared persons. ("More Than 2.4 Million Hold Security Clearances," Secrecy News, July 29, 2009).


Someone is killing Iran’s nuclear scientists. But a computer worm may be the scarier threat

Newsweek / by Christopher Dickey, R. M. Schneiderman and Babak Dehghanpisheh

Stringer: Frank Slijper / Campaign Against Arms Trade / Groningen NL / frank.slijper@hetnet.nl

Dec 14 2010 Dec 13. The covert operations that target Irans nuclear program suddenly came to light with explosive violence and stunning implications for the future of warfare on Nov. 29. On that Monday morning, dawn had just broken over a bustling Tehran so deeply shrouded in smog that many commuters wore face masks to protect against the fumes and dust in the air. On Artesh Street, among rows of new and half-finished apartment blocks, the nuclear physicist Majid Shahriari was working his way through rush-hour traffic with his wife and bodyguard in his Peugeot sedan. A motorcycle pulled up beside the scientist‘s car. Nothing extraordinary about that. But then the man on the bike stuck something to the outside of the door and sped away. When the magnetically attached bomb went off, its focused explosion killed Shahriari instantly. It wounded the others in the car but spared their lives. A clean hit. Only a few minutes later and a few miles away, in a leafy neighborhood in the foothills of the Alborz Mountains, again a motorcycle pulled alongside the car of another scientist, Fereydoun Abbasi

Davani. A longtime member of Iran‘s Revolutionary Guards, Abbasi Davani was named specifically in a United Nations sanctions resolution as ―involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities.‖ Sensing what was about to happen, he stopped the car, jumped out, and managed to pull his wife to safety before the bomb went off. That same morning, in Israel, where many see Iran‘s nuclear program as a threat to the very existence

of the Jewish state, nobody celebrated the Tehran attacks publicly. Nobody claimed responsibility. But

nobody denied it, either. And as it happened, that was the morning Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Meir Dagan would be stepping down after eight years directing the Mossad and its secret operations against Iran. Under a photograph of Shahriari‘s thoroughly perforated Peugeot, one of Israel‘s tabloids ran the headline LAST SHOT FOR DAGAN? This longest day in a dark war was not over yet, however. In Tehran that Monday afternoon, at a press conference that had been delayed for two hours, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told reporters there was ―no doubt the hand of the Zionist regime and the Western governments‖ had been involved in the attacks on the scientists. Then, for the first time, Ahmadinejad admitted something that his government had tried to deny until that moment: the high-speed centrifuges used to enrich uranium for use as nuclear fuel in reactors, or possibly for weapons, had been damaged by a cyberattack. Iran‘s enemies—he didn‘t specify which ones—had been ―successful in making problems for a limited number of our centrifuges with software they installed in electronic devices.‖ Ahmadinejad assured the press that the problem was now taken care of. ―They are unable to repeat these acts,‖ he claimed. Yet only a few days before, top Iranian officials had declared there was no problem at all. Rarely has a covert war been so obvious, and rarely have the underlying facts been so murky. Conspiracy theory hangs as heavy in Tehran these days as the smog: a number of Iranian reformists

opposed to Ahmadinejad have suggested the two scientists targeted in November, as well as another one, Masoud Ali Mohammadi, killed by an exploding motorcycle in January, were attacked by the regime itself because their loyalties were suspect. All reportedly sympathized to some extent with the opposition Green Movement. Both Mohammadi and Shahriari had attended at least one meeting of SESAME, a U.N.-linked research organization based in Jordan, where Israelis as well as Arabs and Iranians were present. ―In the eyes of the Revolutionary Guards, everybody‘s a potential spy,‖ says a former Iranian intelligence officer, who asked not to be named because of likely retributions inside Iran. ―You are either 100 percent dedicated to the system or you are an enemy.‖ So, who done it? The speculation itself is part of the psychological game played by various governments against Iran and to some extent against each other. In what Cold War spies would have called ―a wilderness of mirrors,‖ different intelligence services may take credit, with a wink and a nod, for things they did not do, while denying they did what they actually did do. Enemies of Iran can take pleasure, for now at least, in the fear stirred up by uncertainty. What we can deduce from the limited evidence that has emerged so far, according to former White House counterterrorism and cyberwarfare adviser Richard Clarke, is that at least two countries conducted operations against Iran simultaneously and not necessarily in close coordination. One likely carried out the hits; the other created and somehow infiltrated the highly sophisticated Stuxnet worm into computers of the Iranian nuclear program. In an interview, Clarke, who now runs a security- consulting business, strongly suggested Israel and the United States are the likely sources of the attacks. Other analysts suggest that France, Britain, and especially Germany, home of Siemens, which made the software and some of the hardware attacked by the Stuxnet worm, might also be involved. (A spokesman for Siemens says the company no longer does business with Iran.) Historically, Israel‘s covert operations have been on the violent side. When it comes to strategic murders, the Mossad has established a record 50 years long of ―targeted assassinations,‖ often taking out scientists who tried to help its enemies develop weapons of mass destruction. It has carried out hits all over the Middle East and Europe (see following story). Iran knows this history well: Israeli intelligence sources, who decline to be named on the record, coyly suggest that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are so convinced the Mossad directed the assassination plots that the Guards are taking extreme measures to protect the man considered next on the hit list: Mohsen Fakhrizadeh,

a professor of nuclear physics whom the Israelis sometimes call ―the Iranian Dr. Strangelove.‖ They

believe he‘s directing a secret nuclear-weapons program that is distinct from the public enrichment operations at Natanz and elsewhere, which are open to United Nations inspectors. (The official Iranian government position is that all its nuclear research and all its uranium enrichment are for purely peaceful purposes.) The real damage to the Iranian nuclear program, however, was done by Stuxnetthe most sophisticated computer worm ever detected and analyzed, one targeting hardware as well as software, and a paradigm of covert cyberweapons to come. ―Stuxnet is the start of a new era,‖ says Stewart Baker, former general counsel of the U.S. National Security Agency. ―It‘s the first time we‘ve actually seen a weapon created by a state to achieve a goal that you would otherwise have used multiple cruise missiles to achieve.‖

According to figures compiled by David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security,

a Washington think tank that follows the Iranian program closely, Tehran had major problems bringing

new centrifuges online throughout 2009. The first 4,000 already installed at the Natanz facility continued to spin, but the next 5,000 were beset by delays. The worst problems came in an array of

centrifuges known as A-26, which Iran began installing in late 2008around the time Stuxnet was sent on its mission. In the late summer of 2009, half the functioning A-26 centrifuges had to be pulled out of service. At the turn of this year, Albright has learned, 1,000 more simply broke down. This may have been the ―limited number‖ Ahmadinejad was talking about. Not all of the breakdowns can be attributed to Stuxnet. Spies from Israel and probably elsewhere have long been involved in the sabotage of high-tech materials and components for the Iranian nuclear program that Tehran has had to acquire on the black market because of U.N. sanctions. As far back as April 2007, Eli Levite, then deputy director of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, told a closed forum that ―our efforts gained time for us and have doubtlessly caused significant delays in the [Iranian nuclear] project.‖ The threshold at which Iran can be deemed a real nuclear-weapons powerwhich is the point at which Israel might launch a military strike to neutralize the threat, even if that risked dragging the United States into a third Muslim-world waris pushed back by these covert operations. And that gives diplomacy a chance even if, as happened in Geneva last week, talks with Iran appear to make little progress. Some press reports suggest that Stuxnet, too, is an Israeli weapon. They point to Tel Aviv‘s prowess in computer science, especially in highly secretive groups like Unit 8200, the Israeli military‘s legendary cyber outfit. They point to some code in Stuxnet that might suggest the date on which a prominent Jewish businessman was executed in Tehran in 1979, or the name ―Myrtus,‖ which could be construed as a reference to Esther, the biblical Jewish queen of Persia who stopped a genocide, and so on. But Clarke cautions against such convoluted explanations. ―The argument is that the Israelis are trying to subtly let the Iranians know it was themnot so subtly that they claim it publicly, but enough so the Iranians get to know,‖ he says. ―Stay away from all that.‖ What‘s clear, says Clarke, is that major resources went into Stuxnet‘s development. Microsoft estimates that building the virus likely took 10,000 man-days of labor by top-rank software engineers. Unlike most of the worms and viruses that wreak havoc on computers, this one was not designed to spread far and wide, doing damage wherever it landed. It is structured to target a specific set of devices manufactured only in Finland and Iran that are used to determine the speed at which the centrifuges rotate. If that speed is not modulated perfectly, vibrations make the machines break down, as indeed they have. According to Eric Chien of the antivirus firm Symantec, who has pulled Stuxnet apart like a strand of DNA, all that incredibly complex information was built into it before it ever infected the Iranian system. Clarke suggests that whoever developed Stuxnet probably had the same types of software and centrifuges on which to run tests. ―That‘s expensive,‖ he says. ―That‘s millions of dollars.‖ Because the Iranian nuclear program‘s computers are not connected to the Internet, the worm couldn‘t have been introduced to them online. It‘s presumed to have come from a USB thumb drive that the user may or may not have known was infected: Stuxnet was designed to do nothing to computers that didn‘t connect with the control mechanisms it targeted. And then, depending on where it found itself, Stuxnet was supposed to self-destruct. According to Chien, different components of the virus have different ―time to live‖ mechanisms. A USB key inserted into a newly infected computer can‘t carry the worm for more than 21 days. After that, it disappears. The worm is programmed to quit exploiting one particular weakness in Microsoft‘s software after June 1, 2011, and the worm‘s overall time to live runs out in June 2012. Why bother with an expiration date at all? The answer supplied by Clarke is so very Washington- centric that it‘s almost a dead giveaway. ―All that suggests to me a nation-state actor with a series of lawyers involved in looking at the covert action,‖ says Clarke, whose latest book is Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It. ―I‘ve never seen or heard of a worm before that limited its spread.‖ One explanation, of course, is that the creators of the virus hoped it would self- destruct before it was discovered. Another, however, is that the creators and their government hoped to limit their liability if they were ever exposed. A former senior intelligence official in the U.S. government has doubts the CIA could have vetted such an attack. ―The applicable presidential findings we had in this arena did not cover this kind of activity,‖ he says. If the United States were involved, he adds, it would have had to be a Defense Department operation. Whoever was behind this seminal cyberattack, the next such worm, which might be adapted from the Stuxnet codes that are now widely circulated, may not be so punctilious. (Imagine what WikiLeaks- supporting anarchists might do with it. Or the Iranians.) Like other weapons that have transformed the battlefields of the last century only to become so widespread that they threaten their creators, this worm could turn.


Islamic 'Pipeline to Extremism' Turns Out to Be Mostly FBI Set-Ups

Foreign Policy in Focus / by Francis Njubi Nesbitt [Foreign Policy in Focus contributor. He is the author of Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994 and is currently completing a book on U.S. foreign policies in the Horn of Africa]


Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl

Dec 13 2010 Dec 7. The recent rash of charges against Somali-Americans on ―conspiracy to provide material support‖ to al-Shabaab, a Somali rebel group on the U.S. terrorism list, seems designed to send a clear message that any support for the militants will lead to criminal prosecution. It also demonstrates the ubiquitous presence of law enforcement in these communities. The Obama administration must be careful, however, not to play into the hands of jihadists by overreacting or seeming to unfairly target Somali immigrants. The recent arrest of Mohamed Osman Mahmoud , a 19-year-old Oregonian of Somali descent, is a case in point. Like other inept would-be terrorists who fell for recent FBI sting operations, Mahmoud was obviously incapable of pulling off any complex operation without the help of the FBI. His attempts to contact international jihadists had failed. FBI agents then contacted him, built the bomb, and provided the suspect with money to rent an apartment. His indictment states Mahmoud wanted to commit an act of terrorism since he was 15 years old. Although Mahmoud‘s alleged views are deplorable, merely fantasizing about jihad is not a crime. Radicalization The media and policymakers argue that this is a process of ―radicalization‖ that turns self-identified radicals into jihadists. The New York Police Department‘s much- quoted 2006 analysis of radicalization, Radicalization of the West: The Homegrown Threat , argued that there are four identifiable stages (pre-radicalization, self- identification, indoctrination, jihadization) in the process of radicalization. Borrowing mainly from the European experience, the report ascribes ―jihadist or jihadi- Salafi ideology‖ as what mainly ―motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out autonomous jihad via acts of terrorism against their host countries.‖ However, this assumption does not apply to all would-be militants. Some, like the Somali youth who joined al-Shabaab in 2008, may have been motivated by nationalism rather than anti-Americanism. Analyzing the Mahmoud case in the context of the NYPD theory, the teen was only at the second stage -- self-identification. As the NYPD report indicates, there is no formula for determining who will move from ―self-identification‖ to ―jihadization.‖ Indeed, according to the report, both ―indoctrination‖ and ―jihadization‖ require close contact and support from spiritual and operational leaders. It seems, therefore, that the FBI became Mahmoud‘s operational leader. Another recent report, the American Security Project‘s Enemies Among Us: Domestic Radicalization After September 11 , focuses on the psychological motivations of individuals. The report uses adjectives such as ‗bewildering‖ and ―unpredictable.‖ It argues that the only commonality identified is the eventual exposure of the so-called radicals to ―radical Islam‖ at mosques, the Internet, or through friends and recruiters. ―Alienation‖ is considered a major factor, but it is not clear why alienation turns to actual action or plans to act. The Bipartisan Policy Center report entitled ―Assessing the Terrorist Threat," released this year and timed to coincide with the 9/11 anniversary, portrays the FBI as failing to understand that these incidents were not isolated. Rather, they indicate ―an embryonic terrorist radicalization and recruitment structure had been established in the U.S. homeland.‖ The authors argued that the FBI, and Americans in general, seem to have been lulled into a sense of complacency by polls and statistics that showed that Americans Muslims as well-off and integrated. The media and law enforcement officials continue to refer to these cases as ―terrorism,‖ although so far there is no record of a person of Somali descent committing an act of violent terrorism in the United States. This amorphous definition creates the impression that Somalis, in general, are a threat. In March 2009, for instance, Deputy Director of Intelligence for the National Counterterrorism Center Andrew Liepman told a Senate hearing on al-Shabaab recruitment in the United States that some Somalis were susceptible to ―criminal or extremist influence‖ because of their background. According to Liepman, ―Among Somali-Americans, the refugee experience of fleeing a war-torn country, combined with perceived discrimination, marginalization, and frustrated expectations, as well as local criminal, familial, and clan dynamics may heighten the susceptibility of some members of these communities to criminal or extremist influences.‖ At this same congressional hearing , Philip Mudd, the FBI associate executive assistant director of the National Security Branch, said that the FBI believed there were deliberate efforts to recruit young

people to fight for al-Shabaab. He stated the youths seemed to be motivated by nationalism, with the desire to defend their country from an Ethiopian invasion, rather than Islamist ideology, although the appeal was based on shared Islamic identity. Mudd also indicated that socio-economic conditions such as ―violent youth crime and gang subcultures, and tensions over cultural integration may have played some role in the recruitment process.‖ Do these activities indicate a growing alienation and anger among the 1.5 and second generation of Somali youth growing up in the United States? The vague accusations threaten to indict thousands of otherwise law-abiding Somalis who were outraged by the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. The majority of parents and community leaders consider the United States a place of refuge from the chaos and violence that led to their flight from Somalia. They were as surprised and dismayed as other Americans when they learned that their children had joined the jihadist movement in Somalia. Material Support Providing ―material support or resources‖ -- such as money, goods, personnel, and advice that can be used in terrorist activity -- to a group designated as a ―foreign terrorist organization‖ is illegal and carries a 15-year sentence. Congress first criminalized material support in 1996 in order to deny terrorist groups with humanitarian offshoots the ability to raise funds in the United States. After 9/11, the 2001 Patriot Act broadened it to criminalize ―expert advice or assistance.‖ In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ―material support‖ provision to include money and materials as well as ―training‖ and ―advice‖ -- even if for humanitarian purposes. In August 2010, the Justice Department indicted 14 Somali-Americans on charges of providing ―material support‖ to al-Shabaab and allegedly recruiting youth to join the militia. Twelve of the suspects from California, Minnesota, and Alabama were indicted for leaving the United States to join al-Shabaab. Six of the suspects are U.S. citizens. Attorney General Eric Holder stated that these indictments indicate the existence of a ―deadly pipeline that has routed funding and fighters from cities across the United States.‖ Three months later, prosecutors in San Diego charged five Somali-Americans with providing ―material support‖ to a foreign terrorist organization. The group allegedly sent about $9,000 to al-Shabaab between 2007 and 2008, with some of the funds possibly transferred after the United States added al- Shabaab to its terrorist list in 2008. But in 2008, al-Shabaab was an insignificant threat to the international community, having emerged to resist an Ethiopian invasion supported by the Bush administration. The defendants included such community leaders as Mohamed Mohamed Mahmood, who has served as the imam of a Somali mosque for over a decade. Some of the defendants claimed that they were collecting funds for humanitarian projects in Somalia. Also in November, prosecutors indicted a San Diego woman for allegedly sending $800 to two former Minnesota residents fighting in Somalia. The amounts sent by the defendants are minimal considering that al-Shabaab has other more lucrative funding sources including piracy in the Gulf of Aden and supporters across the oil-rich Arabian peninsula. The ―material support:‖ provision of the Patriot Act is already very controversial among human rights activist interested in Latin America and Asia where it has been used to deny refugee status to indivi- duals forced to cooperate with rebel groups. This provision of law was also used to justify a recent raid on the homes of 14 peace activists (non-Somalis) who oppose U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and Israel/Palestine. The railroading of suspects into the justice system is reminiscent of tactics used by the FBI and prosecutors during the era of McCarthyism and COINTELPRO, both of which perse- cuted perceived ―radicals‖ such as Paul Robeson, W.E.B. DuBois, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Changing Directions These so-called counter-radicalization policies focus on individuals rather than structures, symptoms rather than root causes. A more proactive domestic approach would include policies that prevent radicalization instead of focusing on arresting and prosecuting perpetrators. The aggressive and overt policing and prosecution of marginal cases may deter some, but has the strong potential to breed anti- Muslim and anti-American sentiments at home and abroad. The retaliatory arson attack on the mosque, where the Portland bombing suspect allegedly worshipped, is but one example. There is an urgent need to change direction by establishing ―pipelines to integration‖ to counter the efforts to establish a pipeline to extremism. Such pipelines could include tackling poverty and un- employment by expanding English as a Second Language classes, after-school programs, job train- ing, and citizenship programs in Somali communities. These, in turn, would engage the youth in posi- tive alternatives to the lure of extremism, gangs, drug dealing, and prostitution. In addition, integrating Somalis into the larger community, while respecting their cultural heritage and traditions, requires cultural competency training for law enforcement personnel, teachers, and other public officials. Somali immigrant youth, often children of immigrants themselves, are in danger of losing connection with their ethnic heritage and values. This dilemma of being neither American nor Somali leads them

to search for identity and belonging that some satisfy by turning to religion, following a radical preacher, or in rare cases joining a jihadist group. The overwhelming majority of Somalis, even those who oppose U.S. policies abroad, do not join jihadist groups. For those few who do, it is the exposure to particular personal and communicative networks that turn radical thought into violent action. Trying to identify and neutralize the few youth who attempt to join al-Shabaab does not even begin to deal with the problem.


WikiLeaks cables: Russia 'was tracking killers of Alexander Litvinenko but UK warned it off' Claim that British intelligence was incompetent will deepen diplomatic row sparked by move to deport MP's Russian researcher The Guardian / by Jamie Doward and Emily Dyer Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl Dec 13 2010 Dec 11. Russia was tracking the assassins of dissident spy Alexander Litvinenko before he was poisoned but was warned off by Britain, which said the situation was "under control", according to claims made in a leaked US diplomatic cable. The secret memo, recording a 2006 meeting between an ex-CIA bureau chief and a former KGB officer, is set to reignite the diplomatic row surrounding Litvinenko's unsolved murder that year, which many espionage experts have linked directly to the Kremlin. The latest WikiLeaks release comes after relations between Moscow and London soured as a result of Britain's decision to expel a Russian parliamentary researcher suspected of being a spy. The memo, written by staff at the US embassy in Paris, records "an amicable 7 December dinner meeting with ambassador-at-large Henry Crumpton [and] Russian special presidential representative Anatoliy Safonov", two weeks after Litvinenko's death from polonium poisoning had triggered an international hunt for his killers. During the dinner, Crumpton, who ran the CIA's Afghanistan operations before becoming the US ambassador for counter-terrorism, and Safonov, an ex-KGB colonel-general, discussed ways the two countries could work together to tackle terrorism. The memo records that "Safonov opened the meeting by expressing his appreciation for US/Russian co-operative efforts thus far. He cited the recent events in London specifically the murder of a former Russian spy by exposure to radioactive agents as evidence of how great the threat remained and how much more there was to do on the co-operative front." The memo contains an observation from US embassy officials that Safonov's comments suggested Russia "was not involved in the killing, although Safonov did not offer any further explanation". Later the memo records that Safonov claimed that "Russian authorities in London had known about and followed individuals moving radioactive substances into the city but were told by the British that they were under control before the poisoning took place". The claim will be rejected in many quarters as a clumsy attempt by Moscow to deflect accusations that its agents were involved in the assassination. Russia says it had nothing to do with the murder, but espionage experts claim the killing would not have been possible without Kremlin backing. Shortly before he died, Litvinenko said he had met two former KGB agents, Dmitry Kovtun and Andrei Lugovoi, on the day he fell ill. Both men deny wrongdoing, but Britain has made a formal request for Lugovoi's extradition following a recommendation by the director of public prosecutions. New evidence linking Russia with the death of Litvinenko was recently produced by his widow, Marina, who procured documents allegedly showing the FSB security service seized a container of polonium in the weeks before the poisoning. Moscow disputes the claims. The allegation that British authorities were monitoring the assassins' progress through London is likely to raise questions about whether Litvinenko was warned his life may have been at risk in the days before he was murdered. Several people familiar with the affair said they thought Safonov's claims implausible, with one saying he had never heard it aired within London intelligence circles before. Nevertheless Safonov's remarks in effect questioning the competence of Britain's security services will do little to heal the relationship between London and Moscow. The claims come after Britain announced that Katia Zatuliveter, a 25-year-old Russian working for the Liberal Democrat MP Mike Hancock, is to be deported amid suspicions she was spying for the Kremlin, a charge she plans to contest.

Alexander Sternik, chargé d'affaires at Russia's embassy in London, hinted that the deportation could trigger tit-for-tat expulsions and denounced the move as a "PR stunt" designed to mask Britain's own problems. "These problems are many over the last couple of months," Sternik said. "You can cite the unflattering leaks from WikiLeaks and [England's] unsuccessful [World Cup] bid." The Paris embassy memo also shines new light on relations between Washington and Moscow. Henry Crumpton reportedly gained almost mythical status after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He has been identified in the US media as a CIA agent quoted in the 11 September commission report as unsuccessfully pressing the agency to do more in Afghanistan to combat Osama bin Laden. Safonov was once tipped to take the top job at the federal security service after the then Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, dismissed its incumbent.


The Local

Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl

Dec 13 2010 Dec 12. A Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten) employee warned an acquaint- tance to stay clear of an area in central Stockholm on Saturday where, several hours later, two explosions went off in what is being called a terrorist attack. ―If you can, avoid Drottninggatan today. A lot can happen there…just so you know,‖ the message said, according to the TT news agency. Armed Forces spokesperson Jonas Svensson told TT on Sunday he was unaware of the message. ―I haven‘t heard about this at all. Now I‘m going to check out the information,‖ he told TT when confronted with the news. Later the Swedish military said it was now ―preparing how the issue will be dealt with‖. ―The Swedish Armed Forces did not know ahead of time about the plans or the circumstances surrounding the events which have taken place. If that had been the case, (Swedish security service) Säpo, which is the responsible agency in these types of cases, would have been informed immediately,‖ said military spokesperson Erik Lagersten in a statement. Swedish intelligence agencies may have known that something was in the works, Wilhelm Agrell, a professor in intelligence analysis, told TT. ―A warning is a slippery term and nothing concrete. Warnings can consist of very precise information that can be acted on, but it‘s common that warnings are more diffuse and can‘t be acted on,‖ Agrell said. On Saturday night, TT spoke with John Daniels, head of security for Swedish military intelligence agency MUST. But he refused to comment, instead directing all inquiries to Säpo. Säpo said on Sunday it was taking over the investigation of the two blasts, which occurred within minutes of one another and about 200 metres apart on Drottninggatan, a busy shopping street in central Stockholm. The agency considers the explosions to be a terrorist crime. One man believed to be a suicide bomber was killed in the second blast, while the first explosion injured two others. Shortly before the explosions, Säpo and the TT news agency received a message from a 29- year-old man from southern Sweden who claimed that the prophet Mohammed was being degraded.


Congressman Ron Paul

Dec 12 2010 Dec 10. We may never know the whole story behind the recent publication of sensitive U.S. government documents by the Wikileaks organization, but we certainly can draw some important conclusions from the reaction of so many in government and media. At its core, the Wikileaks controversy serves as a diversion from the real issue of what our foreign policy should be. But the mainstream media, along with neoconservatives from both political parties, insist on asking the wrong question. When presented with embarrassing disclosures about U.S. spying and meddling, the policy that requires so much spying and meddling is not questioned. Instead, the

media focus on how so much sensitive information could have been leaked, or how authorities might prosecute the publishers of such information. No one questions the status quo or suggests a wholesale rethinking of our foreign policy. No one suggests that the White House or the State Department should be embarrassed that the U.S. engages in spying and meddling. The only embarrassment is that it was made public. This allows ordinary people to actually know and talk about what the government does. But state secrecy is anathema to a free society. Why exactly should Americans be prevented from knowing what their government is doing in their name? In a free society, we are supposed to know the truth. In a society where truth becomes treason, however, we are in big trouble. The truth is that our foreign spying, meddling, and outright military intervention in the post-World War II era has made us less secure, not more. And we have lost countless lives and spent trillions of dollars for our trouble. Too often "official" government lies have provided justification for endless, illegal wars and hundreds of thousands of resulting deaths and casualties. Take the recent hostilities in Korea as only one example. More than fifty years after the end of the Korean War, American taxpayers continue to spend billions for the U.S. military to defend a modern and wealthy South Korea. The continued presence of the U.S. military places American lives between the two factions. The U.S. presence only serves to prolong the conflict, further drain our empty treasury, and place our military at risk. The neoconservative ethos, steeped in the teaching of Leo Strauss, cannot abide an America where individuals simply pursue their own happy, peaceful, prosperous lives. It cannot abide an America where society centers around family, religion, or civic and social institutions rather than an all powerful central state. There is always an enemy to slay, whether communist or terrorist. In the neoconserva- tive vision, a constant state of alarm must be fostered among the people to keep them focused on something greater than themselves-- namely their great protector, the state. This is why the neocon- servative reaction to the Wikileaks revelations is so predictable: See, we told you the world was a dangerous place, goes the story. They claim we must prosecute- or even assassinate- those respon- sible for publishing the leaks. And we must redouble our efforts to police the world by spying and meddling better, with no more leaks. We should view the Wikileaks controversy in the larger context of American foreign policy. Rather than worry about the disclosure of embarrassing secrets, we should focus on our delusional foreign policy. We are kidding ourselves when we believe spying, intrigue, and outright military intervention can maintain our international status as a superpower while our domestic economy crumbles in an orgy of debt and monetary debasement.


The Guardian / by John Naughton

Dec 12 2010 Dec 11. One of the most interesting aspects of the WikiLeaks controversy is the light it has shed on the providers of cloud computing. One after another they have fallen over like dominoes when the going got rough. First, some of the ISPs hosting WikiLeaks caved in; then EveryDNS, the company that mapped its domain names (eg wikileaks.org) on to machine addresses, dropped it; then Amazon, which had enough computer power and bandwidth to resist even the most determined cyber- attacks, took it off its computers; then PayPal and later Mastercard, the online conduits for donations, cancelled its accounts. The rationalisations these outfits gave for dropping WikiLeaks had a common theme, namely that it had violated the terms and conditions under which the terminated services had been provided. Amazon is the most interesting case. It provides so-called "cloud computing services" by renting out some of the thousands of computers used to run its online store. WikiLeaks moved its site on to Amazon's cloud to ensure that it would not be crippled by the denial-of-service attacks that had brought other ISPs to their knees. But then the company received a call from senator Joseph Lieberman, the kind of politician who gives loose cannons a bad name, who had been frothing about WikiLeaks being "implacably hostile to our military and the most basic requirements of our national security". Some time after that, Amazon terminated WikiLeaks's account. Lieberman then declared: "I will be asking Amazon about the extent of its relationship with WikiLeaks and what it and other web service providers will do in the future to ensure that their services are not used to distribute stolen, classified information."

Amazon denied that it had caved in to "a government inquiry" but declared that it had kicked

WikiLeaks out because it was not adhering to the company's terms and conditions ? which require that "you warrant that you own or otherwise control all of the rights to the content" and "that use of the

content you supply

"It's clear," pontificated Amazon, "that WikiLeaks doesn't own or otherwise control all the rights to this

classified content. Further, it is not credible that the extraordinary volume of 250,000 classified documents that WikiLeaks is publishing could have been carefully redacted in such a way as to ensure that they weren't putting innocent people in jeopardy." The more you think about it, the more disturbing this becomes. What gives a US senator the right to ask anybody about "the extent of its relationship" with WikiLeaks? His declaration led the New Yorker's Amy Richardson to wonder "if Lieberman feels that he, or any senator, can call in the company running the New Yorker's printing presses when we are preparing a story that includes leaked classified material, and tell it to stop us". And what about Amazon's assertion that WikiLeaks "doesn't own or otherwise control" all the rights to the classified cables that it published? As Markus Kuhn, a computer security researcher at the Cam- bridge Computer Lab, pointed out to me, any work "prepared by an officer or employee of the US go- vernment as part of that person's official duties" is not entitled to domestic copyright protection under US law. So, in the US at least, the leaked cables are not protected by copyright and it doesn't matter whether WikiLeaks owns the rights or not. But, in a way, that's the least worrying aspect of Amazon's behaviour. More troubling is what its actions portend for democracy. Rebecca MacKinnon, a scholar who has written incisively about China's efforts to censor the net, wrote a sobering essay about this last week. "A substantial, if not critical amount of our political discourse," she points out, "has moved into the digital realm. This realm is largely made up of virtual spaces that are created, owned and operated by the private sector." As far as the law of contract is concerned, Amazon can do what it likes. But this isn't just about con- tracts any more. "While Amazon was within its legal rights," MacKinnon warns, "the company has nonetheless sent a clear signal to its users: if you engage in controversial speech that some individual members of the US government don't like? Amazon is going to dump you at the first sign of trouble." Yep. For years people have extolled cloud computing as the way of the future. The lesson of the last week is simple: be careful what you wish for.

will not cause injury to any person or entity".


Source: Statewatch / London / www.statewatch.org

Dec 12 2010 Dec 12. EU: European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR): New ECCHR-Report - Blacklisted: Targeted sanctions, preemptive security and fundamental rights Press release:

Full report written by Gavin Sullivan and Ben Hayes with a foreword by Martin Scheinin, the outgoing UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism:


Source: Statewatch / London / www.statewatch.org

Dec 12 2010 Dec 12. Statewatch Analysis: Update The Proposed European Investigation Order (pdf) by Steve Peers, Professor of Law, University of Essex: http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-


NY Times / by James Risen

Stringer: Frank Slijper / Campaign Against Arms Trade / Groningen NL / frank.slijper@hetnet.nl

Dec 12 2010 Dec 11. When Hajji Juma Khan was arrested and transported to New York to face charges under a new American narco-terrorism law in 2008, federal prosecutors described him as

perhaps the biggest and most dangerous drug lord in Afghanistan, a shadowy figure who had helped keep the Taliban in business with a steady stream of money and weapons. But what the government did not say was that Mr. Juma Khan was also a longtime American informer, who provided information about the Taliban, Afghan corruption and other drug traffickers. Central Intelligence Agency officers and Drug Enforcement Administration agents relied on him as a valued source for years, even as he was building one of Afghanistan‘s biggest drug operations after the United States-led invasion of the country, according to current and former American officials. Along the way, he was also paid a large amount of cash by the United States. At the height of his power, Mr. Juma Khan was secretly flown to Washington for a series of clandestine meetings with C.I.A. and D.E.A. officials in 2006. Even then, the United States was receiving reports that he was on his way to becoming Afghanistan‘s most important narcotics trafficker by taking over the drug operations of his rivals and paying off Taliban leaders and corrupt politicians in President Hamid Karzais government. In a series of videotaped meetings in Washington hotels, Mr. Juma Khan offered tantalizing leads to the C.I.A. and D.E.A., in return for what he hoped would be protected status as an American asset, according to American officials. And then, before he left the United States, he took a side trip to New York to see the sights and do some shopping, according to two people briefed on the case. The relationship between the United States government and Mr. Juma Khan is another illustration of how the war on drugs and the war on terrorism have sometimes collided, particularly in Afghanistan, where drug dealing, the insurgency and the government often overlap. To be sure, American intelligence has worked closely with figures other than Mr. Juma Khan suspected of drug trade ties, including Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president‘s half brother, and Hajji Bashir Noorzai, who was arrested in 2005. Mr. Karzai has denied being involved in the drug trade. A Shifting Policy Afghan drug lords have often been useful sources of information about the Taliban. But relying on them has also put the United States in the position of looking the other way as these informers ply their trade in a country that by many accounts has become a narco-state. The case of Mr. Juma Khan also shows how counternarcotics policy has repeatedly shifted during the nine-year American occupation of Afghanistan, getting caught between the conflicting priorities of counterterrorism and nation building, so much so that Mr. Juma Khan was never sure which way to jump, according to officials who spoke on the condition that they not be identified. When asked about Mr. Juma Khan‘s relationship with the C.I.A., a spokesman for the spy agency said that the ―C.I.A. does not, as a rule, comment on matters pending before U.S. courts.‖ A D.E.A.

spokesman also declined to comment on his agency‘s relationship with Mr. Juma Khan. His New York lawyer, Steven Zissou, denied that Mr. Juma Khan had ever supported the Taliban or worked for the C.I.A. ―There have been many things said about Hajji Juma Khan,‖ Mr. Zissou said, ―and most of what has been said, including that he worked for the C.I.A., is false. What is true is that H. J. K. has never been an enemy of the United States and has never supported the Taliban or any other group that threatens Americans.‖

A spokeswoman for the United States Attorney‘s Office for the Southern District of New York, which is

handling Mr. Juma Khan‘s prosecution, declined to comment.

However, defending the relationship, one American official said, ―You‘re not going to get intelligence in

a war zone from Ward Cleaver or Florence Nightingale.‖

At first, Mr. Juma Khan, an illiterate trafficker in his mid-50s from Afghanistan‘s remote Nimroz Province, in the border region where southwestern Afghanistan meets both Iran and Pakistan, was a big winner from the American-led invasion. He had been a provincial drug smuggler in southwestern Afghanistan in the 1990s, when the Taliban governed the country. But it was not until after the Taliban‘s ouster that he rose to national prominence, taking advantage of a record surge in opium production in Afghanistan after the invasion. Briefly detained by American forces after the 2001 fall of the Taliban, he was quickly released, even though American officials knew at the time that he was involved in narcotics trafficking, according to several current and former American officials. During the first few years of its occupation of Afghanistan, the United States was focused entirely on capturing or killing leaders of Al Qaeda, and it ignored drug trafficking, because American military commanders believed that policing drugs got in the way of their core counterterrorism mission. Opium and heroin production soared, and the narcotics trade came to account for nearly half of the Afghan economy. Concerns, but No Action

By 2004, Mr. Juma Khan had gained control over routes from southern Afghanistan to Pakistan‘s

Makran Coast, where heroin is loaded onto freighters for the trip to the Middle East, as well as overland routes through western Afghanistan to Iran and Turkey. To keep his routes open and the drugs flowing, he lavished bribes on all the warring factions, from the Taliban to the Pakistani intelligence service to the Karzai government, according to current and former American officials. The scale of his drug organization grew to stunning levels, according to the federal indictment against him. It was in both the wholesale and the retail drug businesses, providing raw materials for other drug organizations while also processing finished drugs on its own. Bush administration officials first began to talk about him publicly in 2004, when Robert B. Charles, then the assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement, told Time maga- zine that Mr. Juma Khan was a drug lord ―obviously very tightly tied to the Taliban.‖ Such high-level concern did not lead to any action against Mr. Juma Khan. But Mr. Noorzai, one of his rivals, was lured to New York and arrested in 2005, which allowed Mr. Juma Khan to expand his empire. In a 2006 confidential report to the drug agency reviewed by The New York Times, an Afghan informer stated that Mr. Juma Khan was working with Ahmed Wali Karzai, the political boss of southern Afghanistan, to take control of the drug trafficking operations left behind by Mr. Noorzai. Some current and former American counternarcotics officials say they believe that Mr. Karzai provided security and protection for Mr. Juma Khan‘s operations. Mr. Karzai denied any involvement with the drug trade and said that he had never met Mr. Juma Khan. ―I have never even seen his face,‖ he said through a spokesman. He denied having any business or security arrangement with him. ―Ask them for proof instead of lies,‖ he added. Mr. Juma Khan‘s reported efforts to take over from Mr. Noorzai came just as he went to Washington to meet with the C.I.A. and the drug agency, former American officials say. By then, Mr. Juma Khan had been working as an informer for both agencies for several years, officials said. He had met repeatedly with C.I.A. officers in Afghanistan beginning in 2001 or 2002, and had also developed a relationship with the drug agency‘s country attaché in Kabul, former American officials say. He had been paid large amounts of cash by the United States, according to people with knowledge of the case. Along with other tribal leaders in his region, he was given a share of as much as $2 million in payments to help oppose the Taliban. The payments are said to have been made by either the C.I.A. or the United States military. The 2006 Washington meetings were an opportunity for both sides to determine, in face-to-face talks, whether they could take their relationship to a new level of even longer-term cooperation. ―I think this was an opportunity to drill down and see what he would be able to provide,‖ one former American official said. ―I think it was kind of like saying, ‗O.K., what have you got?‘ ‖ Business, Not Ideology While the C.I.A. wanted information about the Taliban, the drug agency had its own agenda for the Washington meetings information about other Afghan traffickers Mr. Juma Khan worked with, as well as contacts on the supply lines through Turkey and Europe. One reason the Americans could justify bringing Mr. Juma Khan to Washington was that they claimed to have no solid evidence that he was smuggling drugs into the United States, and there were no criminal charges pending against him in this country. It is not clear how much intelligence Mr. Juma Khan provided on other drug traffickers or on the Taliban leadership. But the relationship between the C.I.A. and the D.E.A. and Mr. Juma Khan continued for some time after the Washington sessions, officials say. In fact, when the drug agency contacted him again in October 2008 to invite him to another meeting, he went willingly, believing that the Americans wanted to continue the discussions they had with him in Washington. He even paid his own way to Jakarta, Indonesia, to meet with the agency, current and former officials said. But this time, instead of enjoying fancy hotels and friendly talks, Mr. Juma Khan was arrested and flown to New York, and this time he was not allowed to go shopping. It is unclear why the government decided to go after Mr. Juma Khan. Some officials suggest that he never came through with breakthrough intelligence. Others say that he became so big that he was hard to ignore, and that the United States shifted its priorities to make pursuing drug dealers a higher priority. The Justice Department has used a 2006 narco-terrorism law against Mr. Juma Khan, one that makes it easier for American prosecutors to go after foreign drug traffickers who are not smuggling directly into the United States if the government can show they have ties to terrorist organizations. The federal indictment shows that the drug agency eventually got a cooperating informer who could provide evidence that Mr. Juma Khan was making payoffs to the Taliban to keep his drug operation going, something intelligence operatives had known for years. The federal indictment against Mr. Juma Khan said the payments were ―in exchange for protection for

the organization‘s drug trafficking operations.‖ The alleged payoffs were what linked him to the Taliban and permitted the government to make its case. But even some current and former American counternarcotics officials are skeptical of the government‘s claims that Mr. Juma Khan was a strong supporter of the Taliban. ―He was not ideological,‖ one former official said. ―He made payments to them. He made payments to government officials. It was part of the business.‖ Now, plea negotiations are quietly under way. A plea bargain might keep many of the details of his relationship to the United States out of the public record.


Cables Show Germany Caved to Pressure from Washington http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,733860,00.html Der Spiegel / by Matthias Gebauer and John Goetz Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Dec 10 2010 Dec 9. The American diplomatic cables provide new details about the case of Khaled el-Masri, a German citizen abducted by the CIA in 2003. The reports confirm just how much pressure the US put on Germany to not pursue 13 agents believed to have been involved. But they also reveal how cooperative and responsive German officials were in light of American worries. In the case of Khaled el-Masri, the Lebanese-born German abducted by the CIA, the Munich public prosecutor's office and Germany's Justice Ministry and Foreign Ministry, in Berlin, all generously cooperated with the United States. The new insights on the German-American secret talks in the politically controversial issue in 2007 come from previously unpublished cables from the United States Embassy. Previously, the only thing known was that the US had applied pressure on Berlin in the case. Just a few days ago, WikiLeaks http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/wikileaks/ published a cable recounting the details of a meeting that then-Deputy US Ambassador John M. Koenig had in the German Chancellery, the official office of Chancellor Angela Merkel. During the conversation, Koenig asked the Germans to "weigh carefully at every step of the way the implications for relations with the US" that investigations into the CIA-organized abduction would have. In another embassy cable, the Americans reported that Berlin had been informed of the "potential negative implications for our bilateral relationship" in the longer term. A previously unknown cable from the US Embassy in Berlin, dated Feb. 1, 2007, throws light on how the Germans behaved during this back-room horse-trading. A day earlier, German prosecutors in Munich had issued arrest warrants for 13 suspected CIA operatives believed to have been involved in the abduction of el-Masri in Macedonia in late 2003 as well as in his being taken via Baghdad to a secret CIA prison in Afghanistan on Jan. 23, 2004. There, el-Masri was detained and interrogated until finally being released without charges and brought back to Germany at the end of May that year. The abduction undoubtedly involved one of the CIA's so-called "extraordinary renditions." After 9/11, the CIA launched a highly secret program <http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/cia_renditions/> that saw several dozen suspected terrorists abducted in foreign countries and transported to secret detention centers. Over time, journalists and European Union officials only slowly uncovered details about the program. The el-Masri case is one of the best-documented instances of such abductions. When it first came to light, it caused significant strains between Berlin and Washington. Double-Dealing in Germany The US diplomatic cables now reveal just how accommodating the Germans were in their behavior toward the Americans. On Feb. 1, American diplomats in Berlin were hectically making calls to people all over Germany in an effort to figure out just how serious German efforts to investigate the CIA abduction were at the time. That evening, they relayed their impressions in cables to the State Department, the Department of Justice and the National Security Council. Given the enormous risks involved in the case to both the CIA and the American government, the report was to be delivered immediately to all three agencies. The details that have recently emerged illustrate that Germany was engaged in a bit of double-dealing when it came to the el-Masri case. In public, the German government continued to call for an investigation. But neither the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel nor the Justice Ministry would have touched the hot issue of illegal CIA kidnappings if it hadn't have been for the pressure exerted upon them by the media. Behind closed doors, German officials agreed that el-Masri was apparently merely the unfortunate victim of mistaken identity because of his name. But nobody wanted to have investigations into the CIA, which would surely cause even more damage to already tattered German-

American relations. The reports document the fact that this stance was also shared by Munich's public prosecutor's office, the state government of Bavaria and the Justice Ministry, in Berlin. For example, Bavaria's top prose- cutor, August Stern, told one American diplomat that he had "felt compelled to act due to media pres- sure" to issue the arrest warrants. In fact, it was actually the research of journalists that led to the true identifications of the pilots of the CIA jets and the other members of the group involved in the kidnapping. Bavarian State Officials 'Surprised and Displeased' by Arrest Warrants According to the diplomatic cable, a short time later, an official from the Bavarian Chancellery, the offices of the state governor and his cabinet, also made an unsolicited call to the US Embassy. In the conversation, the official emphasized that the state's chancellery had played "no role in the actions of the prosecutor, who is independent." At the same time, the official said that the state governor's office had been "surprised and displeased" about the arrest warrants. According to the cable, Bavarian Justice Minister Beate Merk also expressed her surprise to American diplomats, although she refrained from making any other comments. At the time, one of the most crucial issues for the Americans was whether or not the Munich arrest warrants would be observed outside of Germany. Although the flight manifests of the CIA-affiliated company Aero Contractors used pseudonyms, such as "Kirk James Bird," it wouldn't take too much research to figure out the true names of the CIA's kidnappers. Having an international arrest warrant with their names on it could mean that whenever they traveled -- either in the United States or abroad, whether for business or pleasure -- they could be brought before a court on charges of participating in the state-organized abduction of el-Masri. A trial like that would be a nightmare for the CIA. Given these circumstances, the US Embassy in Berlin contacted the German Justice Ministry (BMJ), which provided it with some very thoughtful advice. According to one BMJ official, international arrest warrants could only be issued once the ministry had evaluated their legal soundness on a case-by- case basis as well as the "foreign policy implications." The official also cautioned the embassy that any strong political interference by Washington into domestic affairs "might be perceived as an admission of involvement" of the CIA agents by the Germans. Another BMJ official assured the embassy that the cases would not be "handled as routine" and that any step in any investigation would still first require a green light from Berlin. The Americans also got some helpful hints from Germany's Foreign Ministry in the form of then-State Secretary Georg Boomgaarden, who is currently serving as Germany's ambassador to London. Though he admitted that he had only learned about the arrest warrants from media reports, he said that the legal maneuvers seemed a bit "premature" to him. Indeed, the senior diplomat even voiced his doubt about the validity of international arrest warrants approved by a German court that were apparently only based on information reported in the media. And, if Germany's Justice Ministry were to decide to pursue international arrest warrants, Boomgaarden assured the Americans that the Foreign Ministry would of course take any foreign-policy consequences into account. It would be easy to write off the details from the cables as mere trifles if they hadn't been confirmed by reality. In 2007, then-Justice Minister Brigitte Zypries decided not to further pursue the 13 CIA agents. Though their names were still on an Interpol wanted persons list, the United States stated that it would not recognize its validity. Zypries explained that the Americans had made clear to her that they would neither arrest nor hand over the 13 CIA agents. In the end, she concluded that, given the slim chances of success, it made no sense to even try to get them extradited.



Dec 10 2010 Dec 10. België heeft een akkoord gesloten met de Verenigde Staten over de uitwisseling van vingerafdrukken en DNA-gegevens. Dat heeft minister van Binnenlandse Zaken Annemie Turtelboom (Open VLD) bekendgemaakt in de marge van een Europees-Amerikaanse top in Washington, meldt de VRT-nieuwsdienst. Het akkoord heeft volgens de openbare omroep heel wat voeten in de aarde gehad. Vooral de Belgische privacycommissie maakte heel wat voorbehoud. Nu zouden er echter voldoende garanties zijn over het gebruik van de gegevens. Door het akkoord hebben de politiediensten er een belangrijk werkmiddel bij in de strijd tegen zware misdaad. Turtelboom benadrukt ook dat het akkoord over veel meer dan terreurbestrijding gaat. Het akkoord zal in de loop van januari in België worden ondertekend, in de aanwezigheid van de Amerikaanse minister van Binnenlandse Veiligheid Janet Napolitano.


Military Bans Disks, Threatens Courts-Martial to Stop New Leaks

Wired / by Noah Shachtman

Dec 10 2010 Dec 9. It‘s too late to stop WikiLeaks from publishing thousands more classified documents, nabbed from the Pentagons secret network. But the U.S. military is telling its troops to stop using CDs, DVDs, thumb drives and every other form of removable media or risk a court martial. Maj. Gen. Richard Webber, commander of Air Force Network Operations, issued the Dec. 3 Cyber Control Order obtained by Danger Room which directs airmen to immediately cease use of removable media on all systems, servers, and stand alone machines residing on SIPRNET, the Defense Depart- ment‘s secret network. Similar directives have gone out to the military‘s other branches. Unauthorized data transfers routinely occur on classified networks using removable media and are a method the insider threat uses to exploit classified information. To mitigate the activity, all Air Force organizations must immediately suspend all SIPRNET data transfer activities on removable media,? the order adds. It‘s one of a number of moves the Defense Department is making to prevent further disclosures of secret information in the wake of the WikiLeaks document dumps. Pfc. Bradley Manning says he downloaded hundreds of thousands of files from SIPRNET to a CD marked Lady Gaga before giving the files to WikiLeaks. To stop that from happening again, an August internal review suggested that the Pentagon disable all classified computers ability to write to removable media. About 60 percent of military machines are now connected to a Host Based Security System, which looks for anomalous behavior. And now there‘s this disk-banning order. One military source who works on these networks says it will make the job harder; classified computers are often disconnected from the network, or are in low-bandwidth areas. A DVD or a thumb drive is often the easiest way to get information from one machine to the next. They were asking us to build homes before, the source says. Now they‘re taking away our hammers. The order acknowledges that the ban will make life trickier for some troops. Users will experience difficulty with transferring data for operational needs which could impede time- liness on mission execution, the document admits. But military personnel who do not comply may be punished under Article 92 of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. Article 92 is the armed forces regulation covering failure to obey orders and dereliction of duty, and it stipulates that violators shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. But to several Defense Department insiders, the steps taken so far to prevent another big secret data dump have been surprisingly small. After all the churn. The general perception is business as usual. I‘m not kidding, one of those insiders says. We haven‘t turned a brain cell on it. Tape and disk backups, as well as hard drive removals, will continue as normal in the military‘s Secure Compartmented Information Facilities, where top-secret information is discussed and handled. And removable drives have been banned on SIPRNET before. Two years ago, the Pentagon forbade the media?s use after the drives and disks helped spread a relatively unsophisticated worm onto hundreds of thousands of computers. The ban was lifted this February, after the worm cleanup effort, dubbed Operational Buckshot Yankee, was finally completed. Shortly thereafter, Manning says he started passing information to WikiLeaks. Specialists at the National Security Agency are looking for additional technical ways to limit, disable or audit military users actions. Darpa, the Pentagon‘s leading-edge research arm, has launched an effort to greatly increase the accuracy, rate and speed with which insider threats are detected within government and military interest networks. But, like all Darpa projects, this one won‘t be ready to deploy for years if ever. For now, the Pentagon is stuck with more conventional methods to WikiLeak-proof its networks.


Source: Steven Aftergood / Secrecy News / FAS / Washington / www.fas.org

Dec 10 2010 Dec 10. The U.S. Government insists that the classification markings on many of the leaked documents being published by Wikileaks and other organizations are still in force, even though the documents are effectively in the public domain, and it has directed federal employees and contractors not to access or read the records outside of a classified network.

But by strictly adhering to the letter of security policy and elevating security above mission performance, some say the government may be causing additional damage. "At DHS we are getting regular messages [warning not to access classified records from Wikileaks]," one Department of Homeland Security official told us in an email message. "It has even been suggested that if it is discovered that we have accessed a classified Wikileaks cable on our personal computers, that will be a security violation. So, my grandmother would be allowed to access the cables, but not me. This seems ludicrous." "As someone who has spent many years with the USG dealing with senior officials of foreign governments, it seems to me that the problem faced by CRS researchers (and raised by you) is going to be widespread across our government if we follow this policy." "Part of making informed judgments about what a foreign government or leader will do or think about something is based on an understanding and analysis of what information has gone into their own deliberative processes. If foreign government workers know about something in the Wikileaks documents, which clearly originated with the U.S., then they will certainly (and reasonably) assume that their US counterparts will know about it too, including the staffers. If we don't, they will assume that we simply do not care, are too arrogant, stupid or negligent to find and read the material, or are so unimportant that we've been intentionally left out of the information loop. In any such instance, senior staff will be handicapped in their preparation and in their inter-governmental relationships," the DHS official said. "I think more damage will be done by keeping the federal workforce largely in the dark about what other interested parties worldwide are going to be reading and analyzing. It does not solve the problem to let only a small coterie of analysts review documents that may be deemed relevant to their own particular 'stovepiped' subject area. Good analysis requires finding and putting together all the puzzle pieces." So far, however, this kind of thinking is not finding a receptive audience in government. There has been no sign of leadership from any Administration official who would stand up and say: "National security classification is a means, and not an end in itself. What any reader in the world can discover is no longer a national security secret. We should not pretend otherwise."


The Institute for Public Accuracy / by Sam Husseini and David Zupan


Dec 10 2010 Dec 7. The following statement was released today, signed by Daniel Ellsberg, Frank Grevil, Katharine Gun, David MacMichael, Ray McGovern, Craig Murray, Coleen Rowley and Larry Wilkerson; all are associated with Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in Intelligence. WikiLeaks has teased the genie of transparency out of a very opaque bottle, and powerful forces in

America, who thrive on secrecy, are trying desperately to stuff the genie back in. The people listed below this release would be pleased to shed light on these exciting new developments. How far down the U.S. has slid can be seen, ironically enough, in a recent commentary in Pravda (that's right, Russia's Pravda): "What WikiLeaks has done is make people understand why so many

Americans are politically apathetic

suffocating, and the sense of powerlessness that erupts can be paralyzing, especially when

government evildoers almost always get away with their

So shame on Barack Obama, Eric Holder, and all those who spew platitudes about integrity, justice

and accountability while allowing war criminals and torturers to walk freely upon the

American people should be outraged that their government has transformed a nation with a reputation

for freedom, justice, tolerance and respect for human rights into a backwater that revels in its criminality, cover-ups, injustices and hypocrisies.

Odd, isn't it, that it takes a Pravda commentator to drive home the point that the Obama administration is on the wrong side of history. Most of our own media are demanding that WikiLeaks leader Julian Assange be hunted down -- with some of the more bloodthirsty politicians calling for his murder. The corporate-and-government dominated media are apprehensive over the challenge that WikiLeaks

presents. Perhaps deep down they know, as Dickens put it, "There is nothing so strong

simple truth." As part of their attempt to blacken WikiLeaks and Assange, pundit commentary over the weekend has tried to portray Assange's exposure of classified materials as very different from -- and far less

After all, the evils committed by those in power can be



as the

laudable than -- what Daniel Ellsberg did in releasing the Pentagon Papers in 1971. Ellsberg strongly rejects the mantra "Pentagon Papers good; WikiLeaks material bad." He continues: "That's just a cover for people who don't want to admit that they oppose any and all exposure of even the most misguided, secretive foreign policy. The truth is that EVERY attack now made on WikiLeaks and Julian Assange was made against me and the release of the Pentagon Papers at the time." Motivation? WikiLeaks' reported source, Army Pvt. Bradley Manning, having watched Iraqi police abuses, and having read of similar and worse incidents in official messages, reportedly concluded, "I

was actively involved in something that I was completely against." Rather than simply go with the flow,

Manning wrote: "I want people to see the truth

informed decisions as a public," adding that he hoped to provoke worldwide discussion, debates, and reform. There is nothing to suggest that WikiLeaks/Assange's motives were any different. Granted, mothers are not the most impartial observers. Yet, given what we have seen of Assange‘s behavior, there was the ring of truth in Assange‘s mother‘s recent remarks in an interview with an Australian newspaper. She put it this way: "Living by what you believe in and standing up for something is a good thing. … He sees what he is doing as a good thing in the world, fighting baddies, if you like." That may sound a bit quixotic, but Assange and his associates appear the opposite of benighted. Still, with the Pentagon PR man Geoff Morrell and even Attorney General Eric Holder making thinly disguised threats of extrajudicial steps, Assange may be in personal danger. The media: again, the media is key. No one has said it better than Monseñor Romero of El Salvador, who just before he was assassinated 25 years ago warned, "The corruption of the press is part of our

sad reality, and it reveals the complicity of the oligarchy." Sadly, that is also true of the media situation

in America today.

The big question is not whether Americans can "handle the truth." We believe they can. The challenge

because without information you cannot make


to make the truth available to them in a straightforward way so they can draw their own conclusions


an uphill battle given the dominance of the mainstream media, most of which have mounted a

hateful campaign to discredit Assange and WikiLeaks. So far, the question of whether Americans can "handle the truth" has been an academic rather than an experience-based one, because Americans have had very little access to the truth. Now, however, with the WikiLeaks disclosures, they do. Indeed, the classified messages from the Army and the State Department released by WikiLeaks are, quite literally, "ground truth."

How to inform American citizens? As a step in that direction, on October 23 we "Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in Intelligence" (see below) presented our annual award for integrity to Julian Assange. He accepted the honor "on behalf of our sources, without which WikiLeaks' contributions are of no significance." In presenting the award, we noted that many around the world are deeply indebted

to truth-tellers like WikiLeaks and its sources.

Here is a brief footnote: Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in Intelligence (SAAII) is a group of former CIA colleagues and other admirers of former intelligence analyst Sam Adams, who hold up his example as a model for those who would aspire to the courage to speak truth to power. (For more,

please see here.) Sam did speak truth to power on Vietnam, and in honoring his memory, SAAII confers an award each year to a truth-teller exemplifying Sam Adams' courage, persistence, and devotion to truth -- no matter the consequences. Previous recipients include:

-Coleen Rowley of the FBI -Katharine Gun of British Intelligence -Sibel Edmonds of the FBI -Craig Murray, former UK ambassador to Uzbekistan -Sam Provance, former Sgt., US Army -Frank Grevil, Maj., Danish Army Intelligence -Larry Wilkerson, Col., US Army (ret.) -Julian Assange, WikiLeaks "There is nothing concealed that will not be revealed, nothing hidden that will not be made known. Everything you have said in the dark will be heard in the daylight; what you have whispered in locked rooms will be proclaimed from the rooftops."-- Luke 12:2-3 The following former awardees and other associates have signed the above statement; some are available for interviews:


A former government analyst, Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers, a secret government history of

the Vietnam War to the New York Times and other newspapers in 1971. He was an admirer of Sam Adams when they were both working on Vietnam and in March 1968 disclosed to the New York Times

some of Adams' accurate analysis, helping head off reinforcement of 206,000 additional troops into South Vietnam and a widening of the war at that time to neighboring countries. FRANK GREVIL Grevil, a former Danish intelligence analyst, was imprisoned for giving the Danish press documents showing that Denmark's Prime Minister (now NATO Secretary General) disregarded warnings that there was no authentic evidence of WMD in Iraq; in Copenhagen, Denmark. KATHARINE GUN Gun is a former British government employee who faced two years imprisonment in England for leaking a U.S. intelligence memo before the invasion of Iraq. The memo indicated that the U.S. had mounted a spying "surge" against U.N. Security Council delegations in early 2003 in an effort to win approval for an Iraq war resolution. The leaked memo -- published by the British newspaper The Observer on March 2, 2003 -- was big news in parts of the world, but almost ignored in the United States. The U.S. government then failed to obtain a U.N. resolution approving war, but still proceeded with the invasion. DAVID MacMICHAEL MacMichael is a former CIA analyst. He resigned in the 1980s when he came to the conclusion that the CIA was slanting intelligence on Central America for political reasons. He is a member of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. RAY McGOVERN McGovern was a CIA analyst for 27 years, whose duties included preparing and briefing the President's Daily Brief and chairing National Intelligence Estimates. He is on the Steering Group of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. CRAIG MURRAY Murray, former UK ambassador to Uzbekistan, was fired from his job when he objected to Uzbeks being tortured to gain "intelligence" on "terrorists." Upon receiving his Sam Adams award, Murray said, "I would rather die than let someone be tortured in an attempt to give me some increment of security." Observers have noted that Murray was subjected to similar character assassination techniques as Julian Assange is now encountering to discredit him. COLEEN ROWLEY Rowley, a former FBI Special Agent and Division Counsel whose May 2002 memo described some of the FBI's pre-9/11 failures, was named one of Time Magazine's "Persons of the Year" in 2002. She recently co-wrote a Los Angeles Times op-ed titled, "WikiLeaks and 9/11: What if? Frustrated investigators might have chosen to leak information that their superiors bottled up, perhaps averting the terrorism attacks." LARRY WILKERSON Wilkerson, Col., U.S. Army (ret.), former chief of staff to Secretary Colin Powell at the State Department, who criticized what he called the "Cheney-Rumsfeld cabal." See recent interviews


CRS: Criminal Prohibitions on the Publication of Classified Defense Information

CRS / by Jennifer K Elsea


Source: Sabrina Pacifici / BeSpacific / Silver Spring US / www.bespacific.com

Dec 9 2010 Dec 6, The recent online publication of classified defense documents and diplomatic cables by the organization WikiLeaks and subsequent reporting by the New York Times and other news media have focused attention on whether such publication violates U.S. criminal law. The Attorney General has reportedly stated that the Justice Department and Department of Defense are investigating the circumstances to determine whether any prosecutions will be undertaken in connection with the disclosure. This report identifies some criminal statutes that may apply, but notes that these have been used almost exclusively to prosecute individuals with access to classified information (and a corresponding obligation to protect it) who make it available to foreign agents, or to foreign agents who obtain classified information unlawfully while present in the United States. Leaks of classified information to the press have only rarely been punished as crimes, and we are aware of no case in which a publisher of information obtained through unauthorized disclosure by a government employee has been prosecuted for publishing it. There may be First Amendment implications that would make such a prosecution difficult, not to mention political ramifications based on concerns about government censorship. To the extent that the investigation implicates any foreign nationals whose

conduct occurred entirely overseas, any resulting prosecution may carry foreign policy implications related to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and whether suspected persons may be extradited to the United States under applicable treaty provisions.


NY Times / by Michael Slackman

Stringer: Frank Slijper / Campaign Against Arms Trade / Groningen NL / frank.slijper@hetnet.nl

Dec 9 2010 Dec 8. American officials exerted sustained pressure on Germany not to enforce arrest warrants against Central Intelligence Agency officers involved in the 2003 kidnapping of a German citizen mistakenly believed to be a terrorist, diplomatic cables made public by WikiLeaks show. John M. Koenig, the American deputy chief of mission in Berlin, issued a pointed warning in February 2007 urging that Germany ―weigh carefully at every step of the way the implications for relations with the U.S.‖ in the case of Khaled el-Masri, a German of Lebanese descent. Mr. Masri said he was held in a secret United States prison in Afghanistan and tortured before his captors acknowledged their mistake and let him go. The United States‘ concern over the Masri case was detailed in cables sent from the United States Embassies in Germany, Spain and Macedonia in 2006 and 2007. The cables indicated what was long suspected by German opposition leaders who led a parliamentary inquiry into the case: intense political pressure from Washington was the reason that Germany never pressed for the arrest and extradition of 13 operatives believed to be from the C.I.A. who were ultimately charged in indictments issued in Spain and in Munich. ―I am not surprised by this,‖ said Hans-Christian Ströbele, a member of the Green bloc in Parliament who then sat on the legislative investigative committee. ―It was confirmed once again that the U.S. government kept the German government‖ from seeking the arrest of the agents. In one cable, written before Mr. Koenig‘s warning to Germany‘s deputy national security adviser, the embassy in Berlin reported that diplomatic officials had ―continued to stress with German counterparts the potential negative implications for our bilateral relationship, and in particular for our counter- terrorism cooperation, if further steps are taken to seek the arrest or extradition of U.S.

citizens/officials.‖ In 2006 and 2007, the Masri case was one of the most difficult issues between Washington and Berlin, exposing to public scrutiny secret tactics used in the Bush administration‘s antiterrorism efforts that were sharply criticized both in the United States and in Europe. At the time, political pressure was mounting in Germany to investigate and expose the practice of extraordinary rendition, which involved capturing suspects and sending them to third-party countries for questioning in secret prisons. Mr. Masri was seized on Dec. 31, 2003, as he entered Macedonia while on vacation; border security guards confused him with an operative of Al Qaeda with a similar name. He says he was turned over to the C.I.A., which flew him to Afghanistan, where he says he was tortured, sodomized and injected with drugs. After five months, he was dropped on a roadside in Albania. No charges were brought against him. The case drew widespread attention in Europe. The cables show that the United States was especially concerned about cooperation between Spanish and German prosecutors. The Spanish courts became involved because they concluded that the plane that transported Mr. Masri had traveled through Spanish territory. ―This coordination among independent investigators will complicate our efforts to manage this case at a discreet government-to-government level,‖ read a cable sent from the embassy in Madrid in January


The cables‘ release has created a stir in Germany mostly because the documents contain American diplomats‘ caustic comments about German officials and because they show that the embassy had informants in one of the governing parties. The Masri case, however, has already been so thoroughly discussed in public, and the degree of Washington‘s pressure on Berlin is so well known, that it has not gained much attention. The one cable that has caught the attention of some in the German press was written on Feb. 6, 2007, by Mr. Koenig, the second-highest-ranking diplomat in the embassy, under the title ―CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS.‖ Rolf Nikel, Germany‘s deputy national security adviser, told Mr. Koenig that the two governments had differences over Washington‘s antiterrorism methods, including German opposition to the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and to rendition. Mr. Nikel said, according to the cable, ―the Chancellery is

well aware of the bilateral political implications of the case, but added that this case ‗will not be easy,‘ because of the intense pressure from the parliament and the German media.‖ Mr. Koenig said that while Washington ―recognized the independence of the German judiciary,‖ he added that ―to issue international arrest warrants or extradition requests would require the concurrence of the German Federal Government.‖ His point was that the case could be stopped. The prosecutor‘s office in Munich issued warrants for the arrest of the C.I.A. operatives, but Germany‘s government did not press for arrests or extraditions. ―We already dealt with this, including in the Bundestag, about why the German federal government did not take further action to carry out the arrest warrant,‖ said Mr. Ströbele. ―How one deals with the fact that he was taken into custody and tortured whether more will be revealed on that what was done in order to keep it a secret: that is what interests me.‖


Source: Steven Aftergood / Secrecy News / FAS / Washington / www.fas.org Dec 8 2010 Dec 8. "There appears to be no statute that generally proscribes the acquisition or publication of diplomatic cables," according to a newly updated report (pdf) from the Congressional Research Service, "although government employees who disclose such information without proper authority may be subject to prosecution." But there is a thicket of statutes, most notably including the Espionage Act, that could conceivably be used to punish unauthorized publication of classified information, such as the massive releases made available by Wikileaks. See "Criminal Prohibitions on the Publication of Classified Defense Informa- tion", December 6, 2010. The updated CRS report sorts through those statutes, provides an account of recent events, presents a new discussion of extradition of foreign nationals who are implicated by U.S. law, and summarizes new legislation introduced in the Senate (S. 4004). A previous version (pdf) of the CRS report, issued in October, was cited by Sen. Dianne Feinstein in a Wall Street Journal op-ed yesterday in support of prosecuting Wikileaks, though the report did not specifically advise such a course of action. Sen. Feinstein also seemed to endorse the view that the State Department cables being released by Wikileaks are categorically protected by the Espionage Act and should give rise to a prosecution under the Act. But the Espionage Act only pertains to information "relating to the national defense," and only a minority of the diplomatic cables could possibly fit that description. The new CRS report put it somewhat differently: "It seems likely that most of the information disclosed by WikiLeaks that was obtained from Department of Defense databases [and released earlier in the year] falls under the general rubric of information related to the national defense. The diplomatic cables obtained from State Department channels may also contain information relating to the national defense and thus be covered under the Espionage Act, but otherwise its disclosure by persons who are not government employees does not appear to be directly proscribed. It is possible that some of the government information disclosed in any of the three releases does not fall under the express protection of any statute, despite its classified status." Incredibly, CRS was unable to meaningfully analyze for Congress the significance of the newest relea- ses because of a self-defeating security policy that prohibits CRS access to the leaked documents. The CRS report concludes that any prosecution of Wikileaks would be unprecedented and challeng- ing, both legally and politically. "We are aware of no case in which a publisher of information obtained through unauthorized disclosure by a government employee has been prosecuted for publishing it. There may be First Amendment implications that would make such a prosecution difficult, not to mention political ramifications based on concerns about government censorship." For our part, we would oppose a criminal prosecution of Wikileaks under the Espionage Act.


Source: Steven Aftergood / Secrecy News / FAS / Washington / www.fas.org Dec 8 2010 Dec 8. After its access to the Wikileaks web site was blocked by the Library of Congress, the Congressional Research Service this week asked Congress for guidance on whether and how it should make use of the leaked records that are being published by Wikileaks, noting that they could "shed important light" on topics of CRS interest.

CRS "has informed our House and Senate oversight committees, and solicited their guidance, regard- ing the complexities that the recent leaks of classified information present for CRS," wrote CRS Di- rector Daniel Mulhollan in a December 6 email message (pdf) to all CRS staff. "I have also contacted the majority and minority counsels of select committees in the House and Senate requesting guidance on the appropriate boundaries that CRS should recognize and adhere to in summarizing, restating or characterizing open source materials of uncertain classification status in unclassified CRS reports and memoranda for Congress."

"Our challenge is how to balance the need to provide the best analysis possible to the Congress on current legislative issues against the legal imperative to protect classified national security information. This is especially a problem in light of the massive volume of recently released documents, which may shed important light on research and analysis done by the Service," Mr. Mulhollan wrote. "As guidance becomes available from Congress, I will follow-up with additional information. At present,

it seems clear that the republication of known classified information by CRS in an unclassified format

(e.g., CRS reports or congressional distribution memoranda) is prohibited. We believe this prohibition against the further dissemination of classified information in an unclassified setting applies even if a secondary source (e,g., a newspaper, journal, or website) has reprinted the classified document. The

laws and applicable regulations are decidedly less clear, however, when it comes to referencing and citing secondary sources that refer to, summarize, or restate classified information."

A copy of Mr. Mulhollan's email message was obtained by Secrecy News.


Navy serviceman accused of trying to sell classified military documents

Washington Post / by Ellen Nakashima

Stringer: Frank Slijper / Campaign Against Arms Trade / Groningen NL / frank.slijper@hetnet.nl

Dec 8 2010 Dec 6. A Navy intelligence specialist at the Joint Special Operations Command has been accused of taking top secret documents from military networks and offering to sell them to an investigator posing as a foreign agent. Petty Officer Bryan Minkyu Martin was arrested last week by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, after a sting operation in which he passed classified documents to an FBI undercover agent claiming

to be an intelligence officer of a foreign country, according to the affidavit for a search warrant filed last

week in a federal court in North Carolina. Martin, who enlisted in 2007 and was assigned to the Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, has not been charged. An attorney for Martin could not be contacted Tuesday night. The military is investigating Martin under some of the same Espionage Act statutes as those being

used to investigate Pfc. Bradley E. Manning, the Army intelligence analyst suspected of leaking cables and other classified documents to WikiLeaks. According to the affidavit, Martin met the agent at a Hampton Inn in Spring Lake, N.C., on Nov. 15. He

is alleged to have described his access to various classified systems and offered to bring two

classified documents to their next meeting. He also allegedly said that he was seeking "long-term financial reimbursement," that his current assignment focused on Afghanistan and that he would be working for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Martin said that over his prospective 15- to 20-year career, he could be "very valuable," NCIS special agent Richard J. Puryear said in the affidavit. Puryear said Martin accepted $500 in cash, with the promise of more money to come. Over the following days, Martin handed over more documents - marked secret and top secret - according to the affidavit. The document shows he was paid a total of $3,500. Martin's arrest comes as the Pentagon and other federal agencies are trying to strengthen security measures in the wake of WikiLeaks's release of secret diplomatic cables. The State Department said recently that it had cut down access to one of its classified networks. Manning, who was arrested in May, allegedly exceeded his "authorized access" to the military's Secret Internet Protocol Router network, or Siprnet, to obtain data, according to a charge sheet. Dale Meyerrose, former chief information officer of the intelligence community, said special authorization is needed for specific parts of Siprnet. An estimated 3 million people have secret-level clearances, but no more than 15 to 20 percent of those have access to Siprnet, he said.


The Local

Dec 8 2010 Dec 6. Morgan Johansson, the Social Democrat chair of the parliamentary justice committee, has demanded clarification on alleged informal intelligence contacts between the Swedish government and the US authorities. "The justice minister has to firstly explain what has gone on. And secondly she has to probe whether there is any truth to the information that the government tried to withhold important information from the Riksdag," Johansson said on Monday. If the information released as part of the WikiLeaks Cablegate documents turns out to be true it could be a very serious breach of the constitution, Johansson argued. "If we hand over details of Swedish citizens to a foreign power, then it could ultimately be considered to be a breach of the constitution, then it is a very serious issue," he said. According to media reports on Sunday, Anna-Karin Svensson, a senior Swedish civil servant from the justice department, is alleged to have refused US demands for a formal agreement on information exchange covering terrorists as doing so would have required the issue to be presented to parliament. The revelations were contained in a diplomatic cable sent from the US embassy in Stockholm in 2008 following discussions on the matter in Stockholm which included representatives from the United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). According to the document, Svensson told the US delegations that it was a "particularly sensitive time", as the government was still dealing with the fallout from a protracted debate about the so-called 'FRA-law', which authorised the Sweden's National Defence Research Establishment (Försvarets radioanstalt) to carry out signals intelligence activities on domestic cable-bound traffic. She added that it would be "politically impossible" for Sweden's justice minister to avoid presenting a formal agreement with the United States on the exchange of information about possible terror suspects, explaining that doing so would also jeopardise existing "strong but informal arrangements" between the two countries. As an alternative, Svensson advocated that Sweden and the United States continue with "existing informal channels" in order to avoid having to bring the matter to the Riksdag, according to the cable. But Sweden's foreign minister Carl Bildt on Monday rejected the notion that the intelligence sharing arrangement might constitute a breach of Swedish law. "We have an extensive intelligence and security cooperation with many countries and it has become increasingly intense," Bildt said. Johansson argued however that the revelations could lead to demands for justice minister Beatrice Ask to resign. "If it is shown to be as extensive as it sounds and is shown to be unconstitutional, then a demand to resign could result. It is a question of this magnitude, but we are not there yet," he said. But Ask responded on Monday that nothing of any note had occurred, underlining that the agreement that the Americans wanted with Sweden concerned terrorist screening, something Sweden didn't want. "This was rejected by the civil servant. We can't have agreements which can't be presented in the parliament and there is nothing strange about that," Ask told news agency TT. The revelations that an official from the Swedish justice ministry may have acted in a way so as to purposely keep the issue from being discussed in the Riksdag led the Left Party to demand the establishment of a truth commission. "That a representative for the government or civil servant from the government offices conducts this type of discussion with a foreign power is not only inappropriate but perhaps also illegal," said Jens Holm of the Left Party in an interpellation to Beatrice Ask on Monday. But Ask argued that the leaked cables show that Sweden is generally sceptical of these types of

intelligence agreements and explained that informal contact was a matter of course. "I presume it refers to routine intelligence and security work which you always have in regard to fighting crime. This follows the rule and regulations which (Sweden's security service) Säpo and others have," Ask said.


A Difficult US Fight to Choke Off Terror Finance

Der Spiegel / by Yassin Musharbash

Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Dec 8 2010 Dec 7. US diplomats around the world have been trying for years to cut off funding for

terrorism. But many governments have proven reluctant to join the effort. Particularly in Pakistan, high- level contacts to extremist groups are proving to be a significant hurdle. The document exuded confidence -- and officially it didn't exist. "With your help," the US State Department wrote in a "non-paper" to the Saudi Arabian government, "we can learn more and stop the abuse of al-Haramain by terrorists." Then-US Secretary of State authorized the several-page-long memo on Jan. 28, 2003. Its focus was charitable organizations that allegedly also provided funding for terrorism -- organizations like al-Haramain. Above all, the letter was intended to turn Saudi Arabia from a shady half-friend into a solid US ally in the fight against terrorism and its sponsors. The Americans were aware that cash injections from wealthy benefactors in Saudi Arabia were al- Qaida's most important source of revenue. "Finding these people and stopping the financial flows -- whether through public or private action -- would seriously impede the al-Qaida leaderships ability to reconstitute the group and launch devastating new attacks in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere," wrote Powell in the non-paper. His efforts met at least with partial success. Riyadh has since become an ally of the West when it comes to combating terrorism. As recently as a few weeks ago, in late October, Saudi Arabian intelligence helped foil a plan to send two parcel bombs to the US via Europe. But the flow of money to al-Qaida and organizations connected with it has by no means been stopped in Saudi Arabia. In May 2009, Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, traveled to the Saudi Arabian capital Riyadh himself, precisely for that reason. He told Saudi Financial investigators that "private donations from the Gulf" were still the most important source of funding for the Taliban in Afghanistan. 'A Source of Funding' The US embassy noted that "it has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority." It said "donors in Saudi Arabia continue to constitute a source of funding to Sunni extremist groups worldwide." As for al-Haramain, it apparently continues to operate, albeit under a different name. Holbrooke's warning came a full six years after Powell's memo. But Osama bin Laden continues to lead the al-Qaida terror network, Mullah Omar still heads the Afghan Taliban -- and the terrorists haven't run out of money. Militant Islamists collected funds for bomb attacks on suburban railway trains in Madrid in 2004 and the London Underground in 2005. They funded suicide attacks on hotels in Jordan and on the Sinai Peninsula, and they pay for deadly bombings in Iraq and Pakistan that take place almost daily. The problem that Powell described back in 2003 has still not been solved. Everyone has an idea how the terrorists get their money, but no-one can find a way to stem the flow of funds. US diplomats are battling a multi-headed Hydra. The dispatches leaked by WikiLeaks reveal just how bitter this battle has become. The memos repeatedly show the State Department's barely concealed frustration with America's partners. As Many Levels as Possible The authorities in Qatar are described as "largely passive" in the fight against terror and "overall considered the worst in the region." Indonesia is said to be an "alphabet soup" of government bodies supposedly responsible, and a "universe of aliases" of suspected terrorists and terrorism sponsors -- in short, a bureaucratic nightmare. As for Kuwait, the diplomats told Washington that cooperation only improved after a Kuwaiti blew himself up in Iraq. There are, of course, some countries which are particularly helpful, including Morocco, Jordan, Abu Dhabi and Egypt. Cairo has even pointed out new methods that the terrorists are using. The US is trying to wage war on the terrorists on as many levels as possible. In Indonesia, for example, it is helping legislators draft anti-money laundering laws. The US also offers training courses and provides advisers to ministries in many other countries. But essentially little has changed. The diplomatic dispatches on the subject of terror finance tend to focus on three countries: Saudi Arabia, because so much money allegedly flows through the country; Kuwait, because its government took years to blacklist three terror sponsors; and Pakistan, where the US is confronted with a wall of demonstrative non-commitment. Added to the List Diplomacy is a delicate business, and Kuwait is a perfect case in point. The US efforts in Kuwait center on three men: Jabir Al-Jalamah, Mubarak Al-Bathali and Hamid Al-Ali. In the US, they have been officially designated "terrorist facilitators" and financiers since December 2006, and Washington was keen to have them added to the relevant United Nations list. In June of 2006, Washington asked its embassy in Kuwait to sound out how the government there might react to such a move. The diplomats didn‘t envisage any fundamental problems, but predicted the Kuwaitis would drag their feet on the issue. What actually transpired was that Kuwait asked Qatar


prevent the men's names from being added to the UN watch list. US negotiators urged the Kuwaitis


end the blockade in May 2007. The result was a diplomatic spat. The US information about the

three men was "full of holes," the Kuwaitis said. As a result, the American request could unfortunately not be granted. Naturally Kuwait is allowed to have legal concerns -- the documents only show the American point of view. Washington responded by sending Kuwait a "non-paper" listing detailed accusations against the men. But the Kuwaitis said that wasn't enough either. US diplomats adopted a blunter tone: After the three men had been listed as terrorist facilitators in the US, the diplomats pointed out, Kuwait had agreed to at least keep them under surveillance. In reality, however, the three financiers had continued to collect funds for terrorists, the Americans wrote. The Pakistan Question The men were eventually added to the UN's al-Qaida list in January 2008. In May, Kuwait froze the trio's bank accounts. But in the latest available report on the matter, from January 2010, the US expresses "concern, however, that the three Kuwaiti UN 1267 designees (Al Bathali, Al-Ali, and Jalamah) and others, are still traveling and providing support to extremist groups." In addition, the US told the Kuwaiti government that "funding from Kuwait to extremist networks in South Asia is of

particular concern, especially funding of Taliban activity" along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. US relations with Saudi Arabia are likewise less than ideal. Like Kuwait, officials in Riyadh have

repeatedly delayed or obstructed legislation and other efforts to control the flow of donations. One has

to be careful not to create "economic martyrs" among the extremists, the Saudis warn. They are also

concerned about the reaction of the conservative religious establishment in the country. The documents from the US Embassy in Riyadh are also interesting for another reason: The scope of the American-Saudi dialog is much wider than in other countries. It is not solely about money, but also about politics. And the Americans' Saudi interlocutors -- who are often members of the royal family -- provide the West with profound insights. The Saudis talk freely about others and sometimes even about themselves. They describe Iran as a significant sponsor of terrorism, and warn that Shiite Saudis are transferring money to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The annual pilgrimage to Mecca, known as the Hajj, creates a "security vacuum," they say. They know full well that terrorists arrange to meet there. A 'Rotten Head'

When Washington once again urged for more controls on donations, a member of the royal household promised in 2006 to put the matter to the monarch: "Since we often get accused of being autocratic, we might as well be autocratic once in a while," he said. The Saudis are particularly clear about what they think of Pakistan. A memo dated February 2010 says the king himself described Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari as an "obstacle" and a "rotten head." In May 2009, the Saudis made it apparent that they also mistrust the Pakistani secret service, the ISI: "We think 10 times before approaching them," they said according to a US dispatch. Saudi Arabia is important to the US, not least because of its importance within the Muslim world. For the rulers in Riyadh, the role is not inconvenient. And the Saudis do not seem particularly bothered about the fact that the Saudi Interior Ministry is "almost completely" dependent on the CIA in the war on terror, as a US embassy memo asserted in February 2010. And Pakistan? If Saudi Arabia was only a half-friend back in 2003, Pakistan is almost a half-enemy in 2010. The US is not really sure where it stands vis-à-vis Islamabad. Sometimes it appears as if progress is being made, for instance when a civil servant asks for training in tackling terrorist fundraisers. But then there are reports like the following memo from the US Embassy in February 2010: "The military and intelligence establishment has taken steps since spring 2009 to hamper the operations of the Islamabad Embassy." 'Not Be Won for Many Years' Pakistan's non-committal stance appears to be systematic. Islamabad took a similar approach in

response to moves to put Pakistani sponsors of terrorism on the UN list. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry gave its assurances that Pakistan gave its wholehearted backing to the process. It could not, however, take part in the process -- there was a lack of proof, they argued, and the government would undoubtedly be sued.

A US "non-paper" dated Aug. 10, 2009 addressed the problem of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT), the southern

Asian terror organization that carried out the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed a total of 175 people.

It also focused on the groups and people who helped LT, whose tricks the Americans had identified.

The aid organization Jamaat-ud-Dawa, for example, pays for a new school or the expansion of a madrassa, but part of the money is then diverted to fund bomb builders. They "would inflate the cost to

siphon money to LT," a US diplomat wrote.

Pakistan nevertheless remains intractable. The US diplomats concede that "some officials from Pakistan's ISI continue to maintain ties with a wide array of extremist organizations." What choice do US diplomats have? Not much. They warn Islamabad about the threat of damage to the country's reputation, and tell the State Department that "Pakistan‘s intermittent support to terrorist groups and militant organizations threatens to undermine regional security." Have US efforts been entirely in vain? There have certainly been successes, but it is impossible to completely defeat a Hydra. In February 2007, the US Embassy in Riyadh cabled the following prediction back to Washington: "The Saudi leadership acknowledges privately that the war on terrorism will not be won for many years."


Guardian News Service

The Hindu

Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl

Dec 7 2010 Dec 7. The Hindu State department documents record that Khartoum then privately accused the U.S. of carrying out two air attacks in eastern Sudan: one in January 2009, with 43 dead and 17 vehicles destroyed, and another on 20 February, with 45 dead and 14 vehicles destroyed. Pressure on Arab states over weapons sent to militants by Iran and Syria. The U.S has worked discreetly to block the supply of Iranian and Syrian weapons to the Palestinian movement Hamas and Lebanon‘s Hezbollah, pressuring Arab governments not to co-operate -- in many cases its requests based on secret intelligence provided by Israel. State department cables show that Sudan was warned by the U.S. in January 2009 not to allow the delivery of unspecified Iranian arms that were expected to be passed to Hamas in the Gaza Strip around the time of Israel‘s Operation Cast Lead offensive, in which 1,400 Palestinians were killed. U.S. diplomats were instructed to express ―exceptional concern‖ to the Khartoum authorities. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Chad were informed of the alleged Iranian plans and warned that any weapons deliveries would be in breach of UN resolutions banning Iranian arms exports. Sudan‘s foreign minister told a U.S. official his government‘s formal response would be that it was not permitting the import of weapons from Iran, only to be told that ―a simple regurgitation of Sudan‘s previous denial would be unfortunate‖. Months later the media reported that in mid-January, Israeli planes mounted a long-range bombing attack on an arms convoy in Sudan‘s Red Sea province. The Sharq al-Awsat newspaper quoted a US official as saying Sudan had been warned in advance about the shipment. State department documents record that Khartoum then privately accused the U.S. of carrying out two air attacks in eastern Sudan: one in January 2009, with 43 dead and 17 vehicles destroyed, and another on 20 February, with 45 dead and 14 vehicles destroyed. ―We assume that the planes that attacked us are your planes,‖ a senior Sudanese official said. The U.S. embassy in Khartoum then sought clarification from Washington. ―Should this potentially explosive story somehow leak to the sensationalistic Sudanese press,‖ the cable said, ―it could very well turn our security situation here from bad to worse.‖ Explaining the political background to the confrontation, the head of Sudan‘s intelligence and security service, Salah Ghosh, told U.S. diplomats of his government‘s frustration over Washington‘s support for Israel during the Gaza war. U.S. actions would ―calamitously increase support for violent extremism and [push] Hamas into an alliance with Iran‖, he warned. In March 2009 Jordan and Egypt were informed by the U.S. of new Iranian plans to ship a cargo of ―lethal military equipment‖ to Syria with onward transfer to Sudan and then to Hamas. Host nations were requested to require that the flights land for inspection, or deny them over flight rights. It is not known whether any deliveries went ahead. In April Egypt‘s interior minister, General Habib al-Adly, was described in U.S. cables as being behind the dismantling of a Hezbollah cell in Sinai as well as ―steps to disrupt the flow of Iranian-supplied arms from Sudan through Egypt to Gaza‖. At the end of that month Egypt‘s intelligence chief, General Omar Soleiman, told U.S. officials Egypt was ―succeeding‖ in preventing Iran from funnelling financial support to Hamas. ―Egypt had sent a clear message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will interfere in Iran, adding that EGIS [the Egyptian intelligence service] had already begun recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria,‖ Soleiman said. In June Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel‘s prime minister, told US officials there was ―a steady flow of Iranian weapons to Gaza through Sudan or Syria and then by sea‖, though ―Egypt‘s performance in

stopping the tunnels [into Gaza] improved after Cairo understood that the Iranian arms pipeline is a direct threat to Egypt as well‖. Iran, a Mossad representative told a U.S. delegation in late 2009, ―is very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to its proxies‖. It was widely reported in February 2010 that Mahmoud al- Mabhouh, a senior Hamas official who was assassinated in Dubai by suspected Mossad agents, had been the key weapons procurement link between the Palestinian organisation and Iran. Only rarely do the U.S. cables show evidence of direct Israeli requests to the U.S. to block arms deliveries, probably because they would be highly classified. But in one bilateral meeting in Tel Aviv in 2009 a senior state department official noted ―most requests to third countries to deny arms transfer over flights are based on Israeli intelligence. Additional information/intelligence from the government of Israel would ensure greater co- operation.‖ In February 2010, Israeli military intelligence informed the U.S. that Syria ―intended to imminently transfer‖ Scud-D ballistic missiles to Hezbollah, warning of a ―new level of concern‖ on the northern border if the transfer went ahead. Israel requested that any demarche be delivered before the arrival in Washington of their defence minister, Ehud Barak, to avoid the impression ―that the U.S. and Israel collaborated to uncover and thwart the transfer‖. Three days later the US warned Syria that it would be a ―strategic miscalculation‖ to provide Hezbollah with these weapons. President Assad was informed of US concerns by the undersecretary of state, William Burns. But the

Syrian leader ―bluntly stated that he knew of no new weapons systems going to Hezbollah

disturbing and weighty evidence to the contrary‖. Syria‘s deputy foreign minister, Faisal Miqdad, countered that the message showed that ―the U.S. has not come to a mature position [that would enable it] to differentiate between its own interests and Israel‘s‖. But U.S. allies in the west and the Arab world were told bluntly: ―These are U.S. concerns. We are not carrying somebody else‘s ‗water‘ on this issue‖ -- a clear reference to Israel.



IPS / by William Fisher

Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl

Dec 6 2010 Dec 6. Last week's release of 900 pages of U.S. government documents dealing with the implementation of the nation's primary surveillance law suggests that the government has been systematically violating the privacy rights of U.S. citizens. How many citizens is unclear, since the documents were extensively redacted. The previously secret internal documents were obtained through a court battle by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The government declined to disclose the number of citizens who had their telephone calls, e-mail, or other communications intercepted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008. They also declined to discuss any specific abuses, the ACLU said. The 900 documents were delivered in keeping with a previously agreed schedule. Alex Abdo, a senior attorney with the ACLU, told IPS, "For two years now, the government has had the authority to engage in the dragnet and unconstitutional surveillance of Americans' communications with little to no oversight of its actual surveillance decisions." "This week's disclosures confirm that the government repeatedly abused even the minimal, and unconstitutional, limits set out in this new surveillance authority," he added. "Although we know that abuses occurred, the government has withheld all critical details about them." The lawsuit seeks to enforce a November 2009 Freedom of Information Act request for records related to the government's interpretation and implementation of the FAA, including reports and assessments mandated by the law concerning how the FAA is being used, how many citizens are affected and what safeguards are in place to prevent abuse of privacy rights. Prior to the government's release of last week's 900 pages, it had not released any of the records requested. The lawsuit alleges that the requested records are needed to enable informed public debate about whether the FAA - which expires in 2012 - should be repealed, amended or extended. In July 2008, the ACLU and the NYCLU filed a landmark lawsuit to stop the government from conducting surveillance under the FAA on behalf of a broad coalition of attorneys and human rights, labour, legal and media organisations whose work requires them to engage in sensitive and sometimes privileged telephone and e-mail communications with colleagues, clients, journalistic sources, witnesses, experts, foreign government officials and victims of human rights abuses located outside the United States.

A district court dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiffs could not challenge the secret surveillance

law because they could not prove that their own communications had been monitored under it. The ACLU and NYCLU appealed that ruling and have asked a federal appeals court to reinstate the

case. The groups argued that, because of the secret nature of the FAA, the law may never be subject

to judicial review at all if Americans are prohibited from challenging it unless they can show that their

own communications have been collected. "It is unfortunate that once again we have to sue over the secrecy that continues to shroud so much of our government's work," said NYCLU Associate Legal Director Christopher Dunn. "While we have seen recent improvements in transparency, much more remains to be done before we have a truly open government." Attorneys on the case are Alex Abdo and Jameel Jaffer of the ACLU and Dunn and Arthur Eisenberg

of the New York Civil Liberties Union.

However, routine oversight reports carried out by the government itself acknowledge ongoing violations of legal parametres and civil rights that limit when citizens are targeted and minimise the amount of data collected. As noted by the Washington Post, "The documents note that although oversight teams did not find

evidence of 'intentional or willful attempts to violate or circumvent the law

incidents continue to occur', as a March 2009 report stated." The Post goes on to assert that the unredacted portions of the reports refer only elliptically to what

those actions were, but the March 2009 report stated that, "information collected as a result of these incidents has been or is being purged from data repositories." ACLU attorneys say violations of the FISA Amendments Act's "targeting and minimisation


collected or targeted or improperly retained and disseminated." The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is an Act of Congress which prescribes procedures for the physical and electronic surveillance and collection of "foreign intelligence information" between "foreign powers" and "agents of foreign powers" - which may include U.S. citizens and permanent residents suspected of being engaged in espionage and violating U.S. law on territory under United

States control. The act was amended in 2001 by the USA PATRIOT Act, primarily to include terrorism on behalf of groups that are not specifically backed by a foreign government. Lawmakers amended the 1978 law again in 2008 to "broaden and clarify legal authorities" after the Sep. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and advances in internet communications prompted fresh concerns over expanded surveillance powers. The ACLU, human rights activists and other parties sued, charging that the new law is unconstitutional, violating the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches.

A U.S. district judge dismissed the case, but the ACLU appealed the verdict, which is still pending.

Meantime, the ACLU has pursued the related Freedom of Information Act request.


types of compliance


means that citizens and residents' communications were either being improperly


Der Spiegel

Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Dec 6 2010 Dec 6. Few leaks have ever caused so much anger and shock as the publication of the US diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been trying to repair the damage done to Washington's reputation, while some on the right have even called for Julian Assange's execution. Her face has seemed frozen in place for days. She looks peaked, thin-lipped and serious, very se- rious. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is currently enduring the consequences of what is probably the biggest indiscretion in the history of diplomacy, and it shows. Clinton, who has embarked on a damage-control trip around the world, sharply condemned the public- cation of the embassy cables by the website WikiLeaks, calling it a "very irresponsible, thoughtless act that put at risk the lives of innocent people all over the world." "Secretary Clinton is literally working night and day in conversations with countless leaders around the world to try as best we can not only to express regret but to work through these issues," Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns told US lawmakers. Her husband, former

President Bill Clinton, said he would be "very surprised if some people don't lose their lives" as a result

of the leaks.

In the Spotlight

On Wednesday of last week, Hillary Clinton was in the Kazakh capital Astana for a long-planned summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It was her first major appearance on the international stage in the wake of the leaks, and she knew that it could be an embarrassing one. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the 70-year-old ruler of Kazakhstan, was standing on a large stage in the Palace of Independence, waiting for 38 heads of state, as well as other senior politicians from around the world. He was the host of the event, the first OSCE summit since 1999. The head of each delegation had to walk up a small staircase onto the stage to shake the Kazakh autocrat's hand. Finally it was Hillary Clinton's turn. Wearing a dark-blue suit, she climbed up the stairs and walked toward Nazarbayev, smiling broadly. As she stood on the stage with Nazarbayev, Clinton knew that the spotlight was on her, as the head of the US State Department, the government agency responsible for writing so many unflattering psychological profiles and political assessments of politicians worldwide. Some of the people Clinton's ambassadors wrote about were now sitting in the room in front of her. They included Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, whom the diplomats characterized as "pale and hesitant" and likened to a comic-book character, and the president of Turkmenistan, who, according to the cables, is "a practiced liar" and "not very bright". Host Nazarbayev is apparently fond of warm weather, has about 40 horses in his stable and owns a palace in the Arab Emirates. Nazarbayev has already told the Americans that he will get over the revelations. More Than Just Damaged Egos But it's more than a question of potentially damaged egos. The published cables offer insights into the thought processes of American leaders and their counterparts abroad. They provide authentic direct quotes from the world's crisis regions. They report on North Korean B25 rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads and with an estimated range of 3,000 kilometers (4,800 miles), which Pyongyang allegedly shipped to Iran. They reveal that US diplomats were given secret instructions in the summer of 2009 to spy on foreign officials at the UN. They discuss Arab leaders who favored bombing Iran. They describe a suitcase containing $52 million (€39 million) in cash, with which Afghanistan's former vice-president was caught in Dubai before he was released again. And they mention a Lebanese defense minister who said that he hoped Israel would bomb his own country and annihilate Hezbollah. The cables, as reports from a world of secretiveness and discretion, contain astonishingly clear and unvarnished statements made in the context of the diplomatic realm of duplicity. They have shocked, alienated and appalled the world. Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, seemingly in shock and speaking somewhat prematurely, called the leaks the "September 11th of world diplomacy." French government spokesman François Baroin, calling the leaks a threat that needed to be combated, said: "I always thought that a transparent society was a totalitarian society." Hillary Clinton is aware of all of these irritations. According to her spokesman, she claimed not to have read a single one of the problematic documents. This is astonishing. In her speech before the OSCE plenary assembly, she didn't say a word about the WikiLeaks disclosures. 'No Better Friend' Suddenly German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the woman American diplomats described as "rarely creative," was sitting next to Clinton. Merkel was also wearing blue that day. The two women seemed to be having an amiable conversation. The chancellor would later say that the WikiLeaks affair played only a "secondary" role at the meeting. Things did not go quite as smoothly for Clinton with Silvio Berlusconi. Since the leaks occurred, the Italian prime minister -- the last world leader to arrive at the meeting, carrying a folder under his arm and visibly out of breath -- has been under suspicion of securing benefits for himself in connection with energy deals with Russia, which he denies. The cables describe Berlusconi as "feckless, vain and ineffective" and as a party animal who doesn't get enough sleep. But in Astana, Clinton also felt compelled to make amends with the Italian. "We have no better friend, we have no one who supports the American policies as consistently as Prime Minister Berlusconi has," Clinton told reporters. Apologies, professions of solidarity and efforts to make amends: Is this what American foreign policy will look like for the next few months? "We cannot, of course, put the toothpaste back in the tube," writes former CIA case officer Robert Baer in an opinion piece for the Financial Times. "The credibility of the State Department as a reliable interlocutor has evaporated, and no doubt for a long time." In an interview with SPIEGEL, former Saudi Arabian intelligence chief Prince Turki bin Faisal says that American's "credibility and honesty are the victim of these leaks" and assumes that from now on people "will no longer speak to American diplomats frankly."

'Anything Less than Execution Is Too Kind' Those at the right end of the American political spectrum feel threatened by a foreign power once again. Whoever passed on this information is guilty of treason, says former Baptist preacher Mike Huckabee, one of the leading contenders for the Republican presidential nomination in 2012. According to Huckabee, "anything less than execution is too kind a penalty." His rival Sarah Palin wrote on her Facebook page that WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange should be hunted down like a terrorist. "He is an anti-American operative with blood on his hands. … Why was he not pursued with the same urgency we pursue al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders?" One leading politician who hasn't said much is President Barack Obama, whose handling of the WikiLeaks affair thus far only confirms his political adversaries' criticisms. Just like with the controversy over an Islamic center in New York and the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Obama is once again being accused of not taking decisive action, showing weakness and putting America's superpower status at risk. Obama's inaction in the WikiLeaks case was the focus of conservative criticism in the second half of the week. Commentator Ann Coulter calls Obama a hesitant, powerless leader who is stuck in the White House, incapable of doing anything to defend his country. While Interpol is looking for Assange, she says, the US government isn't doing everything in its power to apprehend him. She characterizes the United States as "a helpless, pitiful giant." Conspiracy Theories Turkey has considered taking legal action because of the leaks. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, described in the cables as an "ignorant Islamist" with eight Swiss bank accounts, wants to strike back at US diplomats in a big way. "Those who have slandered us will be crushed under these claims, will be finished and will disappear," Erdogan announced in Istanbul, where he is considering filing a lawsuit against the diplomats. Many Turks suspect that a massive conspiracy by the Jewish lobby is behind the WikiLeaks campaign, a view held even by the deputy chairman of the governing party, the AKP. The goal of the reports, he says, is to weaken the Turkish government. The cables will probably have their most serious long-term effects in places where the world was already extremely fragile before the leaks: the Middle East, Yemen, the countries bordering Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Critics in Islamabad said last week that the United States, Pakistan's strategic partner in the war on terrorism, mistrusts its Pakistani allies and is "playing a double game." Some of the cables revealed US concerns that Islamabad is not sufficiently protecting its nuclear arsenal. "The documents show what Washington really thinks about us," says one official in a Pakistani ministry. Humble Pie Secretary Clinton's diplomats will have to woo their foreign counterparts and openly express their regrets, and they'll even have to eat some humble pie to offset the loss of confidence. The State Department is already thinking about withdrawing some of its ambassadors as a way of making amends. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns says that the WikiLeaks disclosures have done "substantial damage" to diplomacy. The peculiar thing about this debate is that it also has another, entirely different side, in the form of those who feel that the leaked cables are "embarrassing but not damaging" and "lack relevant new information." "The WikiLeaks disclosures did not offer any surprises," writes Switzerland's Neue Zürcher Zeitung, while the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit argues there is nothing at risk "that ought to preoccupy humanity, at least not in Europe." From Banal to Explosive Everyone, from the outraged to those who downplay the significance of the cables, is talking about the same dispatches, the same data sets that WikiLeaks began releasing on its website on Sunday, Nov. 28. The New York Times, Britain's Guardian newspaper, SPIEGEL, the French daily newspaper Le Monde and Spain's El Pais were given advance access to this treasure trove and were able to analyze it. Rarely has an exposé angered so many people and provoked such widely diverging reactions. And rarely have leaks been disseminated so widely and so simultaneously. Some of the 251,287 documents are banal, but some are so explosive that the publications analyzing them agreed not to publish them. There were thousands of instances in which journalists had to exercise discretion in handling the information in the cables responsibly. To protect so-called secondary sources, their names were not mentioned. Certain counterterrorism efforts and military operations were kept secret, out of consideration for the governments involved. SPIEGEL spent months examining this material, just as it has done with material from any other source in the past and will continue to do in the future. The only difference in the WikiLeaks case was

that the five participating publications agreed on the date of release, and agreed not to disclose the names of people whose freedom or lives could be put at risk by such disclosures. Source of Resentment Many of the cables are part of ordinary diplomatic reporting, while others clearly document borderline cases. The recruitment of a source within Germany's Free Democratic Party (FDP) by employees of the US embassy in Berlin is certainly in the latter category. Another such case clearly involves the State Department's instructions to its diplomats to spy on UN officials in New York. The directive on which they were based included a wish list of information about senior UN officials drawn up by the CIA. "The contents of that came from outside the Department of State," department spokesman Philip Crowley said in a press briefing last week. The cables, which instructed diplomats to obtain biometric data on UN envoys, as well as the details of their frequent flier accounts and even credit card numbers, were justifiably a source of resentment and anger at the UN building on New York's East River. Speaking to a plenary session, UN spokesman Farhan Haq quoted a passage from the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. UN Secretary General Ban Ki- moon, clearly troubled by the disclosures, conferred with Clinton, but both remained diplomatically tight-lipped on the issue after the meeting. State of Shock The documents made their deepest impression in the Middle East, where they add credence to an often voiced but never proven suspicion, namely that the governments of Israel and the major Arab countries, who are traditionally hostile toward one another, are completely in agreement on one issue:

their stance toward Iran. Both sides apparently want the Americans to put an end to Tehran's nuclear program and, contrary to their official positions, many Arab leaders are prepared to accept war as a possible consequence. The American diplomats quote the crown prince of the United Arab Emirates as saying that this is merely "a matter of when, not if." Seeing words like this published for the first time made such an impression on the Arab elites that they fell into a state of shock for three days. By Wednesday, the government-controlled newspapers in the Gulf had not printed a word of the colossal statements their own kings, sheikhs and emirs had made. The Arab press was silent for good reason. Arab leaders have lied to their people for years. The ca- bles clearly demonstrate that these leaders' repeatedly voiced appeals for Muslim unity were nothing but hollow phrases. The documents show, for example, that the Sunni Arab leaders showed their deep aversion to the Shiite mullahs in Tehran by showering them with a wealth of insults. The only problem is that their people, influenced by decades of propaganda, have since formed a different opinion. According to a recent survey by the US-based Zogby opinion polling firm, only 10 percent of Egyptians, Saudi Arabians and Jordanians feel threatened by Iran, while 77 percent of respondents fear the United States and 88 percent see Israel as a threat. The disclosures of the embassy cables are making Arab governments in the Middle East much more nervous than governments elsewhere in the world, because they show that at least part of their legitimacy is based on lies. At the end of last week, a group of diplomatic cables from an unknown source suddenly surfaced in the Arab world. The documents had not been released on the WikiLeaks website or by the five media partners. Their source remained unclear by Friday evening, as did the question of how responsibly they are now likely to be treated. However, the cables appear to be authentic. 'Satanic Conspiracy' Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for his part, declared from the very beginning that the cables were forgeries, the result of a "Satanic conspiracy" launched by Washington to harm Arab- Iranian relations. His advisor, Esfandiar Rahim Mashai, said: "America wants to portray itself as the leader of the world, as master of the destinies of nations." No one seems to be as comfortable with the disclosures as the Americans' worst enemy and best friend, respectively, Iran and Israel. While Ahmadinejad sharply criticized what he called the Ameri- cans' "psychological warfare," Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was noticeably relaxed when he spoke with the press in Jerusalem. The fact that the whole world can now read up on how closely Arab intelligence agencies cooperate with Israel, and that the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia called for an attack on Iran -- these are unexpected gifts for Netanyahu.

For the first time in history, Netanyahu told the journalists, there is finally agreement that Iran is a threat. He even said that he sees the leaks as a key to regional peace. "If leaders start saying openly what they have long been saying behind closed doors, we can make a real breakthrough on the road

to peace."

A new WikiLeaks fan community emerged in Israel overnight. A columnist for the major Israeli daily

newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth wrote: "Had WikiLeaks not existed, Israel would have had to invent it."

Relaxed Reaction

And what are the British saying? They had to learn that it apparently didn't bother Prince Andrew that the biggest British arms maker had corrupt business dealings with Saudi Arabia. They also read that the head of their central bank, the Bank of England, voiced misgivings over Prime Minister David Cameron's ability to survive the current financial crisis. The British are, in fact, taking a relaxed approach. Unlike many Americans, they do not see WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange as a public enemy. Sherard Cowper-Coles, a British diplomat who was his country's special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan until recently, said that the material might be "inconvenient" but it contains "few surprises." Now everyone can see for themselves what a first-class job US diplomats are doing, writes historian Timothy Garton Ash, arguing that the leaks are, in fact, good news for the Americans. Fareed Zakaria, the chief columnist for Time, agrees. After studying the cables, Zakaria writes, he was relieved to find that they "show an American diplomatic establishment that is pretty good at analysis." So what exactly is the downside for the United States? Perhaps the biggest problem the cables reveal, writes Zakaria, is that an individual soldier, sitting at his computer on a military base in Iraq, was able to download secret reports on conversations between the French foreign minister and the US defense secretary. For Zakaria, it was Washington's absurd data policy that made the scandal possible in the first place, a problem the Americans have been forced to address. Not Off-Limits Would SPIEGEL have published these reports if they had come from a different source? Does it consider them to be politically significant? The answer, in both cases, is yes. A newspaper or magazine must be able to print material that state authorities wrongly exploit or keep under lock and key, SPIEGEL founder Rudolf Augstein once wrote. "A journalist is motivated by the intention to provide the public with the knowledge it needs to form an opinion on existential issues," the now- deceased former publisher of SPIEGEL also wrote. According to Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Dana Priest of the Washington Post, these documents show how nations interact with each other, and provide "an unfiltered view" of what they think of their enemies and allies. Priest argues that the public has a right to know what its government is up to. But don't countries also have the right to privacy, as the Swiss weekly magazine Weltwoche asks?

It has always been SPIEGEL's view that not everything governments consider to be secret should be

off-limits to journalists. SPIEGEL's 1982 disclosure of the Flick affair, which involved questionable political contributions by the German Flick company, was based on confidential documents from the public prosecutor's office. The magazine's reporting on the Neue Heimat embezzlement affair was based on internal trade union documents, while SPIEGEL obtained information on the Kunduz bombing disaster from confidential German military documents and a classified NATO report. "A journalist who sees the WikiLeaks data primarily as an issue of national or, even worse, Western security, has successfully shot himself in the foot -- and dealt a blow to press freedom in the process," writes Jakob Augstein, son of the SPIEGEL founder and publisher of the weekly newspaper Freitag. But even those newspapers that were critical of the publication of the cables, such as the German tabloid Bild, which characterized the "online anarchists" as criminal, or the daily Die Welt, which wrote of an irresponsible and immensely dangerous "summary breach of secrecy," did not refrain from reporting on the disclosures at length last week. Calls for Revenge

In this respect, Germany was no different from the United States, where political forces on the right are now calling for revenge. Bloggers have used their sites to unveil their own plans for Bradley Manning, the gay, 23-year-old private, a former military IT expert in Iraq, who allegedly downloaded the diplomatic cables and leaked them to WikiLeaks. They want to see him stuffed into one of those orange jumpsuits worn by the prisoners at Guantanamo, picked up by a helicopter and dragged off to

a secret camp. For days, there have been calls on the Internet for his execution. The man who said

that he copied the cables onto a CD he had disguised as one of Lady Gaga music has not become a hero, nor has WikiLeaks founder Assange. Last Thursday, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) criticized what it called a "political campaign" against Assange and Manning. According to the IFJ, the "calls by right-wing commentators for Manning to be executed and that Assange be hunted down as a spy … show a mood of intolerance and persecution that is dangerous not just for the two men but for all journalists engaged in investigating public affairs." The US government is now doing its utmost to prevent the spread of the documents. The Social Security Administration was the first government agency to warn its employees, 62,000 in all, not to disseminate the WikiLeaks documents to others, copy them or even read them. Government workers caught in violation of the order could face criminal consequences.

Manning, who was 22 when he copied the files, has repeatedly been accused of being motivated by a desire for recognition. But Manning himself offered a different explanation before he was taken into custody. He said that he had been told to cover up a lot of things during his time in Iraq, and that this had outraged him. After seeing the now notorious Baghdad helicopter video, he apparently decided to search for more material. When he found the cables, he said, he wanted the world to find out about them. In Shackles Manning has been in a military jail at the Marine Corps Base Quantico, about an hour's drive from Washington, for more than four months now. He gets up at 5:30 every morning and goes to bed at 8:30 every night. His attorney can see him, and an aunt visited him two weeks ago for the first time. His immediate family, on the other hand, has not been to Quantico. When Manning has visitors, he is brought to the visitors' area with his hands and feet in shackles. The noise of the chains can be heard from a distance. He takes antidepressants and sleeping pills, but he is no longer considered a suicide risk. As a precaution, however, there are no sheets in his cell yet. He is allowed to watch television for one hour

a week.

It's quite possible, therefore, that Manning has now become aware of the storm he has unleashed out there, beyond the gates of Quantico.


TG Daily / by Aharon Etengoff

Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Dec 6 2010 Dec 5. Tehran has formed an elite security unit to protect nuclear scientists after failing to prevent the assassination of a high-level Stuxnet expert attempting to counter the voracious worm. Indeed, as TG Daily previously reported, Prof. Majid Shahriari was killed in a drive-by shooting that also involved the planting and detonation of explosives by unknown operatives on speeding motorcycles. According to DebkaFile, the new unit will be jointly administered by Iran's Intelligence Ministry (MOIS)

and the Quds Brigade (نیوری سد ق) of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). Iran forms elite security unit after Stuxnet assassinationIts task: To provide nuclear scientists and their families with the same level of security offered to high-ranking leaders of the Ahmadinejad regime. "The decision to establish an [elite] unit with upgraded security arrangements for the nuclear program's staff and their families was taken to halt [a] stampede for [the] exits," explained DebkaFile analysts. "[As such], until the new unit is in place, the details guarding government and military VIPs will stand guard over the program's staff. [In addition], top scientists are to be provided with armored-plated vehicles [capable of] withstanding sticky bombs and RPGs."

It should also be noted that Ali Akhbar Salehi - chairman of Iran's Atomic Energy Comission - has

confirmed that a massive security shakeup is ongoing. "We [definitely] have been pursuing serious protective measures for hundreds of our scientists and experts since last year," he said. "And, based on [a] recent decision, we are to increase protective measures multi-fold and take other steps as well."


Source: Steven Aftergood / Secrecy News / FAS / Washington / www.fas.org

Dec 6 2010 Dec 6. The Library of Congress confirmed on Friday that it had blocked access from all Library computers to the Wikileaks web site in order to prevent unauthorized downloading of classified records such as those in the large cache of diplomatic cables that Wikileaks began to publish on November 28. Since the Congressional Research Service is a component of the Library, this means that CRS re- searchers will be unable to access or to cite the leaked materials in their research reports to Congress. Several current and former CRS analysts expressed perplexity and dismay about the move, and they said it could undermine the institution's research activities.

"It's a difficult situation," said one CRS analyst. "The information was released illegally, and it's not right for government agencies to be aiding and abetting this illegal dissemination. But the information is out there. Presumably, any Library of Congress researcher who wants to access the information that Wikileaks illegally released will simply use their home computers or cellphones to do so. Will they be able to refer directly to the information in their writings for the Library? Apparently not, unless a secondary source, like a newspaper, happens to have already cited it." "I can understand LOC blocking the public's access to Wikileaks," a former CRS analyst said. "It would have no control over someone from the public using classified information for impermissible or im- proper purposes. [But] the connection between LOC and CRS has always been somewhat fuzzy because Congress intended CRS to have a certain amount of autonomy. There should be room for CRS to adopt a different policy, particularly for specialists who have security clearances, know how to protect classified information, and can be entrusted to use Wikileaks appropriately. To me, it is a wrong course to simply close the door tightly without searching for a compromise needed to continue providing Congress with high-level professional analysis." In fact, if CRS is "Congress's brain," then the new access restrictions could mean a partial lobotomy. "I don‘t know that you can make a credible argument that CRS reports are the gold standard of analytical reporting, as is often claimed, when its analysts are denied access to information that historians and public policy types call a treasure trove of data," another former CRS employee said. "I understand the rationale behind the policy decision to preclude government agencies from making the information available via their sites as a matter of pure principle. On the other hand (as CRS is famous for saying), in some cases it would clearly diminish the weight of some of the analysis CRS does on policy issues, particularly on foreign affairs and military strategy where it is widely known that key information that would help inform thoughtful and comprehensive analysis was released on Wikileaks." "As an example, when [CRS Middle East analyst] Ken Katzman writes on U.S. policy towards Iran I don‘t know how he could meet the high professional standards for completeness and accuracy he routinely meets if he can‘t refer to the information in the [leaked] diplomatic notes that express the thoughts of key leaders in the region on the need to strike Iran‘s nuclear program. The same with North Korea; how do you provide Congress complete and accurate analysis to inform their decision making that ignores the [leaked] information on China‘s increasing frustration with Pyongyang? The examples could go on and on." "I‘m sure public policy analysts from other organizations are going to use the [Wikileaks] information and their reports may prove more valuable to decision makers than CRS reports," the former CRS employee said. Another former analyst questioned the legal basis for the Library of Congress's action. "In its press release, LOC seems to be saying that it is following OMB advice regarding the obligation of federal agencies and federal employees to protect classified information and to otherwise protect the integrity of government information technology systems. But LOC is statutorily chartered as the library of the House and the Senate. It is a legislative branch agency. I don't recall either chamber directing the blocking of access to Wikileaks for/or by its committees, offices, agencies, or Members." Interestingly, the OMB guidance did not require federal agencies to block access to Wikileaks, only to warn employees against downloading classified information. So by imposing such blocks, the Library of Congress has actually exceeded the instructions of OMB. The Library did not reply to an inquiry from Secrecy News over the weekend concerning the impact of its restricted access policy on CRS. If a reply is forthcoming, it will be posted on the Secrecy News blog.


Source: Steven Aftergood / Secrecy News / FAS / Washington / www.fas.org Dec 6 2010 Dec 6. On December 3, I participated in an interesting, somewhat testy discussion about Wikileaks on the show Democracy Now along with Glenn Greenwald of Salon.com, who is a passionate defender of the project. The ultimate victory of Wikileaks (or something like it) is

guaranteed, Mr. Greenwald suggested, so any criticism of it is basically irrelevant. "We can debate WikiLeaks all we want," he said, "but at the end of the day, it doesn't really matter, because the technology that exists is inevitably going to subvert these institutions' secrecy regimes.

It's too easy to take massive amounts of secret [material] and dump it on the internet

that what we're talking about is inevitable, whether people like Steven Aftergood or Joe Lieberman or

others like it or not."

And I think

This seems like wishful thinking. It is true that Wikileaks offers the most direct public access to the diplomatic cables and other records that it has published, most of which could not be obtained any time soon through normal channels. But instead of subverting secrecy regimes, Wikileaks appears to be strengthening them, as new restrictions on information sharing are added and security measures are tightened. (Technology can be used to bolster secrecy as well as subvert it.) In fact, Wikileaks may deliberately be attempting, in a quasi-Marxist way, to subvert secrecy by provoking governments to strengthen it. But please try this in your own country first. It was ordinary political advocacy, not leaks, that produced reversals of longstanding U.S. government secrecy policies this year on nuclear stockpile secrecy and intelligence budget secrecy. It was also political advocacy, not leaks, that led to the declassification of more than a billion pages of classified records since 1995. Obviously, much more remains to be done, and the tools available to transparen- cy advocates are not as powerful as one would wish. Leaks that serve the public interest have their honored place; more would be welcome. Advocacy may fail, and often does. Nothing is inevitable, as far as I know. But so far it is still politics, not the subversion or repudiation of politics, that has produ- ced the greater impact on U.S. secrecy policy. (The calculation may well be different in other coun- tries.) The susceptibility of secrecy policy to political action was discussed in a paper I wrote on "National Security Secrecy: How the Limits Change". It will appear in the forthcoming Fall 2010 issue of the journal Social Research that is devoted to the topic of "Limiting Knowledge in a Democracy."


AP Stringer: Frank Slijper / Campaign Against Arms Trade / Groningen NL / frank.slijper@hetnet.nl Dec 6 2010 Dec 6. Intelligence officials say foreign fighters have been slipping back into Iraq in larger numbers recently and may have been behind some of the most devastating attacks this year, reviving a threat the U.S. military believed had been almost entirely eradicated. It is impossible to verify the actual numbers of foreign insurgents entering the country. But one Middle Eastern intelligence official estimated recently that 250 came in October alone. U.S. officials say the figure is far lower, but have acknowledged an increase since August. At the same time, Iraqi officials say there has been a surge in financial aid to al-Qaida's front group in Iraq as the U.S. military prepares to leave by the end of 2011. They said it reflects fears by Arab states over the growing influence of Iran's Shiite-led government over Iraq and its Shiite-dominated government. On Sunday, security official Maj. Gen. Qassim al-Moussawi said Iraqi forces are searching for six foreign fighters who are among Iraq's most wanted terrorists. The six are suspected of involvement in the Oct. 31 siege of a Christian church that left 68 people dead and drew international outrage, al-Moussawi said. They are also suspected in two summertime attacks on an Iraqi army headquarters in central Baghdad that killed a total of 73 people. "All who committed these attacks are (non-Iraqi) Arabs," he said. "This indicates the failure of al-Qaida leaders to recruit Iraqis to carry out suicide attacks." Al-Moussawi said five of the six suspects are hiding in two Sunni Muslim-dominated provinces bordering Syria, while one has fled to Syria. U.S. officials are playing down the threat. Army Col. Barry Johnson, a spokesman for U.S. forces in Iraq, said the military noticed a slight increase in foreign fighters starting in August, but would not say how many. He said the number remains far lower than when insurgents were rushing in from Arab states between 2005 and 2007. "There were some indications of a flow of foreign fighters in," Johnson said. "And that is often associated with suicide attacks, so we were anticipating something happening." Last year, U.S. counterterrorism officials said the number of foreigners heading to Iraq had trickled from hundreds to "tens" in what they described as a severely weakened al-Qaida in Iraq. But a Mideast counterterrorism official said an estimated 250 foreign fighters entered Iraq in October alone. He said they came through the Syrian city of Homs, a hub for Syrian Muslim fundamentalists that is run mostly by Tunisians and Algerians. Other fighters have come from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Yemen. Additionally, the official said tens of millions of foreign dollars annually are funding the Iraqi insurgency, which has received about $5 billion in aid since 2007. The money comes from al-Qaida

leaders, Muslims who want the U.S. to leave, and so-called 'Arab nationalists' who are eager for Sunni Muslims to regain power in Shiite-dominated Iraq. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to brief the media. Even at the height of the war, foreign fighters were considered a small percentage of the total insurgents in Iraq. But their presence encouraged donations from overseas, and they made up some

of the most hardcore jihadists who were willing to carry out suicide bombings.

Officials see the fingerprints of foreign fighters in a spate of recent attacks:

Four of the church bombers who were from Libya and Syria and carried fake ID cards that identified them as mutes to avoid talking in foreign accents to checkpoint guards, Iraqi Deputy Interior Minister Ahmed Abu Raghef told The Associated Press. He said $70,000 cash was seized from a western Baghdad home where their cell's leaders were operating.

A Tunisian who was also pretending to be mute was arrested on terror charges in August in eastern

Diyala province, according to an Iraqi security official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the media.

A Moroccan fighter was captured and two non-Iraqi insurgents were killed in a raid last Thursday in the

northern city of Mosul, said Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Mohammed al-Askari.

Four Jordanian fighters were killed by U.S. troops in Iraq, according to a November claim by the Islamic State of Iraq, a front group for al-Qaida.

A Nov. 2 string of rapid-fire blasts in Shiite neighborhoods across Baghdad killed 91. Iraqi counterter-

rorism commander Maj. Gen. Fadhel al-Barwari said it must have been carried out with foreign fi- nancing to buy the explosives needed "to launch an attack with a big number of casualties."

U.S. officials and experts voiced doubt that the foreign aid is as high as Iraqi and Mideast authorities believe.

A senior U.S. military official who spoke on condition of anonymity to talk candidly about the sensitive

issue estimated about 10 foreign fighters enter Iraq each month. Michael Knights, a Lafter Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy predicted there are only "small cells of experienced foreign fighters in ISI." But an analysis by private global intelligence firm Stratfor concluded that foreign help in the church siege signals al-Qaida "may have found a new source for militants, and they may

have more resources to carry out fresh attacks."


A personal insight into Mossad and the murder of a top Iranian nuclear scientist

Sunday Telegraph / by Gordon Thomas

Stringer: Martin Rudner [ret.] / Carleton University / Ottawa / www.carleton.ca/cciss

Dec 5 2010 Dec 5. Inside a secret bomb-proof building in a Tel Aviv suburb, which Google Earth does not include on its website, some of the occupants last week exchanged high-fives at their work stations. According to insiders, several sent each other the same message: The Chief‘s Last Hit. That ―chief‖ was Meir Dagan, the outgoing head of Mossad. On his first day in office eight years ago, Mr Dagan had stood on a table in the organisation‘s canteen and promised to support any operation against any of Israel‘s enemies, with every means he had — legal or illegal. He could allow his field agents to use prescribed nerve toxins, dumdum bullets and methods of killing that even the Russian or Chinese secret services would not use. ―We are like the hangman, or the doctor on Death Row who administers the lethal injection,‖ he said, as by his own account his agents listened, enthralled. ―Our actions are all endorsed by the state of Israel. When we kill we are not breaking the law. We are fulfilling a sentence sanctioned by the prime minister of the day.‖ Earlier this month, ―the chief‖ and a small team of specialists — analysts, weapons experts and psychologists met in a conference room adjoining his office. With them was a brigadier-general, the head of the kidon. Named after the Hebrew word for bayonet, the kidon is a unit with 38 elite assassins at its disposal, including five women. Operating out of a military base in the Negev Desert, all are in their twenties, and trained both as expert killers and as expert linguists: a number are fluent in Persian. Last Monday, a thousand miles further east in the Iranian capital, Tehran, it appears that the kidon put both of those skills into practice, killing a top nuclear scientist and critically injuring a second as they drove through the rush-hour traffic. Both were key figures in the Iranian nuclear programme, which Tehran insists is for civilian use only, but which Mossad has long perceived as the ultimate expression of President Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad‘s threat to ―wipe Israel off the map‖.

In one car was 45-year-old Majid Shahriyari, Iran‘s leading expert in designing nuclear switches, a key

part in the construction of nuclear weapons. Ali Alker Saler, an Iranian nuclear official, has described

Shahriyari‘s work as ―only handling the big projects‖. The week before he was assassinated, the nuclear scientist had returned from North Korea.

Intelligence sources in Seoul have suggested that Mr Shahriyari had gone to Pyongyang to discuss a co-production deal over nuclear centrifuges. Claims have also emerged that on his flight home via Syria, a Mossad deep cover agent had spotted Mr Shahriyari at Damascus International Airport as he waited for a connecting flight to Tehran.

In another quarter of Tehran, another top nuclear scientist, Fareydoun Abbasi-Davani, was also on his

way to work at his laboratory at Shahid Beheshti University.

A world expert on isotope separation, he was routinely driven around by a member of the

Revolutionary Guards and, like Mr Shahriyari, had a phone link on his car to Tehran‘s security headquarters. That, however, was the only protection the car had. To assist in the attack, Persian-speaking Mossad deep cover agents have been steadily infiltrating Iran for years. How exactly they helped the hitmen flit in and out of the country remains a secret. But clues to their methods have been provided by Hossein Sajedina, Tehran‘s police chief. He confirmed last week how Shahriyari was killed and Abbasi-Davani seriously injured. ―Two motorcyclists had approached their cars and attached bombs on the vehicle which exploded at once,‖ he said. There have been unconfirmed reports that the bombs had suction pads fitted to them which had enabled them to be attached to the windscreen of each car. Within hours Mr Sajedina had accused Mossad of the crimes. In Tel Aviv a government spokesman said Israel had not been involved. When the news reached Mossad headquarters, the high-fives started, I am told. Yet the day the attack was carried out had also been chosen by ―the chief‖ to formally announce his resignation. For despite enjoying the admiration and loyalty of his agents, Mr Dagan‘s leadership of Mossad had been as controversial as it had been effective. From that same Tel Aviv office last February, he had sent a hit squad into Dubai carrying fake British passports to assassinate Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, a top Hamas commander. The mission had succeeded. But the use of the faked passports had led to a diplomatic row with Britain, culminating in Mossad‘s station chief in London being expelled. Then, in May, Mossad intelligence officers based in Turkey failed to warn that a ―peace flotilla‖ bound

for Gaza with goods and medicines, was not carrying arms. Israel‘s Flotilla-13 of sea-borne commandos attacked the ships, killing nine activists. Mr Dagan offered to resign back then, but was told by Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, to remain in post and help to devise a plan to stop Iran‘s efforts to create a nuclear bomb. In Geneva tomorrow, Baroness Ashton, the EU‘s top diplomat, and members of the UN Security Council will meet Iranian officials in an attempt to kick-start nuclear talks after a halt of more than a year. Yet while the talks themselves are hailed a sign of progress, many believe Tehran is playing for extra time. It has continued its proscribed uranium enrichment programme regardless, and the suspicion is that Iranian hardliners believe they are now so close to having nuclear weapons that the threat of increased international sanctions can simply be ridden out. During the weeks that Mr Dagan was hatching the Tehran operation, Tamir Pardo, his deputy, was told by Mr Netanyahu that he had been chosen to take over. Last weekend, with the Tehran operation set at ―go‖, Mr Pardo had been in the office with Mr Dagan, where a photograph on the wall reflected his outgoing boss‘s style over the past eight years.

It showed an SS officer aiming his rifle at an old man‘s head. Mr Dagan had once explained what the picture meant to him.

―The old Jew was my grandfather,‖ he said. ―He represents my own philosophy of Jewish self-defence and survival. We should be strong, use our brains and defend ourselves so that the Holocaust never happens again.‖

A Mossad source said last week that Mr Pardo had cited the moment captured in that photograph as

sufficient justification for continuing to use all means possible to defend Israel against Iran. Mr Pardo is now 57 and a grandfather, having played a part in the 1976 operation to rescue Jewish hostages on the hijacked Air France plane in Entebbe, Uganda. Last week, as he contemplated taking over the top job in protecting Israel from its most serious threat, Mr Pardo remarked: ―I have big shoes to fill and a lot of work to do.‖


NY Times / by James Glanz and John Markoff

Dec 5 2010 Dec 4. As China ratcheted up the pressure on Google to censor its Internet searches last year, the American Embassy sent a secret cable to Washington detailing one reason top Chinese leaders had become so obsessed with the Internet search company: they were Googling themselves. The May 18, 2009, cable, titled Google China Paying Price for Resisting Censorship, quoted a well- placed source as saying that Li Changchun, a member of Chinas top ruling body, the Politburo Standing Committee, and the countrys senior propaganda official, was taken aback to discover that he could conduct Chinese-language searches on Googles main international Web site. When Mr. Li typed his name into the search engine at google.com, he found results critical of him. That cable from American diplomats was one of many made public by WikiLeaks that portray Chinas leadership as nearly obsessed with the threat posed by the Internet to their grip on power and, the reverse, by the opportunities it offered them, through hacking, to obtain secrets stored in computers of its rivals, especially the United States. Extensive hacking operations suspected of originating in China, including one leveled at Google, are a central theme in the cables. The operations began earlier and were aimed at a wider array of American government and military data than generally known, including on the computers of United States diplomats involved in climate change talks with China. One cable, dated early this year, quoted a Chinese person with family connections to the elite as saying that Mr. Li himself directed an attack on Googles servers in the United States, though that claim has been called into question. In an interview with The New York Times, the person cited in the cable said that Mr. Li personally oversaw a campaign against Googles operations in China but the person did not know who directed the hacking attack. The cables catalog the heavy pressure that was placed on Google to comply with local censorship laws, as well as Googles willingness to comply up to a point. That coercion began building years before the company finally decided to pull its search engine out of China last spring in the wake of the successful hacking attack on its home servers, which yielded Chinese dissidents e-mail accounts as well as Googles proprietary source code. The demands on Google went well beyond removing material on subjects like the Dalai Lama or the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Chinese officials also put pressure on the United States government to censor the Google Earth satellite imaging service by lowering the resolution of images of Chinese government facilities, warning that Washington could be held responsible if terrorists used that information to attack government or military facilities, the cables show. An American diplomat replied that Google was a private company and that he would report the request to Washington but that he had no sense about how the government would act. Yet despite the hints of paranoia that appear in some cables, there are also clear signs that Chinese leaders do not consider the Internet an unstoppable force for openness and democracy, as some Americans believe. In fact, this spring, around the time of the Google pullout, Chinas State Council Information Office delivered a triumphant report to the leadership on its work to regulate traffic online, according to a crucial Chinese contact cited by the State Department in a cable in early 2010, when contacted directly by The Times. The message delivered by the office, the person said, was that in the past, a lot of officials worried that the Web could not be controlled.

But through the Google incident and other increased controls and surveillance, like real-name registration, they reached a conclusion: the Web is fundamentally controllable, the person said. That confidence may also reflect what the cables show are repeated and often successful hacking attacks from China on the United States government, private enterprises and Western allies that began by 2002, several years before such intrusions were widely reported in the United States. At least one previously unreported attack in 2008, code-named Byzantine Candor by American investigators, yielded more than 50 megabytes of e-mails and a complete list of user names and passwords from an American government agency, a Nov. 3, 2008, cable revealed for the first time. Precisely how these hacking attacks are coordinated is not clear. Many appear to rely on Chinese freelancers and an irregular army of patriotic hackers who operate with the support of civilian or military authorities, but not directly under their day-to-day control, the cables and interviews suggest. But the cables also appear to contain some suppositions by Chinese and Americans passed along by diplomats. For example, the cable dated earlier this year referring to the hacking attack on Google said: A well-placed contact claims that the Chinese government coordinated the recent intrusions of

Google systems. According to our contact, the closely held operations were directed at the Politburo Standing Committee level. The cable goes on to quote this person as saying that the hacking of Google had been coordinated out of the State Council Information Office with the oversight of Mr. Li and another Politburo member, Zhou Yongkang. Mr. Zhou is Chinas top security official. But the person cited in the cable gave a divergent account. He detailed a campaign to press Google coordinated by the Propaganda Departments director, Liu Yunshan. Mr. Li and Mr. Zhou issued approvals in several instances, he said, but he had no direct knowledge linking them to the hacking attack aimed at securing commercial secrets or dissidents e-mail accounts considered the purview of security officials. Still, the cables provide a patchwork of detail about cyberattacks that American officials believe originated in China with either the assistance or knowledge of the Chinese military. For example, in 2008 Chinese intruders based in Shanghai and linked to the Peoples Liberation Army used a computer document labeled salary increase survey and forecast as bait as part of the sophis- ticated intrusion scheme that yielded more than 50 megabytes of e-mails and a complete list of user names and passwords from a United States government agency that was not identified. The cables indicate that the American government has been fighting a pitched battle with intruders who have been clearly identified as using Chinese-language keyboards and physically located in China. In most cases the intruders took great pains to conceal their identities, but occasionally they let their guard down. In one case described in the documents, investigators tracked one of the intruders who was surfing the Web in Taiwan for personal use. In June 2009 during climate change talks between the United States and China, the secretary of states office sent a secret cable warning about e-mail spear phishing attacks directed at five State Department employees in the Division of Ocean Affairs of the Office of the Special Envoy for Climate Change. The messages, which purport to come from a National Journal columnist, had the subject line China and Climate Change. The e-mail contained a PDF file that was intended to install a malicious software program known as Poison Ivy, which was meant to give an intruder complete control of the victim‘s computer. That attack failed. The cables also reveal that a surveillance system dubbed Ghostnet that stole information from the computers used by the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and South Asian governments and was uncovered in 2009 was linked to a second broad series of break-ins into American govern- ment computers code-named Byzantine Hades. Government investigators were able to make a tenuous connection between those break-ins and the Peoples Liberation Army. The documents also reveal that in 2008 German intelligence briefed American officials on similar attacks beginning in 2006 against the German government, including military, economic, science and technology, commercial, diplomatic, and research and development targets. The Germans described the attacks as preceding events like the German government?s meetings with the Chinese government. Even as such attacks were occurring, Google made a corporate decision in 2006, controversial even within the company, to establish a domestic Chinese version of its search engine, called google.cn. In doing so, it agreed to comply with Chinas censorship laws. But despite that concession, Chinese officials were never comfortable with Google, the cables and interviews show. The Chinese claimed that Google Earth, the companys satellite mapping software, offered detailed images of Chinas military, nuclear, space, energy and other sensitive government agency installa- tions that would be an asset to terrorists. A cable sent on Nov. 7, 2006, reported that Liu Jieyi, an assistant minister of foreign affairs, warned the American Embassy in Beijing that there would be grave consequences if terrorists exploited the imagery. A year later, another cable pointed out that Google searches for politically delicate terms would sometimes be automatically redirected to Baidu, the Chinese company that was Googles main competitor in China. Baidu is known for scrubbing its own search engine of results that might be unwelcome to government censors. Google conducted numerous negotiations with officials in the State Council Information Office and other departments involved in censorship, propaganda and media licensing, the cables show. The May 18, 2009, cable that revealed pressure on the company by Mr. Li, the propaganda chief, said Google had taken some measures to try and placate the government. The cable also noted that Google had asked the American government to intervene with China on its behalf. But Chinese officials became alarmed that Google still did less than its Chinese rivals to remove mate- rial Chinese officials considered offensive. Such material included information about Chinese dissi-

dents and human rights issues, but also about central and provincial Chinese leaders and their chil- dren considered an especially taboo topic, interviews with people quoted in the cables reveal. Mr. Li, after apparently searching for information online on himself and his children, was reported to have stepped up pressure on Google. He also took steps to punish Google commercially, according to the May 18 cable. The propaganda chief ordered three big state-owned Chinese telecommunications companies to stop doing business with Google. Mr. Li also demanded that Google executives remove any link between its sanitized Chinese Web site and its main international one, which he deemed an illegal site, the cable said. Google ultimately stopped complying with repeated censorship requests. It stopped offering a censored version of its search engine in China earlier this year, citing both the hacking attacks and its unwillingness to continue obeying censorship orders.


The Washington Times / by Bill Gertz

Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com

Dec 4 2010 Dec 1. The National Security Agency (NSA) is conducting a counterintelligence probe

at its Fort Meade, Md., headquarters in a top-secret hunt for a Russian agent, according to a former

intelligence official close to the agency. The former official said the probe grew out of the case of 10 Russian "illegals," or deep-cover spies, who were uncovered last summer and sent back to Moscow after the defection of Col. Alexander Poteyev, a former SVR foreign intelligence officer who reportedly fled to the U.S. shortly before Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited here in June. Col. Poteyev is believed to be the source who disclosed the U.S.-based agent network. NSA counterintelligence officials suspect that members of the illegals network were used by Russia's SVR spy agency to communicate with one or more agents inside the agency, which conducts electronic intelligence gathering and code-breaking. One sign that the probe is fairly advanced is that FBI counterintelligence agents are involved in the

search. "They are looking for one or more Russian spies that NSA is convinced reside at Fort Meade and

possibly other DoD intel offices, like DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]," the former official said. "NSA

is convinced that at least one is at NSA."

Some of the 10 illegals who were posing as U.S. citizens helped service Russian agents working inside the U.S. intelligence community, the former official said. No other details of the investigation could be learned. NSA spokeswoman Vanee Vines said in e-mail: "I don't have any information to provide regarding your query." An FBI spokesman had no immediate comment. NSA has been the victim of several damaging spy cases dating back to the 1960s, when two officials defected to the Soviet Union. In 1985, NSA analyst Ronald Pelton was caught spying for Moscow. He had provided the Soviets with extremely damaging secrets, including details of an underwater electronic eavesdropping program on Russian military cables called "Operation Ivy Bells." China in Kyrgyzstan

A confidential State Department cable made public this week highlights China's role in the U.S.-led

war on terrorism. The U.S. ambassador in far-off Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, confronted China's ambassador about a covert attempt by Beijing to bribe the government there to shut down the strategic U.S. military transit base at Manas in exchange for $3 billion in cash. The Feb. 13, 2009, cable signed by Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller revealed that Chinese Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Zhang Yannian "did not deny categorically" the covert cash offer to close the base, which is a major transit and refueling point for U.S. troops and supplies heading into northern Afghanistan. "After opening pleasantries, the ambassador mentioned that Kyrgyz officials had told her that China had offered a $3 billion financial package to close Manas Air Base and asked for the ambassador's reaction to such an allegation," the cable stated.

"Visibly flustered, Zhang temporarily lost the ability to speak Russian and began spluttering in Chinese to the silent aide diligently taking notes right behind him. Once he had recovered the power of Russian speech, he inveighed against such a calumny, claiming that such an idea was impossible, China was

a staunch opponent of terrorism, and China's attitude toward Kyrgyzstan's decision to close Manas

was one of 'respect and understanding.' The cable highlights what observers say has been China's behind-the-scenes, anti-U.S. strategy of seeking to undermine U.S. global counterterrorism efforts. Mr. Zhang insisted that China's interest in Kyrgyzstan, which shares a border with China's restive Xinjiang province, is purely commercial. He then said China rejected calls by "some Kyrgyz" for China to set up a military base there to counterbalance Russian and U.S. influence. "We want no military or political advantage. Therefore, we wouldn't pay $3 billion for Manas," Mr. Zhang was quoted as saying. Chinese intelligence personnel, however, are another story, according to U.S. officials who have said Beijing's intelligence presence is very large in the country. Mr. Zhang advised the U.S. ambassador on how to keep the base. "Just give them $150 million in cash [per year, and] you will have the base," he said.

The Chinese official also said several times during the meeting that a "revolution in China" is possible

if the economy failed to improve and millions remain unemployed.

"In our experience, talk of revolution at home is taboo for Chinese," the cable said. However, observers have noted that Chinese diplomats used similar language in meetings with U.S. officials as scare tactics, warning of a coming Chinese collapse as a way to stave off political pressure for democratic change. Braced for attack Amid high tensions, U.S. and allied militaries are braced for another North Korean attack - more artillery shelling, missile test launches or possibly another underground nuclear blast. The next incident is expected in coming days after U.S.-South Korean joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea that ended on Wednesday, said intelligence sources familiar with the region. North Korean military forces remain on heightened alert, as do South Korean forces, and the sources said the South Korean military is set to counter any further artillery strikes. One possible target being watched closely is the northernmost of South Korea's five northwest islands, called Baengnyeong Island, a major intelligence base that has been a safe harbor for North Korean

defectors fleeing the communist state in the past. South Korea's military is prepared to carry out aggressive counterattacks against any new strikes. Intelligence analysis of the Nov. 23 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island, which killed four people and wounded 17, indicates that the surprise bombardment is connected to the ongoing leadership succession of Kim Jong-il's third son, Kim Jong-un, as well as to the recent disclosure by the North Koreans of a covert uranium-enrichment program. Kim Jong-un was recently promoted and has aligned himself with North Korean generals involved in artillery forces, according to the intelligence sources. Reports from North Korea indicated that both Kims visited the 4th Corps, whose unit carried out an artillery barrage before the Yeonpyeong attack. Gay training The Pentagon working group on open gays in the military sets out an ambitious training program to ensure that troops treat their colleagues, gay or straight, with dignity. The group, led by Army Gen. Carter Ham and Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson, appears to shy away from what some might call "sensitively training." The report's implementation plan states that "service members are not expected to change their personal religious or moral beliefs; however, they are expected to treat all others with dignity and respect, consistent with the core values that already exist within each service." But objections to homosexuality are not grounds to request a transfer, reports special correspondent Rowan Scarborough. Says the report: Service "members do not have the right to refuse duty or duty assignments based on

a moral objection to another's sexual orientation. Service members remain obligated to follow orders

that involve interaction with others who are gay or lesbian, even if an unwillingness to do so is based

on strong, sincerely held, moral or religious beliefs." And it states that "harassment or abuse based on sexual orientation is unacceptable. All service members are to treat one another with dignity and respect regardless of sexual orientation." Gay survey While the Pentagon working group concluded the negative impact on the force would be "low" if gays serve openly, its survey results present a different story.

Republicans likely will cite some of these numbers in arguing in the Senate, where a vote on repeal is pending, that now is not the time to end the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, as two wars are being fought. The most striking number is that nearly 60 percent of combat soldiers and Marines believe open gays will hurt unit readiness. There are other similar findings, reports special correspondent Mr. Scarborough. Of respondents who said they served under a leader they believed to be gay, 46 percent said it had a "mostly negative" effect on the unit's performance. Only 8 percent termed it "mostly positive."

Of all troops asked how repeal will affect their future, 23 percent said they will either leave the military sooner than planned or think about leaving. For Marines, the percentage was nearly 40 percent.

If the figures are accurate, repeal would result in a surge of troop departures and leave the military scrambling to fill the ranks.


quarter of those surveyed also said they would shower at a different time if someone they believed


be gay were using the facility.

Gay-rights advocates cite the survey's most publicized result: Seventy percent of all troops - support and combat - say repeal will have a positive, mixed or no effect on the force.


Defense News / by Tim Mahon

Stringer: Frank Slijper / Campaign Against Arms Trade / Groningen NL / frank.slijper@hetnet.nl

Dec 4 2010 Dec 3. Norwegian software engineering and systems integration company Teleplan Globe has won a contract valued at about 2 million euros ($2.65 million) for the supply of a new intelligence requirement and collection management system for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Acquisition is being handled by NATO's C3 Agency (NC3A) in The Hague, Netherlands, and the system is due to be fielded in the first half of 2011. ISAF's operational requirement covers computer-based tools supporting the entire intelligence cycle, including planning, collection, analysis and distribution. With local commanders having access to information from an increasingly wide range of intelligence sources, including manned and unmanned aircraft, satellite imagery and ground sensors, efficient use of intelligence becomes vital. Teleplan Globe, based at Lysaker, near Oslo, has developed similar tools and systems for the Norwe- gian armed forces, according to the company's director of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissan- ce (ISR), John Vestengen. "We have invested heavily in building a strong company competence within the intelligence domain, including a continuous participation in the NATO MAJIIC program from the very beginning," he added. MAJIIC, or Multisensor Aerospace-Ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition, is a nine-nation effort, coordinated by NC3A, to maximize use of ISR assets. The idea is to develop and evaluate the technical and operational means for interoperability of a wide range of such national assets. The system to be fielded by Teleplan Globe is one of several components of NATO's latest strategy for Joint ISR, according to NC3A.


WikiLeaks site poised to release documents

Associated Press / by Pauline Jelinek and Raphael G. Satter

Army Times

Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl

Comment by Roger Vleugels: In this 2 month old article information on the Information Review

Task Force first presented to you in Fringe Intelligence No 218. I used there this official name and the alias used in the intelligence community: the WikiLeaks War Room. In that article less on the review task and some information on the counterinsurgency task of that WikiLeaks War Room. Dec 3 2010 Oct 22. The WikiLeaks website is poised to release what the Pentagon fears is the largest cache of secret U.S. documents in history hundreds of thousands of intelligence reports that could amount to a classified history of the war in Iraq.

U.S. officials condemned the move and said Friday they were racing to contain the damage from the imminent release, while NATO's top official told reporters he feared that lives could be put at risk by the mammoth disclosure.

NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen said any release would create "a very unfortunate situation." "I can't comment on the details of the exact impact on security, but in general I can tell you that such


Berlin following a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. In a posting to Twitter, the secret-spilling website said there would be a "major WikiLeaks announcement in Europe" at 9 a.m. Saturday. The group has revealed almost nothing publicly about the nature of the announcement. U.S. Defense Department spokesman Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan echoed Rasmussen's stance, urging WikiLeaks to return the stolen material. "We deplore WikiLeaks for inducing individuals to break the law, leak classified documents and then cavalierly share that secret information with the world, including our enemies," Lapan said. "By disclosing such sensitive information, WikiLeaks continues to put at risk the lives of our troops, their coalition partners and those Iraqis and Afghans working with us." Meanwhile, a team of more than a hundred analysts from across the U.S. military, led by the Defense Intelligence Agency, has been combing through the Iraq documents they think will be released in anticipation of the leak. Called the Information Review Task Force, its analysts have pored over the documents and used word searches to try to pull out names and other issues that would be particularly sensitive, officials have said. The task force has informed U.S. Central Command of some of the names of Iraqis and allies and other information they believe might be released that could present a danger, officials have said. They noted that unlike the WikiLeaks previous disclosure of some 77,000 documents from Afghanistan in this case they had advance notice that names may be exposed. Once officials see what is publicly released, the command "can quickly push the information down" to forces in Iraq, Lapan said Friday in Washington. "CENTOM can jump into action and take whatever mitigating steps" might be needed, he said. Throughout the conflict, the U.S. and its allies have relied heavily on Iraqis as translators and support workers, who were frequently targeted by insurgents. The Iraqis often hid their identities to avoid revealing their links to the Western forces and many emigrated to other nations to flee the threat of violence. While the latest WikiLeaks revelations may not change public perceptions of the Iraq war it has been extremely unpopular in Europe and divides opinion in the United States they could provide new insight about a conflict that seemed headed for success after the invasion in 2003 before descending into a yearslong, blood-soaked struggle. The documents could shed light on the root causes of the insurgency, for instance, or the growth of sectarian violence that blighted Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. It may also give a behind-the-scenes glimpse at some of the major episodes of the war like the manhunt for insurgent chief Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, or the killing of U.S. security contractors on March 31, 2004, by a mob in Fallujah, an incident that led to the U.S. assault on the Iraqi city. The release of the documents would come at a pivotal time for the U.S. in Iraq as the military prepares to withdraw all 50,000 remaining troops from the country by the end of next year, raising questions about the future of relations between the two countries. The U.S. military had as many as 170,000 troops in Iraq in 2007. Violence has declined sharply over the past two years, but near-daily bombings and shootings continue, casting doubt on the ability of Iraqi forces to protect the people. The situation has been exacerbated by growing frustration among the public over the failure of Iraqi politicians to unite and form a new government more than seven months after inconclusive parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is struggling to remain in power since his Shiite alliance narrowly lost the March 7 vote to a Sunni-backed bloc led by rival Ayad Allawi. Wikileaks' previous release in July of secret war documents from Iraq and Afghanistan outraged the Pentagon, which accused the group of being irresponsible. Fogh Rasmussen said Friday that leaks of this nature "may put soldiers as well as civilians at risk." It appears that those fears which the military has invoked in its appeal to WikiLeaks and the media not to publish the documents have yet to materialize. A Pentagon letter obtained by The Associated Press reported that no U.S. intelligence sources or practices were compromised by the Afghan war logs' disclosure.

may have a very negative security impact for people involved," he told reporters Friday in

Still, the military feels any classified documents release can harm national security and raise fears for people who might consider cooperating with the U.S. in the future, Lapan said. Ryan Crocker, U.S. ambassador to Iraq in 2007-08, said the disclosures would be more worrisome if the U.S. were still fully engaged in combat in Iraq but he still sees it as a major problem. "I'd really be worried if as looks to be the case you have Iraqi political figures named in a context or a connection that can make them politically and physically vulnerable to their adversaries," he told a conference Friday at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "That has an utterly chilling effect on the willingness of political figures to talk to us not just in Iraq but anywhere in the world," he said.


More oversight needed for secret military unit: MPs

Toronto Star / by Joanna Smith

Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl

Doc 3 2010 Dec 2. There should be a better way to get to the bottom of allegations involving a shadowy elite Canadian military unit than allowing the force to investigate itself, opposition critics say. ―An elementary principle of natural justice is you can‘t be the judge in your own case,‖ Liberal MP and defence critic Dominic LeBlanc said Thursday. LeBlanc was responding to a report by CBC-Radio Canada that revealed the actions of secret commandos known as Joint Task Force 2 are being probed behind closed doors in Ottawa. The investigation, known as Sand Trap 2, is examining allegations that JTF2 members witnessed an American soldier killing an unarmed man during a joint mission, CBC reported. That follows an earlier investigation, called Sand Trap, into allegations that a member of JTF2 shot and skilled an Afghan who was surrendering four years ago. That investigation ended without any charges being laid. CBC reported the Canadian military is also probing how the chain of command reacted and responded to the allegations. Maj. Doug MacNair, a spokesman for the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command that includes JTF2, said he could not comment on the ongoing investigation but said they are cooperating fully. The commander of the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service, which is conducting the probe alongside a Board of Inquiry, said there is already enough oversight. ―I am independent. There is no interference,‖ Lt.-Col. Gilles Sansterre said Thursday, adding that the Military Police Complaints Commission provides a further level of accountability. ―We have enough oversight.‖ Sansterre said he could not comment on an ongoing investigation, but noted information will be made public if charges are laid. Defence Minister Peter MacKay said he is ―concerned whenever allegations are made‖ but also dismissed the suggestion there is not enough oversight, adding that even civilians hold the process to account through Parliament. ―There is also civilian oversight directly, through the chain of command, to me, to Parliament, to parliamentary committees, and that process has worked quite well,‖ MacKay told reporters outside the Commons Thursday. Defence critics suggested civilian oversight could be more effective by setting up something along the lines of what is done in the United States, where the Department of Defence is accountable to a civilian Inspector General and a senate committee whose members have clearance to examine these sensitive matters. ―There‘s no transparency here,‖ said NDP defence critic Jack Harris. ―(MPs) should look at what is going on,‖ said Bloc Québécois defence critic Claude Bachand. ―They should have briefings regularly and they should have input, which is not the case now.‖


The Washington Post / by Jeff Stein

Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl

Dec 3 2010 Dec 2. Syrian intelligence chiefs made discreet visits to London, Rome, Paris, Beijing and possibly Pyongyang in recent days, according to a new report, a development all the more intri- guing in light of WikiLeaks' disclosures this week that President Bashar Assad might be willing to distance himself from Hamas. The reasons for dispatching his senior intelligence officials abroad are not clear, but according to the Paris-based Intelligence Online newsletter, ―Syrian intelligence services have been engaged in intensive diplomatic activity of late.‖ Gen. Ali Mamlouk, an Assad intimate and head of Syria‘s General Intelligence service, made an unannounced trip to London from Nov. 16 through 20, said the subscription-only newsletter. At his side was Gen. Tha‘er al-Omar, described as head of the service‘s anti- terrorism component, and Gen. Hafez Makhlouf, the head if its internal branch, ―who was traveling outside Syria for the first time.‖ U.K. officials ―shrouded the visit in absolute secrecy,‖ IO reported, citing sources in Damascus. Mamlouk went on to Paris on Nov. 22 to lay the groundwork for an upcoming visit by Assad. In London, presumably, the Syrians met with their U.K. counterparts who, like the CIA, have found common ground with Damascus in combating al-Qaeda and its allies. Mamlouk was said to have also met with lawyers from Matrix Chambers, who have been defending the regime during the U.N. inquiry into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. A final report in the long-running probe is considered imminent. Assad described Hamas as an "uninvited guest" in a 2009 meeting with a U.S. congressional delegation, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, and likened its presence in Syria to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, which his father crushed in the 1980s. Assad hinted that he might be willing to break with Hamas in exchange for ―incentives,‖ such as being allowed to buy U.S. commercial aircraft and parts. Mamlouk was in Rome on Oct. 19 signing an anti-terrorism agreement, IO also reported, accompanied by his top foreign intelligence official, Zouheir Hamad, and his Brussels station chief, Fou‘ad Fadel. Just as Mamlouk was leaving London, meanwhile, another General Intelligence official, Gen. Bassam Merhej, described as ―director of Assad‘s security and military bureau,‖ was arriving in China. ―His real destination was probably Pyongyang, with whom Syria has a nuclear co-operation program,‖ IO reported. A heavy water reactor obtained from North Korea was destroyed in September 2007. A former deputy general director of air force intelligence, Mamlouk was appointed head of the General Intelligence service by Assad in June 2005 and is in frequent contact with his Gulf States counterparts, according to reports.


Washington Post / by Spencer S. Hsu

Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Dec 3 2010 Dec 3. The federal government has repeatedly violated legal limits governing the surveillance of U.S. citizens, according to previously secret internal documents obtained through a court battle by the American Civil Liberties Union. In releasing 900 pages of documents, U.S. government agencies refused to say how many Americans' telephone, e-mail or other communications have been intercepted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act - or FISA - Amendments Act of 2008, or to discuss any specific abuses, the ACLU said. Most of the documents were heavily redacted.

However, semiannual internal oversight reports by the offices of the attorney general and director of national intelligence identify ongoing breaches of legal requirements that limit when Americans are targeted and minimize the amount of data collected. The documents note that although oversight teams did not find evidence of "intentional or willful

attempts to violate or circumvent the law

as a March 2009 report stated. The unredacted portions of the reports refer only elliptically to what those actions were, but the March 2009 report stated that "information collected as a result of these incidents has been or is being purged from data repositories." All three reports released so far note that the number of violations "remains small, particularly when compared with the total amount of activity." However, as some variously put it, "each [incident] - individually or collectively - may be indicative of patterns, trends, or underlying causes, that might have broader implications." and underscore "the need for continued focus on measures to address underlying causes." The most recent report was issued in May.

certain types of compliance incidents continue to occur,"

In a statement Thursday, the ACLU said that violations of the FISA Amendments Act's "targeting and

minimization procedures

being improperly collected or 'targeted' or improperly retained and disseminated." The ACLU has

posted the documents on its Web site.

A spokesmen for Director of National Intelligence James Clapper did not immediately comment on the

ACLU statement.

In an e-mailed statement late Thursday, a spokesman for Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., Dean

Boyd, said the new law "put in place unprecedented oversight measures, reporting requirements and safeguards to protect privacy and civil liberties," and that the reports cited by the ACLU were the

product of "rigorous oversight" by the Justice Department and intelligence community. "In short, foreign intelligence surveillance is today carefully regulated by a combination of legislative, judicial, and executive-branch checks and balances designed to ensure strong and scrupulous protection of both national security and civil liberties," Boyd's e-mail said. Melissa Goodman, staff attorney with the ACLU National Security Project, said, "It is imperative that there be more public disclosure about the FAA [FISA Amendments Act] violations described in these


advance of its 2012 sunset." Congress passed FISA in 1978 to prevent Americans' communications from being tapped without a warrant. Lawmakers amended the law in 2008 to broaden and clarify legal authorities after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and advances in Internet communications prompted fresh concerns over expanded surveillance powers. The ACLU, human rights activists and other parties sued, charging that the new law violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. A U.S. district judge tossed out the case, which remains on appeal, and the ACLU has pursued a related Freedom of Information Act request.

likely means that citizens and residents' communications were either

as Congress begins to debate whether the FAA should expire or be amended in


The disclosure of Arab views on Iran's nuclear plans has made a military strike more likely

The Guardian / by Alan Dershowitz

Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Dec 3 2010 Dec 2. Former US secretary of state Henry Stimson famously declared that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail", referring to Japanese diplomatic cables the US had uncovered by breaking Japan's military code. Today, everybody reads everybody else's diplomatic mail, if they can get their hands on it. Mostly, this is a bad thing because secrecy - when properly used - can serve the interest of peace and security. Nations have the right to keep secrets from other nations, although they generally overdo it. But individuals do not have the right to decide for themselves when to reveal state secrets. The soldier who broke into governmental computers committed a serious crime and will be punished for it. The question is whether those who released the secrets to the press, namely WikiLeaks, are complicit in the crime. The newspapers that published leaked material make a compelling case for the decision to select

certain items for publication while withholding others. The press is, after all, part of our informal system

of checks and balances.

But secretary of state Hillary Clinton is surely correct when she warns that WikiLeaks poses a danger not only to the US but to international diplomacy, while at the same time trying to minimize the actual harm done by these particular disclosures. The disclosure that virtually every Arab country, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, would favour a military attack, as a last resort, to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons could have a discernible effect on the policies of several countries. Israel, of course, has long insisted that the military option be kept on the table. The disclosure that North Korea has delivered missiles to Iran may well frighten European countries into considering the option of military action, if sanctions don't work. There is additional information, not revealed by WikiLeaks, suggesting that although sanctions are having some effect on Iran's economy, Tehran has decided to move forward with its nuclear weapons programme. Computer bugs and the assassination of nuclear scientists may be slowing the process, but are not likely to stop it. The leaks confirm the US has made two disastrous decisions in dealing with Iran. The first came in 2007, when it released a misleading National Intelligence Estimate conveying the impression Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons programme. The second was the more recent statements by secretary of

defence Robert Gates that appear to have taken any military option off the table. These mistakes have encouraged Iran to move ahead with its programme.

A third mistake is to believe that there can be real peace in the Middle East with an Iranian nuclear

sword of Damocles hanging over the head of Israel. Even if Israel were to continue the settlement freeze and negotiate borders with the Palestinian Authority, the Iranians could ruin any prospect of permanent peace by unleashing Hezbollah and Hamas - which oppose any peace with Israel - to target Israeli civilians. President Obama understated the threat when he said a nuclear Iran would be "a game changer". It would be a disaster, threatening Middle East peace, putting an end to any hope of nuclear non- proliferation, and engendering the greatest arms race in modern history. Now that it has been made public that Arab nations favour a military attack, it will become more difficult for these countries to condemn Israel if it was to decide on a surgical strike. This public disclosure might embolden Israel to consider such a strike as a last resort. So the leaking of secret information may have grave, even if unintended, consequences. We need new laws and new technologies to cope with the apparent ease with which low-level functionaries can access and download the most secret of information. But there will always be those willing to break the

law and suffer the consequences for what they believe is a higher purpose; and it is always just a matter of time until the techno-thieves catch up to the techno-cops. We will have to learn to live with the reality that there is no absolute assurance that "gentlemen" (and others) will not be reading each other's mail.


Lawmakers cite lax controls on access to intelligence

The Washington Times / by Shaun Waterman

Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com

Dec 3 2010 Dec 2. The State Department and other U.S. agencies are not fully cooperating with lawmakers' efforts to probe the WikiLeaks security breach, according to the Republican likely to be the next chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Rep. Mike Rogers, Michigan Republican and a senior member of the intelligence committee, said government officials seem "more concerned about their department's reputation than the consequences [of the leak], and that is a big problem." "They've been obstructionist up to this point," Mr. Rogers told The Washington Times. "They need an attitude adjustment." He joins a growing chorus of Democrats and Republicans who are finding fault with the government's post-Sept. 11 information-sharing system, which aims to push intelligence reporting toward the front lines of the war on terrorism. "Clearly, the rush to share everything with everyone has gone too far," Mr. Rogers said. "Clearly, there'll be changes." That sentiment was echoed by Rep. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Maryland Democrat, who chaired part

of the intelligence committee briefing on the WikiLeaks breach this week that Mr. Rogers attended.

Mr. Ruppersberger noted that a half-million people have access to the network that was reportedly compromised - a classified Pentagon computer system called SIPRNet.

"How did we get to the point where a private with a questionable background has that kind of access?"

he said. "We members of Congress

He was referring to a low-level military analyst, Army Pfc. Bradley E. Manning, who has been charged

in connection with the breach and is accused of downloading hundreds of thousands of secret

documents from SIPRNet. Pfc. Manning has been in solitary confinement at the Marine Corps base at Quantico, Va., since July. His attorney has said that before the breach, Pfc. Manning's superiors were so concerned about his mental health that they disabled his weapon. He also was admonished while a trainee for inappropriately referencing classified material in personal videos he posted on the Web. Neither incident appears to have restricted his top-secret clearance or his access to SIPRNet. Former users of SIPRNet say the network is set up very much like the Internet, with users employing a Web browser to visit sites maintained by different U.S. agencies on which they display material classified up to the lowest level - secret. "It is basically a parallel Internet, classified at the secret level," said Adam Rice, a security specialist who used the network when he was in the Army Special Forces.

don't have that kind of access."

For the 500,000-plus cleared users of SIPRNet, there are few barriers to access once they are logged

on, said Mr. Rice, now the head of security for a global Internet firm. "Once you're in

have access to anything in there." When Mr. Rice was a user, "I was amazed at the information that was out there," he said, declining to give any specifics. He was especially surprised, given the size of the user base with access. "It is too big, too uncontrolled," he said. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, California Democrat and chairwoman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, agreed that "part of the problem" is the broad distribution of intelligence that has been promoted since Sept. 11, with intelligence agencies urged to replace their traditional reliance on "need to know" with a new focus on "need to share." "Both concepts - 'need to know' and 'need to share' - must be carefully reviewed and changed," she said in a statement, adding that at present, "hundreds of thousands of individuals receive intelligence" that they do not need. Mr. Rice noted the fact that Pfc. Manning was caught only after he confessed in an online chat to a former hacker who turned him in to the authorities. "If he wasn't such a braggart, he'd have gotten clean away," he said.

This was especially alarming because it indicated that there was no monitoring of downloading by SIPRNet users. "Who was watching the stable door before the horse was stolen?" Mr. Rice said. "How could that

much data leave SIPRNet without anyone knowing about it?" Simple precautions could easily have prevented the massive security breach Pfc. Manning is charged with, Mr. Rice said. "At bottom this problem is just sloppy management."

Mr. Rogers agreed: "The way they handled this was

the technology exists to prevent this." He added that he is "concerned" about what he described as "almost a cavalier attitude" among officials towards the details of information-sharing policy. But other lawmakers were pushing back this week against what they saw as an overreaction presa- ging possible conflict about the issue across party lines and complicated by the jurisdictional issues involved between the intelligence, armed services and government oversight committees. "There was no 'rush' to increase information-sharing after Sept. 11," Sen. Christopher S. Bond, Missouri Republican, said in an e-mailed statement. "It has been a long, painstaking process to increase information to those who need to have it," Mr. Bond said. "I think the solution is not to share less, but to improve auditing and control of the information so that this kind of mass download cannot happen again." But even those critical of SIPRNet access arrangements cautioned against congressional over- reaction. "We've got to get the information into the right hands," Mr. Ruppersberger said. "We can't go back to the stovepipes we had before Sept. 11." Mr. Ruppersberger said that establishing accountability for the breach is important. "Was there a lack of leadership?" he said. "I am sure we will find people who didn't do their jobs." But he observed that many mitigation measures had been taken, including barring downloads to removable media, like the CDs Pfc. Manning boasted of using to steal the data, and improved management oversight. Mr. Rogers, however, was more skeptical. "I am not convinced that the problems are fixed," he said. "If they are, they haven't demonstrated that."

It is mind-boggling because we know

you basically


The Nation / by Jeremy Scahill

Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl

Dec 3 2010 Dec 1. Despite sustained denials by US officials spanning more than a year, US milita- ry Special Operations Forces have been conducting offensive operations inside Pakistan, helping di- rect US drone strikes and conducting joint operations with Pakistani forces against Al Qaeda and Tali- ban forces in north and south Waziristan and elsewhere in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, according to secret cables released as part of the Wikileaks document dump. According to an October 9, 2009 cable classified by Anne Patterson, the US ambassador to Pakistan, the operations were "al- most certainly [conducted] with the personal consent of [Pakistan's] Chief of Army Staff General Kaya- ni." The operations were coordinated with the US Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan. A US special operations source told The Nation that the US forces described in the cable as SOC(FWD)

-PAK were "forward operating troops" from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the most elite force within the US military made up of Navy SEALs, Delta Force and Army Rangers. The cables also confirm aspects of a Nation story from November 2009, "The Secret US War in Pakistan," which detailed offensive combat operations by JSOC in Pakistan. In response to the Nation story, Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell called it "conspiratorial" and explicitly denied that US special operations forces were doing anything other than "training" in Pakistan. More than a month after the October 2009 cable from the US embassy in Pakistan confirming JSOC combat missions,

Morrell told reporters: "We have basically, I think, a few dozen forces on the ground in Pakistan who are involved in a train-the-trainer mission. These are Special Operations Forces. We've been very candid about this. They arethey have been for months, if not years now, training Pakistani forces so that they can in turn train other Pakistani military on how toon certain skills and operational techniques. And that's the extent of ourour, you know, military boots on the ground in Pakistan." According to the October 2009 cable, Morrell's statement was false.

In one operation in September 2009, four US special operations forces personnel "embedded with the

[Pakistani] Frontier Corps (FC)…in the FATA," where the Americans are described as providing "ISR":

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The support from the US forces, according to the cable, "was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location." A month later, according to the cable, the Pakistan Army again "approved deployment of US special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations." To the embassy staff, this was documented in the cable as a "sea change" in Pakistan's military leaders' thinking, saying they had previously been "adamantly opposed [to] letting us embed" US special ops forces with Pakistani forces. According to the cable, "US special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a

year, but were largely limited to a training role," adding that the Pakistani units that received training from US special operations forces "appear to have recognized the potential benefits of bringing US SOF personnel into the field with them."

In another operation cited in the cables, the US teams, led by JSOC, were described as providing

support to the Pakistani Army's 11th Corp and included "a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video." Whether the drones were used for surveillance or as part of a joint offensive

is unclear from the documents. While the US government will not confirm US drone strikes inside the

country and Pakistani officials regularly deride the strikes, the issue of the drones was discussed in

another cable from August 2008. That cable describes a meeting between Ambassador Patterson and

Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani. When the issue of US drone strikes came up, according

to the cable, Gillani said, "I don't care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We'll protest in

the National Assembly and then ignore it." The ability of US special operations forces to operate in Pakistan is clearly viewed as a major development by the US embassy. "Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point," according to the October 2009 cable. It also notes the potential consequences of the activities leaking: "These deployments are highly politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or related matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or US media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance." Such statements might help explain why Ambassador Richard Holbrooke lied to the world when he said bluntly in July 2010: "People think that the US has troops in Pakistan, well, we don't."

A US special operations veteran who worked on Pakistan issues in 2009 reviewed the Wikileaks

cables for The Nation. He said he was taken aback that the cable was not classified higher than "SECRET" given that it confirms the active involvement of US soldiers from the highly-secretive, elite Joint Special Operations Command engaging in combatnot just trainingin Pakistan. And offensive combat at that. JSOC operations are compartmentalized and highly classified. Pentagon spokespeople have repeatedly insisted that the US military's activities in Pakistan are restricted to training operations. Even after the October 2009 cable and multiple JSOC operations in Pakistan, US and Pakistani officials continued to hold official meetings to discuss "potential" joint operations. In January 2010 in Washington DC, US and Pakistani military officials gathered under the umbrella of the "US-Pakistan Land Forces Military Consultative Committee." According to notes from the meeting, they discussed US military operations in Pakistan aiming to "enhance both US and Pakistan Army COIN [counterinsurgency] capabilities" and "potential US COIN Center/Pakistan Army interactions." Among the participants were representatives of the Special Operations Command, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs' Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell, the Office of Defense representative-Pakistan and a Pakistan delegation led by Brigadier General Muhammad Azam Agha, Pakistan's director of military training.

A special operations veteran and a former CIA operative with direct experience in Pakistan have told

The Nation that JSOC has long engaged in combat in Pakistanwhich raises a question: How in-the- loop is the US embassy about the activities of JSOC in Pakistan? Just because Ambassador Anne Patterson approves a cable saying that US special ops forces have only done two operations with Pakistani forces and plays this up as a major-league development doesn't make it true. JSOC has

conducted operations across the globe without the direct knowledge of the US ambassador. In 2006, the US military and Pakistan struck a deal that authorized JSOC to enter Pakistan to hunt Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders with the understanding that Pakistan would deny it had given permission. JSOC has struck multiple times inside Pakistan over the years, regardless of what Ambassador Patterson's cables may say.

In 2006, twelve "tactical action operatives" from Blackwater were recruited for a secret JSOC raid

inside Pakistan, targeting an Al Qaeda facility. The operation was code-named "Vibrant Fury." Which

raises another issue: the activities described in the October 2009 cable very closely align with what a US military intelligence source, a US special forces source and a former Blackwater executive told The Nation in November 2009, namely that JSOC was running an operation in Pakistan where "members

of an elite division of Blackwater are at the center of a secret program in which they plan targeted

assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, 'snatch and grabs' of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan.… The Blackwater operatives also assist in gathering intelligence and help direct a secret US military drone bombing campaign that runs parallel

to the well- documented CIA predator strikes." The arrangement, which involved a web of

subcontractors, allowed the Pakistani Frontier Corpsthe force cited in the cableto work with JSOC operators while simultaneously denying that Americans were involved. From the Nation article, "The Secret US War in Pakistan," in November 2009:

A former senior executive at Blackwater confirmed the military intelligence source's claim that the company is working in Pakistan for the CIA and JSOC, the premier counterterrorism and covert operations force within the military. He said that Blackwater is also working for the Pakistani government on a subcontract with an Islamabad-based security firm that puts US Blackwater operatives on the ground with Pakistani forces in counter-terrorism operations, including house raids and border interdictions, in the North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere in Pakistan. This arrangement, the former executive said, allows the Pakistani government to utilize former US Special Operations forces who now work for Blackwater while denying an official US military presence in the

country. He also confirmed that Blackwater has a facility in Karachi and has personnel deployed elsewhere in Pakistan. The former executive spoke on condition of anonymity.

According to the executive, Blackwater works on a subcontract for Kestral Logistics, a powerful Pakistani firm, which specializes in military logistical support, private security and intelligence consulting. It is staffed with former high-ranking Pakistani army and government officials. While Kestral's main offices are in Pakistan, it also has branches in several other countries. Blackwater operatives also integrate with Kestral's forces in sensitive counterterrorism operations in the North-West Frontier Province, where they work in conjunction with the Pakistani Interior Ministry's paramilitary force, known as the Frontier Corps (alternately referred to as "frontier scouts"). The Blackwater personnel are technically advisers, but the former executive said that the line often gets blurred in the field. Blackwater "is providing the actual guidance on how to do [counterterrorism operations] and Kestral's folks are carrying a lot of them out, but they're having the guidance and the overwatch from some BW guys that will actually go out with the teams when they're executing the job," he said. "You can see how that can lead to other things in the border areas." He said that when Blackwater personnel are out with the Pakistani teams, sometimes its men engage in operations

against suspected terrorists. "You've got BW guys that are assisting

go on the jobsso they're going to go with them," he said. "So, the things that you're seeing in the news about how this Pakistani military group came in and raided this house or did this or did thatin some of those cases, you're going to have Western folks that are right there at the house, if not in the house." Blackwater, he said, is paid by the Pakistani government through Kestral for consulting services. "That gives the Pakistani government the cover to say, 'Hey, no, we don't have any Westerners doing this. It's all local and our people are doing it.' But it gets them the expertise that Westerners provide for [counterterrorism]-related work." The military intelligence source confirmed Blackwater works with the Frontier Corps, saying, "There's no real oversight. It's not really on people's radar screen." In November 2009, Capt. John Kirby, the spokesperson for Adm. Michael Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told The Nation, "We do not discuss current operations one way or the other, regardless of their nature." A defense official, on background, specifically denied that Blackwater performs work on drone strikes or intelligence for JSOC in Pakistan. Captain Kirby told The Nation if it


they're all going to want to

published the story it would "be on thin ice." The US embassy and Pakistan's interior Minister Rehman Malik both denied Blackwater was operating in Pakistan. In January 2010, on a visit to Pakistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, appeared to contradict that line, telling a Pakistani TV station, "They [Blackwater and another private security firm, DynCorp] are operating as individual companies here in Pakistan," according to a DoD transcript of the interview. As Gates's comments began to make huge news in Pakistan, US defense officials tried to retract his statement. As the Wall Street Journal reported, "Defense officials tried to clarify the comment…telling reporters that Mr. Gates had been speaking about contractor oversight more generally and that the Pentagon didn't employ [Blackwater] in Pakistan." The next day, Pakistan's senior minister for the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Bashir Bilour, said that Blackwater was operating in Pakistan's frontier areas. Bilour told Pakistan's Express News TV that Blackwater's activities were taking place with the "consent and permission" of the Pakistani government, saying he had discussed the issue with officials at the US Consulate in Peshawar, who told him that Blackwater was training Pakistani forces. Since the Nation story originally ran, Blackwater has continued to work under the Obama administra- tion. In June, the company won a $100 million global contract with the CIA and continues to operate in Afghanistan, where it protects senior US officials and trains Afghan forces. Earlier this year, Blackwa- ter's owner, Erik Prince, put the company up for sale and moved to the Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates. Whether Blackwater or former Blackwater operatives continue to work in Pakistan is not known. What is clear is that there is great reason to believe that the October 2009 cable from Ambas- sador Anne Patterson describing US special operations forces activities in Pakistan represents only a tiny glimpse into one of the darkest corners of current US policy in Pakistan.


Associated Press / by Gene Johnson

Army Times

Stringer: Kees Kalkman / VDAmok / Utrecht NL / kees@amok.antenna.nl

Dec 3 2010 Dec 3. The Army is still refusing to release the results of its investigation into spying on anti-war activists by a civilian intelligence specialist at Joint Base Lewis-McChord south of Seattle. Officials released more than 100 pages of records this week to The Associated Press in response to a Freedom of Information Act request, most with names redacted. The Army withheld the results and recommendations made by an investigating officer, citing law enforcement and privacy exemptions. Col. John Wells of the Army‘s Litigation Division noted an ongoing federal civil rights lawsuit brought by the activists and the possibility of criminal charges against Army employees, and said release of the documents could impair the rights of those involved to fair trials or disciplinary proceedings. The documents outline the scope of the inquiry, which was initially completed in mid-2009 and then reopened early this year to determine whether military legal advisors were given complete and accurate information about the protest group‘s infiltration. They also show that before the story broke, senior officials at the base were concerned about bad publicity ―should mainstream media decide to report U.S. ‗spying‘ on protesters,‖ and they were upset that local agencies, including the city of Tacoma, had turned over documents to the protesters revealing the intelligence specialist‘s involvement. ―Future information sharing operations with local agencies are at risk because we cannot depend on them to comply with FOIA restrictions and/or our dissemination guidance,‖ said a ―point paper‖ dated March 2, 2009. The base‘s leadership should ―express their displeasure with their Tacoma counterparts [for] the mishandling of this FOIA request,‖ the paper said. Anti-war activists with a group called Olympia Port Militarization Resistance discovered in early 2009 that the administrator of their e-mail list-serve, whom they knew as John Jacob, was actually John Jacob Towery, then an employee of the Force Protection Division at Lewis- McChord. The Force Protection Division includes civilian and military workers who support law enforcement and security operations to ensure the security of Fort Lewis personnel. Towery had been attending the group‘s meetings for two years, and information he collected about the protesters appears to have been passed to his superiors on base as well as local law enforcement, documents released to AP show. The Reconstruction-era Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the Army from directly engaging in domestic law enforcement.

The Army launched its investigation in July 2009, after members of the group complained. The investigating officer‘s marching orders said the inquiry should focus on Towery‘s actions, whether he undertook them at the behest of civilian law enforcement, whether he was paid by any civilian police agency, what his supervisors knew of his activities, and whether he might have violated federal law or Army directives. The highest-ranking person interviewed for the investigation appears to have been a colonel, whose name is redacted. One of the documents provided to AP, an ―information paper‖ apparently prepared by the Force Protection Division, says: ―Information provided by [redacted] and a law enforcement official with the Pierce County Sheriff‘s Office (PCSO) indicate that the activities alleged by the Olympia activist were done in support of the PCSO and Tacoma Police Department as a confidential informant/source and not as a member of the FP Division.‖ The protest group, which formed in 2006, was one of several in the region opposed to the use of civilian ports for shipping military items, such as Stryker vehicles, overseas. They claim that thanks to Towery‘s infiltration, police knew where they were going to protest in advance sometimes arresting them before their civil disobedience even began. Having a spy among them chilled their First Amendment and other rights, they argued. About 200 people were arrested over a two-week period in November 2007, but only about three dozen were charged.


Washington Post / by David Ignatius

Stringer: Martin Rudner [ret.] / Carleton University / Ottawa / www.carleton.ca/cciss

Dec 2 2010 Dec 2. Every war brings its own deformations, but consider this disturbing fact about America's war against al-Qaeda: It has become easier, politically and legally, for the United States to kill suspected terrorists than to capture and interrogate them. Predator and Reaper drones, armed with Hellfire missiles, have become the weapons of choice against al-Qaeda operatives in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They have also been used in Yemen, and the demand for these efficient tools of war, which target enemies from 10,000 feet, is likely to grow. The pace of drone attacks on the tribal areas has increased sharply during the Obama presidency, with more assaults in September and October of this year than in all of 2008. At the same time, efforts to capture al-Qaeda suspects have virtually stopped. Indeed, if CIA operatives were to snatch a terrorist tomorrow, the agency wouldn't be sure where it could detain him for interrogation. Michael Hayden, a former director of the CIA, frames the puzzle this way: "Have we made detention and interrogation so legally difficult and politically risky that our default option is to kill our adversaries rather than capture and interrogate them?" It's curious why the American public seems so comfortable with a tactic that arguably is a form of long- range assassination, after the furor about the CIA's use of nonlethal methods known as "enhanced interrogation." When Israel adopted an approach of "targeted killing" against Hamas and other terrorist adversaries, it provoked an extensive debate there and abroad. "For reasons that defy logic, people are more comfortable with drone attacks" than with killings at close range, says Robert Grenier, a former top CIA counterterrorism officer who now is a consultant with ERG Partners. "It's something that seems so clean and antiseptic, but the moral issues are the same." Firing a missile from 10,000 feet is certainly a lower risk for the attackers than an assault on the ground. "The U.S. is reluctant to mount such capture-or-kill operations in the tribal areas for the same reason that the Pakistanis are: They fear that an elite team might be surrounded by hundreds of tribesmen," says Grenier. Though the Pakistani government publicly denounces the drone attacks, it privately condones them. That's in part because the drones provide a military punch that the Pakistani military is unwilling or unable to match with conventional forces. But legal challenges are beginning, as in a $500 million lawsuit planned by a Pakistani man who told reporters this week that two of his relatives had been killed in a drone strike. The reluctance to chase al-Qaeda on the ground, and perhaps capture its operatives alive, also comes with an intelligence cost. The United States and its allies lose the information that could come from interrogation, along with the cellphones, computers and other communications gear that could be

seized in a successful raid. One reason that counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda were so effective in Iraq was that they utilized this cycle of raid, capture, interrogate, analyze, raid again. The CIA began getting out of the detention business when the infamous "black sites" overseas were closed in 2006. At that time, 14 CIA detainees were transferred to Guantanamo Bay, but since then, only two more have been caught and transferred there; agency officials have been advised that Guantanamo is closed for new business. The only alternatives are Bagram air base in Afghanistan, for al-Qaeda operatives caught in the war zone, or detention and trial in the United States. Don't misunderstand me: It's not that the Obama administration's limits on detention and interrogation are wrong. They have applied clear guidelines to what had been, before 2006, a murky area. The problem is that these rules, and the wariness of getting into more trouble, have had the perverse effect of encouraging the CIA to adopt a more lethal and less supple policy than before. U.S. and Pakistani officials support drone attacks because they don't see a good alternative to combat al-Qaeda's operations in the tribal areas. I don't disagree with that view. But this policy needs a clearer foundation in law and public understanding than it has today. Otherwise, when the pendulum swings, the CIA officers who ran these supposedly clandestine missions may be left holding the bag. So ask yourself: If you don't like the CIA tactics that led to the capture and interrogation of al-Qaeda operatives, do you think it's better to vaporize the militants from 10,000 feet? And if this bothers you, what's the alternative?


Startfor / by Ben West Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Dec 2 2010 Dec 1. On the morning of Nov. 29, two Iranian scientists involved in Iran's nuclear development program were attacked. One was killed, and the other was injured. According to Iranian media, the deceased, Dr. Majid Shahriari, was heading the team responsible for developing the technology to design a nuclear reactor core, and Time magazine referred to him as the highest- ranking non-appointed individual working on the project. Official reports indicate that Shahriari was killed when assailants on motorcycles attached a "sticky bomb" to his vehicle and detonated it seconds later. However, the Time magazine report says that an explosive device concealed inside the car detonated and killed him. Shahriari's driver and wife, both of whom were in the car at the time, were injured. Meanwhile, on the opposite side of town, Dr. Fereidoon Abassi was injured in a sticky-bomb attack reportedly identical to the one officials said killed Shahriari. His wife was accompanying him and was also injured (some reports indicate that a driver was also in the car at the time of the attack). Abassi and his wife are said to be in stable condition. Abassi is perhaps even more closely linked to Iran's nuclear program than Shahriari was, since he was a member of the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and was named in a 2007 U.N. resolution that sanctioned high-ranking members of Iran's defense and military agencies believed to be trying to obtain nuclear weapons. Monday's incidents occurred at a time of uncertainty over how global powers and Iran's neighbors will handle an Iran apparently pursuing nuclear weapons despite its claims of developing only a civilian nuclear program and asserting itself as a regional power in the Middle East. Through economic sanctions that went into effect last year, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany (known as the "P-5+1") have been pressuring Iran to enter negotiations over its nuclear program and outsource the most sensitive aspects the program, such as higher levels of uranium enrichment. he Nov. 29 attacks came about a week before Saeed Jalili, Iran's national security chief, will be leading a delegation to meet with the P-5+1 from Dec. 6-7 in Vienna, the first such meeting in more than a year. The attacks also came within hours of the WikiLeaks release of classified U.S. State Department cables, which are filled with international concerns about Iran's controversial nuclear program. Because of the international scrutiny and sanctions on just about any hardware required to develop a nuclear program, Iran has focused on developing domestic technologies that can fill the gaps. This has required a national initiative coordinated by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to build the country's nuclear program from scratch, an endeavor that requires thousands of experts from various fields of the physical sciences as well as the requisite technologies.

And it was the leader of the AEOI, Ali Akhbar Salehi, who told media Nov. 29 that Shahriari was "in charge of one of the great projects" at the agency. Salehi also issued a warning to Iran's enemies "not to play with fire." Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad elaborated on the warning, accusing "Zionist" and "Western regimes" of being behind the coordinated attacks against Shahriari and Abassi. The desire of the U.N. Security Council (along with Israel and Germany) to stop Iran's nuclear program and the apparent involvement of the targeted scientists in that program has led many Iranian officials to quickly blame the United States, United Kingdom and Israel for the attacks, since those countries have been the loudest in condemning Iran for its nuclear ambitions. It seems that certain domestic rivals of the Iranian regime would also benefit from these attacks. Any one of numerous Iranian militant groups throughout the country may have been involved in one way or another, perhaps with the assistance of a foreign power. A look at the tactics used in the attacks could shed some light on the perpetrators. Modus Operandi According to official Iranian reports, Abassi was driving to work at Shahid Beheshti University in northern Tehran from his residence in southern Tehran. When the car in which he and his wife were traveling was on Artash Street, assailants on at least two motorcycles approached the vehicle and attached an improvised explosive device (IED) to the driver's-side door. The device exploded shortly thereafter, injuring Abassi and his wife. Images reportedly of Abassi's vehicle show that the driver's side door was destroyed, but the rest of the vehicle and the surrounding surfaces show very little damage. A few pockmarks can be seen on the vehicle behind Abassi's car but little else to indicate that a bomb had gone off in the vicinity. (Earlier reports indicating that this was Shahriari's vehicle proved erroneous.) This indicates that the IED was a shaped charge with a very specific target. Evidence of both the shaped charge and the utilization of projectiles in the device suggests that the device was put together by a competent and experienced bomb-maker. An eyewitness account of the attack offers one explanation why the device did not kill Abassi. According to the man who was driving immediately behind Abassi's car, the car abruptly stopped in traffic, then Abassi got out and went to the passenger side where his wife was sitting. The eyewitness said Abassi and his wife were about 2 meters from the car, on the opposite side when the IED exploded. Abassi appears to have been aware of the attack as it was under way, which apparently saved his life. The eyewitness did not mention whether he saw the motorcyclists attach the device to the car before it went off, but that could have been what tipped Abassi off. If this was the case, the bomb-maker may have done his job well in building the device but the assailants gave themselves away when they planted it. In the fatal attack against Shahriari, he also was on his way to work at Shahid Beheshti University in northern Tehran in his vehicle with his wife, according to official reports. These reports indicate that he definitely had a driver, which would suggest that Shahriari was considered a person of importance. Their car was traveling through a parking lot in northern Tehran when assailants on at least two motorcycles approached the vehicle and attached an IED to the car. Eyewitnesses say that the IED exploded seconds later and that the motorcyclists escaped. Shahriari was presumably killed in the explosion while his wife and driver were injured. The official account of the attack is contradicted by the Time magazine report, which cites a "Western intelligence source with knowledge of the operation" as saying that the IED that killed Shahriari detonated from inside the vehicle. Images of what appears to be Shahriari's vehicle are much poorer quality than the images of Abassi's vehicle, but they do appear to show damage to the windshield and other car windows. The car is still very much intact, though, and the fact that Shahriari's driver and wife escaped with only injuries suggests that the device used against Shahriari was also a shaped charge, specifically targeting him. Capabilities Attacks like the two carried out against Abassi and Shahriari require a high level of tradecraft that is available only to well-trained operatives. There is much more going on below the surface in attacks like these that is not immediately obvious when reading media reports. First, the team of assailants that attacked Abassi and Shahriari had to identify their targets and confirm that the men they were attacking were indeed high-level scientists involved in Iran's nuclear program. The fact that Abassi and Shahriari held such high positions indicates they were specifically selected as targets and not the victims of a lucky, opportunistic attack. Second, the team had to conduct surveillance of the two scientists. The team had to positively identify their vehicles and determine their schedules and routes in order to know when and how to launch their attacks. Both attacks targeted the scientists as they traveled to work, likely a time when they were most vulnerable, an MO commonly used by assassins worldwide.

Third, someone with sufficient expertise had to build IEDs that would kill their targets. Both devices appear to have been relatively small IEDs that were aimed precisely at the scientists, which may have been an attempt to limit collateral damage (their small size may also have been due to efforts to conceal the device). Both devices seem to have been adequate to kill their intended targets, and judging by the damage to his vehicle, it appears that Abassi would have received mortal wounds had he stayed in the driver's seat. The deployment stage seems to be where things went wrong for the assailants, at least in the Abassi attack. It is unclear exactly what alerted him, but it appears that he was exercising some level of situational awareness and was able to determine that an attack was under way. It is not at all surprising that someone like Abassi would have been practicing situational awareness. This is not the first time that scientists linked to Iran's nuclear program have been attacked, and Iranian agencies linked to the nuclear program have probably issued general security guidance to their employees (especially high-ranking ones like Abassi and Shahriari). In 2007, Ardeshir Hassanpour was killed in an alleged poisoning that STRATFOR sources attributed to an Israeli operation. Again, in January 2010, Massoud Ali-Mohammadi, another Iranian scientist who taught at Tehran University, was killed in an IED attack that also targeted him as he was driving to work in the morning. While some suspected that Ali-Mohammadi may have been targeted by the Iranian regime due to his connections with the opposition, Abassi and Shahriari appear much too close to the regime to be targets of their own government (however, nothing can be ruled out in politically volatile Tehran). The similarities between the Ali-Mohammadi assassination and the attacks against Abassi and Shahriari suggest that a covert campaign to attack Iranian scientists could well be under way. There is little doubt that the Nov. 29 attacks struck a greater blow to the development of Iran's nuclear program than the previous two attacks. Shahriari appears to have had an integral role in the program. While he will likely be replaced and work will go on, his death could slow the program's progress (at least temporarily) and further stoke security fears in Iran's nuclear development community. The attacks come amid WikiLeaks revelations that Saudi King Abdullah and U.S. officials discussed assassinating Iranian leaders, accusations that the United States or Israel was behind the Stuxnet computer worm that allegedly targeted the computer systems running Iran's nuclear program and the return home of Shahram Amiri, an Iranian scientist who alleged that the United States held him against his will earlier in the summer. The evidence suggests that foreign powers are actively trying to probe and sabotage Iran's nuclear program. However, doing so is not that simple. Tehran is not nearly as open a city as Dubai, where Israeli operatives are suspected of assassinating a high-level Hamas leader in January 2010. It is unlikely that the United States, Israel or any other foreign power could deploy its own team of assassins into Tehran to Carry out a lengthy targeting, surveillance and attack operation without some on-the-ground help. And there is certainly plenty of help on the ground in Iran. Kurdish militants like the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan have conducted numerous assassinations against Iranian clerics and officials in Iran's western province of Kordestan. Sunni separatist militants in the southeast province of Sistan- Balochistan, represented by the Group Jundallah, have also targeted Iranian interests in eastern Iran in recent years. Other regional militant opposition groups like Mujahideen-e Khalq, which has offered intelligence on Iran's nuclear program to the United States, and Azeri separatists pose marginal threats to the Iranian regime. However, none of these groups has demonstrated the ability to strike such high-level officials in the heart of Tehran with such a degree of professionalism. While that is unlikely, they have the capability and a history of eliminating dissidents through assassinations. Furthermore, the spuriousness of many contradictory media reports makes the attacks suspicious. It is unlikely that any foreign power was able to conduct this operation by itself and equally unlikely that any indigenous militant group was able to pull off an attack like this without some assistance. The combination of the two, however, could provide an explanation of how the attacks targeting Shariari and Abassi got so close to complete success.



Asia One

Source: Beowulf / OSINT / www.intellnet.org / osint-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Dec 2 2010 Dec 2. President Barack Obama on Wednesday named an anti-terrorism expert to lead

US efforts to mitigate the damage of the WikiLeaks breach and prevent future illegal data disclosures, the White House said. Russell Travers, deputy director of information sharing at the National Counterrorism Center, "will lead a comprehensive effort to identify and develop the structural reforms needed in light of the WikiLeaks breach," the White House said in a statement. Washington has been in damage control mode ever since the whistleblower website last weekend began publicly disclosing some 250,000 secret US diplomatic cables, many of which revealed embarrassing assessments of foreign leaders. While the White House was seeking to downplay the impact of the security violations as late as Wednesday, the Travers appointment was among the clearest signs that the Obama administration was seriously stung by the data dump and was taking substantive steps to avoid a repeat. Among his new duties, Travers will be advising national security staff on "corrective actions, mitigation measures, and policy recommendations related to the breach," according to the White House. He will also coordinate interagency discussions on developing actions "regarding technological and/or policy changes to limit the likelihood of such a leak reoccurring." Travers has been tasked with collating the stream of terrorism-related information pouring into US agencies since the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Washington Post describes him as the maintainer of the government database of terrorist entities and a coordinator of terrorism information-sharing initiatives. The National Counter-Terrorism Center where he works was among several agencies blamed for failing to uncover a plot to blow up a US airliner on Christmas Day last year. The vast majority of the cables revealed by WikiLeaks in its latest document dump originated from the State Department or its diplomats in overseas missions, and State has launched a review of its security procedures. "The department will also deploy an automated tool that will continuously monitor the classified network to detect anomalies that would not be readily apparent," as well as staff who will analyze the anomalies "to ensure that they do not represent threats to the system," the White House said. The president's intelligence advisory board (PIAB) will look at ways the executive branch shares and protects classified data, and will work "with departments and agencies across the government to ensure they gain a comprehensive appreciation of all relevant challenges and requirements necessary to safeguard classified information and networks." PIAB will "examine the current posture of the whole of government" in terms of leaks of classified data and will "examine the balance between the need to share information and the need to protect information."


UK overruled on Lebanon spy flights from Cyprus, WikiLeaks cables reveal Americans dismissed 'bureaucratic' Foreign Office concern that Lebanese Hezbollah suspects might be tortured

The Guardian / by David Leigh

Stringer: Martin Rudner [ret.] / Carleton University / Ottawa / www.carleton.ca/cciss

Dec 2 2010 Dec 2. American officials swept aside objections that secret US spy flights from Bri- tain's Cyprus airbase risked making the UK an unwitting accomplice to torture, the leaked diplomatic cables reveal. The use of RAF Akrotiri for U2 spy plane missions over Lebanon missions that have never been disclosed until now prompted an increasingly acrimonious series of exchanges between British officials and the US embassy in London, according to the cables. Labour ministers demanded a full "audit trail" of the covert operation, codenamed Cedar Sweep, in 1998 amid growing public concern in the UK about