III.

Common Carriers

a. In General
iv. Nature and basis of liability
Art. 1733, CC

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee., G.R. No. L-

12191, October 14, 1918.

FACTS:

Jose Cangco (Plaintiff), was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company (defendant) in the
capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25.

Cangco, while alighting from the train (at the San Mateo station) operated by the defendant,
stepped on a sack of watermelons resulting to him falling violently on the platform. His body was
drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that
after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to
a full stop.

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was
lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the
accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

The sacks of watermelon had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were
contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon another at the
edge of platform.

The plaintiff sustained very serious injuries. He was then operated on. Evidence shows that the
plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other
expenses in connection with the process of his curation.

August 31, 1915, Cangco instituted this proceeding in the CFI-Manila to recover damages of the
defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the
defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a
menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. The CFI ruled in favor of
the defendant, stating that although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the
fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the
cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and
was therefore precluded form recovering. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Is Manila Railroad Company liable to pay damages due to its employees’ negligence?

RULING: No. Not necessarily because of the employee’s negligence but because of the breach of
contract of carriage.

The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the
obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of
that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to
say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil
Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision.

The liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents,
when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based
upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of
exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for
the breach of his contract.

The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry
him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could
not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.

The defendant’s contention that the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was
his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before
alighting, hence no or apportioned liability shall be imposed, is of no moment.

In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act — that is to say,
whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the
passenger and all other circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger and should
be considered. In this particular instance, the nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement
material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. The plaintiff
was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him
to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. The train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it
came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight
from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company
has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff
would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's
negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.

The only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the
condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus
presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the
obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the
defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers
facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of
some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we
have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the
defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility
concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them
adequately so that their presence would be revealed.

The conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

The Court awarded compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the
sum of P2,500, and the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other
incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
____________

CESAR L. ISAAC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO.,

INC., Defendant-Appellee., G.R. No. L-9671. August 23, 1957.

FACTS:

A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., (defendant), is a corporation engaged in the business of

transporting passengers by land for compensation in the Bicol provinces

On May 31, 1951, plaintiff boarded the defendant’s Bus No. 31 as a paying passenger from Ligao,
Albay bound for Pili, Camarines Sur, but before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a
motor vehicle of the pick-up type coming from the opposite direction, as a result of which plaintiff’s
left arm was completely severed and the severed portion fell inside the bus. Plaintiff was rushed to
several hospitals for blood transfusion, treatment, operation, and monitoring for several months.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant for damages alleging that the collision which resulted
in the loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and recklessness of the driver
of the bus operated by defendant and that defendant incurred in culpa contractual arising from its
non-compliance with its obligation to transport plaintiff safely to his destination. Plaintiff prays for
judgment against defendant for his medical treatment, cost of an artificial arm, for his loss of earning,
for diminution of his earning capacity, moral damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs of suit.

The trial court found that the collision occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the pick-up car
and not to that of the driver of the bus it appearing that the latter did everything he could to avoid the
same but that notwithstanding his efforts, he was not able to avoid it. As a consequence, the court
dismissed the complaint, with costs against plaintiff. This is an appeal from said decision.

ISSUE: Is the defendant liable due to breach of obligation under the contract of carriage?

RULING: No. Trial court’s decision is affirmed.

The Code Commission, in justifying this extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier
(Art. 1733, 1734, 1735, and 1745 (Nos. 5, 6, and 7), 1755, and 1756), says the following:

"A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances.
This extraordinary diligence required of common carriers is calculated to protect the passengers
from the tragic mishaps that frequently occur in connection with rapid modern transportation. This
high standard of care is imperatively demanded by the preciousness of human life and by the
consideration that every person must in every way be safeguarded against all injury. (Report of the
Code Commission, pr. 35-36)" (Padilla, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1956 ed., p. 197).

The following are the principles governing the liability of a common carrier: (1) the liability of a carrier
is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There is breach if it fails to exert
extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of each case ; (2) a carrier is obliged
to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all
the circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of
death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence;
and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel.
Evidence shows that Bus No. 31, immediately prior to the collision, was running at a moderate
speed because it had just stopped at the school zone. The pick-up car was at full speed and was
running outside of its proper lane. The driver of the bus, upon seeing the manner in which the pick-
up was then running, swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road until its front and rear
wheels have gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the rampart of the road. Said driver
could not move the bus farther right and run over a greater portion of the pile, the peak of which was
about 3 feet high, without endangering the safety of his passengers. And notwithstanding all these
efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car.

Authorities abound where failure to observe the same degree of care that as ordinary prudent
man would exercise under ordinary circumstances when confronted with a sudden emergency was
held to be warranted and a justification to exempt the carrier from liability. The failure to
exercise the best judgment in such cases does not establish lack of care and skill on the part of the
driver which renders the company liable. Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to
conclude that the driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the
collision and in our opinion this relieves appellee from liability under our law.

In addition, "It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad
voluntarily or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part of his body through
the window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of the window or outer surface of the car, so as
to come in contact with objects or obstacles near the track, and that no recovery can be had for an
injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained." In this case, the appellant
seated himself on the left side thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow
outside the window, this being his position in the bus when the collision took place. It is for this
reason that the collision resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of appellant thus
doing him a great damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is guilty of contributory negligence.
Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill with a portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps
the injury would have been avoided as is the case with the other passengers. It is to be noted that
appellant was the only victim of the collision.

It is true that such contributory negligence cannot relieve appellee of its liability but will only entitle it
to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new Civil Code).

_________________

PAZ FORES, petitioner, vs. IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent., G.R. No. L-12163             March 4,

1959.

FACTS:

Respondent Miranda was one of the passengers on a jeepney (allegedly owned by the petitioner
Fores) driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an
excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to swerve and to his the bridge
wall. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the passengers were injured,
including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He was taken to the
National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations.

The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon
interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. On the other hand, defendant-petitioner Paz
Fores brings this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (C.A. Case No. 1437-R)
awarding to the respondent Miranda actual damages, counsel fees, and moral damages, with costs.
It is the petitioner's contention that on March 21, 1953, or one day before the accident happened,
she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner liable for the damages awarded?

RULING: Yes, except for the moral damages which was eliminated.

In the assumption that the sale of the subject passenger jeep is a fact, the Public Service
Commission’s approval is necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying
therewith the authority to operate the same. Interpreting the effects of Section 20 of the Public
Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146), the Court has held in the recent cases that a transfer
contemplated by the law, if made without the requisite approval of the Public Service
Commission, is not effective and binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under
the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. The provisions of the statute are clear and
prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the property, franchise, certificate, privileges
or rights, or any part thereof of the owner or operator of the public service Commission. The law was
designed primarily for the protection of the public interest; and until the approval of the public
Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still under the service
of the owner or operator standing in the records of the Commission which the public has a right to
rely upon. It appears that no such approval was given by the Commission before the accident
occurred, hence, the petitioner is liable.

Actual damages are awarded based on the respondent’s expenses and loss of income.

As for moral damages, it must be discarded because, based on Art. 2220 of NCC, in case of breach
of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or
deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages (with the exception
of Art. 1764 where a death of a passenger entitles the deceased passenger to "demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" (Necesito vs. Paras). In the
case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages.

It is also suggested that a carrier's violation of its engagement to safety transport the passenger
involves a breach of the passenger's confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a breach of
contract in bad faith, justifying recovery of moral damages under Art. 2220. This theory is untenable,
for under it the carrier would always be deemed in bad faith, in every case its obligation to the
passenger is infringed, and it would be never accountable for simple negligence; while under the
law (Art. 1756). the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently (and not
maliciously), and Art. 1762 (on contributory negligence) speaks of negligence of the common
carrier.

It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice; but that fact must be
shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the
contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.

Upon the other hand, the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract
of transportations explains, to some extent, the limitations imposed by the new Code on the amount
of the recovery. The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a
presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger; that latter is relieved
from the duty to established the fault of the carrier, or of his employees, and the burden is
placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to an unforseen event or to force
majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768, 777). Moreover, the carrier, unlike in
suits for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees (Art. 1759, new civil code; Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co., supra; Prado vs. Manila Electric Co., 51 Phil., 900).

______________

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., respondents., G.R. Nos. 66102-04,
August 30, 1990.

FACTS:

About 11:00AM on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua and six other boarded the jeepney owned
by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau,
Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan. Their contract with Manalo was for
them to pay P24.00 for the trip. The private respondents' testimonial evidence on this contractual
relationship was not controverted by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, nor by Filriters Guaranty
Assurance Corporation, Inc., the insurer of the jeepney, with contrary evidence.

Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney was
detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of
which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn,
invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road which is the right of way of vehicles
coming from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes. Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden
U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit and delos Reyes,
or after stopping for a couple of minutes as claimed by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, the bus
bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the collision, three
passengers of the jeepney died while the other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries.

Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the CFI by the heirs of the deceased
passengers. In all three cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos Reyes
were all impleaded as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and
Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based
their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. was
also impleaded as additional defendant in one civil case. Among others, the plaintiffs sought to
collect amounts for medical expenses, burial expenses, civil indemnity, loss of wages, exemplary
damages, moral damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation.

The trial court found Manalo negligent and ordered that defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma
Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo thru their negligence, breached contract of carriage with their
passengers be jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the damages awarded, including the cross
claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.

On appeal, the IAC reversed the CFI’s decision by finding delos Reyes negligent and ordered him
and the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the awarded
damages. It applied primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers
who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by
other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test. The MR was denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the
jeepney?
RULING: No. The decision of the CFI is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that only Isidro
Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the
victims or their heirs and that the amount of indemnity for loss of life is increased to thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00 from P3,000.00).

The principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners
and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the
negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty
of negligence."

On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident, it is an undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt. Delos Reyes could
not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. The respondent court did not realize
that the presumption was rebutted by this piece of evidence.

With regard to the substantial factor test, it cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed
when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming the IAC’s
calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. Delos Reyes cannot be
faulted for not having avoided the collision as he had little time to react to the situation (roughly
2.025 seconds). To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside
from the time element involved, there were no options available to him: he cannot swerve to its right
(western shoulder) because the road was narrow and had tall grasses which would indicate that it
was not passable, and he cannot swerve to its left (eastern lane) because considering the time
element involved, he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either
head on or broadside.

The Court find that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses
Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac
vice.

In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code  or that the death or injury of the passenger
was due to a fortuitous event  (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).

The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Caridad
Pascua, Police Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's) conviction for the crime
of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless
Imprudence, and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supra. The negligence of
spouses Mangune and Carreon was likewise proven during the trial.

In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his
passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or
through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers
liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith,
Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).

The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon were
negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with
Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in
case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly,
the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of
contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such
breach be due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al.,). In other words,
the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his
driver's negligence is his.  Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier,
that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled
to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver,  contradictory to the explicit provision of
Article 2181 of the New Civil Code. 

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD,
Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents., G.R. No.
145804, February 6, 2003.

FACTS:

On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station. While Navidad
was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to
the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two ensued that
led to a fist fight. Later on, Navidad fell on the LRT tracks and at the exact moment, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and
he was killed instantaneously.

The widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint
for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent (agency of Escartin) for the death of her husband. Prudent denied
liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security
guards.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent
Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs damages.
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.

Prudent appealed to the CA. the CA promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent
from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly
and severally liable. It ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the
train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor.
In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security
agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows
upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his
having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman.
The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact
that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train. MR was denied.

ISSUE: Are the petitioners liable?

RULING: Yes for LRTA. No for Roman. The assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner
Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability.

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring
the safety of passengers.

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances (Art. 1755, NCC). Such duty of a common
carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the
trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for
death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its employees or b) on
account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission (Art. 1759, 1763, NCC). In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been
at fault or been negligent (Art. 1756, NCC), and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved
of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden
shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In
the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it
has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.

The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the
safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the
services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

The CA’s finding that there is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor, for the reason that the
negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven is justified by the records of the case.

There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act
or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the
LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be
made liable only for his own fault or negligence.

The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.