RULES 20 To 33 COMPLETE

Civil Procedure Digest
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Rule 23 Depositions Pending Action
1. FORTUNE CORPORATION vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION

G.R. No. 108119 January 19, 1994 CABEL
Doctrines:
1) Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause that the court may
order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in
the exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means a substantial reason — one that affords a legal
excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons exist is for the court to determine, as there is no hard and
fast rule for determining the question as to what is meant by the term "for good cause shown." A mere
allegation, without proof, that the deposition is being taken in bad faith is not a sufficient ground for
such an order.
2) Under the present Rules, the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not
bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a
ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party. The various methods of discovery as provided
for in the Rules are clearly intended to be cumulative, as opposed to alternative or mutually exclusive
I. Established Facts
An action for breach of contract was filed by Fortune Corporation against Inter-Merchants Corporation,
before the RTC of San Pablo City, Branch 30. After respondent corporation had filed its Answer,
petitioner served the former with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The
interrogatories were answered by respondent corporation through its board chairman, Juanito A. Teope.
The pre-trial conference was thereafter scheduled for January 9, February 12 and April 22, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, however, petitioner served upon private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition
Upon Oral Examination dated March 26, 1992, notifying the latter that on April 7, 1992, at San Pablo
City, herein petitioner would take the deposition of said Juanito A. Teope, in accordance with Section 15,
Rule 24.
Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff's
Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination
· Petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, written interrogatories which
practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case
· There is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral
deposition;
· such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective
deponent, Juanito A. Teope;
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ACOSTA, CABEL, CRUZ, CULAJARA, JUSTINIANO, NIETO, PRACUELLES, RELIGIOSO
· Mr. Teope has no intention of leaving the country

· The intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required
The trial court thereafter issued an order that the requested deposition shall not be taken since the
proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and has signified
his availability to testify in court
MR was denied
II. Petition for Certiorari (CA)

Petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the Supreme Court. However, this Court referred
the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It held that the trial court has discretion to direct that a
deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for so ruling.
III. Petition for Review on Certiorari (SC)
Issues:
1. Whether or not the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals, based on a gross misapprehension
of facts, constitutes reversible error; Yes
2. Whether or not the said order, based on the three reasons stated therein, is arbitrary or whimsical
because it is contrary to reason, logic or equity No
3. Whether or not mere allegation, without proof, that the examination sought by petitioner was
intended merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress the proposed deponent is, as a matter of law, "good
cause" within the purview of Rule 24, Section 16, Rules of Court No
4. Whether or not, absent the requisite element of "good cause" as mandated by Section 16 of Rule 24,
Rules of Court, a trial court has unbridled discretion to forbid the taking of deposition upon oral
examination as authorized under Rule 24, Section 15, Rules of Court. No
IV. Held
I. Petitioner avers that the decision of respondent court dismissing its petition on the ground that appeal
and not certiorari is the proper remedy in this case, is erroneous for the reason that such ruling is based
on facts which are not obtaining in the case at bar, viz.: (a) that petitioner had already obtained a
deposition, which it had not; (b) that said deposition was offered as evidence, which was not done
because there was nothing yet to offer; and (c) that said offer was rejected, which did not happen
because there was nothing to reject as nothing was offered.
Petitioner claims that since the very purpose of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court is to authorize the taking of
a deposition in a pending action, either to make a discovery in preparation for or to be used as evidence
upon the trial of such action, the taking of the deposition in the case at bar should be done and finished
before trial. Hence, it would be a grave abuse of discretion to compel petitioner to proceed with the trial
of the case without the proposed deposition being first undertaken. Appeal will be utterly inadequate to
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remedy the situation because, in that case, the court shall have rendered its decision without the
petitioner having been afforded the opportunity to make use of the answers that the deponent would
have otherwise given as a result of the deposition. Reversal on appeal of the said decision by the public
respondent may only entail retrial in the lower court and added expense, as well as unnecessary delay in
the case. By its very nature, the taking of the deposition in the case at bar should be made and
completed before trial, and the remedy of appeal to determine whether or not the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner thereof is neither proper, much less adequate.
We agree with petitioner.
Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the ROC, the writ of certiorari lies if the following requisites concur : (a) that
it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions; (b) that such tribunal, board
or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The rule is that certiorari will generally not lie to review a discretionary action of any tribunal. Also, as a
general proposition, a writ of certiorari is available only to review final judgments or decrees, and will be
refused where there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is
sought is still pending and undetermined in the lower tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held
that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. This is because, like
other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not
appealable, considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent
offshoot of it.
However, such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary acts will be reviewed where the
lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order
does not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury
throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there
is a clear or serious abuse of discretion.
II. Petitioner asseverates that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the deposition
be not taken in the absence of good cause therefor.
In fine, as we have earlier clarified, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if
the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good
faith and within the bounds of law.
Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause that the court may
order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the
court in the exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means a substantial reason — one that affords
a legal excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons exist is for the court to determine, as there is no
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hard and fast rule for determining the question as to what is meant by the term "for good cause
shown."
The requirement, however, that good cause be shown for a protective order puts the burden on the
party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons for the order. A particular and specific
demonstration of facts, as distinguished from conclusory statements, is required to establish good cause
for the issuance of a protective order. What constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind
of protective order that is sought.
In light of the general philosophy of full discovery of relevant facts and the board statement of scope in
Rule 24, and in view of the power of the court under Sections 16 and 18 of said Rule to control the
details of time, place, scope, and financing for the protection of the deponents and parties, it is fairly
rare that it will be ordered that a deposition should not be taken at all. All motions under these
subparagraphs of the rule must be supported by "good cause" and a strong showing is required
before a party will be denied entirely the right to take a deposition. A mere allegation, without proof,
that the deposition is being taken in bad faith is not a sufficient ground for such an order. Neither is an
allegation that it will subject the party to a penalty or forfeiture. The mere fact that the information
sought by deposition has already been obtained through a bill of particulars, interrogatories, or other
depositions will not suffice, although if it is entirely repetitious a deposition may be forbidden. The
allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting
the taking of a deposition, nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product
doctrine," nor that privileged information or trade secrets will be sought in the course of the
examination, nor that all the transactions were either conducted or confirmed in writing.
In the present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to
support the order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken, for several reasons.
1. We agree with petitioner's submission that the fact that petitioner had previously availed of the mode
of discovery, which is by written interrogatories supposedly covering all claims, counterclaims and
defenses in the case, cannot be considered "good cause", because: (a) the fact that information similar
to that sought had been obtained by answers to interrogatories does not bar an examination before
trial, and is not a valid objection to the taking of a deposition where there is no duplication and the
examining party is not acting in bad faith; and (b) knowledge of the facts by the petitioner concerning
which the proposed deponent is to be examined does not justify a refusal of such examination.
As a general rule, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with
information essential to the expeditious and proper litigation of each of the facts in dispute. Moreover,
it cannot be disputed that the various methods of discovery as provided for in the Rules are clearly
intended to be cumulative, as opposed to alternative or mutually exclusive.
Under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not
bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a
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ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be
desirable to resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other sequence. Additional lines
of inquiry may come to light after the deposition has been taken, as to which written interrogatories
probably would be adequate, and there is no reason why the examining party should not be entitled to
obtain all the relevant information he desires if no substantial prejudice is done to the party from whom
discovery is sought. On the other hand, interrogatories may well be used as a preliminary to the taking
of depositions, in order to ascertain what individuals have the information sought. And, of course, if the
answers to interrogatories are evasive and unsatisfactory, the interrogating party should be able to
utilize the more effective method of oral examination rather than have to reframe interrogatories.
Ordinarily, however, there will be no occasion for a party to use both methods at the same time, at least
to obtain the same information.
2. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness
may be used in court during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the
taking of his deposition.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The
utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result,
there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties of all the facts before
the trial. Such of this testimony as may be appropriate for use as a substitute for viva voce examination
may be introduced at the trial; the remainder of the testimony, having served its purpose in revealing
the facts to the parties before trial, drops out of judicial picture.
Regardless of the development of devices for pre-trial fact investigation, our legal system is now
thoroughly committed to the notion that on trial itself the adducing of facts by viva voce testimony of
witnesses — whose demeanor and manner are subject to the observation of the judge — is superior to
the use of written statements of the same witnesses. Preference for oral testimony has dictated most of
the limitations on the use of depositions as evidence. And since their use as evidence was originally
conceived as the sole function of depositions proper, the limitations on their taking dovetailed with the
limitations on their use. But under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the
double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a
method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have
been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking
toward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable.
3. We are also in conformity with petitioner's submission that the mere fact that the court could not
thereby observe the behavior of the deponent does not justify the denial of the right to take deposition.
The order of respondent Judge cannot be sustained without nullifying the right to take depositions, and
therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1 of Rule 18 (now Rule 24) of the Rules of Court, which,
clearly, was not intended by the framers of section 16 of the same rule.
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4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or
oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if
the following requirements are complied with:
(a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined;
(b) that the motion has been seasonably filed;
(c) that there is good cause shown; and
(d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.
Once a party has requested discovery, the burden is on the party objecting to show that the discovery
requested is not relevant to the issues, and to establish the existence of any claimed privilege. These,
private respondent has failed to do so. Consequently, its objection to the taking of the deposition
cannot be sustained.
Furthermore, the fact that the deposition is to be taken in San Pablo City, whereas the proposed
deponent lives in Manila, is not sufficient to establish private respondent's theory that the requested
deposition was intended to annoy and harass the proposed deponent.
Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his
deposition. No doubt, private respondent and its representative who is to be examined will be
inconvenienced — as are all parties when required to submit to examination — but this is no ground for
denial of the deposition-discovery process. The mere fact that an officer of private respondent would be
required to attend the examination and thereby absent himself from some of his usual business affairs
during the taking of the deposition is utterly insufficient to justify the court in ruling that he is being
annoyed, embarrassed or oppressed, within the meaning of this language. Something far beyond this is
required in this connection to grant a party relief. At any rate, petitioner has signified its willingness to
select a suitable office in Manila for the taking of the deposition in order to accommodate the proposed
deponent.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretion in issuing an order that the deposition shall not be taken in this case, and that
respondent court erred in affirming the same.
Rule 24 Depositions before Action or Pending Appeal
1. DASMARIÑAS GARMENTS, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, and
AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD. (CRUZ)
G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993
DOCTRINE: Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no
"secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously
it may be taken only "before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters
rogatory.
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I. ESTABLISHED FACTS:
Sometime in September, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the American President Lines, Ltd.
sued Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to
twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. (hereafter, simply Dasmariñas)
specifically denied any liability to the plaintiff (hereafter simply APL), and set up compulsory
counterclaims against it.
The case was in due course scheduled for trial on April 27, 1988. On that date APL presented its first
witness whose testimony was completed on November 12, 1988. The case was reset to May 3, 1989 for
reception of the testimony of two (2) more witnesses in APL's behalf.
II. MOTION TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS – FILED BY APL

At the hearing of May 3, 1989, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it
intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for
this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . . "
III. AMENDED MOTION

Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no
consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by
the President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.," it
was necessary — and it therefore prayed — "that commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to
Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112
Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the
aforenamed persons . . . ."
IV. DASMARINAS’ CONTENTION

The motion was opposed by Dasmariñas. It contended that:
(a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court examine a
person within its jurisdiction;"
(b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined
before the Philippine Court;" and
(c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in
open court and not by deposition."
V. LETTER FROM DIR. ROCES

APL submitted to the Trial Court (a) the letter received by its counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of
the Asian Exchange Center, Inc., advising that "this Office can only take deposition upon previous
authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this being "in consonance with the Supreme Court
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Administrative Order requiring courts or judicial bodies to course their requests through the
Department of Foreign Affairs;" and (b) a letter sent by "fax" to the same counsel by a law firm in Taipei,
Lin & Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting information inter alia of the mode by which, under
the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or an abridged copy" of documents on file with a Taiwan Court
may be obtained.
VI. TRIAL COURT GRANTED THE MOTION TO TAKE TESTIMONIES OF PLAINTIFF’S WITNESSES
The Court opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine representative in
Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses (through Director Roces) residing there by
deposition, but only upon written interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses by serving cross-examination."
VI. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION – FILED BY DASMARINAS (DENIED)

GROUNDS:
(1) authority of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (AECI) to take depositions has not been
established, it not being one of those so authorized by the Rules of Court to take depositions in
a foreign state;
(2) AECI's articles of incorporation show that it is not vested with any such authority;
(3) to permit deposition-taking by commission without the authority of the foreign state in
which deposition is taken constitutes infringement of judicial sovereignty; and
(4) depositions by written interrogatories have inherent limitations and are not suitable to
matters dependent on the credibility of witnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the
"most satisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "'affords the greatest protection to the
rights and liberties of citizens."
Motion for reconsideration was denied because "filed out of time" and being a mere rehash of
arguments already passed upon. In the same Order, APL was directed "to take the necessary steps to
implement the order authorizing the . . . (deposition-taking) of its witnesses not later than the end of
this month, otherwise the Court will consider inaction or lack of interest as waiver to adduce additional
evidence by deposition."
VII. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI – FILED BY DASMARINAS BEFORE THE CA (DISMISSED)

Dasmariñas instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals to nullify the orders of
the Trial Court just described. Said Appellate Court restrained enforcement of the orders of March 15,
1991 and July 5, 1991 "in order to maintain the status quo and to prevent the infliction of irreparable
damage and injury upon the petitioner."
After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals (Third Division) rendered judgment on September 23, 1992
denying Dasmariñas petition for certiorari and upholding the challenged orders of the Trial Court. Once
again, Dasmariñas sought reconsideration of an adverse disposition, and once again, was rebuffed. Its
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 11,
1992.
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VIII. DASMARINAS APPEALED TO THE SUPREME COURT (DENIED)

Once again Dasmariñas has availed of the remedy of appeal. It has come to this Court and prays for the
reversal of the Appellate Court's Decision of September 23, 1992 and Resolution dated December 11,
1992. Once again, it will fail.
IX. DASMARINAS’ CONTENTIONS:
Dasmariñas ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:

1) "in holding that a party could, during the trial of the case, present its evidence by
taking the deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity not
authorized by law to take depositions in lieu of their oral examination in open Court
considering that:
a) the taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed
of before the action comes to trial;
b) no urgent or compelling reason has been shown to justify the
departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge;"
2) "in disregarding the inherently unfair situation in allowing private respondent, a
foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its
witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge while petitioner is
obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to the prying eyes and
probing questions of the Judge;" and
3) "in sanctioning the deposition taking of . . . (APL's) witnesses in Taipei, Taiwan, a
foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy,'
before the AECI, a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions."
RULING:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPOSITION-TAKING WILL TAKE PLACE IN PLACE IN A FOREIGN
JURISDICTION NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE PHILIPPINES IN VIEW OF ITS ‘ONE-CHINA POLICY’ IS
CONSEQUENTIAL.
This is inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by
authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by
the Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in accordance, moreover, with the provisions of
the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will
be fully accorded to the adverse party.
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE TAKING OF DEPOSITION IS A MODE OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY TO BE

AVAILED OF BEFORE THE ACTION COMES TO TRIAL.
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Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no
prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of
depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court
"to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134,
Rules of Court), and even during the process of execution of a final and executory judgment (East Asiatic
Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544).
(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION IN THE CASE AT BAR IS A DEPARTURE FROM
THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL JUDICIAL PROCEEDING OF EXAMINING WITNESSES, HENCE, ILLEGAL.
Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial
judge;" but the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken,
inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e.,
the use of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court and
without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided
the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the
existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility — e.g., "that the witness if out of the province and
at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or . . .
that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc."
(Sec. 4 Rule 24, supra, emphasis supplied) — is first satisfactorily established (See Lopez v. Maceren, 95
Phil. 754).
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT) vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO (CULAJARA)
I. ESTABLISHED FACTS/COMPLAINT:
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago — together with
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria
Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda — are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan (SB). The case
was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the PCGG in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The
complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President
Corazon C. Aquino.
II. MOTION
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their
answer, jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF
PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS”.
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The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the opposition. By order
dated January 29, 1988, the Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and accommodate the
defendants, gave the PCGG 45 days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations.
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of
the Rules of Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25.” Basically, they sought
an answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon.
Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs.
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in the . . . case?" The PCGG
responded by filing a motion to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer,"
"weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and
irrelevant under any guise.”
In compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint. As
regards this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of particulars,
through a Manifestation.
III. DECISION
Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, the SB denied the motion to strike out, for bill of
particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual basis. Also
denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out impertinent pleading. The SB declared inter alia the
complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear enough," there are adequate allegations . . . which clearly
portray the supposed involvement and/or alleged participation of defendants-movants in the
transactions described in detail in said Complaint," and “the other matters sought for particularization
are evidentiary in nature which should be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper . . . ." It also opined
that "service of interrogatories before joinder of issue and without leave of court is premature . . .
(absent) any special or extraordinary circumstances . . . which would justify . . . (the same).”
IV. PRE-TRIAL
The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989. On July 25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-
TRIAL BRIEF. The pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989, and all other parties were required
to submit pre-trial briefs on or before that date.
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the SB a pleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff,” and on August 2, 1989, an “Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" as well as
a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. The amended interrogatories chiefly sought
factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's amended complaint through such questions, for
instance, as —
"1. In connection with the allegations . . . in paragraph 1 . . ., what specific property or
properties does the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr. and
Santiago for being ‘ill-gotten'?"
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"3. In connection with the allegations . . . in paragraph 10 (a) . . ., what specific act or acts . . .
were committed by defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in 'concert with' defendant Ferdinand
Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic plan of said defendant Marcos
to accumulate ill-gotten wealth?”
"5. In connection with . . . paragraph 13 . . ., what specific act or acts of the defendants Tantoco,
Jr. and Santiago . . . were committed by said defendants as part, or in furtherance, of the
alleged plan to conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos?”
"7. In connection with . . . paragraph 15 (c) . . . is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case that
Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are beneficially owned
by either or both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that the defendants Tantoco,
Jr. and Santiago, as well as, the other stockholders of record of the same corporation are mere
'dummies' of said defendants Ferdinand and/or Imelda R. Marcos?”
On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for
examination and copying of —
1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which the verification of the
Amended Complaint asserted that the allegations thereof are "true and correct”;
2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented and xx
marked as exhibits for the plaintiff;" and
3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any) and the
decision (of the Chairman and members) to file the complaint" in the case at bar.
SB admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection
of documents (production being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989), respectively. PCGG filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989 (allowing production and inspection of
documents). It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories, which the
SB treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of August 21, 1989 (admitting the Amended
Interrogatories).
After hearing, the SB promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying
reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second, reiterating by
implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG).
V. SUPREME COURT:
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules of
Court: interrogatories to parties, and production and inspection of document and things.
The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and
cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation
theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings. The various modes or instruments of discovery are
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meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the
basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues.
The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain
the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials
are carried on in the dark.
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as
when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The principle is reflected in
Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions) which generally allows the examination of a deponent —
1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending action,
whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party;”
2) as well as:
1) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things" and
2) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.”
In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism,
such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written interrogatories)
under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under Rule
26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of
Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an
answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after
jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave of
court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are
not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.
It should initially be pointed out — as regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave to File
Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 — that it was correct for them to seek leave to serve
interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. In such a
situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the
action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule
25 (dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court." But there was no need for
the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiffs (dated
August 2, 1989) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's complaint, just as there was no need for
the SB to act thereon.
3. GERONIMO CAGUIAT, RUFINA CAGUIAT, FELICIDAD CAGUIAT, FABIAN CAUGIAT, and

APOLONIA CAGUIAT vs. THE HONORABLE GUILLERMO E. TORRES and FRANCISCO CAGUIAT
(JUSTINIANO)
I. Facts:
A. CFI of Rizal
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1. Petitioners are plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8050 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch VIII, presided over by respondent Judge, while respondent
Francisco Caguiat is the defendant therein.
2. After defendant had filed his answer with counterclaim, and the plaintiffs,
their reply to defendant’s answer, the herein petitioners served on
respondent Caguiat a notice to take his deposition.
3. Respondent Caguiat filed with the lower court an urgent motion to prevent
the taking of the deposition or to restrict its scope, which urgent motion the
petitioners opposed.
4. Respondent Judge issued an order, to hold in abeyance the resolution of

his co-respondent's urgent motion until after the pre-trial set for September
8, 1963 which was, however, reset for October 2, 1964 to give the parties
time to consider an amicable settlement. The parties however failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement.
5. Petitioners again served on respondent Caguiat a second notice for the
taking of his deposition upon oral examination, to prevent which, the latter
filed an urgent motion.
6. Petitioners opposed respondent Caguiat's urgent motion.

7. Resolving the urgent motion and the opposition thereto, the respondent
Judge, granted his co-respondent's urgent motion and ordered the
petitioners to refrain from taking the contemplated deposition.
8. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

9. The petitioners' avowed purpose in securing the deposition of
respondent Caguiat is to get the latter to lay his cards on the table and/or to
simplify or abbreviate the proceedings.
10. Respondent Caguiat, on the other hand, affirms that he has already
revealed practically his entire defense, even to the extent of naming his
witnesses, during the pre-trial, so that the necessity of a deposition has
been obviated. In fact, according to respondent Caguiat, he had expressed
willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, but apparently the petitioners
did not want to.
11. We note that the petitioners have not denied respondent Caguiat's

assertion that he had already disclosed all his evidence during the pre-trial,
neither have they belied that personal animosities between them and the
same respondent which went unfettered during the pre-trial, might
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endanger the peaceful and objective conduct of the deposition upon oral
examination.
B. Court of Appeals
1. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of the
CFI of Rizal.
2. CA denied and dismissed the petition for certiorari.
C. Supreme Court
1. Petitioner filed an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the CA which denied
and dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not deposition is necessary since respondent Caguiat had practically
disclosed all his evidence during the pre-trial conference.
Held: NO. Anent the first alleged error, it is readily to be noted that the conclusions of fact of the Court
of Appeals being assailed are binding upon the parties and this Court. Indeed, the finding of that
appellate court to the effect that appellee has a]ready disclosed all his evidence during the pre-trial and
that personal animosities between the parties "might endanger the peaceful and objective conduct of
the deposition upon oral examination" proposed appears well substantiated in the records before Us. As
aptly stated in the appealed decision:
"It is significant that the respondent Judge deferred the resolution of his
co-respondent's first motion to prevent the taking of his deposition or to
restrict its scope, until after the pre-trial (see Annex H). Likewise, the second
urgent motion of the same tenor (Annex M) and the petitioners' opposition
thereto (Annex N) were resolved only after the completion of the pre-trial and
in fact after the parties' joint petition for hearing on the merits had been
granted (Annex J). The fact that the controverted orders were issued only after
the pre-trial supports respondent Caguiat's affirmation that he had revealed his
defense during the trial, and that the respondent Judge had satisfied himself
that after such revelation there was no more need to take the former's
deposition upon oral examination. Indubitably this view must have been shared
by the petitioners, otherwise they would not have filed a joint motion for
hearing on the merits even before the orders in question were issued." (p. 5,
CA's decision).
In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the disclosure by appellee of practically all
his evidence at the pre-trial and the danger of heightening the animosities between the parties during
the proposed taking of the deposition of appellee are not enough to warrant the trial court's order
preventing completely the taking of said deposition. Such contention is untenable.
There can be no question that the trial court has jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion, that a deposition
shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for so ruling. (Cojuangco v. Caluag, L-7952, July 30, 1955,
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unreported) That the right of a party to take depositions as means of discovery is not exactly absolute is
implicit in the provisions of the Rules of Court cited by appellants themselves, sections 16 and 18 of Rule
24, which are precisely designed to protect parties and their witnesses, whenever in the opinion of the
trial court, the move to take their depositions under the guise of discovery is actually intended to only
annoy, embarrass or oppress them. In such instances, these provisions expressly authorize the court to
either prevent the taking of a deposition or stop one that is already being taken.

In the case at bar, aside from having practically disclosed all his evidence at the pre-trial, appellee
expressed willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, which offer, appellants rejected. Moreover,
according to Court of Appeals, the parties herein filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits even
before the orders in question were issued. Under these circumstances, it is inevitable to conclude that
there was indeed no further need for the deposition desired by appellants. It could have served no
useful purpose, for there was nothing anymore to discover. Appellants have not shown any real
concrete reason for such deposition.
It is Our conclusion that this appeal is absolutely without merit. Instead of availing themselves of the
modes of discovery provided in the Rules in the manner that would accomplish one of the basic
purposes for which they have been designed, namely, to cut down trivial discussion about issues of fact
which are better agreed upon rather than formally tried, appellants have chosen to unduly delay this
case by taking the simple incident herein involved to the Court of Appeals and later to this Court.
4. Cariaga vs. Court of Appeals (NIETO)
Luis Miguel Aboitiz, employed at the time of the incident in question and for sometime prior thereto as
Systems Analyst of the Davao Light & Power Company, Inc. (DLPC), received reports that some private
electricians were engaged in the clandestine sale of DLPC materials and supplies. He initiated a covert
operation.
In October, 1988, he sought the assistance of Sgt. Fermin Villasis, Chief, Theft & Robbery Section, San
Pedro Patrol Station, Davao METRODISCOM. He also hired one Florencio Siton, a welder by occupation
and a Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) member, as his undercover agent under the pseudonym
'Canuto Duran', an 'electrician from Kabakan, Cotabato.
'Canuto Duran' struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, at the Miguel
Store, situated in front of the DLPC office along Ponciano Reyes (now Bangoy) Street, Davao City. He told
Ricardo that his boss ordered him to buy electrical materials to be brought to Diwalwal, a gold panning
area in Monkayo, Davao (formerly Davao del Norte).
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On November 17, 1988, Ricardo introduced 'Canuto' to Jonathan at Miguel Store. It turned out that
Jonathan was the assigned driver of DLPC Service Truck 'S-143' assigned to Work Gang 'Venus'. 'Canuto'
inquired from Jonathan if he could supply him with two (2) 15 KVA transformers.
Siton's undercover work came to an abrupt end on February 1, 1989 when members of Sgt. Villasis'
team 'apprehended' 'Canuto' and turned him over, including the electrical wires that he previously
purchased from Jonathan through Ricardo, to the San Pedro Patrol Station. The team was unable to
arrest Ricardo as he had already left when the team arrived at his house. 'Canuto Duran' 'confessed' in
order to persuade Ricardo — and the others who were involved — to likewise come out with the truth.
Thus, when Ricardo and Sergio Jamero appeared at the San Pedro Patrol Station on the invitation of the
police, they confessed to their crimes.
The accused was also invited to the San Pedro Patrol Station but, according to Sgt. Villasis, he refused to
give a statement.
The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not be personally
served upon him as according to his wife, Antonieta Cariaga, he was in Sultan Kudarat and the date of
his return to Davao City was not certain.
II. RTC
The Court finds accused Jonathan Cariaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft, qualified by grave
abuse of confidence.
According to the trial court, "the prosecution's evidence considered as a whole is strong, clear and
convincing. The statements in the extrajudicial confessions of Ricardo Cariaga implicative of the accused
as the source of the stolen articles, corroborated by Siton's testimony and the police records are
formidable compared to the mere puny denial of the accused."
III. CA
On appeal by Jonathan Cariaga, the Court of Appeals affirmed on April 24, 1995, the decision of the
trial court.
The Court of Appeals reasoned out that the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who did not testify in
open court during the criminal proceedings against petitioner is admissible in evidence and properly
considered by the trial court as this was annexed as part of DLPC's position paper submitted to the
National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. RAB-11-05-00308-89, a complaint filed by the accused
for illegal dismissal, as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the credibility of Siton's testimony which corroborated
that of Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement.
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Hence, this petition. (Petition for Review on Certiorari)
The petition raised that The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo
Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it violates the fundamental right of the accused to
meet the witnesses against him face to face. Hence, Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement is not
admissible under Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court for failure of the prosecution to
comply with the strict requirements of said rule
ISSUE: Whether or not the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga which was attached to DLPC’S position
paper in the labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga is admissible as evidence.
IV. SC
Petitioner argues that the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was not presented in court is
inadmissible. The prosecution presented in evidence as Exh. P-2, Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement
which was attached as Annex "8- A" to DLPC's position paper in the labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga
against the latter for illegal dismissal. The trial court admitted the same in evidence despite the timely
objection of the defense counsel; and the Court of Appeals upheld the admission thereof citing as basis,
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence and Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
Section 47 of Rule 130 reads:

SECTION 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving
the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once and did not appear to testify
in the criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out of the
Philippines. In fact, the private prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat, and
previously, his wife informed the sheriff that he was in Sultan Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four
hours drive from Davao City.
It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases, hence, "mere sending
of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise
its coercive power to arrest." In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness arrested
which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed
fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga should not have been
admitted as evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects of this
rule.
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The preconditions set forth must be strictly complied with. The inability to testify does not cover the
case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. The inability must proceed from a grave
cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech.
Rule 25 Interrogatories to Parties
1. Marcelo vs Sandiganbayan
Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto
Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office.Among
those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in
the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. Merete
likewise described the modus operandi of the group.
For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in apprehending
the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved
their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail
bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two accused.
Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to the postal delivery jeep and
proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and
arrested Pasicolan.
The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. They also brought along
with them the motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in their
possession. On their way to the NBI headquarters, they passed by the Makati Central Post Office,
intending to arrest another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo. However, they were not able to find him
there.
Arnold Pasicolan, Ronnie Romero, and herein petitioner Lito Marcelo were charged with infidelity in the
custody of documents. The case was later withdrawn and another information for qualified theft was
filed before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
qualified theft.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused, Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos,
and Lito Mercado [should be Marcelo] y Cruz, guilty, as principals, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of qualified theft defined in Article 310, in conjunction with Articles 308 and 309, of the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the aggravating
circumstances of taking advantage of public position, the Court imposes upon Arnold Pasicolan y
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Mabazza the penalty ranging from EIGHT (8) years, EIGHT (8) months, and ONE (1) day of Prision mayor,
as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, ONE (1) month, and ELEVEN (11) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Applying again the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the Court imposes upon Ronnie Romero y Santos and Lito Marcelo y Cruz, the
penalty ranging from SEVEN (7) YEARS, four (4) months, and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to eleven (11) years, SIX (6) months, and TWENTY-ONE (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari
II. Issue
(1) Respondent Honorable Court had wrongly made the crucial finding against petitioner that he has
committed the act charged in conspiracy with each other.
III. Ruling
First. Petitioner says that since the subject of the alleged pilferage was mail matter, only a government
employee may be held guilty of qualified theft unless a private individual was shown to have been in
conspiracy with him. He contends that since he is not a government employee, then he cannot be
charged or held guilty of the crime as there is no proof that he conspired with a postal employee.
We cannot understand petitioners theory that, as the subject of the pilferage was mail matter, only a
government employee, presumably of the postal service, can be held liable of qualified theft. What
makes the theft of mail matter qualified is the fact that the subject thereof is mail matter, regardless of
whether the offender is a postal employee or a private individual.
as long as the thing stolen is one of those enumerated in Art. 310, the crime is qualified theft. In this
case, it is mail matter. Hence, it is not necessary that petitioner be shown to have been in conspiracy
with a government employee in order to hold him liable for qualified theft.
Be that as it may, conspiracy was proven in this case. NBI agent Arles Vela testified that petitioner was
instrumental in transferring the contents of the mail bag which Pasicolan handed to them to their
travelling bag and that afterward petitioner and his co-accused Romero tied the bag to their motorcycle.
Vela’s testimony was corroborated by Projecto Tumagan, who likewise testified that Romero and
Marcelo transferred the contents of the mail bag to their bags. Although Tumagan said petitioner and
Romero had two bags, thus contradicting Vela’s testimony that petitioner and his co-accused had only
one bag, the inconsistency in the testimonies of these two prosecution witnesses is not really of much
importance. What is important is that Tumagan corroborated Vela’s testimony that petitioner helped in
putting the letters in their bag. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that these two witnesses were
inside a car and were at some distance from the persons they were observing. At any rate, during the
cross-examination, Tumagan said that the contents of the mail bag were transferred to one other bag
implying that there was really just one bag involved.[17] Moreover, the defense should have confronted
Tumagan with this inconsistency and asked him to explain. For its failure to do so, the defense cannot
for the first time raise the point in this appeal.
Petitioner Marcelo showed no sign of surprise or hesitation when Pasicolan handed the mail bag to him
and Romero. It was apparent he was acting pursuant to a prior agreement because when the mail bag
was given to him, he got the bag and he and Romero then transferred its contents to their travelling
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bag. Petitioner acted in concert with Pasicolan and Romero, thus indicating he was in conspiracy with
them.
Rule 26 Admission by Adverse Party
1. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSALINDA
CANADALLA-GO, represented by her Attorney-in-fact BENITO A. CANADALLA (RELIGIOSO)
G.R. No. 153034, [September 20, 2005], 507 PHIL 312-321)
I.FACTS
Irene Canadalla obtained a loan of P100,000 from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
for purposes of financing her piggery business. As security, Canadalla executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over two parcels of land covered by TCT of the Registry of Deeds of Infanta, Quezon.
Canadalla procured another loan in the amount of P150,000, which was secured by a mortgage over the
same two parcels of land and a third parcel covered by OCT No. P-6679 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Quezon. Since the piggery business allegedly suffered strong reverses, compounded by
devastating typhoons, the prevalence of diseases, and destruction of her store by fire, Canadalla failed
to comply with her obligations to the DBP. Subsequently, the DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgages. Canadalla was able to redeem the foreclosed property within the redemption period of one
year. As to the properties covered by OCT Nos. P-4226 and P-6679, she had six years from 17 January
1990 to redeem the same, they being free patent titles. she offered to redeem the properties for a
redemption price of P1.5 million. But the DBP countered that the redemption price under its 1986
Revised Chapter must be based on its total claim, which was P1,927,729.50 as of 30 September 1995.
Subsequently, she allegedly assigned her right to redeem her properties to her daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalinda A. Canadalla-Go. Go offered to redeem the properties for P526,882.40. In
response, the DBP advised Go that the acceptable redemption price was P1,814,700.58 representing its
total claim as of 17 January 1996. When Go failed to redeem the properties, the DBP consolidated its
titles over the subject properties and new certificates of title were issued in its name. Go filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City a Supplemental Complaint 1 for the "Exercise of Right of
Redemption and Determination of Redemption Price, Nullification of Consolidation, Annulment of Titles,
with Damages, Plus Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. After the DBP filed its Answer but
before the parties could proceed to trial, Go filed a Request for Admission by Adverse Party.
Thereafter, the DBP filed its Comment. During the hearing, Go objected to the Comment reasoning
that it was not under oath as required by Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and that it failed to
state the reasons for the admission or denial of matters for which an admission was requested. For its
part, the DBP manifested that, first, the statements, allegations, and documents contained in the
Request for Admission are substantially the same as those in the Supplemental Complaint; second,
they had already been either specifically denied or admitted by the DBP in its Answer; and third, the
reasons for the denial or admission had already been specifically stated therein. ,the DBP filed a
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manifestation incorporating its response to Go's objections during the hearing, attaching therewith an
affidavit executed by its officer and counsel Atty. Caraan.
II. RTC
RTC issued an Order granting the motion of Go to consider as impliedly admitted the matters sought to
be admitted in the Request for Admission and all those denied by the DBP in its Comment.
(MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE DBP- DENIED)
III. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI under RULE 65
DBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, attributing to the court a quo grave abuse of
discretion in granting the Request for Admission despite the fact that;
(1) Some of the matters assigned in the Request for Admission had already been specifically denied
in its Answer to the Supplemental Complaint;
(2) The sworn statement of Atty. Caraan had sufficiently cured the alleged defect of the Comment;
and
(3) Some of the matters in the Request for Admission involved questions of law, conclusions of facts,
and matters of opinion which are improper subjects of such a request.
IV. COURT OF APPEALS
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that since DBP's answer was not under oath, it could
not be considered as having substantially complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court. The affidavit of Atty. Caraan, one of the legal counsels of the DBP, failed to cure the
defect because it was submitted after the motion for the declaration of implied admission had been
made and the hearing of the same had been terminated. Moreover, in the hearing, the DBP only made a
manifestation that the matters sought for admission had already been covered in the Answer without
objecting to the propriety of some of the matters sought to be admitted. Thus, the DBP failed to timely
raise its objections on the ground of impropriety.
(MOR to CA- Denied)
V. DBP to SC by way of CERTIORARI under RULE 45
DBP challenged the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. As pointed out by the DBP, the
matters stated in Go's Request for Admission are the same as those alleged in her Supplemental
Complaint. Besides, they had already been either specifically denied or admitted in DBP's Answer to the
Supplemental Complaint.
VI. ISSUE
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Whether or not matters requested to be admitted under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which are mere
reiterations of the allegations in the complaint and are specifically denied in the answer, may be
deemed impliedly admitted on the ground that the response thereto is not under oath.
Whether or not some of the matters sought to be admitted in the Request for Admission were matters
of law or opinions.
Whether or not the CA Appeals erred in ruling that the DBP failed to timely raise its objections to the
impropriety of the matters requested for admission.
VII. SUPREME COURT RULING
The Supreme Court GRANTED the instant petition. The decision and resolution of the CA are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Indeed, as pointed out by the DBP, the matters stated in Go's Request for Admission are
the same as those alleged in her Supplemental Complaint. Besides, they had already been either
specifically denied or admitted in DBP's Answer to the Supplemental Complaint. To require the DBP to
admit these matters under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court would be pointless and superfluous. Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 26, before their amendment took effect on 1 July 1997, read:
SECTION 1. Request for admission. — At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any
relevant documents described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any relevant matter of
fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies
have already been furnished.
SEC. 2.Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than ten (10) days
after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party
to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement
either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested shall be promptly
submitted to the court for resolution.
The Court held in Po v. Court of Appeals that "[a] party should not be compelled to admit matters of
fact already admitted by his pleading and . . . to make a second denial of those already denied in his
answer to the complaint.”
A request for admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is inappropriate
under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which, as a mode of discovery, contemplates of interrogatories
that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in the pleading. Rule
26 does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.
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1) Hence, the DBP did not even have to file its Comment on Go's Request for Admission, which
merely reproduced the allegations in her complaint. DBP's Answer itself controverts the
averments in the complaint and those recopied in the request for admission . Even assuming
that a reply to the request is needed, it is undisputed that the DBP filed its Comment either
admitting or specifically denying again the matters sought to be admitted and stating the
reasons therefor. That the Comment was not under oath is not a substantive, but merely a
formal, defect which can be excused in the interest of justice conformably to the well-
entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed as to do substantial
justice.
The filing of such Comment substantially complied with Rule 26. Consequently, the DBP
cannot be deemed to have impliedly admitted the matters set forth in the Request for
Admission for the mere reason that its Comment was not under oath.
At any rate, the petitioner submitted a Manifestation, together with an affidavit incorporating its
specific denials of Go's factual allegations, immediately after it filed its Comment on the Request
for Admission and before the RTC issued an Order, with a view "to avoid any technicalities" on
the matter. The filing of the affidavit amounted also to a substantial compliance with the
requirements of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.
2) Some of the matters sought to be admitted in the Request for Admission were matters of law or
opinions. Under Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the scope of matters that a party may
request the adversary to admit are;
a. The genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with
the request; and
b. The truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. The rule
authorizing a party to call on the other party to make an admission implies the making
of demands for admission of relevant and material matters of facts — and not for
admission of matters of law, conclusions, or opinions.
Since the afore-quoted allegations are matters of law or opinion, they are improper
matters and cannot therefore be deemed impliedly admitted under Rule 26.
3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DBP failed to timely raise its objections to the
impropriety of the matters requested for admission. At the time Go made use of discovery
proceedings under Rule 26, the governing rule before its amendment took effect on 1 July 1997
read: "Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested shall be
promptly submitted to the court for resolution." Petitioner DBP's objection to the impropriety of
some of the matters requested was promptly made as early as the filing of its comment on the
request for admission. DBP's comment consistently averred that it had already dealt with the
matters in question in its answer, either admitting or specifically denying them. Moreover,
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during the hearing, the counsel for DBP manifested the foregoing in open court. In so doing, the
DBP, in effect, argued that the matters in question are redundant and, therefore, improper
subjects for admission.
Lastly, The Court reiterated that, rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended "to expedite trial
and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of
which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. "Thus, if a request for admission would only serve to
delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule would
certainly be defeated. After all, rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial
justice and should not therefore be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.
Rule 27 Production/Inspection of Documents or Things
1. Solid Bank Corporation vs Gateway Electronics Corporation, G.R. No. 164805, April 30, 2008
ACOSTA
In 1997, Gateway Electronics Corporation (Gateway) obtained four (4) loans from Solidbank Corporation
(Solidbank) for Gateway’s manufacturing operation. It was stipulated that the interest would be 8.75%
(later increased to 10%) with 2% per month penalty upon default. The loans were covered by promissory
notes as follows.
Promissory Note No. Date of Loan Amount Date Due
97-375 20 May 1997 US$ 190,000 11 Nov. 1998

97-408 20 May 1997 US$ 570,000 11 Nov. 1998
97-435 09 June 1997 US$ 1,150,000 04 June 1998

97-456 15 June 1997 US$ 130,000 15 June 1998
Gateway assigned its proceeds from their Back-end service agreement with Alliance Semiconductor
Corporation (Alliance) to SolidBank to secure the said loans.
In 2000, Gateway’s outstanding balance was US$ 1,975,835.58. Gateway failed to pay despite numerous
demands. Thus, Solidbank filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Gateway.
II. Solidbank’s Complaint
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· Solidbank alleges that Alliance already paid Gateway so the proceeds should be forwarded to
Solidbank by virtue of the assignment by Gateway.
· [Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents] Solidbank filed the said motion on
ground that the Chief Financial Officer of Alliance informed them of the payment made to
Gateway. The pertinent portions of the motion read:
o “the original, duplicate originals and copies of all documents pertaining to, arising from,
in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement of defendant
[Gateway] and [Alliance]”
o all books of account, financial statements, receipts, checks, vouchers, invoices, ledgers
and other financial/accounting records and documents pertaining to or evidencing
financial and money transactions arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-
end Services Agreement of defendant GEC and Alliance Semiconductors;
III. Trial Court Granted the Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents
· The Trial Court granted Solidbank’s motion on Jan 30, 2001 (Jan. 30, 2001 order).
· Gateway filed a motion to reset the production and inspection to March 29, 2001 to give them
time to collate the documents.
· The trial court also granted Gateway’s motion.
IV. Motion to Cite Gateway in contempt

On July 24, 2001, Gateway produced invoices representing billings they sent to Alliance. However,
Solidbank was not satisfied with the documents and filed a motion to cite Gateway and its officers for
contempt alleging that Gateway failed to comply with the Jan 30, 2001 order.
On April 15, 2002, the motion was denied but the Court ruled that Gateway was not exerting diligent
efforts to produce the documents. Gateway filed a motion for partial reconsideration with respect to the
order declaring them not exerting diligent efforts.
The motion for partial reconsideration was denied.
II. Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with CA
Gateway filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA alleging that the Trial Court’s orders denying their
motion for partial reconsideration and declaring them “not exerting diligent efforts” were null and void.
The CA granted the petition and annulled the said orders.

Thus, Solidbank appealed to the SC under Rule 45.
III. SC Ruling
W.O.N the Gateway failed to comply with the Jan. 30, 2001 order of the trial granting the motion for
production and inspection of documents.
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No.
In Security Bank v CA, the requisites in order that a party may compel the order party to produce or
allow inspection of documents or things are:
(a) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or things, showing good
cause therefor;
(b) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;
(c) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things which the party wishes to be produced and inspected;
(d) Such documents, etc., are not privileged;
(e) Such documents, etc., constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action,
(f) Such documents, etc., are in the possession, custody or control of the other party.
Sec. 1, Rule 27, ROC, provides for the mechanics for production of documents and inspection of things
during the pendency of a case. This remedial measure is intended to assist in the administration of
justice by facilitating and expediting the preparation of cases for trial and guarding against undesirable
surprise and delay; and it is designed to simplify procedure and obtain admissions of facts and evidence,
thereby shortening costly and time-consuming trials.
The purpose of the statute is to enable a party-litigant to discover material information which, by reason
of an opponent's control, would otherwise be unavailable for judicial scrutiny, and to provide a
convenient and summary method of obtaining material and competent documentary evidence in the
custody or under the control of an adversary.
In this case, it cannot be said that Gateway did not exert effort in complying with the assailed order
because Solidbank’s motion was fatally defective as it failed to specify with particularity the
documents it required Gateway to produce. In addition, Good faith effort to produce the required
documents must be accorded to Gateway, absent a finding that it acted willfully, in bad faith or was at
fault in failing to produce the documents sought to be produced.
2. EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN

vs. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC (CABEL)
G.R. No. 204700 November 24, 2014
Doctrines:
The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial
stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of production or
inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court "upon due application and
a showing of due cause."
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For resolution is respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.'s motion for
reconsideration of our April 10, 2013 decision, which reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals'
resolutions and ordered respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) dated
April 7, 2006, including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in order that petitioners may inspect or
photocopy the same.
Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation, Marcelo N. Naval, and Crispin I. Oben filed
their motion to admit attached opposition. Subsequently, respondent filed its reply and petitioners their
motion to admit attached rejoinder.
The motion for reconsideration raises the following points:

(1) The motion for production was filed out of time
(2) The production of the LSPA would violate the parol evidence rule; and
(3) The LSPA is a privileged and confidential document.
Respondent’s Contention
1. Petitioners filed their motion for production way out of time, even beyond the protracted pre-
trial period from September 2005 to 2011. Hence, petitioners had no one to blame but themselves
when the trial court denied their motion as it was filed only during the trial proper.
2. "Article 1634 [of the] Civil Code had been inappropriately cited by [p]etitioners" inasmuch as it is
Republic Act No. 9182 (Special Purpose Vehicle Act) that is applicable. Nonetheless, even assuming that
Article 1634 is applicable, petitioners are: 1) still liable to pay the whole of petitioner Eagleridge
Development Corporation’s (EDC) loan obligation, and 2) seven (7) years late in extinguishing petitioner
EDC’s loan obligation because they should have exercised their right of extinguishment within 30 days
from the substitution of Export and Industry Bank or EIB (the original creditor) by respondent in
December 2006.
3. The production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule under Rule 130, Section 9 of the
Rules of Court. The LSPA is a privileged/confidential bank document. Under the RA 9182, "the only
obligation of both the assignor (bank) and the assignee (the SPV; respondent Cameron) is to give notice
to the debtor (Eagleridge, Naval, and Oben) that its account has been assigned/transferred to a special
purpose vehicle [and] [i]t does not require of the special purpose vehicle or the bank to disclose all
financial documents included in the assignment/sale/transfer[.]"
4. Finally, respondent points out that the deed of assignment is a contested document. "Fair play
would be violated if the LSPA is produced without [p]etitioners acknowledging that respondent is the
real party-in-interest because petitioners . . . would [thereafter] use . . . the contents of a document
(LSPA) to its benefit while at the same time" refuting the integrity of the deed and the legal personality
of respondent to sue petitioners.
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Petitioner’s Contentions
1. Their motion for production was not filed out of time, and "[t]here is no proscription, under Rule
27 or any provision of the Rules of Court, from filing motions for production, beyond the pre-trial."
2. Assuming that there was a valid transfer of the loan obligation of petitioner EDC, Article 1634 is
applicable and, therefore, petitioners must be informed of the actual transfer price, which information
may only be supplied by the LSPA. The substitution of respondent in the case a quo was "not sufficient
‘demand’ as contemplated under Article 1634 inasmuch as respondent Cameron failed . . . to inform
petitioner EDC of the price it paid for the [transfer of the] loan obligation," which made it "impossible
for petitioners to reimburse what was paid for the acquisition of the . . . loan obligation [of
EDC]." Additionally, petitioners contend that respondent was not a party to the deed of assignment, but
Cameron Granville Asset Management (SPV-AMC), Inc., hence, "as [to] the actual parties to the Deed of
Assignment are concerned, no such demand has yet been made."
3. The amount of their liability to respondent is one of the factual issues to be resolved as stated in
the pretrial order of the RTC, which makes the LSPA clearly relevant and material to the disposition of
the case.
4. Parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because they were not parties to the deed of
assignment, and "they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of
the Deed of Assignment." Besides, the deed of assignment made express reference to the LSPA, hence,
the latter cannot be considered as extrinsic to it.
5. As to respondent’s invocation that the LSPA is privileged/confidential, petitioners counter that

"it has not been shown that the parties fall under . . . or, at the very least . . . analogous to [any of the
relationships enumerated in Rule 130, Section 124] that would exempt [respondent] from disclosing
information as to their transaction."
II. Supreme Court
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
Discovery mode of production/inspection of document may be availed of even beyond pre-trial upon a
showing of good cause
The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to
the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of
production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court "upon due
application and a showing of due cause."
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This court held that since the rules are silent as to the period within which modes of discovery
(in that case, written interrogatories) may still be requested, it is necessary to determine: (1) the
purpose of discovery; (2) whether, based on the stage of the proceedings and evidence presented
thus far, allowing it is proper and would facilitate the disposition of the case; and (3) whether
substantial rights of parties would be unduly prejudiced. This court further held that "[t]he use of
discovery is encouraged, for it operates with desirable flexibility under the discretionary control of the
trial court."
"The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal treatment." The evident purpose of
discovery procedures is "to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials" and, thus, facilitating an amicable
settlement or expediting the trial of the case.
We have determined that the LSPA is relevant and material to the issue on the validity of the
deed of assignment raised by petitioners in the court a quo, and allowing its production and inspection
by petitioners would be more in keeping with the objectives of the discovery rules. We find no great
practical difficulty, and respondent continuously fails to allege any, in presenting the document for
inspection and copying of petitioners. On the other hand, to deny petitioners the opportunity to inquire
into the LSPA would bar their access to relevant evidence and impair their fundamental right to due
process.
Contrary to respondent’s stance, Article 1634 of the Civil Code on assignment of credit in
litigation is applicable. Section 13 of the Special Purpose Vehicle Act clearly provides that in the transfer
of the non-performing loans to a special purpose vehicle, "the provisions on subrogation and assignment
of credits under the New Civil Code shall apply."
Furthermore, Section 19 of RA 9182 expressly states that redemption periods allowed to

borrowers under the banking law, the Rules of Court, and/or other laws are applicable. Hence, the right
of redemption allowed to a debtor under Article 1634 of the Civil Code is applicable to the case a quo.
Accordingly, petitioners may extinguish their debt by paying the assignee-special purpose
vehicle the transfer price plus the cost of money up to the time of redemption and the judicial costs.
Petitioners’ right to extinguish their debt has not yet lapsed
Under the last paragraph of Article 1634, the debtor may extinguish his or her debt within 30
days from the date the assignee demands payment. In this case, insofar as the actual parties to the deed
of assignment are concerned, no demand has yet been made, and the 30-day period did not begin to
run. Indeed, petitioners assailed before the trial court the validity of the deed of assignment on the
grounds that it did not comply with the mandatory requirements of the Special Purpose Vehicle Act, and
it referred to Cameron Granville Asset Management (SPV-AMC), Inc., as the assignee, and not
respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. The law requires that payment should be
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made only "to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his [or her] successor in
interest, or any person authorized to receive it." It was held that payment made to a person who is not
the creditor, his or her successor-in-interest, or a person who is authorized to receive payment, even
through error or good faith, is not effective payment which will bind the creditor or release the debtor
from the obligation to pay. Therefore, it was important for petitioners to determine for sure the proper
assignee of the EIB credit or who to pay, in order to effectively extinguish their debt.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent is the proper assignee of the EIB credit, petitioners
could not exercise their right of extinguishment because they were not informed of the consideration
paid for the assignment.
Respondent must disclose how much it paid to acquire the EIB credit, so that petitioners could
make the corresponding offer to pay, by way of redemption, the same amount in final settlement of
their obligation. Assuming indeed that respondent acquired the EIB credit for a lesser consideration, it
cannot compel petitioners to pay or answer for the entire original EIB credit, or more than what it paid
for the assignment.
Under the circumstances of this case, the 30-day period under Article 1634 within which
petitioners could exercise their right to extinguish their debt should begin to run only from the time they
were informed of the actual price paid by the assignee for the transfer of their debt. Parol evidence rule
is not applicable
The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of
assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to
determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment. Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is
applicable, an exception to the rule under the second paragraph is when the party puts in issue the
validity of the written agreement, as in the case a quo.
Besides, what is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or extrinsic
evidence, not those expressly referred to in the written agreement. "[D]ocuments can be read together
when one refers to the other." By the express terms of the deed of assignment, it is clear that the deed
of assignment was meant to be read in conjunction with the LSPA.
As we have stated in our decision, Rule 132, Section 17 of the Rules of Court allows a party to
inquire into the whole of the writing or record when a part of it is given in evidence by the other party.
Since the deed of assignment was produced in court by respondent and marked as one of its
documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is
necessary for its understanding may also be inquired into by petitioners.
The LSPA is not privileged and confidential in nature
Respondent’s contention that the LSPA is privileged and confidential is likewise untenable.
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Indeed, Rule 27 contains the proviso that the documents sought to be produced and inspected
must not be privileged against disclosure. Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged
communication. These are communication between or involving the following: (a) between husband
and wife; (b) between attorney and client; (c) between physician and patient; (d) between priest and
penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest.
Privileged communications under the rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to

protect a trust relationship. It has not been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under
any of the foregoing categories.
Respondent failed to discharge the burden of showing that the LSPA is a privileged document.
Respondent did not present any law or regulation that considers bank documents such as the LSPA as
classified information. Its contention that the RA 9162 only requires the creditor-bank to give notice to
the debtor of the transfer of his or her account to a special purpose vehicle, and that the assignee-
special purpose vehicle has no obligation to disclose other financial documents related to the sale, is
untenable. RA 9162 does not explicitly declare these financial documents as privileged matters. Further,
as discussed, petitioners are not precluded from inquiring as to the true consideration of the
assignment, precisely because the same law in relation to Article 1634 allows the debtor to extinguish its
debt by reimbursing the assignee-special purpose vehicle of the actual price the latter paid for the
assignment.
An assignment of a credit "produce[s] no effect as against third persons, unless it appears in a

public instrument [.]" It strains reason why the LSPA, which by law must be a public instrument to be
binding against third persons such as petitioners-debtors, is privileged and confidential.
All told, respondent failed to allege sufficient reasons for us to reconsider our decision. Verily,
the production and inspection of the LSPA and its annexes fulfill the discovery-procedures objective of
making the trial "less a game of blind man’s buff and morea fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
3. AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION vs. PENNSWELL, INC. (CRUZ)

G.R. No. 172835 December 13, 2007
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets. There is
a privilege not to disclose one’s trade secrets. Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and
banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as
embodied in the Constitution. We said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed
that, aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets
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(pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions
(pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.
I. ESTABLISHED FACTS
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air
transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the
business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.
On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the
contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to ₱449,864.98 with interest at 14% per
annum until the amount would be fully paid.
II. COMPLAINT
For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent filed a
Complaint for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.
III. PETITIONER’S ALLEGATIONS

1. That it was defrauded in the amount of ₱592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four items.
Said items were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact,
identical with products petitioner had previously purchased from respondent. Petitioner asserted that it
was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and labels of such goods.
2. That when the purported fraud was discovered, a conference was held between petitioner and
respondent on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties agreed that respondent would return to petitioner
the amount it previously paid. However, petitioner was surprised when it received a letter from the
respondent, demanding payment of the amount of ₱449,864.94, which later became the subject of
respondent’s Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner.
IV. MOTION TO COMPEL – FILED BY PETITIONER (GRANTED)

During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list
of the ingredients and chemical components of the certain products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and
Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c) Dry
Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound. It appears that petitioner had earlier requested the Philippine
Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry (PIPAC) for the latter to conduct a comparison of respondent’s
goods.
V. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION – FILED BY RESPONDENT

Respondent contended that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components sought
because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire upon
constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge. Respondent maintained that
its products are specialized lubricants, and if their components were revealed, its business competitors
may easily imitate and market the same types of products, in violation of its proprietary rights and to its
serious damage and prejudice.
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VI. RTC REVERSED ITS DECISION

The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. It issued an Order dated 30 June
2004, finding that the chemical components are respondent’s trade secrets and are privileged in
character.
VII. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 – FILED BY PETITIONER WITH CA (DENIED)
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the
Order dated 30 June 2004 of the RTC.
The Court of Appeals ruled that to compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of ingredients of its
lubricants is to disregard respondent’s rights over its trade secrets. It was categorical in declaring that
the chemical formulation of respondent’s products and their ingredients are embraced within the
meaning of "trade secrets."
VIII. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION – FILED BY PETITIONER (DENIED)
IX. HENCE, THIS PRESENT PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN UPHOLDING RTC DECISION DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION
TO SUBJECT RESPONDENT’S PRODUCTS TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE.
RULING:
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are trade
secrets within the contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the business of
general manufacturing and selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods,
wares, merchandise, products, including but not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants,
acids, alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar preparations, among others.
Our conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to be revealed have a commercial value to
respondent. Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the information grants it a competitive
advantage; we also find that there is clearly a glaring intent on the part of respondent to keep the
information confidential and not available to the prying public.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents
must not be privileged against disclosure. On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for
production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of
privileged matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged
character, could not be received in evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the
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items be specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved
in the action and which are in the party’s possession, custody or control.
Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit:
(a) communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c)
communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e)
public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned
by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of
published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d)
information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits.
We, thus, rule against the petitioner. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the
finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its
proprietary rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products.
Rule 28 Physical and Mental Examination of Persons

· Rule on DNA Evidence AM No 07-9-12-SC
Rule 29 Refusal to Comply with Modes of Discovery

· Rule on Writ of Amparo
1. RAUL ARELLANO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SORSOGON, BRANCH I, and SANTIAGO UY-
BARRETA (CULAJARA)
I. ESTABLISHED FACTS/COMPLAINT
The judicial controversy between petitioner Raul Arellano ( for short) and respondent Santiago
Uy-Barreta (Barreta for short) started way back on February 4, 1967 when Barreta filed aforementioned
Civil Case No. 2167 with respondent court against Arellano and a certain Emilio B. Bayona for
reconveyance, with damages, of a certain parcel of land located in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, alleging as cause
of action that the defendants had successfully maneuvered in bad faith, thru a supposedly false
extrajudicial partition, to secure the issuance of a certicate of title No. T-3670 which enabled them to
ultimately have the cancellation thereof by Transfer Certicate of Title No. T-3739 in the name of
Arellano.
After being served with summons, Arellano filed on May 5, 1967, instead of an answer, a motion
to dismiss based on the ground of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, inasmuch as on its
face, said complaint seeks the setting aside of a torrens title by virtue of nothing more than a claim of
ownership through continuous adverse possession for allegedly more than 53 years. Simultaneously,
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, Arellano dispatched the following written interrogatories to
Barreta, which the latter received on May 9, 1967:
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"WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES
Mr. Santiago Uy-Barreta
Sorsogon, Sorsogon
Sir:
In accordance with the provisions of Rule 25 of the new Rules of Court, you are hereby served
the following interrogatories, to be answered by you, separately and fully in writing, under
oath. The answers shall be signed by you, and copy thereof served on the undersigned within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of these interrogatories.
1) Do you have a certificate of title registered in your name over the property,
subject of this litigation?
2) If so, what is the number of the title?
3) If not, under what title do you claim the property?
Manila for Sorsogon, Sorsogon, May 5, 1967”
Since Arellano had not received any answer to the foregoing written interrogatories as of June 9,
1967, on this date, his counsel filed a motion praying thus:
”WHEREFORE, defendant respectfully prays.
1) for leave that his Written Interrogatories be given due course and plaintiff be required to
send his Answers thereto within five (5) days from receipt of the order;
2) that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed if he fails to comply with the aforesaid order sought
for;
3) that hearing of defendant's Motion to Dismiss, rescheduled for June 17th 1967, be
postponed to such date filed by this Honorable Court if plaintiff shall send his Answers to
defendant's Written Interrogatories.”
For reasons not appealing in the record, nothing happened relative to either the motion to
dismiss of May 5, 1967 or the subsequent motion of June 9, 1967 until February 12, 1969, over one and
a half years later, when respondent court motu proprio set both motions for hearing for February 20,
1969, on which date, upon request of Barreta, the court gave him ten (10) days within which "to file the
corresponding opposition after which the said motion will be deemed submitted for resolution.”
As nothing again was heard from Barreta as of April 7, 1969, on this date, Arellano led a motion
reiterating "his prayer for the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Section 5, Rule 29 and Section
3, Rule 17", alleging that Barreta had failed to serve answers to the interrogatories sent to him despite
the periods previously given to him by the court. When this motion was heard on April 25, 1969, once
more Barreta asked for deferment and the court postponed its consideration "for new assignment.”
Five days later, however, Arellano filed another motion for "instant dismissal”. The court ordered:
"Considering the motion dated August 11, 1969, led by counsel for the defendant, Raul
Arellano, alleging that the Written Interrogatories for the plaintiff to answer was sent by them
to the plaintiff on May 5, 1967, was received by the plaintiff on May 9, 1967, which according
to the provision of Rule 25, Section 1, the plaintiff had up to May 4, 1967 within which to give
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his answer or to file his opposition to the said interrogatories before the Court and, therefore,
more than two years had already elapsed since the said Written Interrogatories was sent to
the plaintiff and in spite of the fact that, again the said plaintiff asked to be given another 5)
days from August 6, 1969, within which to file his objection before this Court and since up to
now the said counsel for the plaintiff failed to file his objection to said. Written Interrogatories
nor answered the same, as prayed for by counsel for the defendant, Raul Arellano, the
complaint is hereby dismissed as against the said defendant, Raul Arellano, without special
pronouncement as to costs.”
II.
Almost three months later, however, or on December 16, 1969, Barreta filed a "Motion for
Reinclusion of Raul Arellano as Indispensable Party Defendant" in which, signicantly, he maintained that
Arellano is an indispensable party and as such had to be reincluded as defendant precisely because the
"action against him was dismissed in view of plaintiff’s failure to answer the written interrogatories
which actually and incidentally is not a ground for the dismissal of an action", adding that he, the
plaintiff, "is now ready with the copies of the documents needed to answer the queries of Mr. Raul
Arellano in his quest for interrogatories." Arellano opposed, and on February 16, 1970, the motion was
denied.
III.
Almost a year afterwards that even the foregoing order had not terminated the case. Under
date of January 16, 1971, Barreta, represented this time by new counsel, filed a "Motion to Set Aside
Orders Dismissing Complaint against Defendant Raul Arellano”, which was set for hearing on February 4,
1971.
Promptly opposed by Arellano on the oft-repeated ground that the case had long ago been
finally dismissed, on February 23, 1971, the court denied Barreta's motion.
Barreta bounced back with apparent success on March 22, 1971, when he filed a "Motion for
Admission of Amended Complaint", since respondent court readily granted the same on March 31, 1971
even before Arellano could object to it or be heard. No elucidation of the reasons for the long belated
amendment had to be made by Barreta.
Insisting however that the case insofar as he was concerned had long been terminated and
could no longer be revived, much less indirectly thru the subterfuge of an amended complaint, Arellano
led on February 4, 1972 a motion for the reconsideration of the order of January 12, 1972.
Respondent court issued the last impugned order: the order of dismissal of the court dated
August 19, 1969, cannot, therefore, be considered as one of those falling under the provision of Section
3 of Rule 17 of the New Rules of Court and to constitute an adjudication upon the merits, since the same
was not founded on either a failure to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute this action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with the rules of court or any order of the court. The motion
for reconsideration is therefore denied.
IV. ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 2, Rule 25 has been complied with
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V. SUPREME COURT
After a careful review of the record, We are fully convinced that the petition asking for such
nullification should be granted.
To be sure, We can uphold the order of dismissal in question on the strength of the basic
principles of discovery procedure, more specifically, for failure of Barreta to serve any answer to
Arellano's interrogatories, The contention of respondent that it was erroneous for the trial court to
dismiss the action without first ordering Barreta to answer the interrogatories of Arellano and waiting
for his failure to do so has no merit. Neither is there merit in the claim that the sending of the
interrogatories in question had not yet been given due course by the court. "Leave of court is not
necessary before written interrogatories may be served upon a party." (2 Moran 90, 1970 ed.) In any
event, if Section 1 of Rule 25 could be susceptible of the construction suggested by counsel for Barreta,
it is to Us a sufficient basis for the discovery procedure of written interrogatories in this case to have
proceed in motion after plaintiff had been given a period to oppose and had failed to do so. Besides, the
repeatedly unfulfilled promises of counsel to produce the answers of his client render such objection
academic. Withal, the order of dismissal of August 19, 1969, which counsel referred to in his motion of
December 16, 1969, as having been issued “in view of plaintiff's failure to answer the written
interrogatories" was virtually accepted as final in said motion, so much so that the article of moving for
the reinclusion of Arellano as an indispensable party was conceived In brief, there is here a case where
the party served with written interrogatories has for unexplained reasons failed altogether to comply
with the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 25 that they be answered Under these circumstances, the
assailed dismissal finds justification in Section 5 of Rule 29 which provides:
"Failure of party to attend or serve answers. — If a party or an officer or managing agent
of a party wilfully fails to appear before the office who is to take his deposition after being
served with a proper notice or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule
25 after proper since of such interrogatories the court on motion and notice may strike out all
or any part of any pleadings of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part
thereof or enter a judgment by default against that party and in its discretion, order him to pay
reasonable expenses incurred by the other including attorney's fees.”
2. SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

(JUSTINIANO)
Facts:
A. Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur:
1. Sps. Expedito and Alice Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of foreclosure proceedings and
loan documents with damages against respondent Chinabank. They alleged that on June 28,
1995, they obtained a loan in the amount of P5,800,000.00 from respondent secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-23136.
2. Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in paying their loan obligations hence they
requested for restructuring which was allegedly granted by Chinabank.
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3. However, respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the subject property on October 9, 2001
where it emerged as the highest bidder. Respondent bank was issued a Provisional Certificate of
Sale and upon petitioners' failure to redeem the property, ownership was consolidated in its
favor.
4. According to petitioners, the foreclosure proceedings should be annulled for failure to comply
with the posting and publication requirements. They also claimed that they signed the Real
Estate Mortgage and Promissory Note in blank and were not given a copy and the interest rates
thereon were unilaterally fixed by the respondent.
5. Respondent bank's motion to dismiss was denied, hence it filed an answer with special
affirmative defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a set of written interrogatories with 20
questions.
6. The RTC denied Chinabank's affirmative defenses for lack of merit as well as its motion to
expunge the complaint for being premature. The trial court directed the Clerk of Court to set the
pre-trial conference for the marking of the parties' documentary evidence.
B. Court of Appeals
1. Respondent bank filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to annul the orders of the RTC. The
CA granted said petition.
2. The CA held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the two assailed Orders. It
ruled that compelling reasons warrant the dismissal of petitioners' complaint because they
acted in bad faith when they ignored the hearings set by the trial court to determine the
veracity of Chinabank's affirmative defenses; they failed to answer Chinabank's written
interrogatories; and the complaint states no cause of action.
3. Court of Appeals ruled that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because petitioners
admitted that they failed to redeem the property and that ownership of the same was
consolidated in the name of Chinabank.
4. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
C. Supreme Court
1. Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action.
2. Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to answer
respondent's written interrogatories as provided for in Section 3(c), Rule 29 of the Rules of
Court.
Held: The petition is meritorious.

1. A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial
right. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its
averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus it "must contain a concise
statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action."
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Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint "warrants its
dismissal."
In the instant case, petitioners specifically alleged that respondent bank acted in bad faith when
it extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property notwithstanding the approval of the restructuring of
their loan obligation. They claimed that with such approval, respondent bank made them believe that
foreclosure would be held in abeyance. They also alleged that the proceeding was conducted without
complying with the posting and publication requirements.
Assuming these allegations to be true, petitioners can validly seek the nullification of the
foreclosure since the alleged restructuring of their debt would effectively modify the terms of the
original loan obligations and accordingly supersede the original mortgage thus making the subsequent
foreclosure void. Similarly, the allegation of lack of notice if subsequently proven renders the
foreclosure a nullity in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
We find the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action for nullifying the
foreclosure of the mortgaged property. The fact that petitioners admitted that they failed to redeem the
property and that the title was consolidated in respondent bank's name did not preclude them from
seeking to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure. Precisely, petitioners seek to nullify the proceedings
based on circumstances obtaining prior to and during the foreclosure which render it void.
2. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the complaint should be dismissed
for failure of petitioners to answer respondent bank's written interrogatories.
It should be noted that respondent bank filed a motion to expunge the complaint based on
Section 3(c) of Rule 29 which states:
SEC. 3. Other consequences. — If any party or an officer or managing agent of
a party refuses to obey an order made under section 1 of this Rule requiring him to
answer designated questions, or an order under Rule 27 to produce any document or
other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, or to
permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 28 requiring
him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in
regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; and
As we have explained in Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, the consequences
enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party upon whom the written
interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories
and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order.
In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not
just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should have filed a motion based on Section 5
and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:
SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. — If a party or an officer or
managing agent of a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his
deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to
interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such interrogatories,
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the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that
party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by
default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses
incurred by the other, including attorney's fees.
Due to respondent bank's filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for
ruling that the motion to expunge was premature for lack of a prior application to compel compliance
based on Section 3. Petition is GRANTED.
Rule 30 Trial
1. People vs. Mazo (NIETO)
In an Information dated February 4, 1997, the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon charged appellant
Dennis Mazo before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of killing one Rafael Morada, Jr.
Arraigned on February 12, 1997, the accused pleaded not guilty to the above charges.
SPO2 Jose Riva de la Cruz was the guard on duty when the accused was brought to the police station.
SPO2 De la Cruz asked the accused why he was "surrendering." Dennis answered, "I stabbed Rabot
Morada." The accused also told SPO2 De la Cruz that he used a kitchen knife in stabbing the victim. SPO2
De la Cruz asked him where the knife was. The accused replied, "I threw it in the creek at the back of the
house of Noel Falcutilla."
When SPO3 Elizer Gene Mallen arrived at the police station, SPO2 De la Cruz instructed him to go to the
back of Noel Falcutilla's house to recover the knife. SPO3 Mallen complied and soon returned with the
weapon.
SPO2 De la Cruz showed the knife to the accused and asked him if that was the same knife used in the
killing. The accused replied, "Yes, sir."
SPO2 De la Cruz admitted, however, that his questioning of the accused was made without the latter
having the benefit of counsel.The accused interposed self-defense, claiming that it was the victim who
initially possessed the knife and started the fight.
II. RTC
The Romblon RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused of Murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
III. Appeal to the SC
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Appellant maintains that the killing of Rafael Morada, Jr., was done in self-defense, a justifying
circumstance, 20 or at least constituted incomplete self-defense, a privileged mitigating circumstance.
21 Appellant also argues that the prosecution failed to prove the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. 22 Finally, he faults the trial court for failing to appreciate the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor.
IV. SC
Where the accused owns up to the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him and he
must show by clear and convincing proof that he indeed acted in self-defense. To meet this burden,
appellant has offered his testimony as well as that of Anthony Mortel and Gerry Moreno, his
companions on the night of the incident.
These testimonies, however, are belied by the testimony of Rommel Abrenica, who testified that it was
appellant who was the aggressor.
Appellant also questions Abrenica's opportunity to witness the stabbing:

. . . on cross-examination, he admitted he could not get a good picture of the incident considering he
never alighted from his motorcycle and merely turned his head to observe the incident (Rommel
Abrenica, on cross, id., p. 43). Because of the difficulty of his position, he could not see the incident
(Rommel Abrenica, on clarification by the trial court, id., p. 59). He could not see what was in the hands
of the accused (Rommel Abrenica, on cross, id., p. 51). He cannot be positive that the victim was not the
one carrying the knife (Rommel Abrenica, on cross, id., pp. 51 and 53). He did not, at that time, ask the
victim if he was carrying a knife (id., p. 45); he only assumed the victim had no knife with him because he
had never before seen him with one in the past (id., p. 45). Significantly, he only looked at the victim and
the accused for "a while"
As to whether the witness' position enabled him to accurately observe the incident, the Court notes that
defense counsel's questions to Abrenica were phrased in the negative and assumed facts that had not
been admitted, thereby tending to yield answers that may be interpreted one way or the other.
The Court finds the testimony of Abrenica worthy of belief not only because it is replete with details but
is also corroborated in part by the testimony of Adrian Yap. Yap, like Abrenica, testified that appellant
chased the deceased to the H.E. Building, rebutting appellant's and his witnesses' account. Notably,
appellant, Moreno and Mortel did not mention any chase taking place.
Appellant, though, likewise assails Yap's trustworthiness, whose appearance as a rebuttal witness, it is
claimed, is most "irregular and improper" since he should have testified during the prosecution's
presentation of its evidence-in-chief.
This argument loses its value in the face of the defense's failure to object to the offer of the witness'
testimony or to move for such testimony to be struck off the record when the impropriety thereof
became apparent. In any case, "[e]vidence offered in rebuttal is not automatically excluded just
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because it would have been more properly admitted in the case in chief. Whether evidence could
have been more properly admitted in the case in chief is not a test of admissibility of evidence in
rebuttal. Thus, the fact that testimony might have been useful and usable in the case in chief does not
necessarily preclude its use in rebuttal."
Appellant also doubts Yap's presence during the stabbing incident since the same is uncorroborated by
other evidence.
The Court finds no reason to doubt Yap's presence at the scene of the crime for, like Abrenica's
testimony, Yap's account is fraught with details, which could be possible only if he was actually present
when the killing occurred. Moreover, the trial court described Yap as a "most spontaneous" witness, and
appellate courts usually accord great weight to the trial court's assessment of a witness' credibility,
having been in a better position to observe his demeanor. Further, the defense failed to establish any
motive for Yap to testify falsely against appellant.
Finally, the prosecution has discretion to decide on who to call as witness during trial. Its failure to
present Ronnie Manzo or any of Adrian's companions does not give rise to the presumption that
"evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" since the evidence was merely
corroborative or cumulative and was not proven to be willfully suppressed. Like the affidavit Adrian
executed, which was not offered by the prosecution in evidence, appellant could have subpoenaed
Adrian's companions to testify in his behalf if he believed that their testimonies were vital to his
defense.
Appellant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the deceased was the unlawful
aggressor, his claim of incomplete self-defense must also fail. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable
requisite for this privileged mitigating circumstance to be appreciated.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon is MODIFIED insofar as it convicts appellant Dennis
Mazo of Murder and imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Judgment is hereby
rendered finding appellant GUILTY of Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years of
reclusion temporal in its minimum period as maximum.
2. Sarmiento vs Juan (PRACUELLES)
FACTS: Civil Case No. 126113 was an action filed by private respondent Belfast Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. against herein petitioner and his father Benjamin R.Sarmiento, Sr. for indemnification under an
Indemnity Agreement executed by them in connection with a bail bond. The case was assigned to
Branch X of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by respondent Judge Celestino
C. Juan who had since retired.
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After the petitioner filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim, private respondent filed a
motion to dismiss the case against defendant Benjamin R.Sarmiento, Sr., and to schedule the case for
pre-trial. This motion was granted by Judge Juan and the pre-trial was set on February 5, 1980, at 8:30
a.m.
At the said pre-trial, nobody appeared except Atty. Federico T. Castillo, Jr., counsel for the
private respondent. However, the petitioner sent to the Court on the same date an urgent motion for
postponement stating therein that when he was preparing to go to the Court, he felt severe stomach
pain followed by loose bowel movements, and he accordingly prayed that the pre-trial be postponed to
another date.
The urgent motion for postponement filed by the petitioner was denied in the order of
Judge Juan dated February 5, 1980. On motion of Atty. Castillo, the petitioner was "declared nonsuited"
(should have been "as in default") and the private respondent allowed to present its evidence ex-
parte on February 26, 1980, at 8:30 a.m. cdphil
On February 25, 1980, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of February
5, 1980. In his order of February 26, 1980, Judge Juandenied the said motion for reconsideration "for
lack of merit," and reiterated the permission for the private respondent to present its evidence ex-parte.
RTC: The urgent motion for postponement filed by the petitioner was denied in the order of
Judge Juan dated February 5, 1980. On motion of Atty. Castillo, the petitioner was "declared nonsuited"
(should have been "as in default") and the private respondent allowed to present its evidence ex-
parte on February 26, 1980, at 8:30 a.m.
CA: It does not appear whether the ex-parte presentation of evidence by the private respondent had
already been accomplished, nor that a decision thereon had been rendered. That such proceedings had
not taken place could, however, be gathered from the fact that on March 19, 1980, the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 53399 to annul the aforementioned
orders of Judge Juan dated February 5, 1980 and February 26, 1980. The said petition was remanded to
the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Resolution of the First Division of this Court dated March 28, 1980.
It was docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. No. SP-14649. In a decision promulgated on August
29, 1980 by the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals, the petition was denied due course and
ordered dismissed for lack of merit. Said decision is the subject of the present appeal by certiorari.
SC: Petition for certiorari
ISSUE: Whether the order of the Trial Court was valid.
HELD: NO. We see no merit in the petitioner's contention that the pretrial was prematurely scheduled
on the supposed ground that the last pleading had not been filed. In the petition for certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 53399, the petitioner has alleged that he filed his answer to the complaint containing a
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compulsory counterclaim on December 21, 1979 which was served on the counsel for the private
respondent on the same date. The pre-trial was scheduled to be held on February 5, 1980 or a month
and a half after the petitioner had filed his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 126113 and private
respondent served with a copy of the same. While it may be true that the private respondent had not
filed any answer to the counterclaim contained in the petitioner's answer, such circumstance does not
prevent the trial court from conducting the pre-trial. As was observed by the respondent Court of
Appeals in its questioned decision: "If no answer (to the counterclaim) is timely filed, the pre-
trial order may issue. Otherwise, an unscrupulous party litigant can hold court processes by the simple
expedient of failing to answer."
The requirement that the pre-trial shall be scheduled "after the last pleading has been filed"
(Section 1, Rule 20, Rules of Court) is intended to fully apprise the court and the parties of all the issues
in the case before the pre-trial is conducted. It must be remembered that the issues may only be
ascertained from the allegations contained in the pleadings filed by the parties. The last permissible
pleading that a party may file would be the reply to the answer to the last pleading of claim that had
been filed in the case, which may either be the complaint, a cross-claim. a counterclaim or a third party
complaint, etc. (Secs. 2 and 11, Rule 6, Rules of Court.) Any pleading asserting a claim must be
answered, and the failure to do so by the party against whom the claim is asserted renders him liable to
be declared in default in respect of such claim.) There are, however, recognized exceptions to the rule,
making the failure to answer a pleading of claim as a ground for a default declaration, such as the failure
to answer a complaint in intervention (Sec. 2(c), Rule 12, Rules of Court), or a compulsory counterclaim
so intimately related to the complaint such that to answer to same would merely require a repetition of
the allegations contained in the complaint. (Zamboanga Colleges, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 1 SCRA
870; Ballecer vs. Bernardo, 18 SCRA 291; Agaton vs. Perez, 18 SCRA 1165.)
In the case presently considered, the nature of the counterclaim in the petitioner's answer has
not been made clear, except to categorize it as a compulsory counterclaim. Such being the case, it is
likely to be one where the answering thereof is not necessary, and the failure to do so would not be a
ground to be declared in default. In any event, the private respondent's failure to answer the
petitioner's counterclaim after the period to file the answer had lapsed is obstacle to holding a pre-trial.
The requirement that the last pleading must have been filed before a pre-trial may be scheduled should
more appropriately be construed to mean not only if the last pleading had been actually filed, but also if
the period for filing the same had expired.
We, however, find merit in the petitioner's two other contentions. The denial by Judge Juan of
the petitioner's motion to postpone the pre-trial scheduled on February 5, 1980 may have appeared
valid at the outset, considering that it was filed at the last minute and was not accompanied by a
medical certificate although the ground alleged was illness on the part of the petitioner. Nonetheless, a
different appraisal of the petitioner's plea should have been made after the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was made under oath. Due regard should have been given to the repeated
pronouncements by this Court against default judgments and proceedings that lay more emphasis on
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procedural niceties to the sacrifice of substantial justice. After all, the ex-parte presentation of evidence
had not yet been conducted nor had a decision been rendered in the case. It appeared to be a simple
matter of giving the petitioner a chance to have his day in court in order to defend himself against the
claim filed by the private respondent. As it turned out, the procedure adopted by the trial court proved
unprofitable and disadvantageous to all parties concerned, including the courts. The case would have
been disposed of in a much easier and more expeditious manner if the trial court had heeded the
petitioner's simple plea for a chance to be heard. Thereby, all the proceedings taken subsequent to the
disputed orders of the trial court could have been avoided, and the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court spared from the trouble of resolving the petitions filed before them.
The petitioner also has valid reason to complain about the apparent overanxiousness of the trial
court to finish the case in summary fashion. The petitioner bad manifested to the Court that his inability
to appear before the pre-trial was due to a sudden ailment that befell him while he was preparing to go
to Court. While it is true that the motion for postponement was not accompanied by a medical
certificate, it must be considered that not every ailment is attended to by a physician, or if so, a medical
certificate under oath as required by the Rules could be secured within the limited time available. There
has been no refutation of the cause of the non-appearance of the petitioner as claimed by the latter.
Said cause had been reiterated under oath in the petitioner's motion for reconsideration to which the
trial court turned a deaf ear. Any suspicion that the petitioner was merely suing for delay is readily
dispelled by the fact that the pre-trial was being set for the first time, and that the petitioner took
immediate steps against the refusal of the trial court to set aside the default declaration and to pursue
remedies steadfastly against the same in the higher tribunals.
The declaration default on the part of the petitioner may not be considered as entirely proper
under the circumstances surrounding the same. It is undenied that nobody appeared at the pre-trial
except the counsel for the private respondent. Under settled doctrines, not even the private respondent
may be considered as having appeared at the said pre-trial, it not having made appearance thereat
through a duly authorized representative. In such a situation, the trial court would have acted more
properly if it dismissed the case, or declared the private respondent as plaintiff therein as non-suited,
instead of declaring the petitioner as in default (erroneously stated by it as "non-suited.") This is
because while the court may declare the plaintiff non-suited for non-appearance at the pre-trial or
dismiss the case for his non-appearance at the trial without motion on the part of the defendant (Sec. 3,
Rule 17), the latter may not be declared in default without such motion on the part of the plaintiff. (Sec.
1. Rule 18; Trajano vs. Cruz, 80 SCRA 712.) A plaintiff who makes no valid appearance at pre-trial may
not ask that the defendant be punished for the same shortcoming it was equally guilty of.
Rule 31 Consolidation or Severance
1. SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and ERLITO LORCA vs. HON. LUIS L. VICTOR, Judge
Presiding over Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, TIMOTEA T. MORALDE, CAYETANO
T. MORALDE, JR., ALEXANDER T. MORALDE, EMMANUEL T. MORALDE, and JOCELYN MORALDE
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ABELLANA
[G.R. No. L-64250. September 30, 1983.] RELIGIOSO
I. FACTS
Pantranco South Express, Inc., (Pantranco), driven by Rogelio Dillomas, collided with Bus
of the Superlines Transportation Co., Inc., (Superlines) then driven by Erlito Lorca along
the highway at Lumilang, Calauag, Quezon, resulting in the instantaneous death of
Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., a passenger in the Pantranco bus. Superlines instituted an
action for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca Branch,
against Pantranco and Rogelio Dillomas, driver of said Pantranco Bus. In its complaint,
Superlines alleged that the recklessness and negligence of the Pantranco bus driver was
the proximate cause of the accident and that there was want of diligence on the part of
Pantranco in the selection and supervision of its driver. Private respondents Timotea T.
Moralde, widow of the deceased Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., and her children, Cayetano,
Jr., Alexander, Ramon, Emmanuel, all surnamed Moralde, and Jocelyn M. Abellana, filed a
complaint for damages to the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, against Superlines and
its driver, Erlito Lorca, as well as Pantranco and its driver, Rogelio Dillomas. The cause of
action pleaded against Superlines was based on quasi-delict, while that against
Pantranco, on culpa-contractual. Herein petitioners Superlines and its driver Erlito Lorca
filed a motion to on the ground of pendency of another action, obviously referring to Civil
Case No. 1671-G pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon, Gumaca Branch.
II. RTC
Finding that the two cases involved different parties as well as different causes of action, respondent
Judge Luis Victor denied the motion to dismiss in the challenged order of March 28, 1983.
(Superlines Moved For a Reconsideration- Denied. Dissatisfied, it filed with the Intermediate Appellate
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.)
III. Intermediate Appellate Court
Aaffirmed the orders dated March 28 and April 27, 1983 of herein respondent Judge Luis L. Victor of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite. Denied due course the appeal of Superlines. Hence, this present recourse.
IV. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
It is suggested by petitioners that private respondents Moraldes should pursue their claim for
damages by intervening in the Gumaca action, pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court and in
the light of Municipality of Hagonoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources [73 SCRA 507] and
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Orellano v. Alvestir [76 SCRA 536]. It is contended that since the right of private respondents to claim
damages is founded on the same facts involved in the Gumaca action, any judgment rendered therein
will amount to res judicata in the Cavite case, for whatever adjudication is made in the former case
between Pantranco and Superlines as regards either of the parties' culpability would set said issue at
rest. Furthermore, such intervention would prevent multiplicity of suits and avoid confusion that may
arise should the trial courts render conflicting decisions.
V. ISSUE
Whether or not the Civil Case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon may be consolidated with
Civil Case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite.
VI. SC RULING
The instant petition was denied. SC directed the Regional Trial Court of Quezon, Gumaca Branch, to
transfer, without unnecessary delay, the records of Civil Case to the Regional Court of Cavite, Branch
XVI.
The Court ruled that, a more pragmatic solution to the controversy at bar; Is to consolidate the Gumaca
case with the Cavite case. Considerations of judicial economy and administration, as well as the
convenience of the parties for which the rules on procedure and venue were formulated, dictate that
it is the Cavite court, rather than the Gumaca court, which serves as the more suitable forum for the
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties concerned.
As observed by both the trial and appellate courts, to require private respondents who are all
residents of Kawit, Cavite, to litigate their claims in the Quezon Court would unnecessarily expose
them to considerable expenses. On the other hand, no like prejudice would befall the defendants
transportation companies if they were required to plead their causes in Cavite, for such change of
venue would not expose them to expenses which they are not already liable to incur in connection
with the Gumaca case. The objection interposed by Superlines that it has its offices in Atimonan,
Quezon, should not detract from the overall convenience afforded by the consolidation of cases in the
Cavite Court. For apart from the fact that petitioner and its driver are represented by the same counsel
with offices located in Manila, defendants transportation companies can readily avail of their facilities
for conveying their witnesses to the place of trial.
Accordint to the SC, The ordered consolidation of cases, to SCs mind, crystallizes into reality the thinking
that their predecessors that:
“The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which
gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within
the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect
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opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice
between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be
said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is
that it so restricts the exercise of the court's powers by technicalities that part of its authority
effective for justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole.
The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to
obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of
the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes
on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and
lays itself open to grave criticism." (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523)”
Rule 32 Trial by Commissioner
1. Aljems Corporation (Logging Division) vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 122216. March 28,
2001 ACOSTA
Aljems Corporation was a joint venture by Aljms, as represented by Pacifico Dizon, and Rudy Chua. They
initially agreed upon 55-45 sharing but later it was modified to 50-50.
II. Complaint for Sum of money by Chua against Dizon filed with RTC of Davao City.
· On Aug. 11, 1992, Chua sued Aljems as represented by Dizon for sum of money alleging that he
was not paid his 50% share from Aljems’ income of P3,659,710.07
· Dizon alleges that Chua’s auditor bloated the income and that the correct amount was
P2,089,141.80.
o He further alleges that Chua already received P2,632,719
· During pre-trial the parties agreed to refer the case to a commissioner.
o Commissioner, Leonora Cainglet was appointed by the RTC of Davao City.
III. Commissioner Cainglet

· The commissioner conducted an audit.
· She interviewed representatives from both Aljems and Chua.
· She also received documents and financial statements.
IV. Manifestation to RTC of Davao.
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On March 26, 1993, Aljems alleged that there were discrepancies between the Commissioners audit and
his auditor.
On May 27, 1993, Aljems filed a motion to direct the commissioner to identify transaction, receipts, or
documents which she disapproved or excluded in order to correct her alleged error.
V. RTC of Davao City Order

On Dec. 6, 1993, the RTC of Davao adopted the findings of fact by commissioner and confirmed the
commissioner’s report.
Aljems filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the commissioner should have conducted a
formal hearing in compliance with the Rules of Court. In particular, the commissioner should have issued
subpoenas instead of merely interviewing the parties so that they would have been under oath during
her investigation.
The RTC denied the motion.
VI. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA.

Aljems filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA but the CA dismissed the petition and its
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The CA ruled that Commissioner Cainglet did not err when she did not issue subpoenas because the RTC
did not order her to do so.
Thus, Aljems filed an appeal to the SC. Aljems contends that a formal hearing should have been
conducted.
VII. SC Ruling
W.O.N the trial by commission requires a formal type of hearing.
Yes.
Rule 33 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which are reproduced in Rule 32, 3, and 5 of the present Rues of
Court provides:
SEC. 3. Order of reference, powers of the commissioner. When a reference is made, the
clerk shall forthwith furnish the commissioner with a copy of the order of reference. The
order may specify or limit the powers of the commissioner, and may direct him to report
only upon particular issues, or to do or perform particular acts, or to receive and report
evidence only, and may fix the date for beginning and closing the hearings and for the
filing of his report. Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the
commissioner has and shall exercise the power to regulate the proceedings in every
hearing before him and to do all the acts and take all measures necessary or proper for
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the efficient performance of his duties under the order. He may issue subpoenas and
subpoenas duces tecum, swear witnesses, and unless otherwise provided in the order of
reference he may rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The trial or hearing before
him shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court.
SEC. 5. Proceedings before commissioner. Upon receipt of the order of reference and
unless otherwise provided therein, the commissioner shall forthwith set a time and
place for the first meeting of the parties or their attorneys to be held within ten (10)
days after the date of the order of reference and shall notify the parties or their
attorneys.
The underscored portions of 3 and 5 indicate quite clearly the necessity for a formal hearing and the
swearing of witnesses; otherwise, the commissioner cannot determine factual questions which arise
in the course of his examination of the accounts.
The fact is that the commissioner substitutes for the judge, and whatever the judge can or cannot do,
the commissioner also can or cannot do. Consequently, if a judge cannot decide a question without
hearing the parties on oath or affirmation, neither can the commissioner.
What Sec. 3, 1964 Rules, authorizes to be limited is the scope of the proceedings before the
commissioner, but not the modality thereof. Thus, the order by the lower court of reference may
specify only particular issues to be determined by the commissioner. It may direct him to do only
particular acts or just to receive and report evidence. Whichever may be the case, the requirement for
the commissioner to hold a hearing is clear, for this is the essence of due process.
Rule 33 Demurrer
1. Republic vs Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 152154. November 18, 2003 CABEL
Doctrine: A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of
the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no
important questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented
need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue
as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a
civil action where there exists no serious controversy. Summary judgment is a procedural devise for the
prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to
any material fact.
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Before us are motions of respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Ma. Imelda Marcos
and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., respectively, seeking reconsideration of our decision dated July 15, 2003
which ordered the forfeiture in favor of the Republic of the Philippines of the Swiss deposits in escrow at
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of
January 31, 2002.
Respondent Imelda Marcos, in her motion for reconsideration, asks this Court to set aside the
aforesaid decision premised on the following grounds:
I. The court has deprived her of her right to due process on the follow grounds:
II. The decision of the Supreme Court, which improperly converted the special civil action into
a regular appeal, divested respondent of her right to appeal the case on the merits, thereby
depriving her of due process.
III. The July 15, 2003 decision will prejudice the criminal cases filed against her.
Respondents Ferdinand, Jr. and Imee Marcos also pray that the said decision be set aside and the
case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan to give petitioner Republic the opportunity to present
witnesses and documents and to afford respondent Marcoses the chance to present controverting
evidence.
Respondent Irene Araneta, in her motion for reconsideration, merely reiterates the arguments
previously raised in the pleadings she filed in this Court and prays that the Courts decision dated July 15,
2003 be set aside.
II. OSG’s Arguments
1. The MRs do not raise any new matter and were filed manifestly to delay the execution of the July
15, 2003 decision.
2. Summary judgement is applicable to a petition for forfeiture, as long as there is no genuine
factual issue which could call for trial on the merits.
3. The July 15, 2003 decision clearly expressed the facts on which it is based, most of which were
admitted by private respondents in their pleadings submitted to the Sandiganbayan and in the
course of the proceedings.
4. Certiorari is the appropriate and speedy remedy of petitioner Republic, given the grave abuse of
discretion committed by respondent Sandiganbayan in totally reversing its own decision dated
September 19, 2000 and in issuing the subject resolution dated January 31, 2002, and in considering
that the case is imbued with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical
repercussions.
5. A forfeiture proceeding under RA 1379 is civil and not criminal in nature.
6. The July 15, 2003 decision will not prejudice the criminal actions filed against respondent Imelda
Marcos for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act.
III. Supreme Court –Motion for Reconsideration

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At the outset, we note that respondents, in their motions for reconsideration, do not raise any new
matters for the Court to resolve. The arguments in their motions for reconsideration are mere
reiterations of their contentions fully articulated in their previous pleadings, and exhaustively probed
and passed upon by the Court.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS

Respondent Marcoses argue that the letter and intent of RA 1379 forbid and preclude summary
judgment as the process to decide forfeiture cases under the law. It provides for specific jurisdictional
allegations in the petition and mandates a well-defined procedure to be strictly observed before a
judgment of forfeiture may be rendered.
According to respondents, Section 5 of RA 1379 requires the court to set a date for hearing during
which respondents shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how
they acquired the property. They contend that the proceedings under RA 1379 are criminal in character,
thus they have all the rights of an accused under the Constitution such as the right to adduce evidence
and the right to a hearing. They claim that it is petitioner which has the burden of proving respondents'
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that forfeiture of property should depend not on the weakness of
their evidence but on the strength of petitioner's. Accordingly, respondents maintain that, due to the
criminal nature of forfeiture proceedings, the denials raised by them were sufficient to traverse all the
allegations in the petition for forfeiture.
The issue of the propriety of summary judgment was painstakingly discussed and settled in our July
15, 2003 decision:
A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of
the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no
important questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the
issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that
there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court
for the prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists no serious controversy. Summary
judgment is a procedural devise for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise
only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact.
IS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS? No
The principal contention now of respondent Marcoses is limited to their argument that our
aforementioned decision effectively deprived them of their constitutionally enshrined right to due
process.
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According to respondents, RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence, they are entitled to the
constitutional safeguards enjoyed by an accused. Respondents further argue that the reinstatement of
the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 19, 2000, which ordered the forfeiture of the
properties subject of the instant case by summary judgment, diminished or repealed, by judicial
legislation, respondents rights guaranteed by RA 1379 for failure to set a date for hearing to benefit
respondents.
We disagree.
Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural due process. In order that a
particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance
with both substantive and the procedural requirements thereof.
In the present context, substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that
interferes with the rights of a person to his property. On the other hand, procedural due process
means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in
conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called
upon to administer it.
Insofar as substantive due process is concerned, there is no showing that RA 1379 is unfair,
unreasonable or unjust. In other words, respondent Marcoses are not being deprived of their property
through forfeiture for arbitrary reasons or on flimsy grounds. As meticulously explained in the July 15,
2003 decision of the Court, EO No. 1 created the PCGG primarily to assist then President Corazon Aquino
in the recovery, pursuant to RA 1379, of vast government resources amassed and stolen by former
President Ferdinand Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, close associates and other cronies. These
assets were stashed away here and abroad.
A careful study of the provisions of RA 1379 readily discloses that the forfeiture proceedings in
the Sandiganbayan did not violate the substantive rights of respondent Marcoses. These proceedings
are civil in nature, contrary to the claim of the Marcoses that it is penal in character.
Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in
personam. If they are under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be
included in the criminal case they are criminal in nature, although they may be civil in form; and
where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it
cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which
specifically so provide, where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a
misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in a civil action.
In the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan and Macario Asistio, Jr., this Court categorically declared
that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and therefore civil in nature. The proceedings under RA
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1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties
illegally acquired in favor of the State.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its
nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.
The proceedings in RA 1379 and EO No. 14 were observed in the prosecution of the petition for
forfeiture. Section 1 of EO No.14-A, amending Section 3 of EO No.14, provides that civil suits to recover
unlawfully acquired property under RA 1379 may be proven by preponderance of evidence. Under RA
1379 and EO Nos. 1 and 2, the Government is required only to state the known lawful income of
respondents for the prima facie presumption of illegal provenance to attach. As we fully explained in our
July 15, 2003 decision, petitioner Republic was able to establish this prima facie presumption. Thus, the
burden of proof shifted, by law, to the respondents to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. This,
respondent Marcoses did not do. They failed ― or rather, refused ― to raise any genuine issue of fact
warranting a trial for the reception of evidence therefor. For this reason and pursuant to the State policy
to expedite recovery of ill-gotten wealth, petitioner Republic moved for summary judgment which the
Sandiganbayan appropriately acted on.
Respondents also claim that summary judgment denies them their right to a hearing and to present
evidence purposely granted under Section 5 of RA 1379.
Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present their case, their defenses and
their pleadings. Not only did they obstinately refuse to do so. Respondents time and again tried to
confuse the issues and the Court itself, and to delay the disposition of the case.
Respondent Marcoses erroneously understood hearing to be synonymous with trial. The words

hearing and trial have different meanings and connotations. Trial may refer to the reception of evidence
and other processes. It embraces the period for the introduction of evidence by both parties. Hearing, as
known in law, is not confined to trial but embraces the several stages of litigation, including the pre-trial
stage. A hearing does not necessarily mean presentation of evidence. It does not necessarily imply the
presentation of oral or documentary evidence in open court but that the parties are afforded the
opportunity to be heard.
A careful analysis of Section 5 of RA 1379 readily discloses that the word hearing does not always
require the formal introduction of evidence in a trial, only that the parties are given the occasion to
participate and explain how they acquired the property in question. If they are unable to show to the
satisfaction of the court that they lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare
such property forfeited in favor of the State. There is no provision in the law that a full blown trial ought
to be conducted before the court declares the forfeiture of the subject property. Thus, even if the
forfeiture proceedings do not reach trial, the court is not precluded from determining the nature of the
acquisition of the property in question even in a summary proceeding.
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Due process, a constitutional precept, does not therefore always and in all situations require a
trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit ones evidence in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the absence
of previous notice but the absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. This opportunity
was made completely available to respondents who participated in all stages of the litigation.
When the petition for forfeiture was filed at the Sandiganbayan, respondent Marcoses argued
their case and engaged in all of the lengthy discussions, argumentation, deliberations and
conferences, and submitted their pleadings, documents and other papers. When petitioner Republic
moved for summary judgment, respondent Marcoses filed their demurrer to evidence. They agreed to
submit the case for decision with their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. They moved
for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan resolution dated September 19, 2000 which granted
petitioner Republics motion for summary judgment (which was in fact subsequently reversed in its
January 31, 2002 resolution.) And when the case finally reached this Court, respondent Marcoses
were given, on every occasion, the chance to file and submit all the pleadings necessary to defend
their case. And even now that the matter has been finally settled and adjudicated, their motion for
reconsideration is being heard by this Court.
For twelve long years, respondent Marcoses tried to stave off this case with nothing but empty
claims of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, or they were not privy to the
transactions, or they could not remember (because the transactions) happened a long time ago or that
the assets were lawfully acquired. And they now allege deprivation of their right to be heard and
present evidence in their defense?
It would be repulsive to our basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow respondents to further
delay the adjudication of this case and defeat the judgment of this Court which was promulgated only
after all the facts, issues and other considerations essential to a fair and just determination had been
judiciously evaluated.
Petitioner Republic has the right to a speedy disposition of this case. There is justice waiting to be
done. The people and the State are entitled to favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, the salutary objective being to restore the ownership of the Swiss deposits to the
rightful owner, the Republic of the Philippines, within the shortest possible time.
The respondent Marcoses cannot deny that the delays in this case have all been made at their
instance. The records can testify to this incontrovertible fact. It will be a mockery of justice to allow them
to benefit from it. By their own deliberate acts ― not those of the Republic or anybody else ― they are
deemed to have altogether waived or abandoned their right to proceed to trial.
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos likewise asserts that the factual finding that the foundations involved
in the instant forfeiture proceedings were businesses managed by her and her late husband, will
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adversely affect the criminal proceedings filed by the Republic against her. The contention is bereft of
merit. The criminal cases referred to by said respondent are actions in personam, directed against her
on the basis of her personal liability. In criminal cases, the law imposes the burden of proving guilt on
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, and the trial judge in evaluating the evidence must find that
all the elements of the crime charged have been established by sufficient proof to convict.
But a forfeiture proceeding is an action in rem, against the thing itself instead of against the
person. Being civil in character, it requires no more than a preponderance of evidence. And by
preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to
that of the other. Hence, the factual findings of this Court in its decision dated July 15, 2003 will, as a
consequence, neither affect nor do away with the requirement of having to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the criminal cases against her.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED with FINALITY
2. RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY vs. Spouses VICENTE and MA. SUMILANG DEL ROSARIO (CRUZ)
G.R. No. 138739 July 6, 2000
DOCTRINE: Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to present
their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on
appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants
lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and
render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.
I. ESTABLISHED FACTS
On March 2, 1991, Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario (herein respondents), jointly and
severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company (herein petitioner), a
Promissory Note for ₱138,948.
Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed
to pay their obligations under their Promissory Note.
II. COMPLAINT
On June 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Complaint 7 for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14. During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and collection officer of
petitioner, presented in evidence the respondents’ check payments, the demand letter dated July 12,
1991, the customer’s ledger card for the respondents, another demand letter and Metropolitan Bank
dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the
execution of any of these pieces of documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him.
III. TRIAL COURT ORDERED TERMINATION OF PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
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On July 4, 1994, the trial court issued an Order terminating the presentation of evidence for the
petitioner. Thus, the latter formally offered its evidence and exhibits and rested its case on July 5, 1994.
IV. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE – FILED BY RESPONDENT

Respondents filed on July 29, 1994 a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action. On
November 4, 1994, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to substantiate its
claims, the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay.
V. CA REVERSED RTC DECISION

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
According to the appellate court, the judicial admissions of respondents established their indebtedness
to the petitioner, on the grounds that they admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note, and that
their only defense was the absence of an agreement on when the installment payments were to begin.
Indeed, during the pretrial, they admitted the genuineness not only of the Promissory Note, but also of
the demand letter dated July 12, 1991. Even if the petitioner’s witness had no personal knowledge of
these documents, they would still be admissible "if the purpose for which [they are] produced is merely
to establish the fact that the statement or document was in fact made or to show its tenor[,] and such
fact or tenor is of independent relevance."
VI. HENCE, THIS PRESENT PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PATENTLY ERRED IN ORDERING THE REMAND OF THIS CASE TO THE TRIAL
COURT INSTEAD OF RENDERING JUDGEMENT ON THE BASIS OF PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner contends that if a demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant should
be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence, and the appellate court should render
judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to the trial court "for
further proceedings" would be an outright defiance of Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
On the other hand, respondents argue that the petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its
claim, simply on the ground that they lost their right to present evidence in support of their
defense when the Demurrer to Evidence was reversed on appeal. They stress that the CA merely
found them indebted to petitioner, but was silent on when their obligation became due and
demandable.
RULING:
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana
pronounced:
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"The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal
(i.e., demur to the plaintiff’s evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the
applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion,
i.e., finds that plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary
evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the
defendant’s evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly
placed before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost.
The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial
court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all
possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the
material before them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the
case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still
another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same
token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal,
the movant losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have
elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff’s case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court
which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of
plaintiff’s evidence."
In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to
present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but
on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the
defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve
the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.
In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents’ demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint
on the ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate
court reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of
evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants.
Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the
basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court correctly ruled that "the
documentary evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated xxx,"
and that "the petitioner presented quite a number of documentary exhibits xxx enumerated in the
appealed order," we agree with petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide the
collection suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the
basis of the facts on record.
3. David et al vs Rivera
59
DEAN QUICHO
FACTS:
Claiming to be the owner of an eighteen thousand (18,000)-square meter portion (hereafter,
subject land) of Lot No. 38-B, a five (5)-hectare lot situated at MacArthur Highway, Dau, Mabalacat,
Pampanga, herein respondent Agustin Rivera filed on May 10, 1994 a Complaint for Maintenance of
Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the Provincial
Adjudication Board (PARAB) of San Fernando, Pampanga against petitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino
and Consolacion David.
The respondent averred that the petitioners had been harassing him for the purpose of making
him vacate the subject land although it had already been given to him sometime in 1957 by the parents
of the petitioners as disturbance compensation, in consideration of his renunciation of his tenurial rights
over the original eighteen (18)-hectare farmholding.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that the respondent was occupying the subject land
without paying rentals therefor. The petitioners also averred that they need the subject land for their
personal use but the respondent refused to vacate it despite repeated demands. In his Answer to the
ejectment complaint, the respondent asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of
the tenancy relationship between him and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners, as evidenced
by the Certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Mabalacat, Pampanga. He
likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over the subject land and informed the court of the complaint
he had earlier filed before the PARAB.
PARAB: declaring the respondent as tenant of the land and ordering that his peaceful possession
thereof be maintained.
DARAB: appeal by petitioners
MCTC: ordering the respondent to vacate the subject land. The court found that there was a dearth of
evidence supportive of the respondents claim that the land is agricultural or that it is devoted to
agricultural production. Further, it ruled that the petitioners as the registered owners have a better right
to possession of the subject land.
Without appealing the MCTC Decision but within the period to appeal, the respondent filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City a Petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the nullification of the MCTC Decision. The thrust
of the petition was that the MCTC had no jurisdiction as the issue before it was agrarian in nature.
RTC: issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the petitioners from enforcing the MCTC Decision.
Thereafter, it proceeded to hear the respondents application for preliminary injunction. On November
29, 1995, the RTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
DEAN QUICHO
2017-2018
The case went to trial with the respondent as petitioner presenting his evidence in chief.
However, after the respondent had rested his case, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss raising as
grounds, inter alia: (1) that the extraordinary remedy of prohibition could not be made a substitute for
the available and speedy recourse of appeal; (2) the jurisdiction of the MCTC of Mabalacat, Pampanga
was legally vested, determined as it was by the averments of the complaint in conformity with Rule 70
of the Rules of Court; hence, the decision of the ejectment court was a legitimate and valid exercise of
its jurisdiction.
- DENIED MD, the motion, which was filed after the presentation of the plaintiffs evidence, partakes of a
demurrer to evidence which under Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, may be granted only upon a
showing that the plaintiff has shown no right to the relief prayed for. Noting that the evidence
presented by the petitioner establishes an issue which is addressed to [the] court for resolution. . .
whether or not the respondent court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case filed before it,
the RTC ruled that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper.
CA: appellate court rendered a Decision, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
denying the motion to dismiss, as well as the motion for reconsideration of its order. The appellate court
ratiocinated that the order of denial is merely interlocutory and hence cannot be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In addition, it held that issues raised in the petition for
prohibition were genuine and substantial, necessitating the presentation of evidence by both parties.
ISSUE: Whether the denial of the motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted with
grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
At the outset, it may be well to point out that certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory
order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in the form of a demurrer to evidence filed after the
plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case. Being interlocutory, an order denying a
demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. After
such denial, the petitioners should present their evidence and if the decision of the trial judge would be
adverse to them, they could raise on appeal the same issues raised in the demurrer. However, it is also
settled that the rule admits of an exception, i.e., when the denial of a demurrer is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition to correct what he perceived was
an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC. Indeed, the propriety of the recourse to the RTC
for a writ of prohibition is beyond cavil in view of the following considerations:
First. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, where two tribunals exercised
jurisdiction over two cases involving the same subject matter, issue, and parties, and ultimately
rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for prohibition. The MCTC manifestly
took cognizance of the case for ejectment pursuant to Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended. On the other hand, the ratiocination of the DARAB, which the respondent echoes,
is that the case falls squarely within its jurisdiction as it arose out of, or was connected with,
61
DEAN QUICHO
agrarian relations. The respondent also points out that his right to possess the land, as a
registered tenant, was submitted for determination before the PARAB prior to the filing of the
case for ejectment.
Indeed, Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-
judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters. In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executive
Order No. 129-A created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the
adjudication of agrarian reform cases.
The existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its
jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the controversy as an agrarian
dispute. Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. Even if the tenurial
arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant
relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of the
land claimed to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial
rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute.
As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the
DAR, through the DARAB. With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it follows that
the respondent has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the special civil action
of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation
of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters
clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained. The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction
in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
Second. While appeal is the recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court,
this does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of prohibition to
restrain the inferior court, among other instances, from proceeding further on the ground that it
heard and decided the case without jurisdiction. Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by
the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where
the remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate.
Third. We cannot also sustain the petitioners assertion that jurisdiction is a question of law;
hence, the RTC could have ruled on the matter without the reception of the parties evidence.
The very issue determinative of the question of jurisdiction is the real relationship existing
between the parties. It is necessary that evidence thereon be first presented by the parties
before the question of jurisdiction may be passed upon by the court.
DEAN QUICHO
2017-2018
It should be pointed out that the petitioners elevated to the appellate court the Order of the
RTC denying their motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an
objection by one party to the adequacy of the evidence of his adversary to make out a case. Otherwise
stated, the party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. In this
case, the trial court ruled that respondents evidence in support of his application for a writ of
prohibition was sufficient to require the presentation of petitioners contravening proof. The RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in so ruling.
63

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Civil Procedure Digest

Rule 23 Depositions Pending Action

1. FORTUNE CORPORATION vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION

· Mr. Teope has no intention of leaving the country

II. Petition for Certiorari (CA)

III. Petition for Review on Certiorari (SC)

We agree with petitioner.

Rule 24 Depositions before Action or Pending Appeal

II. MOTION TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS – FILED BY APL

III. AMENDED MOTION

IV. DASMARINAS’ CONTENTION

V. LETTER FROM DIR. ROCES

VI. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION – FILED BY DASMARINAS (DENIED)

VII. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI – FILED BY DASMARINAS BEFORE THE CA (DISMISSED)

VIII. DASMARINAS APPEALED TO THE SUPREME COURT (DENIED)

IX. DASMARINAS’ CONTENTIONS:

Dasmariñas ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:

(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE TAKING OF DEPOSITION IS A MODE OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY TO BE

2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT) vs.

3. GERONIMO CAGUIAT, RUFINA CAGUIAT, FELICIDAD CAGUIAT, FABIAN CAUGIAT, and

4. Respondent Judge issued an order, to hold in abeyance the resolution of

6. Petitioners opposed respondent Caguiat's urgent motion.

8. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

11. We note that the petitioners have not denied respondent Caguiat's

4. Cariaga vs. Court of Appeals (NIETO)

Hence, this petition. (Petition for Review on Certiorari)

Section 47 of Rule 130 reads:

Rule 25 Interrogatories to Parties

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari

Rule 26 Admission by Adverse Party

(MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE DBP- DENIED)

III. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI under RULE 65

IV. COURT OF APPEALS

(MOR to CA- Denied)

V. DBP to SC by way of CERTIORARI under RULE 45

VII. SUPREME COURT RULING

Rule 27 Production/Inspection of Documents or Things

Promissory Note No. Date of Loan Amount Date Due

97-375 20 May 1997 US$ 190,000 11 Nov. 1998

97-435 09 June 1997 US$ 1,150,000 04 June 1998

II. Solidbank’s Complaint

IV. Motion to Cite Gateway in contempt

The CA granted the petition and annulled the said orders.

2. EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN

The motion for reconsideration raises the following points:

5. As to respondent’s invocation that the LSPA is privileged/confidential, petitioners counter that

II. Supreme Court

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

Furthermore, Section 19 of RA 9182 expressly states that redemption periods allowed to

Petitioners’ right to extinguish their debt has not yet lapsed

The LSPA is not privileged and confidential in nature

Privileged communications under the rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to

An assignment of a credit "produce[s] no effect as against third persons, unless it appears in a

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

3. AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION vs. PENNSWELL, INC. (CRUZ)

III. PETITIONER’S ALLEGATIONS

IV. MOTION TO COMPEL – FILED BY PETITIONER (GRANTED)

V. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION – FILED BY RESPONDENT

VI. RTC REVERSED ITS DECISION

VIII. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION – FILED BY PETITIONER (DENIED)

IX. HENCE, THIS PRESENT PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45

Rule 28 Physical and Mental Examination of Persons