Manuel II Palaeologos on the Strife between Bāyezīd I and Ḳāḍī Burhān al-Dīn Aḥmad

Author(s): Elizabeth A. Zachariadou

Source: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 43,
No. 3 (1980), pp. 471-481
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of School of Oriental and African Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/615736
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 MANUEL II PALAEOLOGOS ON THE STRIFE BETWEEN
BAYEZID I AND KADI BURHAN AL-DIN AHMAD
By ELIZABETH A. ZACHARIADOU

The letters of the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Palaeologos, studied and

exploited by Byzantinists since they were published for the first time by
E. Legrand in 1893, are now available in a new edition by G. Dennis, in which
they are translated, accompanied by the appropriate commnentsand, in most
cases, accurately dated.1 These letters constitute a most valuable contemporary
source for the years 1382-1417 because they help to fill one part of the much
deplored 'gap ' in Byzantine historiography. Moreover, they include evidence
which sheds light on some details of early Ottoman history, as will appear from
the following analysis of Manuel's material dealing with the conflict between the
sultan Bayezid I and the ruler of Sivas, Kadi Burhan al-Din Ahmad in 1391.
Manuel II participated in the military campaigns of that year as a vassal
of the Ottoman sultan,2 and while in the Ottoman camp he wrote eight letters
to various personages in the palace circle. These letters, included in the new
edition under the numbers 14-21,3 contain information about the progress of
the campaigns which can, a priori, be considered reliable and impartial: the
Byzantine emperor was in the sultan's company4 and was an eye-witness of
the events, but, as his own writings reveal, he was not emotionally involved.
As to Manuel's intention when he wrote those letters, one can venture a guess.
It is reasonable to suppose that this refined scholar, with his thorough classical
and theological education, chose, in the midst of the hardships of the campaign,
to devote his rare free and quiet hours to the composition of elaborate letters
in which to give expression to his feelings: his unhappiness at serving in the
army of his enemies, his consternation at the slaughter that he was witnessing,
and his sorrow at being cut off from any contact with ' education and refine-
ment'. Nevertheless, one may assume that Manuel's letters also served the
further purpose of informing his people and his allies, the Venetians, about the
events in progress. There cannot be any doubt that both Constantinopolitans
and Venetians were eager to know the sultan's movements-and it may be
recalled that Demetrios Kydones, to whom most of the letters were addressed,
was a Byzantine of Venetian citizenship.5 Thus the letters to be examined
acquire even more value as a source.
These eight letters of Manuel II, preserved in an autograph, do not bear
a date. Nevertheless one can be fairly certain that they were composed during
the second half of the year 1391, for it is known that the Emperor left his
capital on 8 June of that year to join the Ottoman army and that he was back
early in January 1392. The possibility that the letters were composed in the
1 G. T. Dennis, The letters of Manuel II Palaeologus: text, translation and notes, Dumbarton
Oaks Texts iv, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae, vol. vIII, Washington, 1977 (hereafter:
Dennis, Letters).
2 J. W. Barker, Manuel II
Palaeologus (1391-1425): a study in late Byzantine statesmanship,
New Brunswick-New Jersey, 1969, 84-98. For a better understanding of the Ottoman history
of those years, see the review by H. Inalcik, in Archivum Ottomanicum,III, 1971, 272-85.
3 Dennis, Letters, 36-63.
4 It is worth
mentioning that Manuel's letter 16 finishes as follows: 'I can all but make out
the messengers inviting us to go off to the ruler [i.e. Bayezid]. I suppose he again wants to
drink a few toasts before dinner and to force us to fill ourselves with wine from his varied
collection of golden bowls and cups. He thinks that these will assuage the depression caused by
what we have been writing about . ..' (Dennis, Letters, 48).
5 See R. Loenertz, ' D6m6trius Cydones, citoyen de Venise ', in Echos d'Orient, xxxvii, 1938,
125-6; cf. Dennis, Letters, xxxix.
VOL. XLIII. PART 3. 33
472 ELIZABETH A. ZACHARIADOU

previous year, 1390, when also Manuel II participated in the campaigns of

Bayezid I, can be safely excluded, for it is well known that in 1390 BSyezid
was operating against the western emirates and the Karamanids, whereas the
letters in question report activities of the Ottomans in the regions of Sinop
and Samsun and beyond the Kizil Irmak; furthermore, the presence of the
Emperor in the Ottoman army operating in the regions of Pontos and in
'Phrygia' is confirmed by a letter of Demetrios Kydones evidently written in
1391.6 The possibility that the letters were composed during the following
year can also be excluded, because there is no evidence that the Emperor served
in the Ottoman army in 1392 and because it is doubtful whether Bayezid
undertook any campaign in Anatolia in that year (see below). The history of
the years from 1393 onwards excludes any other dating of the letters.
The first signs of the conflict between Burhan al-Din and the Ottomans
had appeared in the last years of the reign of Murad I, when the young and
vigorous Ottoman state started intervening in the affairs of the emirate of
Kastamonu, then under the rule of the Isfendiyarids, in an effort to expand
towards those regions.7 However, with Bayezid's accession the conflict turned
into open war, since the new sultan was determined to unify Anatolia under
Ottoman rule. As soon as he had crossed from Europe to Asia Minor (shortly
after 15 June 1389) he went into action: he annexed the city of Philadelpheia
and occupied the Turkish emirates of Western Anatolia. Then he proceeded
to the siege of Konya. The Karamanids appealed to Burhan al-Din for help,
but soon concluded a treaty with the Ottomans.8
Bayezid's next objective was the emirate of Kastamonu, which he soon
occupied, thus posing a grave threat to the state of Burhan al-Din.
Before we pass on to analyse Bayezid's further military action as depicted
by Manuel II, we may clear up an uncertainty concerning the date of the
conquest of the emirate of Kastamonu by the Ottomans and of the death of
the Isfendiyarid Siileyman Pasha II. Historians have not agreed on the year
of those two closely connected events, which shortly preceded the first clash
between the Ottomans and the ruler of Sivas; they have been variously dated
to 1391, 1392 and 1393.9 However, an entry from the expense account of the
6 On the
manuscript see Dennis, Letters, xxi-xxv. For the dates of the emperor's departure
from Constantinople and of his return, see Barker, Manuel II, 87 and 99; for Kydones's letter
see R. J. Loenertz, Demetrius Cydones: Correspondance,II, Vatican City, 1960, 406-8.
7 On the emirate of Kastamonu see
Encyclopaedia of Islam (second ed.), s.vv. ' Isfendiyar
'
oghlu ' (by J. H. Mordtmann) and' Kastamuini' (by C. J. Heywood); cf. also Y. Yiicel, ,oban-
ogullarl beyligi', in Ankara Universitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakiultesi Dergisi, xxIII, 1-2,
1965, 61-73; also Elizabeth A. Zachariadou,' Pachymeres on the "Amourioi" of Kastamonu ',
in Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, iii, 1977, 57-70; on the years we are examining see
Y. Yiicel, 'Kastamonu'nun ilk fethine kadar Osmanli-Candar miinasebetleri (1361-1392)',
in Tarih Araittrmalarz Dergisi, i/1, 1963, 133-44.
8 On Bayezid I see mainly Encyclopaediaof Islam (second ed.), s.v. ' Bayazid I ', by H. Inalcik.
On the conquest of the Turkish emirates of Western Anatolia see P. Wittek, Das Firstentum
Mentesche (Istanbuler Mitteilungen, 2), Istanbul, 1934, 77-83; a somewhat earlier terminus
ante quem for the conquest of Aydm and Mente?e can be established, namely 6 March 1390, for
in the ' commissio ' of the Venetian ambassador to the Ottoman sultan which bears this date,
one matter recommended is the recognition by the Ottoman sultan of the treaties concluded in
the past between Venice and the two emirates; by then therefore the two emirates were already
annexed to the Ottoman state; see N. Jorga, ' Venetia in Marea Neagra ', in Analele Academiec
Romdne, ser. II, xxxvi, 1913-14, 1102-3.
9 Mordtmann, ' Isfendiyar oghlu ', in EI (second ed.), places the events in 1393; Inalclk,
' Bayazid I', in El (second ed.), places them in 1392, as does t. H. Uzun9arfili, Osmanlz Tarihi
(second ed.), I, Ankara, 1961, 276, n. 2 (with some hesitation); the year 1392 has been accepted
by Yiicel, ' Kastamonu'nun ilk fethine kadar ', 142-3; cf. idem, Kadi Burhaneddin Ahmed ve
devleti (1344-1398), Ankara, 1970, 112-13; also by E. Werner, Die Geburteiner Grossmacht-
die Osmanen (second ed.), Wien-Koln-Graz, 1972, 169. H. H. Giesecke, Das Werk des 'Aziz ibn
ArdaRirAstaribadd, Leipzig, 1940, 86 and 132, dates the event to 1391.
 MANUEL II PALAEOLOGOS 473

Genoese colony of Pera allows us to establish that Bayezid conquered the

emirate of Kastamonu and killed Siileyman Pasha shortly before 5 July 1391,
for on that day the book-keeper of the Genoese administration noted that he
gave a certain amount of money to a qavuqwho had brought a letter in which
the sultan announced to the podesta of Pera his victory over the pasha of
Kastamonu, as well as the latter's death and the conquest of his whole
territory.10 As there is no reason to believe that the sultan delayed the
announcement of his new triumph to the Genoese, the annexation of the
territories of Siileyman Pasha must have taken place late in June 1391. After
this victory, only the port of Sinop, which constituted a separate principality
under Siileyman's brother Mubariz al-Din, remained under Isfendiyarid rule.
It was on 8 June of that year, 1391, that Manuel II, in obedience to the
sultan's command, left Constantinople in order to join the Ottoman army.l1
Thus one may assume that the Emperor participated in the campaign against
Siileyman or, at least, in the last phase of it. There is, however, no mention of
the conquest of Kastamonu in Manuel's letters.
After the conquest of the territories of Siileyman Pasha, Bayezid apparently
intended to advance south-east and to oblige the amir of Amasya, as well as
some other lords ruling over small but strategically important principalities to
the south of the Black Sea, to become his allies-either willingly or under
compulsion; in so doing he would compel Burhan al-Din to renounce any
plans to expand to the Pontic regions.
On the other hand, the expansion of the Ottomans constituted an obstacle
to the projects of Burhan al-Din, who had for several years been contemplating
the conquest of the important city of Amasya and was gradually proceeding
towards the occupation of various fortresses around it.12 Thus the clash
became inevitable.
The only contemporary source describing this clash, and the only one
which has been relied on hitherto, is the Bazm u Razm of 'Aziz ibn Ardashir
Astarabadi, who completed it as a protege of Burhan al-Din. Ibn Ardashir's
narrative is fairly consistent, and has been considered more trustworthy than
the Ottoman and Byzantine sources, since these were composed some decades
later and contain doubtful passages, including some obvious anachronisms
regardingthe events in question.13 Manuel'sinformation concerning Bayezid I's
campaign against Burhan al-Din is not, in general, incompatible with that
given by Ibn Ardashir. Moreover, it adds some new evidence which helps to
make the whole episode clearer. According to Ibn Ardashir, when Burhan
al-Din learned of Bayezid's advance against Kastamonu, he too marched
towards this region; news then reached him of the defeat and death of
Siileyman Pasha, soon to be confirmed by a letter addressed to him by
Bayezid himself. Burhan al-Din continued his march against the Ottomans
and assembled new forces, while Bayezid, already at Osmancik, sought to
come to terms with him. But Burhan al-Din put forward as a condition the

10L. T. Belgrano, Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la Colonia di Pera, secondo saggio
delle spese della Masseria, Atti della Societa Ligure di Storia Patria, xiii, 1877-84, 164: ' quodam
Jhansio turcho nuncio domini Jhalabi, qui portavit literam domini Jhalabi ad dominum
potestatem de victoria quam habuit de Bassa de Castamen et quo modo percussit eum et obtinuit
totum suum territorium '. ' Jhansio ' is obviously a misreading of Jhausio (i.e. ca'uf); ' dominus
Jhalabi ' is the usual expression of the Genoese for Bayezid I (see also infra, notes 37 and 40);
' Bassa de Castamen ', i.e.
11See note 6 above. Papa of Kastamonu, is undoubtedly Siileyman II.
12 Yiicel, Kadi Burhaneddin Ahmed ve devleti, 34-111.
13
For the confusion in Chalkokondylas see Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, Der Islam, L, 1973, 368.
474 ELIZABETH A. ZACHARIADOU

evacuation of the region of Osmancik, which he considered as his own. In the

meantime Ahmad, the amir of Amasya, Mahmfid Qelebi and Kilic Arslan
(i.e. the sons of the late lord of Niksar Taj al-Din) and the Tasan-ogullar
(i.e. the lords of the Merzifonregion), as well as various minor chieftains, took
Bayezid's side and became his allies. Bayezid conquered the fortress of Kirk
Dilim, which belonged to the house of the Kuvvaddar, expelling Saydi Mah.md,
a son of the Kuvvaddar-oglu, and soon more petty lords took his side. Burhan
al-Din challenged the Ottomans to battle in the plain of Qorumluand made the
necessary preparations, but the tribesfolk did not appear and the morale of his
men was low. Despite this, Burhan al-Din continued to challenge Bayezid,
who sent a body of warriors to win over the tribes to his side. This body met
the van of Burhan al-Din's army and a bitter battle took place, after which
the Ottomans retreated to the mountains. This event obliged BayezId to
abstain from further confrontation; but Burhan al-Din advanced towards a
narrow mountain pass in which Bayezid was encamped. Further clashes took
place lasting for three days, and Bayezid failed to overcome the enemy forces.
Finally, Burhan al-Din obtained information about the topography of the pass
and attacked the Ottomans, who fled. Burhan al-Din followed this up
immediately by attacking the amir of Amasya and carried out raids against
the regions of Iskilip, Ankara, Kalecik and Sivrihisar, but Bayezid had
disappeared.14
We shall now summarize the information about this war to be found in
the letters of Manuel II or, more precisely, in those numbered 14, 16, 18, 19
and 20, for while the other letters contain some references to the campaign,
these are too vague to be cited.
In the earliest letter, No. 14, written perhaps in the summer, Manuel II
merely expresses his distress, both at seeing the Byzantines and himself fighting
in the land of ' Scythians ' (i.e. Mongols) and at serving as a commander in the
army of his own enemies, the ' Persians' (i.e. the Turks).15
Letter 16 was obviously composed when Manuel was very far from Con-
stantinople. It constitutes a reply to a letter of Demetrios Kydones, which,
Manuel remarks, had traversed much land and many rivers and had finally
reached his camp in a small and wild plain which could furnish the army with
only wood and water that was not altogether clear. The place was completely
deserted as the inhabitants had fled to the woods and mountains to save their
lives. Slaughter beyond description was taking place, inflicted not by the
Turks alone, for the Serbians, the Bulgarians and the Albanians (i.e. the other
vassals of the Ottoman sultan),16 supposing that they were exacting punishment
for what they had suffered from the Turks and proclaiming that they were
avenging Christ, killed all whom they chanced to meet. Manuel was unable to
learn the name of the place in which they were encamped, but he states that
the Ottoman army had first passed Pompeioupolis (Tas Koprii) and then the
' city of Zeno '; then, with Sinop off to the left and with the Halys (Kizil
Irmak) on the right, they marched for many days using the sun as their guide,
for ' we must head directly toward the rising sun if we are not to lose our way '.
Bayezid's purpose was to enslave or win as an ally a certain I7iEra^s, a lord
ruling over ' the territory bordering on Sinop and Aminsos (Samsun) as well
as a few villages and a small number of men '; then, by treaty, to compel
the lord of Sinop, ZTrevTardp,'to accept and observe whatever oaths he might
14 Giesecke, Ibn Ardagir, 85-6.
15Dennis, Letters, 36-9.
16 It is worth noting that the Wallachians are not mentioned.
 MANUEL II PALAEOLOGOS 475

like him to swear'. He would thus be in a position to frighten 'the man who
rules Sebasteia with the Scythians' (i.e. Burhan al-Din). When all this was
achieved, Bayezid said, he would return home.
This letter was written in winter (i.e. not earlier than the middle of October)
and under harsh circumstances; food was scarce in the Ottoman camp and
disease was prevalent.17
In letter 18, written in the middle of winter from a different place, in which
'the soil is without moisture and like sand ', Manuel states explicitly that ' not
one enemy soldier' had attacked the Ottomans; that no ememy was to be
seen, even from a distance; and that the enemy made not a sound from the
woods. The 'once marvellous Scythians' trembled and allowed the Ottomans
to ravage their land with impunity. On the other hand, conditions in the ranks
of the Ottoman army were extremely difficult. Food was becoming scarcer
and there was no pasture for the horses, which were starving and so becoming
useless.18
Despite these troubles the march of the Ottoman army continued, as
indicated by letter 19, under yet worse circumstances: 'terrible famine and
cold, the fording of rivers, the crossing of mountains too barren to sustain
even wild beasts'. However, developments were presumably favouring the
Ottomans, because Manuel remarks that he found it unbearable to be fighting
on behalf of his enemies, adding to their strength and thus diminishing his own.
By this time the military operations seemed to be over, since Manuel expressed
the hope that he would soon be returning home with all the Byzantines serving
under his command. Bayezid had admitted that the Byzantine aid had been
useful to him and promised some reward to the Emperor.19
Nevertheless the campaign apparently continued, as indicated by letter 20.
By now the Ottoman army had advanced to the south-east at least as far as
the latitude of Ankara and had pillaged the territories beyond the Halys: this
is clear from Manuel's mention of a messenger from Constantinople who had
come to Ankara in order to reach Bayezid's army; the messenger was unable
to accomplish his mission since, once the army had passed, the crossings of the
river became full of 'bandits', so that he had had to wait at Ankara, where
the army finally returned. Manuel was preparing to march home.20
The last letter, No. 21, seems to have been written after the end of opera-
tions, while Manuel was on his way back; it is short and contains no specific
information.21
Before proceeding to a comparison between the data of Manuel II and those
of Ibn Ardashir, two points must be clarified: (a) Manuel's terminology with
respect to the population and the states of Asia Minor and (b) the duration and
extent of Bayezid's march against Burhan al-Din.
(a) Like many of the Byzantines of his period, Manuel calls the Ottomans
'Persians'. This ancient Greek term is widely attested as being the name
applied to the Turks in general in the fourteenth century.22 On the other hand,
Manuel calls the enemies of the Ottomans ' Scythians' and he refers to Kadi
Burhan al-Din as 'the man who rules Sebasteia with the Scythians'. Manuel
evidently uses the term Scythians to designate the Mongols, making a clear

17 Dennis, Letters, 43-9.

18 ibid., 54-7.
19ibid., 56-9.
20 ibid., 58-61.
21ibid., 62-3.
22 G. Moravcsik,
Byzantinoturcica (second ed.), Berlin, 1958, I, 252-4.
476 ELIZABETH A. ZACHARIADOU

distinction between the Turkish (Ottoman) state of Western Asia Minor and
the successors or descendants of the old Ilkhanid state, still surviving in central
Anatolia. The population of those territories was both Turcoman and Mongol,
but some continuity with the Mongol regime still existed 23 and Burhan al-Din
had proclaimed himself sultan of the lands formerly subject to the house of
Eretna,24the last of the Ilkhanids in Anatolia. Apart from the political dis-
tinction, it should be noted that during the campaign, Manuel was able to
observe the ethnic differentiation then noticeable in Anatolia. In the regions
of Amasya, Tokat and Qorum, Mongol tribes were established;25 therefore
the term ' Skythai', which is certainly used by Manuel to designate the people
of Burhan al-Din's state, is perhaps also used to identify the Mongol tribes
living in territories independent of the administration of Sivas. This appears
to be the case in letter 14, written somewhere to the west of Tas Koprii.
(b) As to the duration and the extent of the operations, Manuel's data
help us to form a clearer idea. Ibn Ardashir's narrative does not include any
specific chronological indications; moreover it contains only three place-
names (Osmanclk, Kirk Dilim and Qorumlu). One is thus left with the
impression that the Ottoman army did not advance for very long against
Burhan al-Din. The conclusion reached after reading Manuel's letters is con-
siderably different. As already mentioned, the Byzantine emperor left his
capital on 8 June 1391 and he was back again in January of the next year,26
if not a little earlier: his letters refer to the cold wintry weather. He also
reports that Bayezid's army passed over wild mountains from a land in which
the earth was like sand; by this he must mean the Anatolian plateau. He also
states that they crossed the Kizil Irmak and that they ' returned ' to Ankara.27
Therefore it can be safely concluded that the military operations of Bayezid,
which started in Kastamonu in June, continued against Burhan al-Din for
approximately six months, during which-in the depth of winter-Bayezid
marched up the Anatolian plateau and advanced to the south-east at least as
far as the latitude of Ankara in order to attack the enemy. Even if Manuel
had chosen to remain silent about the sufferings of the Ottoman army, one
could have guessed that this military enterprise involved much hardship and
required extreme courage and determination.
As to the results of the operations, one notes first that, whereas Ibn Ardashir
refers to various invitations to battle made by Burhan al-Din, as well as to
some of his victories over Bayezid, Manuel states explicitly that the army of
the ruler of Sivas kept retreating and left the Ottomans to ravage their country.
This substantial difference is readily explainable by Ibn Ardashir's aim of
glorifying his master, Burhan al-Din. Beyond this, however, the writings of
the two authors are in general not incompatible. A comparison can be made,
starting from letter 16, written after the Ottoman army had passed Tas Koprii
and the ' city of Zeno ' which, unfortunately, remains unidentified. At least as
far as Tas Koprii one can assume that the army followed the old Roman road
leading from Nikomedeia to Amasya and passing through Tas Koprii.28 After
23 C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, London, 1968, 362-3.
'
24Encyclopaedia of Islam (second ed.), s.v. Burhan al-Din Kiadi Ahmad ', by J. Rypka.
25 F. Stimer, ' Anadolu'da Mogollar', in Sel9uklu Arafttrmalars Dergisi, i, 1969, 1-147 and
especially 115-16.
26See above, n. 6.
27 The
emperor's stay in Ankara is also known from his own theological work under the
title ' Dialogue which was held with a certain Persian, the worthy Mouterizes, in Ankyra of
Galatia '; see on this matter Barker, Manuel II, 97.
28 W. M.
Ramsey, The historical geographyof Asia Minor, London, 1890, 64-6.
 MANUEL II PALAEOLOGOS 477

the unknown 'city of Zeno ', the army started advancing towards the east
heading 'directly towards the rising sun', with Sinop to the left and the Kizil
Irmak, as yet uncrossed, to the right. Manuel emphasizes that they had to use
the sun as their guide, thus implying that they did not follow an existing road.
After many days' march they reached the small plain, the name of which
cannot be identified. It is nevertheless fairly certain that they were heading
towards Bafra and Samsun. Ibn Ardashirdoes not discuss this part of the march
and the only stopping-place he mentions is Osmanclk. One may hazard the
guess that the Ottoman army turned towards the south later and that Manuelis
describing an earlier stage of the expedition. In any case, at this point Bayezid
was determined not to fight against Burhan al-Din for, Manuel remarks, he
intended only to frighten the ruler of Sivas while exercising pressure upon two
lords of the vicinity in order to ensure their alliance. Trevradpr?S
, identified as
the 'lord of Sinop', is undoubtedly Mubariz al-Din Isfendiyar-oglu, the
brother of Siileyman Pasha. The second lord, H7ECTdS, i.e. Begce,29is not, so
far as I am aware, mentioned by any other source. Since Manuel describes
him as a lord ruling over a territory bordering on Sinop and Samsun, one
might be inclined to look for him among the amirs of Bafra. However, inscrip-
tions from Bafra giving the names of the amirs of that city have survived, and
Begce is not to be found among them.30 Moreover, Manuel's wording con-
cerning the territory of Begce does not suggest a coastal area. One might
equally suppose that Begce was the name of a Ta?an oglu, as the territory of
this petty lord was in the vicinity of Sinop and Samsun; but as very little is
known about all the small principalities of the Pontic region, the research can
go no further.31 Moreover,Manuel does not inform us of the result of Bayezid's
pressure upon the two lords. What is certain, however, is that the Ottomans
did not conquer Sinop in that year.32
Later, the Ottoman army moved towards the south and arrived at
Osmancik.33Bayezid still followed the same policy. According to Ibn Ardashir,
when he reached Osmancik he was prepared to come to terms with Burhan
al-Din and he also started political manoeuvres to win the support of the
amir of Amasya and of some petty lords of the region. He then took Kirk
Dilim 34 by force, a fact Manuel may have ignored because the operation was
easy and quick.

29 Dennis, Letters, 49, proposes that HEV'TLasstands for a combination of the titles
beg and
shdh;T there is no obvious reason why the letters g and sh should be transcribed by the Greek
letters and t which produce a different sound. e'iTads is obviously Begce, which was also the
name of one of the sons of Evrenos: Encyclopaedia of Islam (second ed.), s.v. ' Evrenos oghullari '
(by I. M6elikoff). For the change g/i see J. Deny, Grammairede la langue turque, Paris, 1921, 59.
In Moravcsik, Byzantinoturcica,II, 250, Begce is inadvertently qualified as ' Osmanische
Statthalter '.
30 Z. Oral, ' ve Bafra'da iki tiirbe ', Belleten, xx, 79, 1956, 385-410.
31For these Duragan
principalities see Yiicel, Kadi Burhaneddin Ahmed ve devleti, 64-5, 89 and 111.
32 See below,
p. 478.
33 For which see islam '
Ansiklopedisi, s.v. Osmancik ', by B. Darkot.
34Kirk Dilim is a village near (orum; a mountain in that region is also called Kirk Dilim
Dag: F. Taeschner, Das anatolische Wegenetznach osmanischen I, Leipzig, 1924, 203.
Quellen,
On the descendants of the Kuvvaddar-oglu see M. Z. Oral, ' Kuvvaddar ogullari', in Belleten,
XIX, 73, 1955, 99-102. Ne?ri, when relating events which he dates to 794 (1391-2), mentions a
battle between Bayezid I and Burhan al-Din which had taken place earlier: Mehmed Ne?ri,
Kitdb-i Cihan-nimd, ed. F. R. Unat-M. A. Koymen, I, Ankara, 1949, 320-1. Ne?ri's source is
a chronological list in which the event is placed around the year 799 (1396-7), see V. L. Menage,
Neshri's history of the Ottomans,London, 1964, 16-17 and 76. As has been noted, Ibn Ardashir
mentions the conquest of Kirk Dilim by Bayezid but not a battle against Burhan al-Din at
this place, while Manuel ignores the Kirk Dilim episode completely. Is the chronological list
reporting another incident which took place later, when Bayezid returned to Anatolia ?
478 ELIZABETH A. ZACHARIADOU

While in Osmancik, Bayezid realized that Burhan al-Din was unwilling to

negotiate, and so began to advance against him. From that point onwards the
accounts of the two authors differ in that Ibn Ardashir presents Burhan al-Din
as making repeated challenges, while Manuel reports the continuous retreat of
Burhan al-Din's army, terrified by the superiority of the Ottomans. However,
the story of the contingent which, according to Ibn Ardashir, had been
despatched to call the tribes to join the Ottoman camp but was dispersed by
Burhan al-Din's van, may well be historically true, although exaggerated by
Ibn Ardashir as to the extent of the victory.
According to Manuel, the Ottoman army advanced, despite all vicissitudes,
over the Anatolian plateau. The Byzantine emperor does not report any
clashes. Moreover, in letter 19 he implies fairly clearly that the Ottomans
consolidated their power with this campaign; that the sultan was satisfied
with the results and-obviously for this reason-promised the emperor some
reward; and finally, that there were no casualties among the Byzantines under
his command. At that point, for which there is no geographical indication, the
expedition seemed to have reached its end. The fact that it continued, as
shown by letter 20, suggests that although Burhan al-Din had retreated con-
siderably, the sultan finally decided to cross the Kizil Irmak and to plunder
the region beyond it. Most probably the crossing took place near Ankara, for
Manuel states that after the raid the army ' returned' to that city. Once the
army had crossed the river, 'bandits' appeared behind it and it thus appears
to have been cut off from the rear for a time. The bandits could well have been
nomads unfriendly towards the Ottoman sultan and favourably disposed
towards the ruler of Sivas, but this can only be hypothesis. Perhaps Ibn
Ardashir is referring to this stage of the operations when he narrates the last
clash, after which Bayezid is presented as fleeing. However, the Ottomans did
not flee, but merely withdrew after the raid. The situation never became
critical for them since, Manuel implies, they pillaged the regions beyond the
Kizil Irmak without meeting any serious resistance and then finally withdrew
to Ankara. The arrival at this Ottoman city 35obviously meant the end of the
campaign. Bayezid and his army stayed for a while at Ankara to relax and
entertain themselves.36 Return to Bursa or to Constantinople was an easy
matter. It can be presumed that after the departure of the Ottomans, Burhan
al-Din did indeed despatch his troops to carry out raids against the regions of
Iskilip, Kalecik, Ankara and Sivrihisar, as reported by Ibn Ardashir.
Manuel II was back in his capital at least by the beginning of January 1392.
Bayezid most probably reached Bursa at approximately the same time; in
any case, he was certainly in that city by the end of May or early in June.37

Having established these dates one can attempt a survey of the events of
the year 1392. It seems that in spring 1392 Bayezid planned a new campaign

35 On Ankara see P. Wittek, ' Zur Geschichte Angoras im Mittelalter ', in Festschrift G. Jacob,
T. Menzel (ed.), Leipzig, 1932, 329-54.
36 Cf. another text of Manuel
quoted by Dennis, Letters, 50-1.
37On 2 June the Genoese of Pera paid someone 'pro portando litteras pro parte domini
potestatis in Bursia Turchie ad dominum Jhalabi': Belgrano, Prima serie di documenti, 172;
cf. N. Jorga, ' Notes et extraits pour servir a l'histoire des croisades au XVe siecle: registres de
comptes de la colonie genoise de Pera', in Revue de l'Orient Latin, rv, 1896, p. 78. Between
February and June 1392 there was frequent coming and going of messengers and ambassadors
between Bayezid I and the Genoese of Pera (Jorga, ' Notes et extraits ', 77-8), whence one
could guess that the sultan was in Bursa; but only in the passage quoted above is there a specific
mention of this city.
 MANUEL II PALAEOLOGOS 479

in Anatolia. At least, this information had reached Venice in April of that year.
The sultan was said to be considering the conquest of Sinop, which he intended
to attack by sea, and for this reason the armament of the appropriate vessels
was taking place in Constantinople, Thessalonica and elsewhere. Manuel II
was going to join the Ottoman forces again to serve as an admiral (capitaneus
armate). The Venetians, presumably alarmed by the naval preparations of the
Ottomans, mobilized their fleet and tried to organize a league against them.38
Either owing to those Venetian activities or to the appearance of the
Hungarians in the regions of Rascia, on the Danube frontier, Bayezid gave up
the new campaign in Anatolia 39 and crossed to Europe. Certain Western
documents suggest that Bayezid was in Rumili in autumn 1392. Taken alone,
none constitutes a proof, but the documents considered together indicate the
sultan's presence in Rumili and perhaps, more precisely, in his north-western
provinces.
(1) According to an entry in the expense accounts of Pera, dated 12 Septem-
ber 1392, the Genoese gave some money to a certain Turk of Bayezid because
he brought the 'news of the Hungarians'. Again, according to another entry
dated 16 October, they gave some money to a Turk, a messenger of Bayezid,
who announced the ' news of the king of Hungary ,.40 It is known that the
king of Hungary had set off against the Ottomans in May 1392; in the summer
of that year he was confronting the Ottoman army in Rascia, near the Danube,
and the campaign continued at least up to September.41 It is not certain that
Bayezid was present in the Ottoman army opposing the Hungarians, but
clearly he was somewhere in the regions near the front and, therefore, he
thought it might be useful to send messengersto the Genoese of Pera to announce
the progress of the operations. It is hard to believe that the sultan informed the
Genoese from Anatolia about events taking place in Rascia.
(2) On 7 October 1392, the Venetian senate discussed the capture of the
lord of Dulcigno, George Strazimir Balsic, and one of his relatives, both at the
hands of Bayezid. They also discussed the agreement between the sultan and
the two prisoners whereby the latter would be liberated if Dulcigno, Scutari
and other places in Albania surrenderedto the Ottomans.42
It should perhaps be remarked at this point that the Venetian documents
of those years give rise to considerable confusion because they mention the
Ottoman sultan Bayezid and the captain of the marches Pasa Yigit under
very similar names. Despite this vexing factor, distinction is not impossible.
Bayezid I is mentioned in the Venetian documents as 'Baysit ' or 'Baysith' or
'
Baisit(us) ', accompanied usually by the title 'bey' or' dominus'. PapaYigit is

38 Jorga, ' Venetia in Marea Neagra ', 1107-9; Loenertz, Demetrius Cydones:
Correspondance,
ii,446-9; cf. G. T. Dennis, ' The second Turkish capture of Thessalonica, 1391, 1394 or 1430 ? ',
in Byzantinische Zeitschrift, LVII, 1964, 54; also F. Thiriet, Regestesdes deliberationsdu senat de
Venise concernantla Romanie, I, Paris-The Hague, 1958, 194.
39Barker, Manuel II, 105, produces some evidence to indicate that Manuel did not participate
in an expedition of Bayezid at this time.
40Jorga, ' Notes et extraits ', 75: ' quodam Turco domini Jhalabi, pro suo alafa, qui aportavit
niova Hungarorum '; Belgrano, Prima serie di documenti, 174: ' pro quodam turco nuntio
Jhalabi, qui portavit nova domini regis Hungarie '.
41 A. Fekete Nagy-L. Makkai, Documenta historiam Valachorum in
Hungaria illustrantia,
Budapest, 1941, 429-32, nos. 383-6; cf. A. Huber, 'Die Gefangennehmung der K6niginnen
Elisabeth und Maria von Ungarn und die Kampfe K6nig Sigismunds gegen die neapolitanische
Partei und die iibrigen Reichsfeinde in den Jahren 1386-1395 ',A.rcliv fufr 6sterreichische
G(eschichte,LXVI, 1885, 535-7.
42J. Valentini, Acta Albaniae Veneta saeculorum XIV et XV, ii, Milan, 1968, 160-2; on
these events cf. also K. Jirecek, ' Skutari und sein Gebiet im Mittelalter ', in Ludwig von
Thalloczy, Illyrisch-albanische Forschungen,I, Munich-Leipzig, 1916, 105.
480 ELIZABETH A. ZACHARIADOU

mentioned in the Venetian documents as 'Basait(us)' or 'Pasait(us)' or 'Pasayt'

and qualified as 'capitaneus' or 'locumtenens' or 'voyvoda Turcorum .43
In the document issued by the Venetian senate with respect to the above-
mentioned events there is a reference to 'Baysit' qualified as ' dominus
turchus '; also of Dulcigno and Scutari as cities due to pass 'sub potentia et
dominio dicti Baysit '. There can hardly be any doubt that these expressions
refer to the sultan himself. Moreover the document in question refers to the
capture of the two lords as having been made by Bayezid himself (facta per
Baysit), as were the agreements (conventionibus factis inter dominum turchum
et dictos dominos), thus giving the clear impression that the sultan himself was
responsible both for the capture and for the negotiations. He must therefore
have been present somewhere not very far from the domains of George Balsic.
(3) A document of Vuk Brankovic, the son-in-law of the king of Serbia,
Lazar (d. 1389), was issued at Pristina on 21 November 1392 concerning the
monastery of Chilandar (Mount Athos), in which the Serbian lord announced
to the monks that he had concluded a treaty with Bayezid; that he had pro-
ceeded with a land census; and that for that reason he had made arrangements
concerning a certain property of the monastery situated within his domain.44
Vuk Brankovi6 was the lord of an independent principality in the region of
Pristina.45 He may well have concluded a treaty with Bayezid after the battle
of Kossovo, but it seems unlikely that he would only decide to announce it to
the monastery of Chilandar three years later. Vuk is probably referring to a
treaty recently concluded with Bayezid I: the sultan was preoccupied with
his north-western frontier at that time; his army had confronted the Hun-
garians in Rascia; and he was considering the acquisition of Dulcigno and
Scutari. That he should conclude a treaty with the Serbian lord of Pristina
does not seem out of place and, if so, this too indicates the sultan's presence
in those regions.
The change of the sultan's military plans is reported by the Ottoman
historian Nesri, who, in a passage containing obvious anachronisms,46states
clearly that Bayezid postponed a planned campaign in Anatolia and crossed
to Rumili.47 According to Nesri the campaign was to have been directed
against Kastamonu, but a raid of the Wallachians in the Danube regions
obliged the sultan to cross to Rumili. These events, dated by Neri to 1391,
fit very well within the framework of the known history of the year 1392.
It seems very possible that Bayezid, while planning an attack against Sinop
by sea, would also have prepared a land campaign against the region of
Kastamonu, since Burhan al-Din had despatched his troops to Iskilip and
Kalecik immediately after the withdrawal of the Ottoman army. Nesri
attributes the change in the sultan's plans to a raid of the Wallachians on the
Danube frontier, in the region of Katnovasi.48 The Ottomans are known to

43
Loenertz, DenmetriusCydonges:Correspondance,ii, 446-9; Valentini, Acta Albaniae Veneta,
ii, 169 and 183, v, 189-91 and 192, vi, 10-12 and 21-2, etc. It is to be noted that the confusion
Papa Yigit-Bayezid is to be found in a Greek medieval text in which Papa Yigit appears as
HaytLaTrT7s: G. Schir6, Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia di anonimo, Rome, 1975, 446 and 456.
44 F.
Miklosich, Monumenta Serbica spectantia historiam Serbiae, Bosnae, Ragusii, Vienna,
1858, 220-2.
45 On the
history of those years see C. Jirecek, Geschichteder Serben, Gotha, 1918, ii, 114-15,
125-8.
46 Nesri connects
47 Bayezid Kotiirum (dead since 1385) with those events.
Nesri, ed. Unat-Koymen, I, 316-17.
48 On this
episode see A. Decei, ' L'expedition de Mircea Ier contre les akinci de Karmovasi
(1393) ', in Revue des Etudes Roumaines, i, 1953, 130-51 (where passages from other later Ottoman
sources which repeat Ne?ri's version are translated).
 MANUEL II PALAEOLOGOS 481

have been attacked on the Danube frontier in 1392 but in another region, in
Rascia, and not by the Wallachians but by the Hungarians. Nevertheless,
Nesri's information should not be rejected as resulting from confusion. The
Wallachians, who certainly knew about the movements of the Hungarians in
the summer of that year,49might well have been encouraged by rumours that
the sultan was going to be active in Anatolia and so have joined in the attack
on the Ottomans.
Be that as it may, the confusion prevailing in the narrative sources-
Ottoman and non-Ottoman-with respect to Bayezid's reign is not hard to
explain, for this sultan, justly nicknamed Ylldlrim, the ' Thunderbolt ', under-
took so many campaigns that it was difficult to follow his impetuous movements.
49 N.
Iorga, Histoire des Roumains et de la Romanite orientale, II, Bucarest, 1937, 335;
cf. P. P. Panaitescu, Mircea cel Bdtrdn, Bucarest, 1944, 237.