Ownership Manajeral:

Debt Policy, Performance and Value

Julius Jogi Christiawan and Josh Tarin

Lecturer Faculty of Economics, Petra Christian University, Surabaya
Email: yulius @ petra.ac.id; josuat @ petra.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This study aims to determine whether there are differences between the company's business decisions with managerial
ownership and the company without managerial ownership. Business decisions may include: financial decisions are proxied
by debt policies (capital structure), operational decisions are proxied by the company's performance, and overall business
decisions are proxied by the value perusahaan.Penelitiaan performed on 137 of the 336 companies listed on the Jakarta Stock
Exchange until 2005. this research proves that there is a policy difference between the debt and the company with the
company's managerial ownership and the company without managerial ownership.

Keywords: managerial ownership, debt policy, the value of the company and the company's performance.

ABSTRACT

The objective of this research is to examine Whether there is a significant difference between the managerial ownership
and non-managerial ownership companies in terms of Reviews their business decision making process. The business
decision Mentioned in this paper includes financial decision the which is indicated resources by debt policies (capital
structure), operational decision reflected in the company's performance, and business decision implied in the company's
value.The research observes 137 of 336 companies roomates had been listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange until the year of
2005. The examination results in the fact that the debt policies and the company's value of the managerial ownership
companies are Significantly different with non-managerial ownership companies. In contrast,

Keywords: managerial ownership, policy of debt, company value and company performance.

PRELIMINARY Flik interest occurs when a decision manager will only

Relationship managers and shareholders in the agency
theory described as the relationship between agent and principal
( Schroeder et al. 2001). managers as agent and shareholders
as principal. Managers must Me- ngambil best business
decision for mening- katkan shareholder wealth. Business
decisions are mamaksimal- right manager resources (utilities)
company. However, shareholders can not supervise all the
decisions and activities undertaken by the manager. A threat
to the shareholders if the manager will act for his own benefit
and not for the benefit of shareholders. This is the basic
problem in agency theory namely the existence of a conflict of
interest.
maximize its interests and not in line with the interests of
shareholders. The behavior of managers in conflict of interest
situations is interesting to study. Decisions and activities of
managers who have the company's shares would be different
from a pure manager as manager. The manager who owns
shares of the company means sekaigus manager is a
shareholder. Mana- jer which has shares of the company will
certainly kepentingannnya harmonize their interests as
shareholders. Semen- tar managers who do not have stock
perusa- panies, there are likely only concerned with its own
interests. Sahaan peru- stock ownership by the manager
called the managerial ownership.

Research on the relationship of managerial ownership

Shareholders and managers interested in maximizing with business decisions managers have been carried out by
their respective objectives. Kon- researchers. but the

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1
2 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, VOL. 9, NO. 1 MAY 2007: 1-8

researchers found different results. For example, research on ownership of the company without managerial ownership.
the relationship between managerial ownership with debt ratio (Debt
ratio meng- describe the results of the funding decision the
manager) show different results among researchers bebe- MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP
rapa. Some researchers found a positive correlation between
Managerial ownership is a situation where the manager
managerial ownership with debt ratio company. (Kim and
has shares of the company or in other words the manager as
Sorensen
well as a shareholder of the company. In a report to-uangan,
this situation is shown by the percentage of shareholding by
1986, Agrawal and Mendelker 1987, Mehran 1998 in
the manager. Because this is a financial statement user
Wahidahwati 2002 Soliha and Taswan
pentingbagi information then this information will be disclosed
2002). While other researchers found that ownership PE
in the notes to the financial statements. Their managerial
managers have been influenced significantly and negatively
ownership be interesting if dikait- right with agency theory. within
associated with debt ratio ( Moh'd 1998 in Wahidahwati
the framework agency theory, the relationship between
managers and shareholders is described as the relationship
2002).
between
In addition, research linking managerial milikan kepe-
enterprise value (the value of the company is the result of
decisions operasio- nal manager), also showed a different ber-
among researchers. Soliha and Taswan (2002) found a
significant and positive relationship between ownership peru- agent and principal ( Schroeder et al. 2001). Agent
sahaan menajerial value. While other researchers found a mandated by principal to run the business for the sake of principal.
weak association between ownership jerial appends the value managers as agent and shareholders as principal.
of the company (Lasfer and faccio
Business decisions is the manager's decision to
mamaksimalkan resources (utilities) company. A threat to the
1999). Based on the premise that managers shareholder will shareholders if managers to act in its own interests and not for
perform and the different business decisions with a manager the benefit of shareholders. In this context, each party has its
who is not shareholder as well as the results of different own interests. This is the basic problem in
studies among researchers about the relationship of
managerial ownership with business decisions, then appends
rik to investigate whether there is truly a difference business
decisions between the company and the managerial
agency theory namely the existence of a conflict of interest.
ownership with a company run by a manager who is not a
Shareholders and managers of each concerned to
manager shareholder.
mamaksimalkan goal. Each party has a risk associated with its
function, the manager has the risk to non-designated again as
a manager if it fails to perform its functions, while shareholders
Based on the background of the problems described have the risk of loss of capital if one chose manager. This
above, this research ber- aim to determine whether there is condition is a consequence of the separation of management
per- business decision making distinctions between the functions to the function of ownership.
company and the managerial ownership with the company
without managerial ownership. To further focus the direction of
this research, the business decisions taken by managers diba-
tation on: financial decisions are proxied by debt policies The above situation would have been different, if the
(capital structure), operational decisions are proxied by the conditions are managers also as shareholders or stockholders
performance of the company, business decisions kese- manager also called peru- condition sahaan with managerial
luruhan proxied by value perusaha-'s. In addition, this study ownership. Deci- sion and activities in the company with
will also provide a strong empirical basis for research on the
managerial ownership would be different from the company
relationship of managerial ownership with managers
without managerial ownership. In company with managerial
to-business decision.
ownership, MA-najer that shareholder will certainly align its
interests with its interests as a shareholder. Semen- tare in the
company without managerial ownership, managers who are
not shareholders

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 Christiawan: Ownership Manajeral: Debt Policy, Performance and Value
the possibilities are only concerned with its own interests.
Managerial Ownership and Debt Policy
Managerial ownership shows the dual role of a manager,
the manager acts as well as shareholders. As a manager
shareholder, he did not want the company experienced
financial difficulties or even bankruptcy. Financial difficulties or
bankruptcy of the business will merugi- right it either as a
manager or as a shareholder. As the manager will lose the
incentive and the shareholders will lose return even diinves-
tasikannya funds. Ways to reduce this risk is to reduce the
level of debt owned company (Friend and Lang in Brailsford
1999). High debt will enhances the risk of bankruptcy of the
company, because the company will have financial distress.
Thus if the manager will try to reduce the number of debt as
low as possible. This dakan Tin- on the other hand is not
profitable because the company relies solely on funds from
shareholders. The company could not ber- flower quickly, than
if perusa- pany also uses funds from creditors.
Research on the relationship between managerial likan
kepemi- debt ratio (debt ratio
describe the results of the funding decision the manager)
showed different results decried tara some researchers. Some
researchers menemu- kan positive relationship between
ownership mana- jerial with debt ratio company. (Kim and
Sorensen, 1986, Agrawal and Mendelker 1987, Mehran 1998
in Wahidahwati 2002 Soliha and Taswan 2002, Brailsford
1999). While other researchers have found that managerial
ownership and the associated negative influence with debt ratio
( Moh'd 1998 in Wahidahwati
2002 Wahidahwati 2002 Mahadwartha 2003). From the
explanation and some research empi- ris above it can be
concluded that the debt policy of the company without
managerial ownership will vary with the company with
managerial ownership.
Managerial Ownership and Performance pany Perusa-
A company's performance is the result of the company's
operations. Operational activities in the financial statements
indicated by pen- achievement of net income. Profit is the
difference between revenue with expenses. So that managers
manage the company will strive
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3
maximizing revenue and pressing expenses.
maximizing activity revenue called also improved profitability,
while pressing
expenses called also improved efficiency. The company's
performance will be better if the shares of the company owned
by the manager. The manager has a firm feel. Managers no
longer as salaried professionals but also as the owner of the
company. The company's performance will impact on the
dividend to be received by shareholders as dividends always
didasar- right on the current year's net income and net income
is a measure of company performance. Managers who have a
stake the company will enjoy this dividend distribution.
Mudambi research shows that ownership by managers
affect the performance of the company. In fact, this study
proved the way to do that is not always the same
(non-monotonic). Directions relationship will be different for
each percentage range kepemi- likan (Mudambi 1995). While
research shows that there are Coles Kumar and late The
relationship between managerial ownership and firm
performance (Kumar 2004, Coles 2002)
From the explanation and some empirical research can
be concluded that the performance of the company without
managerial ownership will vary with the company with
managerial ownership.
Managerial Ownership and Corporate Value
Some of the concepts that explain the value of a
company's value is: nominal value, market value, intrinsic
value, the book value and liquidation value. Face value is the
value listed formally in the articles of association of the
company, so-called right explicitly in the company balance
sheet, and also written clearly in the collective share certificate.
Market value, often called the exchange rate is the price that
goes from the bargaining process in the stock market. This
value can only be determined if the shares are sold on the
stock market. Intrinsic value is the most abstract concept,
because it refers to the estimated real value of a perusa- pany.
The company's value in the concept of intrinsic value is not just
the price of a set of assets, but the value of the company as a
business entity that has the ability to generate profits in the
future. While the book value is the value of a company
calculated by the basic accounting concepts. Put simply
calculated by dividing the difference between total assets and
total debt to the number of shares outstanding. The liquidation
value is the selling value of all company assets after deducting
all overwhelmed
4 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, VOL. 9, NO. 1 MAY 2007: 1-8
Jiban that must be met. The residual value merupa-'s part of
the shareholders. Liquidation value can be calculated in the
same way to calculate the value of the book, which is based on
the balance of performance prepared when a company will be
liquidation. If the market mechanism to function properly, then
the stock price may not be below liquidation value. Due to the
liquidation value is only counted when the company will be
liquidated, investors can use the value of the book as a
replacement for the same goal of estimating the lower limit
share price. So that the book value can be used as a safe limit
measure the value of the company for investment purposes.
However, there bebe- rapa records that must be considered in
understanding the concepts of the book value. First, most of the
assets rated in the historical value. Therefore, in some asset
resale value could be much higher than its book value. Second,
there is sometimes an asset in intangible assets, which is in
liquidation often do not have a sale value. Third, the book value
is strongly influenced by the methods and accounting estimates
as the method of depreciation of fixed assets, stocks per-
assessment methods, and others. Fourth, there is the
possibility arises obligations are not recorded in the financial
statements because it has not been set by the accounting
standards of financial reporting.
Based on the above can disim- pulkan that the concept of
the most representative to determine the value of the company
is pen- dekatan concept of intrinsic value. But right
memperkira- intrinsic value is very difficult, because in order to
determine the need of the ability to identify significant variables
that determine the profitability of a company. The variables that
differ from one company to another. In addition, the
determination of the intrinsic value also requires the ability
mempre- diction direction of trend will occur in the future.
Therefore, the market value used for ease of data is also
based on the assessment of a moderate.
Managers are shareholder will increase the value of the
company, due to the increasing value of the company's value
as an individual shareholder wealth will also increase. Meng-
research associate with the company's managerial ownership
showed different results among researchers. Soliha and
Taswan find a significant and positive relationship between
ownership and corporate value menajerial (Soliha and Taswan
2002). While other researchers found a weak association
between kepe-
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milikan menajerial and value of the company (Laster and faccio
1999).
From the explanation and some research empi- ris above
it can be concluded that the value of the company with
managerial ownership will vary with the company without
managerial ownership.
Based on the above explanation, this research is based
on the hypothesis that business decisions in companies with
managerial ownership will be different at the company without
managerial ownership. Business decisions managers will be
seen from the debt policy, the company's performance and
corporate value. So it can also be hypothesized that the debt
policy, the company's performance and corporate value in the
company with managerial ownership will be different at the
company without managerial ownership.
RESEARCH METHODS
The study population was all perusa- panies who have
made an initial public offering before 2003 at the Jakarta Stock
Exchange. As for the period of observations made are for a
period of 3 years which include the financial statements of
2003 to 2005. The financial statements used as research data
include the balance sheet, income statement and notes to the
financial statements contained in the Faculty of Economics
Profession Corner of Petra.
The sampling is done by purpo- sive, namely by looking at
the data completeness of the financial statements.
Completeness is meant is the completeness of the disclosure
of the name on Management and the existing shareholders in
the notes to the financial statements. Notes to the financial
statements that do not fully disclose this, the financial
statements were excluded from the study sample. It is also
seen if the 2005 prusahaan not delisting. This requirement is
imposed because of the availability of data related to stock
prices in 2005
Of each company, the information in- take is whether
there is a rial on Management ownership, stock market prices,
the number of outstanding shares, operating income, total
assets and the total debt for 3 years ie 2003-2005. Special to
total assets also seen the 2002 data, because the company's
performance seen from the ROA, where total assets in
question is the average total assets.
Based on the explanation above, then, the data collection
methods used in this research is the method of documentation,
namely getting data from documents such as financial
statements and stock price gained
 Christiawan: Ownership Manajeral: Debt Policy, Performance and Value 5

Corner Corner from the JSE and Professions Faculty Eco-nomi pany without managerial ownership (μ2). Pemisah-'s done by
Petra. looking at the presence or absence of managerial ownership in
any company of the research sample. Presence or absence of
As described in the pre-set, this study will examine
managerial likan kepemi- seen from the absence of likan
whether there are differences in decision-making and activities
kepemi- shares by the manager. This information was obtained
of managers between the company and the company's
from the notes to the financial statements. Then calculated the
managerial milikan kepe- without kepemi- likan managerial.
value of the three variables to be observed, namely, the debt
The hypothesis of the variables studied are kneaded ie the
policy, the company's performance and value of companies
ownership status of managerial and business decisions.
based on the definition of these variables. After that, testing
whether there is a difference between the variable value of the
company, the company's performance and debt ratio among the
Managerial ownership status question is whether there is
company without managerial ownership and companies with
a shareholding company by company managers. This variable
managerial ownership. So the test formulations penelitiani
was measured with a nominal scale, ie only dibeda- right
statistics are:
anatara company with managerial ownership or not, with no
regard to how much percentage of its manajerial- ownership in
each company. Presence or absence of managerial ownership
seen from the notes to the financial statements, in particular
the disclosure of the share capital of the company and Ho: μ1 = μ2 Ha:
disclosure of related parties. Total percentage of managerial
μ1 ≠ μ2
ownership is not diperhi- tungkan in this study because this
study only wanted to see whether there is any difference Research hypothesis testing used two-sample t test for
between the firms with managerial ownership and who does independent ( independent sample t test). With a significance
not. Research is directed to the relationship between the level (sig) of 5%. The decision to accept Ho performed if the
magnitude of the managerial ownership with management value "sig"> 0.05, and vice versa Ho is rejected if the "sig"
decisions. <0.05 (Santoso, 2001).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Penelitiaan overall sample ber- number of 137 companies

Decisions and activities of managers in the study include: the
value of the company, the company's performance and funding
decisions. Pany perusa- value measured by the market value of equity
divided by the late perusaha- total assets. The market value of equity is
calculated from the stock market price multiplied by number of shares
outstanding. The company's performance seen from the return on
assets (ROA) of the company (Kumar
2004), (Foster 1986), which is measured by dividing
net income with an average total assets. Medium- seen from
the right funding decisions debt ratio
company, which is measured by dividing longterm debt with the
number long-term debt with
equity.
testing the hypothesis
Hypothesis testing is done with a different test average of
two independent samples. Testing the hypothesis is consistent
with research that aims to prove whether there are differences
debt policy, performance and corporate value among
companies with ownership in the company without managerial
and managerial ownership.
from 336 companies listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange until
2005. The number of samples 137 companies are based on
the availability and completeness of financial reporting data
from 2002 to 2005 in Corner Professions Faculty of Economics
and the company is not in a condition delisting.
The first step of this research is mengiden- tifikasi their
managerial ownership. Of the 137 companies in the research
samples showed 64 firms with managerial ownership and 58
companies with no managerial ownership from 2002-2005.
While 15 companies in a state of managerial ownership and
later changed without managerial ownership or otherwise
during the years 2002-2005. So that the amount of data being
processed is the data 213 company with 194 managerial
ownership and corporate data without managerial ownership.
The results of calculation of the variable value of the company,
the company's performance and debt ratio peru- sahaan without
managerial ownership and perusa- panies with managerial
ownership is as follows:

Before testing the hypothesis, first performed the

separation of data into two groups, namely the group of Description Corporate Debt Policy
companies with managerial ownership (μ1) and group perusa-

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6 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, VOL. 9, NO. 1 MAY 2007: 1-8

Debt policy is calculated from the total long-term debt has a lower value than the company with managerial
divided by the total long-term debt plus equity. The larger the ownership.
number the greater this ratio shows the company's source of
funds comes from long-term debt. Even if the amount is more The results of descriptive statistics mentioned above are complete
than 1 then this company must have a company in a state of can be seen in Table 1.
deficit. Descriptive statistical results showed that the average
of these variables showed a score of 56.87% for firms with Table. Group Statistics
managerial and 67.35% ownership of the company without Std. Std. Error
KPMLKN N Mean
managerial ownership. This suggests that a large part of the deviation mean
source of funds of companies that the research samples No DEBT_RAT 213 0.5687 0.30705 0.02104
no 194 0.6735 0.53881 0.03868
derived from the creditors. Company without managerial
ownership bolder in Taking this debt policy that is with 67%
ROA Is there 213 0.0305 0.10073 0.00690
funding from the creditors. any or not 194 0.0147 0.10221 0.00734

VALUE Is there 213 1.4608 2.27556 0.15592

any or not 194 1.0561 1.49080 0.10703

Hypothesis test

Hypothesis testing using two-sample t test for

Description of the Company's Performance
The company's performance is calculated from net income divided
by average total assets. The average total
assets calculated from the total assets beginning of the year plus
the total assets the end of the year divided by two. The higher
the score indicates the company has been managed by the
returns on
assets tall one. This score indicates how many percent of the
amount of profit compared with the number of
assets. Descriptive statistical results showed scores
3.05% for firms with managerial ownership and 1.47% for the
company without managerial ownership. These results indicate
that the average company without managerial ownership
produce return on assets lower than the company with
managerial ownership.
independent ( independent sample t test). With a significance
level (sig) of 5%. Kepu- decision- to accept Ho performed if the
value "sig"> 0.05, and vice versa Ho is rejected if the "sig"
<0.05 (Santoso 2001). If Ho accepted means there is no
difference in the average kebi- jakan debt, the company's
performance and value of the company without managerial
ownership diban- ding company with managerial ownership.
While Ho is rejected means that there are differences in
average debt policy, the company's performance and value of
the company without managerial ownership compared with
companies with managerial ownership. Dilaku- testing media
right with SPSS 11.5
Here are the results of output SPSS 11.5 for two-sample t
test for independent:

Table 2. Summary of Variable Hypothesis Test

Description of Company Value
Score Sig. Hypothesis Conclusion
(2-tail) testing
The enterprise value calculated from the company's
Debt policy Ho rejected 0,015 average
market value divided by total assets. The market value is
debt policy is
calculated from the stock market price as of December 31
no difference
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding on December
31. The higher the score indicates higher the value perusa-
Company Ho accepted .116 average
pany based on stock market prices. This score indicates how
performance the company's
many times the company's market value compared with book
performance was
value assets. If the score is more than one, indicating that the
no difference
company's market value exceeds the book value of assets of
the company. Descriptive statistical results showed a score of
The value of the Ho rejected 0,036 Average value
1.46 for companies with managerial ownership and 1.07 for the
company Companies no
company without managerial ownership. This result shows that
difference
the average company without managerial ownership
From table. 2 The above shows that the score Sig.
(2-tail) to the debt policy
(DEBT_RAT) is 0,015, the company's performance (ROA) was 0.116
and the value of the company (VALUE)

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 Christiawan: Ownership Manajeral: Debt Policy, Performance and Value
is 0,036. These results indicate that the score Sig. (2-tail) for a
debt policy (DEBT_RAT)
and the enterprise value (VALUE) is under
0.05, which means that Ho refused while the company's
performance (ROA) is above 0.05, which means that Ho is
accepted. This means that there are policy differences
between the company's debt and the value of the company
without managerial ownership than firms with managerial
ownership. As for the company's performance was no
difference between the company without managerial
ownership than firms with managerial ownership.
Analysis and Discussion
The results of data processing in this study proved that
the hypothesis there is a difference between the debt policy of
the company without managerial ownership compared with
companies with proven managerial ownership. The average
score variable debt policy, the company with managerial
ownership compared with the company without managerial
ownership mengu- atkan evidence that a shareholder
managers more cautious in Taking debt policy. The manager
did not want the company experienced financial difficulties or
even bankruptcy. Financial difficulties or bankruptcy will hurt
his business either as a manager or as a shareholder. This is
in line with research Friend and Lang cited by Brailsford, which
shows that the way to reduce this risk is to reduce the level of debt
owned company (Brailsford 1999). High debt will increase the
risk of kebang- krutan company, because the company will
have financial distress. That's why the management will
berusahaan reduce the number of
debt as low as possible. The results of this study reinforce
previous studies ten- pliers relationship between managerial
ownership debt ratio namely: Kim and Sorensen (1986),
Agrawal and Mendelker (1987), Mehran (1998) in Wahidahwati
(2002), Soliha and Taswan (2002), Brailsford (1999), Moh'd,
1998, in Wahidahwati (2002) , Wahidahwati, (2002), and
Mahad- Wartha (2003).
Results of processing data in this study also proves that
the hypothesis there is a difference between the company's
performance of the company without managerial ownership
compared to companies with no proven managerial ownership.
The average performance of the company without managerial
ownership compared to companies with kepemi-
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7
managerial likan is the same even though the average
performance of the company which managed the manager
better shareholder. Memi- taste Liki top managers of the
company as a shareholder is not enough to make a difference
in the achievement of performance compared with pure
manager as professional staff on the payroll of the company.
Factors which could be suspected as the cause of this
conclusion is the small kepemi- likan by the manager for public
companies. This factor certainly needs further research. These
results do not support Mudambi research (1995), Kumar
(2004), Coles (2002), which menun- verifiers indicate
ownership on Management affect the performance of the
company.
Results of processing data in this study also proves that
the hypothesis there is a difference between the value of the
company without the company than the company's managerial
likan kepemi- and proven managerial milikan kepe-. The value
of the company without managerial ownership compared to
companies with proven managerial ownership ber- different.
Even the average value of the company with managerial
ownership is better than the average value of the company
without managerial ownership. Managers are shareholder
proven to increase the value perusa- pany. With the increasing
value of the company then the value of his wealth as an
individual shareholder will also increase.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study proves that there are policy differences
between the company's debt and the value of the company
without managerial ownership than firms with managerial
ownership. The average score of corporate debt policy
variables with managerial ownership diban- ding company
without managerial ownership corroborating evidence that a
manager seka- ligus shareholders to be more careful in taking
debt policy. The value of the company without managerial
ownership compared to companies with proven managerial
ownership is different, even the average value of the company
with better managerial ownership compared with the average
value of the company without managerial ownership.
While the hypothesis about the difference between a
company kiner- ja company without managerial ownership
compared to companies with no proven managerial ownership.
The average performance of the company without the
company's ownership manajerialdibanding with managerial
ownership is tantamount recom-
8 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, VOL. 9, NO. 1 MAY 2007: 1-8

kipun average performance managed company managers

better shareholder.
The results of this study can be a reference for other
studies related to managerial milikan kepe-. This study
supports and can be used as the basis for research on the
relationship between managerial ownership or influence the
policies of debt and the value of the company. In addition to
users of financial statements, especially investors and
creditors, pene- Litian can be used as a reference to see that
among companies managed by the manager and owner who
does not is different in terms of prudential funding decisions
and enhance shareholder value. So the results of this study
can be used as a basis for the granted stock options for
managers.
Lasfer, Meziane and faccio, Mara, 1999, "Mana-
gerial Ownership, Board Structure and Firm Value: The
UK Evidence ", http://ssrn.com/ abstract = 179 008.
Mahadwartha, Putu Anom, 2003, "Predictability
Power of Dividend Policy and Leverage Policy to
Managerial Ownership in Indone- drain: An Agency
Theory Perspective ",
http://ssrn.com/abstract=637582.
Mudambi, Ram and Carmela Nicosia, 1995,
"Ownership Structure and Firm Perfor- Mance:
Evidence from the UK Financial Services Industry", http://ssrn.com/abstrac

295 575.

Schroeder, Richard G., Myrtle W. Clark, Jack M.

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Brailsford, Timothy J., Barry R. Oliver, Sandra L.
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Department of Economics and Accounting, Faculty of Economics - Petra Christian University

http://puslit.petra.ac.id/journals/accounting