Military Logistics

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Theoretical aspects of military logistics

a
Vladimir Prebilič
a
Defenses Studies , Faculty of Social Sciences , Kardeljeva pl. 5, 1000,
Ljubljana, Slovenia
Published online: 03 Aug 2006.
To cite this article: Vladimir Prebilič (2006) Theoretical aspects of military logistics, Defense & Security
Analysis, 22:2, 159-177, DOI: 10.1080/14751790600764037
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751790600764037
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Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 159–177, June 2006
Theoretical Aspects of Military Logistics

Vladimir Prebilič
Defenses Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva pl. 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
Downloaded by [George Mason University] at 20:41 25 December 2014
INTRODUCTION
Logistics, in its broadest sense, has become a vital part of everyday life. There is practi-
cally no activity that does not, at least in a limited way, rely upon logistics. As such, it
appears at every time and in every place where there is a consumption of goods, for its
primary function is to replace a deficit of goods. Warfare, which is considered a highly
complex process, has been connected with logistics throughout the whole of military
history. Although some authors1 assume that the role and importance of logistics have
changed with the development of warfare, this author would argue otherwise. The role
and importance of logistics have remained relatively unchanged throughout military
history, as the numerous needs of military systems have not essentially changed (as, for
example, the soldier’s need of food and water).
But logistics, as such, has not been given adequate special attention. Luttwak claims
that military historians and other analysts simply have not taken an interest in such an
important activity as military logistics. He derives his observation from an aristocratic
idea of warfare, which does not acknowledge logistics as being equal to strategy and
tactics.2 This argument can be confirmed by the fact that modern literature on military
logistics is very sparse, in spite of the term “logistics” having appeared in antiquity,
when its root – logos – originated. From a semantic point of view, this root can be inter-
preted as a word that presents a spoken, or written, novelty in the context of a discussed
topic.3 Another, much narrower meaning of the root “logos” refers to the power of
thought, intellect, calculation and consideration. The noun “logistics” indicates
someone who has mastered the skill of quick calculation, or is a thinking, comprehen-
sible and self-interested person.4
The word “logistics” has accompanied warriors through military history, although it
has had different meanings. Consequently, there are several definitions of the term that
differ, above all, in the extent of their objectives and which refer to military–historical
experiences of individual states, their military doctrines and tasks being encountered by
ISSN 1475-1798 print; 1475-1801 online/06/020159-19 © 2006 Taylor & Francis 159
DOI: 10.1080/14751790600764037
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160 • V L A D I M I R P R E B I L I Č
their defense systems. A chronological review of the definitions of the word “logistics”
indicates the changing nature, or evolution, of the term and its meaning, as well as its
continual adaptation. Modern definitions of military logistics mostly refer to determin-
ing the term’s scope, rather than its mere content.
Peppers defines logistics as a special system that creates and supports the
military–defense capabilities of the armed forces.5 Analysis of the key words “to create”
and “to support” ascertains that “logistics” is a continual process; it is an activity that
must be uninterrupted. Each interruption, or omission in the functioning of logistics,
will be directly reflected in the military–defense capabilities of armed forces. Henry
Eccles, the founder of the modern theory of logistics, explains “logistics” as “. . . a
bridge between the economic system of the nation and the combat forces”.6 As such,
“logistics” comes close to the management of “military economy”. Eccles, therefore,
presented an important link in his theoretical work, namely the interdependence of

“logistics” and strategy.
The economic capabilities of a state limit its armed forces. Likewise, logistic capa-
bilities limit the size of armed forces that can be employed in combat operations. In this
way, economic–logistical factors determine the limits of strategy, as in case of economic
mobilization. The impact of logistics is limited to individual strategic plans and specific
tactical operations. All previous definitions of logistics, its objectives and tasks were
combined by Skinner in his definition of the concept in the International Military
Defense Encyclopedia.7 He defined military logistics as a big organizational business that
involved planning, preparing and supplying military material to support armed forces.
It thereby affects their lives, exercising and training in peacetime, their mobilization,
deployment and combat progress in time of crisis, their fighting capability in the event
of war, and their sustainable operations in the maintenance of peace.
This indicates a mutual approach to military and economic logistics, a case that had
already been made by Ballantine in 1947.8 He defined logistics as a link between the
military front and the “front” in the civilian environment. As such, it represents at one
and the same time the military element of the economy of the nation and the economic
element of military operations.9 In this way, logistics becomes a co-ordinating activity,
which has many other activities at its disposal. Among these are many that are not at the
daily disposal of the armed forces or do not exist within their organizational system.
This is why logistics can also be defined as a link between a state’s general economic
resources and the defense–military subsystems of an individual nation, where the main
emphasis is placed on planning and execution of all measures needed for the realization
of strategic and operational goals. The art of logistics, therefore, lies in the integration
of the strategic, operational and tactical plans with the actual situation on the battle-
field.10
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO SCHOOLS OF LOGISTICS

With the help of military–historical analyses of the development of logistics, it is
possible to identify some factors that have directly and indirectly influenced the devel-
opment and formation of the military logistic systems. An inductive method has
presented a different understanding of the role of logistics in a military engagement and
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THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF M I L I TA RY L O G I S T I C S • 161
the consequent differences in the systemic organization and functioning of logistics. All
these differences have resulted from the military doctrines of the European superpow-
ers (especially France and Prussia) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and
were the result of geo-political and strategic foreign policy ambitions.
Two famous military theorists have directly and indirectly influenced the formation
and re-formation of the existing military systems of both nineteenth-century Prussian
and French military powers. Carl von Clausewitz and Henri Antoine Jomini were the
first who systematically researched logistics and its role in a defense system. Their
views, however, were somewhat different. Clausewitz saw logistics as a constituent part
of a military organization; it was an important component of a military engagement but
did not directly influence its outcome. Jomini stressed the importance of logistics,
which he said must have a special status in all kinds of military engagements.11 Their
contributions to the field of military theory influenced the formation and development
of future defense systems. On the basis of their conceptual differences in the definition
of logistics, I have formulated a theory of these two schools of logistics, which have dif-
ferently installed a logistic system within a broader military system, and have given it a
different meaning.
Clausewitz wrote that nothing was more important than the sufficient supply of indi-
vidual units and the army as a whole.12 Most of his findings were based on his analysis
of the most important military engagements from the sixteenth to the eighteenth
centuries. He gave special attention to the wars led by Frederick the Great and
Napoleon Bonaparte. In both cases he indirectly analyzed the importance of logistics in
their military engagements. Mistakes made by their military commanders and strate-
gists were related to the emphasis on mobility of their armies at any cost. This partially
explains why the French Army left their tents behind along with other unnecessary
military equipment.
Clausewitz drew some interesting conclusions. He emphasized four methods of
supply, on which he based his recommendations for fighting a battle on foreign
territory, and the use of natural resources – i.e. food plundered from the countryside.
He declared that an army should not remain in one place for any length of time. He
broadened the scope of logistics to include the supply of clothes, food, first aid, and
other essentials for his forces. Before that, logistics mainly concentrated on the supply
of weapons, munitions and other goods that were indispensable on the battlefield. He
also defined the relationship between logistical supply and the concept of operations
(military management). If a military engagement were to be an independent action,
which would decide the victor in battle, food supply was a matter of secondary impor-
tance. In the case of a frontal fighting, where armies stay in the same territory for a long
period of time, food supply became a matter of primary importance. In this case, the
commissary (Quartiermeister), or the officer in command of food supply, immediately
became the most important officer.13 His debate on the importance of logistics marked
a major advance in the gradual refinement of the term and its content. Clausewitz,
however, did not place logistics hierarchically alongside the most important basic
fighting skills, those of tactics and strategy.
Whereas Clausewitz, as a military strategist, presented views and analyses based on
Prussian tactics, Jomini, a high-ranking officer of Napoleon’s army, presented logistics
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in a significantly different way. Jomini was the first to place logistics among basic
military skills. According to him, the most important military skills, besides logistics,
are: politics in relation to warfare; strategy or the right directing of bigger combat units
on the battlefield; basic tactics; engineering with an emphasis on attacking and
defending fortresses; and the “minor” tactics of smaller military formations. Jomini
defined logistics as “the art of moving armies”. He included movement as well as the
accommodation and supply of soldiers. Logistics, he argued, made it possible to carry
out tactics and strategy.14 With Jomini, logistics assumed a much more important role
in fighting and in the organization of modern armies.
It would be wrong to argue that both military theorists decisively influenced the role
of logistics in France and Prussia. As high-ranking officers, they were both probably
also influenced by such considerations as the foreign and defense policies of states, and
their geo-political and economic status. This is why I explain the reasons for the differ-
ences between the two theorists in terms of the military–historical experiences of the
strongest armies and their own experiences. The Prussian kingdom, which was estab-
lished by Frederick the Great in the eighteenth century, made considerable progress in
all spheres of activity in the age of enlightenment absolutism. Several reforms, among
them also military reforms, placed Prussia on the map of the eighteenth-century
European political superpowers. The formation of the Prussian state was based also on
military successes, but the Prussian Army fought battles predominantly on its borders
and did not engage in imperial campaigns.
With this background, the Prussian doctrine of fighting was formed, as was its
relationship to logistics. All military engagements of the Prussian army were based
on a concentration of power with which to break through the enemy’s lines and, in
consequence, achieved quick victories.15 Both Prussia’s most important military
engagements – the Austro–Prussian war in 1866 and the Franco–Prussian war in 1871
– only lasted for a relatively short period of time. Considering the short distances that
the Prussian army had to cover and the short duration of the military engagements, its
logistic system did not have to deal with serious major problems; indeed, the logistic
burdens were relatively small.16
I assume, therefore, that the Prussian school of logistics was based on a special form
of supply – principally from the rear. This approach was also supported by the Indus-
trial Revolution, which transferred the burden of transport to the railway system. Rapid
economic development of the Prussian kingdom accelerated the construction of
railway connections and the whole of the country’s railway infrastructure. The
formation of the German Empire and its military system did not introduce any changes
to its logistic system, which soon turned out to be deficient in World War I. In World
War II, Germany found itself with an almost unchanged “Prussian” logistic system. It
has to be stressed here that the term “logistics” appeared relatively late in German
military manuals and in its terminology despite the fact that logistic problems and tasks
had accompanied German armed forces from the time of the Prussian victories. The
term was not completely put into effect until the reformation of the German armed
forces after World War II.
The term “logistics” was successfully substituted by the noun “supply” (die Ver-
sorgung) and the verb “to supply” (supply = versorgung). Because it proved difficult to
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distinguish the meanings of the two terms and to use one or the other consistently, the
German armed forces (die Bundeswehr) adopted specific rules for their use. In spite of
this, the use of the terms “logistics” and “supply” has been defined exactly. The term
“supply” is used for smaller military formations and the term “logistics” for all bigger
formations and, above all, for Headquarters operations. It must be noted that the term
“supply” has a much narrower meaning and that “logistics” represents a much broader
activity.17 The Prussian logistic system, however, has been preserved in most European
countries, in spite of Germany’s defeats in both World Wars. One explanation is the
vicinity of possible battlefields, the intensity of possible military engagements, and the
current foreign and defense policies of the European countries. Today, this is reflected
in the logistic system of the European members of NATO and formation of the second
defense pillar, that of the European Union. The most obvious explanation is that most
European armed forces are not ready for out-of-area operations.

France developed its own view of logistics, which I define as another school of
logistics. Jomini, who developed his own view of the organization of military system,
was influenced by the Napoleonic wars and had very different experiences from those
of Clausewitz. The importance of logistics in the management of military engagements
at such long distances was completely different from the regional engagements of the
Prussian army. The Emperor Napoleon had a completely different, modern and com-
prehensive alternative in the field of logistic organization compared with the Prussian
system of supply from the rear. Napoleon’s alternative was, to a large extent, based on
a magazine-type of supply to the French army born of the age of French absolutism. In
this way, it enabled Napoleon to fight a war at much longer distances and on a much
larger scale and also helped him to support highly mobile military units. Jomini
presented many of Napoleon’s experiences and imperfections in his theoretical works
(his most important book being The Art of War, 1836), which he combined with
empirical data extracted from the Napoleonic wars. As an adviser and tutor to the
Russian Emperor, Alexander II, Jomini had a different understanding of the meaning
of distances in warfare,18 for which reason I have categorized him as the originator of the
“French school of logistics”.
In the eighteenth century, France openly helped and supported the Americans in the
process of gaining independence from the British and in forming a new, sovereign state.
French generals, among whom Marie Joseph La Fayette holds a special position,
directly influenced the formation of the Americans’ new defense system. French
military literature also spread military theoretical knowledge across the USA. Only a
few years after the publication of Jomini’s book The Art of War in 1836, it was translated
into English and soon became the basic literature in the education and training of the
American military officer corps.19
According to available data, I can only conclude that, in this way, the USA adopted
the French school of logistics and their use of the magazine-supply of the military units.
This approach was later modified and upgraded so that it enabled the successful
operation of the American army over much wider areas than found in Europe. This
logistic basis first enabled the expansion westwards across the American sub-continent
and, later, in the twentieth century the involvement of American soldiers in the two
World Wars, and in the war against Japan in the Pacific. Logistic superiority is still
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evident today since the American logistic system effectively supports directly the activ-
ities of US combat forces all over the world and, indirectly, enables the USA to pursue
a relatively aggressive foreign policy.
THE PHENOMENON OF THE “LOGISTIC VACUUM”

The importance of logistics in modern warfare can be theoretically illustrated with the
analysis of some combat variables. The most prevalent characteristics of combat are:
physical geography of a battlefield; the size of a battlefield; the extent of the military
engagement; the size of the armies; the type of the combat technique; and the efficiency
of the armies, etc. If a logistic system is to support the combat forces comprehensively,
it is necessary to reduce the number and impact of these variables because they are
inversely proportional to the quality of the decisions at either the strategic or tactical
level. These variables directly and indirectly influence the importance of logistics,
which has in turn either to conform, or respond, to them. This enables comparisons to
be drawn between the importance of logistics as an accommodation of impacts that the
variables can have on fighting and the best realization of strategic and tactical plans.
Among the above-mentioned variables, I particularly emphasize time as an important
factor as it influences the intensity of fighting as well as the whole logistic system.
The combat variables mentioned above show that mutual relationships shape the
curve of dependence and that the analysis of the values represented by the curve shows
the relatively little importance of logistics at the beginning of a combat. This is due to
the good preparedness of the armed units before the engagement and the organiza-
tional preparations of the logistic system for later supply to military units. Later in the
engagement, the importance of logistics rapidly grows. As a rule, the loss of personnel
and reductions in military material grow as the combat continues, which further
increase the importance of logistics. The curve representing a dependence on logistics
does not increase exponentially. At a certain point in time the importance of logistics in
a military engagement diminishes because of the adaptability of armed forces. When
logistic support fails to meet expectations, individual soldiers and whole military units
are forced to improvise, which means a more rational use of ammunition, and the
capture and use of enemy material and goods in occupied territory. This and other
measures directly decrease the intensity of a military engagement.
Analysis of the intensity of a military engagement does not show the same value
within a given period of time due to the consumption of military material and the loss
(dead and wounded) of the initial number of soldiers.20 Larger deviations from the
expected intensity of an engagement can be seen in case of shorter military engage-
ments. The decline of intensity is a logical consequence of the exhaustion of the combat
forces and the drop in number of soldiers capable of fighting. The dead and wounded
place an additional burden on the logistic system and make further demands on those
still capable of fighting (depending on the extent and intensity of the military engage-
ment). These findings, among other reasons, have also contributed to the formulation
of the blitzkrieg concept, which is based, inter alia, on the concentration of force that
enables a highly intensive, but time-limited, engagement. Modern American doctrine
of warfare is also based on these principles.21
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A decline in combat intensity is accompanied by a reduction in logistic support, a

much more significant consideration because the logistic system itself is often the target
of the enemy’s operational strategy. Its objective is to destroy the rear echelon of the
logistic system, one that is more often in the civilian sphere and involves military
weapons and military material production.22 Furthermore, a logistic system is hindered
by a damaged infrastructure, a decline in production capacity and losses among logistic
personnel situated in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield. While the curve repre-
senting the intensity of the logistic function falls relatively rapidly, combat units are able
to continue for a certain time without the direct support of the logistic system. The
reason for this rests, above all, in the kits of ammunition at every soldier’s disposal,
issued before the start of any combat engagement. The length of this period of impro-
visation depends on numerous factors, among which is the professionalism and
experience of the soldiers and their commanders.

The consequence of these considerations is the so-called logistic vacuum, the
duration of which depends on the capability of restoring any losses that the logistic
system has experienced, or the flexibility of the logistic system itself, which makes it
possible to overcome problems in the most critical of circumstances. The logistic curve
reaches these values at point T1 (see Figure 1). A resumption in the intensity with which
the logistic system functions is also a prerequisite for any increase in the intensity with
which military units fight. If this resumption is not realized, however, and a breakdown
in the logistic system follows, then there either is a decrease of the intensity of fighting
or defeat, as represented by point T2.
Thorough preparations for a military engagement can reduce the impact of a logistic
vacuum, but it is impossible to avoid it altogether as it is not possible to anticipate all the
variables that appear directly before or during a military engagement. The main task of
Figure 1: The appearance of the logistic vacuum
Military
combat
Logistical Logistics
vacuum
Intensity of
military combat
T1 T2
Time
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the military analysts and above all planners remains, therefore, to make the impact of
any logistic vacuum as small as possible and to take all measures to shorten the period
in which it occurs. This can be done with two groups of measures: first, are those
measures that make it possible to control at least in part the decline of capability of a
logistic system. This can be achieved with qualitative planning and through the flexi-
bility of the whole logistic system. Second, are measures either to exercise control over
changes in the intensity of fighting (as much as it is possible in the given circumstances
on the battlefield) or to adapt both the intensity of fighting to the particular circum-
stances on the battlefield and the capabilities of the logistic system.
The phenomenon of a vacuum can be applied to the different levels of the concept of
logistics and even to conceptually narrower views of military supply and distribution of
the military material to the combat units, as implied by Gropman.23
THE FUNCTIONING OF MILITARY LOGISTIC SYSTEMS

Military logistics can be defined as a group of different activities that systematically,
wholly and continually support the needs of the defense–military system. Conse-
quently, it can exist as a sub-system of a larger and more extensive military–defense
system, which can also be interpreted as a sub-system from the point of view of a social
system. Alternatively, it can be treated as an independent system. In further analysis, I
shall ignore this view and place it in an unusual, isolated environment. This kind of
research violates the basic rule of system theory that is predicated on the interaction of
all systems. Wilke argues against the analysis of sub-systems as independent or isolated
factors without knowing how the system functions as a whole.24 Logistics, however, is a
very specific term with a particular meaning because it can appear (in its broadest
sense) anywhere where there is any kind of consumption.
Many characteristics of open social systems – among which Wilke places entropy,
differentiation, homeostasis, centralization, variability and systemic interaction – can
be wholly applied to the logistic system.25 What is more, some most important military
logistic theorists define some characteristics of open social systems as reflecting the
basic principles of modern logistics. Thompson, for example, speaks of intelligence,
objective, generative logistics, interdependence, simplicity, timeliness, impetus, cost-
effectiveness and security.26 If logistics is viewed as a sub-system, it can be equated with
a form of sub-system of the central system or as an activity that prevents entropy and
enables the continued existence of the system. If I isolate logistics, however, and deal
with it as an independent system, I encounter a new paradox, namely the characteristic
of a logistic (sub-) system. As such, it also succumbs to systemic characteristics of open
systems and also entropy. This means that besides serving the system as a whole, it also
has to serve itself and prevent its own entropy (secure its own existence).
More important than some systemic characteristics of a military logistic system is the
system’s output. In this case, it is vital to understand logistics as an activity. Logistics as
an independent activity does not, however, make it possible to reach the objective of
combat. It has to co-ordinate those activities that enable armed forces to realize their
expectations.27 Although some co-ordinated activities represent (sub-) systems of their
own and perform a more extensive range of activities than purely that of logistics,
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logistics has nevertheless had to preserve its leading and superior role, just as it would
be incorrect and even harmful to equate logistics with one of the activities that are co-
ordinated by it. In military history, logistics was often equated with transport and
distribution. In this way, people who dealt with logistics had less responsibility and
work; at the same time, however, it often happened that combat units were left on the
battlefield without the necessary support.
Historical experience and analysis have shown that the role of logistics as a co-ordi-
nating and managing activity has not been properly acknowledged.28 The
consequences have been negative for military leaders and the outcome of combat
disastrous. Although individual activities functioned well, it was the absence of co-
ordination among them that meant they failed to meet the expectations of military
commanders. Logistics as an activity does not allow for amateurism; logistics only
operates among those activities that can only be categorized as successful or unsuc-
cessful. This can be explained through the use of the following example: logistic
support for the German army during World War II successfully co-ordinated all activi-
ties in the rear and was related to the production and manufacture of military material.
It did not, however, successfully organize the distribution of that material among
German soldiers and military formations. This cannot be seen as half a logistical
success because logistics, as an activity and as a systemic output, only records success
when seemingly separate and disparate parts of logistic activity are joined. Conversely,
the efficiency of combat forces is directly affected.
The basic objectives of logistics remain easily definable but not as easily realizable:
planning, preparation and supplying military units with sufficient amounts of military
material, regardless of the negative factors of the environment in which the units are
positioned, present serious difficulties.29 Here, one has to stress the importance of the
most accurate forecast possible, being based on the complicated calculations of con-
sumption and the needs of armed military units. Thus, logistics often has to address the
unpredictable factors of the environment (such as guerrilla action destroying transport
etc.) as well as other two variables that determine the efficiency of logistics and its
success. The first variable determines the amount of the military material needed by
armed units and the second determines the time-scale in which this needs to be done.30
This concept of logistics, which views military forces as customers or consumers of the
services provided by the logistic system, can be illustrated by the following equation:
Ug = Mm / t
where the objective of logistics (Ug) is to supply as much military material (Mm) in as
short a time (t) as possible. For the realization of this objective, logistics has to
overcome numerous factors. This is why its efficiency, as relative value, can be calcu-
lated with the following equation:
Qact
Urel = 100 [%]
Qid
Where the value Qact represents the delivered amounts of military material, while the
value Qid represents a theoretical model, without any influence from external factors. If
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I am to illustrate this logistic efficiency equation, I must first define three usually
different trends of logistics:
a. Theoretical.
b. Expected or desired outcome.
c. Reality.
In Figure 2, the line T1 represents the theoretical trend of logistic efficiency. It illus-
trates the maximum logistic efficiency, or the continual supply of the necessary
amounts of the military material. This is an ideal situation that every logistic system
aims to achieve though not possible in practice. The reason lies in the considerable
number of (negative) factors that impinge on and affect the logistic system and which
can be controlled only in theoretical models. In this case, the value of the external or
unexpected variables is zero. As such, they do not have any impact on logistic efficiency.
Theoretical trends cannot even be reached by so-called peacetime logistics, which is
supposed to meet the expectations and needs of the armed forces in peacetime with
limited activities, such as exercising and training.
The expectations of military commanders are represented by the line T2, which illus-
trates in linear form the growing values of the amounts of military material provided in
a certain period. I equalize this trend (which I define as expected) with peacetime
logistics. In this case, the amount of the provided military material grows linearly with
time to the point where it fulfils the needs of the combat units. This can be done if the
negative and hindering factors of the environment are diminished, which is achieved by
the analyses and preparations of the logistic system itself.
The third and usually most expected line, T3, illustrates the so-called real trend of
logistics efficiency, which appears in case of a combat. I explain deviations from T1 and
T2 with the exceptional circumstances in wartime. The reasons have been explained
above.
Figure 2: Trends of the military logistics
Quantity of
military material
T1
T3
T2
Time
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The starting points of all three lines illustrate relatively high values of the amount of
the military material, because the logistic system has to be at least minimally prepared
for the combat. There are initial stocks and reserves that have to be at every logistic
system’s disposal. Higher realization of the armed forces’ expectations is expected with
the growth of the time interval. In the case of peacetime logistics, one can expect a high
efficiency of logistics as well as the realization of the needs of the armed forces. The effi-
ciency of logistics in peacetime comes close and can also reach theoretical values. The
greatest deviations from these ideal values and the results of logistic activity can be seen
in the line representing wartime logistics (functioning of the logistic system in combat).
Originally, high values of the amounts of the military material are explained with the
preparedness of armed forces for the combat. At this point, I excluded sudden attacks
and extremely low levels of preparedness of the armed forces. The logistic system
manages to fulfil the needs of the combat forces at the onset of combat due to its pre-
paredness and the stores. What follows is the appearance of a logistic vacuum, which
needs to be addressed. The result is the stabilization and restoration of the logistic
system, which enables the functioning of the armed forces on the battlefield to be
normalized and increases the chances of victory.
On the basis of these findings, I have formulated a simplified equation for calculat-
ing the value Qact, which in turn makes it possible to calculate the efficiency of logistics.
It needs to be corrected and balanced with the different factors that have negative
effects on the functioning of the logistic system. I proceed from the fact that the sum of
the external factors (n) reaches values between 0 and 1 and does not exceed 1.
Qact = Qid * (1 – n)
As it seems almost impossible to determine all the external factors marked by the
symbol (n), I extrapolate their meaning and the possibility of being able to determine
their values mathematically.
CASE STUDY: GERMAN LOGISTIC (MIS) MANAGEMENT

In this case study analysis of the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941
(Operation Barbarossa) I have concentrated on the following variables and external
factors (n), which influenced the efficiency of logistics.
I have designated the distance between the battlefield and the rear, namely the
distance that the logistic system has to surmount, as the most important factor. When
defining the importance or influence that distance has on the efficiency of logistics, I
have identified three phases and, consequently, three levels of influence. The first level
of influence (d1) is practically negligible. This category comprises all the distances that
are more or less easily mastered by the logistic system. The second level (d2) comprises
those distances that are beyond the equipment and capacity of the logistic system and,
as such, represent an important negative influence on the efficiency of logistics. The
logistic system can master these distances with improvisation and with logistic reserves
(sequestration of enemy means of transport and communication infrastructures, and
the use of all kinds of the confiscated military material). The third group involves
22-2 master 10/5/06 8:46 AM Page 170
distances (d3) that practically cannot be mastered by the logistic system. Their effect on
the efficiency of logistics is profound and it can completely nullify all the efforts of the
logistic system to the extent that the basic output of the logistic system ceases to exist.
This is the reason why the effect (d3) represents the exponential decrease in the effi-
ciency of the logistic system.
The time when the distinct levels that present the effects of distance appear depends
on numerous factors that directly and indirectly impact on the logistic system, such as
its structure and functioning (military doctrines, the size and equipment of the armed
forces, and the strategic decisions of the highest-ranking military commanders etc.). In
spite of this it remains possible to determine the critical distances for the individual
logistic systems over a given period of time. According to the case study of Operation
Barbarossa, it can be ascertained that all distances in the range from 0 to 500 km belong
to the category (d1).31 Within this radius, the German logistic system operated without
major problems because the German logistics system supported the blitzkrieg in
Europe in the period 1939–1941.
The second category (d2) includes all distances from 500 to 1500 km. When the
German logistic system operated on the eastern front, it had to deal with almost insur-
mountable obstacles.32 The efficiency of the logistics system substantially decreased,
and serious interruptions in efficiency can be noted. Military material reached the
German units on the battlefield in waves. All other distances beyond 1500 km belong
to the third group (d3). They exponentially decreased the efficiency of German logistics
and in several cases even nullified it.33 Nowadays, the distances of the individual cate-
gories have changed but the concept still applies. With the following equation, one can
theoretically calculate what amount of the military material would actually reach
combat units on the battlefield within a certain period of time, a factor that I have
already taken into account with distance intervals (X).
If distance has mostly a negative influence on the efficiency of logistics, this cannot
be said for socio-geographic factors. These factors are: population size; population
density; density of the communication infrastructure; and the general capacity of a
certain area (i.e. the number of soldiers that can be billeted in a particular place). I
would especially stress the importance of the communication infrastructure, which
enables the transport and distribution of military material. There is a positive correla-
tion between logistics efficiency and the density of the communication infrastructure.
The higher the density of the military communication infrastructure, the lower is the
negative influence on the efficiency of the logistic system. The analysis of the combat-
ants in the German forces on the eastern front proves an exception to this rule because
of the incompatibility of the rail communication infrastructure (too wide a space
(gauge) between the railway lines)34 and a substantially lower density of the road
network, much of which was also of lower quality than in Europe. In the equation (ds)
kilometers represent different infrastructures and S represents the area (km2). The
22-2 master 10/5/06 8:46 AM Page 171
Figure 3: The influence of distance on the efficiency of logistics
Logistics
efficiency
d1 d2 d3 Distance
value necessarily needs to be considered carefully, so I used the coefficient α, which

presents the optimal density of the infrastructure network. The German infrastructure
network was of high quality before the beginning of the war and it totalled 14.6 km/
100 km2 of railways and around 50 km/100 km2 of roads.35
Among the most significant negative factors that influence the efficiency of logistics
is a group of physical–geographical factors. These are the geological, morphological,
climatic, hydrological, pedological and phytographic characteristics of a particular
area. As a rule, all these factors have a negative effect on the logistics efficiency. Their
importance, which usually is not crucial, essentially increases in the event of extreme
conditions that are rarely foreseeable: for example, extremely high levels of precipita-
tion; extensive flooding; landslides and rock falls; periods of extended drought, high
temperatures, severe winters. The equation refers to the relief characteristics and incli-
nations which have to be surmounted. The steepness of the terrain is expressed by the
relationship between the changes in altitude (∆hi) over a particular distance (di). Here I
presume that the influence of steepness does not exceed the value 0.6, or the angle of
inclination 30º, due to the fact that such terrain is impassable for the mechanized
military vehicles.36
22-2 master 10/5/06 8:46 AM Page 172
To determine the influence of the angle of inclination on the speed of movement, I

identified two categories: the first category comprises values between 0 and 0.3, and the
second values from 0.3 to 0.6. Both categories need to be set alongside the number of
steep slopes and gradients (ascents) over a particular distance.
In the next equation I consider the surface of the terrain, which I marked with the
coefficient of rolling friction (Ut). When defining this, I calculated the values of the
rolling friction coefficient on asphalt surfaces and used these values in the numerator of
friction (Ut,0). The value of this coefficient is around 0.015.37 The denominator repre-
sents the value of the actual coefficient of rolling friction (Ut,i ) over a particular distance
xi. This value is considered in respect of the entire distance .
The coefficient of rolling friction for a tire on a hard surface is 100 to 1,000 times less
than of sliding or resistance on that same surface. However, there are deformations in
both the wheel and the surface on which it is rolling. This is considered to be a major
factor in rolling friction, because the deformations of the wheel or tire and the surface
on which it is rolling will result in a resistant force that will slow down the object. Energy
is dissipated with the deformation of the wheel against the surface. This loss of energy
is converted to a resistant force, thus slowing down the rolling motion. The coefficient
of rolling friction is therefore highly dependent on the weight of a vehicle and the
softness of the surface. They both can have an enormous impact on rolling friction and,
consequently, on loss of energy.38
If all the above-mentioned stages in the calculation of the efficiency of logistics are
combined in one equation, the real efficiency of logistics can be calculated.
If the direct relative value of the efficiency of logistics is to be calculated, the

following equation is to be used.
22-2 master 10/5/06 8:46 AM Page 173
THE FUTURE OF MILITARY LOGISTICS

The reasons for the defeat of the German army in World War II cannot be easily deter-
mined and assessed. Overy suggests many of them but does not mention logistics,
although it was clear even before the outbreak of war that a modern war is not fought
on the battlefield but in the economy.39 The crucial burden therefore rests on the
logistic system, which mediates and transmits economic power into the precise forms
that enable military systems to put pressure on the enemy forces on the battlefield.
Modern analyses of World War II express doubt that Germany was adequately
prepared for war. At the beginning of the war, Germany was an economically stable
country that had successfully managed the world trade depression and had the
strongest economy among all the European countries. But was that enough? The Nazi
élites were convinced that Germany was prepared for the war, though some high-
ranking officers in the German army (among them especially General Fritsch and
General Blomberg) were not.40 If the sum of the demographic and economic potential
of the opposing states is added, it is both an illusion and utopian to expect military
victory and the subjection of the European continent. In spite of this, Germany got
involved in the so-called spiral of war, namely that the continuation of conflict and the
occupation of new areas was necessary for the German military system. Germany itself
neither had sufficient natural resources nor an adequate labor force and space for the
German Nazi economy. The German home market demanded autarky (self-suffi-
ciency) and was adamantly opposed to Germany’s participation on the European and
world markets.41
Hitler, therefore, adjusted and directed Germany’s expansionist policy to meet this
objective and prepared thorough plans with which to exploit occupied areas. The
supremacy of the German army coincided with supremacy of the German economy in
Europe and this enabled it to put into effect the new doctrine of fighting – the
Blitzkrieg.42 The initial easy victories of the German army and the European states’
inability to form an anti-German coalition additionally convinced Hitler and the
German military headquarters that the German military machine was invincible.
Numerous gaps that appeared inside the military system and military economy were
neglected, which explains why there were neither detailed analyses of the military
engagements and reasons for victories nor simultaneous upgrading of the military
system, arms system and military economy.43 Improvements and corrections were
made only after the German armed forces started to lose men and the once invincible
army experienced defeat.
Experts who deal with modern logistics have a similar role to managers in the
economic systems. The position of logistics, as a link between the civilian environment
and the armed forces, initiates discussion of the qualifications of the people who work
in logistics and who exercise control over the logistic system. Military–historical expe-
riences indicate that military commanders often do not acknowledge the direct control
of the logistic system and its military experts. In planning they especially concentrate on
the amounts of the needed military material and they express their demands for it, but
the problem is in co-operation with the civilian environment, which often supervises the
production of the military material.44 Principles of free economy, competition and
22-2 master 10/5/06 8:46 AM Page 174
rational consumption are standards or norms which do change with production of the
military material, but military commanders do not seem to understand them.
Demands for production are often extremely high and cannot possibly be realized.
Figure 4: The role and position of logistics
Units in combat Rear

Logistics
Military–defense systems are nowadays expected to rationally use the means and at the
same time to increase their efficiency, which is possible only if the economic norms are
taken into account. So modern approaches tend to introduce these norms in the rigid
military–defense system and to allow highly qualified managers manage the modern
logistic system. The problem of how to reach an active co-operation of the civilian experts
in organization and management of such important subsystems is nowadays (more or less
successfully) being solved by almost all modern national-security systems.
Military–historical analyses, which could have prevented many logistic catastrophes,
were incomplete. The reason can be found in the completely different researches of the
winners and losers. On the one hand, the winners concentrated on the analyses of those
facts, which brought victory and were often not critical. They believed that they won
because they had a better system than the enemy. Even if there had been any deficien-
cies, they were not heavily judged and criticized because it was impossible to talk about
the total breakdown of their (sub-) system. This can be a trap for the winner because as
a rule the winner does not further improve his own system. Some partial improvements
follow, but the (sub-) system does not substantially change.
The loser on the other hand usually is not capable of carrying out major analyses and
looking for the causes of the defeat because the defeat is accompanied by the
breakdown of the system. But if analyses are made, it is almost impossible to extract the
most important factors that caused the defeat. Systemic interaction, which in this case
appears as a synergy of the many wrong decisions and systemic mistakes, leads to the
forming of a large conglomerate of reasons. So Germany was not able to eliminate
numerous logistical mistakes after the end of World War I or adequately to do away with
them before World War II.
22-2 master 10/5/06 8:46 AM Page 175
States and their systems should, therefore, form the correct methodology to enable
qualitative research apparatus to be established that would provide the right hypotheses
and answers to the most important questions. Otherwise, the future will bring even
more logistical mistakes, and penalties will continue to be paid in military casualties.
NOTES
1. John A. Lynn; Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, chapter 7.
2. Edward Luttwak, The Endangered American Dream, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993,
p. 5.
3. Hans Kettgen, “Gedanken über Logistik in Theorie und Praxis”, Wehrkunde, Vol. 7/8
No. 13, 1964, p. 28.
4. Logistik-Etymologische Abteilung Logistischen Mitteilungsblatt, Heft 4, Logistikschule der

Bundeswehr, 1967, pp. 33–35.
5. Jerome Peppers, History of United States Military Logistics 1935–1985, Huntsville, Alabama:
Logistics Education Foundation, 1988, p. 6.
6. Henry Eccles, Logistic in the National Defense, Harrisburg: Telegraph Press, 1959, p. 2.
7. Trevor Dupuy (ed.), International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, Vol. 5, Washington DC:
Brassey’s, 1993, p. 1493; and in Vol. 6, 1993, pp. 2573–2577 and 2657–2665.
8. Duncan Ballantine, US Naval Logistic in the Second World War, New York: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1988.
9. Ibid., p. 3.
10. Department of Defense, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, Washington: DoD,
1995, pp. V–VI.
11. Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz and Jonimi: Their Interaction, paper presented to the 23rd
Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State University, 1993,
pp. 1–12, http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm, accessed
8 March 2004.
12. Carl Clausewitz, On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 14.
13. Ibid., p. 244.
14. Antoine Jomini, The Art of War, New York: Greenwood Press, 1971, pp. 32–46.
15. Clifford Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate – Readings on the Military Transforma-
tion of Early Modern Europe, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 13–14.
16. Larry Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff 1865–1941, New York:
New Brunswick Press, 1971, pp. 111–115.
17. Die Logistik der Bundeswehr im neuen Aufgabenspektrum, 1998, p. 22.
18. Johann Allmayer-Beck, Eine geistige Trilogie des 19. Jahrhunderts und ihre Bedeutung für die
Gegenwart, Wien: Hrsg. Von der Gesellschaft für Politisch-Strategie Studien, Österreichis-
chen Bundesverlag, 1988, p. 47.
19. George Ebner, Scientific Optimism: Jomini and the US Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
Combat Studies Institute, 2004, pp. 1–6, http://www.cgsc.army.mil/csi/research/writtinh/
Papers %20C600/Commendebner2.asp, accessed 8 March 2004.
20. Intensity of the combat is understood as the amount of the used military material in a par-
ticular period of time. This can be expressed in the form of all kinds of the used ammunition
(number of the fired cartridges, used hand grenades and all other projectiles), the use of
sanitary material, the loss of weapons and all kinds of deficits in the personal equipment of a
soldier.
21. US Department of Defense, 2003, United States Army Transformation Roadmap, Wash-
ington DC, 2003, pp. 9–11.
22. Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
23. Alan Gropman (ed.), The Big “L”: American Logistics in World War II, Industrial College of
22-2 master 10/5/06 8:46 AM Page 176
the Armed Forces, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1997, p. 15.
24. Helmut Willke, Systemtheorie: eine Einführung in die Grundprobleme der Theorie sozialer
Systeme, Stuttgart: G. Fischer Verlag, 1993, p. 13.
25. Ibid., p. 26.
26. John Thompson, The Lifeblood of War – Logistic in Armed Conflict, London: Brassey’s, 1991,
pp. 3–10.
27. Duncan Ballantine, US Naval Logistic in the Second World War, New York: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1998, p. 28.
28. van Martin Creveld, Supplying War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
29. Cyrus Thorpe, Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation, Washington DC: National
Defense University Press, 1986, pp. 23–25.
30. Vladimir Prebilič, Logistics of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War, PhD dissertation,
Ljubljana University, 2004, p. 89.
31. German land forces were only partly motorized. In spite of the great efforts in this field, the
realization of plans fell behind the expected results. This is why the horses had a very
important role even in World War II. The German Wehrmacht had 590,000 horses at the
beginning of the war and their number increased to 1,200,000 until the end of the war. See
Richard Overy, op. cit. Divisions had a very small number of trucks at their disposal and their
number was additionally limited according to the type of division (panzer division, infantry
division . . .). There were huge differences in the needs of the military material. See Michael
Reimer, Lokomotiven für die Ostfront: Menschen und Maschinen im Zweiten Weltkrieg,
München: GeraMond Verlag, 1999, p. 28.The transport of the German divisions was based
on the trucks with the average load capacity of five tons and it represented around 60 trucks
per division. See Reinhard Frank, Lastkraftwagen der Wehrmacht: deutsche und erbeutete Rad-
fahrzeuge im Einsatz, Technik, Anstrich, Abzeichen, Zubehör – Geschichte und Gliederung der
Nachschubtruppen, Podzun-Pallas Verlag, Utting, 1992, p. 20. But their quality was com-
pletely inappropriate for the situation on the eastern front.
32. German transport rested on the railway and road traffic, which failed to surmount the
distances. The railway transport was completely paralyzed due to the different width of the
railway tracks in the Soviet Union and the inappropriate locomotives. See Eugen Kreidler,
Die Eisenbahnen im Zweiten Weltkrieg – Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten
Weltkrieges, Stuttgart: Muster-Schmidt Verlagsgeselschaft, 2001, p. 98. The trucks did not
endure the low temperatures, bad roads and huge distances. Karl Häßner, Von der NSKK
Transportabteilung zur Wehrmacht, Berlin: Books on Demand GmbH, 1999, p. 20.
33. Because of the extreme burdening, a huge loss of trucks was noted in all three army groups:
the army group north lost 39 percent, the army group center lost 25 percent and the army
group south lost 22 percent of all available transport trucks. This means that in the period
from 1 November 1941 until 15 March 1942, 75,000 trucks and 180,000 horses were lost.
Werner Klee, Gleise für den Krieg: Der Bau von strategischen Bahnen in Deutschland, Eisenbahn
im Krieg, Bahn Extra, No. 2, April–May 2002, p. 19.
34. The German railway system was first faced with the unknown task of adapting the different
width of the railway tracks on the Russian territory (they had to narrow the width of the
tracks from 1524mm to 1435mm). Alfred Knipping, Eisenbahnen zwischen Ostfront und
Atlantikwall 1939–1945, Stuttgart: Transpress Verlag, 2002, pp. 22–24.
35. Richard Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, New York: Oxford University Press,
2002, pp. 85.
36. Kraus Friedrich Schüler, Logistik im Rußlandfeldzug: Die Rolle der Eisenbahn bei Planung, Vor-
bereitung und Durchführung des deutschen Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion bis zur Krise vor Moskau
im Winter 1941–1942 (mit einem Vorwort von Andreas Hillgruber), Frankfurt am Main:
Peter Lang Verlag, 1987, p. 23.
37. Ron Kurtus, Rolling Friction and Automobile Tires, School for Champions, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, www.school-for-schampions.com, 2003, p. 2.
38. Ibid., p. 3.
22-2 master 10/5/06 8:46 AM Page 177
39. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won, New York: W. Norton and Co., 1997, p. 75.
40. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, London: Orion Books Ltd, 1995, p. 476.
41. Reinhard Kroener, “Die personellen Ressourcen des Dritten Reiches im Spannungsfeld
zwischen Wehrmacht, Bürokratie und Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1942”, in Das Deutsche Reich
und der Zweite Weltkrieg: Organisation und Mobilisierung des Machtbereichs, Buch 5/1,
Stuttgart: Deutsche Anstalt Verlag, 1988, p. 678.
42. James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform, New
York: University of Kansas Press, 1992, p. 210.
43. Frank Tipton, A History of Modern Germany Since 1815, London: Continuum, 2003, p. 482.
44. Even in Germany, where the Nazi military system supervised all spheres of society, and
above all the industrial plants, disproportion of production appeared. Total mobilization of
the economy is not possible because it causes tensions in the civilian society and conse-
quently the decline of motivation to participate in war. That is why Hitler was so careful
about economic mobilization and he tried not to burden the German civilian population.
See Robert J. Kershaw, War Without Garlands, Barbarossa, 1941–2, New York: Sarpendon,
2000, p. 42.

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Defense & Security Analysis

Theoretical aspects of military logistics

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Theoretical Aspects of Military Logistics

presented an important link in his theoretical work, namely the interdependence of

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO SCHOOLS OF LOGISTICS

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF M I L I TA RY L O G I S T I C S • 161

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF M I L I TA RY L O G I S T I C S • 163

European armed forces are not ready for out-of-area operations.

THE PHENOMENON OF THE “LOGISTIC VACUUM”

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF M I L I TA RY L O G I S T I C S • 165

A decline in combat intensity is accompanied by a reduction in logistic support, a

experience of the soldiers and their commanders.

Figure 1: The appearance of the logistic vacuum

THE FUNCTIONING OF MILITARY LOGISTIC SYSTEMS

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF M I L I TA RY L O G I S T I C S • 167

Figure 2: Trends of the military logistics

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF M I L I TA RY L O G I S T I C S • 169

CASE STUDY: GERMAN LOGISTIC (MIS) MANAGEMENT

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF M I L I TA RY L O G I S T I C S • 171

Figure 3: The influence of distance on the efficiency of logistics

value necessarily needs to be considered carefully, so I used the coefficient α, which

To determine the influence of the angle of inclination on the speed of movement, I

If the direct relative value of the efficiency of logistics is to be calculated, the

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF M I L I TA RY L O G I S T I C S • 173

THE FUTURE OF MILITARY LOGISTICS

Figure 4: The role and position of logistics

Units in combat Rear

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF M I L I TA RY L O G I S T I C S • 175

4. Logistik-Etymologische Abteilung Logistischen Mitteilungsblatt, Heft 4, Logistikschule der

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF M I L I TA RY L O G I S T I C S • 177

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