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2. Evident premeditation- In case
of aberatiu ictus and error in personae, the
SC did not appreciate evident
premeditation since the victim, who was
actually killed, is not contemplated in the
premeditation of the accused (People vs.
Trinidad, G.R. NO. L-38930, June 28,
1988; People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967;
People vs. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-38930,
June 28, 1988). However, praeter
intentionem and evident premeditation can
be independently appreciated. there is no
incompatibility between evident
premeditation and no intention to commit
so grave a wrong since the latter is based
on the state of mind of the offender while
the former manner of committing the
crime (Reyes; People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil.
536).
3. Treachery - If accused employed
means to render the victim defenseless,
treachery shall be appreciated even if the
killing is due to error in personae (People
vs. Del Castillo, Sr., G.R. No. L-32995,
April 30, 1984) or aberratio ictus (People
vs. Mabug-at, G.R. No. 25459, August 10,
1926, En Banc) or with the circumstance
of praeter intentionem (People vs. Cagoco,
G.R. No. 38511, October 6, 1933)
4. Conspiracy - Conspirators, who
conspired to kill a particular parson, are
equally liable for the killing of another
person due to error in personae (People vs.
Pinto, Jr. and Buenaflor, G.R. No. No.
39519, November 21, 1991). However,
conspirator, who never even fired a single
shot and whose only participation was to
drive their getaway vehicle and to lend his
firearm to his back rider so that the latter
could finish off the target victim was not
found accountable for the injury sustained
by the unintended victim was just a star-
crossed bystander who was accidentally
hit in the process (aberratio ictus) (People
vs. Herbias, G.R. No. 112716-17,
December 16, 1996; People vs. Flora and
Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000).
INTENT TO KILL: Intent to kill is
an element of homicide and murder. But
even if offender had no intent to kill, he
would be held just the same liable for
homicide or murder if his felonious act is
the proximate cause of the death of the
latter. Even if there is no intent to kill,
offender is liable for homicide or murder if
the victim died as a result of the “felonious
act” of the former. The offender’s act is
considered felonious if it is accompanied
with criminal or evil intent such as intent
to inflict injury, intent to hide the body of
the crime, intent to threaten victim, intent
to silence the hold-up victim, or intent to
rape. Offender is liable for homicide
because it is the natural, direct and logical
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
consequence of an act committed with
criminal intent.
a. With intent to hide the body of
the crime – In People vs. Ortega, Jr., G.R.
No. 116736, July 24, 1997 - Ortega
stabbed the victim. Garcia assisted Ortega
in concealing the body of the victim by
throwing the body into the well. Victim
died due to drowning. Issue: Is Garcia
liable for the death of the victim as
principal in homicide even if his intention
was not to kill the victim but merely to
assist Ortega in concealing his dead body
not knowing that the victim was still alive
at that time? In assisting Ortega carry the
body of victim to the well, Garcia was
committing an intentional felony;
concealing the body of the crime to prevent
its discovery makes him liable as an
accessory in homicide. Hence, Garcia
should be held liable for the direct, natural
and logical consequence of his felonious
act of assisting Ortega in hiding the body
of the victim. Since proximate cause of
death of the victim is the felonious and
accessory act of throwing the victim into
the well, Garcia should be held liable for
the death as principal in homicide.
b. With intent to threaten – In US
vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 16486, March 22,
1921, En Banc - The accused in rage he
moved towards victim with a big knife in
hand, threatening to stab him. Victim
believing himself in great and immediate
peril jumped into the water where he was
drowned. The accused was found guilty of
homicide. The act of threatening to stab
victim constitutes a felony of threat.
Hence, accused is liable for the direct,
natural and logical consequence of his
intentional and felonious act. It was held
that: "If a man creates in another man's
mind an immediate sense of danger which
causes such person to try to escape, and in
so doing he injures himself, the person who
creates such a state of mind is responsible
for the injuries which result."
d. Intent to inflict injury -
Intentional infliction of injury resulting in
death of the victim constitutes homicide or
murder. In People vs. Pugay, et al., No
74324, November 17, 1988, the deceased,
a retardate, and the accused Pugay were
friends. Deceased used to run errands for
Pugay and at times they slept together.
During a town fiesta fair was held in the
public plaza. Accused, Pugay and Samson
with several companions, who appeared to
be drunk, made the deceased dance by
tickling him with a piece of wood. Not
content with what they were doing with
the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly
took a can of gasoline from under the
engine of the Ferris wheel and poured its
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contents on the body of the former. Then,
the accused Samson set victim on fire
making a human torch out of him. Pugay
and Samson were stunned when they
noticed the deceased burning. Crime
committed by Samson: There is no intent
to kill. The act of the Accused was merely
a part of their fun-making that evening.
Accused merely intended to set the
deceased's clothes on fire. His act,
however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the
victim would cause at the very least some
kind of physical injuries on his person, a
felony. Since such felony of physical
injuries resulted into a graver offense, he
must be held responsible therefor. (Note:
The crime is not murder qualified by
means of fire because the fire was not use
to kill but merely to inflict injury).
e. Recklessness – Even if there is
no intent to kill and evil intent, offender is
liable for culpable felony if the victim died
as a result of the recklessness of the
former. Crime committed by Pugay: Having
taken the can from under the engine of the
Ferris wheel and holding it before pouring
its contents on the body of the deceased,
this accused knew that the can contained
gasoline. The stinging smell of this
flammable liquid could not have escaped
his notice even before pouring the same.
Clearly, he failed to exercise all the
diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any
act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making
fun of the deceased. The accused is only
guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence.
f. Accident - If there is no intent to
kill, evil intent and recklessness on the
part of the accused, he is not liable for his
intentional act, which caused the death of
the victim. In United States vs. Tanedo (15
Phil. Rep., 196), deceased went with the
accused to hunt wild chickens at the
forest. While hunting, the accused came
upon a wild chicken, and, not seeing
deceased about and not knowing or having
any reason to believe that he was in that
vicinity shot the chicken. The bullet that
hit the chicken recoiled and hit the
deceased. It was held that accused is not
criminally liable. Life was taken by
misfortune or accident while in the
performance of a lawful act executed with
due care and without intention of doing
harm. Note: The accused could not have
foreseen that the slug after hitting the
chicken would recoil and hit deceased. The
principle enunciated in Tanedo case will
not apply if the place where the accused
lawfully discharged his firearm is
populated. In People vs. Nocum, G.R. No.
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
L-482, 25 February 1947, En Banc - There
was a fistic fight between two persons.
Desiring to stop the encounter, accused
shouted at the combatants. As these paid
him no attention, he drew a .45 caliber
pistol and shot twice in the air. The bout
continued, however; so he fired another
shot at the ground, but unfortunately the
bullet ricocheted, and hit an innocent by-
stander, resident of the place. Victim died.
It was held that: “The mishap should be
classed as homicide through reckless
imprudence, the slaying having been
unintentional. It is apparent that defendant
willfully discharged his gun-for without
taking the precautions demanded by the
circumstance that the district was
populated, and the likelihood that his bullet
would glance over the hard pavement of the
Manila thoroughfare. Note: The accused
should have foreseen that the slug after
hitting the pavement would recoil and
might hit somebody.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Offender shall be held liable for
impossible crime if the following requisites
are present: (1) offender performing an act
which would have been an offense against
person or property; (2) offender performed
an act with evil intent; (3) offender did not
commit the offense because of the
impossibility of its accomplishment or
employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means; and (4) offender in performing an
act is not violating another provision of the
law (Luis B. Reyes).
Impossible crime of theft - X,
employee of Mega Inc., received check from
the customer of her employer. Instead of
remitting the check to her employer, X
deposited the check under her account.
However, the drawee bank dishonored the
check because of insufficiency of funds.
What is the crime committed by X? Answer:
The crime committed is impossible crime of
qualified theft. Qualified theft is a crime
against property. The act of depositing the
check is committed with evil intent. The
mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Inc. showed her intent to
gain or be unjustly enriched. There is
factually impossibility to accomplish the
crime of qualified theft since the check is
unfunded. (Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No.
162540, July 13, 2009, Justice Peralta).
Intod principle - In Intod vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21,
1992 – Outside the house of the victim,
accused with intent to kill fired at the
bedroom, where the victim is supposed to
be sleeping. No one was in the room when
the accused fired the shots. No one was hit
by the gun fire. The accused were
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convicted of impossible crime. Accused
shoot the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the
victim was not present in said place and
thus, the accused failed to accomplish
their end due to its factual impossibility.
In the United States, criminal laws are
silent regarding impossible crimes; hence
where the offense sought to be committed
is factually impossible of accomplishment,
the offender shall be liable for attempted
crime. On the other hand, where the
offense is legally impossible of
accomplishment, the actor cannot be held
liable for any crime. In the Philippines, the
crime committed is impossible crime if the
offense sought to be committed is factually
or legally impossible. Killing a dead person
is impossible crime because of legal
impossibility. Putting the hand inside an
empty pocket with intention to steal a
wallet is impossible crime because of
factual impossibility.
Raping a dead person - Prior to RA
8353, rape is a crime against chastity.
Thus, if a person raped a dead person
believing that she was just sleeping,
offender could not be held liable for
impossible crime (J. Ramon Aquino). In
impossible crime the act could have
constituted the crime against person or
property if its accomplishment was not
impossible. Rape is neither a crime against
person nor against property. However, RA
8353 reclassifies rape from crime against
chastity to crime against person. Hence,
an offender for raping a dead person
without knowing that she was already
dead may now be held liable for impossible
crime.
Committing another crime - “A”
discharged shotgun at “B” from a distance
of 300 yards; but because of the limited
range of the firepower of the shotgun, it
would be impossible for “A” to harm “B”.
“A” is liable of discharged of firearm and
not impossible crime. Where the offender
unlawful entered the house and took a
watch that turned out to be his own, he is
liable for trespass to dwelling and not
impossible crime (Criminal Law
Conspectus by Justice Florenz Regalado).
If the accused administered abortive drugs
upon his girlfriend whom he believed to be
pregnant, which turned out not to be true,
but the woman became ill for more than
30 days, the accused will be liable for
serious physical injuries and not
impossible crime of abortion (Criminal Law
Reviewer by Gregorio).
STAGES
ATTEMPTED AND FRUSTRATED
STAGES: In attempted felony, the offender
11 | P a g e
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
performs directly an overt act, which
consists of one or more acts of execution,
but not enough to consequently produce
the felony. In frustrated felony, the
offenders perform all the acts of execution
that would produce the felony as a matter
of consequence. To determine whether the
felony is at the attempted or frustrated
stage, acts of execution of execution of a
felony must be identified. Example: The
acts of execution that would produce
homicide or murder are infliction of mortal
wounds upon the victim. If the wounds
inflicted upon the victim with intent to kill
are non-mortal, the crime committed is
attempted homicide; if wounds are mortal,
the crime committed is frustrated
homicide.
In attempted felony and frustrated
felony, the external acts performed by the
offender and the intended felony must
have a direct connection; but in an
attempted felony, the offender failed to
perform all the acts of execution; thus his
external acts would “not produce” the
felony as a consequence; on the other
hand in a frustrated felony, the offender
performed all the acts of execution; thus,
his external acts “would produce” the
felony as a consequence.
FRUSTRATED AND
CONSUMMATED - In frustrated and
consummated felony, the accused
performed all acts of execution that would
produce the felony as a consequence. If the
felony is not produced due to external
cause, the crime committed is frustrated
felony; if the felony is produced the crime
committed is consummated.
In frustrated felony, the offender
performed all the acts of execution but the
felony was not produced as a consequence
due to extraneous cause. However, there
are felonies, the commission of which has
no frustrated stage since the performance
of all the acts of execution immediately
consummates the felony. In homicide or
murder case, once the offender inflicted
mortal wound on the victim, all the acts of
execution are considered performed.
However, what consummates homicide or
murder is not the infliction of mortal
wounds but the death of the victim as a
consequence of the mortal wound inflicted.
Thus, if the mortally wounded victim did
not die due to medical intervention,
homicide or murder is only at the
frustrated stage. On the other hand, in
rape once the offender sexually penetrate
the labia of the vagina of the victim, all the
acts of execution are considered
performed. But since sexual penetration
consummates rape, there are no occasions
where the offender performed all the acts
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of execution and yet the felony was not
produced as a consequence. In sum, there
is no such thing as frustrated rape since
the performance of all the acts of execution
immediately consummates rape.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSE – In
attempted felony and frustrated felony, the
offender failed to accomplish his criminal
objective by reason of extraneous causes;
if the causes are not extraneous, the
accused will be absolved from criminal
liability.
a. Negative Act - In the attempted
stage of the execution of a felony, the
offender must do a “negative act” to be
exempt from criminal liability for
attempted felony; since the offender has
not yet performed all the acts of execution
that would produce the felony as a
consequence, he must spontaneously
desist from further doing criminal acts
that will complete all the acts of execution.
Example: “A” with intent to kill shot “B”;
“B” sustained non-mortal wound. To be
exempt from criminal liability for
attempted homicide or murder, “A” must
spontaneously desist from further shooting
“B” in order not to inflict mortal injury
upon him.
b. Positive Act – If the offender
performs all the acts of execution, which
would produce the felony as a immediately after the killing of the victim
consequence, offender is not exempted
from liability for frustrated felony even if
he voluntary desisted from further doing
criminal act. Spontaneous desistance is a
defense in attempted felony but not in
frustrated felony. In the frustrated stage of
the execution of a felony, the offender
must do a “positive act” to be exempt from
criminal liability; since the offender has
performed all the acts of execution that
would produce the felony as a intended to kill him, X could have shot the
consequence, he must do something to
prevent, or thwart the production of the
felony. Example: “A” with intent to kill shot
“B”; “B” sustained mortal wound. To be
exempt from criminal liability for
frustrated felony, it is not enough that “A”
would desist from further shooting “B”.
The spontaneous desistance is not a valid
defense since “A” had already inflicted
mortal wound on “B” that would cause his
death as a consequence. Thus, “A” must
save the life of “B” by treating his wound.
If “B” did not die because “A’s” medical
treatment, the latter will not be held liable
for frustrated felony because the homicide
was not produced due to the will of “A”.
c. Not absolutory cause – If the
felony is consummated, offender cannot
undo what was done. Offender would not
be absolved from criminal liability even if
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
he had done something that will mitigate
the effects of the felonious act. Example:
(1) Restitution of funds malversed
immediately and voluntarily made before
the case was instituted is not an
absolutory cause (Navarro vs. Meneses III,
CBD Adm. Case No. 313, January 30,
1998, En Banc). (2) “A” stole chicken
under the house of “B” one evening.
Realizing that what he did was wrong, “A”
returned the chicken to the place under
the house of “B”. Since the crime of theft
was already consummated, the return of
the stolen property does not relieve “A” of
criminal responsibility. “A” had already
performed all the acts of execution, which
produced the crime of theft before he
returned the chicken (Reyes). (3) The fact
that the accused abandoned victim after
six days of captivity does not lessen his
criminal culpability much less exempt him
from criminal liability for the kidnapping
and detention of victim (Baldogo, G.R. No.
128106-07, January 24, 2003, En Banc).
Frustrated homicide or murder –
The intent to kill, as an essential element of
homicide at whatever stage, may be before
or simultaneous with the infliction of
injuries. The evidence to prove intent to kill
may consist of, inter alia, the means used;
the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; and the conduct of
the malefactors before, at the time of, or
(Escamilla vs. People, GR No. 188551,
February 27, 2013).
X opened the door and while still in
the car drew a gun and shot A once, hitting
him just below the left armpit. X sped away.
The wound sustained by A is not fatal.
What is the crime committed? Answer: X
only shot the victim once and did not hit
any vital part of the latter's body. If he
victim multiple times or even ran him over
with the car. Since intent to kill is lacking
but wounds are inflicted upon the victim,
the crime is not attempted murder but
physical injuries only (Pentecostes, Jr. vs.
People, GR No. 167766, April 07, 2010,
Justice Peralta).
X was charged with frustrated
murder for hacking the neck of victim with
the use of a scythe. Invoking the doctrine in
Pentecostes, Jr., X claimed that had he
intended to kill victim, he could have
repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s
death. Is the argument tenable? Answer:
No. Pentesoste Jr. case is not applicable
since the victim in that case was shot in the
arm, a non-vital part of the body. In this
case, the use of a scythe against victim’s
neck was determinative of the homicidal
intent of X. A single hacking blow in the
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neck could be enough to decapitate a
person and leave him dead. Refraining from
further hacking the victim does not negate
intent to kill. What could have been a fatal
blow was already delivered and there was
no more desistance to speak of (People vs.
Abella, G.R. No. 198400, October 07, 2013).
Using a gun, he shot the victim in
the chest. Despite a bloodied right upper
torso, the latter still managed to run
towards his house to ask for
help. Nonetheless, petitioner continued to
shoot at him three more times, albeit
unsuccessfully. The wound sustained by
the victim is fatal. The crime committed is
frustrated homicide (Escamilla vs. People,
GR No. 188551, February 27, 2013).
Attempted rape – In People vs.
Castillo, GR No. 193666, February 19, 2014
- Accused mashed the breast of his
daughter, kissed and licked her vagina,
inserted his finger in her sex organ, and
rubbed his sex organ against hers but he
did not penetrate her vagina.
Jurisprudence dictates that in order for
rape to be consummated, there must be
penetration of the penis into the vagina. A
grazing of the surface of the female organ or
touching the mons pubis of
the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of
the slightest penetration of the female
organ, i.e, touching of either labia of
the pudendum by the penis, there can be
no consummated rape; at most, it can only
be attempted, if not acts of lasciviousness.
This Court is aware of cases where the
conviction of the accused for consummated
rape has been upheld even if the victim
testified that there was no penetration and
the accused simply rubbed his penis in the
victim's vagina. However, in those cases,
there were pieces of evidence such as the
pain felt by the victim, injury to the sex
organ of the victim (e.g., hymenal
laceration), and bleeding of the victim's
genitalia. Here, the victim not only
categorically stated that there was no
penetration, she also stated that she felt no
pain and her vagina did not bleed. Thus,
the appellant cannot be convicted for
qualified rape by sexual intercourse.
However, his conviction cannot be
downgraded to qualified attempted rape.
The prosecution has alleged and proved
that there was qualified rape by sexual
assault when the accused-appellant kissed
and licked his daughter's vagina and
inserted his finger in her sex organ.
In People vs. Castillo, GR No.
193666, February 19, 2014 – the accused
commenced the act of having sexual
intercourse with his daughter but failed to
make a penetration into her sexual organ
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
not because of his spontaneous desistance
but because of the relatively small size of
her orifice. He is guilty of attempted rape.
COMPLEX CRIME
Killing persons and injuring two
more by treacherously detonating a hand
grenade in a dancing place constitutes the
complex crime of multiple murders with
double attempted murder. Single act of
detonating an explosive device may
quantitatively constitute a cluster of several
separate and distinct offenses, yet these
component criminal offenses should be
considered only as a single crime in law on
which a single penalty is imposed because
the offender was impelled by a single
criminal impulse which shows his lesser
degree of perversity. Even though the other
victim did not suffer mortal wounds, the
crime committed is not physical
injuries, because accused was motivated by
the same intent to kill when he detonated
the explosive device inside the dancing
place (People vs. Barde, G.R. No.
183094, September 22, 2010).
RECOMMENDED EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Accused was convicted of crime RA
No. 8282 for his failure to remit SSS
contributions of his employees and was
sentenced to suffer up to 20 years of
reclusion temporal. The penalty is excessive
since he already paid his delinquent
contribution. Under Article 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, the courts are bound to apply
the law as it is and impose the proper
penalty, no matter how harsh it might be.
The same provision, however, gives the
Court the discretion to recommend to the
President actions it deems appropriate but
are beyond its power when it considers the
penalty imposed as excessive. Although an
accused is convicted under a special penal
law, the Court is not precluded from giving
the Revised Penal Code suppletory
application in light of Article 10 of the same
Code (Mendoza vs. People, G.R. No.
183891, October 19, 2011).
CONSPIRACY
IMPLIED CONSPIRACY - In People
vs. Dollendo, G.R. No. 181701, January 18,
2012 -The “evidence of a chain of
circumstances,” to wit: that appellant went
inside the house of Romines to ascertain
that the victim was there; that he fetched
Dollendo to bring him to Ruiz; that he gave
the dipang to Dollendo to commit the
crime; and that they both fled after the
stabbing, taken collectively, shows a
community of criminal design to kill the
victim. Evidently, there was conspiracy in
the commission of the crime.
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COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY - It
is immaterial whether appellant acted as a
principal or as an accomplice because the
conspiracy and his participation therein
have been established. In conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all and the
conspirators shall be held equally liable for
the crime (People vs. Siongco, G.R. No.
186472, July 5, 2010).
DISSOCIATION - To exempt himself
from criminal liability, a conspirator must
have performed an overt act to dissociate or
detach himself from the conspiracy to
commit the felony and prevent the
commission thereof (People vs. Ebet, G.R.
No. 181635 November 15, 2010).
MASTERMIND - To be held liable as
conspirator, it must also be shown that the
accused performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy except in the
case of the mastermind of a crime (People
vs. Vera, GR No. 128966, August 18, 1999).
One who plans the commission of a crime is
liable as conspirator and principal by
inducement (People vs. Comiling, G.R. No.
140405, March 4, 2004, En
banc).Notwithstanding, the fact that one
was not at the crime scene, evidence proved
that he was the mastermind of the criminal
act or the principal by inducement. What is
important is that inducement was the
determining cause of the commission of the
crime. The command or advice made by
principal by inducement was of such
nature that, without it, the crime would not
have materialized (People vs. Janjalani,
G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011).
PRESENCE - Accused, unarmed,
appeared in the company of his employer,
and another person. His employer shot and
killedthe victim. Accused did nothing to
prevent the killing. Accused fled together
with his employer and other person.The
fact that accused appeared together with
employer and another and fled with them
proves a certain degree of participation and
cooperation in the execution of the
crime. However, there is doubt as to
whether accused acted as a principal or
just a mere accomplice. Such doubt should
be resolved in favor of the milder form of
criminal liability—that of a mere accomplice
(People vs. Tomas, G.R. No. 192251,
February 16, 2011). If the accused is armed
at the time, he could be held liable as
principal on the basis of implied
conspiracy. The fact that the companion of
the criminal actor is armed may mean that
the former is supplying moral assistance to
the latter. The armed presence of
conspiratorial companion may prove a
sense of security and encouragement on
the part of the material executor or may
serve as deterrence against possible
14 | P a g e
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
defender or rescuer (Galgo, G.R. No.
133887, May 28, 2002, En Banc).
SPECIAL LAW - B.P. Blg. 22 does
not expressly proscribe the supplementary
application of the provisions RPC including
the rule on conspiracy. Hence, such rule
may be applied supplementarily. Thus, a
non-issuer of bum check can be held liable
for violation of BP Blg. 22 on the basis of
conspiracy. (Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No.
141066, February 17, 2005). The principle
of conspiracy may be applied to RA No.
9262. Thus, a person (such as mother-in-
law), who has no marital, sexual or dating
relationship with the victim, can be held
liable for violence against woman on the
basis of conspiracy (Go-Tan vs. Go, G.R.
No. 168852, September 30, 2008)
Anti-graft law - May a private
person be indicted for conspiracy in
violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if
the public officer, with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to
the filing of the Information? Answer: Yes.
The death of the public officer does not
mean that the allegation of conspiracy
between him and private individual can no
longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only
thing extinguished by the death of the
public officer is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did
it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private
individual (People vs. Go, GR NO. 168539,
March 25, 2014, en banc).
Robbery with rape – When a
homicide takes place by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery, all those who took
part shall be guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide whether
they actually participated in the killing,
unless there is proof that there was an
endeavor to prevent the killing. The records
are bereft of any evidence to prove, or even
remotely suggest, that appellant attempted
to prevent the killing. Therefore, the basic
principle in conspiracy that the "act of one
is the act of all," applies in this case (People
vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November 15,
2010, Justice Peralta; People vs. De Leon,
GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009, Justice
Peralta; People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449,
April 03, 2013)
If a robber tries to prevent the
commission of homicide after the
commission of the robbery, he is guilty only
of robbery and not of robbery with
homicide. All those who conspire to commit
robbery with homicide are guilty as
principals of such crime, although not all
profited and gained from the robbery. One
who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the
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criminal designs of his co-conspirators and
can no longer repudiate the conspiracy
once it has materialized (People vs. Ebet,
GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010,
Justice Peralta; People vs. Diu, GR No.
201449, April 03, 2013).
Kidnapping with rape - A, B and C
kidnapped X from her house, and then
detained her in a safe house for purpose of
extorting ransom. While C went to Jolibee
to buy food, A raped X in the presence of B.
What is the crime committed by A, B and
C? Answer: A is liable for special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape. Since X is a female,
taking her away from her house against her
will and holding her as captive constitute
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Raping the kidnapped victim is a qualifying
circumstance. These two crimes should be
integrated together to form a composite
crime where the law prescribes a single
penalty.
B is also liable for special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape. Since conspiracy is
established between A and B in the
commission of kidnapping, the latter is
responsible for the rape committed by
former since there is no showing that B
endeavored to prevent A from raping X
(People vs. Anticamaray, GR No. 178771,
June 08, 2011, Justice Peralta).
C is only liable for kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. Since there is no
evidence that he is aware of the commission
of rape, he could not have prevented A from
raping the victim. Hence, he is not
responsible for the rape (People vs.
Anticamaray, supra, Justice Peralta).
FENCING
The essential elements of the crime
of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the
accused, who is not a principal or on
accomplice in the commission of the crime
of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells
or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; (3) the accused knew or should have
known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
and (4) there is, on the part of one accused,
intent to gain for oneself or for another
(Ong vs. People, GR No. 190475, April 10,
2013).
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
The essential elements of the crime
of fencing under PD No. 1612 are as
follows: (1) A crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; (2) The accused, who is
not a principal or accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft
(or carnapping but not malversation or
estafa), buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in
any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the said crime; (3) The accused
knows or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and (4) There is
on the part of the accused, intent to gain
for himself or for another (Francisco vs.
People, G.R. No. 146584, July 12, 2004).
a. Proving robbery or theft –
Commission of robbery or theft by the
principal as an element of fencing should
be proven beyond reasonable doubt to
convict the fencer. One may not be
convicted of the crime of fencing if the
complainant did not lodge a criminal
complaint against the principal in the
crime of theft. This will create doubt if
theft was really committed (Tan vs. People,
G.R. No. 134298, August 26, 1999) Failure
to show finality of conviction of theft
against the principal is fatal to prosecution
for fencing. In Francisco vs. People, G.R.
No. 146584, July 12, 2004, - The decision
of the trial court convicting the principal of
theft does not constitute proof against the
accused for the crime of fencing, that the
principal had, indeed, stolen the jewelry.
There is no showing that the said decision
was already final and executory when the
trial court rendered its decision in the
fencing case. Accused was acquitted.
b. Knowledge - In Dimat vs. People,
G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012 – But
Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law
and, therefore, its violation is regarded
as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof
of criminal intent. Of course, the
prosecution must still prove that accused
knew or should have known that the
Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to
complainant was derived from theft or
robbery and that he intended to obtain
some gain out of his acts. Accused knew
that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properly documented. He said that
Tolentino showed him its old certificate of
registration and official receipt. But this
certainly could not be true because, the
vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino
had no documents to show. That Tolentino
was unable to make good on his promise to
produce new documents undoubtedly
confirmed to accused that the Nissan Safari
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came from an illicit source. Still, accused
sold the same to complainant who
apparently made no effort to check the
papers covering her purchase. That
complainant might herself be liable for
fencing is of no moment since she did not
stand accused in the case.
Accused was in the business of buy
and sell of tires for the past 24 years, ] ought
to have known the ordinary course of
business in purchasing from an unknown
seller. Admittedly, Go approached accused
and offered to sell the 13 tires (which were
stolen) and he did not even ask for proof of
ownership of the tires. The entire
transaction, from the proposal to buy until
the delivery of tires happened in just one
day. His experience from the business
should have given him doubt as to the
legitimate ownership of the tires
considering that it was his first time to
transact with Go and the manner it was
sold is as if Go was just peddling the 13
tires in the streets. Accused was convicted
of fencing (Ong vs. People, GR No. 190475,
April 10, 2013).
Accused knew the requirement of
the law in selling second hand
tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires
stores, establishments or entities dealing in
the buying and selling of any good, article,
item, object or anything else of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or
supplier thereof to secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station
commander of the Integrated National
Police in the town or city where that store,
establishment or entity is located before
offering the item for sale to the public. In
fact, accused has practiced the procedure
of obtaining clearances from the police
station for some used tires he wanted to
resell but, in this particular transaction, he
was remiss in his duty as a diligent
businessman who should have exercised
prudence (Ong vs. People, GR No. 190475,
April 10, 2013).
The issuance of a sales invoice or
receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction
and may be raised as a defense in the
charge of fencing; however, that defense is
disputable. In this case, the validity of the
issuance of the receipt was disputed, and
the prosecution was able to prove that Gold
Link and its address were
fictitious. Accused failed to overcome the
evidence presented by the prosecution and
to prove the legitimacy of the
transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut
the prima facie presumption under Section
5 of P.D. 1612 (Ong vs. People, GR No.
190475, April 10, 2013).
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
c. Presumption: Section 6 of PD No.
1612 provides: “Mere possession of any
good, article, item, object, or anything of
value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.”Possession is not
limited to actual manual control of the
offender over the stolen property but
extends to power and dominion over it.
Circumstances normally exist to
forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant
buyer that the object of the sale may have
been derived from the proceeds of robbery
or theft. Such circumstances include the
time and place of the sale, both of which
may not be in accord with the usual
practices of commerce. The nature and
condition of the goods sold, and the fact
that the seller is not regularly engaged in
the business of selling goods may likewise
suggest the illegality of their source, and
therefore should caution the buyer. This
justifies the presumption found in Section 5
of P.D. No. 1612 that “mere possession of
any goods, object or anything of value which
has been the subject of robbery or thievery
shall be prima facie evidence of fencing”.
This presumption is reasonable for no other
natural or logical inference can arise from
the established fact of possession of the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft
(Ong vs. People, GR No. 190475, April 10,
2013).
The accessory in theft should
materially benefit from it. Riding in a
stolen vehicle is “not profiting” within the
contemplation of Article 17 of the Revised
Penal Code since it does not improve his
economic position. Profiting is not
synonymous to intent to gain as an
element of theft (Gregorio). However, in
violation of PD No. 1612, use of stolen
property gives rise to the presumption of
fencing. Hence, the user may be held liable
for fencing even though he did not
materially benefit from crime of theft.
The presumption of theft is
disputable. The presumption of fencing
may be overcome by showing proof that
accused bought the item from a licensed
dealer of second-hand items (Hizon-
Pamintuan vs. People, G.R. No. 11414,
July 11, 1994) or by showing official
receipts covering the purchases of
property, which is the subject of fencing
(D. M Consunji, Inc. vs. Esguerra, G.R. No.
118590, July 30, 1996).
d. Recently stolen property – If
suspect is found in possession of recently
stolen property, he should be charged as
principal in the crime of theft or robbery.
Under Section 3 (j), Rule 131, a person
found in possession of a thing taken in the
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
doing of recently wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act. Settled is
the rule that unexplained possession of
recently stolen property is prima facie
evidence of guilt of the crime of theft ( US
vs. Ungal, 37 Phil., 835). If the subject
property is not recently stolen, the
presumption under Section 3 (j), Rule 131
will not arise. However, the possessor is
still presumed to have violated PD No.
1612 even if the property being possessed
was not recently stolen. Under the law,
mere possession of stolen property gives
rise to the presumption of fencing.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Obstruction of justice under PD No.
1829 is committed by any person who
knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by (1)
altering, destroying, suppressing or
concealing any paper, record, document,
or object, with intent to impair its verity,
authenticity, legibility, availability, or
admissibility as evidence in any
investigation of or official proceedings in,
criminal cases, or to be used in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in,
criminal cases; (2) harboring or concealing,
or facilitating the escape of, any person he
knows, or has reasonable ground to
believe or suspect, has committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order
to prevent his arrest prosecution and
conviction;
a. Commission of crime, not an
element - To be held liable as accessory
under the Revised Penal Code, it is
required that the crime was committed by
the principal. To be held liable for
obstruction of justice, it is not necessary
that the crime was committed by a
criminal suspect. Example: “A” committed
suicide. To make it appear that “B”
murdered “A, “C” placed the gun used in
perpetrating suicide inside the bag of “B”.
“C” committed the crime of obstruction of
justice for having obstructed the
investigation of a criminal case involving
the death of “A”. “C” cannot be held liable
as accessory because murder was not
really committed.
b. Knowledge - An accessory
under Revised Penal Code must have
knowledge of the commission of the crime
by the principal. To commit obstruction of
justice, what is important is not knowledge
of the commission of a crime but
awareness of an ongoing or impending
investigation and prosecution of a criminal
case. In fact, even though the suspect did
not commit a crime, obstruction of justice
17 | P a g e
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
is committed if he knowingly obstructs,
impedes, or frustrates the said
investigation and prosecution.
c. Obstructing criminal
investigation or prosecution - Public
officer, who destroyed dangerous drugs as
evidence for monetary consideration, is
liable for obstruction of justice in addition
to graft and corruption and direct bribery
(2005 Bar Exam)
If a respondent in a preliminary
investigation altered the allegation in the
complaint-affidavit as to the date of
criminal incident to make it appear that
the crime, with which he was charged, had
prescribed, the alteration is constitutive of
the crime of falsification of document
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code and obstruction of justice under PD
No. 1829.
d. Principal of the crime - “A” and
“B” killed “X”. After the slaughter, “A” and
“B” burned the dead body of “X” in the
forest to prevent its discovery. Can “A” and
“B” be charged as accessory of the crime to
murder or obstruction of justice? “A” and
“B” are principals by direct participation in
the crime of murder qualified by
employment of means to afford impunity.
Hence, they cannot be charged as
accessories. Under the Revised Penal
Code, accessories must not have
participated in the commission of the
crime as principals. However, in addition
to murder, they can be charged with the
crime of obstruction of justice for
destroying an object to impair its
availability as evidence in a case. Under
PD No. 1829, it is not required that the
offenders must not have participated as
principals.
e. Suspicion - An accessory under
Article 19 (3) of the Revised Penal Code
must have knowledge of the commission of
the crime by the principal. Entertaining
suspicion is not itself proof of knowledge
that a crime has been committed.
“Knowledge” and “suspicion” are not
synonymous. The word suspicion is
defined as being the imagination of the
existence of something without proof, or
upon very slight evidence or upon no
evidence at all (Reyes). On the other hand,
the offender may violate Section 1 (c) of PD
No. 1829 even though he has no
knowledge of the commission of the crime
as long as he has reasonable ground to
believe or suspects that the person he
assisted has committed a crime. In some,
mere suspicion is enough to establish the
second element of the offense.
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d. Preventing an illegal arrest –
Harboring or concealing a criminal suspect
in order to prevent a lawful warrantless
arrest or the implementation of a warrant
of arrest constitutes obstruction of justice.
However, harboring or concealing a
criminal suspect to prevent an illegal
arrest is not a crime. The term “arrest” in
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829 contemplates
a lawful arrest (Posadas vs. the Hon.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131492, September
29, 2000)
e. Accessory – To make a person
liable as accessory under the Revised
Penal Code, it is required that he is a
public officer, who acted with abuse of his
public functions, or that the person
assisted is guilty as principal in treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take
the life of the Chief Executive or a
principal, who is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime. This
requirement is not applicable if the
accused is charged with obstruction of
justice.
f. No exempting circumstance -
Accessories are exempt from criminal
liability if the principal merely committed a
light felony (Article 16 of the Revised Penal
Code). Accessories of the second or third
kind are exempt also from criminal
responsibility if they are related to the
criminal actor (Article 20 of the Code).
However, if the accessories of the crime
were charged with the crime of obstruction
of justice, they cannot claim criminal
exemption under the Revised Penal Code.
PD No. 1829 has no provision on criminal
exemption.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Generic aggravating circumstances
has the effect of increasing the penalty for
the crime to its maximum period, but it
cannot increase the same to the next higher
degree. It must always be alleged and
charged in the information, and must be
proven during the trial in order to be
appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by
an ordinary mitigating circumstance (People
vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26,
2009, Justice Peralta).
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court has expressly required that
qualifying and aggravating circumstances
be specifically alleged in the information.
Due to such requirement being pro reo, the
Court has authorized its retroactive
application in favor of even those charged
with felonies committed prior to December
1, 2000, which is the date of the effectivity
of the 2000 revision of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure that embodied the requirement
18 | P a g e
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
(People vs. Dadulla, G. R. No. 172321,
February 9, 2011).
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF
POSITION - The mere use of service firearm
is not enough to constitute taking
advantage of public position. Fact that
accused made use of firearms which they
were authorized to carry or possess by
reason of their positions, could not supply
the required connection between the office
and the crime.The crime in question, for
example, could have been committed by the
defendants in the same or like manner and
with the same case if they had been private
individuals and fired with unlicensed
weapons (People vs. Mandolado, G.R. No. L-
51304, June 28, 1983; People vs. Joyno,
G.R. No. 123982, March 15, 1999, En
Banc; People vs. Villa, Jr., G.R. No. 129899,
April 27, 2000; People vs. Villamor, G.R.
Nos. 140407-08 and 141908-09, January
15, 2002, En Banc; and People vs.
Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March 4, 2004,
En Banc).
IGNONIMY - After killing the victim,
the accused severed his sexual organ.
Should ignominy be appreciated? No. For
ignominy to be appreciated, it is required
that the offense be committed in a manner
that tends to make its effect more
humiliating, thus adding to the victim’s
moral suffering. Where the victim was
already dead when his body or a part
thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot
be taken against the accused (People vs.
Cachola, G.R. Nos. 148712-15, January 21,
2004, )`
TREACHERY – To appreciate
treachery, two (2) conditions must be
present, namely, (a) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate, and (b) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted. Treachery is not present because
accused chased victim before the latter was
hacked; hence, it cannot be concluded that
accused employed means of execution
which gives victim no opportunity to
retaliate or escape. Moreover, the location
of the hack wound on the left side of the
face of the victim will also show that a
frontal attack was made (People vs. Duavis,
GR No. 190861, December 07, 2011,
Justice Peralta).
The fatal stabbing of Rosalino by
Ramon was immediately preceded by two
altercations between Ramon and Virgilio,
on one hand, and Rosalino, on the other.
The first altercation occurred right after the
near-collision of the tricycles, while the
other happened shortly after Ramon and
Virgilio had blocked Rosalino’s
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tricycle. During the second altercation,
Rosalino stood face to face with Ramon and
Virgilio. It was then when Ramon stabbed
the victim twice, the sequential method of
attack being borne out in the necropsy
report showing that Rosalino had sustained
two fatal stab wounds in the chest and
abdomen. Under the circumstances,
Rosalino was rendered completely aware of
the imminent danger to himself from
Ramon and Virgilio, rendering their assault
far from sudden and unexpected as to put
Rosalino off his guard against any deadly
assault. To stress, treachery cannot be
appreciated if the victim was forewarned of
an impending danger and could have
foreseen the aggression of the accused
(People vs. Placer, GR No. 181753, October
09, 2013).
Treachery is not a qualifying
circumstance but a generic aggravating
circumstance to robbery with homicide
although said crime is classified as a crime
against property and a single and indivisible
crime (People vs. Baron, G.R. No.
188601, June 29, 2010).
As the killing, in this case, is
perpetrated with both treachery and by
means of explosives, the latter shall be
considered as a qualifying
circumstance since it is the principal mode
of attack. Reason dictates that this
attendant circumstance should qualify the
offense while treachery will be considered
merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance (People vs. Barde G.R. No.
183094, September 22, 2010).
EMPLOMENT OF MEANS TO
WEAKEN DEFENSE - If the employment of
means to weaken the defense of the victim
renders the victim defenseless, treachery
absorbs circumstance of employing means
to weaken defense (People vs. Tunhawan,
G.R. NO. L-81470, October 27, 1988).
DISGUISE - If the accused covers
his face with a handkerchief when he
treacherously killed the victim, the crime
committed is murder qualified by treachery
and aggravated by disguise (People vs.
Piring, G.R. No. 45053, October 19, 1936).
If the accused covers his face with a
handkerchief when he killed the victim, the
crime committed is murder qualified by
employment of means of affords impunity.
If the accused treacherously stabbed
the victim, and the crime committed is
murder qualified by treachery and
aggravated by disguise. If the accused
covers his face with a handkerchief when
he killed the victim, the crime committed is
murder qualified by employment of means
of affords impunity.
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
NIGHTTIME - Thus, treachery
absorbs nighttime where had it not been at
night the offender, with his cohorts, would
not have been able to approach the
deceased without the latter's becoming
aware of his presence and guessing his
intention; If they were able to catch victim
completely unawares, it was due to the
darkness of the night which covered them
(People vs. Gumarang , GR N. 46413,
October 6, 1939).
As a general rule, nighttime is
aggravating because the darkness of the
night facilitated the commission of the
crime or insured impunity. Thus, nighttime
cannot aggravate the crime if it is
committed in a lighted place although at
the wee hours of the night (People vs.
Clariño, G.R. NO. 134634, July 31, 2001).
The darkness of the night and “not
nighttime per se” is important in
appreciating it as modifying circumstance
(People vs. Banhaon, G.R. No. 131117,
June 15, 2004). But if the offender
purposely selected the wee hour of the
night when neighbors and occupants of the
house including the victim were sleeping to
facilitate the commission of the crime or to
afford impunity, nighttime is appreciable
even if the place of commission is lighted.
(People vs. Demate, G.R. No. 132310,
January 20, 2004, En Banc).While accused
were already outside the victims’ house at
around 11:00 p.m., they purposely waited
until 2:00 a.m. before breaking into the
residence so as not to call the attention of
the victims, household members and/or
their neighbors. Taking advantage of the
fact that the victim and household
members were asleep, accused entered the
well-lighted bedroom and killed the victim.
Nighttime should be appreciated since
accused took advantage of the silence of the
night (People vs. Ventura and Ventura, G.R.
No. 148145-46, July 5, 2004, Per Curiam).
ABUSE OF SUEPRIOR STRENGHT
- The fact that there were two persons
who attacked the victim does not per se
establish that the crime was committed with
abuse of superior strength, there being no proof
of the relative strength of the aggressors and
the victim. The evidence must establish that
the assailants purposely sought the advantage,
or that they had the deliberate intent to use
this advantage (People vs. Beduya, G.R. No.
175315, August 9, 2010). Abuse of superior
strength is an aggravating circumstance if
the accused purposely uses excessive force
out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked, or if there
is notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and aggressor, and the latter takes
advantage of superior strength (People vs.
Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18,
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2012).The victim need not be completely
defenseless in order for the said aggravating
circumstance to be appreciated (People vs.
Paling, G.R. No. 185390 March 16, 2011)If
the victim is completely defenseless,
treachery should be appreciated. When the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength
concurs with treachery, the former is
absorbed in the latter (People vs. Rebucan,
G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011).
As regards the abuse of superior
strength as aggravating circumstance, what
should be considered is not that there were
three, four or more assailants as against
one victim, but whether the aggressors took
advantage of their combined strength in
order to consummate the offense. To take
advantage of superior strength is to use
excessive force out of proportion to the
means available to the person attacked to
defend himself, and in order to be
appreciated it must be clearly shown that
there was deliberate intent on the part of
the malefactors to take advantage thereof
(People vs. Del Prado, GR No. 187074,
October 13, 2009, Justice Peralta).
Del Prado, together with his co-
accused, abused their superior strength in
killing victim. Victim was unarmed and
defenseless at the time Del Prado and his
co-accused bludgeoned his head and body
with a baseball bat, hit him with a stone,
and stabbed him twice. The number of
assailants and the nature of the weapons
used against victim show a notorious
inequality of force between victim and his
aggressors. The actuations of Del Prado and
his co-accused in inflicting injury
successively furthermore show that they
purposely used excessive force to ensure
the killing of victim (People vs. Del Prado,
GR No. 187074, October 13, 2009, Justice
Peralta).
The victim, who was 16 year old,
unarmed and pregnant, was stabbed by the
appellant with a sharp bladed and pointed
instrument while she was lying on her
back. The Court has consistently held that
an attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless
woman constitutes the circumstance of
abuse of that superiority which his sex and
the weapon used in the act afforded him,
and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself. The crime committed is
complex crime of murder with
unintentional abortion (People vs. Salcedo,
GR No. 178272, March 14, 2011, Justice
Peralta).
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION - In
order “for evident premeditation to be
appreciated, the following [requisites must
concur]: (1) the time when accused
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
[decided] to commit the crime; (2) an overt
act manifestly indicating that [he] has clung
to his determination; and, (3) sufficient
lapse of time between [such a determination
and the actual] execution to allow the
accused time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act (People vs. SPO1
Alawig, GR No. 187731, September 18,
2013). The essence of evident premeditation
is that the execution of the criminal act
must be preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment
(People vs. Alinao, GR No. 191256,
September 18, 2013).
Accused, in razing victim’s house in
order to drive him out and shooting him the
moment he appears at his front door,
clearly had a previously and carefully
crafted plan to kill his victim. The time it
took accused and his son to device their
plan, plot where the gasoline should be
poured, and procure the gasoline and the
firearms, as well as the time it took to go to
victim’s house, and even the time when
they waited for victim to come out of the
house, all afforded accused sufficient
opportunity to reflect upon the
consequences of his act to kill his brother-
in-law and his determination to commit the
cold-blooded deed from the time of its
conception until it was carried out (People
vs. Alinao, GR No. 191256, September 18,
2013).
Evidence shows that Luague had a
grudge against Porferia, and that their last
confrontation occurred a day before the
shooting. The involvement of appellants
Dearo and Toledo was shown by the
testimony of Jose Santiago that the two
were with Luague three days before the
shooting. Appellant Dearo then vowed to
kill Emeterio. These uncontroverted pieces
of evidence clearly showed the instances
when appellants resolved to commit the
felony. The space of time from the
resolution to the actual execution allowed
them to contemplate on the matter, or
maybe even reconsider. Evident
premeditation attended the killing of the
victim (People vs. Dearo, et.al., GR No.
190862, October 09, 2013).
The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution
to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.[ For it to be appreciated, the
following must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the
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accused clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.
The altercation between accused and victim
took place at around 3:00 p.m. and the
hacking incident took place at around 5:30
p.m. of the same day. The lapse of time
between the decision and the execution is
not sufficient to allow appellant to fully
reflect upon the consequences of his act
and to effectively and efficiently prepare
and plan his actions prior to the
commission of the crime (People vs. Duavis,
GR No. 190861, December 07, 2011,
Justice Peralta).
DISREGARD OF SEX: Robbery with
homicide is essentially a felony against
property. The aggravating circumstance of
disregard of the victim’s age is applied only
to crimes against persons and honor.
Moreover, the bare fact that the victim is a
woman does not per se constitute disregard
of sex. For this circumstance to be properly
considered, the prosecution must adduce
evidence that in the commission of the
crime, the accused had particularly
intended to insult or commit disrespect to
the sex of the victim. In this case, the
appellant killed the victim because the
latter started to shout. There was no intent
to insult nor commit disrespect to the
victim on account of the latter’s sex (People
vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 153119, April 13, 2004.
The circumstances of disregard of
sex, age or rank should be taken singly or
together. But the circumstance of dwelling
should be considered independently from
the circumstance of disregard of age, sex
and rank since these circumstances
signify different concepts. In the latter, the
disrespect shown by offender pertains to
the person of the offended due to her rank,
age and sex. In the former, the disrespect
pertains to the dwelling of the offended
party due to the sanctity of privacy which
the law accords it. In People vs. Puno, G.R.
No. L-33211, June 29, 1981, En Banc -
Disregard of rank and dwelling were
appreciated independently.
In robbery with violence and
intimidation against persons, dwelling is
aggravating because in this class of
robbery, the crime may be committed
without the necessity of trespassing the
sanctity of the offended party's
house(People vs. Evangelio, G.R. No.
181902, August 31, 2011).
AID OF ARMED MEN: Aid of armed
men or persons affording immunity
requires (1) that the armed men are
accomplices who take part in minor
capacity, directly or indirectly (People vs.
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
Lozano, G.R. Nos. 137370-71, September
29, 2003, En Banc) and (2) that the
accused availed himself of their aid or relied
upon them when the crime was committed.
Thus, this circumstance should not be
appreciated were armed men acted in
concert to ensure the commission of the
crime (People vs. Carino, G.R. No. 131117,
June 15, 2004).
In “aid of armed men,” the men act
as accomplices only. They must not be
acting in the commission of the crime
under the same purpose as the principal
accused, otherwise they are to be regarded
as co-principals or co-conspirators (People
vs. Enoja, GR No. 204894, March 10,
2014).
CRUELTY: The crime is not
aggravated by cruelty simply because the
victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of
which were fatal. For cruelty to be
considered as an aggravating circumstance
there must be proof that, in inflicting
several stab wounds on the victim, the
perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain
and suffering of the victim. The number of
wounds inflicted on the victim is not proof
of cruelty (Simangan vs. People, G.R. No.
157984. July 8, 2004, ).
The crime was qualified by
treachery. The victim, who was barely
thirteen years old, was helpless and unable
to defend himself. His feet and hands were
tied while the appellant mauled and kicked
him, and hit him with a piece of wood. The
appellant was so depraved that he even
electrocuted the victim by placing a live
wire on the latter’s palms and burying him
alive. This is borne by the autopsy report
of Dr. Suzette Yalung, which indicates that
the victim died because of cardiac arrest
due to asphyxiation. By his detestable
acts, the appellant intended to exacerbate
the suffering of the victim. Hence, cruelty
was attendant to the commission of the
crime. However, cruelty is absorbed by
treachery (People vs. Chua, G.R. No.
149538, July 26, 2004, ).
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
MINORITY - In People vs. Agacer,
G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013 –
Accused is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, which
graduates the penalty one degree lower. The
rationale of the law in extending such
leniency and compassion is that because of
his age, the accused is presumed to have
acted with less discernment. This is
regardless of the fact that his minority was
not proved during the trial and that his
birth certificate was belatedly presented for
our consideration, since to rule accordingly
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will not adversely affect the rights of the
state, the victim and his heirs.
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER – Peralta).
Voluntary surrender is a circumstance that
reduces the penalty for the offense. Its
requisites as a mitigating circumstance are
that: (1) the accused has not been actually
arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself
to a person in authority or the latter’s
agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary
(People vs. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084,
January 18, 2012; People vs. Placer, GR
No. 181753, October 09, 2013).
The surrender made after 14 days
from the date of killing cannot be
considered voluntary since his act did not
emanate from a natural impulse to admit
the killing or to save the police officers the
effort and expense that would be incurred
in his search and incarceration. (People vs.
Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, December 14,
2011).
Surrender is not voluntary where
the accused went to Barangay Chairman
after the killings to seek protection against
the retaliation of the victims’ relatives, not
to admit his participation in the killing of
the victims (People vs. Del Castillo, G.R. No.
169084, January 18, 2012).
The appellants are not entitled to
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The evidence shows that the
appellants were arrested when the police
officers manning the checkpoint stopped
the passenger jeepney driven by appellant
Ronald and arrested the appellants. The
fact that the appellants did not resist but
went peacefully with the peace officers does
not mean that they surrendered voluntarily
(People vs. Castillano, G.R. No. 139412,
April 2, 2003).
The essence of voluntary surrender
is spontaneity and the intent of the accused
to give himself up and submit himself to the
authorities either because he acknowledges
his guilt or he wishes to save the
authorities the trouble and expense that
may be incurred for his search and
capture. Without these elements, and
where the clear reasons for the supposed
surrender are the inevitability of arrest and
the need to ensure his safety, the surrender
is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot
be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to
serve as a mitigating circumstance. In the
present case, when the petitioners reported
the incident and allegedly surrendered the
bladed weapon used in the stabbing, such
cannot be considered as voluntary
surrender within the contemplation of the
law. Besides, there was no spontaneity,
because they only surrendered after a
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
warrant of their arrest had already been
issued (Belbis, Jr. vs. People, GR No.
181052, November 14, 2012, Justice
VENDICATION: The mitigating
circumstance of having acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense
was, likewise, properly appreciated. The
appellant was humiliated, mauled and
almost stabbed by the deceased. Although
the unlawful aggression had ceased when
the appellant stabbed Anthony, it was
nonetheless a grave offense for which the
appellant may be given the benefit of a
mitigating circumstance. But the mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation
cannot be considered apart from the
circumstance of vindication of a grave
offense. These two circumstances arose
from one and the same incident, i.e., the
attack on the appellant by Anthony, so that
they should be considered as only one
mitigating circumstance (People vs. Torpio,
G.R. No. 138984, June 4, 2004, ).
In vindication of grave offense,
criminal exemption of accessories,
alternative circumstance of relationship
and defense of stranger, the concept of
relationship is the same. It refers to (1)
spouse, (2) ascendants, (3) descendants, or
(4) legitimate, natural or adopted brothers
or sisters or (5) of his relatives by affinity in
the same degrees. However, in defense of
relative, there is an additional concept of
relationship. It includes relatives by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree.
Thus, an uncle is a relative within the
concept of defense of stranger (Reyes).
However, relationship of uncle and niece is
not an alternative circumstance (People vs.
Ulit, G.R. Nos. 131799-801, February 23,
2004).
PASSION - The following essential
requirements must be present: (1) there
was an act that was both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such condition
(passion or obfuscation) of the mind; and
(2) such act was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the perpetrator
might have recovered his normal
equanimity (People vs. Comillo, G.R. No.
186538, November 25, 2009). Four days
after the victims attempted on the virtue of
his wife, accused killed them. The period of
four days was sufficient enough a time
within which accused could have regained
his composure and self-control. Hence,
passion should not be appreciated (People
vs. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27,
2011).
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCE
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Alternative circumstances are those
which must be taken into consideration as
aggravating or mitigating according to the
nature and effects of the crime and other
conditions attending its commission. Based
on a strict interpretation, alternative
circumstances are thus not aggravating
circumstances per se. (People vs. Orilla,
G.R. Nos. 148939-40, February 13, 2004,
En banc).
If the offender has committed a
felony in a state of intoxication, this
circumstance may be mitigating or
aggravating. If the intoxication is habitual
or intentional, the circumstance is
aggravating (People vs. Patelan, G.R. No.
182918, June 6, 2011). If the intoxication is
not habitual, and not subsequent to a plan
to commit a felony, and that the accused's
drunkenness affected his mental faculties,
the circumstance is mitigating (People vs.
Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 187683, February 11,
2010). For intoxication to be considered as
a mitigating circumstance, it must be
shown that the intoxication impaired the
willpower of the accused that he did not
know what he was doing or could not
comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts
(People vs. Patelan, supra). The absence of
any independent proof that his alcohol
intake affected mental faculties of the
accused militates against a claim of the
mitigating circumstance of intoxication
(People vs. Dela Cruz, supra).
EVIDENT PEMIDITATION
For evident premeditation to be
appreciated, the following must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when
the accused determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the accused clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the circumstances of his act
(People vs. Duavis, G.R. No. 190861,
December 7, 2011).Accused told witness
that they were “going to kill the doctor”.
After less than thirty minutes, the accused
killed the victim, who is a doctor. Evident
premeditation should not be appreciated.
The span of time (less than thirty minutes),
from the time the accused showed their
determination to kill the victim up to the
time they shot the victim, could not have
afforded them full opportunity for
meditation and reflection on the
consequences of the crime they
committed (People vs. Patelan, G.R. No.
182918, June 6, 2011).Unlike evident
premeditation, there is no requirement for
conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient
period of time to elapse to afford full
opportunity for meditation and
reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on
the very moment the plotters agree,
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
expressly or impliedly, to commit the
subject felony (People vs. Carandang, G.R.
No. 175926, July 6, 2011).
REPETITION
Differences of recidivism, quasi-
recidivism, reiteracion and habitual
delinquency:
(a) Nature of crime – In recidivism,
the first crime, and the aggravated second
crime are embraced in the same Title of the
Revised Penal Code; In quasi-recidivism,
the nature of the first crime and aggravated
second crime is not material. In reiteration,
the penalty for the first crime is equal or
greater than that for the aggravated second
crime or the penalty for the first two crimes
is lighter than that for the aggravated third
crime. In habitual delinquency, the first,
second and third crimes must be a
habitual-delinquency crime, and that is,
serious or less serious physical injuries,
theft, robbery, estafa or falsification of
document.
(b) Time element – In recidivism, the
accused was convicted of the first crime by
final judgment at the time of trial of the
second crime. In quasi-recidivism, the
accused has been convicted by final
judgment of the first offense but before
beginning to serve his sentence or while
servicing of his sentence, he committed the
second crime. In reiteration, the accused
was convicted of the first crime (or first two
crimes) and served his sentences at the
time he was convicted of the second crime
(or third crime). In habitual delinquency,
the accused was convicted of first habitual-
delinquency crime; within 10 years after
conviction or release, he was found guilty of
habitual-delinquency crime for the second
time; within 10 years after conviction or
release he was found guilty of habitual-
delinquency crime for the third time or
oftener.
(c) Nature of the aggravating
circumstance - Recidivism and reiteration
are ordinary aggravating circumstances, the
presence of any of which will trigger the
application of the penalty for the second
crime committed in its maximum period
unless it is off-set by mitigating
circumstance. Quasi-recidivism is special
aggravating circumstance, the presence of
which will trigger the application of the
penalty for the second crime or third crime
in its maximum period regardless of the
presence of mitigating circumstance.
Habitual delinquency is an extraordinary or
special aggravating circumstance, the
presence of which will trigger the imposition
of additional penalty for the third or
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subsequent crime. This is not subject to the
off-set rule.
SELF-DEFENSE
SELF-HELP PRINCIPLE - In People
vs. Apolinar, CA, 38 O.G. 2870, it was held:
Defense of property is not of such
importance as right to life, and defense of
property can be invoked as a justifying
circumstance only when it is coupled with
an attack on the person of one entrusted
with said property. However, in People vs.
Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20,
1983, the SC found the presence of
unlawful aggression despite the fact that
the invasion of his property right was not
coupled by an attack against the accused.
The accused has the right to resist
pursuant Article 429 of the Civil Code,
which provides: “The owner or lawful
possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may
use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.” However, since
the means employed to resist the invader
(killing) is not reasonable, the accused is
merely given the benefit of incomplete self-
defense. Justice Florenz Regalado stated
that the rule in Apolinar case may be
deemed to have been superseded by
Narvaez case.
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION – The
essential requisites of self-defense are the
following: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense. Verily, to invoke
self-defense successfully, there must have
been an unlawful and unprovoked attack
that endangered the life of the accused,
who was then forced to inflict severe
wounds upon the assailant by employing
reasonable means to resist the attack
(Belbis, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 181052,
November 14, 2012, Justice Peralta).
The rule consistently adhered to in
this jurisdiction is that when the accused’s
defense is self-defense he thereby admits
being the author of the death of the victim,
that it becomes incumbent upon him to
prove the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court. The rationale for
the shifting of the burden of evidence is
that the accused, by his admission, is to be
held criminally liable unless he
satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-
defense. But the burden to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is not thereby
lifted from the shoulders of the State, which
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
carries it until the end of the proceedings.
In other words, only the onus
probandi shifts to the accused, for self-
defense is an affirmative allegation that
must be established with certainty by
sufficient and satisfactory proof. He must
now discharge the burden by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the
weakness of that of the Prosecution,
considering that the Prosecution’s evidence,
even if weak, cannot be disbelieved in view
of his admission of the killing (People vs.
Roman, GR No. 198110, July 31, 2013).
Unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without it,
there can be no self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, that can validly be
invoked. “There is an unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim when he puts in
actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or
right of the person invoking self-
defense. There must be actual physical
force or actual use of a weapon.” It is
present only when the one attacked faces
real and immediate threat to one’s life. It
must be continuous; otherwise, it does not
constitute aggression warranting self-
defense (People vs. Gamez, GR No. 202847,
October 23, 2013). Accordingly, the
accused must establish the concurrence of
three elements of unlawful aggression,
namely: (a) there must be a physical or
material attack or assault; (b) the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least,
imminent; and (c) the attack or assault
must be unlawful (People vs. Roman, GR
No. 198110, July 31, 2013).
Kinds of aggression - Unlawful
aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or
material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or
material unlawful aggression means an
attack with physical force or with a weapon,
an offensive act that positively determines
the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression
means an attack that is impending or at the
point of happening; it must not consist in a
mere threatening attitude, nor must it be
merely imaginary, but must be offensive
and positively strong (like aiming a revolver
at another with intent to shoot or opening a
knife and making a motion as if to attack).
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be
a mere threatening attitude of the victim,
such as pressing his right hand to his hip
where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or
like aiming to throw a pot (People v. Del
Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18,
2012; People vs. Roman, GR No. 198110,
July 31, 2013).