on its own initiative and at any stage of the action, by
Bautista v. Silva
FACTS:
 Sps Berlina Silva and Pedro Silva are the registered
owner of a 216 square meter lot located in Barrio of
Parada, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
 On March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as
attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina F. Silva, thru a
Special Power of Attorney signed and executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in
favor of spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista
 Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of the Registry
of Deeds for the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the
names of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista
on March 4, 1988.
 RTC- signature appearing on the SPA is a forgery
and consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Pedro in favor of Sps Bautista is not
authorized by Berlina. Deed of Absolute is null and
void
 CA- affirmed
 Spouses Bautista filed Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 on the following grounds:
1. Respondent as represented by Hermes Dorado
in his capacity as attorney-in-fact has no legal
authority to file action against petitioners.
2. The petitioners are considered as purchasers in
good faith and for value having relied upon a
Special Power of Attorney which appears legal,
valid and genuine on its face.
3. Gratia argumenti that the special power of
attorney is a forgery and the deed of sale
executed by the husband is null and void, the
nullity does not include the one half share of the
husband.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action
2. WON Sps Bautista are purchasers in good faith
3. WON petitioners may retain the portion of Pedro Silva
HELD:
1. NO. Written authorization of Dorado was not needed
because the Complaint was actually filed by respondent,
and not merely through Dorado as her attorney-in-fact.
Respondent herself signed the verification attached to the
Complaint. She stated therein that she is the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 3091-V-89 and that she caused the
preparation of the Complaint. Respondent also personally
testified on the facts alleged in her Complaint. Respondent
acted for and by herself, and not through any
representative, when she filed the Complaint. The
sufficiency of the Complaint was not affected by the
inclusion of Dorado as party representative for this was an
obvious error which, under Section 11 of Rule 3, is not a
ground for dismissal, as it may be corrected by the court,
dropping such party from the complaint.
2. NO. To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled
land need only show that he relied on the face of the title
to the property. Such degree of proof of good faith,
however, is sufficient only when the following conditions
concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the
land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third,
at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any
claim or interest of some other person in the property, or
of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his
capacity to convey title to the property.
Absent one or two of the conditions, then the law itself puts the
buyer on notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher
degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of title and
examining all factual circumstances in order to determine the
seller's title and capacity to transfer any interest in the property.
In the present case, petitioners were dealing with a seller who
had title to and possession of the land but, as indicated on the
face of his title, whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that
the marital consent of respondent is required before he could
convey the property. To prove good faith then, petitioners must
show that they inquired not only into the title of Pedro but also
into his capacity to sell.
According to petitioners, they conducted the following forms of
inquiry: first, they inspected the photocopy of the SPA
presented to them by Pedro; second, they brought said copy to
Atty. Lorenzo Lucero (notary public) and asked whether it was
genuine; and third, they inspected the original copy of the SPA
after they advanced payment of Php55,000 to Pedro.
Petitioners relied on the SPA, specifically on its notarial
acknowledgment which states that respondent appeared
before the notary public and acknowledged having executed
the SPA in favor of Pedro
A person dealing with a seller who has possession and title to
the property but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as
a buyer in good faith if he proves that he inquired into the title
of the seller as well as into the latter's capacity to sell; and that
in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found
in the seller's duly notarized SPA. He need not prove anything
more for it is already the function of the notarial
acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to
the document, its due execution and authenticity.
In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in
Germany at the time they were buying the property and the
SPA relied upon by petitioners has a defective notarial
acknowledgment. The SPA was a mere photocopy and we are
not convinced that there ever was an original copy of said SPA
as it was only this photocopy that was testified to by petitioner
Nida Bautista and offered into evidence by her counsel. We
emphasize this fact because it was actually this photocopy that
was relied upon by petitioners before they entered into the
deed of sale with Pedro. As admitted to by Nida Bautista, upon
inspection of the photocopy of the SPA, they gave Pedro an
advanced payment of Php55,000; this signifies that, without
further investigation on the SPA, petitioners had agreed to buy
the subject property from Pedro.
But then said photocopy of the SPA contains no notarial seal.
A notarial seal is a mark, image or impression on a document
which would indicate that the notary public has officially signed
it. There being no notarial seal, the signature of the notary
public on the notarial certificate was therefore incomplete. The
notarial certificate being deficient, it was as if the notarial
acknowledgment was unsigned. The photocopy of the SPA
has no notarial acknowledgment to speak of. It was a mere
private document which petitioners cannot foist as a banner of
good faith.
3. NO.  Nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted
by the husband without the marital consent of the wife
affects the entire property, not just the share of the
wife.
Guerrero v. Bihis
JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM vs ATTY. NESTOR
Q. QUINTANA
AC No. 7036 | June 29, 2009 | PUNO, CJ.
FACTS:
 Executive Judge Laquindanum of the RTC of Midsayap,
Cotabato wrote a letter to the SC requesting that proper
disciplinary action be imposed on Atty. Quintana for
performing notarial functions in Midsayap which is beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that
issued his notarial commission (Cotabato City and the
Province of Maguindanao) and for allowing his wife to do
notarial acts in his absence.
 Prior to that, she also wrote a letter to Atty. Quintana
directing him to stop notarizing documents withinMidsayap.
 Per Judge Laquindanum, Atty. Quintana could not extend
his notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and
Maguindanao.Midsayap is not part of either of the two and
is part of Cotabato province. The City within Cotabato
province is Kidapawan City.
 However, respondent continuously performed notarial
functions in Midsayap as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of
Loss of ATM Card and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Driver’s
License.
 In response, Atty. Quintana alleged that:
1. He filed a petition for notarial commission before the
RTC of Midsayap. However, the same was not acted
upon by Judge Laquindanum for 3 weeks. This is
becausethe latter questioned his affiliation with the
IBPCotabato City Chapter and required him to be a
member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a
Certification of Payments from the latter chapter.
Because of this, he opted to withdraw his petition. (Per
Judge Laquindanum, she did not act on the petition
because he had not paid his IBP dues which is a
requirement before a notarial commission may be
granted.)
2. Judge Laquindanum wanted to humiliate him and be
ostracized by fellow lawyers.He was singled out by her
asnotarial commissions were immediately issued to
others. However, when it came to him, Judge
Laquindanum even tracked down all his pleadings,
communicated with his clients and disseminated
information through letters.
3. He admitted that he subscribed documents in his office
at Midsayap. However, he contended that he did not
violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice because he
was equipped with a notarial commission. He he did not
act outside Cotabato province since Midsayap is part of
the former.
4. As a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice
his legal profession in the entire Philippines.
5. Judge Laquindanum had no authority because only
Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of Cotabato City who
issued his notarial commission and the Supreme Court
could prohibit him from notarizing in Cotabato province.
6. He denied the he authorized his wife to notarize
documents. He even slapped his wife and told her to
stop doing it as it would ruin his profession.
 During the hearing, the ff. were presented to prove further
violation of the rules:
1. Deed of Donation (notarized in 2004) where Rosil
appears as one of the signatories. However, she died
2003.
2. Various documents notarizedfrom 2006 to 2007 (his
commission in Maguindanao and Cotabato City expired
on 2005, and he had not renewed the same)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice (YES)
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper (NO)
HELD:
A. The SC adopted the findings of the OBC. It was found out
that respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap
and Kabacan, Cotabato, which is already outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
 Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides:
Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary
public may perform notarial acts in any place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a
period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January
of the year in which the commissioning court is made,
unless earlier revoked [or] the notary public has resigned
under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
 In the case at bar, respondent may perform his notarial acts
only within Cotabato City and Maguindanao. It must be
noted that Midsayapand Kabacan are not part of either
Cotabato City or Maguindanao but part of North Cotabato.
 This act of the respondent can also be considered as
malpractice and falsification.
B. As for the act of his wife notarizing documents, the SC held
that a notary public is personally accountable for all entries
in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of such
responsibility by passing the buck to other people. He is
answerable for the acts of his personnel like his wife who
acts as his secretary in this case.
 Such act violates Canon 9 of the CPR which requires
lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
C. As to the abovementioned Deed of Donation, the
respondent violated Sec. 2(b) Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice which provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is
not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules.
 In the case at bar, it is clear that respondent did not
determine the presence or qualifications of affiants. As
such, he committed acts of gross negligence and ignorance
of the provisions.
 This act of the respondent also violates Rule 1.01 of the
CPR.
D. That he performed notarial acts with an expired
commission was also proven.
 This act of the respondent violates the lawyer’s oath to
obey the laws.
E. The respondent’s claim that he has the right to perform
notarial acts in the entire Philippines since he is a lawyer in
good standing has no merit.
 While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to
engage in the practice of law in the Philippines, not every
lawyer in good standing can perform notarial functions.
 The lawyer must have been commissioned as notary public
and submitted himself to the commissioning court by filing
his petition for issuance of his Notarial Practice. The
commissioning court may or may not grant the said petition
based in its sound discretion.
 In the case at bar, since respondent did not submit himself
to the procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial
commission, he has no reason to claim that he can perform
notarial acts in the entire country.
 It must be noted further that Judge Laquindanum, being the
commissioning court in Midsayap, has the authority to
monitor the duties and responsibilities of a notary public
commissioned or those performing notarial acts without
authority in her territorial jurisdiction.
F. Considering the gravity and number of his offenses,
suspension from the practice of law for 6 months and
revocation and suspension of notarial commission for 2
years is more proper.
 That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the
sole source of income for his family will not serve to lessen
the penalty.
 Notarial commission should not be treated as a money-
making venture. It is a privilege granted only to those who
are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest.
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015
 This case stemmed from 3 letter-complaints for
Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice endorsed to
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate
action.
 The first letter-complaint, was filed by the
commissioned notaries public within and for the
jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, against Atty.
Juan C. Siapnofor notarizing documents without a
commission.
In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno
was maintaining a notarial office along Alvear Street
East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing
notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and
Dagupan City without the requisite notarial
commission.
They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never
commissioned as Notary Public for and within the
jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City.
Instead, he applied and was commissioned to perform
notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison
of the RTC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan from March
22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial
commission, however, was never renewed upon
expiration.
Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had
delegated his notarial authority to his secretaries,
Mina Bautista and Mary Ann Arenas, who wrote legal
instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.
 The second letter-complaintwas filed by Audy B.
Espelitaagainst Atty. Pedro L. Santos
It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his driver’s license
and he executed an affidavit of loss which was
notarized by Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however,
was denied for authentication when presented before
the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos
was not commissioned to perform notarial
commission within the City of Manila.
 The third letter-complaint came from a concerned
citizen reporting that a certain Atty. Evelyn who was
holding office at Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila, had been notarizing and signing documents
for and on behalf of several lawyers.
COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. SIAPNO
Atty. Siapno denied the accusations and averred that the law
office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista
and Arenas were not his secretaries.
But after the investigation conducted by the RTC Judge of
Lingayen, it was found out that Atty. Siapno was issued a
notarial commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and
February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His commission,
however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not
issued another commission thereafter.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. SIAPNO IS LIABLE.
RULING: YES.
A review of the records and evidence presented by
complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law
office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of
one of the complainants. It was also proven that Atty. Siapno
notarized several instruments with an expired notarial
commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice provides that:
Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary
public may perform notarial acts in any place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of
two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year
in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or
the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the
Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary
public may perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty.
Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan
since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform
such act.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission
from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey
the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also
Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all
times.13
Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have
performed notarial work in Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan
City in the province of Pangasinan without the requisite
commission, the Court finds the Atty. Siapno must be barred
from being commissioned as notary public permanently and
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years.
COMPLAINTS AGAINST ATTY. SANTOS AND ATTY.
EVELYN
To date, no formal investigation has been conducted on the
alleged violation of Atty. Santos and the reported illegal
activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn since the RTC Judge tasked
to do the investigation manifested that he can no longer do so
because he is no longer the RTC Judge of Manila
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a
certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-
DOCKET the same as separate administrative cases.
The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether
permanent or in acting capacity, is ordered to conduct a formal
investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and
Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of copy of
this decision.
Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, et al. v. Atty. Edwin Pascua
A.C. No. 5095. November 28, 2007. En Banc (Sandoval-
Gutierrez, J.)
Facts:
In 1993, Father Ranhilio Aquino (Academic Head of the
Philippine Judicial Academy) together with the other
complainants filed a letter-complaint against Atty. Edwin
Pascua (a Notary Public in Cagayan) which alleged that Atty.
Pascua falsified 2 documents as follows:
1. He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-
Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as
"Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998,
dated December 10, 1998".
2. He also made it appear that he had notarized the
"Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo entering
the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of
1998, dated December 10, 1998.
Furthermore, Fr. Aquino alleged that according to the Notarial
Register of Atty. Pascua, the last entry thereinwas Document
No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore,
he couldnot have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214
on December 10, 1998.
To this, Atty. Pascua wrote his Comment on the letter-
complaint stating that he did notarize the two documents, but
both were not recorded in his Notarial Register due to the
oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn ElsieC. Patli, whose
affidavit was attached.
The Supreme Court granted the letter-complaint and the same
was referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
forinvestigation, report and recommendation.
In 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that the
alleged notarized documents were not duly recorded in the
Notarial Registry of Atty. Pascua. Further, Atty. Pascua is to be
made liable for such act or omission, either it was intentional or
due to inadvertence.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct in the
performance of his duties as a Notary Public.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Pascua is guilty of
misconduct in the performance of his duties as a Notary Public
for failing to register in hisNotarial Register the affidavit-
complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B.
Domingo.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry
which henotarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No.
1200 on Page 240. On the otherhand, the two affidavit-
complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998
areDocument Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page
No. 243, Book III. Thus,Fr. Aquino and the other complainants
are, therefore, correct in maintaining thatAtty. Pascua falsely
assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit
complaints,a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary
Public, but also asa member of the Bar.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of
Acorda (Doc.No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingo's
a􀁆davit (Doc. No. 1214) waswithdrawn in the administrative
case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, etal. with the
CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the submission of
hereincomplainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another
affidavit-complaint making itappear as notarized on December
10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. Itmay not be
sheer coincidence then that both documents are dated
December 10,1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of
misconduct and isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for 3
months with a STERN WARNING thata repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His
notarialcommission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, 
vs. ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO
FACTS:
 Spouses Benjamin Santuyo and EdithaSantuyo
accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious
misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyer’s
oath and the notarial law.
 Sometime in December 1991, they purchased a
parcel of land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of
sale was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer
and was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No.
94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991.
Complainant spouses averred that about six years
after the date of notarization, they had a dispute with
one Danilo German over the ownership of the land.
The case was estafathrough falsification of a public
document.
 During the trial of the case, German presented in
court an affidavit executed by respondent denying the
authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The
spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on
said deed.
 Spouses Benjamin Santuyo and EdithaSantuyo
accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious
misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyer’s
oath and the notarial law.
 Respondent denied the allegations against him. He
denied having notarized any deed of sale covering the
disputed property. According to respondent, he once
worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and
Jacob Law Office where he was asked to apply for a
notarial commission. While he admitted that he
notarized several documents in that office, these,
however, did not include the subject deed of sale.
 He also claimed that, in some occasions, the
secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix
the dry seal of the junior associates on documents
relating to cases handled by the law firm. Respondent
added that he normally required the parties to exhibit
their community tax certificates and made them
personally acknowledge the documents before him as
notary public
 To refute the accusation against him he said that at
the time the Deed of Sale was supposedly notarized
he was on vacation.
 IBP: It noted that the alleged forged signature of
respondent on the deed of sale was different from his
signatures in other documents he submitted during
the investigation of the present case.However, it ruled
that respondent was also negligent because he
allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial
functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry
seal and notarial registerrecommended that
respondent’s commission as notary public be revoked
for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or he
should not be granted a commission as notary public
for two (2) years upon receipt hereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Hidalgo is guilty of
negligence in the performance of his duty as a Notary
Public.
RULING:
YES. Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary
public is sensitive respondent should have been more discreet
and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should
not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries;
otherwise he should not have been commissioned as notary
public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other
mechanics of the document for notarization to the secretary
there can be a possibility that even the respondent’s signature
which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the
secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case
herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the
supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed the office
secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial
registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him
alone; and should not have relied on somebody else
Agadan v. Kilaan
CARLITO ANG v ATTY JAMES GUPANA
February 5, 2014
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Carlito Ang filed a case against Atty Gupana, alleging that on
May 31, 1991, he and the other heirs of Candelaria Magpayo
executed an Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and
Partition involving a lot. He was given his share of 2,003 sqm
but when tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found out that
the original TCT had already been cancelled and a new one
was issued in the names of other people.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent had a direct participation in the commission of
forgeries and falsifications because he was the one who
prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss and Deed of
Absolute Sale that led to the transfer and issuance of the new
TCTs.
• The DOAS which was allegedly executed by Magpayo was
antedated and the latter’s signature was forged as shown by
the Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Cebu.
• The certified true copy of page 37, Book No. XII, Series of
1989 of respondent’s Notarial Report showed that Doc No
181 did not refer to the DOAS but to an affidavit.
• As to the affidavit of loss, it could not have executed by
Magpayo as she died 3 years prior to the execution of such.
• Respondent made himself the attorney–in–fact of the other
heirs, and pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney in his
favor, executed a Deed of Sale selling the property to Lim
Kim So Mercantile Co.
Respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang was
using the administrative complaint as a tool to force the
defendants in a pending civil case to accede to their wishes.
He further said that Ang had filed a civil case to annul the deed
of sale and prayed for reconveyance of the subject parcel of
land.
• In such civil case, Ang declared that he was not an heir of
Magpayo but is the son of the latter’s common-law husband.
• Because of his admission, the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the four certificates of title were cancelled. In
Ang’s motion for reconsideration, a compromise was
reached that only one TCT ill be annotated with a notice of lis
pendens.
• These developments meant that Ang would lose his case so
Ang resorted to the filing of the present administrative
complaint.
IBP Proceedings
The IBP found the respondent administratively liable. He
delegated the notarial functions to the clerical staff of their
office before being brought to him for his signature. This must
have been the reason for the forged signatures of the parties in
the questioned documentas well as the erroneous entry in his
notarial register. The Investigating Commissioner merely
reminded respondent to be more cautious in the performance
of his duties as regards his infraction of his notarial duties.
The Respondent committed an unethical act when he allowed
himself to be an instrument in the disposal of the subject
property through a deed of sale executed between him as
attorney–in–factdespite his knowledge that said property is the
subject of a pending litigation.
ISSUE: Whether Atty Gupana should be held administratively
liable
HELD:
The Court finds that respondent did not act unethically when
he sold the property in dispute as the sellers’ attorney–in–fact
because there was no more notice of lis pendens annotated on
the particular lot sold.
The Court found respondent administratively liable for
violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require
the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he
notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly
executed on April 29, 1994.
The Notarial Law that the party acknowledging must appear
before the notary public or any other person authorized to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents.
In the case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that
Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before respondent on
April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was
already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the
jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. Indeed,
respondent averred in his position paper before the IBP that he
did not in fact know Candelaria personally before, during and
after the notarization thus admitting that Candelaria was not
present when he notarized the documents.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of
this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and
to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act and deed.
It devolves upon respondent to act with due care and diligence
in stamping fiat on the questioned documents. Respondent’s
failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading
the function of notarization. Hence, he should be liable for his
infraction, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is
placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey
the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him
not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession.
Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer
shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.” In merely relying on his clerical staff
to determine the completeness of documents brought to him
for notarization, limiting his participation in the notarization
process to simply inquiring about the identities of the persons
appearing before him, and in notarizing an affidavit executed
by a dead person, respondent is liable for misconduct.
The revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are
in order.
ANGELES, Jr. v. BAGAY
FACTS:
 Atty. Angeles, Jr., the Provincial Legal Officer of
Bataan, submiited a letter to Hon. Remigio M.
Escalada, Jr., Executive Judge ofRTC-Bataan against
Atty. Renato C. Bagay for his alleged notarization of
18 documents at the time he was out of the country
from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. 14 Deeds of
Absolute Sale, 3 Deeds of Donation and one Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate.
 It was stated that at the time the documents were
notarized, respondent was outside the country
attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico.
 The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who
caused the documents to be notarized which showed
a common statement that they did not see respondent
sign the documents himself and it was either the
secretary who signed them or the documents
cameout of the office already signed.
 Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it
was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay
departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and
returned on April 8, 2008.
 The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP,
Bataan Chapter which opted to endorse the matter to
the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.
 The Court required respondent to comment on the
said letter.
 In his comment, respondent claimed that he was not
aware that those were documents notarized using his
name while he was out of the country. Upon his own
inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done
by his secretary and without his knowledge and
authority. The said secretary notarized the documents
without realizing the import of the notarization act.
 Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses
and averred that he had terminated the employment
of his secretary from his office.
 The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. When the
case was called for mandatory conference only
respondent appeared. The mandatory conference
was terminated and the parties were directed to file
their respective position papers.
 Only respondent submitted a position paper, to which
he added that for 21 years that he had been
practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any
blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the
law profession and notarial practice.
 The Report and Recommendationof the Investigating
Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles,
Jr. was not verified, that most of the attachments were
not authenticated photocopies and that the comment
of respondent was likewise not verified.
 However, the Investigating Commissioner observed
that respondent’s signature on his comment appeared
to be strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the
attached documents which he admitted were
notarized in his absence by his office secretary.He
admitted the fact that there were documents that were
notarized while he was abroad and his signature was
affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of
the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it
was established that by his negligence in employing
an office secretary who had access to his office, his
notarial seal and records especially pertaining to his
notarial documents without the proper training,
respondent failed to live up to the standard required
by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
 Investigating Commissioner recommended the
immediate revocation of respondent’s commission as
notary public and his disqualification to be
commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.
ISSUE: Whether the notarization of documents by the
secretary of respondent while he was out of the country
constituted negligence.(YES)
RULING:
 Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for
reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized
under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he
was out of the country. This clearly constitutes
negligence considering that respondent is responsible
for the acts of his secretary.
 Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these
Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not
commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary
public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim
that it was his secretary’s act which he did not
authorize.
 He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which
he employed. He left his office open to the public
while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his
notarial seal and register within the reach of his
secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use
these items to notarize documents and copy his
signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be
countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a
simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood
that respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere
afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him
could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.
 Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his
negligence. A person who is commissioned as a
notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries
in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of
this responsibility by passing the buck to his
secretary.
 Respondent claims that for the 21 years that he has
been practicing law, he acted as a notary public
without any blemish and this was his first and only
infraction. His experience, however, should have
placed him on guard and could have prevented
possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer
negligence, 18 documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person and the public was deceived.
Such prejudicial act towards the public cannot be
tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of
revocation of notarial commission and disqualification
from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years
is appropriate.
 WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with
MODIFICATION. Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay
grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the
Court REVOKES his notarial commission and
DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as
notary public for a period of two (2) years. The Court
also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
three (3) months effective immediately, with a
WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will
be dealt with even more severely.

Bartolome v. Basilio
FACTS:
 Bartolome alleged that Basilio, a notary public in
Tarlac City, notarized a document entitled "Joint
Affidavit of Non-Tenancy and Aggregate
Landholdings” purportedly subscribed and sworn to
before him by Loreto M. Tañedo and Ramon T. Lim
on January 15, 2006 despite the fact that Tañedo had
already passed away as early as December 1, 2003
 Basilio admitted having notarized the Joint Affidavit
but claimed that, prior to the notarization, he verified
the identities of the persons who appeared before him
through their respective Social Security System
identification cards and driver's licenses. He further
denied any knowledge that the one who appeared
before him misrepresented himself as Tañedo.
 During the clarificatory hearing, Basilio admitted his
failure to: (a) record the subject document in his
notarial book; (b) submit a copy of the same to the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City; and (c) have the
notarization revoked or recalled
 IBP Investigating Commissioner Randall C.
Tabayoyong- Basilio was found to have manifested
gross negligence and a complete disregard of the
Notarial Rules. Contrary to Section 8, in relation to
Section 6, Rule II of the Notarial Rules, Basilio failed
to indicate in the Joint Affidavit the details of the SSS
identification card and driver's license which were
allegedly shown as competent evidence of identity of
the persons who appeared before him. Thus, his
claim that he verified the identities of the persons who
subscribed the Joint Affidavit could not be given
credence. Basilio also failed to record in his notarial
register his notarial act on the Joint Affidavit in
violation of Section 2 (a), Rule VI of the Notarial
Rules. He also failed to submit a copy of the Joint
Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC, contrary to
Section 2 (h), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules. Thus,
Basilio’s notarial commission shall be revoked and be
disqualified from obtaining a notarial commission for a
period of 1 year and suspended from the practice of
law for 6 months
ISSUE: WON IBP correctly found Basilio liable for violation of
Notarial Rules
HELD: YES. Basilio failed to faithfully comply with his duties as
a notary public.
Section 5 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules-  A notary public
shall not affix an official signature or seal on a notarial
certificate that is incomplete. 
Section 8, Rule II of the Notarial Rules- Notarial Certificate"
refers to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized instrument or
document that is completed by the notary public, bears the
notary's signature and seal, and states the facts attested to
by the notary public in a particular notarization as
provided for by these Rules
Basilio affixed his official signature and seal on the notarial
certificate of the Joint Affidavit without properly identifying the
persons who signed the same. His claim that he verified the
identities of the affiants through their respective SSS
identification cards and driver's licenses cannot be given any
credence considering the ostensible lack of their details on the
face of the certificate. Neither was he able to provide the fact of
identification in any way. On the other hand, it has been
established that one of the named signatories to the Joint
Affidavit was already dead when he notarized the aforesaid
document. Hence, it is sufficiently clear that Basilio had indeed
affixed his official signature and seal on an incomplete, if not
false, notarial certificate.
Moreover, Basilio violated Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial
Rules which prohibits the notarization of a document if the
person involved is not personally known to the notary public or
has not identified himself through competent evidence of
identity.
To add, Basilio himself admitted that he failed to record his
notarial act on the Joint Affidavit in his notarial register,
contrary to Section 2 (a), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules.
Since the notarial register is a record of the notary public's
official acts, he is charged with recording therein the necessary
information regarding the document or instrument notarized. If
the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial
records, doubt as to its nature arises so that the alleged
notarized document cannot be considered a public
document. Considering the evidentiary value given to the
notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record
the document in his notarial register is tantamount to falsely
making it appear that the document was notarized when, in
fact, it was not.
It should be clarified, however, that while Basilio had also failed
to submit a copy of the Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of
the RTC, and to retain a copy thereof for his own records, the
requirement therefor, as stated under Section 2 (h), Rule VI of
the Notarial Rules, applies only to instruments acknowledged
before the notary public. Documents like the Joint Affidavit
which contain a jurat and not an acknowledgment are not
required to be forwarded to the Clerk of Court. Hence, there
should be no administrative infraction on this score.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
person who signed the same is the very person who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and the truth of what are stated therein. By failing in this
regard, the notary public permits a falsehood which does not
only transgress the Notarial Rules but also Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
Atty. Christopher Basilio is suspended from the practice of law
for 1 year and is prohibited from being commissioned as a
notary public for 2 years.
Castelo v. Ching
DR. BASILIO MALVAR vs ATTY. CORA JANE P. BALEROS
AC No. 11346 | March 8, 2017 | REYES, J.
FACTS:
 Malvar is the owner of a land in San Fernando City, La
Union. He executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Leah Mallari over the said lot for ₱500,000.00.
 An agreement was made between Malvar and Mallari
wherein the formerundetook to facilitate the transfer of the
land title to Mallari.  provided that the notary public personally knows the affiant.
 However, without Malvar’s knowledge and consent, Mallari
filed an Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land using the former's name and signature
because the latter cannot withstand the delay of the former
in the delivery of the title.
 Subsequently,  a civil case for collection of sum of money
was instituted by Mallari seeking reimbursement for the
expenses she incurred because of the titling of the
property.  notarial register).
 Initially, a compromise agreement was forged between the
two. However,because 2 out of the 4 checks were
unfunded, such agreement eventually failed.
 As such, Mallari filed a criminal case for violation of BP 22
against Malvar. On the other hand, a criminal case for
falsification of public document against Mallari was filed. It
was alleged that the crime was committed through the
conspiracy of Mallari and the respondent.
 Eventually, the Prosecutor found no sufficient evidence to
establish conspiracy, thereby dropping respondent’s name
from the indictment.
 Unfazed, Malvar initiated the present petition for
disbarment against the respondent. By notarizing the
Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable
Land, the latter made it appear that Malvar executed it
when the truth is that he never went to the office of the
respondent and that he was in Manila at the time of the
alleged notarization.The respondent made a mockery of the
Notarial Rules by notarizing the application in his absence.
 On the other hand, respondent claimed that Benny Telles,
the complainant and his sons came to her office to have the
subject document notarized and that she is certain as to the
identity of the complainant.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent violated the Rules on
Notarial Practice (YES)
HELD:
A. Ajurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary
certifies that the instrument is sworn to before her. It lays
emphasis on the requirements of physical presence of the
affiant as well as his act of signing the document before the
notary public. Such requirement of physical presence
ensures the proper execution of the duty of the notary
public to determine whether the former's signature was
voluntarily affixed.
 In the present case, an affidavit which the respondent
admittedly notarized forms part of the subject document.
The unsubstantiated claim that Malvar appeared before her
and signed the document in her presence cannot prevail
over the evidence supplied by Malvar pointing that it was
highly improbable for him to appear before the respondent
on the date so alleged that the subject document was
notarized. Patients' record cards were submitted.
 Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Notarial Rules was
transgressed when the respondent’s official signature and
seal on the notarial certificate was affixedeven in the
absence of Malvarand when she failed to ascertain the
identity of the affiant.
B. The Notarial Rules also demands the submission of
competent evidence of identity (as defined in Section 12 of
Rule II of the Notarial Rules)like an ID with photograph and
signature. Such requirement can be dispensed with
 In the case at bar, granting that Malvarwas present before
the notary public, the respondent remained unjustified in
not requiring the former to show a competent proof of his
identification considering thatshedoes not personally know
Malvar. 
C. The respondent also displayed lack of diligence in
nonobserving the obligations imposed upon her under
Section 2 Rule VI of the Notarial Rules (re: entries in the
 In the case at bar, same notarial details were assigned by
the respondent to two distinct documents. It was
discovered that per the respondent's notarial register, the
notarial details put into the subject documentpertains to a
Joint Affidavit of Adjoining Owners executed by Ricardo
Sibayan and Cecilia Flores. The subject document nowhere
appears in the respondent's notarial register.
 It must also be noted that ifa document does not appear in
the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt
is engendered that the document was not really notarized.
 Given the evidentiary value accorded to notarized
documents, the failure to record the document in the
notarial register corresponds to falsely making it appear
that the document was notarized when, in fact, it was not. 
 Notaries public should observe utmost care and utmost
fidelity in the performance of their duties, otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds
will be undermined.
D. To excuse herself from failing to record the subject
document in the notarial register, she admitted that it is her
office staff who usually fills it up. This is another violation of
the Notarial Rules which dictates that such duty is to be
fulfilled by her and not somebody else.
 The same act also violates Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the CPR.
NOTE: The IBP Commissioner noted that the respondentwas
also remiss in her duty when she failed to retain an original
copy of the document in her records and to submit the
duplicate copy of the document to the Clerk of Court.
 At this point, the SC does not agree.The requirement stated
in Section 2(h) of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules applies only
 to an instrument acknowledged before the notary public
and not to the subject document which contains a jurat.  her room and had tobe coaxed by her mother to affix her
 A jurat  is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment.It is
that part of an affidavit in which the notary certifies that
before him, the document was subscribed and sworn to by
the executor.An acknowledgment, on the other hand, is the
act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed.
Lopena v. Cabastos
Chita Pantoja-Mumar v. Atty. Juanario C. Flores
A.C. No. 5426. April 4, 2007. En Banc (Callejo Sr., J.)
Facts:
Chita Pantoja-Mumar filed a complaint against Atty. Juanario
C. Flores charging the latter with fraud, misrepresentation,
deceit,falsification of document, breach of duty and violation of
his oath as a lawyer.
Allegedly, Atty. Flores prepared a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Absolute Sale over a 3-hectare property located
at Pangdan, Cambanay, Danao City which was owned by Jose
Pantoja, Sr. (deceased; predecessor-in-interest). The Deed
was executed in favor of the Spouses Filomena and Edilberto
Perez, who were laterable to secure a Torrens Title over the
property under their names. But Chita averred that the sale did
not push through, and the Deed was notnotarized. Moreover,
even though the sale did not materialize, Atty. Flores notarized
the Deed.
Chita added that worst was the fact that Spouses Perez and
Atty. Flores had the document thumb marked by [a person
other than] Maximina Pantoja as appearing above in the same
typewritten name.
On the other hand, Atty. Flores said that during the signing and
the notarization of the Deed, Mrs. Pantoja pleaded with him
toproceed with the notarization of the document because she
badly needed themoney. She promised to have the document
signed by Mrs. Mumar as soon asshe would come to Danao
City. But Mrs. Pantoja did not make good her promise. In
addition to this, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale
was published in the Sun Star Daily.
The matter was referred to the IBP and was assigned to
Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa.
In the Position Paper submitted by Atty. Flores, as regard the
Maximina’s thumb mark, he recalled that Mrs. Pantoja asked
permission from him if shecould bring the document inside the
bedroom for her daughterto affix her thumbmark. Mrs. Pantoja
told them that Maximina was "reclusive and sufferingfrom
mental imbalance." For this reason, Atty. Flores surmised that
the so-called thumbmark of Maximina which appears onthe
cedula is the fake one for it was probably affixed on thecedula
by one of her sisters, since Maximina would not come out of
thumbmark on the document.
The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that these acts
and omissions wereestablished through respondent's own
admission that he notarized the document even ifMaximina
Pantoja did not affix her thumbmark in his presence, and that
complainant didnot appear before him to sign the deed.
Commissioner Herbosarecommended that the notarial
commission of Atty. Flores berevoked; and that he be
disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period
oftwo years and suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Commissionon Bar
Discipline approved Resolution No. XVII-2006-281 affirmed
with modifications wherein Atty. Januario C. Flores ishereby
suspended from the practice of law for 2 years and his notarial
commission is revoked and disqualified from reappointment for
2 years.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Flores violated the NotarialLaw and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Flores violated the
NotarialLaw and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As a notary public, he should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed the same are the very same persons
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contentsand truth of what are stated therein. A notary
public is duty-bound to require the personexecuting a
document to be personally present, to swear before him that
he is that personand ask the latter if he has voluntarily and
freely executed the same.
Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without
ascertaining that all thevendors-signatories thereto were the
very same persons who executed it and personallyappeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein, Atty, Flores undermined the confidence of the public
on notarial documents; he therebybreached Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 1.012 thereof.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Januario C. Flores is GUILTY
of violating the NotarialLaw and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His notarial commission, if still existing,is
hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for aperiod of 2 years. He is,
1
Lawyers must touphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for the law andlegal
processes
2
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 1 year
effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report the date of
his receipt of thisDecision to enable this Court to determine
when his suspension shall have taken effect.
ARTURO L. SICAT,  vs.ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR.,  the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of
FACTS:
 Complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of
the SangguniangPanglalawigan of Rizal, charged
respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal
Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility by committing
fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings,
particularly the notarization of a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito
C. Benitez. According to complainant, respondent
made it appear that Benitez executed the said
document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter
had already died on October 25, 2000.
 He alleged that prior to the notarization, the
Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with
J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management,
represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-
cost houses.
 For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of
Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the
amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez
Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar
Goco.  The check was received and encashed by the
latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA notarized by
respondent Ariola.
 Respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000,
Benitez had already signed the SPA.  He claimed that
due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001
that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA
notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all
necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA
in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May
12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the
SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it,
hence, legally, there was no public document that
existed.
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's
notarial commission be revoked and that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year
ISSUE: Whether or not is guilty of violating the CPR and
his Duties as a Notary Public
RULING:
Yes. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his
duty to serve the ends of justice,9 not to corrupt it. Oath-
bound, he was expected to act at all times in accordance
with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only
injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon
an honorable profession.After a careful review of the
records, we find that respondent never disputed
complainant's accusation that he notarized the SPA
purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He
likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date,
Benitez was already dead. His act was a serious breach of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on
October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized the
SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on
January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the latter's
death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent
declared that Benitez "appeared before him and
acknowledged that the instrument was his free and
voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally
perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless and routinary act. It converts a private
document into a public instrument, making it admissible in
evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
His assertion of falsehood in a public document
contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal
profession and potentially cast suspicion on the
truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal
Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of his
great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a
public officer as well. A public office is a public trust.
Respondent should not have caused disservice to his
constituents by consciously performing an act that would
deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta.
MANUEL MALLARI and MILLIE MALLARI, petitioners, vs.
REBECCA ALSOL, respondent.
G.R. No. 150866. March 6, 2006. CARPIO, J p
FACTS
Stalls No. 7 and 8 of the Supermarket Section of the
Cabanatuan City Public Market were awarded to and occupied
by Abelardo Mallari, father of Manuel Mallari (Petitioner) and
Rebecca Alsol (Respondent). Before Abelardo's death on July
1986, he gave the stalls to his children. Manuel and his wife
Millie Mallari occupied Stall No. 7 while respondent and her
husband Zacarias occupied Stall No. 8. In July 1988,
respondent's daughter became sick and the Alsol family had to
stay in Manila for two months for the medical treatment. They
returned to Cabanatuan City in September 1988 only to find
out that petitioners were already occupying Stall No. 8. The
partition between Stalls No. 7 and 8 had been removed and
respondent's merchandise and things were already gone.
Petitioners refused respondent's demand to vacate.
Respondent sought the help of the City Market Committee
which grants the Stall No. 7 to Manuel and Stall No. 8 to
respondent. Later, the City Government, represented by then
Mayor, executed a Contract of Lease, wherein it states that the
respondent the right to occupy Stall No. 8 for a monthly rental,
subject to increase or decrease in accordance with the rules
and ordinances of the City Government. However, petitioners
still refused to vacate Stall No. 8 and instead they filed an
action for annulment of the Lease Contract which was later on
dismissed by the RTC.
The respondent filed an action for recovery and possession
before the trial court, to which the RTC declared that the
respondent as the rightful awardee of Stall No. 8. The CA
affirmed the ruling of RTC with modifications.
ISSUE
1. Whether the Lease Contract executed between
respondent and the City Government is valid?
RULING
YES. Respondent and the City Government executed the
Lease Contract on 4 June 1990 prior to petitioners' filing of
appeal before the Secretary of Finance.Petitioners insist that
the Lease Contract is not valid because the City Treasurer
should have signed the Lease Contract and not Mayor Perez.
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in applying
RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992 or long after the
execution of the Lease Contract on 4 June 1990. Petitioners
further allege that granting Mayor Perez has the authority to
sign the Lease Contract, Mayor Perez did not appear before
the notary public who notarized the Lease Contract. Hence, the
Lease Contract did not produce any right in favor of
respondent.
The Court agrees with petitioners that RA 7160 is not the
applicable law. Instead, the Court of Appeals should have
applied Batas Pambansa Blg. 337("BP 337") or the old Local
Government Code. Still, even under BP 337, city mayors have
the authority to sign contracts on behalf of city governments.
Under Section 171(2), Article One, Chapter 3 of BP 337, the
powers and duties of the city mayor are
Sec. 171. Chief Executive; Compensation, Powers and
Duties. . . . .
(2)The city mayor shall:
xxx
(g)Represent the city in its business
transactions, and sign all warrants drawn on the city
treasury and all bonds, contracts and obligations of
the city;
xxx
On the other hand, the powers and duties of the city treasurer
are enumerated under Section 181(4), Article Five, Chapter 3
of BP 337. In applying BP 337, there is nothing in the powers
and functions of the city treasurer that gives the city treasurer
authority to sign contracts for the city government. Instead,
Paragraph (g), Section 171(2), Article One, Chapter 3 of BP
337 clearly provides that the city mayor shall represent the city
in its business transactions and sign contracts of the city.
Hence, Mayor Perez has the authority to sign the Lease
Contract on behalf of the City Government. Even under the
Revenue Code of Cabanatuan City of 1974, the authority of the
city treasurer is limited to direct and immediate supervision,
administration and control over the Cabanatuan public markets
and its personnel.The city treasurer has the authority to
designate spaces and stalls to vendors,but the authority does
not include signing of contracts on behalf of the City
Government. ETHSAI
Petitioners also allege that the Lease Contract is not valid
because Mayor Perez did not appear before the notary public
who notarized the document.
We cannot sustain this argument.
Notarization converts a private document into a public
document. However, the non-appearance of the parties before
the notary public who notarized the document does not
necessarily nullify nor render the parties' transaction void ab
initio.Thus:
. . . Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the necessity of a
public document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. Failure to follow the proper form does not
invalidate a contract. Where a contract is not in the form
prescribed by law, the parties can merely compel each other to
observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This
is consistent with the basic principle that contracts are
obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all essential requisites are present.
Hence, the Lease Contract is valid despite Mayor Perez's
failure to appear before the notary public.
ST. MARY’S FARM v PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES
July 31, 2008
Nachura, J.
FACTS:
St Mary’s Farm (plaintiff) is the registered owner of land in Las
Piñas City. It passed a board resolution authorizing Rodolfo
Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision 4000 sqm of the land.
• Allegedly, after thetransaction, Agana did not return to
plaintiff the borrowed title and instead, allegedly forged a
board resolution of the plaintiffsupposedly to the effect that
plaintiff had authorized him to sell the remaining 21,598sqm
of the property.
A series of transactions took place between Agana and Prima
Real Properties (Prima), wherein an absolute deed of sale was
made, transferring the ownership of the land of plaintiff to
Prima. A new title was issued its name, issued by Alejandro
Villanueva, in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Las Piñas.
• The 4000 sqm land was also purchased by Prima.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for annulment of sale with
damages, alleging that the authorization certified to by its
Corporate Secretary and used by Agana in selling the property
to Prima was a forgery as the Board of Directors of the plaintiff
never enacted such a resolution. Further, Prima, in collusion
with Agana, acted maliciously and in bad faith in relying on the
forged authority without taking any step to verify the same with
the plaintiff as owner. The sale should be declared void as it
was a result of a fraudulent transaction.
Prima sought the dismissal of the complaint based on the
ground that Venice Agana and Natividad Villacorta, who filed
on behalf of the plaintiff the complaint, lacked legal capacity to
sue because they were not authorized therefor by the board of
directors of the plaintiff.
• It was a buyer in good faith and for value as it relied solely on
the face of the authorization and paid in full the purchase
price.
• Even assuming that the authorization of Agana was forged,
when plaintiff, through its President, Marcelino Agana
(brother of Rodolfo) accepted/received part of the purchase
price knowing fully well the same to be the proceeds of the
sale of the subject property, plaintiff has been precluded as it
is now estopped from asking for rescission of the deed of
absolute sale and reconveyance of the subject property.
The RTC and the CA dismissed the complaint. Petitioner was
bound by the acts of its agent and must necessarily bear
whatever damage may have been caused by this alleged
breach of trust.
Petitioner insists that the certification was a forgery. The
signature of the corporate secretary on the document was not
genuine and that the document was merely presented to the
notary public for notarization without the corporate secretary
appearing before him.
ISSUE: Whether Agana was duly authorized by Petitioner
under the Certification to enter into the sale of the property as
there is no proof of the Certification's authenticity and due
execution
HELD:
The Court has already held that non-appearance of the party
before the notary public who notarized the deed does not
necessarily nullify or render the parties' transaction void ab
initio. However, the non-appearance of the party exposes the
notary public to administrative liability which warrants sanction
by the Court.
Notwithstanding this fact, it is not enough to overcome the
presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in
the board resolution.
• To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient,
clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all
reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the
certificate. In the absence of such proof, the document must
be upheld.
On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had
every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana's authority to sell the
subject property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an
innocent purchaser for value in good faith.
When the document under scrutiny is a special power of
attorney that is duly notarized, we know it to be a public
document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie
evidence of the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented
with such a document would have no choice between knowing
and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on
it. The notarial acknowledgment has removed that choice from
him and replaced it with a presumption sanctioned by law
that the affiant appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged that he executed the document, understood
its import and signed it.
Here, in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment
found in the seller's duly notarized special power of attorney.
He need not prove anything more for it is already the function
of the notarial acknowledgment to establish the appearance of
the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity.
METROBANK v. ARGUELLES
FACTS:
 Respondent brothers, Servando and Claudio
Arguelles were registered owners of a parcel of land
in Imus, Cavite.
 The Arguelleses entered into a conditional sale of the
land to Edgardo Trinidad and his wife Marilou. In
accordance with the terms of the sale, the Trinidads
gave the Arguelleses P 50,000.00 as down payment.
The balance was to be paid in monthly installments.
 The Trinidads occupied and began developing the
property in 1986. They paid the real estate taxes due
on it from 1987 to 1997. With a deed of sale in their
favor, the Trinidads eventually had the land titled in
their names.
 In that same year, they applied with Metrobankfor a
loan, offering the land as collateral.
 Satisfied that the Trinidads owned the property,
Metrobank accepted it as collateral and lent them
money. Subsequently, Metrobank granted the couple
several more loans, totaling more than P 11 million,
all secured by the land.
 The Arguelleses filed a complaint against the
Trinidads with the RTC for the cancellation of TCT in
the latter’s names. Subsequently, the complaint was
amended to implead Metrobank and sought the
cancellation of the real estate mortgages over the
property in its favor.
 The Arguelleses denied having executed a deed of
sale in favor of the Trinidads. They alleged that they
entrusted their owner s duplicate copy of title to Atty.
Alejandro Saulog, Sr., who assisted the parties in
executing a conditional sale covering the land. The
Trinidads used a fictitious deed of sale, notarized by a
certain Atty. Saulog, Jr. to effect the transfer of title in
their names.
 In answer, the Trinidads claimed that they paid for the
land by installments, completing the payment with the
result that the Arguelleses executed the deed of sale
in their favor. For its part, Metrobank filed a cross-
claim against the Trinidads for litigation expenses,
alleging that the Trinidads were answerable for such
expenses under the mortgage contracts.
 RTC ruled in favor of the Arguelleses and cancelled
both the title in the name of the Trinidads and the
mortgages in Metrobank’s favor. It found that
Trinidadsdid not pay the balance of the agreed
 purchase price by installmentssince they could not
present proof of the payments they supposedly made.
 Two handwriting experts testified during the trial on
the authenticity of the Arguelleses signatures
appearing on the deed of sale: 1) Atty.
DesiderioPagui whom the Arguelleses hired and 2)
Rogelio Azores of the National Bureau of
Investigation. Their opinions differed. Atty. Pagui
concluded that the signatures were forged, while
Azores maintained that the signatures were authentic.
The RTC adopted the conclusion of Atty. Pagui,
finding that he presented a more thorough and
detailed analysis. He compared both similarities and
differences between the questioned signatures and
specimen signatures; whereas, Azores gave
emphasis to the similarities.
 The CA affirmed RTC and held thatMetrobank was
not a mortgagee in good faith as it appears that
Metrobank compelled the Trinidads to acquire title
over the property before the initial loan could be
approved.
ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale that the Arguelleses
supposedly executed in favor of the Trinidads was authentic.
(YES)
RULING:
 The courts below concluded that the subject deed of
sale is not authentic based on the following:
1. The notary public who notarized the document
could not recall if the Arguelleses personally
appeared and signed the deed of sale before him;
2. Two copies of the deed of sale, one dated 1986
and the other 1991, were presented;
3. The Trinidads failed to prove that they paid the
Arguelleses the full purchase price mentioned in the
conditional sale;
4. The testimony of the expert witness for the
Arguelleses sufficiently proved that the two brothers
signatures were forged.
 First. Both the RTC and the CA held that the
presumption of regularity of a public document did not
attach to the subject deed of sale, given that the
notary public, Atty. Saulog, Jr. failed to establish the
authenticity of the signatures on it. He could not
remember if the Arguelleses, present in court as he
testified, were the same persons who appeared and
acknowledged the document before him.
 But it is too much to expect a notary public who had
but a brief time with the Arguelleses during the
notarial ceremony to remember their faces 12 years
later. What matters is Atty. Saulog, Jr. s testimony
respecting the ritual of notarization that he invariably
followed. He gave unbending assurance that he
ascertained the identities of the parties to documents
who appeared before him, including the Arguelleses,
by requiring them to show documentary proofs of the
same6 and to sign the documents in his presence.
 Besides, the theory of the Arguelleses is that it was
Atty. Saulog, Jr. who facilitated the preparation of the
falsified deed of sale for the benefit of the Trinidads.
But, if this were so, it would have made more sense
for Atty. Saulog, Jr. to testify in defense of the
genuineness of the transaction by claiming that he
recalled the faces of those who appeared before him
12 years ago and that they were no other than the
Arguelleses.
 Second. The Arguelleses point out that the residence
certificates on the acknowledgment portion of the
deed of sale did not belong to them since these did
not tally with their 1991 residence certificates. Further,
they presented evidence that Atty. Saulog, Jr. did not
have a notarial commission in 1991.
 But two copies of the deed of sale were presented in
this case, identical in every way except that the first,
the Trinidad s original copy of the deed of sale carried
the date June 24, 1986 while the second, a certified
copy of the deed of sale from the Register of Deeds of
the Arguelleses, bore the date June 24, 1991.
Evidently, it is the first document, original,
unblemished, and bearing the year 1986 that is the
correctly dated copy. On the other hand, the year
typewritten on the second document, the certified
copy, had been crudely altered by erasure with the
digits "91" superimposed to make the year read
"1991." In other words, the deed of sale was executed
in 1986, not 1991.
 The Arguelleses merely claim that their residence
certificate numbers on the copies of the deed of sale
did not reflect their 1991 residence certificates. They
do not state, however, that those numbers do not
represent their 1986 residence certificates, the correct
year when the deed of sale was executed. Further,
they do not also claim that Atty. Saulog, Jr. did not
have a notarial commission in 1986 the year that the
clean deed of sale was actually notarized.
 Third. Both the RTC and the CA held that what is
crucial in determining the authenticity of the deed of
sale is the question of whether or not the Trinidads
paid the balance of the purchase price after
November 23, 1983. The two courts point out that the
Trinidads not only failed to present proof of payment,
but Marilou Trinidad was also unable to say
specifically when they paid their installments to the
Arguelleses.
 But, firstly, the fact that Marilou Trinidad did not have
any receipt evidencing payment of the balance of the
price cannot give rise to the assumption that they had
not paid the same. Marilou testified that she in fact
asked the Arguelleses to issue receipts for the
payments made but the latter declined, saying that
they would be executing a deed of sale upon full
payment and that this would be better proof of
payment than ordinary receipts. That the Trinidads
trusted the Arguelleses sufficiently to waive the
receipts is evidenced by Claudio Arguelles own
admission that they also did not issue any receipt for
the P 50,000.00 down payment that the Trinidads
made.
 Secondly, while the conditional sale contained an
undertaking by the Trinidads to pay the balance of the
purchase price in installments, such payment may be
assumed to have been made from the fact that the
Trinidads were subsequently found in possession of a
deed of sale that the Arguelleses executed in their
favor. Not only this, unquestionably, the Arguelleses
gave up possession of their owner s duplicate copy of
the title and this subsequently found its way into the
hands of the Trinidads. There can be no better proof
than these that the Trinidads had already paid their
obligation to the Arguelleses. Indeed, in 1991 the
Trinidads succeeded in registering the title to the land
in their names.
 Actually, as plaintiffs, the Arguelleses carried the
burden of proving the affirmative of their claims (1)
that the Trinidads had not fully paid for the land and
(2) that they caused the falsification of a deed of sale
supposedly executed by the Arguelleses in their favor
 and used it to transfer the title to the property in their
names. Further, by the nature of their action, the
Arguelleses must rely on the strength of their
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of
the defendants.
Mary Jane Velasco v. Atty. Charlene Doroin and Atty
Hector Centeno
FACTS:
 Mary Jane Velasco filed a disbarment complaint
against respondents for forgery and falsification
 Court's Second Division required the respondent
lawyers to comment on the complaint within 10 days
from notice
 Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, counsel for respondents, filed a
Motion for Extension to File Comment praying that an
extension of 60 days be given
 Court granted the Motion for Extension with a warning
that the same shall be the last and no further
extension will be given
 However, respondents failed to file their comment
 Court ordered respondent lawyers and their counsel
to show cause why they should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for such failure
 Copies of the resolution were returned unserved from
Atty. Centeno with notations "party out/unknown
at/party moved out" and "moved out." Atty. Doroin
received the said resolution on July 27, 2001.
 Complainant was required to submit the correct
addresses of Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno, while Atty.
Charlie Doroin was fined Php 500 for failure to comply
with the show cause resolution
 Complainant failed to comply with the directive of the
Court.
 The Court again required the complainant to show
cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with
for her non-compliance with the said directive and to
submit her compliance within 10 days from notice. In
the same resolution, the fine imposed on Atty. Charlie
Doroin was increased to Php 1,000 for his failure to
file his comment on the complaint as required by the
Court, or to suffer imprisonment of 5 days in case he
fails to pay and to submit his comment
 Atty. Doroin paid the fine but still failed to submit the
comment and has not complied with the show cause
resolution by submitting the correct addresses of Atty.
Quintin P. Alcid and respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.
 June 23, 2005, the complainant submitted the
addresses of Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector
Centeno as well as a copy of a SPA authorizing Mr.
Juanito C. Perez to prosecute the instant case.
 IBP issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing to the parties to the case with a
strict note that "non-appearance by any of the parties
shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in
further proceedings."
 Only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the
complainant, together with his counsel Atty. Andres
Villaruel, Jr. appeared. The hearing of the case was
reset on November 30, 2005. Again, only Mr. Juanito
Perez, attorney-in-fact of the complaint, together with
his counsel, Atty. Villaruel, appeared.
 Commission on Bar Discipline reported that:
-In her Affidavit-Complaint, it was alleged that she
was appointed as Administratrix in Special
Proceedings Case pending before RTC QC. The
deceased, Eduardo Doroin, died on 21 January 1996,
in Papua New Guinea. In this Special Proceedings
case, respondents were collaborating counsels for
Oppositor, Josephine Abarquez.
- Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by deceitful means
into making her sign an Extra-Judicial Settlement and
Deed of Partition, allotting complainant the sum
of P1,216,078 giving the paramour of complainant's
father, Josephine Abarquez, the share
of P7,296,468.00 and also allotting complainant's 2
alleged illegitimate brothers and an alleged
illegitimate sister, a similar sum of P1,216,075 each
alleging that such sharing is in accordance with law.
But no share was assigned to complainant's mother,
who was the legal wife of Dr. Eduardo Doroin.
-To partially satisfy complainant's share of Php
1,216,078, Atty. Doroin required complainant to sign a
paper which was an alleged Confirmation of Authority
to Sell the property of complainant's father located at
Kingspoint subdivision, Bagbag, Novaliches, QC
-When the complainant visited the lot situated at
Kingspoint Subdivision sometime in June 1996, there
was no house constructed thereon, but when she
visited it again on January 1999, there was already a
four-door townhouse constructed. Complainant was
informed by the caretaker at the site that the owner is
Evangeline Reyes-Tonemura. Complainant also
learned later on that the property, which was one of
the properties submitted to the Court handling the
Special Proceedings case, was sold by Atty. Doroin to
Evangeline Reyes-Yonemura by forging the signature
of complainant's late father.
-Atty. Hector B. Centeno, a Notary Public of Quezon
City, knowing that complainant's father was already
dead made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute
Sale that complainant's father appeared before him in
Quezon City on 17 January 1997.
-Commission found that respondents violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when they caused "extreme and great
damage to the complainant."
-Commissioner also noted that the failure of the
respondents to answer the complaint for disbarment
despite due notice on several occasions and to
appear on the scheduled hearing set showed "flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates
despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which
deserves disciplinary sanction." The Commissioner
recommended that the respondent lawyers be
disbarred.
 Board of Governors of IBP- dopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Commission on
 Bar Discipline with the modification that respondent
lawyers be suspended indefinitely
ISSUE: WON Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno
are guilty of violating their lawyer's oath and Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which would merit
their disbarment.
HELD:
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility- "A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all
times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public
at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and
right to practice law during good behavior and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has
afforded him.
In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers
forged the deed of sale and forced her to sign the deed of
extrajudicial settlement by explaining to her that it was "in
accordance with law."
The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers
constitute a blatant violation of the lawyer's oath to uphold the
law and the basic tenets of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that no lawyer shall engage in dishonest
conduct
In succession law compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse
shall have a share in the estate by way of legitimes and no
extrajudicial settlement can deprive the spouse of said right
except if she gives it up for lawful consideration, but never
when the spouse is not a party to the said settlement.
The guilt of the respondent lawyers is beyond dispute. They
failed to answer the complaint filed against them. Despite due
notice, they failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the
IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainant
remain uncontroverted.
We agree with the modification submitted by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines that an indefinite suspension would be the
more appropriate penalty on Atty. Charlie Doroin. However, we
cannot be as lenient with Atty. Hector Centeno who, aside from
committing a dishonest act by depriving a person of her rightful
inheritance, also committed a criminal offense when he
falsificated a public document and thereafter absconded from
the criminal proceeding against him after having posted bail.
Loberes-Pintal v. Baylosis
CHARLES B. BAYLON vs. ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO
A.C. No. 6962 | June 25, 2008 | QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
 Charles claimed that PacitaFilio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and
his late wife, Rosemarie Baylon, conspired in preparing an
SPA authorizing his wife to mortgage his real property in
Taguig. His signature thereon was forged.
 He was out of the country when the SPA was executed and
notarized by respondent. To support his contention, he
presented a certification from the Government of Singapore
and Philippine Bureau of Immigration.
 As a result, his property was mortgaged and t was
subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of his wife to
settle her mortgage obligations.
 For his part, respondent admitted notarizing the SPA.He,
however, argued that he initially refused to notarize it due
to the absence of the supposed affiant (Charles). He only
notarized the same when the complainant's wife came back
to his office together with a person whom she introduced to
him as Charles Baylon. He believed that such person was
indeed Charles when a Community Tax Certificate (CTC)
bearing the name Charles Baylon was presented to him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent had been negligent in
the performance of his duties as a notary public (YES)
HELD:
 Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into
account the nature of the SPA, the respondent should have
exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity
of the person who represented himself as Charles Baylon.
 He should not have relied on the CTC presented in view of
the ease with which CTCs are obtained these days. 
 Recognizing the established unreliability of a CTC in
proving the identity of a person, the SC did not even
include it in the list of competent evidence of identity that
notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of
persons appearing before them to have their documents
notarized.
 Furthermore, considering that respondent already
previously notarized some documents for the complainant,
he should have compared the complainant's signatures in
those documents with the impostor's signature before he
notarized the SPA.
NOTE: Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are authorized may act as notaries public. It
converts a private document into a public document thus
making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to
a private instrument.For this reason, notaries public should not
take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their
office.They are expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of such duties, which are dictated by public policy
and are impressed with public interest.
MARIA FATIMA JAPITANA vs.ATTY. SYLVESTER C.
PARADO
A.C. No. 10859, January 26, 2016
 On June 22, 2006, Atty. Parado notarized the Real
Estate Mortgage between RC Lending Investors, Inc.
as mortgagee, and Maria Theresa G. Japitana  and
Ma. NetteJapitana as mortgagors. It was supposedly
witnessed by Maria Sallie Japitana and Maria Lourdes
Japitana-Sibi  and her husband Dante Sibi, Fatima's
sisters and brother-in-law, respectively.
The mortgage covered a parcel of land on which the
family home of the Japitanas was constituted. On the
same date, Atty. Parado notarized the
Affidavitallegedly executed by Theresa, Nette,
Lourdes, Dante, and Sallie to show their conformity to
the Real Estate Mortgage over the land where their
family home was situated.
 On October 23, 2006, RC Lending, filed its Petition for
ExtraJudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage.
Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued under the name of RC Lending. On February
3, 2009, it filed an ex-parte motion7 for the issuance
of a break-open order, for RC Lending to effectively
take the possession of the subject property as it was
gated and nobody would answer in spite of the
sheriffs repeated knocking.
 Fatima, however, assailed that the signatures in
the Real Estate Mortgage as well as in the
Affidavit, both notarized on June 22, 2006, were
forgeries. She asserted that Atty. Parado did not
require the persons who appeared before him to
present any valid identification. Fatima alleged
that Atty. Parado manually forged the signatures
of Sallie, Lourdes and Dante, as witnesses to the
Real Estate Mortgage. She added that her sister,
Theresa, was a schizophrenic since 1975. More
importantly, Fatima averred that Atty. Parado had
no notarial authority, as certified by the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Parado is liable.
RULING: YES.
A close perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Parado had no
existing notarial commission when he notarized the documents
in question in 2006. This is supported by the certification
issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that based on
the Notarial Records, Atty. Parado had not been issued a
notarial commission for the year 2006. He failed to refute the
same as he neither appeared during the mandatory conference
nor filed his position paper.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, a person
commissioned as a notary public may perform notarial acts in
any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of
January of the year in which the commissioning is made.
Commission either means the grant of authority to perform
notarial or the written evidence of authority.
Without a commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to perform any
of the notarial acts. A lawyer who acts as a notary public
without the necessary notarial commission is remiss in his
professional duties and responsibilities.
In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to
disciplinary action for notarizing documents outside their
territorial jurisdiction or with an expired commission.
Atty. Parado knowingly performed notarial acts in 2006 in spite
of the absence of a notarial commission for the said period.
Further, he was dishonest when he testified in court that he
had a notarial commission effective until 2008, when, in truth,
he had none. Atty. Parado's misdeeds run afoul of his duties
and responsibilities, both as a lawyer and a notary public.
Moreover, even if Atty. Parado had a valid notarial
commission, he still failed to faithfully observe the Rules
on Notarial Practice when he notarized the Real Estate
Mortgage and the Affidavit of Conformity with the persons
who executed the said documents merely presenting their
Residence Certificate or Community Tax
Certificate (CTC) before him.
Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
requires the presentation of a competent evidence of
identity, if the person appearing before the notary public is
not personally known by him. Section 12, Rule II of the
same Rules defines competent evidence of identity as:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by
an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of
the individual; or (
b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy
to the instrument, document or transaction, who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally
knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither
of whom is privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who each personally knows the individual and
shows to the notary public a documentary identification.
Atty. Parado did not claim to personally know the persons
who executed the said documents. Hence, the
presentation of their CTCs was insufficient because those
cannot be considered as competent evidence of identity,
as defined in the Rules. Reliance on the CTCs alone is a
punishable indiscretion by the notary public.
Doubtless, Atty. Parado should be held accountable for failing
to perform his duties and responsibilities expected of him. The
penalty recommended, however, should be increased to put
premium on the importance of the duties and responsibilities of
a notary public. Pursuant to the pronouncement in Re:
Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Parado should be
suspended for two (2) years from the practice of law and
forever barred from becoming a notary public.
In Re: Decision Dated September 26, 2012 in OMB-M-A-10-
023-A, etc. Against Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan
A.C. No. 9676. April 2, 2018. First Division (Del Castillo, J.)
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) furnished the Court
a copy of itsDecision in the case of Camilo v. Brion, where it
said that:
On a final note, this Office finds it unsettling that the
Deed of Partitionsubmitted before the DAR was
notarized by Atty. Robellito B. Diuyan on 23 July2003,
when one of the signatories therein, Alejandro F.
Camilo, had earlier diedon 23 August 2001. On this
matter, let a copy of this Decision be furnished
theSupreme Court of the Philippines for its
information and appropriate action.
In a Resolution dated July 24, 2013, this Court treated the
aforesaid Decision and the Deed of Partition as an
administrativecomplaint against respondent Atty. Robelito B.
Diuyan and required the latter to file acomment thereon.
In his Comment, Atty. Diuyan stated that:
In the case at bar, eight (8) persons appeared before
me with thedocument deed of partition prepared by
them subject matter of the complaint. Iasked them
one by one if the document is true and correct [and]
with theirCommunity Tax Certificates, they answered
me in the affirmative and afterbeing satisfied with their
answer I notarized the document for free as they
areconsidered as indigents. Of course, they signed it
one by one in front of me.
Subsequently, the matter was referred to the IBP investigation,
report, and recommendation. During its pendency, Atty. Diuyan
was recovering from a stoke and was unable to attend the
mandatory conference. Nevertheless, he maintained in his
Position Paper what was said earlier.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Diuyanguilty
of breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and
accordingly, recommended for the revocation of his notarial
commission, if any, for oneyear, effective immediately. The
same was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but
modified the penalty for the revocation of his notarial
commission, and for his disqualification frombeing
commissioned for 2 years and suspension from the practice
oflaw for six months.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Diuyanshould he held administratively liable for
notarizing a Deedof Partition based on the affiants' CTCs.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that there was nothing irregular
with act of Atty. Diuyan notarizing the Deed of
Partition on July 23, 2003 based on the affiants' CTCs. The law
applicable at thetime of the notarization only required the
presentation of the CTCs.
Atty. Diuyan notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003,
or prior tothe effectivity of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice,of which he is being heldaccountable by the IBP.
However, when the Deed was notarized on July 23, 2003,
theapplicable law was the notarial law under Title IV, Chapter
11, Article VII of the RevisedAdministrative Code, 17 Section
251 of which states:
SECTION 251. Requirement as to notation of
payment of (cedula)residence tax. — Every contract,
deed, or other document acknowledged before
anotary public shall have certified thereon that the
parties thereto have presentedtheir proper (cedula)
residence certificates or are exempt from the
(cedula)residence tax, and there shall be entered by
the notary public as a part of suchcertification the
number, place of issue, and date of each (cedula)
residencecertificate as aforesaid.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Complaint against respondent Atty.
Robelito B. Diuyan isDISMISSED for lack of merit.
Riosa v. Tabaco La Suerte Corporation
AQUILES RIOSAvs.TABACO LA SUERTE CORPORATION
FACTS:
 AquilesRiosa (Aquiles) filed his Complaint for
Annulment/Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute
Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title, Reconveyance
and Damages against respondent Tabaco La Suerte
Corporation (La Suerte) before the RTC.
 In his complaint, Aquiles alleged that he was the
owner and in actual possession of a commercial lot in
Albay, that he acquired the said property through a
deed of cession and quitclaim executed by his
parents and that he declared the property in his name
and had been religiously paying the realty tax on the
said property, on three (3) occasions, he obtained
loans from SiaKoPio in the total amount of
₱50,000.00; that as a security for the payment of
loans, SiaKoPio requested from him a photocopy of
the deed of cession and quitclaim; that SiaKoPio
presented to him a document purportedly a receipt for
the ₱50,000.00 loan with an undertaking to pay the
total amount of ₱52,000.00 including the ₱2,000.00
attorney’s fees; that without reading the document, he
affixed his signature thereon; and that in September
2001, to his surprise, he received a letter from La
Suerte informing him that the subject lot was already
registered in its name.
  Aquiles claimed that by means of fraud,
misrepresentation and deceit employed by SiaKoPio,
he was made to sign the document which he thought
was a receipt and undertaking to pay the loan, only to
find out later that it was a document of sale. Aquiles
averred that he did not appear before the notary
public to acknowledge the sale, and that the notary
public, a municipal judge, was not authorized to
notarize a deed of conveyance.
 In its Answer, La Suerte averred that it was the actual
and lawful owner of the commercial property, after
purchasing it from Aquiles on December 7, 1990; that
it allowed Aquiles to remain in possession of the
property to avoid the ire of his father from whom he
had acquired property inter vivos, subject to his
obligation to vacate the premises anytime upon
demand; that on February 13, 1991, the Register of
Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-80054 covering the subject property in its
name; that Aquiles necessarily undertook the cost of
repairs and did not pay rent for using the premises;
 RTC ruled in favor of Aquilesgave credence to the
testimony of Aquiles that he was made to sign an
instrument of sale without his knowledge because he
trusted SiaKoPio and he was of the belief that what
he had signed was merely an instrument of
indebtedness.
 On appeal the CA reversed the RTC decision and
upheld the validity of the subject deed of sale in favor
of La Suerte. It declared La Suerte as the lawful
owner of the subject lot and improvements thereon,
subject to the right of reimbursement for the
renovation expenses. The CA held that tax
declarations or realty tax payments by Aquiles were
not conclusive evidence of ownership.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a perfected and valid contract of sale for
the subject property between Aquiles and La Suerte, through
its Chief Executive Officer, SiaKoPio.
RULING:
No there was no perfected sale. One of Aquiles contention
was that he did not appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the sale, and that the notary public, a municipal
judge, was not authorized to notarize a deed of conveyance.
The CA failed to consider the glaring material discrepancies on
the dates appearing in the purported deed of absolute sale
notarized by Judge Arsenio Base, Municipal Court Presiding
Judge of Tabaco City (Judge Base).
The document was dated 1999, but the date in the
acknowledgment and notarial reference was an earlier date,
1990. The ex-oficio notary public, Judge Base, was not
presented to explain the apparent material discrepancy of the
dates appearing on the questioned document. This only
confirms the claim of Aquiles that he signed the receipt
representing his loan at the bodega of SiaKoPio sometime in
1990, and not at the office of Judge Base in 1999.La Suerte
insists that the discrepancy on the dates was a mere clerical
error that did not invalidate the deed of sale. It is worthy to
stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the
clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its
favor the presumption of regularity. While it is true that an error
in the notarial inscription does not generally invalidate a sale, if
indeed it took place, the same error can only mean that the
document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus,
not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document
would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose
genuineness and due execution need not be proved.
An even more substantial irregularity raised by Aquiles pertains
to the capacity of the notary public, Judge Base, to notarize the
deed of sale. Judge Base, who acted as ex-oficio notary public,
is not allowed under the law to notarize documents not
connected with the exercise of his official duties.There are
possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as
Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex
officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular
notary public provided that certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or
notary public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only
when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception
applies. The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude
towards Judge Cariño's improper notarial activity. There was
no such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was
produced, we would be hard put to accept the veracity of its
contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city,
was even then not an isolated backwater town and had its fair
share of practicing lawyers.
REX M. TUPAL, complainant , vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V.
ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, respondent .
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014. LEONEN, J
FACTS
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a
complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo, OF Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, for
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance
of the law. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without
the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits
of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties. He
notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties' marriage.
These "package marriages" are allegedly common in Bacolod
City. Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of
cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were
notarized on the day of the contracting parties' marriages.
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular
No. 1-90, which allows municipal trial court judges to act as
notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if
connected with their official functions and duties, dated
February 26, 1990. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation
are not connected with a judge's official functions and duties as
solemnizing officer. Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex
officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he
solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits.
He also did not require the parties to present their competent
pieces of evidence of identity as required by law.
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of
cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation was connected with his official functions and
duties as a judge. The Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not prohibit
judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties
whose marriage they will solemnize. Judge Rojo also argued
that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He
is a judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was not required to
affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. Also, Judge
Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the
parties presenting their competent pieces of evidence of
identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of
their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same
persons who executed the affidavit. The parties' identities are
"unquestionable."
ISSUE
Whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law?
RULING
YES.Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may
act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex
officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts,
and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official
functions and duties. They may also act as notaries public ex
officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts' territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of
lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents ex
officio.
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were
documents not connected with the exercise of his official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized
affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or
notaries public were lacking in his court's territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted. The parties must have complied
with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among
these formal requisites is a marriage license. If the contracting
parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Instead, the parties
must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The judge, as
solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal
impediment to marry each other. The judge must also execute
a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties'
qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Also, based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who
notarizes the contracting parties' affidavit of cohabitation
cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties' marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge's only duty involving the
affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have
indeed lived together for at least five years without legal
impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the
judge can notarize the parties' affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected
with the judge's official function and duty to solemnize
marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent
with the duty to examine the parties' requirements for marriage.
If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation,
he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit's
statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Should
there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that
he solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false
allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of
the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with their official
function and duty to solemnize marriages.
To accept Judge Rojo's argument will render the solemnizing
officer's duties to examine the affidavit of cohabitation and to
issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been
complied with redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot
objectively examine a document he himself notarized. Article
34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary
assume that "the person authorized by law to administer oaths"
who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing
officer" who performs the marriage ceremony are two different
persons.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until
notarized. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity." The affidavit of
cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose," remains a
private document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation,
he notarized nine private documents. As discussed, affidavits
of cohabitation are not connected with a judge's official duty to
solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without
certifying that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in Bacolod
City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are
lacking in the municipality or circuit of the judge's court
constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if
the signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the
notary public must require the signatory to present a
competent evidence of identity
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person
appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the
instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public
does not personally know the signatory, he must require the
signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized,
he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their
affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties
were personally known to him or that the parties presented
their competent pieces of evidence of identity. That the parties
appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do
not make the parties personally known to him. The parties are
supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits.
To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least
be acquainted with them.Interviewing the contracting parties
does not make the parties personally known to the notary
public
UWE MATHAEUS vs SPOUSES ERIC and GENEVIEVE
MEDEQUISO
February 3, 2016
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
In a civil case, the Tagbilaran MTCC issued a decision
ordering petitioner to pay respondent spouses the amount of
30,000 with legal interest, attorney’s fees and costs.
• Petitioner filed an appeal before the RTC of Bohol, which
affirmed the MTCC decision.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA, which
dismissed the case.
• The Court ruled that the required Verification and
Certification on Non-Forum Shopping was sworn to not
before a notary public but before a clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court in Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
• Although Section 242 of Article III of the Revised
Administrative Code authorizes clerks of court to act as
notaries public ex-officio, the Supreme Court consistently
ruled that clerks of court may notarize or administer oaths
only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official
functions.
• A verification in an appeal via a Petition for Review is not
within the scope of the matters wherein clerks of court may
notarize or administer an oath.
ISSUE: Whether there was a proper verification and
certification of the Petition for Review
Petitioner’s Contention
• The clerk of court may validly notarize the verification in the
CA petition, as it is merely a continuation of the proceedings
in the Civil Case.
• The filing of an unverified answer in the Civil case should not
be taken against him, because as a non-lawyer and foreigner
who prepared and filed the same without furnishing copies to
the opposing party, he did not know the judicial rules of
procedure. His answer, which was discarded by the MTCC,
should be admitted.
HELD:
The Court has already held that, “Clerks of Court are notaries
public ex-officio, and may thus notarize documents or
administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the
exercise of their official functions. Clerks of court should not, in
their ex-officio capacity, take part in the execution of private
documents bearing no relation at all to their official functions.”
Even if it is to be conceded that the CA petition is just a
continuation of the proceedings in the Civil Case, the Court
cannot agree with petitioner's argument that the notarization of
verifications and certifications on non-forum shopping
constitutes part of a clerk of court's daily official functions.
• The workload of a clerk of court is already heavy enough.
We cannot add to this the function of notarizing complaints,
answers, petitions, or any other pleadings on a daily or
regular basis.
Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that, “the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of
the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of
service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal thereof.”
With respect to certifications against forum shopping, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to
relax the Rule on the ground of substantial compliance or
presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons.
In this case, the Court is not inclined to relax the rules for the
petitioner’s benefit as it perceives no compelling reasons to
rule in his favor, considering that the petitioner has already
committed lapses starting from the MTCC. (stated in the
contention) Hence, the CA’s dismissal is just and should stand.
MALABED v. ATTY. DELA PEÑA
FACTS:
 Complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for
"deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that
"misled the Court." First, complainant claimed that the
Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by
respondent refers to a different complaint, that is the
complaint filed by complainant's brother against
FortunatoJadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate
to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil
action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf
of his client FortunatoJadulco.
 Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not
furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent
covered by Original Certificate of Title, but respondent
forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals.
Complainant claimed that she could not properly
defend herself without a copy of the title. She further
claimed that the title presented by respondent was
fabricated. To support such claim, complainant
presented Certifications from the DENR and the
Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly
confirming that there is no file in their offices of OCT.
 Respondent basically denied the charges against him.
Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File
Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-]
1118 for quieting of title before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification
of Lupon Chairman, the late RodulfoCatigbe, issued
on May 9, 2001."
 Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was
attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No.
B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to
complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel
was not furnished, respondent wondered why he
 raised this matter only upon filing of the instant
complaint.
 Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty
of conflict of interest when he represented the
occupants of the lot owned by complainant's family,
who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman
Catholic Church, which deed of donation respondent
notarized.
 Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of
donation had no relation to the case filed against the
occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed
that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings
favorable to his clients should be addressed to Judge
Asis himself.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct.(YES)
RULING:
 Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of
interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of
donation of a parcel of land executed by
complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic
Church. Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to
litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are
occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.
 Suffice to state that notarization is different from
representation. A notary public simply performs the
notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial
Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and
affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy
certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand,
refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a
court action.
 As regards complainant's serious accusations against
respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and
conspiring with the latter to render judgments
favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare
allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply
narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil
Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by the
Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC.
Complainant conveniently failed to present any
concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of
conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis.
Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of
the presiding judge should be filed against the judge,
and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the
judge.
 Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of
title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC
on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement,
which respondent claimed was the certificate to file
action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued
on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on
18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of
Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in
Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other words, there
is no truth to respondent's allegation that the subject
matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before
the LuponTagapamayapa and that a certificate to file
action was issued prior to the filing of the complaint.
Catungal v. Rodriguez
Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Maghari III
South Cotabato Communications Corp v. Tomas
EMMANUEL BABAS, DANILO T. BANAG, ARTURO V.
VILLARIN, SR., EDWIN JAVIER, SANDI BERMEO, REX
ALLESA, MAXIMO SORIANO, JR., ARSENIO ESTORQUE,
and FELIXBERTO ANAJAO vs. LORENZO SHIPPING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 186091| December 15, 2010 | NACHURA, J.
FACTS:
 Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (LSC) owns several
equipment necessary for its business. It entered into a
General Equipment Maintenance Repair and Management
Services Agreement(Agreement) with Best Manpower
Services, Inc. (BMSI) who was to provide maintenance and
repair services to LSC’s container vans and heavy
equipment, among others. BMSI further undertook to
provide checkers to inspect all containers received.
 LSC also leased its equipment, tools, and tractors to BMSI.
 BMSI then hired petitioners to work at LSC as checkers,
welders and utility men, among others.
 After6 years, LSC entered into another contract with BMSI
(Service Contract).
 Months thereafter, petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for regularization against LSC and BMSI.
 After 1 month, LSCterminated the Agreement.
Consequently, petitioners lost their employment.
 BMSI argued that it was willing to regularize petitioners but
some of them lacked the requisite qualifications for the job.
BMSI was also willing to reassign petitioners.
 LSC, on the other hand, averred that petitioners were
employees of BMSI and were assigned to LSC by virtue of
the Agreement. BMSI is an independent job contractor and
the Agreement between LSC and BMSI constituted
legitimate job contracting.
 LA: Dismissed. petitioners were employees of BMSI.
 NLRC: Reversed. BMSI is not engaged in legitimate job
contracting.
 CA: Reversed. BMSI is an independent contractor.
 Petitiners appealed to the SC. Only 7 of the 9 petitioners
signed the Verification and Certification.Petitioners Maximo
Soriano, Jr. and FelixbertoAnajao did not sign because
they could no longer be located by their co-petitioners.
ISSUE (YUNG RELATED SA LEG FORMS LANG):Whether
or not all the 9 original petitioners can be considered to have
brought the present appeal before the SC (NO)
HELD:
 The petition satisfies the formal requirements only with
regard to the petitioner who signed the petition but not his
co-petitioner who did not sign nor authorize the other
petitioner to sign it on his behalf. Thus, the petition can be
given due course only as to the parties who signed it.
 The other petitioners who did not sign the verification and
certificate against forum shopping cannot be recognized as
petitioners and have no legal standing before the Court.
The petition should be dismissed outright with respect to
the non-conforming petitioners.
 Consequently, the petition was dismissed insofar as
petitioners Soriano and Anajao are concerned.
Prince Transport Inc v. Garcia
Fyfe v. Philippine Airlines inc
People v. Arrojado
PEOPLE V ARROJADO
FACTS:
 Herein respondent was charged with the crime of
murder by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas
City, Capiz
 Thereafter, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Information filed against him on the ground that the
investigating prosecutor who filed the said Information
failed to indicate therein the number and date of issue
of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Certificate of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter
No. 1922 (B.M. No. 1922) which was promulgated by
this Court via an En Banc Resolution dated June 3,
2008
 Herein petitioner filed its Comment/Oppositionto
respondent's Motion to Dismiss contending that: (1)
the Information sought to be dismissed is sufficient in
form and substance; (2) the lack of proof of MCLE
compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and
signed the Information should not prejudice the
interest of the State in filing charges against persons
who have violated the law; and (3) and administrative
edict cannot prevail over substantive or precedural
law, by imposing additional requirements for the
sufficiency of a criminal information.
 The RTC of Roxas City issued an Order dismissing
the subject Information without prejudice.
 Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and/or
mandamus with the CA assailing the Orders of the
RTC.
 In its presently assailed Decision, the CA denied
respondent's petition and affirmed the questioned
RTC Orders.  PHILIPPINE BAPTIST S.B.C. (PBSBC) vs FAITH IN CHRIST
ISSUE:
Whether or not court of appeals erred when it ruled that
the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate her
mcle compliance number and date of issuance thereof in
the information against respondent Jesus a. Arrojado
warranted the dismissal of the same.
RULING:
NO. BM No. 1922REQUIRE practicing members of the
bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts
or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of
their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately
preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the case
and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.
Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the
Information, without prejudice, did not leave the
prosecution without any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. To avoid undue delay in the disposition of the
subject criminal case and to uphold the parties' respective
rights to a speedy disposition of their case, the
prosecution, mindful of its duty not only to prosecute
offenders but more importantly to do justice, could have
simply re-filed the Information containing the required
number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's
MCLE Certificate of Compliance, instead of resorting to
the filing of various petitions in court to stubbornly insist on
its position and question the trial court's dismissal of the
subject Information, thereby wasting its time and effort and
the State's resources.
In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition
of cases brought about by a counsel's failure to indicate in
his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or
her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an
En Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which
amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase
"Failure to disclose the required information would cause
the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records" and replacing itwith "Failure
to disclose the required information would subject the
counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action."
Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a
lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and
date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance
will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and
expunction of the pleadings from the records.
Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the
prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action. (This was not yet
in effect when the said information was filed)
BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH (BFBC) and
JESUS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. (FCJBC)and REYNALDO
GALVAN
August 22, 2016
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
PBSBC owned a lot in Angeles City, which is the subject
property in this case. A contract of loan was entered into
between PBSBC and BFBC where the latter borrowed money
from the former to enable it to purchase the subject property.
Thereafter, BFBC took possession of the property.
Galvan and his companions began attending BFBC’s religious
activities at the subject property. Later on, Galvan formed and
incorporated FCJBC and took control of the property.
• This action came to the attention of the Luzon Convention of
Southern Baptist Churches, Inc. (LCSBC). It upheld BFBC's
right over the subject property and recognized BFBC's
pastor, Rev. Rolando T. Santos, as its legitimate pastor.
• FCJBC continued to occupy the property. Hence, BFBC
sent a demand letter and demanded that FCJBC vacate
the property within five (5) days from notice and to pay the
amount of P10,000.00 per month beginning October 2001 as
reasonable compensation for its use.
• The demand was unheeded.
BFBC and PBSBC filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer
and damages against FCJBC and Galvan.
• Respondents contended that it had been in existence since
1984, formerly known as the Faith Baptist Church. Further,
Rolando Santos was the pastor of FBC from 1993 to 2000.
Due to a misunderstanding within the church group, Santos
left FBC, together with some of its members. In February
2001, Santos' group formed BFBC.
• FBC continued to occupy the subject property and later
organized themselves into FCJBC.
• FCJBC contended that it paid installments due on the subject
property in the sum of 10K, leaving a balance of P240K.
FCJBC alleged that they were willing and able to pay the
installments due on the subject property, however, PBSBC
refused to accept any payment from it.
part of BFBC and PBSBC indicative of permission to occupy
the land.
This case falls under the concept of forcible entry as it has
been settled that in forcible entry cases, no force is really
necessary. The act of going on the property and excluding the
lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of
force over the property.
• On this part, nothing was said on how FCJBC's entry was
effected or when dispossession started. It failed to allege
when dispossession took place and how it was effected.
The one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry
on the land, except that when entry was made through stealth,
the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff
learned thereof.
If the dispossession did not occur by any of the means
stated in Section 1, Rule 70, as in this case, the proper
recourse is to file a plenary action to recover possession
with the Regional Trial Court. Hence, the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the case.
Fairland Knitcraft Corp v. Loo Po

FCJBC further averred that, prior to BFBC's filing of the

present complaint, a Petition for Consignation of Payment
was already filed on October 9, 2002 with the RTC.

The MTC rendered a decision in favor of BFBC, which was

affirmed by the RTC. On the Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed before the CA, it granted the petition dismissing the
complaint. Hence, BFBC and PBSBC filed the instant petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the instant case is one of unlawful detainer or

forcible entry

HELD:
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry are entirely distinct causes
of action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession founded on
illegal occupation from the beginning - forcible entry; and (b)
action founded on unlawful detention by a person who
originally acquired possession lawfully - unlawful detainer.

The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both

the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court and not
the designation or caption. The complaint must specifically
allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer or forcible entry if
the complaint filed was for unlawful detainer, or forcible entry,
respectively.

A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that it

contradicts the requirements for unlawful detainer. In
anunlawful detainer action, the possession of the defendant
was originally legal and its possession was tolerated or
permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract.
• In this case, the allegations in the complaint shows that
FCJBC's occupancy was unlawful from the start and was
bereft of contractual or legal basis. There was, likewise,
no allegation that BFBC and PBSBC tolerated FCJBC's
possession of the subject property. Neither was there any
averment in the complaint which shows any overt act on the