G.R. No.

L-28040 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA,
administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator,
CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO
DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor

DOCTRINE: Hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from

the moment of the death of such predecessor in interest. There is no legal bar to a successor
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such
death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of
the estate.

FACTS:Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco, filed a petition for the
probate of her will. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. While a widower , Francisco de Borja
allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana
instituted testate proceedings where she was appointed special administratrix.

A compromise agreement was entered into by and between "The heir and son of Francisco de
Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate
Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja. 

Jose de Borja submitted the agreement for Court approval. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja
opposed in both instances. The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement is
not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that:
(1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco
de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between
Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to
have force and effect.

Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara
vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will
for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed
out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly
conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between
heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de
Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963
agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.

On the other hand, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into, the governing
provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or
not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil.
479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already divided the estate in
accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have
divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.

ISSUE: Whether the prerequisite previous probate of the will is applicable in this case.

HELD: NO. The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara is not applicable to the case at bar. This is
apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana
Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000
payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of
her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
Tangco, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja
by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to
her for consideration or otherwise.

This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
case at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any
other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted
or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest
(Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite
contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if
the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of
course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the
vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the
transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the
parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82)
are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the
Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious
reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
 G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a
minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who
represents the minors v. LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS
BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,
AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON.
LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of
Abra
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor

DOCTRINE: Rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owner
of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived
of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be
pure or contingent.

FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra,
to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed
another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and,
therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. During the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the
death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the
petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground
that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

ISSUE: Whether the children of the deceased, Fortuna Barcena, be allowed to substitute the
deceased plaintiff.

HELD: YES. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be
substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case to its completion. The records of this case show that
the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March
31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena
was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she
died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency
of the proceeding can be substituted.

Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs
become the absolute owner of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent,
and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The
moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance
whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased
vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in
litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs
upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became
parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow
their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner, vs.
MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND
"BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA
III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN,
YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO
G. R. No. 171701 February 8, 2012
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor

DOCTRINE: The heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos properties upon the
death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent’s death.

FACTS: After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino mandated PCGG to recover
all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Marcos. The PCGG, acting on behalf of the
Republic, filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages
against Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death and his heirs. PCGG
amended its Complaint, and added personalities as defendants.

Closely analyzing petitioner’s Complaint and the present Petition for Review, it is clear that the
Marcos siblings are being sued in two capacities: first, as co-conspirators in the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth; and second, as the compulsory heirs of their father, Ferdinand E.
Marcos. To prove the general allegations against the Marcos siblings, petitioner primarily relied on
the Sworn Statement and the Deposition of one of the financial advisors of President Marcos,
Rolando C. Gapud, taken in Hong Kong on various dates.

The Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO moved to intervene before the Sandiganbayan

alleging that the trust funds in the account of Pantranco amounting to 55 million rightfully belonged
to the Pantranco employees, pursuant to the money judgment awarded by NLRC.

On 11 March 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution admitting the pieces of evidence while
expressing some reservation. Respondents subsequently filed their respective Demurrers to
Evidence and all were granted except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. Primarily because she
had categorically admitted that she and her husband owned properties enumerated in the
Complaint, while stating that these properties had been lawfully acquired. The court held that the
evidence presented by petitioner constituted a prima facie case against her, considering that the
value of the properties involved was grossly disproportionate to the Marcos spouses’ lawful
income. Thus, this admission and the fact that Imelda R. Marcos was the compulsory heir and
administratrix of the Marcos estate were the primary reasons why the court held that she was
responsible for accounting for the funds and properties alleged to be ill-gotten.

ISSUE: Are the compulsory heirs of former President Marcos obliged to render an accounting
and return the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses?

HELD: YES. The Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, because (1) the action
pending before the Sandiganbayan is one that survives death, and, therefore, the rights to the
estate must be duly protected; (2) they allegedly control, possess or own ill-gotten wealth, though
their direct involvement in accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have been proven.
Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is
imperative therefore that the estate be duly represented. 

Under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos
properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent’s death. In
this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the
properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the
distribution of the estate.

Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case
the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa states that upon the death of a person, each of his
heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion
which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-
owners of the estate while it remains undivided."

In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos
– that is, the accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth – the present case must be
maintained against Imelda Marcos and herein respondent Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr.,
as executors of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. While it was
not proven that respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may be in
possession, ownership or control of such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of
the Marcos couple. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does not remove the character
of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.
 ANTIPOLO INING v. LEONARDO R. VEGA
G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013
Del Castillo, J.
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor

DOCTRINE: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the
latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect
a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.

FACTS: Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a parcel of land in Kalibo,
Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was
survived by his siblings Romana Roldan and Gregoria Roldan Ining, who are now both deceased.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent
Leonardo R. Vega. Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I.
Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.

In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s
surviving heir, Leonardo filed for partition against Gregoria’s heirs. Leonardo alleged that on
several occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed
his.

In their Answer, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had
no cause of action against them. They have become the sole owners of the subject property
through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez, who in turn
acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.

ISSUE: Whether the court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court on the ground that
Lucimo Francisco repudiated the co-ownership only on February 9,1979?

HELD: NO. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled
and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of
Leon’s estate.

Leon died without issue; he had siblings, Romana and Gregoria. Since Leon died without issue,
his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares.
In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property upon
the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death.

Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. Thus, having succeeded to
the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners
thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest
of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. 

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. It has been held that "a co-
owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing."

However, it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a
repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not
an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter
Teodora.42 Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession,
exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is. Consequently,
he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this
reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the
property has not been lost.
 G.R. No. 129008             January 13, 2004
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA
assisted by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO
ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her
husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA,
LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P.
ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER
P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA,respondents.
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor

DOCTRINE: Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of
Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.

FACTS: May 13, 1995- Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several
personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. He also left
a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom
he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso
"Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P.
Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.

Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their
children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into
an extra-marital relationship and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.

November 14, 1995- respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June
29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent
located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued
Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora, Veronica,
Alberto and Rowena. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of
P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over
the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.

December 1, 1995- respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration  before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of
administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.

December 4, 1995- respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related
Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register
of Deeds of Dagupan City.

February 5, 1996- petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense
that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the
properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora and that the titles thereof were delivered
to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his name.
They also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but
rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration
proceedings. Petitioners then filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing on the
aforesaid ground.

The lower court denied the motion on the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-
in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed.

This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that the proper party to file
the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased is the
estate of the decedent and not the respondents. The Court of Appeals stated that it discerned no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent
judge when he denied petitioners’ motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its
discretionary nature.

ISSUE: Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case.

HELD: YES. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of
Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property,
rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total
lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and
Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young, this Court
recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent
under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:

The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits
on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules
are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate
have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs
cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of
the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent
are violated or dissipated.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions: (1) if the
executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the administrator is
alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party defendant. Evidently,
the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling
when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed
administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.

All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property
of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, (3) the third
being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.