1. A.C. No.

10911, June 06, 2017

VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint for disbarment dated October 16, 2009 filed
by complainant Virgilio Mapalad, Sr. against respondent Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez before the Integrated Bar
ofthe Philippines (IBP).

The Facts

Complainant alleged that in an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 1635-1-784 before the Municipal Trial Court in Santiago City,
Isabela, complainant was one of the plaintiffs while respondent was the defendants' counsel therein. As the
said case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal dated May 22, 2009, in
which respondent indicated his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance No. II-0014038
without indicating the date of issue thereof.[2] On appeal, respondent filed the appellants' brief, again only
indicating his MCLE Compliance Number.[3]

In another case docketed as Special Civil Action No. 3573, respondent, for the same clients, filed a Petition for
Injunction wherein he once again only indicated his MCLE Compliance Number.[4] Respondent also filed a
Motion for Leave of Court dated July 13, 2009 in the said special civil action, indicating his MCLE Compliance
Number without the date of issue.[5]

Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, complainant discovered that respondent had no MCLE compliance yet.
The MCLE Office then issued a  Certification dated September 30, 2009, stating that respondent had not yet
complied with his MCLE requirements for the First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004) and
Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007).[6]

Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that respondent's act of deliberately and unlawfully misleading the
courts, parties, and counsels concerned into believing that he had complied with the MCLE requirements
when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct.[7] The complainant, thus, prayed for
the IBP to recommend respondent's disbarment to this Court.[8]

In a resolution dated February 10, 2010, this Court required the respondent to file a comment on the
complaint within 10 days from notice.[9] Despite receipt thereof, however, respondent failed to comply with
the said resolution.[10] This Court, thus, issued another resolution dated July 11, 2011 requiring the respondent
to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and, again, to
file a comment to the complaint.[11] However, the respondent again failed to comply.[12]

On August 14, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing.[13] On the date of the hearing, however, none of the parties appeared despite due notice.
[14]
 Nonetheless, the IBP directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from
notice.[15] Only the complainant filed his position paper, reiterating the allegations and arguments in his
complaint.[16]
After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD rendered a report[17] dated December 17,
2013 with the following recommendation, to wit:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the pieces of evidence submitted by the complainant, it is
recommended that ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ be DISBARRED and that his name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys upon finality of the decision.

SO ORDERED.

On September 28, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-685, adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the CBD-IBP Investigating Commissioner, viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record
and applicable laws, and for Respondent's violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10,
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he falsified his MCLE Compliance Number and used
it in his pleadings in Court, including his having ignored the Orders and notices of the Commission on Bar
Discipline and his having been previously sanctioned twice by the IBP, Atty. Anselmo Echanez is
hereby DISBARRED and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. [19]

No motion for reconsideration was filed by either party.

The Issue

Should respondent be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint and evidence on
record?

The Ruling

We answer in the affirmative.

Preliminarily, let it be stated that there is no denying that the respondent was given ample opportunity to
answer the imputations against him and defend himself but he did not do so despite due notices.

At any rate, respondent's acts of misconduct are clearly manifest, thus, warranting the exercise by this Court
of its disciplinary power.

First. It was clearly established that respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850[20]. No less than the MCLE Office
had issued a certification stating that respondent had not complied with the first and second compliance
period of the MCLE.[21]

Second. Despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated a false MCLE compliance number in
his pleadings before the trial courts.[22] In indicating patently false information in pleadings filed before the
courts of law, not only once but four times, as per records, the respondent acted in manifest bad faith,
dishonesty, and deceit. In so doing, he indeed misled the courts, litigants – his own clients included –
professional colleagues, and all others who may have relied on such pleadings containing false information.[23]

Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is a mockery of the courts,
especially this Court, considering that it is this Court that authored the rules and regulations that the
respondent violated.[24]

The Lawyer's Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires commitment to obeying laws and legal
orders, doing no falsehood, and acting with fidelity to both court and client, among others, viz.:

I, x x x do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these, voluntary obligations
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (emphasis supplied)

Also, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR likewise states:

CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice.

In using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings, respondent also put his own clients at risk. Such
deficiency in pleadings can be fatal to the client's cause as pleadings with such false information produce no
legal effect.[25] In so doing, respondent violated his duty to his clients.[26] Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR provide:

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Third. The respondent also repeatedly failed to obey legal orders of the trial court, the IBP-CBD, and also this
Court despite due notice. In the special civil action above-cited, the trial court directed the respondent to file a
comment on a motion which raised in issue respondent's use of a false MCLE compliance number in his
pleadings but he did not file any.[27] This Court also directed respondent to file a comment on the instant
complaint but he failed to do so.[28] We then issued a show cause order against the respondent to explain why
he should not be disciplined or held in contempt for failing to file the required comment but again, respondent
did not heed this court's order.[29] The IBP-CBD also notified the respondent to appear before it for mandatory
conference/hearing but the said notice was also ignored.[30]

Court orders should be respected not only because the authorities who issued them should be respected, but
because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the government,
which is absolutely essential if our government is to be a government of laws and not of men.[31]
Clearly, respondent's act of ignoring the said court orders despite notice violates the lawyer's oath and runs
counter to the precepts of the CPR. By his repeated dismissive conduct, the respondent exhibited an
unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court.

Respondent's culpability is further highlighted by the fact that, as cited by the IBP Board of Governors in its
resolution, respondent had already been sanctioned by the IBP twice. In a decision dated April 11, 2013 by this
Court en banc, respondent was found guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission,
and was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years with the warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.[32] In another decision dated May 31, 2016, this
Court en banc again found respondent guilty of performing notarial acts without a notarial commission and
was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years and barred permanently from being commissioned
as notary public with a stem warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with severely.[33] It is
noteworthy that in both cases, respondent already manifested his lack of regard, not only for the charges
against him, but most importantly to the orders of the IBP and the courts. In the said cases, the respondent
likewise failed to file answers, comments, or position papers, or attended mandatory conferences despite due
notices.[34]

Taken altogether, considering respondent's act of using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings[35],
his repeated failure to obey legal orders[36], and the fact that he had already been sanctioned twice by this
Court on separate cases[37], We are constrained to affirm the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution No. XXI-2014-
685, recommending his disbarment to prevent him from further engaging in legal practice.[38] It cannot be
overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice.[39] As vanguards of our legal system,
they are expected to maintain legal proficiency and a high standard of honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
[40]
 Also, of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.[41] He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
underfoot and ignore the very bonds of society, is unfaithful to his position and office and sets a detrimental
example to the society.[42]

WHEREFORE, respondent Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as
a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
2. A.C. No. 7314, August 25, 2015
MARY ANN T. FLORES, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a Resolution1 dated 21 March 2014 in Administrative Case No. 7314, Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio LL.
Mayor, Jr., the Board of Governors (Board) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation2 of the Investigating Commissioner3 finding respondent guilty of
violation of his sworn duty not to delay any man's cause for money or malice and disbarring him from the
practice of law.

Facts
This administrative case stemmed from the Complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) by Jose Roberto Flores (Flores), the husband of herein complainant, against JMJB
International Services, Inc. The case, docketed as NLRC Case No. 99-06-0972, was raffled to respondent, who is
a Labor Arbiter.4redarclaw

In a Decision5 dated 23 July 2001, respondent dismissed the case on a finding that Flores had voluntarily
resigned from employment.6redarclaw

Flores elevated the case to the NLRC, but the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The case
was then brought to the Court of Appeals (CA).7redarclaw

The CA, in its Decision8 dated 21 October 2002, ruled that the appeal to the NLRC had been timely filed.9The
appellate court set aside the NLRC Resolution for being null and void and granted monetary awards to
Flores.10 On 19 February 2003, the CA Decision became final and executory.11redarclaw

On 24 July 2003, Flores filed before respondent a Motion for Execution of the CA Decision.12redarclaw

On 15 November 2003, complainant claimed that the counsel of her husband received from the CA a Notice of
Transmittal of Records of Case dated 19 August 2003 addressed to the Clerk of Court of the NLRC.

As respondent was not acting on the Motion for Execution, the counsel of Flores filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Manifestation on 20 September 2004 praying that the motion be resolved with dispatch.

Upon inquiry with respondent's labor arbitration associate, the counsel learned that the records of the case
were still being requested from the Records Section of the NLRC.13 Apparently, as shown in the
Certification14 dated 13 October 2004 issued by a Records Officer of the NLRC, the case records had been sent
for archiving sometime in 2003 and were difficult to retrieve.

On 16 November 2005, respondent finally issued a Writ of Execution against JMJB International Services, Inc.
By that time, the corporation had not yet been dissolved, but had already amended its name to F.O. Maidin
International Services, Inc.15 This amendment prompted the counsel of Flores to file a Motion to Amend Writ
of Execution. Respondent, however, refused to act on the motion, reasoning that F.O. Maidin International
Services, Inc. was not a party to the case.16redarclaw

Accordingly, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent, citing that the latter's act of
archiving the records of the labor case and refusal to amend the Writ of Execution constituted a violation of
the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and other ethical standards.17redarclaw

In a Resolution18 dated 11 April 2007, this Court referred the administrative case to the IBP for investigation,
report, and recommendation.

The IBP's Investigating Commissioner, in a Report and Recommendation19 dated 21 July 2008, found
respondent guilty and recommended his disbarment. The gist of the report reads:20redarclaw

We find as unacceptable the respondent's gross delay in performing what is supposedly a purely ministerial
act on his part, his unexplained and unsanctioned resort to "archiving" which led to the disappearance of the
case records, and his gross ignorance of the law in refusing to issue a writ of execution against what the SEC
has essentially certified to be a company hiding under a new name. We believe that the respondent's actions
were not a product of ignorance, indolence, or negligence, but rather, were clearly borne out of a willful,
deliberate, and wholly malicious intent to misuse his position by favoring one of the parties in NLRC Case No.
99-06-0972, thus causing no small degree of serious injury to the complainant therein and to the integrity of
the legal process as a whole.

In a Resolution21 dated 14 August 2008, the IBP Board adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation with modification, lowering the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for three
years.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,22 but it was denied in the IBP Board Resolution23 dated 21
March 2014. The Board affirmed its previous Resolution with modification, reverting the penalty to
disbarment.24redarclaw

Neither party has filed a motion for reconsideration or petition for review thereafter.25redarclaw

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and other ethical standards.

DISCUSSION

We adopt the IBP Board Resolution.

There is a clear neglect of duty and ignorance of the law on the part of respondent on account of his failure to
immediately act on the Motion for Execution, as well as his refusal to amend the Writ of Execution despite
having been informed of the amendment of the name - but not the dissolution — of the corporation against
which the writ was issued.

The justification offered by respondent to explain his delay in acting o|n the motion cannot be countenanced,
as it was through his fault that the records of the case were lost. That he archived the case records at the NLRC
Records Section, not on the basis of official or sanctioned guidelines but only because it was the common
practice in his office, reflects his lack of due diligence and care in the custody of official documents.

While delay in the processing of documents normally occurs, it was inexcusable and out of the ordinary for
respondent to allow a period of more than two years to lapse before acting on the motion. This omission
amounts to gross misconduct as the unnecessary delay has caused prejudice to complainant. As defined, gross
misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with
the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination
of the cause.26redarclaw

Respondent also erroneously interprets jurisprudence when he insists that the writ could not have been
issued against F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc., because it was not a party to the case. His argument
contravenes the pronouncement of the Court in Republic Planters Bank v. Court of Appeals,27in which it said
that "a change in the corporate name does not make a new corporation, and whether effected by special act
or under general law, has no effect on the identity of the corporation, or on its property, rights, or liabilities."

As a Labor Arbiter, respondent is a public officer28 who must at all times be accountable to the people, whom
he must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.29 The unjustified delay in his actions
and his failure to act according to law constituted a breach of his accountability not only to complainant, but
also to the public in general.

Further, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer to delay no man for money or malice,30 and abandoned his
professional responsibility to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.31redarclaw

Without a doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalties, including suspension and disbarment.32 These penalties are imposed with great caution,
because they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action and their consequences are beyond
repair.33 Disbarment, in particular, may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.34redarclaw

The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become
a repeat offender.

In Maligsa v. Cabanting,35 the respondent lawyer was disbarred after the Court: found out that he had
notarized a forged deed of quitclaim. The penalty of disbarment was imposed after considering that he was
previously suspended from the practice of law for six months on the ground that he had purchased his client's
property while it was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding.36redarclaw

In Flores v. Chua,37 the respondent lawyer was disbarred after he was found guilty of notarizing a forged deed
of sale. The penalty of disbarment was imposed because in a previous administrative case, respondent was
found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 [16] of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He was also sternly warned
that a repetition of a similar act or violation in the future would be dealt with more severely.38redarclaw

Herein respondent was already suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months in another
case, Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,39 in which he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. For that offense, he was warned that the
commission of the same or a similar offense in the future would result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty. In light of respondent's previous suspension from the practice of law in an earlier administrative case
as above-mentioned, the recommendation of the IBP Board to disbar respondent is only proper.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent ATTY. JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR. guilty of grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering
him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the
practice of law and his name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal files of respondent; all the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic
of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

3. [ AC. No. 6387, Jul 19, 2016 ]

GABINO V. TOLENTINO & FLORDELIZA C. TOLENTINO v. ATTY. HENRY B. SO & ATTY. FERDINAND L. ANCHETA +

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Henry B. So for neglect in handling a case, and
respondent Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta for extorting P200,000.00 from a client.

Complainant Flordeliza C. Tolentino was the defendant in Civil Case No. SC-2267 entitled "Benjamin Caballes v.
Flordeliza Caballes" a case involving recovery of possession of a parcel of land.[1] On June 24, 1991, Branch 26
of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, rendered the Decision[2] against complainant Flordeliza
ordering her to vacate the land.

The case was appealed[3] to the Court of Appeals through complainant Flordeliza's counsel, Atty. Edilberto U.
Coronado (Atty. Coronado). While the appeal was pending, Atty. Coronado was replaced by Atty. Henry B. So
(Atty. So), a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform.[4]

Complainants Flordeliza and Gabino V. Tolentino, her husband, afterwards learned that the Court of Appeals
affirmed[5] the Regional Trial Court Decision against complainant Flordeliza. Complainants contend that Atty.
So did not inform them nor take the necessary action to elevate the case to this Court.[6] Thus, they were
compelled to secure the legal services of Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta (Atty. Ancheta), whom they paid
P30,000.00 as acceptance fee.[7]

Atty. Ancheta allegedly promised them that there was still a remedy against the adverse Court of Appeals
Decision, and that he would file a "motion to reopen appeal case."[8]Atty. Ancheta also inveigled them to part
with the amount of P200,000.00 purportedly to be used for making arrangements with the Justices of the
Court of Appeals before whom their case was pending.[9]

Initially, complainants did not agree to Atty. Ancheta's proposal because they did not have the money and it
was against the law.[10] However, they eventually acceded when Atty. Ancheta told them that it was the only
recourse they had to obtain a favorable judgment.[11]

Hence, in January 2003, they deposited P200,000.00 to Atty. Ancheta's Bank Account No. 1221275656 with
the United Coconut Planters Bank.[12]

Complainants were surprised to learn that no "motion to reopen case" had been filed,[13] and the Court of
Appeals Decision had become final and executory.[14]

Hence, complainants sought to recover the amount of P200,000.00 from Atty. Ancheta. Through a letter dated
September 10, 2003[15] by their new counsel, complainants demanded for the return of the P200,000.00.
However, Atty. Ancheta did not heed their demand despite receipt of the letter.

On May 17, 2004, complainants filed their Sinumpaang Sakdal[16] praying for the disbarment of Atty. So for
neglect in handling complainant Flordeliza's case, and Atty. Ancheta for defrauding them of the amount of
P200,000.00.

Atty. So counters that he was no longer connected with the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the
Department of Agrarian Reform when the Court of Appeals Decision was promulgated on July 16, 2001.[17] He
alleges that he worked at the Bureau from 1989 to 1997, and that he resigned to prepare for the elections in
his hometown in Western Samar.[18] It was a procedure in the Bureau that once a handling lawyer resigns or
retires, his or her cases are reassigned to other lawyers of the Bureau.[19]

Atty. Ancheta did not file a comment despite due notice. Hence, in this Court's Resolution dated February 23,
2011,[20] he was deemed to have waived his right to file a comment. This Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.[21]

On June 8, 2011, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed the parties
to appear for mandatory conference at 10:00 a.m. on July 6, 2011.[22] However, on July 6, 2011, only Atty. So
appeared.[23] Since there was no showing on record that complainants and Atty. Ancheta were notified, the
mandatory conference was reset to August 10, 2011 at 10:00 a.m.[24]

In the August 10, 2011 mandatory conference, complainant Flordeliza was represented by her daughter, Arlyn
Tolentino, together with counsel, Atty. Restituto Mendoza.[25]Arlyn Tolentino informed the Commission that
complainant Gabino V. Tolentino had already died.[26] Respondents did not appear despite due notice.[27]

Hence, the mandatory conference was terminated, and the parties were directed to submit their respective
verified position papers within a non-extendible period of 10 days from notice. After, the case would be
submitted for report and recommendation.[28]

On September 19, 2011, complainant Flordeliza filed as her position paper, a Motion for Adoption of the
Pleadings and their Annexes in this Case,[29] including the relevant documents[30] in Criminal Case No. SC-1191
(for estafa) against Atty. Ancheta, which she filed.

Atty. So filed his Position Paper[31] on September 15, 2011. Atty. Ancheta did not file any position paper.[32]

The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended[33] that Atty. So be absolved of the charge against him for
insufficiency of evidence.[34] As to Atty. Ancheta, the Commission found him guilty of serious misconduct and
deceit and recommended his disbarment.[35]

In the Resolution[36] dated December 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner.

On January 11, 2016, the Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to this Court for final action, pursuant
to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[37]

This Court accepts and adopts the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines correctly absolved Atty. So of the charge of negligence in the
performance of his duties as counsel of complainant Flordeliza.

Complainants fault Atty. So for failing to inform them about the Court of Appeals Decision and for not taking
the necessary steps to elevate their case to this Court.[38]However, it is undisputed that Atty. So was no longer
employed at the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance when the Court of Appeals Decision was rendered on July
16, 2001. Atty. So had resigned in 1997, four (4) years before the Decision was promulgated.[39]

Atty. So handled the appeal of complainant Flordeliza in his capacity as a government-employed legal officer
of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform. In his Notice of
Appearance[40] dated August 11, 1993 and Motion to Admit Additional Evidence[41] dated November 22, 1993
filed before the Court of Appeals, Atty. So affixed his signature under the representation of the Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance.

Atty. So's appearance for complainant Flordeliza may be likened to that of a lawyer assigned to handle a case
for a private law firm's client. If the counsel resigns, the firm is simply bound to provide a replacement.
[42]
 Similarly, upon Atty. So's resignation, the Director of the Bureau merely reassigned his case assignment to
other lawyers in the Bureau even without complainants' consent.

It would have been prudent for Atty. So to have informed complainants about his resignation and the eventual
reassignment of their case to another lawyer, although this was not required. Still, Atty. So's omission is not of
such gravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension. The serious consequences of disbarment or
suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence of the respondent's
misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.[43]

On the other hand, complainants were not entirely blameless. Had complainants been indeed vigilant in
protecting their rights, they should have followed up on the status of their appeal; thus, they would have been
informed of Atty. So's resignation. Atty. So resigned four (4) years before the Court of Appeals Decision was
promulgated.[44]Thus, complainants had ample time to engage the services of a new lawyer to safeguard their
interests if they chose to do so. A party cannot blame his or her counsel for negligence when he or she is guilty
of neglect.[45]

II

The same conclusion cannot be made with regards Atty. Ancheta. We agree with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines' recommendation that he should be disbarred.

Atty. Ancheta's repeated failure to comply with several of this Court's Resolutions requiring him to comment
on the complaint lends credence to complainants' allegations. It manifests his tacit admission. Hence, we
resolve this case on the basis of complainants' Sinumpaang Sakdal and its Annexes.

It was established by the evidence on record that (1) Atty. Ancheta received the acceptance fee of P30,000.00
on December 9, 2002;[46] and (2) complainants deposited on January 17, 2003[47] the amount of P200,000.00 to
Atty. Ancheta's bank account. Atty. Ancheta made false promises to complainants that something could still be
done with complainant Flordeliza's case despite the Court of Appeals Decision having already attained finality
on September 22, 2001.[48] Worse, he proposed bribing the Justices of the Court of Appeals in order to solve
their legal dilemma.

Atty. Ancheta should have very well known that a decision that has attained finality is no longer open for
reversal and should be respected.[49] A lawyer's duty to assist in the speedy administration of
justice[50] demands recognition that at a definite time, issues must be laid to rest and litigation ended.[51] As
such, Ancheta should have advised complainants to accept the judgment of the Court of Appeals and accord
respect to the just claim of the opposite party. He should have tempered his clients' propensity to litigate and
save them from additional expense in pursuing their contemplated action. Instead, he gave them confident
assurances that the case could still be reopened and even furnished them a copy of his prepared "motion to
reopen case." Despite his representation that he would file the motion, however, he did not do so.[52]

Atty. Ancheta's deceit and evasion of duty is manifest. He accepted the case though he knew the futility of an
appeal. Despite receipt of the P30,000.00 acceptance fee, he did not act on his client's case. Moreover, he
prevailed upon complainants to give him P200,000.00 purportedly to be used to bribe the Justices of the Court
of Appeals in order to secure a favorable ruling, palpably showing that he himself was unconvinced of the
merits of the case. "A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause."[53] Atty. Ancheta's misconduct betrays his lack of appreciation that the practice of law
is a profession, not a money-making trade.[54]

As a servant of the law, Atty. Ancheta's primary duty was to obey the laws and promote respect for the law
and legal processes.[55] Corollary to this duty is his obligation to abstain from dishonest or deceitful conduct,
[56]
 as well as from "activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system."[57] Atty. Ancheta's advice involving corruption of judicial officers tramps the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and the judicial system and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

Complainants eventually found out about his duplicity and demanded for the return of their money.[58] Still,
Atty. Ancheta did not return the P200,000.00 and the P30,000.00 despite his failure to render any legal service
to his clients.[59]

Atty. Ancheta breached the following duties embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS

Rule 15.05. - A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.

Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.

CANON 16 -A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME
INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.03. - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand....

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
A lawyer "must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to
his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein."[60] Atty.
Ancheta's deceit in dealing with his clients constitutes gross professional misconduct[61] and violates his oath,
thus justifying his disbarment under Rule 138, Section 27[62] of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, his failure to heed the following Resolutions of the Court despite notice aggravates his
misconduct:

Resolution[63] dated June 21, 2004, requiring him to

(1)
comment on the complaint;

Resolution[64] dated October 16, 2006, directing him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
(2)
dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the June 21, 2004 Resolution;

Resolution[65] dated January 21, 2009, imposing upon him the penalty of P1,000.00 for failure to comply
(3)
with the June 21, 2004 and October 16, 2006 Resolutions;

Resolution[66] dated January 27, 2010, imposing an additional fine of P2,000.00 or a penalty of

(4)
imprisonment of 10 days for failure to comply with the January 21, 2009 Resolution; and

Resolution[67] dated January 12, 2011, ordering his arrest and directing the National Bureau of
(5) Investigation to arrest and detain him for five (5) days and until he complied with the previous
Resolutions.

Atty. Ancheta's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of this Court constitutes utter disrespect of
the judicial institution. His conduct shows a high degree of irresponsibility and betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character. Indeed, his continued indifference to this Court's orders constitutes willful disobedience of the
lawful orders of this Court, which, under Rule 138, Section 27[68] of the Rules of Court, is in itself a sufficient
cause for suspension or disbarment.

The maintenance of a high standard of legal proficiency, honesty, and fair dealing[69]is a prerequisite to making
the bar an effective instrument in the proper administration of justice.[70] Any member, therefore, who fails to
live up to the exacting standards of integrity and morality exposes himself or herself to administrative liability.
[71]

Atty. Ancheta's violations show that he is unfit to discharge the duties of a member of the legal profession.
Hence, he should be disbarred.[72]

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Henry B. So is DISMISSEDfor insufficiency of evidence.
On the other hand, this Court finds respondent Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta GUILTY of gross misconduct in
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility and hereby DISBARS him from the
practice of law. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to remove the name of Ferdinand L. Ancheta from
the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent Ancheta is ORDERED to return to complainants Gabino V. Tolentino and Flordeliza C. Tolentino,
within 30 days from receipt of this Resolution, the total amount of P230,000.00, with legal interest at 12% per
annum from the date of demand on September 10, 2003 to June 30, 2013, and at 6% per annum from July 1,
2013 until full payment. Respondent Ancheta is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of payment of
the amount within 10 days from payment.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country.

This Resolution takes effect immediately. 

SO ORDERED.

4. AC. No. 10910, Jan 19, 2016

ANTERO M. SISON v. ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO +

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In his verified affidavit-complaint,[1] dated September 17, 2012, filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty. Sison),
president of Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc. (MDAHI), charged respondent Atty. Manuel
Camacho (Atty. Camacho) with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He accused Atty.
Camacho of violating Rule 1.01, for dishonestly entering into a compromise agreement without authorization,
and Rule 16.01, for failure to render an accounting of funds which were supposed to be paid as additional
docket fees.

Complainant's Position

Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim action against
Paramount Life & General Insurance Corp. (Paramount Insurance), docketed as Civil Case No. 05-655, before
the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 139 (RTC). The initial insurance claim of MDAHI against
Paramount Insurance was P14,863,777.00.

On March 4, 2011, Atty. Camacho met with Atty. Enrique Dimaano (Atty. Dimaano), corporate secretary of
MDAHI, and proposed to increase their claim to P64,412,534.18 by taking into account the interests imposed.
Atty. Camacho, however, clarified that the increase in the claim would require additional docket fees in the
amount of P1,288,260.00, as shown in his hand-written computation.[2] MDAHI agreed and granted the said
amount to Atty. Dimaano which was evidenced by a Payment Request/Order Form.[3] On May 27, 2011, Atty.
Dimaano gave the money for docket fees to Atty. Camacho who promised to issue a receipt for the said
amount, but never did.[4]

Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011, the RTC had already rendered a decision[5] in favor of
MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus interests in the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00.

On August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter[6] to MDAHI recommending a settlement with Paramount
Insurance in Civil Case No. 05-655 in the amount of PI5,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent a protracted appeal
with the appellate court. MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not indicate its conforme on the
letter of Atty. Camacho. Surprisingly, even without the written conformity of MDAHI, Atty. Camacho filed the
Satisfaction of Judgment,[7] dated August 15, 2011, before the RTC stating that the parties had entered into a
compromise agreement.

On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty. Camacho to clarify the events that transpired.[8] He asked Atty.
Camacho whether he paid the amount of P1,288,260.00 as additional dockets fees, and the latter replied that
he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed.

Disappointed with the actions of Atty. Camacho, Atty. Sison sent a letter,[9] dated August 24, 2011, stating that
he was alarmed that the former would accept a disadvantageous compromise; that it was against company
policy to bribe any government official with respect to the P1,288,260.00 given to the clerk of court; and that
MDAHI would only pay P200,000.00 to Atty. Camacho as attorney's fees.

Respondent's Position

In his verified answer,[10] dated October 30, 2012, Atty. Camacho denied all the allegations against him. He
stressed that he had the authority to enter into the compromise agreement. Moreover, the alleged docket
fees given to him by MDAHI formed part of his attorney's fees.

He further stated in his position paper[11] that the judgment debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI without
any objection, as duly evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt.[12] Thus, there was no irregularity in the
compromise agreement.

With respect to the amount handed to him, Atty. Camacho averred that he filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff
to Pay Attorney's Fee on September 13, 2011 before the RTC. The Court granted the said motion in its April 12,
2012 Order[13] stating that the amount of PI,288,260.00 was considered as part of his attorney's fees.

On July 6, 2012, the RTC issued an Order[14] resolving the motion for reconsideration filed by both parties in
favor of Atty. Camacho. In the said order, the RTC opined that only P300,000.00 was previously paid to Atty.
Camacho[15] as attorney's fees. Based on the foregoing, Atty. Camacho asserted that the amount of
P1,288,260.00 which he received, truly formed part of his unpaid attorney's fees. He stressed that the said RTC
order had attained finality and constituted res judicata on the present administrative case. He added that
MDAHI disregarded the RTC order as it filed an estafa case against him concerning the amount of
PI,288,260.00.

Report and Recommendation

After the mandatory conference on January 24, 2013 and upon a thorough evaluation of the evidence
presented by the parties in their respective position papers, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report and
Recommendation,[16] dated April 1, 2013 finding Atty. Camacho to have violated the provisions of Rule 1.01
and Rule 16.01 of the CPR and recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) year suspension from
the practice of law against him. In its Resolution No. XX-2013-474,[17] dated April 16, 2013, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Board) adopted the said report and recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera.

Aggrieved, Atty. Camacho filed a motion for reconsideration[18] before the Board reiterating that the
compromise agreement was valid because MDAHI did not reject the same and that the amount of
P1,288,260.00 formed part of his attorney's fees.

In his Comment/Opposition,[19] Atty. Sison countered that Atty. Camacho never denied that he filed the
satisfaction of judgment without the written authority of MDAHI and that there was a pending estafa case
against him before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 146, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688,
regarding the P1,288,260.00 handed to him.
In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-532,[20] dated August 10, 2014, the Board adopted the report and
recommendation[21] of National Director Dominic CM. Solis. The Board partially granted the motion for
reconsideration and dismissed, without prejudice, the charge regarding the failure to account for the money,
because it was premature to act on such issue due to the pending criminal case against the Atty. Camacho.
Accordingly, the penalty of one (1) year suspension imposed was lowered to six (6) months suspension from
the practice of law.

Hence, the case was elevated to the Court.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho violated Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.

Entering into a compromise agreement without written authority of the client

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their dealings.
Members of the Bar took their oath to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or
malice. These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly
fiduciary nature of their relationship.[22]

In the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate compromise agreements for the benefit of their clients.
Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that " [s]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
xxx (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to
waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired xxx."

In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the Bar, Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifies a
stringent requirement with respect to compromise agreements, to wit:

Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by
any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive
anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

In the case at bench, the RTC decision, dated May 26, 2011, awarded MDAHI approximately P65,000,000.00.
When Paramount Insurance offered a compromise settlement in the amount of P15,000,000.00, it was clear as
daylight that MDAHI never consented to the said offer. As can be gleaned from Atty. Camacho's letter, MDAHI
did not sign the conforme regarding the compromise agreement.[23]

Glaringly, despite the lack of a written special authority, Atty. Camacho agreed to a lower judgment award on
behalf of his client and filed a satisfaction of judgment before the RTC. The said pleading also failed to bear the
conformity of his client.[24] Although MDAHI subsequently received the payment of P15M from Paramount
Insurance, it does not erase Atty. Camacho's transgression in reaching the compromise agreement without the
prior consent of his client.

For entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of his client, Atty. Camacho violated
Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Members of the Bar must always conduct themselves in a way that promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[25]

Failing to account for the money of the client

Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of Rule 16.01 of the CPR, which provides for a lawyer's duty to
"account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client."

Here, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty. Camacho the amount of PI,288,260.00 as payment of
additional docket fees but the latter failed to apply the same for its intended purpose. In contrast, Atty.
Camacho invoked the July 6, 2012 Order of the RTC which declared the MDAHI allegation as unsubstantiated,
and claimed that the said amount formed part of his attorney's fees. The Board, on the other hand, opined
that it was still premature to decide such issue because there was a pending estafa case, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 13-1688, filed by MDAHI against Atty. Camacho involving the same amount of P1,288,260.00.

The Court is of the view that it is not premature to rule on the charge against Atty. Camacho for his failure to
account for the money of his client. The pending case against him is criminal in nature. The issue therein is
whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of misappropriating the amount of P1,288,260.00 entrusted to
him by his client. The present case, however, is administrative in character, requiring only substantial
evidence. It only entails a determination of whether Atty. Camacho violated his solemn oath by failing to
account for the money of his client. Evidently, the adjudication of such issue in this administrative case shall
not, in any way, affect the separate criminal proceeding.

In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of the
respondent's administrative liability. The findings in this case will have no material bearing on other judicial
action which the parties may choose to file against each other. While a lawyer's wrongful actuations may give
rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the
appropriate case; and every case must be resolved in accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the
quantum of proof required in each.[26]

Delving into the substance of the allegation, the Court rules that Atty. Camacho indeed violated Rule 16.01 of
the CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally requested MDAHI for additional docket fees, the latter obediently
granted the amount of P1,288,260.00 to the former. Certainly, it was understood that such amount was
necessary for the payment of supposed additional docket fees in Civil Case No. 05-655. Yet, when Atty. Sison
confronted Atty. Camacho regarding the said amount, the latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of
court as the payment period had lapsed. Whether the said amount was pocketed by him or improperly given
to the clerk of court as a form of bribery, it was unmistakably clear that Atty. Camacho did not apply the
amount given to him by his client for its intended legal purpose.

Atty. Camacho did not even deny making that request to MDAHI for additional docket fees and receiving such
amount from his client. Rather, he set up a defense that the said amount formed part of his attorney's fees.
Such defense, however, is grossly contradictory to the established purpose of the P1,288,260.00. In its
Payment Request/Order Form,[27] it is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI released the said amount only to
be applied as payment for additional docket fees, and not for any other purposes. Consequently, the lame
excuse of Atty. Camacho is bereft of merit because it constitutes a mere afterthought and a manifest
disrespect to the legal profession. Atty. Camacho is treading on a perilous path where the payment of his
attorney's fees is more important than his fiduciary and faithful duty of accounting the money of his client.
Well-settled is the rule that lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their clients' money for
themselves by the mere fact that the clients owe them attorney's fees.[28]

Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI from the moment he received the said amount.
In Tarog v. Ricafort,[29] the Court held that ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and
imperative for a lawyer to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own
records. Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for the money
entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability is by issuing and keeping
receipts.

Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC already rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 05-655, adjudging MDAHI
entitled to an insurance claim in the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00. From that date on, there was
no more need for additional docket fees. Apparently, still unaware of the judgment, MDAHI subsequently
released the money for additional docket fees to Atty. Dimaano, who handed it to Atty. Camacho on May 27,
2011. Despite a decision having been rendered, Atty. Camacho did not reject the said amount or return it to
his client upon receipt. Instead, he unilaterally withheld the said amount by capriciously invoking the payment
of his attorney's fees.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer
for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer's failure, to
return upon demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.[30]

Administrative penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for
violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR.
The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who
are qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[31]

In Luna v. Galarrita,[32] the Court suspended the respondent lawyer for two (2) years because he accepted a
compromise agreement without valid authority and he failed to turn over the payment to his client. In the
case of Melendrez v. Decena[33] the lawyer therein was disbarred because he entered into a compromise
agreement without the special authority of his client and he drafted deceptive and dishonest contracts.
Similarly, in Navarro v. Meneses III,[34] another lawyer, who misappropriated the money entrusted to him by
his client which he failed and/or refused to account for despite repeated demands, was disbarred because his
lack of personal honesty and good moral character rendered him unworthy of public confidence.

In this case, Atty. Camacho entered into a compromise agreement without the conformity of his client which is
evidently against the provisions of the CPR and the law. Moreover, he deliberately failed to account for the
money he received from his client, which was supposed to be paid as additional docket fees. He even had the
gall to impute that the money was illicitly given to an officer of the court. The palpable indiscretions of Atty.
Camacho shall not be countenanced by the Court for these constitute as a blatant and deliberate desecration
of the fiduciary duty that a lawyer owes to his client.

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho's acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant,
exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the Bar. His actions erode
rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his
violations, as well as the damage and prejudice they caused to his client, Atty. Camacho deserves the ultimate
penalty of disbarment.

Further, he must be ordered to return the amount of P1,288,260.00 to MDAHI, which he received in his
professional capacity for payment of the purported additional docket fees. Disciplinary proceedings revolve
around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative liability, which must include those
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-stated, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Furthermore, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is ORDERED to return to Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc.
the money intended to pay for additional docket fees which he received from the latter in the amount of
P1,288,260.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the records of
respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.
January 26, 2016
5. A.C. No. 10868
[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]
CHERYLE. VASCO-TAMARAY, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERCURIAM:
Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in a pleading merit the penalty of
disbarment.
Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a ComplaintAffidavit before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis) filed, on her
behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her signature on the
Petition.1 She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage as
"counsel for petitioner," referring to Vasco-Tamaray.2
Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but that of her husband, Leomarte Regala
Tamaray.3 To support her allegation, she attached the Affidavit4 of Maritess Marquez-Guerrero. The Affidavit
states:
1. Sometime in October 2006, I accompanied Cheryl Tamaray in going to East Cafe at Rustan's Makati
to meet with her husband Leomarte Tamaray;
 2. We arrived at the said place at around 7:00 pm and Leomarte introduced to us (Cheryl and I) Atty.
Deborah Z. Daquis as his lawyer. He further told us that Atty. Daquis' husband also worked in Japan
and that's how he got to know the latter and got her services;
3. Among other things, Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and the presence of Atty.
Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to annul his marriage with Cheryl;
4. Cheryl was shocked and just cried. After awhile [sic], Leomarte's brother arrived and shortly after,
the group left;
5. The next instance that I saw Atty. Daquis was when we (Cheryl and I) went to McDonald's-Greenbelt
where Atty. Daquis tried to convince her not to oppose Leomarte's decision to have their marriage
annulled[.]5(Emphasis supplied)
Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her "that a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City."6 In February 2007, Atty.
Daquis asked her to appear before the City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City.7
On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's Office and met Atty. Daquis. She
asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the Petition but Atty. Daquis refused.8
Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage from
Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. She was surprised to see that the Petition was
allegedly signed and filed by her.9
Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was forged by Atty. Daquis, and
that her purported community tax certificate appearing on the jurat was not hers because she never resided
in Muntinlupa City.10 She attached a Certification issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of Putatan, Muntinlupa
City stating that she was "never . . . a resident of #9 Daang Hari Street, Umali Compound, Summitville
Subdivision, Barangay Putatan."11 She also attached a Certification issued by Barangay Talipapa stating that she
has been a resident of "#484-J Saguittarius St., Solville Subd., Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City...
from 2000 till present."12
Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was Atty. Daquis' idea,
consented to by Leomarte Tamaray.13
She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The Petition states that her postal address
is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[,]"14 which is the address of
her husband's family. The return slips of the notices sent by the trial court were received by Encarnacion T.
Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives ofLeomarte Tamaray.15
Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray, complainant herself, and not
complainant's husband. She alleged that Vasco-Tamaray knew of the Petition as early as October 2006, not
December 2006.16
With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when she notarized the Petition, the
community tax certificate number was supplied by Vasco-Tamaray.17 Atty. Daquis' allegation was supported by
the Joint Affidavit of her staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and Ludy Lorena (Lorena).18
Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-Tamaray to be a client of Atty.
Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis forge Vasco-Tamaray's signature. Purawan stated that she typed
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and that the community tax certificate was provided by
Vasco-Tamaray.19
Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand money from Leomarte Tamaray but
she refused to do so.20
Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When Vasco-Tamaray requested another
copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was unable to grant her client's request because she did not have a copy
of the Petition with her at that time.21
Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son with a certain Reuel Pablo
Aranda. The illegitimate son was named Charles Dino Vasco. Reuel Pablo Aranda signed the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/ Admission of Paternity portion of the birth certificate.22
The Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their position papers,23 but based on the
record, only Vasco-Tamaray complied.24
The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the Complaint because Vasco-Tamaray failed
to prove her allegations. The Commission on Bar Discipline noted that Vasco-Tamaray should have questioned
the Petition or informed the prosecutor that she never filed any petition, but she failed to do so.25
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in the Resolution dated September 27, 2014.26
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should be held administratively liable
for making it appear that she is counsel for complainant Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray and for the alleged use of a
forged signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15 is dismissed.
I
By pretending to be counsel for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her duty of doing no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any
falsehood in court as stated in the Lawyer's Oath.27
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
for legal processes.
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was Leomarte Tamaray's
counsel28 but was unable to rebut the other allegations against her.
Respondent admitted that she met complainant in October 2006,29 but did not refute30 the statement in
Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit that Leomarte Tamaray introduced her as his lawyer.31 Likewise,
respondent admitted that she met with complainant subsequently,32 but did not refute Maritess Marquez-
Guerrero's statement that in one of the meetings, she tried to convince complainant not to oppose Leomarte
Tamaray's decision to annul their marriage.33
Respondent argued in her Answer that she was the counsel for complainant.34 Yet, there is no explanation
how she was referred to complainant or how they were introduced. It appears, then, that respondent was
contacted by Leomarte Tamaray to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. As stated in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit, "Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that
meeting and the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to annul his marriage with
Cheryl[. ]"35
Based on this, it seems Leomarte Tamaray intended to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
However, respondent made it appear that complainant, not her client Leomarte Tamaray, was the petitioner.
There is a probability that respondent did not want Leomarte Tamaray to be the petitioner because he would
have to admit that he entered into a bigamous marriage, the admission of which may subject him to criminal
liability.
In addition, if it is true that complainant was respondent's client, then there appears to be no reason for
respondent to advise her "not to oppose Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled."36
The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never received any court process
because her purported address in the Petition is the address of Leomarte Tamaray. The Petition states that
complainant is "of legal age, Filipino citizen, married with postal address at 09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp.,
Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[.]"37
The Certificate of Marriage of complainant and Leomarte Tamaray states that Leomarte's residence is at
"Summitvil[l]e Subv [sic], Muntinlupa," while complainant's residence is at "Hermosa St. Gagalangin, Tondo,
Manila."38 Assuming that complainant lived with her husband after they were married, complainant most likely
did not receive court processes because she left their home before the filing of the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage. As written in the Minutes of the meeting before the Office of the City Prosecutor:
P[etitioner] & R[espondent] met sometime in 1993 through his secretary. They became sweethearts in 1993
and their relationship as steadies lasted until 1996;
During the 3 years of their union, petitioner knew respondent's family as she even sleeps in their house; Theirs
was also a long distance relationship as respondent worked in Japan;
Upon respondents [sic] return to the Philippines they got married in Feb, 1996. They had no children, as
respondent immediately left for Japan on March 11, 1996;
Respondent returned to the Philippines but unfortunately he brought another woman. As a result, petitioner
left their house.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, complainant cannot be faulted for her failure to inform the prosecutor that she did not file any
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage because during the meeting on March 5, 2007, complainant had
no knowledge that the Petition was filed in her name.40 She obtained a copy of the Petition after the March 5,
2007 meeting.41
In Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy,42 this court discussed Canon 1, Rule 1.01, as follows:
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal professions, engraves an overriding
prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct- determinative as it is of the errant lawyer's penalty- depends on the factual
circumstances of each case .
....
. . . Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant measure, respondent
blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words,
his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.43
When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth was otherwise, she committed
a falsehood against the trial court and complainant.
II
Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she allowed the use of a forged
signature on a petition she prepared and notarized.44
Complainant alleged that her signature on the Petition was forged.45 Respondent merely denied complainant's
allegation.46
The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain "CVasco."47 The records of this case
show that complainant has used two signatures. In her identification cards issued by the University of the East,
she used a signature that spelled out "CVasco."48 In her Complaint-Affidavit against respondent, complainant
used a signature that spelled out "CTamaray."49
A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and on
complainant's identification cards show a difference in the stroke of the letters "c" and "o." Further,
complainant's signatures in the documents50 attached to the records consistently appear to be of the same
height. On the other hand, her alleged signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage has a big
letter "c."51 Hence, it seems that complainant's signature on the Petition for Declaration ofNullity of Marriage
was forged.
While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's signature, the fact remains that
respondent allowed a forged signature to be used on a petition she prepared and notarized.52 In doing so,
respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01. These canons state:
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the integrated bar.
RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
RULE 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In Embido v. Pe, Jr.,53 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr. was found guilty of violating Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 and was meted the penalty of disbarment for falsifying a court decision "in a non-existent court
proceeding."54 This court discussed that:
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a
lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part.
Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.55
In a similar manner, respondent's act of allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition she prepared and
notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her part.
Other acts that this court has found violative of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 are: engaging in a scuffle inside court
chambers;56 openly doubting paternity of his own son;57 hurling invectives at a Clerk of Court;58 harassing
occupants of a property;59 using intemperate language;60 and engaging in an extramarital affair.61
Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a court is tantamount to
consenting to the commission of a falsehood before courts, in violation of Canon 10.
In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,62 this court discussed the importance of Canon 10, Rule 10.01, as follows:
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an
exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice."63 (Emphasis supplied)
III
This court further finds that respondent violated Canon 17, which states:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented complainant, who is the
opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the same case.
The responsibilities of a lawyer under Canon 17 were discussed in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.:64
The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest
degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client's interest. The most thorough groundwork and
study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor bestowed on his person
to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys.
Rather, such honor attaches to him for the entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the
consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic requirements but also going the extra mile in the
protection of the interests of the client and the pursuit of justice[. ]65
Respondent is reminded of the duties and responsibilities of members of the legal profession, as discussed
in Tenoso v. Echanez:66
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State-the administration of
justice-as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. "67 (Citations omitted)
IV
This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 when she entered her appearance
as counsel for complainant68 even though she was engaged as counsel by Leomarte Tamaray.69 Canon 15, Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rationale for Canon 15 was discussed in Samson v. Era:70
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same
way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter
that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The
rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship,
the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the
case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and
guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree .
. . . The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere
expiration of the professional employment.1âwphi1 Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should
not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously
represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the
previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that:
"A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him."
The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to
himself. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the client's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any
other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.71
The test to determine whether conflict of interest exists was discussed in Hornilla v. Salunat:72
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is
his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.73 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel.74 When the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed the Petition as counsel for complainant.75 If respondent was
indeed engaged as counsel by complainant, then there is conflict of interest, in violation of Canon 15, Rule
15.03.
However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as counsel by complainant. Hence,
this court finds that respondent did not commit conflict of interest.
V
On a final note, Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015. Section 12 of
Rule 139-B now provides that:
Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.
(b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to
the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the
respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly
and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall be issued
within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submission of the Investigator's report.
 (c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted,
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the
resolution.
(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.76
Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was given the power to
"issue a decision"77 if the lawyer complained of was exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension or
disbarment."78 In addition, the case would be deemed terminated unless an interested party filed a petition
before this court.79
The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the power to impose disciplinary action
on members of the bar. The factual findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline and
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are recommendatory, subject to review by this
court.80
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7,
Rule 7.03, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 against respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is DISMISSED.
The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is directed to remove the name of Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.
This Resolution takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

6. [ AC. No. 10781, Apr 12, 2016 ]

COBALT RESOURCES v. ATTY. RONALD AGUADO +

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Cobalt Resources, Inc. (CRI) against respondent
Atty. Ronald C. Aguado (Atty. Aguado) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of Rules
1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the lawyer's oath.

The Antecedents

In its Complaint,[1] CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010, a group of armed men, clad in vests bearing the mark
"PASG" and pretending to be agents of the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG), hi-jacked its delivery
van which was then loaded with cellular phones worth P1.3 million; that Dennis Balmaceda (Balmaceda), the
driver of the delivery van, and his companions were all forcibly taken away at gun point and were dropped at
the Country Hill and Golf Club; that Balmaceda called Antonio Angeles (Angeles), the Security Director of CRI,
who immediately reported the incident to the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation Detection Unit
(PNP-CIDU); that with the use of Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) Tracking Device installed in the cellular
phones, Angeles and the PNP-CIDU tracked down the location of the cellular phones to be in front of Pegasus
Bar along Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that the PNP-CIDU, together with Angeles proceeded to Pegasus Bar
and found three (3) vehicles parked in front of the bar: (1) Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 owned by
Atty. Aguado, (2) Chevrolet Optra with Plate No. ZDW-764 and (3) a motorcycle with Plate No. NK-1180; that
when the PNP-CIDU approached the vehicles, Anthony Palmes (Palmes) ran but he was chased by the police
officers and was arrested; that Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the reception area of Pegasus Bar was
not arrested as none of the police officers knew, at that time, of his participation in the crime; that the PNP-
CIDU searched the vehicles and found the cellular phones, the Identification Card (ID) showing Atty. Aguado as
Legal Consultant of the PASG, the Mission Order identifying Atty. Aguado as the Assistant Team Leader, and a
vest bearing the mark PASG.

CRI further averred that the men who hijacked its delivery van used the fake mission order when it flagged
down the delivery van; that the mission order identified Atty. Aguado as the assistant team leader and
authorized the armed men to seize CRTs cellular phones; that the PASG issued a certification stating that the
mission order was fake; that Atty. Aguado carried an ID bearing his picture and name which showed that he
was a PASG legal consultant; and that this ID was likewise fake as evidenced by a certification issued by the
PASG.

Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,[2] dated September 8, 2010, executed by Palmes, CRI concluded that it
was Atty. Aguado who prepared the fake mission order and masterminded the crime as he was the one who
conceived it and laid down the nitty-gritty details of its execution; and that it was; he who recruited the armed
men who actually executed the hijacking.

Eventually, two separate Informations for Robbery[3] and Caraapping[4] were filed against Atty. Aguado and
several others.

The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer but, despite several extensions, he failed to do so.

The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference.

In his Conference Brief,[5] Atty. Aguado denied the allegations. He averred that "on March 5, 2010, at about
11:00 to 12:00 in the afternoon,"[6] his Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 was carnapped along Scout
Mandarin while in the custody of his driver; that he reported the incident to the police authorities; that on
March 7, 2010, he was awakened by relatives informing him that his name was on the front page of several
tabloids in a story connecting him to the alleged hijacking; and that he was indicted in the case because of the
ID found hanging in his carnapped vehicle.

In its Report and Recommendation,[7] dated May 3, 2011, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found
Atty. Aguado liable for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in falsifying the ID and mission
order showing him as the Legal Consultant and the Assistant Team Leader, respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-
CBD recommended that he be suspended for two (2) years. It, however, deferred the issue of Atty. Aguado's
purported participation in the alleged hijacking incident as the issue pertained to a judicial function.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the CBD, as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful conduct by falsifying the ID and Mission Order, Atty. Ronaldo Aguado is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years.[8]
Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for reconsideration[9] praying that the May 3, 2011 report of the IBP-CBD be
set aside and that a new resolution ordering the disbarment of Atty. Aguado be issued. CRI claimed that Atty.
Aguado deserved the ultimate penalty of disbarment as the falsification of public documents was sufficiently
established and, as the CBD knew, he masterminded the hijacking using his profession to commit the crime.

On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion for reconsideration[10] of the March 20, 2013 Resolution
praying that it be set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the complaint. He averred that the charges of
usurpation of authority and falsification filed against him had been dismissed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City; that he could not be presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was
never in possession of the falsified ID and mission order; and that he never used, took advantage or profit
therefrom. Atty. Aguado asserted that this case should, at the very least, be suspended pending the resolution
of the robbery and carnapping charges against him.

In a Resolution,[11] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied both motions and affirmed
its March 20, 2013 Resolution.

Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, CRI filed a petition for review[12] before the Court.
CRI was firm in its stand that Atty. Aguado be meted out the penalty of disbarment for his falsification of a
PASG mission order and ID and for his involvement in the hijacking of the CIR delivery van and its cargo.

Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review insisting on his innocence and praying for the dismissal of the
complaint.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.

It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being administrative in nature, is separate and distinct
from a criminal action filed against a lawyer and they may proceed independently of each other.[13] A finding of
guilt in the criminal case does not necessarily mean a finding of liability in the administrative case.[14] In the
same way, the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence against an accused, who
is also a respondent in an administrative case, does not necessarily exculpate him administratively because the
quantum of evidence required is different. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required.[15] "In
administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly
preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant."[16] Preponderance of evidence
means "evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto."[17]

Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was in possession of a
falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order identifying him as the Assistant
Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation. Although Atty. Aguado claimed in his Conference Brief that he
was indicted merely on the basis of an ID found hanging in his carnapped Toyota Fortuner,[18] his counsel, Atty.
Letecia Amon (Atty. Amon), during the mandatory conference held on February 25, 2011, acknowledged that
the ID and mission order were found in the Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty. Aguado, thus:

ATTY. HARON:
 Is she willing to admit that respondent is the same person referred to in the document called mission
order marked as Annex "F" issued by the PASG.

ATTY. AMON:

I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.

ATTY. HARON:

I'm showing counsel for respondent with a copy of a mission order marked as Annex "F"....

COMM. CACHAPERO:

Machine copy.

ATTY. HARON:

This is the copy.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

Take a look, is that a machine copy?

ATTY. HARON:

Yes, Your Honor. Annex "F" states that Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is the assistant team leader of the team by
mission order.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

He is only asking, the respondent is the one who owns that document. He is not yet asking whether that
document is authentic or not.

ATTY. AMON:

Yes, Your Honor, as written here.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

Yes, he is the one.

ATTY. HARON:

Would the respondent also like to admit that the identification card and the mission order were found
inside his Toyota Fortuner, Plate No. UNO-68.

ATTY. AMON:
 Of which he is the owner, yes.

ATTY. HARON:

Admitted also, Your Honor.

ATTY. HARON:

Would the respondent also like to admit the certifications Annexes "G" and "H" issued by the PASG are
genuine and duly executed. I'm showing counsel copies of the certifications, Your Honor, marked as
Annexes "G" and "H" which bears the seal of that office, Your Honor.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

What is your proposal Atty. Haron?

x x x.[19] [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay[20] of Palmes explicitly described Atty. Aguado's participation in the crime
as follows:

xxx

2. Alam ko kung sinu-sino ang mga taong kasama sa pagplano at pagsasagawa ng nasabing 'hijacking'.
Bagamat may partisipasyon ako sa krimen, hindi ko alam na ang gagawing paghuli sa mga nasabing cellphone
ay labag sa batas dahil ako ay pinaniwala na ang gagawin naming paghuli sa mga cellphone ng Cobalt ay isang
lehitimong operasyon ng PASG.

3. Bago pa man naganap ang nasabing hijacking ay dati akong empleyado ng Cobalt na nakatalaga sa Delivery
Section/Pull Out Service. Ngunit hindi nagtagal ay nag-resign ako.

4. Noong ikalawang lingo ng Pebrero, nilapitan ako ni Jaime "James" Abedes at sinabi sa akin ng kung pwede
ay i-monitor ko daw ang ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt at ako ay bibgyan niya ng "budget" upang ang kanyang
grupo ay makapagsagawa ng 'seizure operations.'

5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong sumangayon sa mungkahi ni James ngunit ako ay pinapanatag niya na
lahat ng dokumento at papeles ay kumpleto. Sabi pa ni James, "Si Atty. Aguado ang magbibigay ng complete
documents at Mission Order dahil naka-direkta siya sa PASG Malacanang para ma-flag down ang delivery van".

6. Ako ay naniwala sa kanyang sinabi dahil sa pagbanggit niya na may kasama kaming abogado. Dahil dito ay
pumayag ako sa mungkahi ni James.

7. Kinabukasan ay nagkita kami ni James sa Caltex Pioneer corner Shaw Boulevard. Nalaman ko kay James na
may hawak siyang Security Guard doon. Pinakilala niya ako kay Eliseo De Rosas alias Nonoy na isa ring tauhan
ni James. Siya ay may gamit na Honda na motorsiklo na kulay berde na may plakang 1180 NK. Noong araw din
na iyon ay nagtungo kami sa Brixton Street upang i-monitor ang warehouse ng Cobalt dahil may warehouse
ang Cobalt sa Brixton Street.

8. Pagkatapos naming pumunta sa Brixton Street ay nagtungo naman kami sa P. Tuazon Street kung saan may
mga clients ang Cobalt, at doon naming nakita ang delivery van na Mitsubishi L-300 ng Cobalt.
9. Sinimulan namin ni Nonoy ang pagmonitor ng ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt. Sa aming ginawang pag-
monitor ay napansin naming madalas magpakarga ng gas ang nasabing delivery van sa Petron Station sa
Ortigas Avenue corner B. Serrano Street. Isang lingo kaming nag-monitor ni Nonoy sa ruta ng Cobalt.

Ipinaalam naming kay James ang nakakalap naming impormasyon. Noong natiyak naming ang ruta ng delivery
van ay nagpaschedule si James ng 'meeting' kay Atty. Aguado.

10. Ika-22 ng Pebrero 2010 alas-6 ng gabi sa McDonald's Quezon Avenue ay nag meeting kami. Ang mga
kasama sa meeting ay si James, Atty. Aguado, Joe Almonte, at Nonoy. Noong kami ay nandoon ay lumipat ng
lamesa si Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte at sila ay nagusap.

11. Pagkatapos ng usapan nila ay pumunta sa amin si James at sinabi sa amin kung ano ang kanilang
napagusapan. Sinabi sa amin ni James na mag-iisue daw ng Mission Order si Atty. Aguado. Si Atty. Aguado na
rin daw ang magbubuo ng grupo ng mga lalake upang i-flag down ang delivery van ng Cobalt.

12. Noong ika-25 ng Pebrero 2010 alas 7 ng gabi, ay muli kaming nagkita nila James, Nonoy at Joe Almonte sa
McDonald's Quezon Avenue. Pagsapit ng alas-8 ng gabi ay tumawag si Atty. Aguado na nasa Starbucks Cafe sa
Tomas Morato Avenue daw siya naka-puwesto. Kaya't kaming apat ay sumunod sa Starbucks. Pagdating
naming sa Starbucks ay nandoon nga si Atty. Aguado at may kasama siyang isang pulis.

13. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis sila Atty. Aguado at James sakay ng Toyota Fortuner na may plakang UNO-68.
Sinabi sa amin ni James na sila ay magsasagawa ng "ocular" ng lugar kung saan gagawin ang pag-flag down ng
delivery van. Nang sila ay magbalik, kami ay sinabihan na gagawin namin ang operasyon sa umaga ng
kinabukasan (ika-26 ng Pebrero, Biernes).

Ayon pa sa kanila, ako raw ay pupuwesto sa Petron Station sa may Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue ng
alas-8 ng umaga upang doon abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van. Samantalang, ang mga taong
magsasagawa ng pag flag down (pawang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado) ay pupuwesto na rin sa may Benitez Street.
Kapag nakita ko na raw ang delivery van ay agad akong tumawag kay James upang ipagbigay alam ang
pagdaan nito at i-alert ang mga nasabing mga lalake, pagkatapos ay tumungo raw ako sa Benitez Street upang
siguraduhin na tama ang delivery van na ipa-flag-down.

Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay isa-isa na kaming nagsi-uwian.

14. Kaya't kinabukasan, ika-26 ng Pebrero, alas-8 ng umaga ay nagtungo ako sa nasabing Petron Station.
Ngunit tumawag si James na hindi raw matutuloy ang operation dahil kulang sa tao si Atty. Aguado.

15. Kami (ako, Joe Almonte at Nonoy) ay muling pinulong ni James sa McDonald's Quezon Avenue noong ika-i
ng Marso alas-7 ng gabi. Bandang alas-8 ng gabi ay dumating na rin si Atty. Aguado. Sila Atty. Aguado, James at
Joe Almonte [ay] nag-usap sa labas ng Smoking Area samantalang kami ni Nonoy ay nanatili sa loob.

16. Nang matapos ang usapan ay sinabi sa amin ni James na nag-set ulit ng operation si Atty. Aguado
kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, Martes, ngunit hintayin daw naming ang feedback mula kay Atty. Aguado dahil
kelangan daw ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.

17. Muli akong nagtungo kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, alas- 8 ng umaga, ngunit maya-maya lamang ay
tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na hindi na naman daw tuloy ang operation dahil hindi
nakakuha ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.
Sa puntong ito ay sinabi ko na kay James na sana sigurado ang mga papeles ni Atty. Aguado dahil ayaw ko ng
illegal na trabaho. Sinabi naman sa akin ni James na kumpleto naman daw ang mga papeles at legal ang
gagawing operation.

18. Ika-4 ng Marso 2010, ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na tuloy na daw ang operation
kinabukasan (ika- 5 ng Marso). Sinabi rin niya sa akin na alas-8 ng umaga ay kailangan daw na naka-puwesto
na ako sa Petron Station.

19. Kaya noong ika-5 ng Marso 2010, alas-8 ng umaga, ako ay pumuwesto na sa Petron Gasoline Station sa
Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue sakay ng isang motorsiklo. Bandang alas-8:3O ng umaga ay dumating
naman si James sakay ng isang Chevrolet na may plakang ZDW 764 at may kasama pa siya na pinakilala sa
aking "Larry."

Bandang alas-9 ng umaga ay dumating ang Toyota Fortuner ni Atty. Aguado. Nakita ko na sakay ng nasabing
Toyota Fortuner si Atty. Aguado at Joe Almonte. Hindi sila bumaba bagkus ay nagpakarga lamang ito ng
gasolina sa nasabing Petron Station. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis na rin sila. Sumunod namang umalis si James at
Larry sakay ng Chevrolet.

20. Bandang alas-9:3O ng umaga, nakita ko na dumating ang delivery van ng Cobalt sa Petron upang ito ay
magpakarga ng gasolina. Tumawag ako kay James gamit ang aking cellphone at sinabi ko, "Nandito na ang
delivery van na white, may plakang NKQ 734." Sumagot si James, "ok nakapuwesto na kami. Andito na kami
sa area"

21. Agad akong umalis patungo sa Benitez Street upang abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van upang ma-flag
down ito. Gamit ang aking motorsiklo, ako ay dali-daling nagtungo sa Benitez Street.

Pagdating ko doon ay nakita ko ang nasabing Chevrolet ni James at isang L-300 van na kulay blue-green na
may plakang DFN-733. Nadatnan ko rin ang tatlong lalake na pawang armado at nakasuot ng tsalekong may
tatak na PASG at nag-aabang sa gilid ng daan. Mayroon din akong napansin na nakasakay sa loob ng nasabing
blue-green na L-300 van ngunit hindi ko na nabilang ang dami nila.

22.  Ako ay pumunta sa Chevrolet (driver side), at binuksan naman ni James ang bintana nito. Sinabi ko ulit sa
kanya na parating na ang delivery van. Sumagot siya, "Sige. Timbrehan mo lang sila pag malapit na. Hintayin
mo relay kung saan ka susunod." Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na sila.

23.  Pagkaalis nila, kami at nang tatlong nasabing lalake ay nag-abang sa pagdaan ng delivery van. Nang makita
ko itong paparating, agad kong sinabi "approaching na. yang puti, yang puti." Pagkatapos noon ay agad pinara
ng isa sa mga nasabing lalakeng nakasumbrero ang delivery van. Sumenyas ito sa driver ng delivery van na
itabi ito sa gilid. Pilit binuksan ng tatlong lalake ang magkabilang pintuan ng delivery van at nang mabuksan
ang mga nasabing pintuan ay agad hinila palabas ang tatlo nitong pahinante at agad silang pinosasan.

xxxx
From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had participation in the crime as charged in
the complaint, from the planning stage up to its execution. These falsified documents found in his possession,
as certified found in his possession, as certified as evidenced by the PASG, were used to facilitate the
commission of the crime. The well-settled rule is that "in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in
possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification."[21] Atty.
Aguado failed to rebut the allegations. Other than the police blotter showing that he reported the carnapping
of his vehicle, Atty. Aguado presented no other convincing evidence to support his denial of the crime. He also
failed to show any ill motive on the part of Palmes in testifying against him whom he claimed to have met only
in February 2010.

Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner cannot be given credence considering his inconsistent
statements on the matter. In this regard, the Court quotes a portion of the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Oliver Cachapero. Thus:

He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping of his Fortuner car on the same day the hijacking was
staged by supposed PASG personnel suggesting that he was a victim and not a perpetrator. However, his
allegations in this regard is put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm sheet, Respondent reported that the
carnapping took place at 2:30 of March 5, 2010 while in his sworn statement, he claimed that his car was
carnapped at 4:31 p.m. the precise time the supposed carnapping was staged is too vital that Respondent
could not have overlooked the same in his narration of facts in his counter-affidavit or in his statement before
the police authorities expecially because he supposedly reported the incident on the very same day it
happened. But as correctly observed by the Complainant, even if the report on the time of the carnapping
incident would have been properly made, the hijacking took place much earlier and therefore the same does
not negate the commission of the crime by the Respondent. Also, the reporting did not prove the fact of
carnapping especially where, as in this case, no eyewitness account was presented, no suspect apprehended,
and no criminal case was filed.[22]
The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly mandates:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden with conditions,[23] and granted only to
those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers as instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice.[24] As officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith,
lawyers are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and so mandated to behave at all times
in a manner consistent with truth and honor.[25] They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but
also this high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[26]

Atty, Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit and unable to faithfully discharge his bounden
duties as a member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up to the exacting standards demanded
of him, he proved himself unworthy of the privilege to practice law. As vanguards of our legal system, lawyers,
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal professor and to refrain from any act
or omission which might diminish the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal
profession.[27]

In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of gross dishonesty, imposed the supreme penalty of
disbarment for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful acts by falsifying documents. In Brennisen v.
Atty. Contawi,[28] the Court disbarred the lawyer when he falsified a special power of attorney so he could
mortgage and sell his client's property. In Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr.,[29] the penalty of disbarment was meted out
against the lawyer who authored the falsification of an inexistent court decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF the roll of attorneys.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be made part of his personal records;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

7. A.C. No. 11064, September 27, 2016

BIENVENIDA FLOR SUAREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. ELEONORA. MARAVILLA-ONA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case arose from a verified letter-complaint1 dated July 19, 2012 filed by complainant
Bienvenida Flor Suarez before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) seeking for the refund of the professional and legal fees which she paid to respondent Atty. EleonorA.
Maravilla-Ona.

The Facts

On February 22, 2011, Bienvenida went to the office of Atty. Maravilla-Ona to seek the latter's legal assistance
in transferring title to a land, under her name. Atty. Maravilla-Ona agreed to render her services for a
consideration of forty-eight thousand pesos (P48,000) by way of professional and legal fees. Accepting the
engagement, Bienvenida turned over the necessary documents to Atty. Maravilla-Ona and gave the latter the
amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000) as down payment, as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 515532 dated
February 22, 2011.

On March 4, 2011, Bienvenida returned to Atty. Maravilla-Ona's office to make another payment in the
amount of thirty-five thousand pesos (P35,000), as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 49376. Thereafter, on
March 28, 2011, Bienvenida made her final payment to Atty. Maravilla-Ona in the amount of twelve thousand
pesos (P12,000), as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 52163.3chanrobleslaw

Despite the lapse of a considerable period, Bienvenida did not receive any update on the status of the transfer
of land title under her name. Apparently, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to do anything to facilitate the said
transfer of title. Thus, Bienveriida opted not to push through with the transaction and, instead, claimed
reimbursement for the amounts she paid to Atty. Maravilla-Ona, to which the latter agreed.

After a year of waiting, Atty. Maravilla-Ona issued to Bienvenida a Bank of Commerce check dated May 9,
2012 in the amount of fifty-eight thousand pesos (P58,000).4 However, to Bienvenida's dismay, when she
presented the check to the bank, it was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Maravilla-Ona
thereafter made several promises to return Bienvenida's money, which, up to this moment, remain unfulfilled.

Aggrieved, Bienvenida filed the instant administrative case before the CBD praying for the recovery of
P58,000, representing the amount of the dishonored check issued by Atty. Maravilla-Ona.

Acting on the complaint, the CBD, through Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago, issued an
Order5 dated August 1, 2012 requiring Atty. Maravilla-Ona to submit her Answer to the complaint, with a
warning that failing to do so would render her in default. However, notwithstanding the said warning, Atty.
Maravilla-Ona did not submit any Answer.

On January 31, 2013, IBP Commissioner Loreto C. Ata (Commissioner Ata) notified the parties to appear for a
mandatory conference scheduled on March 7, 2013. The notice stated that "nonappearance by any of the
parties shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in further proceedings."6chanrobleslaw

At the mandatory conference, only Bienvenida appeared. Thus, Commissioner Ata issued an Order7noting
Atty. Maravilla-Ona's absence during the mandatory conference and her failure to file an Answer. Accordingly,
Atty. Maravilla-Ona was declared in default.

Considering the condition and age of Bienvenida, who was already 84 years old at that time, Commissioner
Ata found it imperative to proceed with the investigation ex parte. Hence, after clarificatory questions were
propounded on Bienvenida, the mandatory conference was terminated and the case was submitted for report
and recommendation.8chanrobleslaw

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation9 dated July 22, 2014, the CBD found that Atty. Maravilla-Ona was guilty of
gross misconduct and violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility for: (1) issuing a worthless check;
(2) refusing to settle due obligations despite demand; (3) failing to serve the complainant with competence
and diligence; and (4) failing to apprise her client of the status of the transactions.10 Thus, the CBD
recommended that Atty. Maravilla-Ona be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and
ordered to pay Bienvenida the amount of P58,000.

On December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution11 adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD with the modification increasing Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to disbarment, to
wit:

RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2014-917

CBD Case No. 12-3534
Bienvenid[a] Flor Suarez vs.
Atty. EleonorA. Maravilla-Ona

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding Respondent guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Canon
18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for issuing a worthless check, for her refusal to
settle due obligations despite demand, for her failure to serve the Complainant with competence and diligence,
and for her failure to apprise her client of the status of transactions in relation to a plethora of cases, Atty.
Eleanor A. Maravilla-Ona is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and [her] name ORDERED stricken
off from the Roll of Attorneys.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 11, 2016, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of Resolution along with the records of this
case. 

The Court's Ruling

We concur with the IBP Board of Governors' finding of administrative liability.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code provides that "[lawyers] shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, lawyers become guardians of the law and indispensable
instruments for the orderly administration of justice.14 As such, they can be disciplined for any conduct, in
their professional or private capacity, which renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court.15chanrobleslaw

In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Maravilla-Ona violated her sworn duties under the Lawyer's Oath and
the Code. The records plainly show that Atty. Maravilla-Ona was completely remiss and negligent in fulfilling
her obligations as a lawyer to Bienvenida. After collecting the full amount of her professional and legal fees,
Atty. Maravilla-Ona did not take a single step to process the registration of land title in Bienvenida's name.
Worse, when asked to return the money she received from Bienvenida, Atty. Maravilla-Ona issued a worthless
check which consequently bounced when presented for payment.

In Belleza v. Atty. Macasa, the Court ruled that a lawyer's failure to return the client's money upon demand
gives rise to the presumption that the lawyer has misappropriated it for his or her own use to the prejudice of
and in violation of the trust reposed in him or her by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well
as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.16 Atty.
Maravilla-Ona's failure to return Bienvenida's money is a breach of Rule 16.01 of the Code, which provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 16.01 -A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Atty. Maravilla-Ona's agreement to render her legal services to Bienvenida, sealed by her receipt of her legal
fees, is an assurance and representation that she would be diligent and competent in fulfilling her
responsibilities as Bienvenida's lawyer. However, Atty. Maravilla-Ona acted to the contrary. Thus, the IBP
correctly found that she violated Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 thereof, which state:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;

xxxx

Rule 18.03  A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Atty. Maravilla-Ona's negligence, her failure to return her client's money, and her act of issuing a worthless
check constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence, and betrayal of her client's interests. These acts
undoubtedly speak of deceit Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary
to justice, modesty or good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a person owes to his or her fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.17 Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the
legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes her unfit to practice law.18chanrobleslaw

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office;
(4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's
oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party without authority to do so.19 Thus, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. However, the
question as to what disciplinary sanction should be meted out against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct
requires consideration of a number of factors.
In the instant case, the misconduct of Atty. Maravilla-Ona is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the
orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Bienvenida and to appear at the scheduled
mandatory conference. This .constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming
lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must maintain respect not only to the courts, but
also to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring
him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference.
Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another chance to defend himself
through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority.
Indeed, he is justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and
promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only to the
courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys.20

We also take note of the past disbarment complaints that had been filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona. In A.C.
No. 10107 entitled Beatrice C. Yatco, represented by her Attorney-In-Fact, Marivic Yatco v. Atty. Eleanor Ma
illa-Ona, the complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for issuing several worthless
checks as rental payments for the complainant's property and for refusing to vacate the said property, thus
forcing the latter to file an ejectment case against Atty. MaraviJla-Ona. The IBP required Atty. Maravilla-Ona to
file her Answer, but she failed to do so. Neither did she make an appearance during the scheduled mandatory
conference. In its Resolution21 dated February 13, 2013, IBP found Atty. Maravilla-Ona guilty of serious
misconduct and for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code. The Court latter adopted and approved the IBP's
findings in its Resolution dated September 15, 2014 and suspended Atty. Maravilla Ona from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year.

In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona, docketed as A.C. No. 10944 and entitled Norma
M. Gutierrez v. Atty. Eleanor Maravilla-Ona, the complainant therein alleged that she engaged the services of
Atty. Maravilla-Ona and gave her the amount of P80,000 for the filing of a case in court. However, Atty.
Maravilla-Ona failed to file the case, prompting the complainant to withdraw from the engagement and to
demand the refund of the amount she paid. Atty. Maravilla-Onreturned P15,000 and executed a promissory
note to pay the remaining P65,000. However, despite several demands, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to refund
the complainant's money. Thus, a complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for  grave 
misconduct, gross negligence and incompetence. But again, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file her Answer and
appear in the mandatory conference before the IBP. The IBP found that Atty. Maravilla-Ona violated Canon 16,
Rule 16.03 of the Code22 and recommended her suspension for a period of five ( )years, considering her pr ious
infractions. The Court, however, reduced Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to suspension from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) years, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely. She was also ordered to return the complainant's money.

Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of.violating her oath as a lawyer and the Code, as well as defying
the processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her blatant disregard of the Code and her sworn duty as a
member of the Bar to continue. She had been warned that a similar violation will merit a more severe penalty,
and yet, her reprehensible conduct has, again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the legal profession.

In her previous disbarment case, We showed leniency by reducing her penalty to suspension for a period of
three (3) years. We cannot similarly treat Atty. Maravilla-Ona this time. It is clear that she did not learn any
lesson from her past experiences and since then has continued to exhibit traits of incorrigibility. It is time to
write finis to Atty. Maravilla-Ona's professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the
interest of justice.23chanrobleslaw

In Overgaard v. Valdez,24 the respondent was disbarred for deserting his client after collecting the full amount
of his legal fees without attending to any of the cases for which he was engaged. This Court ruled that
respondent committed manifestly deceitful and dishonest acts, which violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15;
and Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code.

Similarly in Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III,25cralawred the Court disbarred the· lawyer therein for
misappropriating the client's money intended for securing a certificate of title on the latter's behalf. Finally,
in CF Sharp Crew Management Incorporated v. Atty. Torres,26 the Court disbarred the respondent for failing to
account for, and misappropriating, the various amounts he received from his client.

Considering all of the foregoing, We deem it fit to affirm the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment
from the practice of law upon Atty. Maravilla-Ona. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and
whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of her clients
and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Court to withdraw the
same.27chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eleonor A. Maravilla-Ona is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of
Canons 1, 16, and 18; and Rules 1.01, 16.01, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, she is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name is ordered stricken off from the
Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. The Court orders respondent to RESTITUTE complainant Bienvenida
Flor Suarez the amount of fifty-eight thousand pesos (P58,000) within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Decision. Otherwise, respondent may be held liable for contempt.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as
the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Eleonor A.
Maravilla-Ona's record in this Court.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

8. AC. No. 9920, Aug 30, 2016 ]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. FORMER JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS +

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
A judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a solemnizing officer.

This disbarment complaint is an offshoot of our Decision in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Necessario, et al.[1] Respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Tormis), together with other judges and
employees of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, was dismissed for turning the solemnization of
marriages into a business.[2] Tormis was dismissed from the service for the second time, and this Court
directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate disbarment proceedings against her.
On July 3, 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, led the judicial audit-team created by the
Office of the Court Administrator to investigate Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Cebu City for alleged misdeeds in the solemnization of marriages.[3]

Two (2) undercover agents from the judicial audit team, posing as a couple, went to the Palace of Justice to
ask about the marriage application process.[4] They were told by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look
for a certain "Meloy."[5]

Fearing that the male undercover would be recognized by the court employees in Branch 4, the two agreed
that only the female undercover would go inside the court.[6]She was then assisted by a woman named Helen.
Helen assured the female undercover that their marriage process could be hurried.[7] She also claimed that it
was possible for the marriage to be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated
when the marriage license became available.[8]

The Office of the Court Administrator found that the respondent judges in that case connived with the court
personnel, who acted as "fixers" in solemnizing marriages.[9]The judges heedlessly kept solemnizing marriages
despite irregularities in the requirements provided under the law.[10]

In the Resolution dated July 10, 2007, this Court treated the judicial audit team's memorandum as an
administrative complaint against the respondent judges, including Tormis.[11] The judges were directed to file
their comments on the charges against them.[12] They were also suspended pending resolution of the case.[13]

On August 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepano of the Office of the Court
Administrator submitted a Memorandum dated August 29, 2007 and Supplemental Report.[14] The Report
stated that:

Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team. The team
reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under Article 34
of the Family Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages
than the number of marriage certificates in the courts' custody. There is also an unusual number of marriage
licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were even
marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. The town of Barili, Cebu is
more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours. Liloan,
Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.[15] (Citations omitted)
The Report included the court employees' admissions of their participation in the alleged misdeeds. The
following personnel substantiated the charges against Tormis:

Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the Municipal

Trial Court in.Cities, Cebu City, confirmed that she
would personally assist couples who wished to be
(1)
married by checking that their documents were
complete before referring them to the judges,
including Tormis;[16]

Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer of Branch 6 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City,
"narrated several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from
(2)
the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili."[17] These
marriages were solemnized by Tormis;[18]
 Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
(3)
Cebu City, would aid couples in the solemnization of their marriages by referring them to the judges;[19]

Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, "admitted
that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage licenses were obtained
(4)
from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not
strict about couples' attendance in the family planning seminar";[20]

Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer of Branch 4 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City,
admitted that she would assist couples and refer them to the judges, including Tormis.[21] She added that
(5)
"during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage solemnization";[22]

Rebecca L. Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City,
admitted that "she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to get
(6)
married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint
cohabitation for ten pesos (P10)";[23] and

Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, admitted that she did not examine marriage
(7) applications.[24] Couples who were not Barili residents could obtain a marriage license from her, provided
that they had relatives residing in Barili;[25]

Affidavits of private individuals were also attached to the records.[26] Among these individuals was Jacqui Lou
Baguio-Manera (Baguio-Manera), a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu. Baguio-Manera claimed that her
marriage was solemnized by Tormis with the aid of "Meloy," who asked for a fee of P1,500.00.[27] She and her
then fiance were not required to present a marriage license; they were only directed to bring their birth
certificates.[28] She averred that while Article 34[29] did not apply to them, their marriage certificate was marked
with the annotation, "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Article 34 of
Executive Order No. 209."[30]

On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the Resolution requiring all the judges involved, including
Tormis, to comment on the Supplemental Report.[31] The Resolution also directed the Process Servicing Unit to
furnish all the judges with a copy of the Report.[32] Further, all the court personnel involved were asked to
show cause why they should not be disciplined for their misconduct.[33]

In her comment, Tormis denied the charges against her.[34] She claimed that the action of the Office of the
Court Administrator was an "entrapment."[35] According to her, there was nothing wrong with solemnizing
marriages on the same date the marriage license was issued.[36] In view of the pro forma affidavits of
cohabitation, she relied on the presumption of regularity.[37] Tormis asserted that she should not be blamed
for assuming that the affidavits were true since judges are not handwriting experts.[38]

Tormis also claimed that Baguio-Manera's affidavit was hearsay.[39] She averred that when Baguio-Manera and
her husband was asked about the affidavit, they confirmed the truthfulness of their statements, particularly
that they had been living together for five (5) years.[40] Lastly, Tormis blamed the filing clerks for the
irregularities in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala.[41]

On November 12, 2007, Tormis, together with Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, filed a Memorandum of Law with
Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of the Case.[42] This Court lifted the suspension of
the judges but forbade them from solemnizing marriages.[43]
On December 7, 2007, both judges moved for early resolution with a waiver of formal and/or further
investigation and to dismiss.[44] This Court noted their Motion and affirmed the relief they sought, thus
allowing the payment of the judges' unpaid salaries and benefits from July 9, 2007.[45]

The Office of the Court Administrator, through a memorandum dated June 15, 2010, found Tormis guilty of

gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to
make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting
parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate
from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.[46]
This Court upheld the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator and noted the individual liability of the
judges:

Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis

Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the
marriage certificates actually examined. However, the monthly report of cases showed that she solemnized
three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007. The OCA report also noted that it was
only in July 2007 that her court started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.

Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents such as the
marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. In several
instances, only affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to
marry.

Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity of the
required documents particularly the marriage license. The judicial audit team found numerous erasures and
superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties' place of residence. In one instance, the judge
solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the
marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note
saying "12/28/06" under it.

The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the
marriage requirements' authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties
and the given address of the parties. These irregularities were evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R.
Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the
marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." Flowever, there was an application for marriage
license attached to the marriage certificate showing that Secuya's address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu
City."[47]
This Court ruled that:

3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would
have been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave
credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service in
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);
....

The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto
dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment
proceedings against the judge.[48] (Emphasis in the original)
The affidavits of Celerina Plaza (Plaza) and Crisanto Dela Cerna (Dela Cerna) resulted from Marilou Cabañes'
(Cabañes) and Helen Mongaya's (Mongaya) separate supplemental comments on the charges against them.
[49]
 Cabañes, then Court Stenographer of Branch 4, named Plaza as Tormis' assistant, in charge of meeting
couples at their lobby.[50] On the other hand, Mongaya, then Court Interpreter of Branch 4, attached Dela
Cerna's affidavit to her comment.[51]

Plaza claimed to be Tormis' personal aide since 2002.[52] She alleged that after Tormis' suspension in 2006, she
was directed to find couples who wanted to get married.[53] She was also told to direct the parties to Branch 4
and find Cabañes or "Meloy."[54]

In his affidavit, Dela Cerna stated that he was employed as Tormis' personal aide.[55]He claimed that during the
investigation, Tormis directed him and Tormis' children to bring all the marriage certificates from her office to
her house.[56]

In view of Judge Necessario, et al., the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the case be docketed as
A.C. No. 9920 (Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691) and entitled Office of the Court Administrator v. Former Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis.[57]

On June 18, 2013, this Court approved the docketing of the case and directed respondent Former Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis to comment on the disbarment charge against her.[58]

Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification[59] dated August 12, 2013 asking the Office of the Court
Administrator to state the particular Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility that she had violated as
basis for her disbarment.

In the Resolution[60] dated September 10, 2013, this Court noted the Urgent Motion for Clarification and
directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to inform respondent of the particular Canons that she had violated.

On November 29, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant sent respondent a letter informing her that the
charges in her administrative cases as a judge were the grounds for her disbarment.[61] It cited A.M. No. 02-9-
02-SC,[62] which provides that administrative cases against judges shall also be considered as disciplinary
charges against them as members of the bar.[63] Some administrative cases against judges stand on grounds
that similarly violate the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or on other breaches long recognized as grounds for discipline of lawyers. The Office of the
Bar Confident reiterated that, in those cases, the respondent judge may be directed to comment on the
complaint and explain why he or she should not be punished as a member of the bar.[64]

The letter cited the previous administrative charges against respondent, thus:

(a) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691,[65] where respondent was

dismissed from service, had she not been previously
dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817[66] for
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross
ignorance of the law by turning solemnization of
 marriage into a business;[67]

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692,[68] where respondent was suspended for six (6) months without salary for gross
(b) misconduct for repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant with her
comment;[69]

A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC[70] and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC,[71] where respondent was fined P5,000.00 for
(c) gross violation of Rule 114, Section 17[72] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure by inappropriately
approving the bail posted by an accused in a criminal case;[73]

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609,[74] where respondent was severely reprimanded for her "unauthorized receipt of
(d)
cash bond and keeping the same in her house";[75]

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817,[76] where respondent was dismissed from service for gross inefficiency, violation
(e)
of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross ignorance of the law;[77] and

AM. No. MTJ-001337,[78] where respondent was reprimanded after being found "guilty of improper
(f) conduct for trying to influence the course of litigation in Criminal Case No. 99796- 12."[79] She, together
with another judge, was admonished for her "unbecoming conduct as dispensers of justice."[80]

Respondent filed her one-page Comment[81] on January 10, 2014, asking this Court to grant her peace of mind.
[82]
 She states that she is adopting her Motion for Reconsideration[83] in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 as her Comment
on the disbarment case against her.[84] In this Motion, respondent enumerates her previous administrative
cases with her justifications.

For A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692, respondent claims that she had furnished the complainant with a copy of her
comment three (3) times.[85] She avers that the complainant even acknowledged the receipt of her comment
through her manifestation, as noted in this Court's July 30, 2003 Resolution.[86] Despite this, she was still fined
P2,000.00 for her repeated defiance to this Court's directive to furnish the complainant with a copy of her
comment.[87] She believed that the case ended upon resolution and upon this Court's noting her payment of
the fine. However, she claims that:

[The Supreme Court] made an underground evaluation of the case and made it appear that when she
complied with their Resolution in 2 March 2005 to impose a fine of P2,000.00, it was already an admission that
"[s]he (respondent) refused to present proof of service to complainant of her Comment or she did not furnish
complainant with said document[.]"[88]
For A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC, respondent claims that this Court "obviously ignored"
her explanation.[89] She asserts that she was the only available judge at that time since she was working from
Mondays through Saturdays and even Sundays due to her load of cases.[90]

For A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609, respondent questions why this Court ruled that she deliberately made untruthful
statements in her Comment with the intent to deceive this Court.[91]

For A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, respondent claims that the audit was conducted one (1) day after she had served a
prior suspension.[92] She argues that since she was not in her court for a long time, she cannot be faulted for
knowing nothing about what has been happening in her sala during her absence.[93] She alleges that the Clerk
of Court, her co-respondent in the case, "could have manipulated it so that even if the cases had already been
disposed of some years back he made it appear that this had remained unacted upon."[94]
For A.M. No. MTJ-001337, respondent claims that the dismissal of the judges was based on an alleged
"entrapment." She argues that it was impossible for her to act on the marriage of the undercover agents
because she was in Tacloban City for her high school reunion.[95] She was merely indicted based on the
statements of Plaza and Dela Cerna, who had been intimidated by Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Office of the Court
Administrator judicial audit team head.[96]

On March 18, 2014, this Court noted respondent's Comment and resolved to refer the case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant for investigation, report, and recommendation.[97]

In its Report and Recommendation[98] dated August 24, 2015, the Office of the Bar Confidant noted that the
Office of the Court Administrator, represented by Atty. Miguel Mergal, presented Plaza and Dela Cerna as their
witnesses.[99] Respondent also requested Atty. Rullyn Garcia's presence in the proceedings.[100]

However, none of the witnesses participated in the proceedings. Hence, the parties were required to just
submit their respective memoranda for evaluation.[101]

The Office of the Court Administrator filed a memorandum[102] dated February 27, 2015 quoting the facts and
ruling in Judge Necessario, et al. It avers that Plaza's and Dela Cerna's testimonies "are beside the point and
these have been rendered moot because of their failure to appear at the hearings scheduled by the Office of
the Bar Confidant."[103]

The Office of the Court Administrator argues that respondent should be disbarred due to gross misconduct for
her participation in the solemnization of marriages.[104] It points out that the various administrative charges
against respondent "clearly shows that she does not possess high standards of competence and reliability
required of a practicing lawyer."[105]

On the other hand, respondent's memorandum[106] dated February 26, 2015 mainly anchored on the claim that
Atty. Rullyn Garcia's report submitted was falsified.[107]Respondent claims that Atty. Rullyn Garcia intimidated
the court employees and caused them to "admit whatever allegations he brought up during the
investigation."[108] She prays that the case be dismissed for lack of substantial evidence since Plaza's and Dela
Cerna's affidavits were not personally attested to by the affiants.[109]

The Office of the Bar Confidant, after conducting the proceedings and considering the memoranda of the
parties, recommended that the disbarment case against respondent be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
[110]
 It emphasized that formal investigation is indispensable in disbarment proceedings:

For the charge of gross misconduct for the irregularities in the solemnization of marriages as the basis for
this disbarment proceedings.

This case was set for hearing. During the scheduled hearing, the representative from OCA manifested that
they are presenting two (2) witnesses in the persons of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto Dela Cerna. The purposes
of their testimonies are for them to substantiate the allegations against former Judge Tormis, identify and
authenticate the existence and veracity of their respective affidavits submitted to the Court. However, the two
witnesses failed to appear during the proceedings of this case. Thus, their affidavits are considered hearsay
and inadmissible in evidence . . . in this proceeding. The affidavit are [sic] not entirely reliable evidence in court
due to their incompleteness and inaccuracies that may have attended in their formulation. The affidavit does
not purport to contain a complete narration of facts and that court testimonies are generally viewed as more
reliable as they are subjected to cross examination from the opposing party. . . . Likewise, Atty. Rullyn Garcia,
the OCA audit team head, failed to appear. The purpose of his testimony would be to shed light more on
whether the alleged affidavits executed by Celerina Plaza and Crisanto Dela Cema were actually and
voluntarily submitted to the Court and, if so, who required them to execute and submit the same to the Court.

....

The determination of the merit of th[ese] disbarment proceedings may not be relied upon solely on the
premise of the dismissal from the service of former Judge Tormis. As earlier discussed, the grounds for
dismissal from the service of former Judge Tormis, in her capacity as presiding judge, in administrative matter
is different from this disbarment proceedings against her. Otherwise, the Court would have ruled on the
disbarment aspect, which shall be incorporated in the decision of dismissal from the service of former Judge
Tormis in one decision only. As provided for under the constitutional right to due process, former Judge
Tormis should be given full opportunity to be heard and confront witnesses against her in th[ese] disbarment
proceedings. This constitutional right should not be denied to former Judge Tormis, who cried for due process
since her dismissal from the service.

For the dismissal from the service, in her capacity as judge, for gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of
gross ignorance of the law in performance of her duties as presiding judge.

Former Judge Tormis cried for justice in dismissing her from service, as presiding judge, without according her
due process. She was not given the opportunity to be heard but the only basis of her dismissal from the
service was the testimonies/allegations against her of some courts [sic] personnel, who were allegedly
intimidated by the judicial audit team, during the judicial audit. She was not given the chance to confront nor
furnished copies of the said court personnel's testimonies. She was denied her constitutional right against
searches and seizures of documents from her sala when the audit team obtained documents and records, as
evidence against her, when they conducted the investigation in her sala, since she was not informed of the
said audit.

In A.M. No P-08-2519 and A.M. No. P-08-2520, the Court held that the rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures as provided under Section 2, Article III in the Constitution may be invoked even in administrative
proceedings. The exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Art. Ill of the Constitution also bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such'right. The fact that the present case is administrative in nature, does
not render the above principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta vs C.A., any violation of the aforestated
constitutional right renders the evidence inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings.

Records show that all the administrative sanctions against former Judge Tormis were all for simple gross
inefficiency or neglect of duties and gross ignorance of the law in the discharge of her duties and
responsibilities as the presiding judge of the MTCC, Br. 4, Cebu City. Neither of these findings held her for
gross misconduct, which constitute immoral conduct, that would tend to affect her standing and moral
character as an officer of the court and as a member of the Bar. Further, she has never been found guilty for
graft and corruption during her entire service in the judiciary as a member of the bench in the lower court that
would cause her automatically disbarred from the practice of law.

Finally, the counter-charges of former Judge Tormis against Atty. Rullyn Garcia may not be given due course in
th[ese] proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that the disbarment case
against former JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.[111] (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)
The issues for resolution are as follows:

First, whether the alleged irregularities committed by respondent in the solemnization of marriages, where
she was found guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law, constitute gross
misconduct warranting her disbarment;

Second, whether Plaza's and Dela Cerna's affidavits are indispensable in finding that respondent's acts
constitute gross misconduct and merit the penalty of disbarment; and

Lastly, whether respondent's long line of administrative sanctions should affect her standing as a member of
the bar.

Although this Court recognizes the indispensability of the appearance of Plaza and Dela Cerna in the
proceedings before the Office of the Bar Confidant, the disbarment case cannot be dismissed solely based on
this.

An affidavit is commonly recognized as hearsay evidence.[112] Since it is often prepared not by the affiant but by
another person who makes use of his or her own language in writing the statements, it is generally rejected
unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify.[113] "Courts take judicial notice of the fact that an
affidavit does not purport to contain a complete narration of facts."[114] Court testimonies, therefore, are
favored because these can be subjected to cross examination.[115]

Plaza and Dela Cerna failed to appear in the proceedings before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The Office of
the Bar Confidant noted that their testimonies would have supposedly confirmed the charge against
respondent regarding the alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages.[116] Plaza's and Dela Cerna's
testimonies would have likewise verified the existence and veracity of their affidavits.[117]

Similarly, Atty. Rullyn Garcia failed to appear in the proceedings. His purported testimony would have
disproved the accusation that Plaza's and Dela Cerna's testimonies were executed with his intimidation.
[118]
 Due to their absence, Plaza's and Dela Cerna's allegations in their affidavits were rendered inadmissible.[119]

Nevertheless, despite the inadmissibility of the affidavits, this Court in Judge Necessario, et al. upheld the
finding of the judicial audit team that respondent committed irregularities in the solemnization of marriages.
This Court ruled that these findings had sufficient basis and were supported by evidence, pertinent laws, and
jurisprudence.[120] Respondent was held guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross ignorance of
the law warranting her dismissal, had she not been previously dismissed from service in another case.[121]

The administrative case against respondent in Judge Necessario, et al. should likewise be considered as a
disciplinary proceeding against her under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which provides:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular
and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for
the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against
the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
While respondent blatantly violated particular Canons of Judicial Ethics with her participation in the alleged
marriage scam, she similarly breached the following Canons on the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
for legal processes.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. . . .

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law[.]
Membership in the bar is an essential requirement for membership in the bench.[122] "[T]he moral fitness of a
judge also reflects his [or her] moral fitness as a lawyer."[123]Consequently, a judge who violates the code of
judicial conduct similarly violates his or her lawyer's oath.[124]

Respondent's act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in utter disregard of the law and jurisprudence clearly
constitutes gross misconduct. The repetitiveness of her act shows her clear intent to violate the law. She
disregarded the lawyer's oath, which mandates lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. In view
of this, either the penalty of suspension or disbarment is warranted. Rule 138, Section 27 provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Gross misconduct is an "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment."[125] To consider gross misconduct "the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest[.]"[126]

The Supplemental Report of the Office of the Court Administrator made the following findings:

III. On Judge Rosabella M. Tormis

1. Based on the documents, i.e., marriage certificates and other supporting documents, actually examined, she
solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007, while the monthly reports
of cases reflected a total of three hundred and five (305) marriages she solemnized from 2004 to 2007.

2. It was only last July that her court started using a logbook to record the marriages she solemnized, which, as
of the date of the judicial audit and investigation, reflected a total of sixty-three (63) marriages for that month.

3. Of the 181 marriages she solemnized, one hundred thirty-one (131), or 72.38% were solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code, while fifty (50), or 27.62% were with marriage licenses.
4. Of the 50 marriages with marriage license, forty (40), or 80% marriage licenses were obtained from the local
civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, while the remaining ten (10), or 20%, were obtained from other local civil
registrars.

5. The following marriages were solemnized by her with no or incomplete supporting documents:

6. The following marriages were solemnized by her even if the validity of the supporting documents, especially
the marriage licenses presented, appear to be questionable[.]

7. The authenticity of the requirements for the following marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code, by
reason of the (a) circumstances of the cohabitation, (b) minority during the period of cohabitation, and (c)
given address of the contracting parties, appears to be questionable:

8. In almost all of the marriages solemnized by her, there was no proof that the solemnization fee of P300.000,
as required under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, was paid by the contacting parties.[127]
The act of solemnizing marriages without the required marriage license constitutes misconduct.[128] The
positive testimonies substantiate that respondent solemnized marriages without previously issued licenses;
hence, respondent's act deviates from the established rule.[129] In Arañes v. Occiano:[130]

[A] marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of
such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by
law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.[131]
Tupal v. Rojo[132] explained the role of a judge as a solemnizing officer:

Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties and
examine the requirements they submitted. The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal
requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license.

A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of the
legal disqualifications to contract marriage. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally examine the marriage license presented.

If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal
impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. Instead, the parties must
present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry
each other. The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties'
qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage. Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines provides:

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of
the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.[133] (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Although it is true that marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code merit exemption from a marriage
license, respondent should have complied with the mandate of personally ascertaining the circumstances of
cohabitation of the parties. Records reveal that the declarations embodied in the required joint affidavit of
cohabitation of the parties do not actually represent the accurate circumstances of their alleged cohabitation.
[134]

In addition, there were marriages solemnized by respondent involving foreigners who only submitted
affidavits in lieu of a certificate of legal capacity to marry.[135] In cases where one or both of the contracting
parties are foreigners, Article 21[136] of the Family Code provides that a certificate of legal capacity to marry is
necessary before the acquisition of a marriage license. As the solemnizing officer, respondent should have
ensured that pertinent requirements were secured before the issuance of the marriage license. Thus, the
absence of a certificate of legal capacity to marry should have prompted her to question the propriety of the
issuance.

The connivance between respondent and the court employees is settled. The court employees acted as
"'fixers' and 'facilitators'"[137] that mediated between the judges and the contacting parties. Apparent are the
superimpositions and erasures in the addresses of the contracting parties so they would appear to be
residents of either Barili or Liloan, Cebu.[138] For the contracting parties to easily obtain their marriage license,
discrepancies between their true addresses as declared in their marriage certificates and their addresses in
their marriage licenses were made. The contracting parties were able to get married despite incomplete
requirements. Thus, the handwritten marginal notes of monetary figures attached to the marriage certificates
show the presence of consideration.[139]

Marriage is recognized under the law as an inviolable social institution, which is the foundation of the family.
[140]
 In Beso v. Daguman:[141]

[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has
surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of
the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to
its destruction.[142]
Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of marriage. As a judicial officer, she is expected
to know the law on solemnization of marriages.[143] "A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he [or
she] must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of
their office[,] should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties."[144]

Similarly, as a lawyer who is an officer of the court, respondent should have not permitted herself to be an
instrument of any violation of law. Her careless attention in dispensing with the necessary requirements of
marriage and in conniving with court employees to further monetary interests underscores her utter disregard
of the sanctity of marriage.

Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his or her professional dealings or in a private capacity, is basis
for suspension or disbarment.[145] Possession of good character is a fundamental requirement not only for
admission to the bar but also for the continuance of exercising the privilege to practice law.[146] However, as a
rule, disbarment is only warranted in cases of misconduct that "seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court."[147]

Respondent's undue haste in repeatedly solemnizing marriages despite incomplete and irregular requirements
shows indifference to her role as an officer of the court. The repetitiveness of her acts shows her proclivity in
transgressing the law and protecting these violations with her authority. A lawyer, as an officer and an
essential partner of the court in the solemn task of giving justice, is given the grave obligation of maintaining
the integrity of the courts.[148] This is especially so with judges. A judge is "the visible representation of law and
justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that
regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
follow."[149] In Samson v. Caballero:[150]

The first step towards the successful implementation of the Court's relentless drive to purge the judiciary of
morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on
judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they
should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on
them is — and should be — higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the
right to judge.[151]
Respondent was involved in infractions that warranted her prior administrative sanctions. Her long line of
cases shows her depravity of character, in that she remained undeterred by the past penalties she had
incurred. Considering that she was repeatedly involved in administrative charges, the severe penalty of
disbarment should be meted against her.

Disbarment does not equate to a sanction stripping a lawyer of his or her source of living.[152] It is intended to
"protect the administration of justice that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable
and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them."[153] As held in Foronda
v. Guerrero:[154]

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law.[155]
Respondent's conduct has fallen short of the strict standards required by the legal profession. Hence, her
repeated failure to live up to the values expected of her as an officer of the court renders her unfit to be a
member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis is DISBARREDfrom the practice of law and her
name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to respondent's
personal records, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for dissemination to its chapters and members and
all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
9. A.C. No. 7348, September 27, 2016
ROUEL YAP PARAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUSTO P. PARAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Through this administrative Complaint1 directly filed before this Court, Rouel Yap Paras (Rouel) charges his
father Atty. Justo J. Paras (Atty. Paras) with violation of his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.2 Atty. Paras allegedly voluntarily offered properties he did not own nor possess to the
Department of Agrarian Reform for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.3 Atty. Paras
has been previously disciplined twice upon complaint of his wife.4chanrobleslaw
In September 2006, Rouel found out that a listing of possible beneficiaries for the Department of Agrarian
Reform's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was being made by a certain Edna Mijares and Tomas
Visitacion.5 On the same month, he received at their residence in Negros Oriental6 a copy of a Notice of
Coverage7 dated September 8, 2006 from the Department of Land Reform. The Notice of Coverage was
addressed to Atty. Paras and was signed by Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Grace B. Fua. Five (5) of the six
(6) properties listed in the Notice of Coverage were those subject of Civil Case No. 02-028-BY pending before
Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Negros Oriental.8 Civil Case No. 02-028-BY is based on a
Complaint9 filed by Rouel against Atty. Paras for annulment of Original Certificates of Title of the properties.

Rouel referred the matter to his counsel, who wrote Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Grace B. Fua.10 In the
letter dated October 9, 2006, his counsel requested a copy of all documents pertaining to the September 8,
2006 Notice of Coverage addressed to Atty. Paras.11 Rouel's counsel also informed the Department of Agrarian
Reform that: (1) the real properties were subject of a pending case;12 (2) Atty. Paras was suspended by this
Court for unlawfully "having the said properties titled in his name[;]"13 (3) the properties were titled in the
name of Atty. Paras only for free patent title coverage;14 (4) Atty. Paras did not possess the properties;15 and
(5) Rouel was the real owner and in possession of the properties.16chanrobleslaw

The Department of Agrarian Reform granted the request and furnished Rouel with all documents related to
the Notice of Coverage.17 Among these documents were: (1) Atty. Paras' October 20, 2004 letter18 to Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas; (2) an authorization letter19 by Atty. Paras for Edna R. Mijares;
and (3) an October 9, 2006 Certification20 by Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Grace B. Fua.21chanrobleslaw

On October 25, 2006, Rouel Yap Paras filed this Complaint before this Court and alleged:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. That respondent, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS,. had violated the LAWYER'S OATH and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a) Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. Deceit
2. Violation of Oath of Office
3. Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
b) The Code of Professional Responsibility in Canon 1, "A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes"; Canon 3, "a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only trne, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts;
Canon 7, "a lawyer shall at all times up hold [sic] the integrity and dignity of the legal profession[,]"; Canon
10 that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court"; Canon 8, "a lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues...";
2. That the respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct when he deliberate[ly]
represented himself as "LANDOWNER", and voluntarily offered real properties to the DAR for CARP
coverage, when he knew fully well that he is NOT THE OWNER OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;

3. That RESPONDENT, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS, ... with manifest bad faith and inexcusable negligence, proceeded
to present himself to the DAR, and offered the subject properties, even with his full knowledge of the pending
litigations involving the said properties;

4. That in spite of the pendency of the "PETITION FOR annulment of OCT NOS. 32360, 32361, 32362, and
33476 and DAMAGES" proceedings, which is pending before the Regional Trial Court Branch 45, Bais City,
respondent, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS, had instigated the VOLUNTARY OFFER OF COVERAGE TO THE DAR, to
dispossess the complainant, his mother, and the members of the YAP family of their property rights, as it is
very clear that ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS was fully aware that the subject real properties WERE NOT OWNED BY
HIM, and he DID NOT HAVE ANY ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION of the subject real properties;

5. That the AUTHORIZATION issued to EDNA MIJARES by respondent, is a GROSS MISREPRESENTATION, and

this had caused innocent barrio folks of Barangay Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental to pay P500.00 to
Edna Mijares, in view of the false promise that they will be included as DAR beneficiaries, even if they were
not tenants or residing in the subject property;

7. THAT RESPONDENT HAD THE SOLE INTENT OF DISPOSSESSING THE UNDERSIGNED, HIS LEGITIMATE SON,
OF HIS PROPERTY RIGHTS, USING HIS LEGAL PROFESSION, AS HIS WEAPON OF VENGEANCE, TO UNDERMINE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED, HIS MOTHER, ROSA YAP PARAS, AND MEMBERS OF
THE YAP FAMILY OF BINDOY, NEGROS ORIENTAL[.]22(Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred as respondent had already been suspended by this Court in
two (2) previous administrative cases.23chanrobleslaw

On February 22, 2007, respondent filed his Comment.24 He alleged that the present Complaint is "identical in
subject-matter, principal parties involved, issues and persecutory intent"25cralawred with A.C. No. 734926 filed
against him by Rosa Yap-Paras, complainant's mother.27 However, respondent admitted that:

the properties subject-matter of the instant [administrative] complaint ... [are] subject of a pending trial court
proceedings [sic] before RTC, Branch 45, Bais City: Civil Case No. 02-028-BY, entitled: ROUEL YAP PARAS vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS and Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental, for "Annulment of OCT Nos. 32360, 32350, 32361,
32362 and 33476 and damages.["]28

On the allegation of voluntary offer of properties, respondent claimed:

4. That under ... [the] Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law . . . the implementation of the law under
C[omprehensive] A[graria]n R[eform] P[rogram] on private properties is under two (2) modes, namely:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1) Compulsory Acquisition by DAR (Sec. 16, CARL), or 2) Voluntary Offer of Sale
(VOS, under Sees. 19 & 20, RA 6657). Under Mode 1, DAR on its own initiative listing and documentation
compulsorily covers usually big real properties owned by a single landowner in a given community thru service
of its "NOTICE OF COVERAGE". The other Mode 2 covers properties offered for sale under VOS by landowner.
The pursuit of whichever mode of acquisition is left to the discretion of DAR unless offer is made.

Respondent's CARP coverage is thru the COMPULSORY MODE. This is evidenced by ... a "NOTICE OF
COVERAGE" of DAR- sent by DAR to Respondent informing him of the extent of coverage of compulsory
acquisition by DAR with listing (initial) of his real properties covered. In fact Respondent had been informed
that following or subsequent "NOTICE OF COVERAGE" shall include or involve properties not covered by titles
or under tax declarations only, real properties which respondent owned in Bindoy as well as in the neighboring
municipalities of Ayungon and Mabinay, all in the province of Negros Oriental.

It being a compulsory coverage process initiated, pursued and documented primarily by DAR, the listing of all
real properties titled, covered only by tax declarations or possessed by Respondent are all the workings of
DAR. Respondent never submitted to DAR a listing of his properties.29

Respondent prayed for the dismissal of this case.30chanrobleslaw

On April 11, 2007, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report,
and recommendation.31chanrobleslaw

On August 22, 2007, a mandatory conference was set for October 26, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.32 Counsel of
complainant appeared for complainant, while respondent appeared for himself.33  The conference ended with
both parties submitting their issues to Investigating Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner
Hababag) of the Commission on Bar Discipline.34chanrobleslaw

Complainant's counsel submitted the following issues for resolution:

1. Whether or not the respondent should be liable for misrepresenting himself as owner of the subject real
properties when in truth an[d] in fact. he is not;

2. Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to
observe honesty, candor, integrity and in the pleadings filed therein;

3. Whether or not the respondent is bound by the findings of the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No.
4947 the fact that respondent committed deceit and falsehood in having applied for pre-patent [sic] of the
lands owned by another over which he had no actual physical possession being aware of the fact that the
same was previously transferred in the name of Aurora Yap and which act reflected his fitness to practice law
in violation of Rule 7.03[,] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.35

Respondent, on the other hand, submitted the following Issues for resolution:

1. Whether or not the previously filed and pending Civil Case No.

02-028-BY filed by the complainant and seeking annulment of free-patent titles is a prejudicial question to this
case;

2. Whether or not complainant has successfully identified his quitclaimed acquired properties as to be related
to the three (3) free patented titles of the respondent.36

Both parties were ordered to submit position papers.

On November 23, 2007, complainant filed his Position Paper.38 He reiterated the circumstances and grounds
for respondent's disbarment and emphasized respondent's October 20, 2004 letter to Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas, stating:

[C]ontrary to the misrepresentations of the respondent, he offered the subject real properties for VOLUNTARY
ACQUISITION with the DAR as shown in his letter....

IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD THE DELIBERATE AND MALICIOUS INTENT TO DEPRIVE THE
COMPLAINANT OF OWNERSHIP RIGHTS TO THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES, USING HIS LEGAL KNOWLEDGE TO
CIRCUMVENT THE JUDICIAL PROCESSES BY USING THE DAR, INSPITE OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT SUSPENDING HIM FOR ONE YEAR FOR "HIS DECEIT AND FALSEHOOD IN THE APPLICATION FOR A FREE
PATENT OVER SAID PROPERTIES.["] NOW HE HAS DEFIED AGAIN THE SUPREME COURT BY VOLUNTARILY
OFFERING THIS LAND FOR COMPENSATION BY DAR BY FALSELY CLAIMING AS THE OWNER OF SAID
PROPERTIES[;]
THAT IT WAS ONLY IN 2006, THAT THE DAR GAVE NOTICE OF THE COMPULSORY ACQUISITION, AND INSPITE
OF THE POSSESSION OF COMPLAINANT, THE RESPONDENT HAD CONTINUED TO PURSUE THE DAR
ACQUISITION, BY CONDUCTING MEETINGS WITH HIS ["]DAR BENEFICIARIES", AS PROOF OF HIS
.BENEVOLENCE, SINCE HE IS GIVING AWAY ALL THE TITLED PROPERTIES, IN HIS NAME, KNOWING THAT HE IS
NOT THE TRUE OWNER/POSSESSOR THEREOF;

THAT RESPONDENT WAS FOLLOWING UP THE RELEASE OF THE CHECKS REPRESENTING THE DAR PAYMENT
FOR THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES, TO BE IN HIS NAME, THUS, THE INTENT TO "CASH IN", IS SO GROSS AND
UNJUST, AND SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT DOES NOT DESERVE TO BE AN OFFICER OF THE COURT AND A
MEMBER OF THE BAR[.]39(Emphasis in the original)

On December 18, 2007, respondent filed his Position Paper.40 He claimed that (1) the pendency of Civil Case
No. 02-028-BY is a prejudicial question to the present case;41 and that (2) complainant "failed to identify [the]
four (4) quitclaim-acquired properties as the same as those gratuitously given by Government to Respondent
by way of free patent titles."42 To prove his second claim, respondent compared the size of properties in the
quitclaim to complainant as against the size of free patent titled properties he acquired.43chanrobleslaw

On January 14, 2008, complainant filed his Reply.44 He restated his claims and added that "while respondent
claims ownership over real properties located in Bindoy, Negros [O]riental, he has not paid any of REAL TAXES
over the subject real properties[.]"

In his Report and Recommendation46 dated January 5, 2008, Commissioner Hababag found respondent guilty
of violating his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as member of the bar in his acts of
applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue despite knowledge that the same had
already been sold by his· mother to complainant's aunt. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment,
he committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties when he
manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the
fact these were continuously in the possession and occupation of complainant's family, as evidenced no less
by respondent's own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP in Adm. Case No. 4947.

The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. . . .
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.

The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his
duties as lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he has shown no remorse nor reformation thereby occasioning sanction for his stubbornness.

The penalty of a one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law was recommended.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-4250 dated January 17, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Hababag's Report and Recommendation. However, the
Board of Governors modified the penalty and reduced respondent's suspension from one (1) year to six (6)
months.
On April 25, 2008, complainant moved for reconsideration52 of the January 17, 2008 Resolution, praying that
the penalty of suspension be reconsidered and a penalty of disbarment be imposed instead. On January 3,
2013, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-
07.53chanrobleslaw

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he voluntarily offered property that he neither owned nor possessed for
coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

We confirm the guilt of respondent. However, we modify the penalty imposed.

In deciding this case, this Court takes judicial notice of two (2) administrative cases filed by Rosa Yap Panis
against respondent.

In Paras v. Atty. Paras,54 respondent was found guilty of falsifying Rosa Yap-Paras' signature in bank loan
documents and other related instruments; and of immorality, concubinage, and abandonment of his own
family.55 Respondent was meted the penalty of a six (6)-month suspension from the practice of law for the first
offense, and a one (1)-year suspension for the second offense.

In Yap-Paras v. Atty. Paras,57 respondent was found guilty of violating his lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he "[applied] for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue
despite his knowledge that the same had already been sold by his mother to complainant's sister."58 This Court
also found that:

[He] committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties when he
manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the
fact that these were continuously in the possession and occupation of complainant's family, as evidenced no
less by respondents own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.59

Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Both Yap-Paras and this case involve the same real properties. Both likewise refer to respondent's deceit and
misrepresentation as basis for his administrative sanction.

In this case, one of the complainant's claims was that:

[R]espondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct when he deliberate[ly] represented
himself as "LANDOWNER," and voluntarily offered real properties to the DAR for CARP coverage, when he
knew fully well that he is NOT THE OWNER OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES[.]61 (Emphasis in the original)

Respondent's violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by misrepresenting
himself as the owner of the properties, has already been decided in Yap-Paras:

In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his lawyer's oath as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the courts, the
obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court.
Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer
of the court in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue despite his
knowledge that the same had already been sold by his mother to complainant's sister.  This fact, respondent
even admitted in the comment that he filed before this Court when he alleged that the said properties were
public land under the Forestal Zone "when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions
of entire occupancy of the Parases." Moreover, respondent committed deceit and falsehood in his application
for free patent over the said properties when he manifested under oath that he had been in the actual
possession and occupation of the said lands despite the fact that these were continuously in the possession
and occupation of complainants family, as evidenced no less by respondent's own statements in the pleadings
filed before the IBP.62 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Commissioner Hababag likewise found respondent guilty of the same offense in this case:

Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as member of the bar in his acts of
applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue despite knowledge that the same had
already been sold by his mother to complainant's aunt. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment,
he committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties when he
manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the
fact these were continuously in the possession and occupation of complainant's family, as evidenced no less
by respondent's own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP in Adm. Case No. 4947.63 (Emphasis
supplied)

Although respondent's violation in this case was not squarely addressed by Commissioner Hababag's Report
and Recommendation, the records of the case reveal that respondent's voluntary offer of properties was
motivated by ill will, for which he should be sanctioned.

Prior to respondent's voluntary offer of properties, he was sanctioned by the Board of Governors in Resolution
No. XVI-2004-120 dated February 27, 2004.64 The Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, thus:

[R]espondent committed deceit and falsehood in having applied for free patent over lands owned by another
over which he had no actual physical possession being aware of the fact that the same was previously
transferred in the name of Aurora Yap[.]65

Despite the issuance of the Resolution and the full knowledge that the properties were subject of a pending
civil case,66 respondent submitted in August 2004 to the Department of Agrarian Reform of Bantayan,
Dumaguete City a list of landholdings he allegedly owned for voluntary offer under Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program coverage.67 He even wrote a letter dated October 20, 2004 addressed to Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas requesting that the list of properties he submitted be covered under the
Compulsory Acquisition Scheme instead, as he could not get his spouse's conformity for voluntary
offer.68chanrobleslaw

The existence of the letter was contrary to his claim in his Comment that he had no hand in the Compulsory
Acquisition scheme:

It being a compulsory coverage process initiated, pursued and documented primarily by DAR, the listing of all
real properties titled, covered only by tax declarations or possessed by Respondent are all the workings of
DAR. Respondent never submitted to DAR a listing of his properties.69 (Emphasis supplied)

He further contradicted himself when he admitted the October 20, 2004 letter during the mandatory
conference:
ATTY. YAP:
The existence of the Letter of the Respondent, Atty. Justo J. Paras dated October 20, 2004 to Stephen M.
Leonidas, Provincial Agrarian· Reform Officer of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Bantayan, Dumaguete
City which is in [sic] filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform, Negros Oriental?
COMM. HABABAG:
Any comment?
ATTY. PARAS:
We admit that.70

Eight (8) months after this Court promulgated its Resolution in Yap Paras,71 which confirmed the Board of
Governors' Resolution No. XVI-2004-120, respondent authorized Edna R. Mijares, Chair of the Domolog
Tagaytay Multi-Purpose Cooperative, to come up with a list of beneficiaries for the properties he requested to
be covered under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of the Department of Agrarian Reform.72chanrobleslaw

By authorizing Edna R. Mijares, respondent pushed for the inclusion of his alleged properties for
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program coverage. He did this notwithstanding the Resolution finding him
guilty of "commit[ing] deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties when he
manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the
fact that these were continuously in the possession and occupation of complainants family[.]"73chanrobleslaw

Respondent's acts constitute a violation of his lawyer's oath, which states:

I,__________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)

His deliberate act of disregarding this Court's ruling is conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and degrades the legal
profession. He is likewise guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 10- A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01. - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

In offering to government property that he knew he neither owned nor possessed, respondent committed
dishonesty, misrepresentation, and deceit. Although deceit and misrepresentation are present in both Yap-
Paras and in this case, the surrounding circumstances are different. In Yap-Paras, deceit and
misrepresentation were used to apply for the issuance of a free patent. On the other hand, in this case, they
were used for a voluntary offer of land for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program coverage. The application
for the issuance of a free patent and the voluntary offer of property for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program coverage are distinct from one another and are not prerequisites of each other. His offense in the
previous case is separate and distinct from this case, for which he is sanctioned anew.

Respondent has already been sanctioned three (3) times. The dispositive portion of Paras, which was dated
October 17, 2000, reads:

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on
the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for
ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the
penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's record as an
attorney, and notice ofthe same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.74 (Emphasis supplied)

In Yap-Paras, respondent was suspended and warned by this Court:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of It's
lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility,the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar
offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court
Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and likewise be entered in
the record of respondent as attorney.

SO ORDERED.75 (Emphasis supplied)

This is respondent's fourth case involving the same properties and his second infraction of an offense of the
same nature. The six (6)-month suspension imposed by the Commission on Bar Discipline is too light a penalty.
Respondent deserves· a graver penalty for his acts of dishonesty, misrepresentation, and deceit.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras

GUILTY of violating the lawyer's oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
10. A.C. No. 5951, July 12, 2016
JUTTA KRURSEL, Complainant, v. ATTY. LORENZA A. ABION, Respondent.
 RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a verified Complaint,1 filed on January 23, 2003, complainant Jutta Krursel, a German national, charges
respondent Atty. Lorenza A. Abion with forgery, swindling, and falsification of a public document. She asks
that respondent be disbarred.

Complainant alleges that she engaged the services of respondent to assist her in filing a case against
Robinsons Savings Bank - Ermita Branch land its officers, in relation to the bank's illegal withholding/blocking
of her account.

In March 2002, respondent filed, on complainant's behalf, a complaint against Robinsons Savings Bank and its
officers before the Monetary Board I of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for "Conducting Business in an Unsafe
and Unsound Manner in violation of Republic Act No. 8791[.]"

Without complainant's knowledge, respondent withdrew the complaint with prejudice through a letter5dated
April 15, 2002 addressed to I the Monetary Board. Complainant claims that respondent forged her signature
and that of a certain William Randeli Coleman (Coleman) in the letter.6 She adds that she never authorized nor
acceded to respondent's withdrawal of the complaint.7chanrobleslaw

Complainant was further surprised to discover two (2) Special Powers of Attorney dated March 7, 20028and
March 24, 2002,9 which appear to have her and Coleman's signature as principals. The documents constituted
respondent as their attorney-in-fact to represent, to receive, sign in their behalf, all papers, checks, accounts
receivables, wired remittances, hi their legal and extra legal efforts to retrieve and unblock the peso and dollar
savings accounts opened up with the Robinsons Savings Bank at its branch office at Ermita, Manila, in order for
her to withdraw and to encash all their accounts, receivables, checks, savings,
remittances.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Again, complainant claims that the signatures were forged.11 She denies ever having executed a special power
of attorney for respondent.
Complainant further alleges that on March 24, 2002, respondent filed before this Court a Complaint for "Writ
of Preliminary Prohibitive and Mandatory Injunction with Damages[.]"13 For such services, respondent
demanded and received the following amounts on May 7, 2002:
Php 225,000.00 - For filing fee to the Supreme Court
Php
- For Sheriff's Service Fee
55,000.00
Php
- For Atty. Soriano, Clerk of Court, to expedite matters
50.000.00
Php
- Total14 (Emphasis in the original)
330,000.00
Respondent failed to account for these amounts despite complainant's demands for a receipt.15Complainant's
demand letter16 dated June 24, 2002 for accounting and receipts was attached to the Complaint as Annex E.

Instead of providing a receipt for the amounts received, respondent allegedly presented complainant a
document purporting to be an Order17 dated May 10, 2002 from this Court's First Division, resolving the case'
in complainant's favor. The Order was purportedly signed by Atty. Virginia; R. Soriano, "Division Clerk of the
First Division of the Supreme Court."18 Complainant sought the advice of Atty. Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr.,
who, in turn, wrote to Atty. Virginia Ancheta-Soriano (Atty. Soriano) on July 30, 200219inquiring about the
supposed Order.20 Atty. Soriano replied21 denying the signature as hers. She stated that the Order did not even
follow this Court's format, and that, on the contrary, the case had been dismissed.2

Finally, complainant alleges that in April 2002, while she was sick and in the hospital, respondent asked for
complainant's German passportj to secure its renewal from the German Embassy.23 For this service,
respondent asked for the total amount of P440,000.00 to cover the following
expenses:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
May 20, 2002 - Php 40,000.00 - For Processing of Travel Papers 
May 27, 2002 - Php 50,000.00 - For Additional Fee for the Travel Papers
June 3, 2002 - Php 350.000,00 - For the release of Travel Papers as required by Atty. O. Dizon, BID
                     Php 450,000.00 [sic]24 (Emphasis in the original)
These sums were allegedly not properly accounted for despite complainant's demand.25cralawred Respondent
eventually presented a purportedly renewed German passport, which complainant rejected because it was
obviously fake.26 Complainant later found out that her original German passport was in the possession of
Robinsons Savings Bank.

Complainant avers that respondent's malicious acts warrant her removal from the roster of lawyers.28She adds
that she and Coleman filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City a criminal
Complaint29 against respondent for the unlawful acts committed against them.

In the Resolution31 dated February 24, 2003, this Court required respondent to file her comment.

Copies of the February 24, 2003 Resolution were subsequently served on respondent's various addresses.
However, these were returned unserved with the notations "Unclaimed," "Party Moved Out," "Moved Out,"
and "Party in Manila."32 This Court requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation, but
respondent could still not be found.

In the Resolution34 dated October 10, 2011, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.

On March 14, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed both
parties to appear for mandatory conference.35 However, copies of the Notice of Mandatory Conference were
returned unserved as both parties were stated to have "moved out."

Hence, in the Order37 dated April 24, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline deemed the case submitted for
resolution on the basis of the Complaint (with attachments) filed before this Court.

In his Report and Recommendation38 dated July 6, 2013, Investigating Commissioner Peter Irving C. Corvera
recommended that respondent be disbarred for fabricating and forging Special Powers of Attorney and an
order from this Court, coupled with her exaction of money from complainant without receipt or accounting
despite demands.39 These acts are in culpable violation of Canon 1; Rule 1.01; Canon 16, Rule 16.01; and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the Resolution41 dated October 10, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted
and approved the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent did hot file a
motion for reconsideration or any other subsequent pleading.
On October 13, 2015, the Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to this Court for final action under
Rule 139-B of the Rulesj of Court.

The issue for resolution is whether respondent should be disbarred for committing forgery, falsification, and
swindling.

At the outset, we cannot ignore this Court's several attempts to serve a copy of the February 24, 2003
Resolution (requiring respondent to file a comment on the Complaint for disbarment) on respondent at her
address ion record and at the different addresses provided by complainant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, only to be returned unserved. On June 1, 2011, this Court requested the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation to locate respondent, but to no avail.43 All these circumstances reveal that either
respondent was disinterested in contesting the charges against her or she was deliberately eluding the service
of this Court's Resolutions to evade the consequences of her actions.

Respondent's willful behavior has effectively hindered this Court's process service and unduly prolonged this
case. This evasive attitude is unbecoming of a lawyer, an officer of the court who swore to "obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."

In Stemmerick v. Mas,45 this Court held that proper notice of the disbarment proceedings was given to the
respondent lawyer who abandoned his law office after committing the embezzlement against his client.
Thus:
Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat this Court's
jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing
his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders and processes on respondent's office was
sufficient notice to him.

Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice requirement cannot
apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does not require that the impossible be
done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must
be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.

In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or their
respective chapters of any change in office or residential address and other contact details. In case such
change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential address appearing in the records of
the IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings
against him.46 (Citations omitted)
Here, respondent's apparent disregard of the judicial process cannot be tolerated. Under the circumstances,
respondent is deemed to have waived her right to present her evidence for she cannot use her disappearance
as a shield against any liability she may have incurred.

Respondent's evasive attitude is tantamount to "a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court,"47 which alone is a ground for disbarment or suspension.

We proceed to address the charges raised in the Complaint.

II
Complainant claims that respondent forged her and Coleman's signatures in two (2) documents: first, in the
Special Powers of Attorney dated March 7, 200248 and March 24, 2002;49 and second, in respondents April 15,
2002 letter50 withdrawing her complaint against Robinsons Savings Bank before the Monetary Board of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

A comparison of the signature of complainant Jutta Krursel in her Complaint and Verification and Certification,
on one hand, and her contested signature in the Special Power of Attorney dated March 7, 2002, on the other,
visibly shows significant differences in the stroke, form, and general appearance of the two (2) signatures. The
inevitable conclusion is that the two (2) signatures were not penned by one person. Similarly, complainant's
contested signature under the Conforme portion in the April 15, 2002 letter of respondent clearly appears to
have been forged.

Nonetheless, with respect to complainant's forged signature in Special Power of Attorney, we find no other
evidence pointing to respondent as the author of the forgery. Jurisprudence51 creates a presumption that a
person who was in possession of, or made use of, or benefitted from ithe forged or falsified documents is the
forger. However, in this case, the facts are insufficient for us to presume that respondent forged complainant's
signature.

Although the Special Power of Attorney may have been executed in respondent's favor—as it authorized her
to represent, receive, and sign papers, checks, remittances, accounts, and receivables on behalf! of
complainant—her appointment as attorney-in-fact was only in relation to complainant's "legal and
extra[-]legal efforts to retrieve and unblock [complainant's] peso and dollar savings accounts with Robinsons
Savings Bank, Ermita."52chanrobleslaw

The authority given was only in furtherance of complainant's employment of respondent's legal services.
There was no allegation or proof that respondent benefitted from or used the falsified document.53Moreover,
complainant had possession of the Special Power of Attorney, a icopy of which was attached to her Complaint.
In all likelihood, the Special Power of Attorney may not only have been known to complainant; she may have
conformed to its preparation all along.

However, the same conclusion cannot be made with regard to compiainant's forged signature in the April 15,
2002 letter. In the Verification54 attached to the letter, respondent declared under oath that she jcaused the
preparation of the letter of withdrawal of the complaint with prejudice. She declared under oath that she also
caused the conforme of her clients after informing them of the facts, both as counsel and attorney-in-fact.

Thus, respondent committed serious acts of deceit in: (1) withdrawing the complaint with prejudice, without
the knowledge and consent of complainant; and (2) forging complainant's signature or causing her signature
to be forged in the April 15, 2002 letter, thus making it appear that complainant conformed to the withdrawal
of the complaint.

In Sebastian v. Calis:55
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature
of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in
his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.56 (Citations omitted)
Respondent's deception constitutes a gross violation of professional ethics and a breach of her fiduciary duty
to her client, subjecting her to disciplinary action.

III

Furthermore, we agree with the Committee on Bar Discipline's fmding that complainant has sufficiently
proven her allegations regarding the falsified order.

The appearance of the purported May 10, 2002 Order58 in G.R. No. 152946 is markedly different from the
orders and resolutions of this Court. Indeed, it was later confirmed through the letter59 issued by Atty. Soriano,
Clerk of Court of the First Division, that there was no such order issued, that the signature there was not hers,
and that the format did not follow this Court's format.

Complainant avers that she paid substantial amounts of money to respondent in relation to the filing of the
complaint for injunction in G.R. No. 152946, though respondent did not issue any receipt or accounting
despite her demands. Instead, respondent allegedly furnished complainant with the fabricated May 10, 2002
Order purportedly ruling in her favor. Complainant later found out that no such order existed. The case was
already dismissed.

Respondent's acts amount to deceit, malpractice, or gross misconduct in office as an attorney.60 She violated
her oath to "do no falsehood"61 and to "conduct [her] self as a lawyer . . . with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to; [her] clients."62 She also violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his elient informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Respondent's transgressions are grave and serious. She abused her legal knowledge and training. She took
undue advantage of the trust reposed on her by her client. Her misconduct exhibits a brazen disregard of her
duties as a lawyer. The advocate for justice became the perpetrator of injustice.

Aside from defrauding her client, respondent recklessly put Arty. Soriano's career in jeopardy by fabricating an
order, thus making a mockery of the judicial system. That a lawyer is not merely a professional but also an
officer of the court cannot be overemphasized. She owes the courts of justice and its judicial officers utmost
respect.63 Her conduct degrades the administration of justice and weakens the people faith in the judicial
system. She inexorably besmirched the entire legal profession.

In Embido v. Pe, Jr.,64 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Pe, Jr. was found guilty of violating Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 and was meted the penalty of disbarment for falsifying a court decision "in a non-existent court
proceeding."
Thus:
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a
lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part.
Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.66 (Citations omitted)
Respondent's unethical and unscrupulous conduct proves her unworthy of the public's trust and confidence.
She shamelessly transgressed all the things she swore to uphold, which makes her unfit to continue as a
member of the bar. Hence, we find no hesitation in removing respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.

However, we find a dearth of evidence to support complainant's claim as to the amounts demanded and
received by respondent, that is: (1) a total of P330,000.00 in relation to G.R. No. 152946; and (2) a total of
P440,000.00 for the renewal of complainant's passport. The demand letter dated June 24, 2002, attached to
the Complaint as Annex E, is not competent proof of the actual amounts paid to and received by respondent.
The demand letter does not contain the date when the addressee received the letter; this produces doubt as
to whether the demand letter was actually sent/delivered to respondent.

In administrative cases, it is the complainant who has the burden to prove, by substantial evidence,67the
allegations in the complaint.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Arty. Lorenza A. Abion GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of
the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby DISBARREDfrom the practice of
law. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to remove the name of Lorenza A. Abion from the Roll of
Attorneys.

This Resolution is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against
respondent.

The Legal Office of the Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to file the appropriate criminal charges
against respondent!for falsifying an order of this Court.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country.

This Resolution takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
11. A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016
 PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK A.
CARONAN," Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant),
before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against
respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for
purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former has the required
educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent
is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on August 5,
1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant
graduated in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of
Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a
Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he
married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters.8Through the years, complainant rose from the
ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)
in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car
rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since
then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree.

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had enrolled
in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent
passed the Bar Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the University of
Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig
City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job
and had a family to support.

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to report
to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an
investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes
Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his and
respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land
Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's
University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and his Birth
Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's
University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A. Caronan."19 Complainant later
learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case for
qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at
respondent's wedding.

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities,
complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta
Pena & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the
alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters concerning respondent.22 On the other
hand, a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also received a phone call from a
certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he was
authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not.24 Further, he learned that
respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed
a fear for his own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations among his colleagues,
which eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-
Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law.

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him arid invoked res judicata as a defense. He
maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case
No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against
him, and which case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No.
10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General
Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several
administrative and criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties failed to
appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On such date, however, both
parties again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order36 directing them to file their
respective position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any.37

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued
his Report and Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's
name, identity, and academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations
against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity.40 On the other hand, complainant presented
clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his
arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is
married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National
Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.43

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that .the photograph taken of respondent
when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating
Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar
Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant
and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No.
49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent and the
name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a
mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent.47

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting the Investigating
Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the
Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is
the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed
the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain
a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon
his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo.49Respondent
himself also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records
showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover,
the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows
the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile,
complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which
are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high
school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances
obtained in 2010 and 2013.55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name,
identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" -
never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred
from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the
Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein
for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration:
political science, logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he
left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating.56Clearly,
respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and
earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and
educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in
the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R.
Melendrez,59 the Court explained the essence of good moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by the public in the place where he is known.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the
penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[60] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he
assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies
which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for
years. Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of
the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and
the court.6

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications
to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted
in the filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the
legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.6

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of
falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to
obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate
civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPEDand STRICKEN OFF the
Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and cralawlawlibrary

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all
courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning
that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity
of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

12. [ AC. No. 11317, Aug 23, 2016 ]

ETHELENE W. SAN JUAN v. ATTY. FREDDIE A. VENIDA +

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint filed by Ethelene W. San Juan (Ethelene) against respondent
Atty. Freddie A. Venida (Atty. Venida) for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Sometime in 2007, Ethelene required the services of a lawyer to handle the petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage that she was considering to file. Ethelene's mother referred her to Atty. Venida, whom
she engaged to file the case on her behalf. Atty. Venida agreed to handle the case for a consideration of
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000) by way of acceptance, filing, and docket fees. Atty. Venida personally
collected the P25,000 from Ethelene's house on April 22, 2007, and required her to sign a verification to be
attached to the petition.[1]

The following day, Atty. Venida required an additional Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) for the fees of the sheriff
or process server in order to serve the summons. Ethelene paid the said amount on April 24, 2007, as
evidenced by an Acknowledgment Receipt[2] dated April 22, 2007. Atty. Venida assured Ethelene that he will
file the petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Makati RTC) as soon as possible.

After a month, Ethelene's mother called Atty. Venida to inquire if the case had already been filed, and the
latter answered in the affirmative. Based on Atty. Venida's assurances, Ethelene's mother contacted him again
to confirm if a hearing of the case had already been scheduled. Atty. Venida told Ethelene's mother to wait
and that he will inform them if a hearing had already been set. Ethelene's mother persisted on inquiring when
a hearing on the petition will be scheduled, and Atty. Venida repeatedly answered that it normally takes time
before a hearing is scheduled, and they would just have to wait.[3]

In the meantime, Ethelene's mother asked for a copy of the petition that Atty. Venida filed in court. Upon
examination of the copy of the petition that she received,[4]Ethelene discovered that it was not stamped
"Received" by the Makati RTC Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). Ethelene contacted Atty. Venida to clarify this
matter, and the latter informed her that only the draft copy was given to them and that the file copy of the
petition, duly acknowledged by the OCC, was left in his office.[5] Ethelene asked Atty. Venida for his office or
residence address in order to secure a copy of the petition herself. However, Atty. Venida refused to reveal his
address.

Beginning to suspect that something was amiss, Ethelene went to the OCC to verify and inquire about the
status of the petition. To her great dismay and disappointment, the OCC informed her that no such petition
was filed with its office.[6] Ethelene contacted Atty. Venida to clarify the matter, but the latter merely avoided
her and told her he was busy. When Atty. Venida finally agreed to meet with Ethelene and her mom, he did
not show up. Ethelene tried to contact him again, but he never returned her calls.[7]

Thus, on August 8, 2007, Ethelene filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Venida with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued a Notice of
Mandatory Conference on February 13, 2014 directing Ethelene and Atty. Venida to appear before the CBD for
mandatory conference on April 8, 2014 and to submit their respective Mandatory Conference Brief three days
prior to the scheduled date. Both parties, however, failed to appear despite notice. Thus, the CBD submitted
the case for resolution.

In its Report and Recommendation[8] dated June 22, 2015, the CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Venida for exhibiting dubious character that affects the standing of lawyers. The CBD was convinced that Atty.
Venida acted in bad faith, with a clear intent to deceive Ethelene when he furnished her a draft copy of the
petition rather than a receiving copy to show that the petition had, indeed, been filed.

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-609,[9] adopting and approving
the recommendation of the CBD. The Resolution reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record
and applicable laws, and considering Respondent's rude disposition denigrating the legal profession and
insolent and conceited manner before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Given the foregoing finding, the only remaining question that begs resolution is whether Atty. Venida is guilty
of misappropriating the total amount of P29,000 that Ethelene entrusted to him for filing the petition for the
annulment of the latter's marriage.

We sustain the findings of the IBP that Atty. Venida acted in bad faith and deceived Ethelene, in violation of his
sworn duties under the Lawyer's Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

Lawyers are duty-bound to exhibit fidelity to their client's cause and to be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them to diligently prosecute their clients' cases the moment they agreed to handle them, as is
mandated of them under Canon 17 of the Code. They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and
abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.
[10]
 Atty. Venida grossly failed to fulfil this mandate.

The records definitively show that Atty. Venida was completely remiss and negligent in handling Ethelene's
case, notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of Twenty-Nine Thousand Pesos (P29,000) from her by way of his
acceptance and filing fees. Instead of filing the petition, Atty. Venida gave his client a runaround and led her to
believe that the petition had already been filed. When pressed for updates, Atty. Venida evaded Ethelene and
refused to return her calls. Worse, the fees remain unaccounted for, which were entrusted to him for the filing
of the petition.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he or she does
not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.
[11]
 Consequently, Atty. Venida is duty-bound to return the P29,000 given to him by Ethelene. Failure to do so is
a breach of Rule 16.01 of the Code, which provides:

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Atty. Venida's agreement to handle Ethelene's case, cemented by his receipt of his legal fees, is an assurance
and representation to his client that he would be diligent and competent in handling her case. This includes
constantly updating her, on his volition, of the status of her case. Thus, his actuations are contrary to Canon
18, and its Rules 18.03 and 18.04, which state:

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information. x x x
Moreover, Rule 1.01 of the Code states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary to justice,
modesty or good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
[12]
 As pronounced by this Court in Belleza v. Atty. Macasa,[13] a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds
or properties as they fall due or upon demand. His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise
to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.[14]

Atty. Venida's misappropriation of the funds, as well as avoidance to account for his actions when confronted
of his falsities, constitutes dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence, and betrayal of his client's interests.
These acts undoubtedly speak of deceit. Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and
dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.
[15]
 Good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law,
but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar.[16]

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office;
(4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's
oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party without authority to do so.[17] Thus, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. A lawyer must at
no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the
Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership in it.[18]

The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the recommendation of the IBP-CBD to disbar Atty. Venida from
the practice of law for his infractions against Ethelene. However, jurisprudence advises that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. However, the said penalties are imposed with
great caution, because they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action and their consequences are
beyond repair.[19]

The question as to what disciplinary' sanction should be meted out against a lawyer found guilty of
misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors. When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the
Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster
public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from
similar misconduct.[20]

It is for this reason that we take note of Atty. Venida's wanton disregard of the disbarment complaint against
him, as well as the arrogance that he exhibited before the IBP-CBD in ignoring the notices sent to him to
explain the matter. Clearly, Atty. Venida does not seem to consider that an administrative case against him,
which could very well result in the revocation of his license and expulsion from the Roll of Attorneys, is neither
pressing nor important enough to merit his attention.

We also take note of the past disbarment complaints that had been filed against him that resulted in his
suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law for each case. In G.R. No. 132826 entitled Rolando Saa v.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline, Board of Governors, Pasig City, and Atty.
Freddie A. Venida, the complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty. Venida with this Court. We required
Atty. Venida to comment on the complaint against him in a Resolution dated February 17, 1992. Instead of
complying with the directive, he belatedly filed a partial comment and asked to be furnished with a copy of
the complaint. Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, Atty. Venida still did not file his complete comment
within 10 days as required in the February 17, 1992 Resolution. He only filed a partial comment on January 26,
1993 or 11 months after being directed to do so in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Atty. Venida filed his full
comment on September 4, 1995 which was a little over three years after due date. For his blatant disregard of
the Court's order and unduly delaying the complaint against him, Atty. Venida was suspended by the Court for
one (1) year from the practice of law.

In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Venida, docketed as A.C. No. 10043 and entitled Aurora H.
Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, the complainant alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Venida to
handle her case which was pending with the Court of Appeals. Complainant made several follow-ups on her
case until she lost contact with him. Hearing nothing from Atty. Venida, complainant just found out that her
appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed when an Entry of Judgment in the case was issued against her.
Thus, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Venida for his gross, reckless, and inexcusable
negligence in handling her appeal. We found Atty. Venida guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03
to 18.04 and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Indubitably, Atty. Venida has a penchant for violating not only his oath as a lawyer and the Code, but orders
from the Court as well. He had been repeatedly warned that a similar violation will merit a more severe
penalty, and yet, his reprehensible conduct has, time and again, brought embarrassment and dishonour to the
legal profession. The Court cannot allow his blatant disregard of the Code and his sworn duty to continue.

In CF Sharp Crew Management Incorporated v. Atty. Torres,[21] the Court disbarred the respondent for failing to
account for and for misappropriating the various amounts he received from his client. Similarly in Arellano
University, Inc. v. Mijares III,[22] the Court disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating the client's money
intended for securing a certificate of title on the latter's behalf.

With the aforementioned cases as guidelines, We deem it fit to impose the ultimate penalty of disbarment
from the practice of law upon Atty. Venida, considering that this is the second disciplinary action against him
for a case of a similar nature. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and whenever it is made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Court to withdraw the same.[23]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida is found GUILTY of violating Canons 16, 17, and 18, and
Rules 1.01, 16.01, 18.03 and 18.04 of the .Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.

Atty. Venida is ordered to refund the amount of P29,000 to complainant Ethelene W. San Juan within thirty
(30) days from notice. Otherwise, he may be held in contempt of court.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Freddie A.
Venida's record in this Court.

SO ORDERED.
January 26, 2016
13. A.C. No. 8723
[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2974]
GREGORY FABAY, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. REX A. RESUENA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment filed by Gregory Fabay (Fabay) against respondent Atty. Rex A.
Resuena (Atty. Resuena), docketed as A.C. No. 8723 for Gross Misconduct due to the unauthorized
notarization of documents relative to Civil Case No. 2001. 1
The facts are as follows:
On October 15, 2003, Virginia Perez, Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez and Valentino
Perez (plaintiffs) filed a complaint for ejectment/forcible entry against Gregory Fabay before the Municipal
Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur with respondent Atty. Resuena as their counsel.
On the same date, October 15, 2003, Atty. Resuena notarized a special power of attorney (SPA) with plaintiffs
as grantors, in favor of Apolo D. Perez. However, it appeared that it was only Remedios Perez who actually
signed the SP A in behalf of Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez. Said SPA was
recorded in Atty. Resuena's notarial book as Doc. No. 126, Page 26, Book 1, Series of 2003.2
The ejectment case was later on decided in favor of the client of Atty. Resuena, however, on appeal, the
Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, ordered the case to be remanded to the court a quo to
try the case on the merits.3 In its Decision4 dated August 4, 2005, the trial court noted that both Amador Perez
and Valentino Perez have already died on September 7, 1988 and April 26, 1976, respectively.
Complainant Fabay alleged that Atty. Resuena violated the provisions of the Notarial Law by notarizing a
special power of attorney notwithstanding the fact that two of the principals therein, Amador Perez and
Valentino Perez were already dead long before the execution of the SPA. Complainant added that Atty.
Resuena likewise notarized a complaint for ejectment in 2003 where Apolo Perez was made to appear as
attomey-infact of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez when again the latter could not have possibly authorized
him as they were already dead. Further, complainant averred that Atty. Resuena, as counsel of the plainfiffs,
participated in the barangay conciliations which is prohibited under the law.
Thus, the instant complaint for disbarment for violation of the notarial law and for Atty. Resuena's misconduct
as a lawyer.
On October 18, 2010, the Court resolved to require Atty. Resuena to file his comment relative to the complaint
filed against him. 5
In compliance, Atty. Resuena submitted his Comment6 dated December 20, 2010 wherein he denied the
allegations in the complaint and claimed that it was tainted with malice, considering that it was only filed with
the Supreme Court on August 20, 2010 when in fact it was allegedly prepared last June 18, 2006.
Atty. Resuena explained that although it was just Remedios Perez who signed the SP A on behalf of Amador
Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, there was no misrepresentation since Remedios Perez is
the spouse of Amador Perez and she was likewise previously authorized by the other co-owners, Gloria Perez
and Gracia Perez, to represent them.7 Atty. Resuena, thus, prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed
for lack of merit.
On January 19, 2011, the Court then resolved to refer the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation/decision. 8
On June 16, 2011, a mandatory conference was conducted where complainant was assisted by his counsel
Atty. Crispo Borja, Jr., while Atty. Resuena appeared for himself.
Atty. Resuena denied that he participated in the barangay conciliations and presented the certificate issued by
the barangay captain showing that there was no record of his attendance during the confrontations of the
parties before the barangay. He, however, did not deny that Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already
deceased at the time of the execution and notarization of the SP A, albeit, he argued that in the same SP A,
Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were signed by or represented by Remedios Perez. He further insisted that
in the acknowledgment portion of the SP A, the names of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were not
included as among the parties who have personally appeared before him. Thus, Atty. Resuena insisted that
there was no misrepresentation done in the notarization of the SPA.
In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Resuena to have violated the provisions of the
notarial law. The pertinent portion thereof reads as thus:
A close scrutiny of the evidence submitted would show that respondent notarized a Special Power of Attorney
on October 15, 2003 wherein the supposed principals were Virginia Perez, Marcella Perez, Amador Perez,
Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez, Valent.ino Perez, the purpose of which, was to authorize Apolo D. Perez to
represent them to sue and be sued in any administrative or judicial tribunal in connection with any suit that
may arise out of any and all transactions in their properties covered by TCT No. RT-1118 (14380), 38735,
38737. In the said document, the signatures of Amado Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez and Valentino Perez
were signed as "BY: REMEDIOS PEREZ". Remedios Perez is the spouse of Amador Perez and the mother of
[Apolo] Perez.
Evaluating the Special Power of Attorney, two of the parties, namely, Amador Perez and Valentino Perez
were already dead during the execution of the Special Power of Attorney. Amador Perez died sometime in
September 7, 1988, while Valentino Perez died in April 26, 1976. Despite this fact, respondent allowed them
to be represented by Remedios Perez in the signing of the Special Power of Attorney without the proper
authority provided for by law.
On the other hand, the other parties in the Special Power of Attorney, GRACIA PEREZ and GLORIA PEREZ were
both residing in the United States of America. While the respondent alleged that there was a previous
authority to sign the Special Power of Attorney, no proof was presented by the respondent to that effect.
They also were signed as "BY REMEDIOS PEREZ".9
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that his notarial commission be revoked and that he be disqualified to be
commissioned as notary public for one (1) year.
In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-591 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP-Board of Governors adopted and
approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On September 9, 2013, complainant moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. XX-2013-591 and prayed
that the same be set aside and instead the penalty of suspension be imposed against Atty. Resuena as an
erring member of the bar and not merely as a notary public.
On May 3, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-293, 10 denied complainant's
motion for reconsideration, thus affirming Resolution No. XX-2013-591 but modified the penalty imposed to
two (2) years disqualification from notarial practice.
We concur with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.
Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon
the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.11
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same
are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free
act and deed. 12
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal
appearance before the notary public:
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document
-
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Resuena violated not only the notarial law but also his oath as a
lawyer when he notarized the subject SP A without all the affiant's personal appearance. As found by the IBP-
CBD, the purpose of the SP A was to authorize a certain Apolo D. Perez to represent the principals "to sue and
be sued in any administrative or judicial tribunal in connection with any suit that may arise out of their
properties." It is, thus, appalling that Atty. Resuena permitted Remedios Perez to sign on behalf of Amador
Perez and Valentino Perez knowing fully well that the two were already dead at that time and more so when
he justified that the latter's names were nevertheless not included in the acknowledgment albeit they are
signatories of the SP A. Equally deplorable is the fact that Remedios was likewise allowed to sign on behalf of
Gracia Perez and Gloria Perez, who were said to be residing abroad. Worse, he deliberately allowed the use of
the subject SPA in an ejectment case that was filed in court. In effect, Atty. Resuena, in notarizing the SPA,
contented himself with Remedios' representation of four of the six principals of the SPA, doing away with the
actual physical appearance of all the parties. There is no question then that Atty. Resuena ignored the basics
of notarial procedure and actually displayed his clear ignorance of the importance of the office of a notary
public. Not only did he violate the notarial law, he also did so without thinking of the possible damage that
might result from its non-observance.
We cannot overemphasize that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed
the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the
document in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed.
In Agbulos v. Atty. Viray,  13 this Court, citing Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan,  14 reiterated anew the necessity of
personal appearance of the affiants, to wit:
The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to authenticate
documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the adverse consequences of this
practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the absent affiants. Doing away with the essential
requirement of physical presence of the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the documents
may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging
party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.
Atty. Resuena's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly
affected by the notarized document but also made a mockery of the integrity of a notary public and degraded
the function of notarization. Moreso, in this case, where Atty. Resuena being the counsel of the plaintiffs-
affiants can be assumed to have known the circumstances of the subject case, as well as the fact that affiants
Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already deceased at the time of the execution of the subject SP A.
Having appeared to have intentionally violated the notarial law, Atty. Resuena has, in fact, allowed himself to
be an instrument of fraud which this Court will not tolerate.
A graver responsibility is placed upon Atty. Resuena by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.1âwphi1 The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands
lawyers not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. 15 It requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. 16 Moreover, the Notarial Law and the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require a duly-commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his
Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or act which constitutes good cause for the
revocation of commission or imposition of administrative sanction. 17 Unfortunately, Atty. Resuena failed in
both respects.
Through his acts, Atty. Resuena committed a serious breach of the fundamental obligation imposed upon him
by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1. 01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was
his duty to serve the ends of justice, not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act at all times in
accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also
bring reproach upon an honorable profession. 18 Atty. Resuena must now accept the consequences of his
unwarranted actions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rex A. Resuena is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public, and of violating the
lawyer's oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is DISBARRED from the practice of law and likewise PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as
a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Resuena's
personal record. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
14. A.C. No. 4191               June 10, 2013
ANITA C. PENA, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts violative of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Peña, former head of the Records Department of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno.
Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200, located in
Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-
61244,2Register of Deeds of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon. She personally
knew respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation case, which
she filed against her husband in 1974, and the aforementioned property was her share in their property
settlement. Complainant stated that she also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus, as she was respondent's
trusted employee who did secretarial work for respondent. Estrella Kraus was always there whenever she
visited respondent in connection with her cases.
Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she (complainant) apply for
a loan from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for sale to interested buyers, and that her
property be offered as collateral. Respondent assured complainant that she would work out the speedy
processing and release of the loan. Complainant agreed, but since she had a balance on her loan with the GSIS,
respondent lent her the sum of ₱27,000.00, without any interest, to pay the said loan. When her title was
released by the GSIS, complainant entrusted it to respondent who would handle the preparation of
documents for the loan and follow-up the same, and complainant gave respondent the authority for this
purpose. From time to time, complainant inquired about the application for the loan, but respondent always
assured her that she was still preparing the documents required by the bank. Because of her assurances,
complainant did not bother to check on her property, relying on respondent's words that she would handle
speedily the preparation of her application.
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her apartment was
already demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed on her property, which she later
learned was already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her property from Estrella D. Kraus.
Complainant immediately confronted respondent about what she discovered, but respondent just brushed
her aside and ignored her. After verification, complainant learned that her property was sold on November 11,
1986 to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and respondent was the Notary Public before whom the sale was
acknowledged.3 Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., through its Managing Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold the same
to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13, 1989.4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and
that she neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before respondent to acknowledge the sale.
She alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. using her
trusted employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as the instrument in the sale, and that her signature was forged, as she
did not sign any deed selling her property to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in any capacity in her law office, and
that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus (Spouses Kraus), were her clients. Respondent denied that she
suggested that complainant should apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses. She said that it was
the complainant, on the contrary, who requested her (respondent) to look for somebody who could help her
raise the money she needed to complete the amortization of her property, which was mortgaged with the
GSIS and was about to be foreclosed. Respondent stated that she was the one who introduced complainant to
the Spouses Kraus when they were both in her office. In the course of their conversation, complainant offered
the property, subject matter of this case, to the Spouses Kraus. The Spouses Kraus were interested, and got
the telephone number of complainant. Thereafter, complainant told respondent that she accompanied the
Spouses Kraus to the site of her property and the Office of the Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the
Spouses Kraus called up respondent to tell her that they had reached an agreement with complainant, and
they requested respondent to prepare the deed of sale in favor of their company, Krisbuilt Traders Company,
Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the Spouses Kraus went to respondent's office where complainant signed the
Deed of Sale after she received Sixty-Seven Thousand Pesos (₱67,000.00) from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent
alleged that complainant took hold of the Deed of Sale, as the understanding was that the complainant would,
in the meantime, work for the release of the mortgage, and, thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of
title, together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses Kraus who would then pay complainant the balance of the
agreed price. Complainant allegedly told respondent that she would inform respondent when the transaction
was completed so that the Deed of Sale could be recorded in the Notarial Book. Thereafter, respondent
claimed that she had no knowledge of what transpired between complainant and the Spouses Kraus.
Respondent stated that she was never entrusted with complainant's certificate of title to her property in
Marikina (TCT No. N-61244). Moreover, it was only complainant who negotiated the sale of her property in
favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. According to respondent, complainant's inaction for eight years to
verify what happened to her property only meant that she had actually sold the same, and that she concocted
her story when she saw the prospect of her property had she held on to it. Respondent prayed for the
dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and affirming the veracity
of her complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and
recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996, complainant moved that hearings be scheduled by the Commission on
Bar Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for its initial hearing, and hearings were conducted
from March 21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for the reception of
respondent's evidence were set, but supervening events caused their postponement.
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence,8 which was opposed by complainant. The
Investigating Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for the outright dismissal of the complaint, and
directed respondent to present her evidence on October 24, 2001.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in the name of complainant and the
issuance of a new title to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the Register of Deeds failed to appear on
March 1, 2002. During the hearing held on July 29, 2003, respondent's counsel presented a certification10 from
Records Officer Ma. Corazon Gaspar of the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which certification stated that a
copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Anita C. Peña in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., covering a
parcel of land in Marikina, could not be located from the general file of the registry and that the same may be
considered lost. Hearings continued until 2005. On February 17, 2005, respondent was directed by the
Investigating Commissioner to formally offer her evidence and to submit her memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the IBP on the
ground that the criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36, which estafa case
was anchored on the same facts as the administrative case, had been dismissed in a Decision11 dated August
20, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 94-138567. The RTC held that the case for estafa could not prosper against the
accused Atty. Christina C. Paterno, respondent herein, for insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, considering the absence of the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that
would show that Anita Peña's signature therein was forged and the transfer of the land was made through
fraudulent documents.
The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not there was clear and preponderant
evidence showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility by (a) deceiving
complainant Anita C. Peña; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to
register the subject property in his name; and (c) knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, submitted his Report
and Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust reposed upon her by complainant by
executing a bogus deed of sale while she was entrusted with complainant's certificate of title, and that
respondent also notarized the spurious deed of sale. Commissioner Sordan stated that there was no evidence
showing that respondent actively conspired with any party or actively participated in the forgery of the
signature of complainant. Nevertheless, Commissioner Sordan stated that complainant's evidence supports
the conclusion that her signature on the said Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986 was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced notwithstanding diligent search in the National
Archives and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Commissioner Sordan stated that
the interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her witness, Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy
of the owner's duplicate certificate of title was delivered to respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did not give
credence to respondent's denial that complainant handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244 in
November 1986 at the GSIS, as Maura Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as Records Processor at
the GSIS, testified that she saw complainant give the said title to respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that she gave respondent her owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as collateral in constructing a
townhouse, and that the title was in the safekeeping of respondent for seven years.13 Despite repeated
demands by complainant, respondent refused to return it.14 Yet, respondent assured complainant that she
was still the owner.15Later, complainant discovered that a new building was erected on her property in January
1994, eight years after she gave the title to respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that
after eight years, complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan application nor visited her
property, if it is untrue that she sold the said property. Complainant explained that respondent kept on
assuring her that the bank required the submission of her title in order to process her loan application.16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's land to Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with respect to the sale of
the property described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. for ₱200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that
complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her presence inside her office.19 However, respondent would neither
directly confirm nor deny if, indeed, she notarized the instrument in her direct examination,20 but on cross-
examination, she stated that she was not denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed of
Sale.21 Estrella Kraus' affidavit22supported respondent's defense.
Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing by complainant
of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale, and the notarization by respondent of the said Deed. However,
Commissioner Sordan doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he affirmed that his participation in the
alleged Deed of Absolute Sale was mere recording, but he later affirmed that he saw the parties sign the Deed
of Absolute Sale.23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like respondent's testimony that she
saw complainant sign the Deed of Sale before her is proof of respondent's deception. Respondent's
notarization of the disputed deed of sale showed her active role to perpetuate a fraud to prejudice a party.
Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence and fealty to her
office by attesting that the alleged party, Anita Peña, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth
and in fact the said person did not participate in the execution thereof. Moreover, respondent should be
faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made respondent liable for violation of
her oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a),24 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
Canon 125and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and her name
stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the notarial commission of
respondent, if still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually disqualified from reappointment
as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464, adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of her oath as a lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Christina C. Paterno is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Furthermore, respondent's notarial commission if still existing is Revoked with Perpetual Disqualification from
reappointment as a Notary Public.
The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees with the sanction imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the
facts and the law applicable to each case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections 128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of
Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable
doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate
and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the
culpability is merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there
was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually
rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was committed.32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the
court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.33 The
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to complainant's testimony that she gave
respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as respondent would apply for a bank
loan in complainant's behalf, using the subject property as collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former records processor in complainant's
office at the GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she saw complainant give her title to
respondent.35Respondent admitted in her Answer36 that she executed the Deed of Sale per the request of the
Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale was notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 15032237 in
complainant's title, TCT No. N-61244. As the Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault
of the complainant, nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her allegation
that her signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant by facilitating the sale of
the property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's approval. However, complainant
proved that respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila, National Capital Region her
Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall keep a notarial register,38 and
he shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, among others,
and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall
likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof.39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy of the entries
to the proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the month next following or
the failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk of court.40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification,41 dated February 22, 1994, stating
that respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for the year 1986, and that
respondent has not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial Report for the month of
November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed and notarized by her. Hence, a copy of the Notarial
Report/Record and the said Deed of Sale could not also be found in the National Archives per the
certification42 of the Archives Division Chief Teresita R. Ignacio for Director Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of
respondent to fulfill her duty as notary public to submit her notarial register for the month of November 1986
and a copy of the said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on the same month is cause for revocation of
her commission under Section 249 of the Notarial Law.43 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are
mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.44
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended for any deceit
or dishonest act, thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or
for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of the certificate of
title (TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who admittedly prepared the Deed
of Sale, which complainant denied having executed or signed, the important evidence of the alleged forgery of
complainant's signature on the Deed of Sale and the validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a
copy of the Deed of Sale could not be produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be
located in the general files of the registry, and a certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be
considered lost.45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila her Notarial
Report for the month of November 1986,46 including the said Deed of Sale, which was executed on November
11, 1986. Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined that it appears that efforts were exerted to get rid
of the copies of the said Deed of Sale to prevent complainant from getting hold of the document for the
purpose of handwriting verification from an expert to prove that her alleged signature on the Deed of Sale was
forged. The failure of respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial Register/Report for
the month of November 1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale, which was notarized by her within that month,
has far-reaching implications and grave consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of
the said Deed of Sale and showed the deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its
authenticity. During her testimony, it was observed by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected in the
transcript of records that respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny that she notarized the said Deed
of Sale.
For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As a member of
the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly the following Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law, pursuant to Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the
notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing, is perpetually REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
15. AMPARO BUENO, Complainant Adm. Case No. 8383

-versus Present: SERENO, C.J, CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION, . PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO,* ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, MENDOZA, REYES, PERLAS-BERNABE,* and LEONEN,JJ

Promulgated: . ~

ATTY. RAMON A. RANESES, r-r· Respondent.

DECEMBER 11, 2012

X---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----X

DECISION

PER CURIAM: Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon Rafieses filed on March
3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, and subsequently Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-de los Reyes,
conducted the fact-finding investigation on the complaint.

Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation2 dated September 29, 2008
to the IBP Board of Governors which approved it in a resolution dated December 11, 2008.

In a letter3 dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal transmitted to
the Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a Notice of Resolution4 and the records of the case.

Factual Antecedents

In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to represent her in Civil Case No. 777. In
consideration for his services, Bueno paid Atty. Rañeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay
him P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer fee paid.

Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings. On several
occasions, Atty. Rañeses would either be absent or late.

Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00. This amount would
allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing Civil Case No. 777, so that they would
not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She immediately sold a pig
and a refrigerator to raise the demanded amount, and gave it to Atty. Rañeses.

According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in December 1988, because
the amount she had previously given was inadequate. Bueno then sold her sala set and colored television to
raise the demanded amount, which she again delivered to Atty. Rañeses.

Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment on the adverse
party’s offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the case, but Atty. Rañeses failed to comply
with the court’s directive. According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses concealed this development from her. In fact, she
was shocked when a court sheriff arrived sometime in May 1991 to execute the decision against them.

Bueno went to Atty. Rañeses’ office to ask him about what happened to the case. Atty. Rañeses told
her that he had not received any decision. Bueno later discovered from court records that Atty. Rañeses
actually received a copy of the decision on December 3, 1990. When she confronted Atty. Rañeses about her
discovery and showed him a court-issued certification, Atty. Rañeses simply denied any knowledge of the
decision.

In a separate affidavit,6 Bueno related another instance where Atty. Rañeses asked his client for money
to win a case. Sometime in June 1991, Atty. Rañeses allegedly asked her to deliver a telegram from Justice
Buena of the Court of Appeals to her aunt, Socorro Bello. He told her to tell Bello to prepare P5,000.00, an
amount that Justice Buena purportedly asked for in relation to Criminal Case No. T-1909 that was then on
appeal with the Court of Appeals.

According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses went to Bello’s residence two weeks later. In her (Bueno’s)
presence, Bello paid Atty. Rañeses P5,000.00. Bello demanded a receipt but Atty. Rañeses refused to issue
one, telling her that none of his clients ever dared to demand a receipt for sums received from them.

Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly failed to attend the
hearings scheduled by Commissioner Gonzaga on March 20, 2000,7 on May 11, 20008 and on October 2,
2000. 9 During the hearing on October 2, 2000, Commissioner Gonzaga issued an Order10 declaring Atty.
Rañeses in default. Bueno presented her evidence and was directed to file a formal offer.

On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a “Time Motion and Request for Copies of the Complaint
and Supporting Papers”11 (dated September 30, 2000) filed by Atty. Rañeses. Atty. Rañeses asked in his
motion that the hearing on October 2, 2000 be reset to sometime in December 2000, as he had prior
commitments on the scheduled day. He also asked for copies of the complaint and of the supporting papers,
claiming that he had not been furnished with these. In the interest of substantial justice, Commissioner
Gonzaga scheduled a clarificatory hearing on November 16, 2000.

Atty. Rañeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000. In the same hearing, Commissioner
Gonzaga noted that the registry return card refuted Atty. Rañeses’ claim that he did not receive a copy of the
complaint. Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled another clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2001. He stated that
if Atty. Rañeses failed to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant
submits her memorandum.13
 Atty. Rañeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day, Commissioner Gonzaga
declared the case deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant’s submission of her memorandum.
14

At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who scheduled another hearing
on March 14, 2003.15 During the hearing, only Bueno and her counsel were present. The Commissioner noted
that the IBP-CBD received a telegram from Atty. Rañeses asking for the hearing’s resetting because he had
prior commitments. The records, however, showed that Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer and the case had
already been submitted for resolution. Thus, Commissioner De los Reyes issued an Order16 directing Bueno to
submit her formal offer of evidence and her documentary evidence, together with her memorandum.

The IBP-CBD received Bueno’s Memorandum17 on May 27, 2003, but she did not file any formal offer,
nor did she submit any of the documentary evidence indicated as attachments to her complaint.

The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings

In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty.
Rañeses be absolved of the charge of negligence, but found him guilty of soliciting money to bribe a judge.

Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and certifications that
she indicated as attachments to her complaint. These would have proven that Atty. Rañeses had indeed been
negligent in pursuing her case. Without these documents, which are not difficult to procure from the courts,
Commissioner Limpingco concluded that he would only be left with Bueno’s bare allegations which could not
support a finding of negligence.

Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Bueno’s allegation that Atty. Rañeses solicited money to
bribe judges to be credible. According to Commissioner Limpingco, the act of soliciting money to bribe a judge
is, by its nature, done in secret. He observed that Bueno had consistently affirmed her statements in her
affidavit, while Atty. Rañeses did nothing to refute them.

Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Rañeses even made a false claim before the
investigating commissioners, as he alleged in his “Time Motion and Request for Copies of the Complaint and
Supporting Papers” that he did not receive the complaint against him, a fact belied by the registry receipt card
evidencing his receipt.

Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be disbarred for failure to maintain
his personal integrity and for failure to maintain public trust.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, but reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension from the practice of law.19

The Court’s Ruling

The Court approves the IBP’s findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Rañeses from the practice of law in
accordance with Commissioner Limpingco’s recommendation and based on our own observations and findings
in the case.
 The charge of negligence

According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should serve their clients
with competence and diligence. Specifically, Rule 18.02 provides that “[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation." Rule 18.03, on the other hand, states that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable."

“Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.”20 A client is entitled to the benefit of all remedies and
defenses authorized by law, and is expected to rely on his lawyer to avail of these remedies or defenses. 21

In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsel’s failure to file an appellant’s brief
amounts to inexcusable negligence.22 In Garcia v. Bala, 23 the Court even found the respondent lawyer guilty
of negligence after availing of an erroneous mode of appeal. To appeal a decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the respondent therein filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB,
instead of filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Because of his error, the prescribed
period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing his clients.

In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse party’s offer of evidence
and to submit the required memorandum would have amounted to negligence. However, as noted by
Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support her allegations with court documents that she could have
easily procured. This omission leaves only Bueno’s bare allegations which are insufficient to prove Atty.
Rañeses’ negligence. We support the Board of Governors’ ruling on this point.

The charge of soliciting money

In Bildner v. Ilusorio, 24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to get a favorable
decision for his client. He visited the judge’s office several times and persistently called his residence to
convince him to inhibit from his client’s case. The Court found that the respondent lawyer therein violated
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – the rule that instructs lawyers to refrain from any
impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of influencing, the court. The
respondent lawyer therein was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below, he committed a
fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. These are exacerbated
by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the investigation of his case; he practically disregarded its
processes and even lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given him about the
case.

While the only evidence to support Bueno’s allegations is her own word, the Investigating
Commissioner found her testimony to be credible. The Court supports the Investigating Commissioner in his
conclusion. As Commissioner Limpingco succinctly observed:

By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily take place
in secrecy with only respondent Atty. Rañeses and complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant Amparo
Bueno has executed sworn statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in
 hearings held before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for his part, has
not even seen it fit to file any answer to the complaint against him, much less appear in any hearings
scheduled in this investigation.25

Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners reveals his
propensity for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that Bueno’s affidavits depict him to be.

Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty.
Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and
implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer’s
relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.

First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent. It is false
because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the
professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the
Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means – a
decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by
his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.

From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the “take,” the
Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow
offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all – to all lawyers, their clients and
the general public – that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the
interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not
compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
delete his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the respondent.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, be notified of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]

16. RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.

RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:

In a letter[1] to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with copies thereof furnished all the
Associate Justices of the Court and other government entities, RTC judges and counsels listed thereunder,
Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who identified himself as member, Philippine Bar, expressed his frustrations over the
unfavorable outcome of and the manner by which the Court resolved the following cases filed by him, to wit:
1. UDK-12854, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
 2. G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs. Commission on Elections
3. G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
4. G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
5. G.R. No. 154310, Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
6. G.R. No. 155446, Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
7. G.R. No. 156630, Ronilo Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
8. G.R. No. 157046, Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.
9. G.R. No. 164163, Glenn Caballes vs. People, et al.
10. G.R. No. 164677, Marissa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta, et al.
In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances surrounding the dismissal on February 7,
2000[2] of the very first case he filed with the Court, UDK-12854, entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals,
et al. Frustrated with the adverse ruling thereon, Atty. Sorreda had previously written a letter[3] dated April 2,
2001 addressed to the Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court, the Court of
Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the Court, as follows:
Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the aforesaid case is totally execrable
and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty and office of the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action
not of men of reason or those who believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from whom
might is right. I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitors throat a ruling which, from
all appearances, it could not justify.
Reacting to the above, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August 14, 2001,[4] required Atty. Sorreda
to show cause why he should not be properly disciplined for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme
Court by using vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it.
In response to the show cause order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more letters to the Court dated
December 2, 2001[5] and June 16, 2002,[6] arguing for the propriety of his action and practically lecturing the
Court on his concepts of Legal and Judicial Ethics and Constitutional Law. In its Resolutions of January 15,
2002[7] and August 27, 2002[8], the Court merely noted said two letters.
Quoted from his earlier communications are the following statements of Atty. Sorreda disparaging the
Court with intemperate, insulting, offensive and derogatory language, to wit:
SOMETHING HAS GOT TO BE SERIOUSLY AND TERRIBLY WRONG WITH THE COUNTRYS JUSTICE SYSTEM[9]
WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THIS COUNTRY, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE?
xxx xxx xxx
I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest term such strong-handed actuations as the Honorable Court
has displayed. They are as one might expect in a dictatorship or authoritarian regime.[10]
Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled remarks, Atty. Sorreda again
went on a rampage in his subject letter of February 21, 2005:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the most palpably meritorious cases that have
ever been brought before the Supreme Court, or any court of justice for that matter. I cannot doubt that were
it not for the Solleguemiscounting, and the other incidents that ensued from it, at least some of these ten
cases would have met with entirely different endings, so obvious and patent are their merits to any
reasonable and impartial mind.
In short, Mr. Chief Justice, it is obvious that the High Court has taken it personally against me. To the
detriment of my innocent clients. And of justice.
Mr. Chief Justice, why should this be? If the Court had anything against me, I stood ready to have the ax fall on
my own neck, if it came to that. As I had stated in one communication-
[I]f there is one thing I agree with in the High Courts position, it is that x x x if indeed I had wronged the Court
in the way it had described, and if indeed my explanations and arguments lack merit, I should indeed be
disciplined; and surely no less than DISBARMENT will do. It should also be done as swiftly as possible, given the
gravity of the charge and the high dignity and importance of the institution attacked. Now on January 22, 2002
and May 7, 2002, the Court has resolved to deny to the undersigned the full opportunity for self-defense that
he request therefore he is now left without any defense, and he can only wonder why no sanction has come
down until the present time.
Might it be because I had continued, Of course, I shall also only expect that such judgment, when it does
come, will be a fully-reasoned one, as thoroughly discussed perhaps as that in In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, for
the proper guidance of all concerned- and the Court knows that it is not able to give such a fully-reasoned
judgment as I ask? But rather than admit it has done wrong and rectify the same, it would rather get back at
me by means of unfavorable rulings in the cases I elevate to it- let the innocent litigants, whose only mistake
was to hire me as their counsel, and the cause of justice suffer as they may.
Mr. Chief Justice, that is not only unjust; that is craven cowardice, to deal with an adversary like that. It is
not something I would have expected from the supreme judges of the land.
I can only view other happenings in the Honorable Court in such light. The same verifications that were
previously unfaulted, suddenly became course for dismissal. What other interpretation can I give it, than that
the court had run out of excuses to dismiss, since I was being careful not to repeat the same adjudged
shortcomings; and was now scrounging every which way for one, just so to make sure I continue to get my
comeuppance.
That of the first nine cases, not one was assigned to the Third Division- only either to the Second Division, then
chaired by Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, which handled the Sollegue case; or the First Division, chaired by the
Chief Justice, to whom I have directly written afterwards. Could it be only a coincidence - or is it a more likely
explanation that the powers-that-be in the Court wanted to be very sure I never get favorable ruling?
Especially when it is considered that, following Justice Bellosillos retirement on November 12, 2003, for the
first time in the history of the nations judiciary a vacancy in the Supreme Court was filled up way beyond the
constitutionally prescribed period of 90 days- and after so much mystery and intrigue has surrounded the
appointment of his successor, Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario. In fact Justice Nazario was sworn in on July 14,
2004, just one day before a new retirement took place, this time of Justice Jose C. Vitug. It was only following
this latest retirement, that for the first time this counsel had a case assigned to other than the First and
Second Division. Could it be that Justice Vitug, then Chairman of the Third Division, and Justice Nazario,
erstwhile presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, had redoubtable reputations for independent-mindedness;
and the powers-that-be in the court exercised their utmost influence to at least prevent the both of them
sitting in the bench at the same time, lest together they should buck the system and divide the Court, if not
successfully sway the Court to favorably rule on the undersigned counsels cases before it?
xxx xxx xxx
But this time, in these ten cases I have recounted, I am wholly convinced that the court is in the wrong. I
cannot but thus be filled with both acute sadness and burning indignation. Sadness as counsel, to come to the
realization that the high institution of which I am an officer has sunk to such a low. Indignation as a citizen,
that the public officers who are supposed to serve him and help him find justice, should instead give
judgments that so insult the intelligence and glare with iniquity.
Mr. Chief Justice, whatever gave the Court the notion that it could pronounce 29 days as greater than 60 days,
and not to have to account for it? Who can believe that the supposedly most illustrious legal minds of the
land, would miss seeing grave abuse of discretion in the actions of an agency that directly contravened
numerous laws and rules all at once? How could democracys vaunted last bulwark suffer a widow and her
children to thereafter live in their toilet, by sanctioning the plainly void sale and illegal demolition of their
erstwhile family home? Did the court pause for even three minutes to put itself in the shoes of an evidently
innocent man kept locked up for three years now on a manifestly false and fabricated charge, before it so
blandly invoked its discretion not to entertain his appeal at all? Where did the Court get such brazenness,
such shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the ground that the docket fees had not been paid, when the
evidence clearly show they in fact were? What manner of men are you- even challenging the citizenry to
inform on the corrupt, and the bar to become like Frodo in the fight against societys evils in your public
speeches and writings, and yet you yourselves committing the same evils when hidden from public view.
Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the clearest manifestation that the supreme magistrates have
bought into the What-are-we-in-power-for mentality? (Underscoring ours)
Upon instructions of the Chief Justice, Atty. Sorredas aforesaid letter of 21 February 2005 was included in
the March 15, 2005 en banc agenda of the Court.
In an en banc Resolution[11] dated March 15, 2005, the Court again required Atty. Sorreda to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for maliciously attacking the Court and its
Justices.
By way of compliance to the second show cause order, Atty Sorreda, in his letter of May 10, 2005 [12], again
with copies thereof furnished the Justices, judges and lawyers thereunder listed, states that he does not see
the need to say any more because the cause has already been shown as clear as day in his earlier letter of 21
February 2005, adding that [T]he need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter swiftly and
decisively. While admitting the great seriousness of the statements and imputations I have leveled against the
Court, he dared the Court whether it is capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the Supreme Judge.
After going over the records of the cases in which Atty. Sorreda accuses the Court of being unfair in the
resolution thereof, the Court stands by its rulings thereon. Atty. Sorreda mockingly stated that the Court does
not know how to count when it dismissed the Sollegue case on ground of failure to file the petition therein
within the reglementary period. For the enlightenment of the good counsel, the Court dismissed the petition
in Sollegue not only for failure to have it filed within the period fixed in Sec. 4, Rule 65 but also for failure to
submit the duplicate original or certified true copy of the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
June 28, 1999 in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56. [13] In another
case, Ronilo Sorreda vs. CA, Atty. Sorreda claimed that said case was dismissed on the mere ground of
insufficient verification. Again, Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that the petition was dismissed not merely for
defective verification but more so because the petition was evidently used as a substitute for a lost remedy of
appeal.[14]We see no need to belabor the grounds for the dismissal of the other cases enumerated by counsel,
said grounds having been stated in the respective minute resolutions which were plain, clear, simply worded
and understandable to everyone, even to those who do not have a formal education in law. Suffice it to say
that the dismissal of those petitions was the result of a thorough deliberation among members of this Court.
Atty. Sorredas imputation of manipulation in the assignment and raffle of cases is utterly baseless and at
best a mere figment of his imagination.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into
disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they
constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyers oath and a
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Ang vs. Castro[15], this Court held that if a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious
statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct
contempt, equivalent as it is to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the administration of justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily.[16]
Atty Sorredas conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically -
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxx
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having no materiality
to the case.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his clients genuine interest
and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, [17] he must do so only within the bounds of the law. [18] A lawyer is entitled to voice his
criticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the
expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and
common sense.[19]
Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to
point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error. But, certainly, this does not give him the
unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court
is duty-bound to act to preserve its honor and dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession.[20]
The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer [21] are
enlightening:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid
excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms,
spells out one such duty: To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain
towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorney's
oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity xxx to the courts. Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,[22] Justice Sanchez further elucidated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.
 Likewise, in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales,[23] we held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that
right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirement of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice. There is no antimony between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, with the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.
As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.[24] No less must this be and with greater reasons in
the case of the countrys highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice,
to which his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor
can it have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a
treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.[25]
Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive criticism to
the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle
to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates.[26]
We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or
private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.[27]
In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al vs. Ponce Enrile, [28] we imposed on the respondent
therein the penalty of suspension from the Bar. Here, as in Tacardon, we find the exclusion of Atty. Sorreda
from the Bar a fitting sanction until he proves himself worthy to enjoy the privileges of membership to the
profession. It is imperative to instill in him sense of discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done outside the brotherhood he
has dishonored and to which he will be allowed to return only after he has purged himself of his misdeeds.[29]
WHEREFORE, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED as a member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging in the
practice of law until otherwise ordered by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator to be distributed to all courts for their
information. This Resolution shall be spread in his personal record and is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
17. MANUEL C. YUHICO, A.C. No. 8391
Complainant, [Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631]
     
- versus -  
  Promulgated:
 ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ,  
 Respondent. November 23, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
 
Before us is a Complaint[1] dated January 10, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Fred
L. Gutierrez (Gutierrez) filed by Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office of the City Prosecutor
in Pasig Cityon May 4, 2005. Yuhico was there to testify at the preliminary investigation of a Complaint for
Estafa against one Jose S. Chicharro, who was then being represented by Gutierrez. He claimed that they
eventually became acquainted as they frequently saw each other during the hearings of the case.
 
On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez phoned him and asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00.
Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his mother who was
seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon,
since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client.
 
On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, this time in the amount of P60,000.00,
allegedly to pay the medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to
Atty. Gutierrez an Equitable PCI Bank check amounting to P60,000.00.[2] Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his
two loans totalling to P90,000.00 within a short time.
 
On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a text
message on July 12, 2005 at 2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:
 
I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to think that I may be taking
advantage of our friendship. You see i've long expected as substantial attorney's fees since last
week from my client Ogami from japan. It's more or less more than 5m and its release is
delayed due to tax and the law on money laundering. From my estimate it wud be collected by
me on or b4 august 5. N the meantime I am quite in a financial difficulty as everyone is.
 
Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from him again. He said Gutierrez
claimed that his daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the licensure examination in the
U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts on or before August 10, 2005. In his
text message on July 12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez said:
 
As you are aware of these past few days were really great trials 4 me. My mother died,
my wife got sick and now my bro in law died. These events led me to struggling finances. To get
 me going I tried to sel my car but my buyer backed out. Now my immediate problem is the amt
of 70thousand which my daughter needs for her payment sa US medical board. I dnt want her to
miss this opportunity. Can u help me again? I will pay all my debts on or b4 Aug.10 pls. Thanks.

However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he demanded
from Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico on July 12,
2005 and requested him to give him another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.
 
Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans from Gutierrez from August to December 2005.
Gutierrez, on the other hand, for numerous times promised to pay, but always failed to do so. At one point,
Gutierrez even asked Yuhico's account number and promised to deposit his payment there, but he never
deposited the payment.
 
On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter[3] to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but to no
avail.
 
Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
 
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the complaint against
him.[4]
 
In his Answer,[5] Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the one who offered to lend him money in gratitude
for the assistance he extended to the latter when he was under threat by his clients. He, however, admitted
that he accepted the loan due to compelling circumstances. Gutierrez added that he has no intention of
evading his obligation to pay his debts, but he is currently in financial distress, thus, he cannot pay his debts
yet. He claimed he will pay his debts when his financial condition improves.
 
On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to appear at the mandatory conference before the IBP-
CBD. Gutierrez failed to attend on two occasions.
 
On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties to submit their respective position papers.
 
Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant's counsel attended.
There was no appearance on the part of Gutierrez.
 
In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,[6]had
already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in view of his failure to pay his
debts and his issuance of worthless checks.
 
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment
of just debts and ordered him to return the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to Yuhico, with
interest until full payment.
 
In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that, instead of
rendering the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew effective upon the expiration of the
sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004 Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not
have jurisprudence on the issue of double or multiple disbarment, the American jurisprudence, however,
recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as the minimum requirement of five (5) years for
readmission to the Bar.
 
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to adopt the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with modification as to the payment of the amount
of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00), this time, without interest.
 
We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to its recommendations.
 
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice
and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and
to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[7]
 
In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and his
failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of
debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are beyond his financial
capacity to pay.
 
Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and misrepresentations for the
purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of
habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he
sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without actually making good of
his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the
responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
 
We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, [8] the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice
of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks.
 
In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its
recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already been
previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our
laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for readmission,
as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar him
anew.
 
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found FRED L.
GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He is ORDERED to PAYthe amount of Ninety
Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to the complainant immediately from receipt of this decision with interest.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly recorded in the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record of Gutierrez; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the
Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
 
SO ORDERED.
18. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC., A.C. No. 8380
Complainant,
Present:
- versus - 
ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H. MIJARES III,

Respondent. Promulgated:

November 20, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

 DECISION

 PER CURIAM:

 This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted to him by his client.

The Facts and the Case

The facts are taken from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Sometime in January 2004, complainant Arellano University, Inc. (the University) engaged the services of
respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, for securing a certificate of title covering a dried up
portion of the Estero de San Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was the subject of a
Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the University.
In its complaint for disbarment against Mijares, the University alleged that it gave him all the documents he
needed to accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was given P500,000.00 on top of
his attorneys fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for facilitation and processing. He in turn promised to
give the money back in case he was unable to get the work done.

 On July 5, 2004 Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the titling of the
property, meaning that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to approve
it and that the documents had already been sent to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The University requested Mijares for copies of the MMDA approval but he unjustifiably failed to
comply despite his clients repeated demands. Then he made himself scarce, prompting the University to
withdraw all the cases it had entrusted to him and demand the return of the P500,000.00 it gave him.

 On November 23, 2005 the University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally terminating his services in
the titling matter and demanding the return of the P500,000.00. But the letter could not be served because he
changed office address without telling the University. Eventually, the University found his new address and
served him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did not return the money asked
of him.

 In his answer to the complaint, Mijares alleged that he and the University agreed on a number of courses of
action relating to the project assigned to him: first, get the Universitys application for a survey plan which the
DENR-NCR approved for a facilitation cost of P500,000.00; second, get a favorable MMDA endorsement for a
facilitation cost of another P500,000.00; and, third, the titling of the property by the Land Registration
Authority for a facilitation cost of still another P500,000.00.

 Mijares also alleged that the DENR-NCR Assistant Regional Director told him that he needed to get a favorable
endorsement from MMDA and that the person to talk to about it was Undersecretary Cesar Lacuna. Mijares
later met the latter through a common friend. At their meeting, Mijares and Lacuna allegedly agreed on what
the latter would get for recommending approval of the application. Later, Mijares said, he gave
the P500,000.00 to Lacuna through their common friend on Lacunas instruction.

 Mijares next alleged that, after he received the money, Lacuna told him that the University filed an identical
application earlier on March 15, 2002. Mijares claimed that the University deliberately withheld this fact from
him. Lacuna said that, because of the denial of that prior application, he would have difficulty recommending
approval of the present application. It appeared that Lacuna endorsed the previous application to the Mayor
of Manila on July 23, 2003 but the latter did not act on it.

 Mijares finally alleged that he and Lacuna wanted to bypass the Mayor of Manila in the paper work but they
were unable to arrive at a concrete plan. Mijares claimed that the University gave him only P45,000.00 as his
fees and that it was with the Universitys conformity that he gave the P500,000.00 to Lacuna.

 The IBP designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the
complaint. Despite numerous settings, however, Mijares failed to appear before the Commissioner and
adduce evidence in his defense.
 On October 17, 2008 Commissioner Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation[1] in the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Phillippines Board of Governors. The Report said that the University did not authorize
Mijares to give P500,000.00 to the then MMDA Deputy Chairman Cesar Lacuna; that Mijares had been unable
to account for and return that money despite repeated demands; and that he admitted under oath having
bribed a government official.

 Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15,
Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and meted out the penalty of disbarment; b) that he be ordered to return the P500,000.00 and
all the pertinent documents to the University; and c) that Mijares sworn statement that formed part of his
Answer be endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation and, if warranted, for prosecution with
respect to his shady dealing with Deputy Chairman Lacuna.

On December 11, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XVIII-2008-631, adopting and approving
the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but modifying the penalty from disbarment to indefinite
suspension from the practice of law and ordering Mijares to return the P500,000.00 and all pertinent
documents to the University within six months from receipt of the Courts decision.[2] 

The Question Presented

 The only question presented in this case is whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty of misappropriating
the P500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing the titling
of a property that it claimed. 

The Courts Ruling

 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for
the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to
do so.[3] 

Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he must
promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of
said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and make sure that they are used
for their intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property immediately to his client upon
demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have misappropriated the same in violation of the trust
reposed on him.[4] A lawyers conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics.[5] 

Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence on record that
the Court can consider is the Universitys evidence that he got P500,000.00 from complainant for expenses in
facilitating and processing its title application; that he undertook to return the money if he did not succeed in
his purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained the MMDA approval of the application; and that he
nonetheless refused to return the money despite repeated demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the
finding of guilt of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. 

Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid out in his answer, the same
does not rouse sympathy. He claims that he gave the P500,000.00 to Undersecretary Lacuna, with the
Universitys conformity, for a favorable MMDA endorsement to the Mayor of Manila. He also claims that, in a
complete turnaround, Lacuna later said that he could not provide the endorsement because, as it turned out,
the MMDA had previously given such endorsement of the Universitys earlier application and the Mayor of
Manila did not act on that endorsement.

But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the University and make it see that it
had no cause for complaint, having given him clearance to pass on the P500,000.00 to Lacuna. Instead, Mijares
kept silent. He did not deny that the University went all over town looking for him after he could not return
the money. Nor did he take any action to compel Lacuna to hand back the money that the University gave
him. More, his not showing up to testify on his behalf at the investigation of the case is a dead giveaway of the
lack of merit of his defense. No evidence exists to temper the doom that he faces. 

Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed a government official to act
favorably on his clients application to acquire title to a dried-up creek. That is quite dishonest. The Court is
not, therefore, inclined to let him off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another way of saying
he can resume his practice after a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to shape up. 

The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBPs recommendation that the Court include in its decision
an order directing Mijares to return the P500,000.00 that the University entrusted to him. The University
knowingly gave him that money to spend for facilitation and processing. It is not nave. There is no legitimate
expense called facilitation fee. This term is a deodorized word for bribe money. The Court will not permit the
conversion of a disbarment proceeding into a remedy for recovering bribe money lost in a bad deal. 

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, GUILTY of violation of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. He is, in addition,
directed to return to complainant Arellano University, Inc. all the documents in his possession covering the
titling matter that it referred to him. 

Let the sworn statement of respondent Mijares, forming his Answer, be forwarded to the Office of the
Ombudsman for whatever action it deems proper under the circumstances.

 SO ORDERED.

19. A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016

ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS, Respondent.
 DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a verified complaint1 filed on November 4, 2011 by Arnold Pacao (complainant), seeking
the disbarment of Atty. Sinamar Limos (Atty. Limos) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

The Facts

Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF)
branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by BHF. At the preliminary investigation, Atty.
Limos appeared as counsel for BHF. Thereafter, the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible settlement. A
meeting was then arranged between the complainant and Atty. Limos, where the latter represented that she
was duly authorized by BHF. After a series of negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum
of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments. Further negotiation led to an agreement whereby the
complainant would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then deliver
to the complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise agreement, and a joint motion to approve
compromise agreement for filing with the court.3

On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn,
signed an Acknowledgment Receipt4 recognizing her undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos
failed to meet the terms of their agreement. Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought to get from
the complainant the next installment amount of their purported agreement, but the latter refused.5

Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative, Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that
Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any
money in behalf of BHF. The complainant also learned that BHF did not receive the P200,000.00 initial
payment that he gave to Atty. Limos.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter7 to Atty. Limos to return the P200,000.00 initial
settlement payment, but the latter failed and refused to do so.8

The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she did not
file any responsive pleading.9 A mandatory conference was then set on March 1 and 29, 2012, and April 19,
2012, but Atty. Limos failed to attend. Thereafter, the IBP-CBD ordered the parties to submit their position
paper, but once again, Atty. Limos did not bother to submit her position paper.

On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Limos.10 The
Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud and
practiced deceit on the complainant to the latter's prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the material
fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor
was authorized to receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant. Atty. Limos was likewise ordered to return
to the complainant the full amount of P200,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from
the date of her receipt of the said amount to the date of her return of the full amount.11

In a Resolution12 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner's report and recommendation.

On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records to the Court for final
action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.13 As per verification of the Court, neither party has filed a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for review thereafter.

The Issue

Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Limos from the
practice of law?14

Ruling of the Court

To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case,
for she had already been twice suspended from the practice of law, by this Court, for three months each
in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos15 and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos.16 In Villaflores, Atty. Limos received attorney's fees of
P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to perform her undertaking with her
client; thus she was found guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. Likewise, in Wilkie, Atty. Limos
was held administratively liable for her deceitful and dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan of
P250,000.00 from her client and issued two postdated checks in the latter's favor to pay the said loan despite
knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover the same. In both cases, the Court, gave Atty. Limos a warning
that repetition of the same or similar acts by her will merit a more severe penalty.

Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this Court for receiving the
amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible amicable settlement with her client
BHF. However, Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorize to negotiate and conclude a
settlement for and on behalf of BHF nor was she authorized to receive any money in behalf of BHF. Her
blunder is compounded by the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF, nor did she return the same
to the complainant, despite due demand. Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment knowing
fully well that she was not authorized to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her
engagement as counsel of BHF had already ceased.

The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense. The foregoing factual antecedents
demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit and misrepresentation. It is not too farfetched for this Court to
conclude that from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to get
hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar.

Atty. Limos' case is further highlighted by her lack of regard for the charges brought against her. Similar
with Wilkie, despite due notice, Atty. Limos did not bother to answer the complaint against her. She also failed
to file her mandatory conference brief and her verified position paper. Worse, Atty. Limos did not even enter
appearance either personally or by counsel, and she failed to appear at the scheduled date of the mandatory
conferences which she was duly notified.17

By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for that matter, to justify her actions, Atty.
Limos failed to demonstrate that she still possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the
Bar. Her seeming indifference to the complaint brought against her was made obvious by her unreasonable
absence from the proceedings before the IBP. Her disobedience to the IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant
disrespect for the authority of the Court.
Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is
she unfit to stay in the legal profession for her deceitful conduct but is also remiss in following the dictates of
the Court, which has supervision over her. Atty. Limos' unwarranted obstinacy is a great insolence to the Court
which cannot be tolerated.

The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27,18 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has
become a repeat offender. Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos'
prior misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession, the imposition of the ultimate penalty of
disbarment is warranted.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is aware that the power to disbar is one to
be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.19 However, Atty. Limos'
recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court's warning, which is deemed to be an affront to
the Court's authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her
repeated desecration of her ethical commitments proved herself to be unfit to remain in the legal profession.
Worse, she remains apathetic to the need to reform herself.

"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions."20 "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic."21

Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case definitely
establish her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to
continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of Atty. Sinamar Limos. Further, let other copies be served
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

20. A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015 ]

 NELSON P. VALDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Nelson P. Valdez (Nelson) against Atty. Antolin
Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. (Atty. Dabon) anchored on the ground of grossly immoral and indecent conduct which
transgressed the high moral standards required for membership in the Bar.

The Position of the Complainant

Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals (CA),
with gross immorality for allegedly carrying on an adulterous relationship with his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez
(Sonia), which was made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation.

In his Affidavit-Complaint,[1] dated September 13, 2006, Nelson averred, among others, that he married Sonia
on January 28, 1998 in Paniqui, Tarlac; that Sonia was employed as Court Stenographer of the CA from 1992
until her resignation on May 15, 2006;[2] that Sonia admitted to have had an adulterous and immoral
relationship with Atty. Dabon, from 2000 to 2006, a span of more than five years; that he came to know of the
relationship only on April 18, 2006 after receiving an anonymous text message hinting/stating about the
existence of an illicit affair between the two; and that initially, Sonia denied the affair but eventually broke
down and admitted her sexual liaison with Atty. Dabon when confronted with a text message he received from
Atty. Jocelyn Dabon (Atty. Joy), the wife of the respondent, on May 4, 2006 at about 9:47 o'clock in the
morning, which stated:

Nelson, Jun and I were separating I will file an annulment anytime soon, although I'm in great pain, I ask for
your apology and forgiveness for everything he is leaving for US and I hope he evolves into a strong and
mature person there. D cya masamang tao, just emotional and easily manipulated. Sana don't blame him
entirely bee. he is d type that never initiate things. He is passive and tame. He was honest with me and I hope
Sonia would find d courage to tell d truth to you. I just pray for peace and fresh start for all of us. I just want to
go on with my life and use above all these for my son's sake. I love jun and I appeal to you n asana wala ka
maisip sa atin lahat. Just as I have accepted everything. Salamat sa panahon at pangunawa. God bless.[3]

Nelson also asserted that Sonia confessed her infidelity and described her extramarital affair with Atty. Dabon
to have been attended by sexual assaults and maintained through intimidation and threats of exposure,
humiliation and embarrassment.

In her own Affidavit,[4] dated September 13, 2006 and attached to the complaint, Sonia narrated that her illicit
relationship with Atty. Dabon started sometime in November 2000 and ended in March 2006 when she,
bothered by her conscience, decided to break it off; that Atty. Dabon relentlessly pursued her for years and
even admitted that he fell in love with her the first time he laid eyes on her; that on November 13, 2000, Atty.
Dabon lured her to what appeared to be a mere friendly lunch date, managed to put sleep-inducing drug into
her food or drink causing her to feel drowsy and weak and, thereafter, brought her to Victoria Court Motel
where he sexually molested her while she was asleep; that she opted to keep silent about the incident for fear
of its adverse repercussions of shame and embarrassment to her and her family; that she pleaded with Atty.
Dabon to leave her and forget what had happened, but the respondent instead taunted her by laughing at her
misery; that since then, Atty. Dabon succeeded in having repeated carnal knowledge of her once or twice a
week through intimidation and threats; that Atty. Dabon threatened her that he would tell everyone that she
had been playing around with him, if she would not yield to his lascivious cravings; and that she suffered in
silence for years and submitted herself to the bestial desires of Atty. Dabon, until she even thought that she
was in love with him.

Sonia further claimed that after years of living in deception and infidelity, she decided to call it quits with Atty.
Dabon sometime in March 2006 but he could not let go of their relationship; that Atty. Dabon started
pestering and threatening her through phone calls and handwritten messages in vile attempts to persuade her
to continue their illicit affair; that despite their break-up, Atty. Dabon still pursued his lustful quest by bringing
her to Anito Motel, along Quirino Avenue on March 10, 2006, but she foiled his plan when she went ballistic
prompting the respondent to drive her back to the CA; that on March 13, 2006, Atty. Dabon forcibly boarded
her car and pleaded for forgiveness and reconciliation but she remained firm in her resolve to end the affair;
that she had to seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty. Heiddi Venecia Barrozo (Atty. Barrozo) and Atty.
Aileen T. Ligot (Atty. Ligot), just to convince Atty. Dabon to alight from her car as the said incident had already
drawn the attention of several employees within the vicinity of the CA parking lot; that Atty. Dabon used the
members of his staff to relay his messages and deliver his handwritten letters to her; that Atty. Dabon,
angered by her repeated rejection, went berserk and sent her a letter which stated, among others, that he
could no longer stand her constant avoidance of him and that he would divulge their illicit relationship to her
husband; that it numbed her with fright, so she called Atty. Joy, without disclosing her identity, and told her
that Atty. Dabon was harassing an employee at the CA; that Atty. Dabon sent a text message to Nelson telling
him of the extramarital affair; that Atty. Joy called up Nelson and informed him that her husband, Atty. Dabon,
had confessed to her the illicit relationship; and that when she was asked by Nelson, she initially denied the
affair for fear of reprisal but, afterwards, admitted the truth and explained to him that she was merely a victim
of Atty. Dabon's threat and intimidation which led to their illicit relationship.

Nelson further stated that Atty. Dabon's willful, flagrant and shameless conduct was in gross defiance of the
customs, values and sense of morality of the community. He prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Dabon whose
immoral acts showed his lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor and, hence, unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court. Nelson alleged that he had previously filed an administrative complaint
for "Gross Immorality" against Atty. Dabon before the CA.

Together with Sonia's Affidavit, Nelson also attached to his Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment, the Joint
Affidavit[5] executed by Atty. Barrozo and Atty. Ligot on May 19, 2006; the Affidavit[6] of Virginia D. Ramos
(Ramos), dated May 19, 2006; and the Affidavit[7] of Marie Iris Magdalene Minerva (Minerva), dated May 22,
2006, wherein the said affiants corroborated the declaration of Sonia in her affidavit.

The Position of Atty. Dabon

Respondent Atty. Dabon strongly refuted the accusation against him claiming that the same was baseless and
unfounded and that the complaint for disbarment was merely calculated to harass, annoy and besmirch his
reputation.

In his Comment,[8] Atty. Dabon denied the charges of grossly immoral and unlawful acts through sexual
assaults, abuses, threats and intimidation. He posited that the allegations of spouses Nelson and Sonia in their
respective affidavits were nothing but pure fabrication solely intended to malign his name and honor. In
support of his prayer for the dismissal of the present disbarment case, Atty. Dabon proffered the following
arguments:

First, complainant Nelson had no personal knowledge of the alleged illicit relationship between him and Sonia.
He relied heavily on the sworn statement of Sonia which was replete with inconsistencies and incredible and
preposterous claims which defied logic and common sense, thus, revealing the fallacy of the subject
complaint. He contended that it was highly improbable for him, a married lawyer at that, to suddenly turn
crazy and abandon all cares just to satisfy his purported lustful hungerness by sexually assaulting Sonia, "an
ordinary plain-looking 43-year old woman with two (2) teen aged children."[9]

Second, nowhere in the administrative complaint of Nelson previously filed before the CA was there any
mention of any sexual assault he allegedly committed against Sonia or of an adulterous relationship that was
maintained through threats and intimidation. Surprisingly, such allegations were included in the present
complaint for disbarment. He also pointed out that Nelson did not attach to his administrative complaint
before the CA the September 13, 2006 Affidavit of Sonia containing grave imputations against him. Such
omissions were indicative that the serious charges against him were mere concoctions and afterthoughts
designed to attain Nelson's desire to come up with a graver accusation against him. The filing of the complaint
for disbarment was motivated by vengeance against him as Nelson was consummed by his suspicion that he
had seduced Sonia which led to the deterioration of their marriage. He was a victim caught in the crossfire
between the troubled couple, Nelson and Sonia.

Third, there was no truth to Sonia's allegation that he was attracted to her from the first time he saw her much
less pursued her relentlessly. He and Sonia were just close friends. He was Sonia's confidante. She would
usually confide in him her personal woes and problems especially those concerning her husband, Nelson. It
was Sonia who aggressively sought his companionship and frequented his office, bringing food, fruits and
other goodies. The said visits were attested to by Mary Jane Tulalian and Imelda Adan in their respective
affidavits,[10] both dated April 30, 2008. His friendship with Sonia turned sour when she learned of his plan to
settle for good in the Unites States with his family. Sonia began to avoid him. He exerted efforts to make her
understand his decision, but to no avail.

Fourth, the cards expressing Sonia's affection towards him as well as the expensive gifts she gave him belied
her claim that she was sexually assaulted and that she resisted his alleged sexual advances.

Fifth, it was unlikely that Sonia would not tell anyone the grave injustice and abuses that she allegedly suffered
in his hands or report the matter to the police considering her length of service in the Judiciary and her
familiarity on how the criminal justice system worked.

Sixth, he denied Nelson's allegation that he confessed to his wife, Atty. Joy, his illicit relationship with Sonia.
He also denied that the alleged text messages, quoted by Nelson and Sonia in their respective affidavits, were
sent by him or his wife. All were part of an elaborate scheme to force him to immediately resign as Division
Clerk of Court from the CA.

Lastly, it was not true that he harassed Sonia through text messages and phone calls. It was he who was the
victim of harassment from Nelson, who orchestrated a series of events that compelled him to leave the
country earlier than scheduled for fear that an untoward incident might happen to him.

On August 15, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[11]

After the parties had submitted their respective verified position papers, Investigating Commissioner Manuel
T. Chan (Investigating Commissioner Chan) of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) rendered his
Report and Recommendation,[12] dated October 2, 2008, finding that the charge against respondent Atty.
Dabon had been sufficiently proven. The recommendatory portion of the report reads:
WHEREFORE, this Commissioner, after a thorough and exhaustive review of the facts and applicable legal
provisions, recommends that respondent be found guilty of gross immoral conduct and, accordingly, be
disbarred and dropped from the Roll of Attorneys.[13]

On December 11, 2008, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the recommendation and
issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-653, the pertinent portion of which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct, Atty. Antolin Allyson M.
Dabon, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED and his name be stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.[14]

Atty. Dabon filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-653, but it was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XX-2012-550,[15]dated December 14, 2012.

After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership
in the legal profession.This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity,[16] and the legal profession exacts from its members nothing
less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.[17]

The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit[18] that "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be
of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself
as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards."
Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show
deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.[19]

In the case at bench, the Court subscribes to the IBP's opinion that there was substantial evidence showing
that Atty. Dabon did have an illicit relationship with Nelson's legal wife.

To begin with, the Court notes from the respondent's Comment that he appeared to be perplexed as to
whether or not he would admit his extramarital liaisons with Sonia. As Investigating Commissioner Chan
stated in his report, Atty. Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at the same
time, he seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by sexual assaults,
threats and intimidations. The Court also observed that he devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that
the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat or intimidation was
exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not once did he squarely deny the affair itself.
In other words, the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some
kind favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted.[20] It is clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his
denial only pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof, he
is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.

More telling of the existence of a romantic relationship are the notes and cards[21] that Sonia sent to Atty.
Dabon containing personal and intimate messages in her own handwriting. The messages conveyed Sonia's
affection towards him as she even referred to him as "hon" or "honey." There were also gifts she gave him on
special occasions such as signature shoes, watch and shirts. It also appeared that Sonia frequently visited him
in his office either to bring him food, fruits and other goodies or to invite him to lunch which apparently
displayed her emotional attachment to him. Curiously, the foregoing was never refuted by Sonia. Such "ego-
boosting admissions"[22] of Atty. Dabon indeed proved that a consensual relationship between him and Sonia
existed.

It has not escaped the Court's attention either that Atty. Dabon really tried hard to win back Sonia because he
could not let go of their relationship, even to the point of pestering her with his persistent pleas for
reconciliation. In one instance, Atty. Dabon boarded Sonia's car and refused to alight unless she would talk to
him. Sonia had to seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty. Barrazo and Atty. Ligot, who pleaded with him
to alight from the vehicle. Moreover, Atty. Dabon made several attempts to communicate with Sonia in the
hope of rekindling their relationship through letters and phone calls but she remained firm in her stand to
avoid him. Such incident was recounted by Ramos and Minerva in their respective affidavits.

Incidentally, vis-a-vis Nelson's overwhelming evidence of said harassments, he offered only denials which was
self-serving and weak under the law on evidence. Other than his general claim that Atty. Barrazo, Atty. Ligot,
Ramos, and Minerva were biased witnessess because they were former officemates of Sonia, the respondent
did not even bother to proffer his own version of the supposed harassment incidents.

In light of the above disquisition, the Court finds Sonia's allegation that the illicit relationship was made
possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidations, to be untrue. Certainly, a
sexually abused woman could not be expected to lavish her oppressor with expensive gifts or pay him
affectionate compliments or words of endearment. The natural reaction of a victim of a sexual molestation
would be to avoid her ravisher. In this case, however, it appeared that Sonia continually remained in the
company of Atty. Dabon for more than five years, even inviting him for lunch-outs and frequenting his office to
bring food whenever the latter was preoccupied with his workload and could not go out with her to eat. Verily,
Sonia's actuations towards Atty. Dabon are in stark contrast to the expected demeanor of one who had been
repeatedly sexually abused.

Further, the Court cannot fathom why Sonia never reported the alleged sexual abuse to the police, if such was
the truth. She could have placed the respondent behind bars and put an end to her claimed misery. Also, the
Court cannot lend credence to Sonia's claim that she merely succumbed to the respondent's sexual advances
because of his continuous threats of public exposure and humiliation. It must be stressed that Atty. Dabon
would be in a much more precarious situation if he would carry out such threats, as this would exposed
himself to countless criminal and administrative charges. The Court believes that Nelson's allegation of sexual
assaults and continuing threat and intimidation was not established by clear preponderant evidence. The
Court is left with the most logical conclusion that Sonia freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral
relationship with Atty. Dabon sans any threat and intimidation.

Consequently, the Court quotes with approval the following observations of Investigating Commissioner Chan
on this score, thus:

Sorting out the maze of technicalities, denials and evasions of the respondent as well as the oftentimes
exaggerated language of complainant or his wife, Sonia, and the self-exculpatory declarations of Sonia, this
Commissioner considers the following facts as established:

1. Respondent and Sonia are both married, not to each other, but to other persons, and each is aware of
this fact, or should have known such fact at the start of their illicit relationship because they were
officemates at that time;

2. Respondent and Sonia engaged in an intimate and sexual relationship, intermittent perhaps, for a
period of about six years starting 2000 up to 2006;

3. Respondent and Sonia, despite protestations of Sonia that respondent assaulted her using drugs and
employing threats and blackmail to maintain the relationship, appeared to have entered into such illicit
relationship voluntarily and also appeared to have been fueled by their deep emotional needs, if not
mutual lust, as shown by the fact that the illicit relationship lasted for six long years;

4. Respondent and Sonia, despite the protestation of Sonia to the contrary, were not really ready to give
up the illicit relationship even if they were fully aware of its immorality or its devastating effect on their
respective marriages and careers as shown by the fact that both respondent and Sonia did not
voluntarily confess to their respective spouses their dark secret, but were only discovered by
complainant through other channels.[23]

For what ethical breaches then may Atty. Dabon be held liable?

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Morality in our liberal society today is probably a far cry from what it used to be. Notwithstanding this
permissiveness, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility
and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.[24] Indeed, those who have taken the oath
to assist in the dispensation of justice should be more possessed of the consciousness and the will to
overcome the weakness of the flesh.
It has been repeatedly held that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.[25] A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act,
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. It is willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[26]

In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife showed his moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. It manifested his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his
utmost moral depravity and low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, he has fallen
below the moral bar. Such detestable behavior warrants a disciplinary sanction. Even if not all forms of
extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside of marriage are considered
disgraceful and immoral as they manifest deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[27]

In Advincula v. Macabata,[28] the Court elucidated as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a
lawyer found guilty of misconduct. Thus:

Xxx. "When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of
disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the
integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. Disciplinary proceedings are
means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to
be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While it is
discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer,
it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever
be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to
exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the
profession and to the public.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct
which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those
acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction
unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the
practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer
to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered.

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment, depending on the
circumstances of the case.[29] In case of suspension, the period would range from one year[30] to indefinite
suspension, as in the case of Cordova v. Cordova,[31] where the lawyer was found to have maintained an
adulterous relationship for two years and refused to support his family. On the other hand, there is a string of
cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment, to wit:

In Toledo v. Toledo,[32] a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,[33] a lawyer was disbarred after the complainant proved that he had abandoned her
and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. The Court declared that the respondent
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[34] the respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and
three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he
could contract marriage in a foreign land.

In Dantes v. Dantes,[35] disbarment was imposed as a penalty on the respondent lawyer who maintained illicit
relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant. The
Complainant's testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that
the respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.

In Villatuya v. Tabalingcos,[36] the respondent lawyer was disbarred because he was found to have entered into
marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. The Court declared that he exhibited a deplorable
lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.

In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's misconduct and unrepentant demeanor clearly showed a serious flaw in his
character, his moral indifference to the sanctity of marriage and marital vows, and his outright defiance of
established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril. Accordingly, the Court finds the need for the imposition of the extreme
administrative penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. GUILTYof Gross Immorality, the Court
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law.

Let respondent's name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all court throughout the country with copies of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
21. A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E.
BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the
Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen
E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s when
they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation.
Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty.
Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married
the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a
Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he
only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of
her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve
his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed.
Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid
and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America
(USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef
Frederic.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that
was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws.
When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their
union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He
also promised to legally adopt their son.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition
to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to
the said petition.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty.
Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter10 written
and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his
love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into
their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is
able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the
nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium
in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective comments,
which they separately did on November 25, 2002.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital
obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children,
their relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of
property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for
whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a
Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by
the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was
granted on June 23, 1984.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by the
Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the
marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus,
Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to
Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of
losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their
relationship.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez
started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999;
and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise
pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig
began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic
overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too
old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason
why she resigned from his law firm.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order24 setting the mandatory
conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the
conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position
papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on
October 17, 200325 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24,
2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage
to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of
disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established
a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only
corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal conduct,
must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital
adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head
up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of
emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding
knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an
otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the
community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of
the alleged affair between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations.
He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be
supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as
may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the
status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent with
both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for
reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the
Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.cralawred
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in
that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character.
Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his
all.”34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended
from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis ours)
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.”35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of
disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which
was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths
crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his
first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal
partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez
in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved
heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that
time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous
marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense
of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering
that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to
marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the
subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a
façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled
that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in
order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time
that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then
already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be
considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards
immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his
previous marriage to Gomez.

“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’”37 In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment
is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman
who has borne him a child.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage,
taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only
in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish
the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the
offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are uncorroborated
and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant
consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984
while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for
the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the
claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez
to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed
having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance
of evidence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed
received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the
veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig
wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a
relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the

recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A.
Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision
shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all
appellate and trial courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
22. A.C. No. 5686               June 16, 2015
TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a letter-complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by
Teodulo2Enriquez against Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. for gross negligence and inefficiency in the
performance of his duties as a lawyer.
On January 7, 1997, Mr. Ernesto Ouano, Sr. filed a complaint3 for forcible entry against complainant Teodulo
Enriquez before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Talibon, Bohol. To defend his interests, Enriquez
engaged4 the services of the law office of Attys. Joselito M. Alo, R. L. C. Agapay, and Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr.
with Atty. Lavadia as the assigned attorney.5
On March 18, 2000, in open court, Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit their position papers and affidavits within 30
days from the receipt of the pre-trial order after which, the case would be submitted for decision. However,
Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the defendants being declared in default. The MCTC
rendered a decision6in favor of the plaintiffs.7 Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal8 with sufficient bond.
In its April 26, 2001 Order,9 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol dismissed the appeal based on
Section 7(b),10 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The RTC stated that Atty. Lavadia failed to file the appeal
memorandum after more than 71 days. Atty. Lavadia moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by
the RTC in its June 26, 2001 Order11 pointing out that it had granted four motions for extension and still no
appeal memorandum was filed.
On January 16, 2002, this disbarment complaint was received by the OBC. Enriquez alleged that in failing to
file the necessary pleadings before the court, Atty. Lavadia caused them great damage and prejudice. This
constituted gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance of his professional duties as a
lawyer.12 Enriquez thus prayed that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred. On July 3, 2002, this Court required Atty.
Lavadia to submit his comment.13
On August 29, 2002, the Court received an ex parte manifestation from Atty. Lavadia stating that he cannot file
a comment because he did not receive a copy of the complaint.14 The Court, thus, required Enriquez to furnish
Atty. Lavadia a copy of the complaint within 10 days and required the latter to file his comment within 10 days
from receipt thereof.15
On December 10, 2002, Enriquez informed16 the Court that he sent a copy of the complaint and its annexes to
Atty. Lavadia on December 6, 2002 as evinced by a receipt.17
Atty. Lavadia filed two motions for extension18 citing his heavy case load and family problems as reasons in
both instances for not filing the comment. Said motions were granted by the Court giving Atty. Lavadia
another 60 days within which to file his comment.19
On February 18, 2003, Atty. Lavadia again filed a motion to extend to file his comment due to his wife’s
continued illness.20 The Court granted another 30-day period, stating that it would be the last extension it
would grant.21
Failing to submit his comment within the period granted, this Court required Atty. Lavadia to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt and to submit his comment within 10 days from notice.22 Still, Atty. Lavadia
failed to comply. The Court thus imposed on him a ₱1,000.00 fine or imprisonment of five days if he failed to
pay the fine and ordered him to comply with its previous resolutions.23
Atty. Lavadia paid the fine on June 2, 2005,24 and asked for additional time to file his comment this time stating
that he had moved from Tagbilaran to Cebu because of his wife’s illness which was caused by "dark-beings."
He claimed that a series of unfortunate events plagued them, i.e., their house was razed by a fire, the hard
drive of his computer crashing, and his family members falling ill due to a "dark being."25 The Court thus
granted a 30-day extension.26
Failing once again to file his comment, the Court in its September 19, 2007 Resolution imposed a fine of
₱2,000.00 and required Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment within five days from notice.27 There is no record
to show that he complied with the September 19, 2007 Resolution.
In its August 18, 2010 Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.28
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) scheduled a mandatory conference29 on January 14, 2011 but
both parties failed to appear.30 Parties were then ordered to submit their position papers within ten days from
receipt of the Order.
On April 20, 2011, Atty. Lavadia requested that he be furnished a copy of the complaint having lost his copy in
a fire that razed his home.31 The IBP CBD resolved to furnish Atty. Lavadia a copy of the complaint. It also
directed the parties to file their position papers within 15 days from August 1, 2011.32
In its Report and Recommendation,33 the IBP CBD recommended that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred and his name
be withdrawn from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP CBD found that not only did Atty. Lavadia cause material
prejudice to his clients by neglecting his duties as counsel in failing to file the necessary pleadings to defend
his client’s interest, he also displayed a willful, defiant and cavalier attitude by repeatedly defying the
resolutions of the Court. By his actions the IBP CBD considered Atty. Lavadia unfit to dispense his duties and
responsibilities as an attorney.
On September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to adopt the report and recommendation
of the IBP CBD.34
Atty. Lavadia moved for reconsideration35 but it was denied.36
After careful review and deliberation, we agree with the report of the IBP that Atty. Lavadia is administratively
liable.
We cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties and obligations.37 Lawyers
bear the responsibility to meet the profession’s exacting standards.38 A lawyer is expected to live by the
lawyer’s oath, the rules of the profession and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The duties of a
lawyer may be classified into four general categories namely duties he owes to the court, to the public, to the
bar and to his client.39 A lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable and subject to the
Court’s disciplinary authority.40
In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall under those duties to his client and to the
court. This Court notes Atty. Lavadia’s propensity for filing motions for extension of time to file pleadings but
failing to file the same, in violation of Rule 12.03 of the CPR which states:
Rule 12.03. – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. (Emphasis
supplied)
In fact, such proclivity on the part of Atty. Lavadia to file such motions precisely led to the filing of this
complaint. In the course of this administrative proceeding, he continued to flaunt to this Court his willful
defiance and disregard for court orders.
LAWYER AND CLIENT: RULE 12.03 AND CANON 18 AND RULE 18.03
A lawyer is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence.41 Lawyers are reminded to note Rules
12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR:
Rule 18.03. – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there
with shall render him liable.
In Solidon v. Macalalad,42 we stated that receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services and failing to
render the services is a violation of Canon 18 of the CPR. In that case, we also stated that a lawyer’s failure to
file the position paper is a per se violation of Rule 18.03 of the CPR.43 We pointed to the fiduciary nature of a
lawyer’s duty to his client. We stated:
x x x A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with
utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert his
best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client. Accordingly, competence,
not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate
attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer.44 (Citations omitted)
In Mariveles v. Mallari,45 we disbarred Atty. Mallari for violating Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR. There, Atty.
Mallari, after being granted a total of 245 days to file his client’s appellant’s brief failed to file the same,
resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. The Court considered Atty. Mallari’s act a shameless disregard of his
duties as a lawyer and found him to be unfit for membership in the noble profession.46 In the recent case of
Figueras v. Jimenez,47 Atty. Jimenez was found administratively liable for failing to file the appellant’s brief on
behalf of his client.
Here, Enriquez paid a total of ₱29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees relating to the preparation of
pleadings for the case including the appeal.1âwphi1 Atty. Lavadia however failed to discharge his duties. He
failed to file his client’s position paper rendering his client in default. While he filed a notice of appeal and
several motions for extension of time to file the appeal memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower
court, he ultimately neglected to file the appeal memorandum. Thus, following our pronouncement in Solidon,
Atty. Lavadia has clearly transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making him
administratively liable. As in Mariveles, Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions of time to file the
appeal memorandum after he filed the notice of appeal with sufficient bond. The lower court granted him four
extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to file the appeal memorandum. His failure
adversely affected the cause of Enriquez, his client. In repeatedly asking for extensions of time without
actually filing the appeal memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is liable under Rule 12.03 of the CPR.
LAWYER AND THE COURTS: RULE 12.03 IN RELATION TO CANON 11
Under Canon 1148 of the CPR a lawyer is required to observe and maintain due respect to the court and its
judicial officers. We read this provision in relation to Rules 10.0349 and 12.03 of the CPR for this rule does not
merely affect the client but the judicial process.
In Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto,50 this Court reiterated its previous ruling in Sebastian v. Bajar51 where we stated
that:
x x x Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively". Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant
flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof." Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s
deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes. (Citations
omitted).
The present complaint was filed January 2002. We granted Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment
to the complaint. We issued no less than eight resolutions ordering Atty. Lavadia to comment: two of which
ordered him to pay fines of ₱1,000.00 and ₱2,000.00 and requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and
to comply with the Court’s resolutions. In fine, we have granted him a total of 155 days extension to file his
comment, in response to his repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex parte motions. After a lapse of eight
years, this Court referred the case to the IBP where Atty. Lavadia once again filed a motion for extension to file
his position paper but nevertheless failed to file the same.
While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we cannot countenance his act of
repeatedly pleading for extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the Court. This reflects his
willful disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to discharge his duties and functions as a
lawyer. As we stated in Vaflor-Fabroa52 the Court’s Resolution is not a mere request. A lawyer’s blatant
disregard or refusal to comply with the Court’s orders underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof. Here, this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we gave
Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted him, he continued to
fail to do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court’s orders merits disciplinary action.
We said in Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez53 that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or
merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. This Court has imposed the
penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment for a lawyer’s
failure to file a brief or other pleading.
In the present case, we note that this is Atty. Lavadia’s first infraction. However, given his proven propensity
for filing motions for extension of time and not filing the required pleading, this Court finds that it should
impose the severe sanction lest some other unknowing clien'ts engage his services only to lose their case due
to Atty. Lavadia's nonchalant attitude. Considering the gravity of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier actions both to his
client and his impertinent attitude towards the Court, we find the penalty of DISBARMENT as recommended
by the IBP appropriate. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED for
violating Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN.OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as a member of the Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court
Administrator, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
23. A.C. No. 10207               July 21, 2015
RE: DECISION DATED 17 MARCH 2011 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-28361 ENTITLED "PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. JOSELITO C. BARROZO"
FORMER ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR JOSELITO C. BARROZO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This disbarment case against former Assistant Public Prosecutor Joselito C. Barrozo (respondent) is taken up
by this Court motu proprio by virtue of its power to discipline members of the bar under Section 11 Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court.
Factual Antecedent
Jennie Valeriano (Valeriano) was a respondent in several cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambasa Blg.
222which were assigned to respondent as Assistant Public Prosecutor of Dagupan City, Pangasinan. According
to Valeriano, respondent told her that he would resolve the cases in her favor in exchange for ₱20,000.00.
hence, Valeriano went to the Office of Regional State Prosecutor to report the matter. The Regional State
Prosecutor introduced her to agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who, after being told of
respondents’ demand, immediately planned an entrapment operation. During the operation conducted of
February 15, 2005, respondent was caught red-handed by the NBI agents receiving the amount of ₱20,000.00
from Valeriano.
As a result, a case for direct bribery3 under paragraph 2, Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code was filed
against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City. The case, however, was later on indorsed
to the Sandiganbayan as respondent was occupying a position with a salary grade 27 or higher.
After finding the existence of all the elements4 of the crime, the Sandiganbayan, in a Decision5 dated March
17, 2011, found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery and sentence him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prison correctional maximum, as
minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prison mayor medium, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of ₱60,000.00. in addition, it imposed upon him the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 (MR) but was denied in a Resolution7 dated September 28,
2011.
Undeterred, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari8 before this Court but was denied in a
Resolution9dated December 14, 2011 on the ground that the Petition failed to sufficiently show that the
Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in its challenged issuances as to warrant the exercise of the
Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Respondent thrice move for reconsideration.10 the first two MRs
were denied,11 while the third one was ordered expunged from the records.12
Subsequently, an Entry of Judgment13 was issued stating that the Court’s Resolution of denial had already
become final and executor on August 16, 2012.
In October 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter14 dated in August 14, 2013 from Wat &
Co. of Hong Kong stating that its client in Hong Kong received a letter from the Philippines signed by "Atty.
Joselito C. Barrozo," asking for long service payment from the employers of domestic helper Anita G. Calub
who passed away on March 4, 2013. Upon checking online and discovering that said person was convicted of
direct bribery, Wat & Co. requested the OBC to inform it if respondent is still a lawyer qualified to practice law.
Prompted by Wat & Co.’s letter, the OBC inquired from the Department of Justice (DOJ) whether respondent
is still connected thereat.15 in reply, the DOJ informed OBC that respondent had already resigned from his
position effective May 3, 2005.16
On November 15, 2012, OBC wrote Wat & Co. to confirm that respondent was indeed convicted of direct
bribery by final judgment and that the Philippine Court has yet to rule on his disbarment.
In view of the foregoing and considering that respondent’s conviction is a ground for disbarment from the
practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Court through a Resolution17 dated
December 11, 2013 required respondent to comment on why he should not be suspended/disbarred from the
practice of law.
In his Comment18 respondent identified the issue in this case as whether he can engage in the practice of law
despite his conviction. He then argued that he did not engage in the practice of law as his act of signing the
claim letter does not constitute such practice. He averred that he signed it not for any monetary consideration,
but out of his sincere desire to help the claimants. And since there is no payment involved, no lawyer-client
relationship was established between him and the claimants. This therefore negates practice of the law on his
part.
Subsequently, upon Order of the Court, the OBC evaluated the case and came up with its February 20, 2015
Report and Recommendation19 recommending the disbarment of respondent.
Our Ruling
The court adopts the OBC’s recommendation.
It must first be clarified that the issue in this case is not what respondent essentially argued about in his
Comment, i.e., whether his act of signing the claim letter constitutes practice of law. As aptly stated by the
OBC in its recommendation and viewed from proper perspective the real issue here is whether respondent
should be suspended or disbarred by reason of his conviction of the crime of direct bribery. Hence, the Court
finds respondent’s comment to be totally without merit as he veered away, whether wittingly or unwittingly,
from the crux of the controversy in this case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a
lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. And with the finality of respondent’s conviction
for direct bribery, the next question that needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that
involves moral turpitude.
To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same must have been "done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [it must involve] an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."20
In Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa,21 the Court already had the occasion to answer the same question posed in this case,
viz:
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Section 27,
Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. – A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a will disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority [to do so]. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Xxxx
[T]he crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,22 we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to
committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
crime but the act must unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise
or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for
some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his
fellowmen and society in general. Also the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a
betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary o the accepted rule of right
and duty, justice, honesty, and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude.23
Clearly, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude which, as mentioned, is a ground for the suspension
or disbarment of a lawyer from his office as an attorney.
The Court is mindful that a lawyer’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude does not automatically call
for the imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment since it may, in its discretion, choose to impose the
less severe penalty of suspension. As held, the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or
merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.24 here, however, the
circumstances surrounding the case constrain the Court to impose the penalty of disbarment as
recommended by the OBC.
It must be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime respondent was an assistant public
Prosecutor of the City of Dagupan. His act therefore of extorting money from a party to a case handled by him
does not only violate the requirement that cases must be decided based on the merits of the parties
respective evidence but also lessens the people’s confidence in the rule of law. Indeed
Respondent’s conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers,
specially one occupying a public office.1âwphi1 Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from
any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
A government lawyer is keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility,
higher than his brethren in private practice,25
Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his disregard of his oath as a government official but
is likewise of such a nature as to negatively affect his qualification as a lawyer, respondent must be disbarred
from his office as an attorney.
As a final note, it is well to state that:
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable – lawyers in whom courts and [the
public at large] may repose confidence. Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs
that vital yet fragile confidence, [the Court] shall not hesitate to rid [the] profession of odious members.26
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is herby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of the Decision be attached to his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
24. A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457               February 3, 2015
MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio
(Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court's
Resolution dated 30 September 2014.
A.C. No. 7973
On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar
Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara
in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He
became a dentist and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a
petition for the annulment of their marriage, which was eventually granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth,
filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the
case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In
2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned abouthis return, Sesbreño
filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged
that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus,
Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-
2273. Sesbreño alleged that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because
he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against
Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous conviction for
homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not
fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by
continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon
the directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the
same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the
inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory
penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further
alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was
motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters
in court.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on the sole issue to be
resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled that the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreño guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreño to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4
months of reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that Sesbreño was released from confinement
on 27 July 2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission,1 the IBPCBD
further ruled that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and found that
the circumstances leading to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:
Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was shown to be a foe of
respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his companion Christopher shown to have wronged the
respondent. They simply happened to be at the wrong place and time the early morning of June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the earmarks of moral
turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his
conduct, displayed extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who
deserved not to be slighted by a couple of drunks who may have shattered the stillness of the early morning
with their boisterous antics, natural display of loud bravado of drunken men who had one too many.
Respondent’s inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who were not even directed at
respondent reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only
vindictive without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority.2
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred for having
been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreño alleged that the
IBP-CBD misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that the attendant circumstances in
Sorianoare disparate, distinct, and different from his case. He further alleged that there was no condition set
on the grant of executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored to his full civil and political rights. Finally,
Sesbreño alleged that after his wife died in an ambush, he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in
the case for bigamy against Garcia and that he already advised his clients to settle their other cases. He alleged
that Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying Sesbreño’s
motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the Court’s Resolution dated 30
September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12
February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as
attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled
that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.5
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by this Court in
International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation
of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in
seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are
crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases
are reached.7
In People v. Sesbreño,8 the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby
MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreñois hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a
prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Luciano Amparado in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show the
presence of moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion Christopher
Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when the latter, without any
provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them. According to
Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreño when they heard the
screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them.
Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes),
recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running
away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes’ house in the process. Another witness,
Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw Sesbreño in the middle of the street,
carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that
Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the
indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights.
Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was granted "an
absolute and unconditional pardon"11 which restored his "full civil and political rights,"12 a circumstance not
present inthese cases. Here, the Order of Commutation13 did not state that the pardon was absolute and
unconditional. The accessory penalties were not mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the
Order of Commutation and they were also not mentioned in stating the commuted sentence. It only states: By
virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the Board of
Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional Trial
Court, Cebu City and Supreme Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and 1 day
to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of
₱50,000.00.14
Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and restored
Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.15 In this case, the
executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of
penalty.16 Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability.17 The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was
never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison.
More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory
penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no
application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it
was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege.19 It is granted
only to those possessing good moral character.20 A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.21
WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all
over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
25. A.C. No. 9872               January 28, 2014
NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants, 
vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P. Navarro
(Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following facts of the case:
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of the
payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to
Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also included the payment of the
debts of Presbitero’s late husband to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the
property, and the collection of the rentals due for the retained areas from their occupants. It appeared that
the DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late
husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000. Presbitero alleged that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she engaged
the services of respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a case for
quieting of title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds
from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but deductible from
respondent’s fees. Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses of the case,
but nothing came out of it.
In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s services to handle
the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo
convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent
undertook to register the property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it is registered.
Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Navarro for the registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the
registration decree over the property was already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged
that she would not have spent for the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real
situation of the property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar trading
business. Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and agreed that the loan
(a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c) shall be
secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the
principal amount of the loan as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro,
drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a second MOA
with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger,
postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise
discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no
agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third MOA, except
that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod
City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City
Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged under the third MOA,
and respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel of land
adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he mortgaged to Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a total of
₱900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. In September 2006,
the checks issued by respondent to complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against
which they were drawn were already closed. When complainants called respondent’s attention, he promised
to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for
the succeeding months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero terminated the
services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the
mortgages executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest on the
loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
against respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high interest rates. He
also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his son’s accounts. Complainants
further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property he mortgaged
because he showed them a different property from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that
respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold it for only
₱150,000.
Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that it was Yulo
who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him that Presbitero would help
him with the refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc. Respondent alleged that Navarro
fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed the money. He alleged that their business
transactions were secured by real estate mortgages and covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied
that the property he mortgaged to Presbitero was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold
the property because the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to
Navarro was valuable and it was actually worth more than ₱8,000,000.
Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was unable to
continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when the business with Victorias Milling Company,
Inc. did not push through because Presbitero did not help him. Respondent also denied that he was hiding
from complainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for September to
December 2005. He denied making any false representations. He claimed that complainants were aware that
he could no longer open a current account and they were the ones who proposed that his wife and son issue
the checks. Respondent further alleged that he already started with the titling of Yulo’s lot but his services
were terminated before it could be completed.
A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under suspension. In
response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in February 2006 and learned of his
suspension only in May 2006.
After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the parties, the IBP-CBD found
that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000 from Navarro and ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero
which he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed. The IBP-CBD found that based on the
documents presented by the parties, respondent did not act in good faith in obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD
found that respondent either promised or agreed to pay the very high interest rates of the loans although he
knew them to be exorbitant in accordance with jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny that he
misled Navarro and her husband regarding the identity of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also
mortgaged a property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but documents showed that its value was only ₱300,000.
Documents also showed that he sold that property for only ₱150,000. Respondent conspired with Yulo to
secure loans by promising her a 10% commission and later claimed that they agreed that Yulo would "ride" on
the loan by borrowing ₱300,000 from the amount he obtained from Navarro and Presbitero. Respondent
could not explain how he lost all the money he borrowed in three months except for his claim that the price of
sugar went down.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding the issuance of the postdated
checks, and there was nothing in the records that would show that he informed them that it would be his wife
or son who would issue the checks. The IBP-CBD also found that respondent had not been transparent in
liquidating the money he received in connection with Presbitero’s VOS with DAR. He was also negligent in his
accounting regarding the registration of Yulo’s property which was financed by Navarro.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were already
closed.
The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received from complainants.
In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interest is fully protected or the client is
given independent advice.
On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records were not clear
whether the notice of suspension respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the report and recommendation
of the IBP-CBD or the final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that respondent mishandled his cases.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by reducing the recommended penalty from disbarment to
suspension from the practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of Governors likewise ordered respondent to
return the amount of his unpaid obligation to complainants.
Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of disbarment be instead imposed
upon respondent.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on
the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to
nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also
established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but he later
sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged
property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he
did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his
son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that
he could no longer open a current bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the
checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants
believe that the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch
of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of
checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in
respondent’s name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that
conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties.1 A lawyer
may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity.2 The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.3
In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity. Although Navarro
financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship. However,
respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that respondent
misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from her. To appease
Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter
lot as additional collateral but he failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity
with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both
Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted
the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed
the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose
name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show
that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME
INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.4 We agree with the IBP-CBD
that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received
various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent received ₱265,000
from her. Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could not present any
receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was
only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and other expenses
but again, he could not substantiate his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent
had been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s
property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who had since
passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent received ₱50,000
from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how respondent spent the funds
because he was not transparent in liquidating the money he received from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client,
Presbitero.1âwphi1Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by, the client.5
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when
in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time he
secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate mortgage,
it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he
issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms
of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was
unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts
were already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected.
Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his
dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust
and confidence reposed in him by his client.
We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on respondent the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see no reason to deviate
from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of disbarment. Respondent
failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a
member of the legal profession.7 Instead, respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took
advantage of his client to secure undue gains for himself8 that warrants his removal from the practice of law.
Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation ordering respondent to return his
unpaid obligation to complainants, except for advances for the expenses he received from his client,
Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.9 Our only concern
is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability.10
Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against
each other.11 Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose involving the
client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was
spent for that particular purpose.12 If the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must
immediately return the money to his client.13 Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting,
and he failed. He must return the full amount of the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01,
and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the
practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000,
and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this order within thirty days from finality
of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all
over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

26. A.C. No. 10579               December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board or Governors (BOG). Integrated Bar of the Philippines (!BP), dated
March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who
recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent)from the practice of law for
one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),received a complaint2,
dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for "unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful"3 acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt of
the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On
October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the
scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of
documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if
there was a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on
the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10
o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay
complainant and her husband the sum of ₱100,000.00 and ₱22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate
of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10
Complainant’s Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal
problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had
notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent ₱20,000.00 as
acceptance fee and ₱5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal
problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of ₱100,000.00,
payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent
being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot
she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing
of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and
thereafter received from complainant the amount of ₱150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the
exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and
accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant
confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty
and Development Corporation, only amounted to ₱22,410.00 per trial court records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one
who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent
merely replied that he would takea collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy
of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in
the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of
conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not
the point of contention in the case;and 4] the veryanomalies she complained of were not mentioned.
Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of
₱70,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 "in the moment of urgency or emergency."16 Complainant obliged the request and
gave respondent the sum of ₱22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of ₱50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings
on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of ₱25,000.00 which was covered by a
receipt,17 stating that "it is understood that the balance of ₱25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable
judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster." On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount
be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the
balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of ₱25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of the
case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff
gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare a
reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts
because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these were amended; and to
make the additional averment that the defendant was using false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from
him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein.Upon reading the same, however,
complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked
for ₱2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the
judge as a present. Complainant was also told thatoral arguments on the case had been set the following
month.19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote
him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been
acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent,
requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the
filing fees. Respondent never replied.
Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law since
March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that
he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his
notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have
received ₱10,000.00 as acceptance fee and ₱5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of ₱100,000.00,
respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount
to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was declared as "no loan"
and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the amount of ₱150,000.00 he received for filing
fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent
in covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the
court would need the money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the
amount. In the same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of ₱50,000.00 and having received
₱22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge
who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the
possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally present a
bottle of wine to the judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past.
Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel was
assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the
consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by
way of counterclaim, respondentdemanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases
for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts inher
possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant
also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While respondent
was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the
preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who
likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of ₱100,000.00 she extended to
respondent was never considered as "no loan."
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June
20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent
for estafa.23
Findings and Recommendation
of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of
ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of ₱122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to ₱127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information
charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest
had been issued.26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution,the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified
the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months.
Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting
to ₱127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Court’s Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his
alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." It is well established that a lawyer’s conduct is "not confined to the performance of his
professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and
private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were
worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land
involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to
overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of ₱150,000.00
as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to ₱22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that complainant, who
was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that would further burden her
financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount
just to initiate her complaint withthe trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted the excessive
amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is
likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and
good faith expected of all members of the legal profession.
Moreover, the "fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client."28 Money entrusted
to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act isa
gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from
complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the
receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing
fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer
receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use
the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the
client.31 Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client,
respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
"representation expenses" allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable
decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and,
worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already
been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the
supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used
as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’strust but an overt act of
undermining the trust and faith of the public inthe legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the height
of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the
administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges,
lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of
respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The
absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s
actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010.1âwphi1 At this juncture,
respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case,
and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct
but was also remiss in his duty to his client.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal thathe likewise
violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that "[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client." In his private capacity, he requested from his client,
not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and
borrowed ₱100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of
₱70,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 "in the moment of urgency or emergency" but was only given ₱22,000.00 by
complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which
was never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity,
seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant
because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the
defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules.
The loans of ₱100,000.00 and ₱22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of
complainant and were, thus, considered as "no loan,"does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of
requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of
his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to
complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain
not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the
people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their
duties tosociety, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations.32 Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not
confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties,
but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with.
Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to
modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented insufficient
evidence of respondent’s "lawyering" for the opposing party, Tierra Realty. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR,
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts." The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally
be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the
lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with
the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests."33 Thus, even if
lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the
same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in
the rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to
which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to
having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case.
While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint inCivil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the
validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were
challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court cannot
brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint
against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed
document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as
to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s
case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his
unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion.
It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More
significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited "not only because the relation of attorney and client is
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good
taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession suffers."34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for
violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
CPR.35 For the practice of law is "a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to
those who are qualified and who possess good moral character."36 The appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended
on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly
immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a
party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor,
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal
of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three
(3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and
omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office
as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render
him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the
legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no
less thanthe penalty of disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his private
capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to
complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no
bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a memberof the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s
administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may
choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed
directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the
quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required.
Preponderance of evidence is "a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto."40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more
than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to consider the
prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule,
imprescriptible.42
Thus, the IBP-BOG was co ITect in ordering respondent to return the amount of ₱127,590.00 representing the
balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyerclient
relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of ₱50,000.00 which respondent received from
complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a
bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant.
While respondent's deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with
mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their professional
relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he
contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, "the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession."43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by "purging
the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney."44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him
to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of ₱127,590.00, ₱50,000.00 and ₱2,500.00. Let a copy of
this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Con fidanl, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator to be circulated to ail courts.
SO ORDERED.
27. A.C. No. 10438               September 23, 2014
CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED, Complainant, 
vs.
NICOLAS C. TORRES, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint1 dated October 30, 2008 filed by complainant CF Sharp Crew
Management Incorporated (complainant) against respondent Nicolas C. Torres (respondent), charging him
with violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Complainant is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in overseas maritime
employment.2 It hired respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer by profession, as its Legal and Claims
Manager who was tasked, inter alia, to serve as its legal counsel and to oversee the administration and
management of legal cases and medicalrelated claims instituted by seafarers against complainant’s various
principals. Among the cases respondent handled in his capacity as Legal and Claims Manager were the claims
of seafarers Bernardo R. Mangi (Mangi), Rodelio J. Sampani (Sampani), Joseph C. Delgado (Delgado), and
Edmundo M. Chua (Chua).3
In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondent’s request, complainant issued checks in the
amounts of ₱524,000.00, ₱652,013.20, ₱145,650.00, ₱97,100.00, and ₱296,808.40 as settlement of the
respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua.4 However, complainant later discovered that, save
for the check in the amount of 145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the checks to the
seafarers and instead, had them deposited at International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch,
under Account No. 003-10-06902-1.5 With respect to Sampani, complainant also discovered that he only
received the amounts of ₱216,936.00 and ₱8,303.00 or a total of ₱225,239.00 out of the requested amount of
₱652,013.20, through checks not issued by complainant.6
On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline directly received
the instant complaint and on even date, issued an Order7 requiring respondent to file an answer, but the latter
failed to do so. Neither did respondent appear in the mandatory conference scheduled on March 20, 2009 nor
did he file his position paper.8
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated August 1, 2009, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found
respondent administratively liable for violating the CPR, and accordingly recommended that he be meted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.10
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent had indeed requested and was issued checks as
settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua onthe pretense that the requested
amounts represented what was lawfully due them.11 However, instead of giving the said checks to the named
seafarers, he deposited the same at the International Exchange Bank, Banawe,Quezon City Branch, under
Account No. 003-10-06902-1,12 except for the check in the amount of 145,650.00 issued to Delgado.13
Meanwhile, respondent belatedly filed his Verified Answer (With Motion to Re-Open Investigation)14 on March
24, 2010. He explained that he was not able to timely file an answer because complainant supplied a wrong
address to the IBP and filed non-bailable criminal cases against him which caused his detention in a regular
prison cell and, thus, his inability to comply with the IBP’s directives.15
On the merits of the complaint,respondent maintained that the seafarers’ claims had long been settled and
that the release documents signed by the named seafarers were already inactual custody and possession of
the complainant.16 He further contended that he only signed the dorsal portions of the checks as a form of
guaranty of their genuineness17 and that he could not have encashed them as they wereall payable to a
particular payee.18Lastly, respondent claimed that when he resigned in August 2008, complainant forced him
to sign promissory notes to reimburse certain amounts which had not been accounted for by the latter in
exchange for his clearance documents.19 But before he was able to settle the promissory notes, he was already
arrested in connection with the criminal cases filed by complainant against him.20
In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved
the aforesaid report and recommendation with modification, increasing the recommended period of
suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years, and ordering respondent to return the full amount of
money he received from complainant which is legally due to the seafarers, with legal interest, within thirty
(30) days from receipt of notice.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 on April 22, 2013 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution23 dated March 8, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating
the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP in its report and
recommendation, except as to: (a) the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent; and (b) the
monetary award in favor of the complainant.
It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and ascribes to a
lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith.24 The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon
the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.25 This is
the standard laid down by Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME
INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
In the foregoing light, it has been heldthat a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics.26
In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner correctly found that complainant had duly proven its charges
against respondent. In particular, complainant had exposed respondent’s modus operandi of repeatedly
requesting the issuance of checks purportedly for the purpose of settling seafarers’ claims against the
complainant’s various principals, only to have such checks (except for the check inthe amount of 145,650.00
issued to Delgado) deposited to an unauthorized bank account, particularly International Exchange Bank,
Banawe,Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1. It is well-settled that "when a lawyer
receives money from the client for a particular purpose,the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the
intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client."27 This, respondent failed to
do.
Clearly, respondent’s acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence reposedin
him by the complainant, and betrayal of his client’s interests which he is duty-bound to protect.28 They are
contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct." Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful,
and dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice
law.29
Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, the Court deems it proper to modify the penalty
recommended by the IBP.1âwphi1 Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers
misappropriated their clients’ money, the Court imposed upon them the ultimate penalty of disbarment from
the practice of law. In Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III,30 the Court disbarred the lawyer for
misappropriating his client’s money intended for securing a certificate of title on the latter’s behalf. Similarly,
in Freeman v. Reyes,31 the same penalty was imposed upon the lawyer who misappropriated the insurance
proceeds of her client’s deceased husband.
As already discussed, respondent's conduct of misappropriating complainant's money has made him unfit to
remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful,
dishonest, unlawful, and grossly immoral acts.32 As a member of the Bar, he is expected at all times to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed in him by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.33 Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and whenever it is made to appear that an
attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the
right but also the duty of the Court to withdraw the same,34 as in this case. In view of the foregoing,
respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law.
Likewise, the Court cannot concur with the IBP's recommendation regarding the return of the settlement
money respondent received from complainant, considering, among others, that it was not specifically prayed
for in the latter's administrative complaint and that the civil liability of respondent therefor may already be the
subject of existing cases involving the same parties. WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is found guilty
of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the
roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of
this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
28. A.C. No. 4945               October 8, 2013
MA. JENNIFER TRIA-SAMONTE, Complainant, 
vs.
EPIFANIA "FANNY" OBIAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint-affidavit1 filed by Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte
(complainant) against Epifania "Fanny"Obias (respondent) charging her for grave misconduct and/or gross
malpractice.
The facts
In 1997, spouses Prudencio and Loreta Jeremias (Sps. Jeremias),through respondent, offered for sale a parcel
of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 597 (subject property) to the late Nestor Tria
(Nestor) and Pura S. Tria (Sps. Tria), for a consideration of ₱2,800,000.00 and payable in
installments.2 Respondent, who was to receive the payment from Sps. Tria and transmit the same to Sps.
Jeremias, undertook to deliver the deed of sale and owner’s copy of the title to her clients (Sps. Tria) upon full
payment of the purchase price.3 She further undertook to cause the conversion of the subject property from
agricultural to residential, and the transfer of the title to the names of Sps. Tria as part of the package
agreement.4 Respondent received all the installment payments made by Sps. Tria and issued receipts
therefor.5 After full payment of the purchase price on July 11, 1997,6 and after giving an additional
₱115,000.00for capital gains tax and other expenses,7 Sps. Tria requested from respondent the delivery of the
deed of sale and the owner’s copy of the title to them but respondent failed to comply explaining that the
Department of Agrarian Reform clearance for conversion of the subject property from agricultural to
residential was taking time.8 Despite several subsequent demands, respondent still failed to fulfill her
undertakings under the package agreement.9
On May 22, 1998, Nestor was fatally shot and died.10 Thereafter, complainant, daughter of Sps. Tria, again
demanded from respondent and Sps. Jeremias the delivery of the deed of sale and the certificate of title of the
subject property to them, but to no avail. For their part, Sps. Jeremias informed complainant that they had
received the consideration of ₱2,200,000.00 and they had executed and turned-over the sale documents to
respondent.11
Complainant later discovered that a deed of sale over the subject property was executed by Sps. Jeremias and
notarized by respondent favor of someone else, a certain Dennis Tan, on May 26, 1998 for a consideration of
₱200,000.00.12
In defense, respondent, in her Comment,13 claimed that Nestor instructed her in November 1997 not to
proceed with the processing of the deed of sale and, instead, to just look for another buyer.14 She further
averred that Nestor also demanded from her the return of the purchase price, and that she complied with the
said demand and returned the ₱2,800,000.00 in cash to Nestor sometime during the latter part of January
1998.15 However, she did not ask for a written receipt therefor. In fact, Nestor told her not to return the
₱115,000.00 intended for capital gains taxes and other expenses, and to just apply the said sum as attorney’s
fees for the other legal services that she rendered for him.16
In the Court’s Resolution17 dated August 30, 1999, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After numerous postponements, mostly at
the instance of respondent,18 only the complainant and her witnesses testified before the IBP. Eventually,
respondent’s right to present evidence was considered waived.19
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On September 25, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes (Investigating
Commissioner), issued his Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent to have violated her oath as a
lawyer due to her participation in the second sale of the subject property despite the lack of any lawful
termination of the prior sale of the same property to Sps.Tria. The Investigating Commissioner observed that
respondent received, and admitted to have received, from Sps. Tria the ₱2,800,000.00 purchase price and the
amount of ₱115,000.00 for expenses. He further found the second sale of the same property to Dennis Tan as
a clear indication that respondent: (a) employed serious deceit or fraud against Sps. Tria and their family; (b)
violated their proprietary rights; and (c) violated the trust and confidence reposed in her.21 On the other hand,
the Investigating Commissioner did not give credence to respondent’s defense that she returned the
₱2,800,000.00 purchase price given by Sps. Tria and that the latter caused the cancellation of the sale of the
subject property in their favor, absent any receipt or documentation to prove the same.22 As counsel for Sps.
Tria, respondent failed in her obligation to observe honesty and diligence in their transaction and, as such, she
was found guilty of grave misconduct and gross malpractice in violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code).23 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.24
Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-18525 dated October 19,2007 but reduced the suspension of respondent from the practice of law from
five years to one year.
Both complainant and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration26 which were, however,
denied in the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution No. XX-2012-109 dated March 10, 2012.27
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should beheld administratively liable for violating
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the IBP. Indeed, respondent, in her Comment,
already admitted that she rendered legal services to Sps. Tria,28 which necessarily gave rise to a lawyer-client
relationship between them. The complete turnaround made by respondent in her motion for reconsideration
from the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution No. XX-2012-109, where she contended that there was no
lawyer-client relationship between her and Sps. Tria,29 cannot thus be given any credence.
Since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also donned the hat of a real
estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal profession. In this regard, the
legal advice and/or legal documentation that she offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate
transaction subject of this case should not be deemed removed from the category of legal services.30 Case law
instructs that if a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is established.31 Thus, in view of the fact that Sps. Tria knew
respondent to be, and transacted with her as, a lawyer, her belated and unilateral classification of her own
acts as being limited to those of a real estate broker cannot be upheld. In any case, the lawyer-client
relationship between Sps. Tria and respondent was confirmed by the latter’s admission that she rendered
legal services to the former. With this relationship having been established, the Court proceeds to apply the
ethical principles pertinent to this case.
It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients’ cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in them.32 They are duty-bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all
their dealings and transactions with their clients.33 Irrefragably, the legal profession demands of attorneys an
absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the
interests of their clients.34 As enshrined in Canons 17 and 18 of the Code:
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.1âwphi1
In the present case, respondent clearly transgressed the above-mentioned rules as her actions were evidently
prejudicial to her clients’ interests. Records disclose that instead of delivering the deed of sale covering the
subject property to her clients, she willfully notarized a deed of sale over the same property in favor of
another person. Accordingly, far removed from protecting the interest of her clients, Sps. Tria, who had, in
fact, already fully paid the purchase price of the subject property, respondent participated and was even
instrumental in bringing about the defeat of their rights over the said property. Hence, respondent grossly
violated the trust and confidence reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17and 18 of the
Code. To add, by turning against her own clients, respondent also violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Lest it
be forgotten, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.35 These unyielding standards respondent evidently failed to adhere to.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, records bear out that the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was decreased from a period of five years to just one
year by the IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-185. However, the Court observes that the
said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the bases for such modification in contravention of
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which mandates that "the decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based."
Verily, the Court frowns on the unexplained change made by the IBP Board of Governors in the recommended
penalty. Be that as it may, the Court proceeds to correct the same.
Jurisprudence reveals that in similar cases where lawyers abused the trust and confidence reposed in them by
their clients as well as committed unlawful, dishonest, and immoral or deceitful conduct, as in this case, the
Court found them guilty of gross misconduct and disbarred them. In Chuav. Mesina, Jr.,36 the Court disbarred
the lawyer who, upon his misrepresentations, breached his promise to his clients to transfer to them the
property subject of that case, but instead, offered the same for sale to the public. Also, in Tabang v.
Gacott,37 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who, among others, actively sought to
sell the properties subject of that case contrary to the interests of his own clients. As the infractions in the
foregoing cases are akin to those committed by respondent in the case at bar, the Court deems that the same
penalty of disbarment be imposed against her. Clearly, as herein discussed, respondent committed deliberate
violations of the Code as she dishonestly dealt with her own clients and advanced the interests of another
against them resulting to their loss. For such violations, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of
disbarment consistent with existing jurisprudence.
As a final point, it bears to note that the foregoing resolution does not-as it should not -include an order for
the return of the ₱2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of ₱115,000.00 for expenses allegedly
received by respondent, albeit the Investigating Commissioner's findings on the same. In Roa v. Moreno,38 it
has been held that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not
the respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is
his administrative liability.39Thus, the Court's findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no
bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in nature -meaning, those liabilities
which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement40 – as the same should be threshed out in
a proper proceeding of such nature.
WHEREFORE, respondent Epifania "Fanny" Obias is found guilty of gross misconduct and is accordingly
DISBARRED.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
29. LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA, A.C. No. 6258
Complainant,    Present:  

-         versus - Promulgated:

 ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE,  August 24, 2010

Respondent. -- -

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For consideration is the disbarment complaint filed by Luzviminda R. Lustestica (complainant) against Atty.
Sergio E. Bernabe (respondent) for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed of Donation of real property despite
the non-appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica (complainants father) and his first wife, Cornelia
P. Rivero, both of whom were already dead at the time of execution of the said document. 

In his Answer,[1] the respondent admitted the fact of death of Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P.
Rivero, considering their death certificates attached to the complaint. The respondent claimed, however, that
he had no knowledge that the real Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero were already dead at the
time he notarized the Deed of Donation.[2] He also claimed that he exerted efforts to ascertain the identities of
the persons who appeared before him and represented themselves as the donors under the Deed of
Donation.[3]

  After the submission of the respondents Answer to the complaint, the Court referred the matter to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Commission on Bar Discipline) for
investigation, evaluation and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline made the following
findings: 
 The core issue is whether or not Respondent committed a falsehood in violation of his oath as a
lawyer and his duties as Notary Public when he notarized the Deed of Donation purportedly
executed by Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero as the donors and Cecilio R.
Lustestica and Juliana Lustestica as the donees on 5 August 1994. 

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2013, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:

 x x x The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. x x x.

As correctly observed by Complainant, Respondents Acknowledgment is the best evidence that

NO RESIDENCE CERTIFICATES were presented by the alleged donors and the donees. Had the
parties presented their residence certificates to Respondent, it was his duty and responsibility
under the Notarial Law to enter, as part of his certification, the number, place of issue and date
of each residence certificate presented by the parties to the Deed of Donation. Respondent,
however, failed to make the required entries. Respondents claim that the persons who
allegedly appeared before him and represented themselves to be the parties to the Deed of
Donation showed their residence certificates and that he instructed his secretary to indicate the
details of the residence certificates of the parties is self-serving and not supported by the
evidence on record.

x x x x

The fact that Respondent notarized a forged/falsified document is also undisputed not only by
[the] strength of Complainants documentary evidence but more importantly, by Respondents
own judicial admission. x x x.In view of Respondents judicial admission that the alleged donors,
BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA and his first wife, CORNELIA P. RIVERO, died on 7 September 1987
and 24 September 1984, respectively, it is beyond reasonable doubt that said donors could not
have personally appeared before him on 5 August 1994 to [acknowledge] to him that they
freely and voluntary executed the Deed of Donation. Moreover, x x x quasi-judicial notice of the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court finding accused CECILIO LUSTESTICA and JULIANA
LUSTESTICA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principals of the crime of falsification of
public document.[4]

In his Report dated August 15, 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found the respondent grossly
negligent in the performance of his duties as notary public and recommended that the respondents notarial
commission be suspended for a period of one (1) year. The IBP Commissioner also recommended that a
penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension be imposed against the respondent, with a warning that a
similar conduct in the future will warrant an imposition of a more severe penalty.[5]
By Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline adopted and approved the Report of the IBP Commissioner. The pertinent portion of this
Resolution reads:

[C]onsidering Respondents gross negligence in the performance of his duties as Notary Public,
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary
Public for two (2) years with a notification that this suspension of one year must be served in
succession to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of Suspension of one year in CBD
Case No. 04-1371.[6]

From these undisputed facts, supervening events occurred that must be taken into consideration of the
present case.

First, CBD Case No. 04-1371, entitled Victorina Bautista, complainant, v. Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe,
respondent, which was the case referred to in Resolution No. XVII-2005-116, was docketed as A.C. No.
6963[7] before the Court. In a decision dated February 9, 2006, the Court revoked the respondents notarial
commission and disqualified him from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years, for his
failure to properly perform his duties as notary public when he notarized a document in the absence of one of
the affiants. In addition, the Court suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Second, on January 6, 2006, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-
2005-116 before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The respondent moved to reconsider the IBP
Resolution, claiming that the penalty imposed for the infraction committed was too harsh. The motion was
denied in Resolution No. XVII-2006-81, dated January 28, 2006,[8] for lack of jurisdiction of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, since the administrative matter had then been endorsed to the Court.

Third, on January 4, 2006, a motion for reconsideration (the same as the one filed with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline) was filed by the respondent before the Court. In a Minute Resolution dated
March 22, 2006, the Court noted the findings and recommendations in Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 and
required the complainant to file her Comment to the respondents motion for reconsideration. On April 28,
2006, the complainant filed her Comment praying for the denial of the motion.

On July 5, 2006, the Court issued a Minute Resolution noting the denial of the respondents motion for
reconsideration, by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, and the complainants Comment to the respondents
motion before the Court.
Subsequently, on January 26, 2009, the Court declared the case closed and terminated after considering that
no motion for reconsideration or petition for review, assailing both IBP resolutions, had been filed by the
respondent.[9]

On October 8, 2009, the respondent, through a letter addressed to the Office of the Bar Confidant, requested
that he be given clearance to resume the practice of law and to allow him to be commissioned as a notary
public. In his letter, the respondent alleged that he has already served the penalties imposed against him in
A.C. No. 6963 and the present case. He claimed that after the receipt of the IBP Resolutions in both cases, he
did not practice his profession and had not been appointed or commissioned as a notary public.

The Office of the Bar Confidant

Acting on the respondents letter, the Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a Report and Recommendation,
which states:

1.      The EFFECTIVITY of the respondents suspension and disqualification should have

been COMMENCED on the date of receipt of the Decision of the Court and not from the
date of receipt of the Resolution of the IBP recommending the respondents suspension
from the practice of law and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public, it
being recommendatory in nature;

2.      The prayer of the respondent to resume his practice of law in Adm. Case No. 6963 be
denied;

3.      The respondent be REQUIRED to submit certification from competent courts and IBP that
he has fully served the entire period of suspension and disqualification in Adm. Case No.
6963;

4.      The Court may now FINALLY RESOLVE the findings and recommendation of the IBP in its
Resolution No. XVII-2005-16, dated October 2005, in Adm. Case No. 6258, for final
disposition of the case and for proper determination whether the order of suspension and
disqualification in Adm. Case No. 6963 should be lifted after the respondent has
satisfactorily shown that he has fully served the suspension and disqualification.[10]

The Courts Ruling

The findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline are well-taken. We
cannot overemphasize the important role a notary public performs. In Gonzales v. Ramos,[11] we stressed
that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. 
The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.[12]  A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face.[13] It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity of a notarized
document would be undermined.[14]

The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent in discharging his
duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and failed to comply
with the most basic function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties presentation of their
residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities. Given the respondents admission in his
pleading that the donors were already dead when he notarized the Deed of Donation, we have no doubt that
he failed in his duty to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him as donors in the Deed
of Donation.

Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103), but also Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law)[15] states:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where
the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that
the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed.  The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not,
his certificate shall so state.

In turn, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. At the same time,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.

In this regard, a reading of the respondents Acknowledgment in the Deed of Donation shows how
these provisions were violated by the respondent:

BEFORE ME, Notary Public for and in Bulacan this AUG 05 1994 day of August, 1994, personally
appeared:

BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA: C.T.C. # _______:________:________

CORNELIA RIVERO : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
CECILIO LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
JULIANA LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
  

known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument
and acknowledged to me that the same are their free act and voluntary deed.[16]

The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct because he falsely represented in his Acknowledgment
that the persons who appeared before him were known to him to be the same persons who executed the
Deed of Donation, despite the fact that he did not know them and did not ascertain their identities as he
attested.[17]

Moreover, the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct when he did not observe the requirements
under Section 1 of the Old Notarial Law that requires notaries public to certify that the party to the instrument
has acknowledged and presented, before the notaries public, the proper residence certificate (or exemption
from the residence certificate) and to enter the residence certificates number, place, and date of issue as part
of the certification.[18] The unfilled spaces in the Acknowledgment where the residence certificate numbers
should have been clearly established that the respondent did not perform this legal duty.

With these considerations, we find that the imposition of administrative sanctions for the above
infractions committed is in order.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the penalty of suspension, for a period of one (1)
year, from the practice of law and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2)
years. Considering that this is already Atty. Bernabes second infraction, we find the IBPs recommendation to
be very light; it is not commensurate with his demonstrated predisposition to undertake the duties of a notary
public and a lawyer lightly.

In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[19] we disbarred a lawyer for failing to subscribe to the sacred duties imposed
upon a notary public. In imposing the penalty of disbarment, the Court considered the lawyers prior
misconduct where he was suspended for a period of six (6) months and warned that a repetition of the same
or similar act would be dealt with more severely.[20]

In Flores v. Chua,[21] we disbarred the lawyer after finding that he deliberately made false
representations that the vendor appeared before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. We took into
account that he was previously found administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (for bribing a judge) and sternly warned that a repetition of similar act or acts or
violation committed by him in the future would be dealt with more severely.[22]
 In Traya v. Villamor,[23] we found the respondent notary public guilty of gross misconduct in his notarial
practice for failing to observe the proper procedure in determining that the person appearing before him is
the same person who executed the document presented for notarization. Taking into account that it was his
second offense, he was perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public.[24]

In Social Security Commission v. Coral,[25] we suspended indefinitely the notarial commission of the
respondent lawyer who was found to have prepared, notarized and filed two complaints that were allegedly
executed and verified by people who have long been dead. We also directed him to show cause why he should
not be disbarred.[26]

Considering these established rulings, read in light of the circumstances in the present case, we find
that Atty. Bernabe should be disbarred from the practice of law and perpetually disqualified from being
commissioned as a notary public. We emphasize that this is respondents second offense and while he does
not appear to have any participation in the falsification of the Deed of Donation, his contribution was his gross
negligence for failing to ascertain the identity of the persons who appeared before him as the donors. This is
highlighted by his admission[27] in his Answer that he did not personally know the parties and was not
acquainted with them. The blank spaces in the Acknowledgment indicate that he did not even require these
parties to produce documents that would prove that they are the same persons they claim to be. As we
emphasized in Maligsa:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The
bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A
lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients.To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain
from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.[28]

In light of the above findings and penalties, the respondents request to be given clearance to resume
the practice of law and to apply for a notarial commission, after serving the administrative sanctions in A.C.
No. 6963, is now moot and academic. We, accordingly, deny the request for clearance to practice law and to
apply for notarial commission.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) NOTE the letter dated October 8, 2009 of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe to the Office of the
Bar Confidant.

(2) ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline with

MODIFICATION on the administrative penalty imposed.
 (3) DECLARE respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe liable for gross negligence, in the performance of his
duties as notary public, and for his deceitful and dishonest attestation, in the course of
administering the oath taken before him. Respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. He is also PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

(4) DENY the request for clearance to practice law and to apply for notarial commission of respondent
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Sergio E. Bernabes record, as a member of the bar, and
copies furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts.

In view of the notarization of a falsified deed whose purported parties were already dead at the time of
notarization, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Prosecutor General, Department of
Justice for whatever action, within its jurisdiction, it may deem appropriate to bring against Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe.

SO ORDERED.

30. A.C. No. 6622

Manuel G. Villatuya, complainant

Vs.

Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos

Promulgated: July 10, 2012

X- -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- --- - - X

DIECISION

PER CURIAM:

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Orticc or the Bar Confidant,
complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos (resrondent) with unlawful
solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to
complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondent’s first marriage was
subsisting.

In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file a
Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
record.

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a Notice5 setting
the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference, complainant
appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be
resolved by the Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to

complainant 2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent
filed his

verified Position Paper, on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005.

Complainant’s Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial consultant
to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter’s numerous petitions for corporate
rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he
would be entitled to ₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in
addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December
2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were
working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of ₱900,000 for the 18
Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a total of ₱4,539,000 from the
fees paid by their clients. Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi
and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal
services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles
of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates11 and
proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of
bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a
Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office
(NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980
with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma.
Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin
Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.

Respondent’s Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not an
employee of his law firm – Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 – but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.,
where the former is a major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and
incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the latter’s dismissal of many
rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal
agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his
clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid.

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his law
firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect
of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case’ such
as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this contention, respondent
attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by
Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said company.

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been
retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his
alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts.21 To the
said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification
issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the
contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into by
respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place between respondent and
Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The second marriage contract was between
respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon, and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila
on 28 September 1987.24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary
Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage
Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status.

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or submitted
during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert
those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission that he had
filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTCCalamba, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were
Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and
Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and
void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing
on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not attend the
hearing,30 respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of
the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna,
seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name.

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two (2)
Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede
S. Tabalingcos.” The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the
marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was
still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having
committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar
Lozano was still subsisting. Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of ₱24,000 for his
provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases.

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding,
the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for
nullification he had filed with the RTC–Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the administrative case
against him be submitted for resolution.

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the
specific charges against respondent.37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in
the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with
the proper courts since it was only empowered to determine respondent’s administrative liability. On this
matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the
Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his
legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It
failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating
Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence that respondent committed
bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latter’s first marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the
gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys.

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was
premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending
the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name
as having entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by
complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of
disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise
moved to archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed
with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts.
 On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed
their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the
rationale

behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former’s share in the
fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share
with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant,
however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the
fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be
disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven,
the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane
Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise
the latter’s legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations
and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the
specific provision that was breached.

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the
report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits
lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises,
though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the
lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily
lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for
indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as
the practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management,
Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a
means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex “C”49 of the
Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement
of legal services. The letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees,
respondent would render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention
is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President of
Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former
is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of
law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorneyclient relationship may be
operative in one and not in the other. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether
respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the
Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this
allegation, complainant submitted NSOcertified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent
with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they
were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no
opportunity to controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and
fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case.
Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of
affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see
no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of
the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory
proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into
two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the
second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did
not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages.
He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna – one in Biñan and the
other in Calamba – to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void.
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity
or impugned the genuineness of the NSOcertified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant
to prove the former’s marriages to two other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing
evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The
documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the
birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is
accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has
not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil
actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his
allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as
special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any
grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondent’s
regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of
marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old
Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while
his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, we held thus:

[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty
of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not
only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who
cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his
professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be
expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the
court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of
committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
 Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office
of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDii~RED.

31. A.C. No. 5859

(Formerly CBD Case No. 421)

ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO, SEVERINO P. MERCADO AND SPOUSES JESUS AND
ROSARIO MERCADO, complainants

Vs.

ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
 November 23, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For our review is the Resolution[1]of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional malpractice and gross misconduct and
recommending his disbarment.

The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner,[2]are undisputed.

The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a civil
case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed before the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office.[3]

Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of Rosario P.
Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the defendant, but did not
turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the
garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance
was his, as attorneys fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against
the respondent.[4]

On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the respondent
guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of clients funds and recommending to the Court his one-year
suspension from the practice of law.[5]
 Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits against
the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases against the family
corporation, the corporations accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the case where
respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed
cases against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his
suspension from the practice of law for one year. Complainants allege that the respondent committed
barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed
several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family members, their lawyers,
and the family corporation.[6] They maintain that the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to exact
revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against the
respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under
Section 27,[7]Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.

He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file lawsuits against
the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed against the complainants were not
harassment suits but were in fact filed in good faith and were based on strong facts.[8]

Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was merely
exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to seek relief elsewhere by
reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his attorneys fees.

Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients family. He argues that the case that
he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their perception of unlawful transgressions
committed by the latter for which they must be held accountable for the public interest.

Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language. On the contrary,
he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar language in accusing him of
extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorneys fees.[9]

After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties submissions, we find ourselves in
agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.[10] Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has
the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded
him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved
by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to
exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending
or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the
public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.[11]In Maligsa v.
Cabanting,[12]we explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal profession should refrain
from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct
particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending him from
the practice of law for one year. In summary, the respondent filed against his former client, her family
members, the family corporation of his former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors
of the IBP who issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his former client
received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former client, a total of twelve (12) different
cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors
Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the
Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.[13]

In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had previously been
dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the Mercado family separately
docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-
139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of previously dismissed cases.[14]

Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as long as
he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose other than to
achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the
respondent against his former client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show
her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law.

The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being dismissed, the
timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with a renegade member of the
complainants family, the defendants named in the cases and the foul language used in the pleadings and
motions[15]all indicate that the respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of
filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against his
former client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a clients funds.

In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16]the Court pronounced that it is professionally irresponsible for a
lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,

Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint.  Although no
person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right must be
exercised in good faith.[17]

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice.  They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary.
 A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice.  Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments.  A lawyer should not only
help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that
impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.[18]Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort
and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an
officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a former client to
whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility[19]provides:

CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated.

Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information acquired
by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the structure and
operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or
in support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through
the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will
not be tolerated by the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law

effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
NOTE: sorry hon, wala akong mahanap na A.C.No. 10250… Itong OCA lang ang meron. 

32. Wilhemina B. Buere v. Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon

33. Joy T. Samonte Vs. Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil; A.C. No. 11668; July 17, 2017
RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is a Complaint[1] dated March 15, 2013, filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), by complainant Joy T. Samonte (complainant) against respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil
(respondent), praying that the latter be disbarred for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and betrayal of trust.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal
case, i.e., NLRC Case RAB-XI-10-00586-12, filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana
plantation.[2]Consequently, complainant engaged the services of respondent to prepare her position paper,
and paid him the amount of P8,000.00[3] as attorney’s fees.[4] Despite constantly reminding respondent of the
deadline for the submission of her position paper, complainant discovered that he still failed to file the same.
[5]
 As such, on January 25, 2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[6] based on the evidence on record,
whereby complainant was held liable to the workers in the total amount of P633,143.68.[7] When complainant
confronted respondent about the said ruling, the latter casually told her to just sell her farm to pay the farm
workers.[8] Because of respondent’s neglect, complainant claimed that she was left defenseless and without
any remedy to protect her interests against the execution of the foregoing judgment;[9] hence, she filed the
instant complaint.

In an Order[10] dated March 26, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed respondent to
submit his Answer to the complaint.

In his Answer[11] dated April 19, 2013, respondent admitted that he indeed failed to file a position paper on
behalf of complainant. However, he maintained that said omission was due to complainant’s failure to adduce
credible witnesses to testify in her favor. In this relation, respondent averred that complainant instructed her
to prepare an Affidavit[12] for one Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who was intended to be her witness; nevertheless,
respondent was instructed that the contents of Romeo’s affidavit were not to be interpreted in the Visayan
dialect so that the latter would not know what he would be testifying on. Respondent added that
complainant’s uncle, Nicasio Ticong, who was also an intended witness, refused to execute an affidavit and
testify to her lies. Thus, it was complainant who was deceitful in her conduct and that the complaint against
him should be dismissed for lack of merit.[13]

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation[14] dated March 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD found respondent administratively
liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year. Essentially, the IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.[15]

In a Resolution[16] dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid
Report and Recommendation, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however, as to the penalty in
order to account for his breach of the rules on notarial practice.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and accordingly, exercise
the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all
times, a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and competence to their
cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they accept them for a fee or for free.[17] To this end,
lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. [18] These principles are
embodied in Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR, which respectively read as
follows:

CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between complainant and respondent
when the latter agreed to file a position paper on her behalf before the NLRC and, in connection therewith,
received the amount of P8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services. Case law instructs that a
lawyer-client relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to handle a client’s case and
accepts money representing legal fees from the latter,[19] as in this case. From then on, as the CPR provides, a
lawyer is duty-bound to “serve his client with competence and diligence,” and in such regard, “not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him.”

However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly failed to file the
necessary position paper before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against his
client, i.e., herein complainant. To be sure, it is of no moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce
any credible witnesses in support of her position paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification for respondent
to completely abandon his client’s cause. By voluntarily taking up complainant’s case, respondent gave his
unqualified commitment to advance and defend the latter’s interest therein. Verily, he owes fidelity to such
cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.[20] In Abay v. Montesino,[21] it was
explained that regardless of a lawyer’s personal view, the latter must still present every remedy or defense
within the authority of the law to support his client’s cause:

Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise stated,
he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from
his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit
of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer
to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest
of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held
administratively liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.

Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. Records show that
he indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he admittedly prepared[23] and notarized[24] the affidavit of
complainant’s intended witness, Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses
Umaguing v. De Vera,[25] the Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer to not only obey the laws
of the land, but also to refrain from doing any falsehood, viz.:

The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an
exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.”[26] (Emphases supplied)

Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. – A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any
person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral[.] (Emphasis supplied)

On this score, it is well to stress that “notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof
of authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this
reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.”[27]

Having established respondent’s administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty.

The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v. Capistrano,[28] the Court suspended the lawyer for a
period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his
client. Similarly, in Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,[29] the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer for his inexcusable
negligence in failing to file the required pleading to the prejudice of his client. Hence, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by the IBP and accordingly suspends respondent
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, as in the case of Dela Cruz v. Zabala,[30] where
the notary public therein notarized an irregular document, the Court hereby revokes respondent’s notarial
commission and further disqualifies him from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2)
years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUlLTY of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period
of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, his notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he
is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. Finally, he
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

NOTE: Sorry, wala akong mahanap na Adm. Case No. 11544, OCA lang din meron. 

34. Selecive Security Services, Inc. and Edwin C. Embudo v . Atty. Reggie G. Duran
35. Dany V. Quijano v. Atty. Corazon S. Agustin-Ongbueco
.

Carmelo Iringan Vs. Atty. Clayton B. Gumangan; A.C. No. 8574; August 16, 2017
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant Carmelo Iringan
(Carmelo) against respondent Atty. Clayton B. Gumangan (Atty. Gumangan) relative to Civil Case No. 518-09,
entitled Sps. Renato and Carmen A. Iringan v. Carmelo A. Iringan, for Illegal Detainer and Ejectment with
Damages, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of the City of Tabuk, Kalinga.

Civil Case No. 518-09 was instituted before the MTCC by spouses Renato (Renato) and Carmen Iringan
(spouses Iringan) against Carmelo, who is Renato’s brother. The spouses Iringan alleged in their complaint that
they are the owners of a piece of land, with an area of about 625 square meters, located in Tabuk, Kalinga,
registered under Original Certificate of Title No. P-8864[1] in Renato’s name. A two-storey structure stands on
said piece of land, which was used as a restaurant with the name “Emilia’s Kitchenette.” Renato acquired the
right to operate said restaurant from his mother, Lourdes Iringan, by virtue of a Deed of Assignment to
Operate Establishments[2] dated January 19, 1982, for the consideration of P5,000.00. Pursuant to a Contract
of Lease[3] dated December 30, 2005, Renato agreed to lease to Carmelo the land and the two-storey building
thereon (collectively referred to herein as the premises) for a period of one year, for a monthly rental of
P5,000.00. The Contract of Lease was notarized by Atty. Gumangan also on December 30, 2005. The lease
expired but Carmelo continued to possess the premises upon spouses Iringan’s tolerance. In September 2008,
the spouses Iringan demanded that Carmelo vacate the premises but to no avail. A Final Demand dated April
1, 2009 was served upon Carmelo on April 2, 2009, signed by Atty. Gumangan, with Renato’s approval and
conformity. Carmelo, however, still refused to vacate the premises. The barangay heard the dispute between
the spouses Iringan and Carmelo on April 29, 2009 but no settlement was reached. Thus, the spouses Iringan
had no other recourse but to file Civil Case No. 518-09 for Illegal Detainer and Ejectment with Damages
against Carmelo.

In his defense, Carmelo averred that he and Renato are brothers. The premises actually belonged to their late
parents Sixto and Lourdes Iringan, and upon their parents’ deaths, the premises descended to Carmelo,
Renato, and their other siblings. Hence, Renato is not the sole owner of the premises even though the
certificate of title to the land is registered in his name alone. Renato is a mere trustee of the premises for his
siblings. The Deed of Assignment to Operate Establishments did not vest title to the premises upon the
spouses Iringan as this was in derogation of the succession rights of Renato’s siblings. Carmelo further claimed
that the Contract of Lease for the premises was spurious as he had never entered into such a contract with
Renato. Carmelo asserted that he did not sign the Contract of Lease nor did he appear before Atty. Gumangan
who notarized the same.

In its Decision[4] dated September 24, 2009, the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of the spouses Iringan.
Particularly on the matter of the Contract of Lease, the MTCC found:

THERE IS A VALID CONTRACT OF LEASE EXECUTED BY THE  PARTIES

Exhibit “D” of the [spouses Iringan] is the alleged “Spurious” Contract of Lease. It is a document duly notarized
before a Notary public. It was executed with all the formalities required by law and duly acknowledged before
Atty. Clayton Gumangan. This Contract of Lease is a public document, which needs no further proof of its
content and is entitled to much faith and confidence, unless clear evidences show otherwise. This is where
[Carmelo] failed. [Carmelo] offered no evidence tending to show that said document is indeed spurious. What
we have, are the allegations of [Carmelo] and his witnesses, which allegations are, to say the least, self-serving
and biased. Allegations are not proofs.

On this point, the [spouses Iringan] submitted the Affidavit of the  Notary Public before whom the document
was executed and acknowledged. In said Affidavit, Atty. Gumangan affirmed that he prepared the document
and that Carmelo and Renata Iringan signed the contract of lease in his presence. There is no showing that
Atty. Gumangan was telling a lie, or that he was ill-motivated. His affidavit rings true and is credible.

xxxx

Then too, we have the affidavit of the instrumental witnesses, in the person of Hilda Langgaman and Narcisa
Padua (Exhibit “Q”). They were the witnesses to the execution of the contract at the office of Atty. Gumangan.
They saw with their own eyes Carmelo and Renato signing the Contract of Lease. These are impartial
witnesses. In order to discredit the allegations of the Affidavit of Atty. Gumangan, [Carmelo] submitted the
Affidavit of Atty. Mary Jane Andomang to the effect that Atty. Clayton Gumangan has not submitted his
notarial register containing the questioned document. But the non-submission of Atty. Gumangan of his
notarial register does not preclude the fact that said document was executed and notarized as claimed by the
affiants. If any, it should be Atty. Gumangan who is brought to task for his negligence, not the [spouses
Iringan]. The failure of Gumangan to submit his register should not prejudice the cause of the [spouses
Iringan]. This Affidavit of Atty. Andomang only proved that Atty. Gumangan failed to submit his register. It
cannot disprove the due execution of the Contract of lease.

Much noise has been made on the fact that the document was allegedly executed in December 2005 but that
the Community Tax Receipt of Renato was dated January 17, 2006. Also, that the CTR of [Carmelo] has not
been indicated in the said document. Again, to [Carmelo], this smacks of fraud.

The court is not convinced. This may have been a typographical error attributable to human frailties. The
intent to defraud or falsify was not shown by [Carmelo] through independent and credible evidences. Fraud is
not assumed.[5]

The MTCC decreed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [spouses Iringan] and against Carmelo Iringan,
ordering [Carmelo] to;

1. VACATE immediately the property in dispute and turnover peacefully its possession to the [spouses
Iringan];

2. Pay FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS a month from April 2, 2009 up to the time the finality of
Judgment with interest at 6% per annum;

3. The total amount awarded above shall earn legal interest at 12% per annum from the time judgment
became final until the same shall have been fully paid;

4. PAY TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS as attorney’s fees and cost of litigation; and

5. [P]ay the cost of the suit.[6]

Carmelo filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, Branch 25,
docketed as Civil Case No. 762. In a Decision[7] dated May 25, 2010, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTCC
judgment. The RTC eventually issued a Writ of Execution and an Alias Writ of Execution dated November 2,
2010 and February 22, 2011, respectively, for the implementation of its judgment.

In the meantime, while Civil Case No. 762 was still pending before the RTC, Carmelo instituted on April 5,
2010, before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the present administrative
complaint[8] against Atty. Gumangan, alleging as follows:

3. That [Atty. Gumangan] is a practicing attorney and a notary public, principally based [in] Tabuk, Kalinga;

4. That sometime on December 30, 2005, a “Contract of Lease” was purportedly executed by and between
[Carmelo] and Renato Iringan; This document was prepared and notarized by [Atty. Gumangan];

5. That the aforecited “Contract of Lease” became the principal subject of a Civil Case between [Carmelo] and
Sps. Renato and Carmen Iringan docketed as Civil Case No. 518-09; The original copy of the pertinent
Summons (with the Complaint and annexes thereto) is made Annex “A” and appended therewith is a certified
machine copy of the said “Contract of Lease” (Annex “C” of the Complaint);

6. That the purported “Contract of Lease” is entirely spurious and fraudulent; [Carmelo] never executed such
instrument and did not appear before [Atty. Gumangan] for its due subscription under oath; [Carmelo] never
ever entered into any lease contract with Renato A. Iringan whether verbal or in writing;

7. That it is too obvious that the alleged Lease Contract prepared and notarized by [Atty. Gumangan] is
fraudulent since by simple examination, the same was executed and subscribed before [Atty. Gumangan] on
December 30, 2005, when in fact Renato Iringan’s CTC (08768743) was issued on January 17,
2006; [Carmelo’s] own CTC does not appear thereon, meaning that he never appeared to execute it; That
besides not appearing before [Atty. Gumangan], [Carmelo] has not been or seen the alleged witnesses to the
contract;
8. That more importantly, [Carmelo] had not known, met or had any transaction with [Atty. Gumangan]; He
only saw him for the first time in the Municipal Trial Court, Tabuk, Kalinga, during one of the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 518-09 where [Atty. Gumangan] happened to be present in attendance;

9. Moreover, the said “Contract of Lease” was never filed with the notarial report of [Atty. Gumangan] with
the Office of the Clerk of Court of Kalinga.; The Sworn Affidavit of Atty. Mary Jane A. Andomang (Regional Trial
Court, Branch 25, Clerk of Court) made Annex “B” hereof attests to this fact;

10. That the very blatant act of [Atty. Gumangan] in preparing and notarizing said “Contract of Lease”
bespeaks of wanton and willful violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility for lawyers; As officers of
the Court they are mandated not to involve themselves in fraudulent and deceitful acts, to the grave damage
and prejudice of private individuals;

11. That [Atty. Gumangan] had not acted with honesty and faithfulness to the responsibilities and duties of his
profession; He must then be sanctioned and subjected to disciplinary action by this Honorable Supreme Court.
[9]

Carmelo prayed that Atty. Gumangan “be DISBARRED/SUSPENDED from the practice of law, and with all the
attendant accessory penalties and fines to be justly imposed.”[10]

In support of his allegations, Carmelo attached, among other documents, the purported Contract of Lease
between him and Renato and the Affidavit[11] dated September 3, 2009 of Mary Jane A. Andomang
(Andomang), RTC Clerk of Court VI, certifying that Atty. Gumangan “did not submit his Notarial Report and a
copy of a ‘Contract of Lease,’ appearing as Doc. No. 191, Page No. 39, Book No. X, Series of 2005.”

Atty. Gumangan, in his Comment/Answer,[12] asserted that Carmelo instituted the instant administrative
complaint to harass and embarrass him, and to extricate himself, Carmelo, from the felonious acts of
dispossessing his very own brother of the latter’s property.

Atty. Gumangan admitted that he notarized the Contract of Lease, but maintained that Carmelo, together with
Renato, personally executed said Contract before Atty. Gumangan and in the presence of two witnesses,
namely, Hilda Langgaman (Langgaman) and Narcisa Padua (Padua). Atty. Gumangan attached to his
Comment/Answer the Joint Affidavit[13] dated July 20, 2009 in which Langgaman and Padua affirmed that they
were personally present at Atty. Gumangan’s office when Carmelo and Renato signed the Contract of Lease,
and that they saw with their own eyes Carmelo signing said Contract. Atty. Gumangan likewise attached to his
Comment/Answer the Affidavit[14]dated July 9, 2009 executed by Carmelo’s daughter-in-law, Cathelyn Bawat
Iringan (Cathelyn), attesting to the existence and implementation of the Contract of Lease:

That as trustee of the Emilia’s Kitchenette, I was instrumental in the payment of rentals over said Kitchenette
to plaintiffs [spouses Iringan] thus:

a) In June, 2007, I withdrew the sum of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos from the Rural Bank of Rizal,
Kalinga and used it for the medical operation of Inez Gamad; the amount was treated as rentals of Emilia’s
Kitchenette covering the months of November & December, 2006, January, February and March of year 2007;

b) I paid Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos on August 23, 2007 for our rental of April and May 2007;
c) I paid rental of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to Carmen Iringan, which was used for the eye
treatment of Renato Iringan;

d) I issued a check in the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, given to Engr. Federico Iringan,
son of [spouses Iringan]; Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos was used to cover rentals of the Kitchenette and
Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos was personal to Federico[.]

Atty. Gumangan proffered the following explanation for the irregularities as regards the community tax
certificates (CTCs) of Carmelo and Renato, the parties to the Contract of Lease:

A. [Carmelo] and his brother Renato Iringan appeared before the herein [Atty. Gumangan] in the afternoon of
December 30, 2005, and after they x x x, together with their witnesses, affixed their signature on the Contract
of Lease, the herein [Atty. Gumangan], directed them to produce their community tax certificates, but they
failed to do so, but they instead promised to secure their community tax certificates the earliest possible
opportunity;

B. Considering that December 30, 2005 is a Friday, and the next working day January 01, 2006, is a holiday,
Renato Iringan secured his community tax certificate on the 17th day of January 2006. x x x.[15]

Atty. Gumangan substantiated his foregoing averments by appending Renato’s Affidavit [16] dated August 11,
2010 to his Comment/Answer, in which the latter deposed and stated:

1. That on the 30th day of December 2005, I together with my brother Carmelo Iringan, went to the
office of Atty. Clayton B. Gumangan, for the purpose of executing a Contract of Lease, over my two
storey building, located at Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga;

2. That after we came to the terms and conditions of the Contract of Lease, Atty. Gumangan, prepared
the same, and explained the contents thereof to us in Ilokano dialect;x x x x

5. That after we had affixed our signatures, Atty. Gumangan required us to present our community tax
certificates, but we have none that time;

6. That Atty. Gumangan, directed us to secure a cedula, but considering that it was then a Friday and
the 30th of December 2005, we told him that we will just secure our community tax certificates, on
the following working day which is [in] January of 2006;

7. That I then entered the number of my community tax certificate the date of its issuance and place of
issuance. on the 17th of January 2006;

8. That considering that Carmelo Iringan is my very own brother, I no longer [asked] him to secure his
community tax certificate for the purpose of entering its number, date of issue and place of issue, in
our Contract of Lease as directed by Atty. Gumangan[;]

9. That I hereby state that I and my very own brother CARMELO IRINGAN, together with our witnesses
are personally present before Atty. Gumangan, when we [executed] our contract of lease[.]
In addition, Atty. Gumangan belied Carmelo’s claim that they do not know each other prior to Civil Case No.
518-09. According to Atty. Gumangan, after Renato and Carmelo executed the Contract of Lease before him,
he frequented Emilia’s Kitchenette, which was only 500 meters away from the RTC, and Tabuk City, Kalinga is a
small community where almost everyone know each other.

Atty. Gumangan also argued that the Contract of Lease was not the principal subject of Civil Case No. 518-09.
Civil Case No. 518-09 was for Illegal Detainer and Ejectment with Damages filed by Renato against Carmelo
because of the latter’s failure to vacate the premises. It was Carmelo who alleged that the Contract of Lease
between him and Renato was spurious, but both the MTCC and the RTC found that the notarized Contract was
a public document which needed no further proof of its content and was entitled to much faith and
confidence, absent clear evidence to the contrary.

Lastly, Atty. Gumangan submitted the Affidavit[17] dated July 21, 2009 of one Margielyn Narag (Narag),
Carmelo’s employee at Emilia’s Kitchenette from July 2008 to June 2009. Narag recalled in her Affidavit that in
June 2009, she saw Carmelo practicing his signature on a blank yellow pad paper, while his niece, Ines
Gammad (Gammad) watched. After sometime, Gammad went over Carmelo’s signatures and said, “kitaem
sabalin ti pirmam,” which meant, “look[,] your signatures are now different.”

In a Resolution[18] dated October 11, 2010, the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference on June 8, 2011. Only Carmelo
and his counsel appeared for the scheduled mandatory conference. In his Order[19] dated June 8, 2011,
Commissioner (Com.) Hector B. Almeyda (Almeyda) granted Carmelo’s motion and instead of resetting the
mandatory conference, directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 40 days, without
prejudice to the submission of a comment or reply to the other party’s position paper within 10 days from
receipt; and provided that, thereafter, the case would be deemed submitted for report and recommendation.

Com. Almeyda rendered his Report and Recommendation[20] on December 7, 2011 finding that:

The existence and execution of the lease contract between [Carmelo] and his brother Renato appears to be an
established fact. Not only was the agreement between the brothers given recognition by a couple of courts
(MTC of Tabuk City and the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk City), [Carmelo], other than the self-serving claim
that he did not appear at the signing, completely failed to deny that his signature on the contract of lease was
not his or otherwise forged. The validity of the contract of lease, absent clear evidence of its non-execution in
the face of document/affidavits that quite clearly showed the contrary, established the fact of execution.

There is one other matter [though] that needs some discussion. Sustaining the validity of the contract of lease
notwithstanding, [Atty. Gumangan] must be held responsible for the execution of that document that is
incomplete due to the absence and/or questionable CTC’s of the parties. Add to that the admitted failure of
[Atty. Gumangan] to make his notarial report, and even on the assumption that he filed his notarial report, he
failed to include in his notarial report the contract of lease as among those he notarized. The violation of the
notarial law and the liability of [Atty. Gumangan] in this regard is obvious.

In the end, Com. Almeyda recommended:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint for disbarment on the grounds relied on be
dismissed for insufficiency of merit to sustain the plea for disbarment and/or suspension. But [Atty.
Gumangan] is advised to be a bit more circumspect in the performance of his duties as a lawyer so that he is
warned that a repetition of a similar lapse will be dealt with more serious sanctions.

Due to the incompleteness in the preparation of the contract of lease, [Atty. Gumangan’s] commission as
notary public is recommended to be revoked upon notice and he is further recommended to be disqualified to
act as notary public for the next two (2) years.[21]

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-415[22] dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted
and approved Com. Almeyda’s Report and Recommendation.

The Court wholly agrees with the findings and recommendations of Com. Almeyda and the IBP Board of
Governors.

The Contract of Lease was executed by Renato and Carmelo on December 30, 2005 and notarized by Atty.
Gumangan on even date. During said time, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice[23] still applied.

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice required the notary public to maintain a notarial register with the
following information:

RULE VI
Notarial Register

Sec. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. – (a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial
register at the time of notarization the following:

(1) the entry number and page number;

(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;

(3) the type of notarial act;

(4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;

(5) the name and address of each principal;

(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not personally known to
the notary;

(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person’s identity;

(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;

(9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary’s regular place of work or business;
and

(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance. (Emphasis supplied.)

Highlighting the importance of the requirement of competent evidence of identity of the parties, the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice explicitly prohibited the notary public, who did not personally know the parties,
from notarizing an instrument or document without the same, thus:

RULE IV
Powers and Limitations of Notaries Public

Sec. 2. Prohibitions. – x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document –

2. Is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. (Emphases supplied.)

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defined “competent evidence of identity” as follows:

RULE II
Definitions

Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. – The phrase “competent evidence of identity” refers to the
identification of an individual based on:

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual; or

(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses
neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the
individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.

Atty. Gumangan herein violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice by notarizing the Contract of Lease on
December 30, 2005 without competent evidence of identity of Renato and Carmelo and, thus, committing an
expressly prohibited act under the Rules.

Atty. Gumangan did not allege that he personally knew Renato and Carmelo when they appeared before him
on December 30, 2005 for the notarization of the Contract of Lease. There was no showing that Renato and
Carmelo presented current identification documents issued by an official agency bearing their photographs
and signatures before Atty. Gumangan notarized their Contract of Lease. Langgaman and Padua witnessed
Renato and Carmelo signing the Contract of Lease in person at Atty. Gumangan’s office, but they did not attest
under oath or affirmation that they personally knew Renato and Carmelo, and neither did they present their
own documentary identification.

According to Renato, Atty. Gumangan asked them to present their CTCs, but neither Renato nor Carmelo had
CTCs at that moment. Renato only secured a CTC on January 17, 2006, which he belatedly presented to Atty.
Gumangan for recording.

CTCs no longer qualifies as competent evidence of the parties’ identity as defined under Rule II, Section 12 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In Bay/on v. Almo,[24] considering the ease with which a CTC could be
obtained these days and recognizing the established unreliability of a CTC in proving the identity of a person
who wishes to have his document notarized, the Court did not include the CTC in the list of competent
evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before
them to have their documents notarized.[25] Worse, neither Renato nor Carmelo had CTCs with them on
December 30, 2005, yet, Atty. Gumangan still proceeded with notarizing the Contract of Lease, allowing
Renato to belatedly present his CTC weeks later, while Carmelo did not present any CTC at all.

Moreover, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice also prescribed:

RULE VI
Notarial Register

Sec. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register.  – x x x

(d) When the instrument or document is a contract, the notary public shall keep an original copy thereof as
part of his records and enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof and shall give to each
entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. He shall also retain a
duplicate original copy for the Clerk of Court.

(h) A certified copy of each month’s entries and a duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged
before the notary public shall, within the first ten (10) days of the month following, be forwarded to the
Clerk of Court and shall be under the responsibility of such officer. If there is no entry to certify for the month,
the notary shall forward a statement to this effect in lieu of certified copies herein required. (Emphases
supplied.)

Per Atty. Andomang’s Affidavit dated September 3, 2009, Atty. Gumangan did not submit to the RTC Clerk of
Court his Notarial Report and a duplicate original of the Contract of Lease dated December 30, 2005 between
Renata and Carmelo. Atty. Gumangan did not dispute Atty. Andomang’s Affidavit nor provide any explanation
for his failure to comply with such requirements.

In Agagon v. Bustamante,[26] which involved closely similar administrative infractions by therein respondent,

Atty. Artemio F. Bustamante, the Court stressed the importance of the notary public’s compliance with the
formalities for notarization of documents:

There is no doubt that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law when
he failed to include a copy of the Deed of Sale in his Notarial Report and for failing to require the parties to the
deed to exhibit their respective community tax certificates. Doubts were cast as to the existence and due
execution of the subject deed, thus undermining the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process and
diminishing public confidence in notarial documents since the subject deed was introduced as an annex to the
Affidavit of Title/Right of Possession of Third Party Claimant relative to NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-12-0672-00.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgment and affirmation of a document or instrument. In the performance of such notarial acts, the
notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as affixed on a document. The notarial
seal converts the document from private to public, after which it may be presented as evidence without need
for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization. should not be treated as an empty,
meaningless, or routinary act. As early as Panganiban v. Borromeo, we held that notaries public must inform
themselves of the facts which they intend to certify and to take no part in illegal transactions. They must guard
against any illegal or immoral arrangements.

It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act. It
is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is converted into a public one,
making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution. Indeed,
a notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public
must observe utmost care in complying with the elementary formalities in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Moreover, the Notarial Law and the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require a duly commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his
Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or act which constitutes good cause for the
revocation of commission or imposition of administrative sanction. Unfortunately, respondent failed in both
respects. (Citations omitted.)

A lawyer, who is also commissioned as a notary public, is mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
Faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment are
sacrosanct. A notary public cannot simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law.[27]

Clearly, herein, Atty. Gumangan – in notarizing the Contract of Lease without competent evidence of the
identity of Renato and Carmelo, and in failing to submit to the RTC Clerk of Court his Notarial Report and a
duplicate original of the Contract of Lease – had been grossly remiss in his duties as a notary public and as a
lawyer, consequently, undermining the faith and confidence of the public in the notarial act and/or notarized
documents.

Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the Court holds Atty. Gumangan administratively liable and imposes upon
him the penalty of suspension of his notarial commission for two years.

As a last note, the Court points out that its judgment in the present case does not touch upon the execution
and existence of the Contract of Lease between Renato and Carmelo, facts which the MTCC found sufficiently
established in its Decision dated September 24, 2009 in Civil Case No. 518-09, and affirmed on appeal by the
RTC in its Decision dated May 25, 2010. Such factual findings of the MTCC and RTC were not based solely on
the irregularly-notarized Contract of Lease between Renato and Carmelo, but also on the consistent
declarations of Renato, Atty. Gumangan, and the two impartial witnesses, Langgaman and Padua, that Renato
and Carmelo personally appeared and signed said Contract of Lease at the office and in the presence of Atty.
Gumangan on December 30, 2005. Carmelo’s self-serving denial, averments of irregularities in the notarization
of the Contract of Lease, and presentation of Atty. Andomang’s Affidavit dated September 3, 2009 were
deemed insufficient by the MTCC and the RTC to refute such factual findings.

It is worthy to mention that any defect in the notarization of the Contract of Lease did not affect its validity
and it continued to be binding between the parties to the same, namely, Renato and Carmelo. The irregularity
in the notarization was not fatal to the validity of the Contract of Lease since the absence of such formality
would not necessarily invalidate the lease, but would merely render the written contract a private instrument
rather than a public one.[28] In addition, parties who appear before a notary public to have their documents
notarized should not be expected to follow up on the submission of the notarial reports. They should not be
made to suffer the consequences of the negligence of the notary public in following the procedures prescribed
by the Notarial Law.[29]

Hence, the ruling of the Court in the present administrative case, essentially addressing the defects in the
notarization of the Contract of Lease dated December 30, 2005 between Renato and Carmelo and Atty.
Gumangan’s failings as a notary public, should not affect the judgment rendered against Carmelo in Civil Case
No. 518-09, the unlawful detainer case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Clayton B. Gumangan is found GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law, the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. His incumbent commission as notary
public, if any, is REVOKED, and he is PROHIBITED from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2)
years, effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect. He is finally WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent Atty.
Clayton B. Gumangan’s personal record as member of the Bar. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Spouses Felix and Fe Navarro Vs. Atty. Margarito G. Ygoña; A.C. No. 8450; July 26, 2017
RESOLUTION

CAGUIOA, J:

A notarized document is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public must exercise utmost
care in performing his duties to preserve the public’s confidence in the integrity of notarized documents.[1]

The relevant facts, as borne by the records, are as follows:

Complainants spouses Felix and Fe Navarro (Spouses Navarro) were the owners of a parcel of land (subject
property) located at Barrio Panadtaran, San Fernando, Cebu, Philippines, covered by Tax Declaration No. 0137-
7148.[2]
Sometime in November 2002, the Spouses Navarro obtained a loan from Mercy Grauel (Grauel) in the amount
of P300,000.00.[3] As a collateral for the loan, the Spouses Navarro executed and signed a Promissory Note and
a Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property on November 22, 2002.[4] In addition, Grauel proposed to the
Spouses Navarro the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the subject property to Grauel, in the
event that the Spouses Navarro would fail to pay the loan. [5] Grauel admitted that she made the proposal to
avoid the tedious process of foreclosing a property, and that the Deed of Absolute Sale would serve merely as
an additional security for the loan.[6] According to Grauel, the Spouses Navarro agreed to her proposal and
voluntarily signed the Deed of Absolute Sale.[7]

Grauel repeatedly demanded payment from the Spouses Navarro, but her demands went unheeded. [8] Grauel
recounted that due to her hectic schedule, she forgot to register the Real Estate Mortgage with the Office of
the Register of Deeds. It was only on March 2004 when Grauel filed her request and paid the corresponding
fees for the registration of the Real Estate Mortgage. Despite this, the Real Estate Mortgage was not
registered because the Office of the Register of Deeds allegedly just sat on Grauel’s request.[9]

Upon instructions made by Grauel, Atty. Ygoña sent the Spouses Navarro a letter, received on September 24,
2004, demanding payment of the loan.[10] According to Grauel, since the Spouses Navarro could no longer pay,
Grauel proposed that the Spouses Navarro convey to her the subject property to extinguish all their
obligations arising from the loan.[11] Thereafter, on October 22, 2004, Atty. Ygoña notarized the Deed of
Absolute Sale which Grauel used to cause the transfer of the tax declaration over the subject property to her
name.[12]

Upon learning that Grauel filed a civil case for Quieting of Title, the Spouses Navarro filed an adverse claim in
order to restore their right over the subject property.[13] The Spouses Navarro also filed a criminal complaint
against Grauel and Atty. Ygoña for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, and the instant
administrative case against Atty. Ygoña.[14] The Spouses Navarro asserted that, driven by their dire need for the
proceeds of the loan and lacking familiarity with the particulars of the transaction, they hastily signed the
Deed of Absolute Sale, of which the date and other relevant portions were allegedly left blank.[15]

According to the Spouses Navarro, and as admitted by Grauel, the Promissory Note, the Real Estate Mortgage,
and the Deed of Absolute Sale were all executed on November 22, 2002. [16] The Real Estate Mortgage was
notarized by Atty. Ygoña on the same date. However, the Deed of Sale was notarized only on October 22,
2004.[17]

In their complaint,[18] the Spouses Navarro alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale was fictitious and that their
signatures therein were forged. In impugning the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Spouses Navarro
pointed out several irregularities, particularly, the Community Tax Certificates (CTC) used in the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the Acknowledgment portion.[19] In addition, the Spouses Navarro presented a
Certification[20] issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court (Notarial Section), Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
7th Judicial Region, confirming that Atty. Ygoña had submitted his notarial report for the year 2004, but the
subject Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on October 22, 2004 was not among the documents listed.

For his part, Atty. Ygoña averred that at the time the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented to him for
notarization, it was complete in all material particulars, and that the Spouses Navarro freely and voluntary
executed and signed the same.[21] Atty. Ygoña also emphasized that the Spouses Navarro did not deny the
genuineness of their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale.[22]
In a Resolution[23] dated September 19, 2005, the City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint for Estafa
against Atty. Ygoña as there was no proof that he conspired with Grauel in committing the crime against the
Spouses Navarro. However, in the same Resolution, the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an
Information for Estafa under Article 315, No. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Grauel after finding
probable cause that she employed deceit and fraud when she induced the Spouses Navarro to sign the Deed
of Absolute Sale purposely as an assurance before granting the loan, but used it to transfer the title over the
property to her name, to the prejudice of the Spouses Navarro.[24]

At the scheduled mandatory conference on August 13, 2010, the Spouses Navarro and Atty. Ygoña were
present, and assisted by their respective counsels, jointly moved for the resetting of the case to give them
enough time to go over the records.[25]

During the last mandatory conference on November 19, 2010, the Spouses Navarro, represented by Atty.
Rainier C. Lacap, and Atty. Ygoña agreed that stipulations, admissions, and issues shall be limited to the
pleadings already filed.[26] The mandatory conference was terminated and the parties submitted their
respective position papers. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

After due proceedings, Commissioner Mario V. Andres (Commissioner Andres) rendered a Report and
Recommendation[27] on June 10, 2013, concluding that Atty. Ygoña failed to diligently perform his notarial
functions after notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale, when he should have already been aware of a possible
badge of pactum commissorium in the transaction – that the lender, Grauel, intended an automatic
appropriation of the subject property in case of nonpayment of the loan by the Spouses Navarro.[28] The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that if the notarial commission of the Respondent
still exists, that it be hereby revoked and that he be disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public
for two (2) years. It is also recommended that herein Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
three (3) to six (6) months.[29]

In its Resolution[30] dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the said
Report and Recommendation, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex “A”, and finding the recommendation fully supported by evidence on record and the
applicable laws, and for failure to exercise the utmost diligence in the performance of his functions as a notary
public, Atty. Margarita G. Ygoña’s Notarial Commission is hereby Immediately Revoked. Atty. Margarito G.
Ygoña is further DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for two (2) years and SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) months.[31]

On February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty. Ygoña’s Motion for Reconsideration finding no
reason to reverse its previous decision.[32] On August 26, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty.
Ygoña’s Second Motion for Reconsideration for the following reasons: (1) neither the Rules of Court nor the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Rules allow the filing of the same; (2) for being dilatory; and (3) the issues
therein had already been passed upon.[33]
After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, this Court affirms the resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent Atty. Ygoña administratively liable, but modifies the penalty
imposed.

The Court does not entirely agree with the basis of Commissioner Andres in finding Atty. Ygoña liable forhis
failure to diligently perform his notarial functions. Commissioner Andres concluded that Atty. Ygoña should
have been aware that the Deed of Absolute Sale he had notarized was in the nature of a pactum
commissorium. The Court finds that this issue should be resolved in a separate civil action. Likewise, the issue
of whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale was indeed forged, is civil, and perhaps criminal, in nature, and
should be passed upon in a proper case. [34]Nevertheless, the Court agrees that Atty. Ygoña was remiss in the
exercise of his notarial functions.

Notarization is not merely an empty or meaningless exercise. It is invested with public interest, such that only
those qualified and authorized may act as notaries public.[35] Notarization converts a private document into a
public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.[36] A notarized
document is, therefore, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and the courts, administrative agencies,
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public.
[37]
 Corollary to this, notaries public must observe utmost care and diligence in carrying out their duties and
functions.

In Salita v. Salve,[38] a case with a similar factual milieu, the Court revoked therein respondent Atty. Salve’s
notarial commission and disqualified him from being commissioned as a notary for a period of (2) years, for his
gross neglect in the performance of his duty as a notary when he notarized the pre-formed Deed of Absolute
Sale without therein complainant Salita’s presence before him. The Court found that it was unfathomable for
Salita to appear before Atty. Salve to have the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized, as it would be detrimental to
his own interests.[39]

Here, Atty. Ygoña should have been more circumspect in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale. Assuming that
there is truth in Atty. Ygoña’s assertion that the Spouses Navarro freely and voluntarily signed and executed
the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Court agrees with Commissioner Andres that the discrepancies in the CTCs used
in the Deed of Absolute are too glaring to ignore.[40] Thus, serious doubt exists as to whether the Spouses
Navarro did indeed appear before Atty. Ygoña to have the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized, as required by the
Rules on Notarial Practice.[41]

Moreover, the Court notes the Certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that the notarial
report submitted by Atty. Ygoña did not contain the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. [42] This failure on the part
of Atty. Ygoña to record the transaction in his books and include the same in his notarial register, as required
by the Rules on Notarial Practice,[43] warrants a corresponding sanction.

As for the penalty to be imposed, the Court takes into account the dismissal of the criminal case for
falsification filed against Atty. Ygoña. Despite the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors on Atty. Ygoña’s Second
Motion for Reconsideration, the Court deems it necessary to point out that the Spouses Navarro previously
filed a disbarment case[44] against the former counsel of Grauel, Atty. Gregorio B. Escasinas, concerning the
same civil action involving the subject property. This shows the Spouses Navarro’s propensity to file suits
against the lawyers of their opponent, which the Court should not overlook. Thus, considering the foregoing,
the Court agrees with, and hereby adopts, the recommended penalty of the IBP that respondent Atty. Ygoña’s
notarial commission be revoked and that he be disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for
two (2) years. However, the Court does not agree that the acts of Atty. Ygoña warrant the recommended
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Margarita G. Ygoña is found GUILTY of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as
notary public. His notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016

ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant) against Atty.
Meljohn B. De la Peña (respondent) for dishonesty and grave misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for "deliberately and
repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File
Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers to a different complaint, that is the complaint filed by
complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is
required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato
Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of
Appeals. Complainant claimed that she could not properly defend herself without a copy of the title. She
further claimed that the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To support such claim, complainant
presented Certifications from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Registry
of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file in their offices of OCT No. 1730.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants
of the lot owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic
Church, which deed of donation respondent notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch 16
Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor.
Complainant narrated the outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x
and his client[s] x x x."

Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal
as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) -
University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution, and received salaries
therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in any government office.

In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against him. Respondent
alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of Lupon Chairman, the late
Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No. B-
1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was not
furnished, respondent wondered why he raised this matter only upon filing of the instant complaint.

Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed against the
occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to
his clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.

As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from the service,
respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of
Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution. However, respondent countered that he
was no longer connected with the NIT College of Law; and thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent
further claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and he had not received any salary
except honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the
MCLE Office a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were no objections, he proceeded to
perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia,
complainant in the administrative case against him, who interposed no objection to his petition for judicial
clemency filed before this Court.

Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20 February
2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All these submissions
basically reiterated the respective arguments of the parties and denied each other's
allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the IBP

In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz
noted the foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent described
complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the
wife of that married man died." According to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear
manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer
of the court."

With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that respondent
is guilty of the same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings
she has submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct (1) for using a Certificate
to File Action which was used in a complaint filed by complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against
Fortunato Jadulco, who is respondent's client; (2) for not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the
free patent covered by OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the Comment respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals; and (3) for accepting the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern
Philippines College of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of prohibition
on reemployment in any government office as a result of his dismissal as a judge.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP Commissioner's
recommendation. The Resolution reads:   
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137 
Adm. Case No. 7594 
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B.
De La Peña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the Court

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and complexion"10 and accused
complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died."11 In his
Rejoinder, respondent maintained that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed to
debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the administrative
case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this
case. While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from
using improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and
to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice
of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language
even in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the parties in
the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is no
such certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what
respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in the complaint filed by complainant's brother,
Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato Jadulco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x x x
was the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."

Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC on 18
October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he
used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on 18 October
2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No.
B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation that the subject matter of Civil
Case No. B-1118 was brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was issued
prior to the filing of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action
when there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title

With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent
title, we find that it does not constitute dishonesty.

Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of the title
exists. There is no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of
the title. The remedy of complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish
complainant or counsel with a copy of the title so she and her counsel could examine the same.

Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding an
examination of the parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this
administrative case, absent any clear and convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated such
fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do not prove that respondent manufactured OCT
No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their official
records.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Conflict of interest

Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of donation
of a parcel of land executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually,
respondent allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are occupants in the lot owned
by complainant's family.

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the notarial
acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats,
signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act of
assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and conspiring
with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare allegations, without any
proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973,
which were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to
present any concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and Judge
Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed against the
judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the judge.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of
Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for partiality,
with prejudice to reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of which
is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent accepted the positions
of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College of Law, a government institution, and received compensation
therefor.

Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to his
designation except for honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of his designation to the
OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and approval from the Supreme Court." He
further avers that complainant in the administrative case against him (as a judge) posed no objection to his
petition for clemency.

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between
permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not absolve
him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does not in any way
extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a government office. Neither does the fact
that complainant in his previous administrative case did not object to his petition for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have declined
from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such positions.17Clearly,
respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon him by the
Court.
In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law
practice despite the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to comply with Court directives
constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's suspension or even
disbarment.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Gross Misconduct

In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to file
action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the civil
action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in his pleadings;
and (3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on reemployment in any government office as accessory
penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and

accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the commission of
the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and all courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11494, July 24, 2017
HEIRS OF JUAN DE DIOS E. CARLOS, NAMELY, JENNIFER N. CARLOS, JOCELYN N. CARLOS, JACQUELINE
CARLOS-DOMINGUEZ, JO-ANN CARLOS-TABUTON, JIMMY N. CARLOS, LORNA A. CARLOS, JERUSHA ANN A.
CARLOS AND JAN JOSHUA A. CARLOS, Complainants, v. ATTY. JAIME S. LINSANGAN, Respondent.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Complainants are children of the late Juan De Dios E. Carlos (Juan) who presently seek to disbar respondent
Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan (Atty. Linsangan). Atty. Linsangan acted as counsel for their late father in several
cases, one of which involving the recovery of a parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
Complainants alleged that Atty. Linsangan forced them to sign pleadings and documents, sold the parcel of
land in Alabang, Muntinlupa City in cahoots with complainants' estranged mother, and evaded payment of
income taxes when he divided his share in the subject property as his supposed attorney's fees to his wife and
children, all in violation of his oath as lawyer.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntilupa City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
139061 with an area of 12,331 square meters was previously owned by the Spouses Felix and Felipa Carlos.
Their son, Teofilo Carlos (Teofilo), convinced them to transfer said title to his name with a promise to
distribute the same to his brothers and sisters. Teofilo delivered the owner's duplicate copy of the title to his
brother, Juan. However, Teofilo sold the entire property to Pedro Balbanero (Pedro). Pedro, however, failed to
pay the agreed installment payments.

For purposes of recovering the subject property from Teofilo (and Teofilo's supposed wife, Felicidad), and
from Pedro, Juan engaged the services of Atty. Linsangan. It appears that Atty. Linsangan, for Juan, filed the
following cases: (a) a case1 against Felicidad which was settled with the latter acknowledging Juan's one-half
interest and ownership over the property; (b) a case against Pedro which was concluded on September 12,
1997; and (c) another case2 against Felicidad, albeit filed by another lawyer who acted under the direct control
and supervision of Atty. Linsangan. In this case against Felicidad, it appears that the other half of the property
was adjudicated to Juan, as Teofilo's sole heir. Said adjudication was appealed to the CA.3

It further appears that Atty. Linsangan represented Juan in the following cases, likewise all involving the
subject property: (a) an action for partition4 filed by Bernard Rillo against Pedro; (b) an ejectment case5filed by
Juan against Pedro; and (c) Juan's intervention in the case6 between Pedro and Teofilo.

It finally appears that Atty. Linsangan also represented Juan in the certiorari cases and petitions for review
filed before the CA7 and this Court,8 likewise involving the same property.

During the pendency of the above cases, or on September 22, 1997, Atty. Linsangan and Juan executed a
Contract for Professional Services9 enumerating the above cases being handled by Atty. Linsangan for Juan. In
said Contract, Atty. Linsangan and Juan agreed, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx

WHEREAS, the Parties have decided to consolidate their agreements in connection with ATTORNEY's
engagement as CLIENT's attorney to recover the subject property;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereto have mutually
agreed and bound themselves as follows:

1. That ATTORNEY shall continue to take all legal steps to recover the 10,000 square meters covered by TCT
No. 139061, or any portion thereof acceptable to CLIENT, through any or all of the Court cases mentioned
above, or such other Court cases as may be necessary;

2. That ATTORNEY shall not enter into any compromise agreement without the written consent of CLIENT.
CLIENT may enter into any compromise agreement only upon consultation with ATTORNEY;

3. That ATTORNEY shall avail of all legal remedies in order to recover the property and shall continue the
prosecution of such remedies to the best of his knowledge, ability, and experience, all within legal and ethical
bounds;
4. That CLIENT shall shoulder all necessary and incidental expenses in connection with the said cases;

5. That considering, among others, the extent of services rendered by ATTORNEY; the value of the property
sought to be recovered; the importance of the case to CLIENT; the difficulty of recovery (considering that the
Balbanero spouses have a favorable Court of Appeals['] Decision in C.V. No. 29379, while Felicidad Sandoval's
name appears in the TCT No. 139061 as wife of the registered owner, Teofilo Carlos), the professional ability
and experience of ATTORNEY; as well as other considerations, CLIENT hereby confirms and ratifies that he has
agreed and bound himself to pay ATTORNEY a contingent fee in an amount equivalent to FIFTY PERCENT
(50%) of the market value of the property, or portion thereof, which may be recovered, or the zonal value
thereof, whichever is higher.

The said attorney's fees shall become due and payable upon recovery of the property, or any portion thereof,
(a) upon finality of a favorable Court decision, or (b) compromise settlement, whether judicially or
extrajudicially, through the execution of any document acknowledging or transferring CLIENT's rights over the
property, or any portion thereof, whether or not through ATTORNEY's, CLIENT's, or other person's efforts or
mediation, or (c) or by any other mode by which CLIENT's interest on the subject property, or a portion
thereof, is recognized, or registered, or transferred to him; or (d) should CLIENT violate this contract; or (e)
should CLIENT terminate ATTORNEY's services without legal or just cause.

6. That CLIENT undertakes and binds himself to pay the said attorney's fees to the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) To ATTORNEY himself;
(b) In case of ATTORNEY'S death or disability, to LORNA OBSUNA LINSANGAN;
(c) In case of death or disability of ATTORNEY and LORNA OBSUNA LINSANGAN, jointly and severally, to
LAUREN KYRA LINSANGAN, LORRAINE FREYJA LINSANGAN, and JAMES LORENZ LINSANGAN;
(d) In default of all the [foregoing], to the estate of ATTORNEY.
7. That this Contract shall be binding and enforceable upon CLIENT's heirs, successors-in-interest,
administrators, and assigns, if any.

8. That finally, CLIENT hereby authorizes, at ATTORNEY's option, the annotation of this contract on TCT No.
139061 or any subsequent title which may be issued. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x10
However, it was not only Juan who went after the property, but also Bernard Rillo and Alicia Carlos, a sister-in-
law. The latter also filed an action11 for recovery of their share and by Compromise Agreement, an area of
2,331 square meters was awarded in their favor, leaving a 10,000 square meter portion of the property.12

This remaining 10,000 square meter portion was eventually divided in the case filed by Juan against Felicidad
(which Atty. Linsangan admits13 to have filed albeit through another lawyer who acted under his control and
supervision), through a Compromise Agreement wherein 7,500 square meters of the subject property was
given to the heirs of Juan while the remaining 2,500 square meters thereof was given to Felicidad.14 In said
Compromise Agreement, the parties likewise agreed to waive as against each other any and all other claims
which each may have against the other, including those pending in the CA15 and this Court. This Compromise
Agreement was approved by the trial court on December 11, 2009.16

Subsequently, a Supplemental Compromise Agreement17 dated December 16, 2009 was submitted by the heirs
of Juan and Atty. Linsangan, dividing among them the 7,500 square meter-portion of the property as follows:
3,750 square meters to the heirs of Juan and 3,750 square meters to Atty. Linsangan pursuant to the Contract
for Professional Services. In said Supplemental Compromise Agreement, Atty. Linsangan waived in favor of his
wife and children his 3,750 square meter share, except as to the 250 square meters thereof, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) To Mrs. Lorna O. Linsangan - 2,000 square meters; 
(b) To Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(c) To Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(d) To James Lorenz O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(e) To Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan - 250 square meters.18
Said Supplemental Compromise Agreement was likewise approved by the trial court in its Decision19dated
December 18, 2009. There was no mention in the record, however, that the Compromise Agreement and the
Supplemental Compromise Agreement were likewise presented for approval before the several courts where
the other cases were pending.

On December 10, 2015, Atty. Linsangan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale20 with a certain Helen S. Perez
(Helen) covering the entire 12,331 square meters of the subject property for a purchase price of One Hundred
Fifty Million Pesos (PhP150,000,000). Atty. Linsangan sold the entire property using the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. a Special Power of Attorney21 dated August 26, 2010, executed by his wife Lorna Linsangan, and children,
Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan, Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan and James Lorenz O. Linsangan to sell their shares in
the subject property;

2. a Special Power of Attorney22 dated September 2009, executed by Juan's wife, Bella N. Vda. de Carlos, and
their children, Jo-Ann Carlos Tabuton, Jacqueline Carlos-Dominguez and Jimmy N. Carlos to represent them in
all cases involving their interests and shares in the properties of Juan;

3. a Special Power of Attorney23 dated September 30, 2009 executed by Lorna A. Carlos, Jerusha Ann A. Carlos
and Jan Joshua A. Carlos to represent them in all cases involving their interests and shares in the properties of
Juan;

4. a Special Power of Attorney24 dated May 2013 executed by Porfirio C. Rillo and Jose Rillo to sell their shares
consisting of 200 square meter portion and 199 square meter portion, respectively, of the subject property;

5. a Special Power of Attorney25 dated October 15, 2009 executed by Jocelyn N. Carlos and Jennifer N. Carlos
to represent them in all cases involving their interests and shares in the properties of Juan;

6. a Special Power of Attorney26 dated May 28, 2010 executed by Bernard Rillo in favor of Alicia D. Carlos to
sell his share in the subject property by virtue of a Compromise Agreement dated September 3, 1987 in the
case of Bernard Rillo, et al. vs. Teofilo Carlos, et al., Civil Case No. 11975, Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch CXLIV.
On November 28, 2015, Helen issued several checks27 in varying amounts either made payable to Cash or to
Jaime S. Linsangan or Lorna O. Linsangan and simultaneous thereto, Atty. Linsangan released the owner's
duplicate original of TCT No. 139061 to Helen.28 It further appears that in lieu of one check in the amount of
PhP2,500,000, Atty. Linsangan received, in cash, the amounts of PhP2,000,000 on December 4, 2015,29  and
PhP500,000 on December 10, 2015,30 from Helen.

Upon learning of the sale, complainants allegedly requested from Atty. Linsangan for their shares in the
proceeds and for the copies of the Special Power of Attorney as well as the case records, but that Atty.
Linsangan refused.31 Complainants also requested from Atty. Linsangan, this time through another lawyer,
Atty. Victor D. Aguinaldo, that their shares in the subject property be at least segregated from the portion
sold.32
On August 20, 2016, complainants wrote a letter33 to Atty. Linsangan revoking the Special Power of Attorney
which they executed in the latter's favor. In said letter, complainants accused Atty. Linsangan of conniving with
their mother, Bella N. Vda. De Carlos, in submitting the Compromise Agreement and in selling the subject
property. Complainants, however, recognized Atty. Lisangan's services for which they proposed that the latter
be paid on the basis of quantum meruit instead of fifty percent (50%) of the subject property.34

Subsequently, or in September 2016, complainants filed the instant administrative complaint35 against Atty.
Linsangan accusing the latter of forcing them to sign pleadings filed in court, copies of which were not
furnished them; of selling the subject property in cahoots with their mother; of evading the payment of
income taxes when he apportioned his share in the subject property to his wife and children.36

By way of Comment,37 Atty. Linsangan avers that the Supplemental Compromise Agreement was never
questioned by the complainants until now38 and that they had never requested for a copy thereof from him.
Atty. Linsangan admits that the subject of the sale with Helen is the property in Alabang, Muntinlupa City and
that complainants were not given a share from the payments because such were specifically made applicable
to his and his family's share in the subject property only.39 Atty. Linsangan also contends that the proposal that
he be paid on the basis of quantum meruit is only for the purpose of reducing his 50% share as stated in the
Contract for Professional Services he executed with Juan, so that the balance thereof may accrue to
complainants.40

The Issue

The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent is guilty of violating his lawyer's oath.

The Ruling of this Court

After a careful review of the record of the case, the Court finds that respondent committed acts in violation of
his oath as an attorney thereby warranting the Court's exercise of its disciplinary power.

We begin by emphasizing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.41 Whether or not a lawyer is still entitled to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the
duties and responsibilities of an attorney. The avowed purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is not
to punish the lawyer, but to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the
public and those charged with the administration of justice.42 The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and
its violation is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.43

The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that while the cases involving the subject property were
still pending resolution and final determination, Atty. Linsangan entered into a Contract for Professional
Services with Juan wherein his attorney's fees shall be that equivalent to 50% of the value of the property, or a
portion thereof, that may be recovered. It is likewise not denied by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon
himself, and to his wife and children, half of the property awarded to complainants as heirs of Juan, through a
Supplemental Compromise Agreement. Similarly, such Supplemental Compromise Agreement was entered
into by Atty. Linsangan and the heirs of Juan concurrently with the pendency of several cases before the CA
and this Court44 involving the very same property. What is more, Atty. Linsangan, probably anticipating that he
may be charged of having undue interest over his client's property in litigation, caused another lawyer to
appear but all the while making it absolutely clear to Juan that the latter's appearance was nevertheless under
Atty. Linsangan's "direct control and supervision."

Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5)45 of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers from
acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have
taken part by virtue of their profession. While Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states
that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting," is no longer reproduced in the new Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), such proscription
still applies considering that Canon I of the CPR is clear in requiring that "a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" and Rule 138, Sec. 3
which requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein."46 Here, the law transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article 1491(5) of the Civil
Code, in violation of his lawyer's oath.

While jurisprudence provides an exception to the above proscription, i.e., if the payment of contingent fee is
not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property but only after the judgment has
been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer,47 such is not applicable to the instant case. To reiterate, the
transfer to Atty. Linsangan was made while the subject property was still under litigation, or at least
concurrently with the pendency of the certiorari proceedings in the CA and the petitions for review in this
Court.48 As mentioned, there was nothing in the record which would show that these cases were likewise
dismissed with finality either before the execution of, or by virtue of, the Compromise Agreement and the
Supplemental Compromise Agreement between complainants and Atty. Linsangan.

What is more, Atty. Linsangan, at the guise of merely waiving portions of the subject property in favor of his
wife and children, actually divided his attorney's fee with persons who are not licensed to practice law in
contravention of Rule 9.02,49 Canon 950 of the CPR.

Another misconduct committed by Atty. Linsangan was his act of selling the entire 12,331 square meters
property and making it appear that he was specifically authorized to do so by complainants as well as by the
other persons51 to whom portions of the property had been previously adjudicated. However, a perusal of the
supposed Special Power of Attorney attached to the Deed of Absolute Sale, save for that executed by his wife
and children, only authorizes Atty. Linsangan to represent complainants in the litigation of cases involving
Juan's properties. Nothing in said Special Power of Attorney authorizes Atty. Linsangan to sell the entire
property including complainants' undivided share therein.

Atty. Linsangan's reasoning that he only took it upon himself to sell the property because complainants were
unfamiliar with real estate transactions does not exculpate him from liability. If indeed that were the case,
then it is incumbent upon Atty. Linsangan to make it clear to the complainants that he was acting in such
capacity and not as their lawyer.52 But even this, Atty. Linsangan failed to do.

Worse, Atty. Linsangan does not deny having received the downpayment for the property from Helen. Atty.
Linsangan does not also deny failing to give complainants' share for the reason that he applied said payment
as his share in the property. In so doing, Atty. Linsangan determined all by himself that the downpayment
accrues to him and immediately appropriated the same, without the knowledge and consent of the
complainants. Such act constitutes a breach of his client's trust and a violation of Canon 1653 of the CPR.
Indeed, a lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact that
the client owes him attorneys fees.54 The failure of an attorney to return the client's money upon demand
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of
the general morality, as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment. In short, a lawyer's unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in
this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.55

Pointedly, the relationship of attorney and client has consistently been treated as one of special trust and
confidence. An attorney must therefore exercise utmost good faith and fairness in all his relationship with his
client. Measured against this standard, respondent's act clearly fell short and had, in fact, placed his personal
interest above that of his clients. Considering the foregoing violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491(5) of
the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon
respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.56

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan LIABLE for violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491(5) of the
Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this
Decision. Let copies of this Decision be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and
guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Linsangan.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8371

SPOUSES GERARDO MONTECILLO and DOMINGA SALONOY ... Complainants

versus

ATTY. EDUARDO Z. GATCHALIAN ... Respondent

PRESENT: SERENO, CJ, CHAIRPERSON; LEONARDO-DE CASTRO; DEL CASTILLO; PERLAS-BERNABE; CAGUIOA, JJ

Promulgated: JUN 28, 2017

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J:

This administrative case stemmed from a complaint1 filed by Spouses Gerardo Montecillo and Dominga
Salonoy (complainants) against Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian (respondent) before the Office of the Bar
Confidant charging him of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for being negligent in handling
complainants’ case. In a Resolution2 dated August 9, 2010, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

The Facts

Complainants engaged the legal services of respondent for an ejectment case in which they were the
defendants.3 After filing their Answer to the complaint, complainants received a notice from the court setting
the preliminary conference on March 25, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning. When complainants went to
respondent’s office to confer with him about it, the latter told them that he did not receive the notice and that
he could not attend the preliminary conference due to a conflict in his schedule. Complainants expressed that
they can attend the conference even without him. He allegedly advised them not to attend anymore as he
would arrange with the court for a new schedule when he is available.4

Complainants relied on respondent’s advice and did not attend the preliminary conference anymore.
Thereafter, they found out that respondent not only failed to attend the scheduled preliminary conference,
but also failed to take any steps to have it cancelled or reset to another date. They also learned that, contrary
to respondent’s representation, he did receive the notice setting the date of the preliminary conference.
Subsequently, complainant received an Order5 dated March 25, 2009 that deemed the ejectment case
submitted for decision due to complainants’ failure to appear during the preliminary conference. When they
approached respondent about it, he belittled the matter and told them not to worry as he would take care of
it.6

Subsequently, the trial court issued a Decision7 dated April 21, 2009 adverse to the complainants. Respondent
received it on May 4, 2009 but failed to inform complainants about the status of the case as to enable them to
prepare the next course of action. Complainants learned about the adverse ruling upon inquiring with the trial
court only on May 13, 2009, or nine (9) days after respondent’s receipt thereof, when their period to appeal
was almost about to lapse.8

Complainants went to respondent’s office wherein the latter prepared a Notice of Appeal. Afterwards,
complainants terminated respondent’s legal services and engaged another lawyer to prepare their
Memorandum of Appeal. On appeal, the ejectment case was remanded to the court of origin.9

In sum, complainants assail respondent’s negligent and complacent handling of their case.10

In his Comment,11 respondent contended that when complainants informed him about the scheduled
preliminary conference, he told them that he would be unable to attend due to a conflict in schedule, as he
was committed to attend a criminal case hearing in Quezon City. Nevertheless, he instructed complainants to
attend the preliminary conference even without his appearance and inform the court about the conflict in
schedule. He denied having advised complainants not to attend the preliminary hearing and belittled the
Order dated March 25, 2009. Finally, he alleged that the Order dated March 25, 2009 was complainants’ fault,
due to their failure to attend the preliminary conference, and upon telling this to complainants, they
terminated his legal services.12

On June 22, 2011, while the case was pending before the IBP, complainants filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Withdraw Complaint.13

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In the IBP’s Report and Recommendation14 dated August 29, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for breach of Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He explained that the submission of the ejectment case
for resolution and the eventual adverse decision against complainants were attributable to respondent’s
negligence. Knowing that he had a conflict in schedule, respondent should have prepared and filed an
appropriate motion to cause the cancellation and resetting of the scheduled preliminary conference. Whether
he advised complainants to attend the preliminary conference on March 25, 2009 or not is immaterial. What
was relevant was his course of action when confronted with a conflict of schedule in his court appearances.15

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found complainants’ version of facts more in line with common
experience as opposed to respondent’s version. Notably, there was no cogent explanation why complainants
would dismiss his alleged instruction to attend the conference without him.16

In a Resolution17 dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution18 dated September 23, 2016.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating
the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court resolves to adopt the IBP’s findings and recommendation.

Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost diligence and competence, and never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him.19 A lawyer owes fidelity to the clients’ cause20 and, accordingly is expected to
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs.21 Consequently, he is expected to maintain
at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote one’s full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, whether it is accepted for a fee or for free.22 The relevant provisions of the CPR read thus:

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer’s duties of competence and diligence include not merely reviewing
cases or giving sound legal advice, but also consist of properly representing a client before any court or
tribunal, attending scheduled hearings and conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings,
prosecuting handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the
client or the court to prod him to do so.23 A lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling these duties subjects him to
disciplinary action.24

Guided by these edicts, the Court rules that respondent failed to exercise the diligence required of lawyers in
handling complainants’ case. Based on the records, he failed to file the necessary motion to postpone the
hearing due to a conflict in his schedule, and as a result, complainants lost their opportunity to present their
evidence in the ejectment case. As complainants’ counsel in the ejectment case, respondent was expected to
exercise due diligence. He should have been more circumspect in preparing and filing the motion, considering
the serious consequence of failure to attend the scheduled preliminary conference - i.e. the defendant’s
failure to appear thereat entitles the plaintiff to a judgment,25 as what happened in this case.
The Court likewise finds respondent liable for failing to immediately inform complainants about the trial
court’s adverse decision. To emphasize, a lawyer has an obligation to promptly apprise clients regarding the
status of a case as expressed in Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR:

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

To be clear, a lawyer need not wait for their clients to ask for information but must advise them without delay
about matters essential for them to avail of legal remedies. In the present case, respondent failed to
immediately notify complainants about the adverse decision of the trial court. Had the complainants not
inquired with the trial court, they would have lost their opportunity to appeal. For this reason, respondent is
also administratively liable for negligence under Rule 18.04 of the CPR.

As regards the proper penalty, recent cases show that in similar instances where lawyers neglected their
clients’ affairs by failing to attend hearings and/or failing to update clients about court decisions, the Court
suspended them from the practice of law for six (6) months. In Caranza Vda. de Saldivar v. Cabanes,26 a lawyer
was suspended for failure to file a pretrial brief and to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. In Heirs
of Ballesteros v. Apiag,27 a lawyer was likewise suspended for not attending pre-trial, failing to inform clients
about the dismissal of their case, and failing to file position papers. In Spouses Aranda v. Elayda,28 a lawyer
suffered the same fate when he failed to appear in a scheduled hearing despite due notice, which resulted in
the submission of the case for decision. Consistent with these cases, the Court agrees with the IBP’s
recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian is found GUILTY of violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to
respondent’s personal record as a member of the Bar. Furthermore, let copies of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to
all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Aurea Y. Yangca v. Atty. Jules A. Mejia (Retired RTC Judge of Alaminos City, Pangasinan
A.C. No. 10537, February
03, 2015
REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of their clients. 
Lawyers are expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their clients without need for reminders.  The
privilege of the office of attorney grants them the ability to warrant to their client that they will manage the
case as if it were their own.  The relationship between an attorney and client is a sacred agency.  It cannot be
disregarded on the flimsy excuse that the lawyer accepted the case only because he or she was asked by an
acquaintance.  The professional relationship remains the same regardless of the reasons for the acceptance by
counsel and regardless of whether the case is highly paying or pro bono.

Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal, terminating the case of
her client not on the merits but due to her negligence.  She made it appear that the case was dismissed on the
merits when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellant’s Brief on time.  She did not discharge her duties of
candor to her client.

This court resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution3 dated March 20, 2013.  In its delegated capacity to conduct
fact finding for this court, it found that respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.4  Consequently, the Board of Governors
recommended that Atty. Margallo be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.5

In the Complaint6 filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he engaged Atty. Margallo’s services as
legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled “Spouses Roque v. Ramirez.”7  The case was initiated
before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.8

According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a referral from a friend of
Ramirez’s sister.9  He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition that she be
given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of attorney’s fees.10  It was also agreed upon that
Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per court appearance.1

On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez.12  Atty. Margallo
advised him to appeal the judgment.  She committed to file the Appeal before the Court of Appeals.

The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008.14  On
December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s Brief.  Ramirez notified Atty.
Margallo, who replied that she would have one prepared.1

On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief.  Atty. Margallo
informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the brief.16cralawred

On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there was still no
word from the Court of Appeals.17cralawred

On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied.18  She told him that the
Court of Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father, which was
the basis of his claim.19  She also informed him that they could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision
of the Court of Appeals had been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already
lapsed.20cralawred

Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals.  There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed on April 13,
2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the reglementary period.21cralawred

Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.22  By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the
case for free, save for travel expense of P1,000.00 per hearing.  She also claimed that she had candidly
informed Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50% chance of winning the case.23  She denied ever
having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the land subject of
the controversy.

Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez had
begged her to do so.24  She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for document signing on
January 8, 2009, he ignored her.  When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that he had
been busy.25  Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals
was due to losing her client’s number because her 8-year-old daughter played with her phone and accidentally
erased all her contacts.26cralawred

Mandatory conference and findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010.27  Only Ramirez appeared despite Atty.
Margallo having received notice.28  The mandatory conference was reset to July 22, 2010.  Both parties then
appeared and were directed to submit their position papers.

Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be reprimanded for her actions and be
given a stern warning that her next infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely.30  This was
based on his two key findings.  First, Atty. Margallo allowed the reglementary period for filing an Appellant’s
Brief to lapse by assuming that Ramirez no longer wanted to pursue the case instead of exhausting all means
possible to protect the interest of her client.31  Second, Atty. Margallo had been remiss in her duties as
counsel, resulting in the loss of Ramirez’s statutory right to seek recourse with the Court of Appeals.

In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline.  The Board of Governors
resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 2013.34  In the Resolution dated March 21,
2014, the Board of Governors granted Ramirez’s Motion for Reconsideration and increased the recommended
penalty to suspension from practice of law for two (2) years.35cralawred

On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules of
Court.36  She alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe considering that she had
been very careful and vigilant in defending the cause of her client.  She also averred that this was the first time
a Complaint was filed against her.37cralawred

Ramirez thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion for Reconsideration previously filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty. Margallo’s Petition for Review.38  In the
Resolution39 dated October 14, 2014, this court granted Ramirez’s Motion. Atty. Margallo filed her Reply40 on
October 6, 2014.

This court’s ruling

The Petition is denied for lack of merit.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is “imbued with utmost trust and confidence.”41  Lawyers are
expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them.  They
commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their
ability without need to be reminded by either the client or the court.  The expectation to maintain a high
degree of legal proficiency and attention remains the same whether the represented party is a high-paying
client or an indigent litigant.42cralawred

Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provide:

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there
with shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.cralawlawlibrary

In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,43 a lawyer was suspended after failing to justify his absence in a
scheduled preliminary conference, which resulted in the case being submitted for resolution.  This was
aggravated by the lawyer’s failure to inform his client about the adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals,
thereby precluding the litigant from further pursuing an Appeal.  This court found that these actions
amounted to gross negligence tantamount to breaching Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence.  In this
light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs.  Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless
of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the
cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing
the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the
required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.  While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s
mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.44  (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
cralawlawlibrary

Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.

The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client was palpable
but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client.  This cost complainant Ramirez his entire case and left
him with no appellate remedies.  His legal cause was orphaned not because a court of law ruled on the merits
of his case, but because a person privileged to act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite
diligence.  Her assumption that complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor
excuse.  There was no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her client.  This is an admission that
she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption.  Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to
exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is contrary to what she had sworn
to do as a member of the legal profession.  For these reasons, she clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18,
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their authority or power
for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties.  In many agencies, there is information assymetry between
the principal and the entrusted agent.  That is, there are facts and events that the agent must attend to that
may not be known by the principal.

This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship.  Lawyers are expected
not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their relevance in relation to their
causes of action or their defenses.  The salience of these facts is not usually patent to the client.  It can only be
seen through familiarity with the relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential
interpretations.  More so with the intricacies of the legal procedure.  It is the lawyer that receives the notices
and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the interest of his or her client.

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary.  Between the lawyer and
the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies.  While it is true that
the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of reputation.  It is only upon
actual engagement that the client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and accountability of the
counsel that he or she chooses.  In some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too late.  Between the
lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference or negligence.

Respondent Atty. Margallo’s position that a two-year suspension is too severe considering that it is her first
infraction cannot be sustained.  In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross
negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months. 
In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted
in the submission of the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six
(6) months.  In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v.  Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was
absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months.  In Abiero v. Juanino, a
lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
was also suspended for six (6) months.  Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper
to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends him for a period of six (6)
months.45  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary
Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies.  On the other hand,
respondent Atty. Margallo’s neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in court to protect his
legal interests.  This lack of diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied on her
alleged competence as counsel, must not be tolerated.  It is time that we communicate that lawyers must
actively manage cases entrusted to them.  There should be no more room for an inertia of mediocrity.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.46  Under the
current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.  The
findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional
powers of this court.  Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.  Despite the
precedents, it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that the severity of the infraction is
worth a penalty of two-year suspension.  We read this as a showing of its desire to increase the level of
professionalism of our lawyers.

This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties imposed in order to address a current need in
the legal profession.  The desire of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher ethical standard for
its members’ conduct is laudable.  The negligence of respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of
candor is reprehensible.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED.  The Recommendations and Resolution of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND
AFFIRMED.  Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. 
This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7919               October 8, 2014
DOMADO DISOMIMBA SULTAN, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. CASAN MACABANDING, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an administrative complaint1 filed on May 14, 2008 before the Office of the Bar Confidant by Domado
Disomimba Sultan (complainant) against Atty. Casan Macabanding (respondent) for allegedly having notarized
a falsified affidavit.
The Facts
According to the complainant, he ran for the position of Mayor for the Municipality of Buadipuso Buntong,
Lanao del Sur in 2007. He filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) dated March 29, 2007 with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) for the May 14, 2007 elections.2 Thereafter, an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate
of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor3 (Affidavit of Withdrawal) dated April 10, 2007 was notarized and submitted
by the respondent to the COMELEC, withdrawing the complainant’s candidacy without the latter’s knowledge
or authorization.
When the complainant learned of this, he wrote a letter4 dated April 18, 2007 and submitted an Affidavit5 to
Mamangcoday Colangcag (Colangcag), Acting Election Officer of the COMELEC in Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao
del Sur. The complainant alleged that he neither executed the Affidavit of Withdrawal nor authorized anybody
to prepare a document to withdraw his COC. He asked that the withdrawal be ignored and that his name be
retained on the list of candidates.
On May 16, 2007, the complainant filed a petition with the COMELEC to count the votes cast in his favor. The
complainant also filed a criminal complaint on May 17, 2007 withthe Prosecutor’s Office of Marawi City
against Abdulmojib Moti Mariano (Mariano) who was another candidate for the mayoralty position,the
respondent, and Colangcag for Falsification of Public Documents.6 Information7 was thereby filed against the
respondent and Colangcag which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5842-08 in the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao Del Sur, Marawi City.
Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division found merit in the complainant’s petition and ordered the
reinstatement of his name in the list of candidates for the position of mayor in its Resolution8 dated June 12,
2007. All votes cast in favor of the complainant were also counted. Thus, Mariano elevated the matter to the
COMELEC en banc, which issued a subpoenarequiring the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to study the
signature appearing on the Affidavit ofWithdrawal. Subsequently, the NBI transmitted its Questioned
Documents Report No. 428-9079 to the COMELEC en banc, stating that the signature in the Affidavit of
Withdrawal and the specimen signatures of the complainant were not written by one and the same person.10
On May 14, 2008, the complainant filed the present administrative complaint against the respondent with
prayer for his disbarment. After the respondent filed his comment11 on the complaint, the case was referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and
recommendation.12
The respondent countered that the instant administrative case was filed against him as political harassment
because his family supported the complainant’s opponent, Mariano.13 He admitted that he notarized the
affidavit after it was signed by the complainant voluntarily and in the presence of witnesses and thereafter,
submitted the same to the COMELEC. However, the complainant changed his mind when Mariano, who was
the only remaining mayoralty candidate, refused to pay millions of pesos to the complainant.14 The
respondent withheld the identity of the witnesses allegedly to avoid problems within their family.
On July 1, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation,15 recommending "that
the respondent be suspended from the active practice of law for six (6) months and two (2) years as notary
public."16
On May 15, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-29717 adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable lawsand rules, and considering respondent’s irregular notarization and submission of complainant’s
Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy to the COMELEC without complainant’s knowledge and
authorization, Atty. Casan Macabanding is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months and
SUSPENDEDfrom being commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) years.18
The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 which the IBP Board of Governors denied inits Resolution
No. XX-2014-7620 dated March 8, 2014 for being a mere reiteration of matters already threshed out and taken
into consideration.21
Issue
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS IN
THE COMPLAINT.
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed.
The complainant presented the findings of the NBI which are hereunder reproduced:
FINDINGS:
Laboratory and scientific comparative examination of the specimens submitted, under stereoscopic
microscope and magnifying lenses, with the aid of photographic enlargements (Comparison charts), reveal
that there exist fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics/habits between the questioned
signature "DOMADO DISOMIMBA" (written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on one hand, and the sample
specimen signatures "DOMADO DISOMIMBA" (written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on the other hand, such
as in:
- Structural pattern of characters/elements
- Direction of strokes
- Proportion characteristics
- Other minute identifying details
CONCLUSION:
Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned signature "DOMADO DISOMIMBA" (written in Arabic
characters/alphabet), on one hand, and the sample specimen signatures "DOMADO DISOMIMBA" (written in
Arabic characters/alphabet), on the other hand, WERE NOT WRITTEN by one and the same
person.22 (Underscoring and emphasis in the original)
The respondent maintained that the NBI officer who examined the complainant’s signature is not an expert in
Arabic language and thus, could not give an expert opinion regarding a signature written in Arabic language.23
On this score, the Court refers to Mayor Abdulmojib Moti Mariano v. Commission on Elections and Domado
Disomimba Sultan,24 wherein the Court resolved with finality the dismissal of Mariano’s petition before the
Court alleging that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the complainant’s reinstatement in the list of mayoralty candidates.
Mariano’s petition challenged the issuances of the COMELEC which were anchored on its finding that the
affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy imputed to the complainant was forged. It was dismissed by the Court in
the Resolution dated August 19, 2008. OnOctober 9, 2008, the complainant was then proclaimed as the duly-
elected mayor of Buadiposo Buntong, Lanao del Sur, having obtained the highest number of votes (4,078).
Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the COMELEC’s failure to avail of the services of
anArabic expert was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.25 The Court denied the motion and addressed
the issue raised in this wise:
Contrary to petitioner’s basic stance, a handwriting expert does not have to be a linguist at the same time.To
be credible, a handwriting expert need not be familiar with the language used in the document subject of his
examination. The nature of his examination involves the study and comparison of strokes, the depth and
pressure points of the alleged forgery, as compared to the specimen or original handwriting or
signatures.26 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence. In
Rodica v. Lazaro,27 the Court expounded:
In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr., this Court reiterated its oft[-] repeated ruling that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to clearly prove her allegations by preponderant evidence. Elaborating on the required quantum
ofproof, this Court declared thus:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or
not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity ofknowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses,
although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
x x x x28 (Citation omitted)
The complainant adduced preponderantevidence that his signature was indeed forged in an affidavit which
the respondent notarized and submitted to the COMELEC. Consequently, the respondent should be held
administratively liable for his action. "Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed
upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any.1âwphi1 The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession."29 "It should be noted that a notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public
must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A
notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the
facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves tobe part of illegal
transactions."30 In fact, the respondent admitted that the affidavit was notarized in his office without the
presence of the complainant.31
In Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana,32 the respondent therein was suspended from the practice of law
for one year; his notarial commission was revoked and he was also disqualified from reappointment as notary
public for a period of two years for notarizing an affidavit of loss without the presence of the party
acknowledging the document.
The same sanctions were imposed against the erring lawyer in Agbulos v. Viray,33 where the respondent
therein admitted "that not only did he prepare and notarize the subject affidavit but he likewise notarized the
same without the affiant’s personal appearance. He explained that he did so merely upon the assurance of his
client Dollente that the document was executed by complainant."34
In Isenhardt v. Real,35 the respondent therein was subjected to similar penalties when he notarized a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) supposedly executed by the complainant. It was proven by documentary evidence
that the complainant was in Germany at that time and therefore could not have appeared before the
respondentto have the SPA notarized.
The complainant in Linco v. Lacebal36 filed an administrative case against the respondent notary public for
notarizing a deed of donation despite the latter’s knowledge that the purported donor had already passed
away on an earlier date. For this reason, the respondent’s notarial commission was revoked and he was
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years. Furthermore,he was
suspended from the practice of law for one year. Thus, based on prevailing jurisprudence, the penalties meted
out against a lawyer commissioned as a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such are: the
revocation of notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Casan Macabanding is found administratively liable for misconduct and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year. Further, his notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years, with a stem warning that
repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to
report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine when the revocation of his
notarial commission and his disqualification from being commissioned as notary public shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal
records of Atty. Casan Macabanding.
SO ORDERED.

Romeo Dorotan, Attorney de Oficio for Destitute vs. Ammie E. Veloso, Senior Branch Manager, DBP

March 8,
2017
A.C. No. 11346
DR. BASILIO MALVAR, Complainant 
vs
ATTY. CORA JANE P. BALEROS, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment1 filed on June 30, 2014 by Dr. Basilio Malvar (complainant)
against Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros (respondent) for acts amounting to grave misconduct consisting of
falsification of public document, violation of Administrative Matter No. 02-8-13-SC or the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules) and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Antecedent Facts
The complainant is the owner of a parcel of lana located .in Barangay Pagudpud, San Fernando City, La
Union.2 On January 7, 2011, the complainant executed a Deed of Absolute Sale3 in favor of Leah Mallari
(Mallari) over the said lot for the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00). This transaction was
acknowledged by the children of the complainant through a document denominated as Confirmation of Sale.4
The process of conveying the title of the lot in the name of Mallari spawned the legal tussle between the
parties. According to the complainant, an agreement was made between him and Mallari wherein he
unde1iook to facilitate the steps in order to have the title of the lot transferred under Mallari's
name.5 However, without his knowledge and consent, Mallari who was not able to withstand the delay in the
delivery of the title of the land sold to her allegedly filed an Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land6 as a preliminary step for the segregation and titling of the same before the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
San Fernando City, La Union using the complainant's name and signing the said application.7 A civil case for
collection of sum of money was instituted by Mallari before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Aringay, La
Union seeking reimbursement for the expenses she incurred by reason of the transfer and titling of the
property she purchased.8 A compromise agreement9 was forged between the parties which failed because two
out of the four checks issued by the complainant were unfunded.10 This prompted Mallari to file a criminal
case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law, against the
complainant before the MTC of Aringay, La Union.11
Ultimately, a criminal case for falsification of public document against Mallari was filed before the Office of the
Prosecutor and now pending before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 1.12 The complainant alleged that it was through the conspiracy of Mallari and the respondent that the
crime charged was consummated.13
Notwithstanding the Office of the Prosecutor's determination that the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish conspiracy between Mallari and the respondent, thereby dropping the latter's name from the
indictment, the complainant remained unfazed and thus, initiated the present petition for disbarment seeking
the imposition of disciplinary sanction against the respondent.14 The complainant claimed that the
respondent, by notarizing the assailed Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land, made it
appear that he executed the same when the truth of the matter was he never went to the office of the
respondent for he was in Manila at the time of the alleged notarization and was busy performing his duties as
a doctor.15
On August 19, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference16 requiring both parties to appear before it on November 18, 2014. However, the scheduled
mandatory conference was reset to December 2, 201417 where the complainant personally appeared while the
respondent was represented by her attorney-in-fact and counsel.18
The complainant buttressed in his position paper that the respondent consummated the crime of falsification
of public document as delineated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and thus, the presumption of
regularity in the notarization of the contested document has been overthrown and cannot work in her
favor.19 He recapped that he never appeared before the respondent to have the subject document
notarized.20 The complainant stressed that the respondent made a mockery of the Notarial Rules by notarizing
the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land in his absence.
In her Position Paper,21 the respondent refuted the allegations against her by narrating that Benny Telles, the
complainant and his sons came to her office to have the subject document notarized and that she is certain as
to the identity of the complainant.22 Moreover, she argued that the charges filed against her were all part of
the complainant's scheme to avoid his obligations to Mallari as the buyer of his lot.23
Ruling of the IBP
On June 15, 2015, Commissioner Maria Angela Esquivel (Commissioner Esquivel) found that the respondent
was negligent in the perfonnance of her duties as a notary public and violated the Notarial Rules, thereby
recommending disciplinary imposition against her.1avvphi1 The pertinent portion of the Report and
Recommendation24 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent's commission as a
notary public be revoked; that she be disqualified for being a notary public for two (2) years with a stem
warning that a repetition of similar offense shall be dealt with more severe 1y .25
In a Resolution26 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner
Esquivel's report and recommendation with modification, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", for failure of Respondent to observe due diligence in the performance of her duties
and obligations as a Notary Public specifically Rule VL Section 2 of the Notarial Law. Thus, [the respondent's]
notarial commission, if presently commissioned, is immediately REVOKED. Furthermore, [she] is DISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as a Notary Public for two (2) years and SUSPENDED from tile practice of law for six
(6) months.27 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
The Issues
Whether administrative liability should attach to the respondent by reason of the following acts alleged to
have been committed by her:
1. Falsification of the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land;
2. Notarization of the aforesaid document in the absence of the complainant; and
3. Double Entries in the Notarial Registry.
Ruling of the Court
After a close scrutiny of the facts of the case, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
With regard to the imputation of falsification of public document, the Court hall not inquire into the merits of
the said criminal case pending adjudication before the MTCC and make a ruling on the matter. Commissioner
Esquivel orrectly declined to resolve the falsification case pending resolution before the regular court to which
jurisdiction properly pertains. Though disbarment roceedings are sui generis as they belong to a class of their
own and are distinct from that of civil or criminal actions, it is judicious for an administrative body ike IBP-CBD
not to pre-empt the course of action of the regular courts in order to avert contradictory findings.28
The Court concurs with the conclusion of Commissioner Esquivel that the respondent violated several
provisions of the Notarial Rules.1âwphi1 The complainant insists that the Application for Certification of
Alienable and Disposable Land was notarized sans his presence. An affidavit requiring a jurat which the
respondent admittedly signed and notarized on August 18, 2010 forms part of the subject document.
The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to before
her, thus, making the notarial certification essential.29 The unsubstantiated claim of the respondent that the
complainant appeared before her and signed the contested document in her presence cannot prevail over the
evidence supplied by the complainant pointing that it was highly improbable if not impossible for him to
appear before the respondent on the date so alleged that the subject document was notarized. The
complainant furnished in his Sworn Judicial Affidavit submitted before the court patients' record cards
showing that he attended to a number of them on August 18, 2010 in De Los Santos Medical Center, E.
Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.30
Ajurat as sketched in jurisprudence lays emphasis on the paramount requirements of the physical presence of
the affiant as well as his act of signing the document before the notary public.31 The respondent indeed
transgressed Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Notarial Rules by affixing her official signature and seal on the
notarial certificate of the affidavit contained in the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable
Land in the absence of the complainant and for failing to ascertain the identity of the affiant. The thrust of the
said provision reads:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions.
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document-
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The physical presence of the affiant ensures the proper execution of the duty of the notary public under the
law to determine whether the former's signature was voluntarily affixed.32 Aside from forbidding notarization
without the personal presence of the affiant, the Notarial Rules demands the submission of competent
evidence of identity such as an identification card with photograph and signature which requirement can be
dispensed with provided that the notary public personally knows the affiant. Competent evidence of identity
under Section 12 of Rule II of the Notarial Rules is defined as follows:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the
identification of an individual based on:
a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual; or
b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses
neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the
individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
Granting that the complainant was present before the notary public at the time of the notarization of the
contested document on August 18, 2010, the respondent remained unjustified in not requiring him to show a
competent proof of his identification. She could have escaped administrative liability on this score if she was
able to demonstrate that she personally knows the complainant. On the basis of the very definition of
a jurat under Section 6 of Rule II of the Notarial Rules, case law echoes that the non-presentation of the
affiant's competent proof of identification is permitted if the notary public personally knows the
former.33 A 'jurat' refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the
notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document
in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such
instrument or document.34
Further, the respondent displayed lack of diligence by the nonobservance of the obligations imposed upon her
under Section 2 of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, to wit:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register.
(a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of notarization the
following:
(1) the entry number and page number;
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) the type of notarial act;
(4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5) the name and address of each principal;
(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules if the signatory is not personally known to the
notary;
(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of business; and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.
xxxx
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the
page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The same notarial details were assigned by the respondent to two distinct documents. In an order of the
MTCC where the criminal case for falsification of document was pending, Clerk of Court Atty. Raquel Estigoy-
Andres (Atty. Estigoy-Andres) was directed to transmit the original document of the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land which was notarized by the respondent.35 A similar order was
issued by the MTCC requiring the DENR for the production of the impugned document.36 The DENR issued a
certification that despite diligent efforts they could not locate the said document but which they were certain
was received by their office.37 Meanwhile, upon Atty. Estigoy-Andres' certification,38 it was discovered that as
per the respondent's notarial register submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Document No. 288, Page
No. 59, Book No. LXXIII, Series of 2010 does not pertain to the Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land but to a notarized document denominated as Joint Affidavit of Adjoining Owners39 executed
by Ricardo Sibayan and Cecilia Flores. Undoubtedly, the document entitled Application for Certification of
Alienable and Disposable Land nowhere appears in the respondent's notarial register. The respondent further
exposed herself to administrative culpability when she regretfully offered plain oversight as an excuse for the
non-inclusion of the challenged document in her notarial register and by stating that it is her office staff who
usually fills it up. To reiterate, the respondent admitted having signed and notarized the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land but based from the foregoing, she indubitably failed to record
the assailed document in her notarial book. It is axiomatic that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or
routinary act. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is converted into a public one,
making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution.40 "If the
document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is
engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and
cannot bolster any claim made based on this document."41 The respondent's delegation of her notarial
function of recording entries in her notarial register to her staff is a clear contravention of the explicit
provision of the Notarial Rules dictating that such duty be fulfilled by her and not somebody else. This likewise
violates Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the CPR which provides that:
A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
In addition to the above charges, Commissioner Esquivel noted that the respondent failed to retain an original
copy in her records and to submit the duplicate copy of the document to the Clerk of Court. However, in a
previous case, the Court ruled that the requirement stated under Section 2(h) of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules
applies only to an instrument acknowledged before the notary public and not to the present document which
contains a jurat.42 "A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment."43 It is that part of an affidavit in
which the notary certifies that before him or her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor;
while an acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer
or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.44Hence, no liability can be ascribed to the respondent relative to
such ground.
The Court finds unacceptable the respondent's defiance of the Notarial Rules. Under the circumstances, the
respondent should be made liable not only as a notary public who failed to discharge her duties as such but
also as a lawyer who exhibited utter disregard to the integrity and dignity owing to the legal profession. The
acts committed by the respondent go beyond being mere lapses in the fulfilment of her duties under the
Notarial Rules, they comprehend a parallel breach of the CPR particularly Canon 9, Rule 9.01, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" and
the Lawyer's Oath which amplifies the undertaking to do no. falsehood and adhere to laws and the legal
system being one of their primordial tasks as officers of the court. Given the evidentiary value accorded to
notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in her notarial register
corresponds to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when, in fact, it was not.45 It cannot
be veremphasized that notaries public are urged to observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
notarized deeds will be undermined .46
In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers who were remiss in their duties as notaries public to
disciplinary sanction. Failure to enter the notarial acts in one's notarial register, notarizing a document without
the personal presence of the affiants and the failure to properly identify the person who signed the
questioned document constitute dereliction of a notary public's duties which warrants the revocation of a
lawyer's commission as a notary public.47 Upholding the role of notaries public in deterring illegal or immoral
arrangements, the Court in the case of Dizon v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.48 prohibited the respondent for a period of
two (2) years from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing a compromise agreement without the
presence of all the parties. In the case of Atty. Benigno T Bartolome v. Atty. Christopher A. Basilio,49 which
factual milieu is similar to the present case, the Court meted out against therein respondent the penalty of
revocation of notarial commission and disqualification for two (2) years from being appointed as a notary
public and suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law due to various infringement of the Notarial
Rules such as failure to record a notarized document in his notarial register and notarizing a document
without the physical presence of the affiant.
Following jurisprudential precedents and as a reminder to notaries public that their solemn duties which are
imbued with public interest are not to be taken lightly, the Court deems it proper to revoke the notarial
register of the respondent if still existing and to disqualify her from appointment as a notary public for two (2)
years. She is also suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. Contrary to the complainant's
proposition to have the respondent disbarred, the Court is of the belief that her acts do not merit such a grave
penalty and the sanctions so imposed suffice. The Court held in an array of cases that "removal from the Bar
should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary suspension or fine -
would accomplish the end desired."50
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros is GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and she is hereby DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two
(2) years. She is likewise SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately.
Further, she is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11121, September 13, 2016
DELIA LIM, Complainant, v. ATTY. AQUILINO MEJICA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
1
Before the Court is an administrative complaint  for disbarment filed by complainant Delia Lim (Lim) charging
respondent Atty. Aquilino Mejica (Atty. Mejica) with violation of Rule 1.03 of Canon 1, Rule 12.02 of Canon 12
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

On July 16, 2008, Atty. Mejica filed a criminal action for grave oral defamation against Lim, then incumbent
Vice Mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar, before the Office of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor (OAPP) of Oras,
Eastern Samar, docketed as I.S. No. 08-90-0. He alleged that Lim uttered against him the following slanderous
words at the Session Hall of the Sangguniang Bayan of Oras: "HI AGUS BALDADO NAG KIHA KAN ATTY. AKI
MEJICA HA IBP UG YANA HI ATTY. MEJ[I]CA SUSPENDIDO HIT IYA KA ABOGADO SAKOP HIN UNOM KA BULAN,
IPAN NUMAT NIYO" (Mr. Agus Baldado filed a case against Atty. Mejica before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and now Atty. Mejica is suspended from practice of his profession as a lawyer for a period of
six (6) months, you relay this information).2chanrobleslaw

On February 19, 2009, acting Provincial Prosecutor Cornelio M. Umil II issued a Resolution3 dismissing the
complaint of Atty. Mejica for lack of probable cause. A Motion for Reconsideration4 (MR) was filed, but the
same was denied in a Resolution5 dated May 20, 2009.

However, while Atty. Mejica's MR was still pending before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP), he
filed on March 31, 2009, for the second time, the same complaint6 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Oras, Eastern Samar, docketed as Criminal Case No. (0)2009-03.

On July 6, 2009, the MCTC issued an Order7 dismissing the complaint of Atty. Mejica on the ground that the
same had already prescribed. An MR was filed but the same was denied in an Order8 dated September 14,
2009.

Consequently, Lim filed the instant case alleging that Atty. Mejica deliberately committed forum shopping
when he filed the same complaint with the same attachments with the MCTC during the pendency of his MR
to the dismissal of his complaint before the OPP.9chanrobleslaw
On November 16, 2009, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP issued an Order10 directing Atty.
Mejica to submit his answer to Lim's complaint within 15 days from receipt of the order.

In his Answer,11 Atty. Mejica argued that the filing of the case before the MCTC pending the resolution of his
MR before the OPP was made in good faith. He argued that he did not know that an oral defamation case may
be filed directly with the MCTC.12chanrobleslaw

According to Atty. Mejica, he consulted his friend, Atty. Emmanuel C. Apelado, a Public Attorney's Office
lawyer, when he found out that the person drafting the pleadings of Lim was the same person who was
handling the case in the OPP. He alleged that he was advised, that an oral defamation case is not subject to
preliminary investigation and as such he could file the same directly with the MCTC.13chanrobleslaw

Also, he argued that since the criminal complaint was filed before the OAPP, its resolution for probable cause
would not be a bar for the court's judicial determination of probable cause considering that in case of oral
defamation, preliminary investigation is not required.14chanrobleslaw

On August 31, 2010, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice15 directing the parties to appear for a mandatory conference.
During the mandatory conference, however, only Lim and her counsel appeared, while Atty. Mejica was
absent.16chanrobleslaw

On January 10, 2011, the IBP-CBD issued an Order17 terminating the mandatory conference and directing both
parties to submit their respective position papers within a non-extendible period of 30 days upon receipt of
the said order.

Recommendation and Resolutions of the IBP

On November 17, 2011, the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation18 finding Atty. Mejica liable for
violating Rule 12.02 of Canon 12 of the CPR, and recommended that he be suspended for a period of six (6)
months. Subsequently, the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in a Resolution19 dated June 20, 2013. The IBP Board of Governors, however, modified the
penalty by reducing the suspension to three (3) months.

On October 23, 2013, an MR20 was filed by Atty. Mejica but the same was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in a Resolution21 dated September 27, 2014. The IBP Board of Governors, however, after
considering this Court's previous sanctions imposed against Atty. Mejica, increased his suspension to five (5)
years.

The Issue

Essentially, the case directly poses to the Court the question of whether the instant disbarment complaint
constitutes a sufficient basis to suspend Atty. Mejica from the practice of law for five (5) years for violation of
the CPR.

Ruling of the Court

There is no violation of the rule against non-forum shopping

"There is forum shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another."22 "The test for determining forum shopping is whether
in the two (or more) cases pending, there is an identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and relief
sought."23chanrobleslaw

In Yu v. Lim,24 the Court discussed the requisites of forum shopping as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity
of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with
respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case.25cralawred (Citation omitted and italics in the original)
In the present case, the Court finds that the second requisite of forum shopping does not exist since there is
no identity of relief in I.S. No. 08-90-0 filed before the OAPP of Oras, Eastern Samar and in Criminal Case No.
(0)2009-03 filed before the MCTC of the same place.

In I.S. No. 08-90-0, the complaint seeks for the finding by the prosecutor of probable cause against Lim for
Grave Oral Defamation so that the latter could be held for trial. Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. (0)2009-03,
the complaint seeks for the conviction of Lim.

In Co v. Lim, et al.,26 the Court, for the purpose of determining the existence of forum shopping, held that the
determination made by the Secretary of Justice on whether there is a prima facie case for the prosecution of
the case is distinct from the judicial determination of the RTC that there is no probable cause for the
continued hearing of the criminal case. Moreover, the Court held that these are two distinct actions which
should be independently assailed. The former is pursuant to the powers and functions of the Department of
Justice as provided for under the Revised Administrative Code while the latter is in accord to the judicial
powers conferred by Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.27chanrobleslaw

Applying the foregoing, it is clear that in the present case, the exercise of the OPP of its investigative power to
determine the existence of probable cause to the complaint filed by Arty. Mejica is likewise different and
distinct from the power of the court to hold Lim for trial for the offense charged.

Moreover, it is well settled that "[w]hat is pivotal in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative
agencies to rule on the same or related cases and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different courts and/or
administrative agencies upon the same issues."28 In the present case, however, there is no sufficient evidence
to prove that Atty. Mejica deliberately filed the two complaints for such purpose. As aptly explained by him,
the same was a result of a mere inadvertence and that the same was immediately rectified upon coming to his
knowledge.

Assuming, however, that there is identity of relief, the complaint pending before the OPP cannot be
considered for purposes of determining if there was forum shopping. The power of the prosecutor, pursuant
to Section 3, Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, is only investigatory in character.
It states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following powers
and functions:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x 
 
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction
system.

xxxx
Clearly, the prosecutor's resolution does not constitute as a valid and final judgment because his duty, should
he find probable cause to prosecute the respondent, is to file the appropriate information before the proper
court.

As to the institution of the criminal action, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 1. Institution of criminal actions. — Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 112, by filing the
complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation.

(b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaints shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in
their charters.

The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running period of prescription of the offense charged
unless otherwise provided in special laws.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when preliminary investigation shall
be conducted, provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. - Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

Except as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the
filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.
In the present case, considering that the crime charged is Grave Oral Defamation which is punishable
by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, the complaint should
clearly be filed directly with the MCTC pursuant to above-quoted provisions. Thus, the OPP of Oras, Eastern
Samar did not acquire jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Atty. Mejica is liable for violation of Canon 10 of the CPR

Nonetheless, the Court finds that Atty; Mejica failed to exercise candor and courtesy to the court when he
failed to inform the same of the pendency of his MR before the OPP in connection with the same cause of
action. Likewise, records show that he failed to withdraw his MR before the OPP despite the subsequent filing
of his complaint before the MCTC.

Although it is the MCTC that has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Atty. Mejica, he made a mockery of
the judicial process and further eroded public confidence in lawyers when he ignored the proceedings he
initiated in the OPP.
For these acts, the Court finds Atty. Mejica liable under Canon 10 of the CPR for violating the lawyer's duty to
observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. It states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 10. A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the Court.
Clearly, Atty. Mejica committed an act of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting
ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar.

Proper penalty to be imposed against Atty. Mejica

As to the penalty, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In the present case, the IBP found that this is not Atty. Mejica's first infraction. In Baldado v. Atty. Mejica,29 the
Court suspended him for three (3) months for his negligence in failing to protect the interest of his client. Also,
in Caspe v. Mejica,30 he was suspended for two (2) years for his corrupt motive in facilitating the filing of cases
against the complainant therein, in violation of the CPR.

The Court, however, repeatedly held "[t]hat the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court."31 While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the Bar, where the evidence calls
for it, the Court will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

Also, it is well-settled that "[t]he appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case."32chanrobleslaw

Under the circumstances, considering that there was no bad faith or malice on the part of Atty. Mejica and
that it was merely a result of his wrong notion that the complaint for oral defamation is within the jurisdiction
of the OPP, the Court finds it appropriate to impose upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for six (6) months. This serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the court, the legal profession and
the public.

"Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer."33 It is a cardinal requirement for every practicing
lawyer.34 "They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of
their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients."35chanrobleslaw

As a final note, the Court emphasizes its reminder to all members of the bar in Belleza v. Atty.
Macasa,36wherein it states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as embodied in the [CPR]. Public
confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of
the bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.37 (Citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution No. XXI-2014-595 dated September 27, 2014 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors is hereby SET ASIDE.

The Court, however, finds Atty. Aquilino Mejica to have violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby meted out the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS with WARNING that a similar offense by him will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of Atty. Aquilino Mejica as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

ROMULO A. DELES, G.R. NO. 163986

Petitioner,
Present:
 
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
(Chairperson)
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
 
HON. PEPITO GELLADA and
HON. MA. LORNA P. DEMON-
TEVERDE, in their Official Capacities
as Acting Presiding Judges of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 53, Negros
Occidental and Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 2, Bacolod City,
respectively, Promulgated:
Respondents. March 23, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
RESOLUTION
 
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
 
 
Before the Court is a Motion for Clemency Ad Cautelam filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo A. Deles praying that
the Court, acting as a Court of Equity, set aside the sentence of Imprisonment for Indirect Contempt of Court
for joining rallies and demonstrations within the immediate vicinity of the Supreme Court or the Halls of
Justice carrying placards, posters and streamers announcing, among other things:
Judge Labayen Judge Diamante
Judge Hilario Judge Rojo
Judge Demonteverde Hoodlums in Robes
STOP Demolition of Farmers (sic) Beneficiaries Houses
Pls. Do not usurp the powers of DAR, PARAD & DARAB, other RESIGN.
 
 
and, in its place, to impose against petitioner the penalty of Suspension for Sixty (60) days from the practice of
law, and in addition thereto, to impose on him a fine of P4,000.00 as originally meted out by MTCC Judge
Lorna P. Demonteverde.
 
 

In his Comment, Judge Pepito Gellada, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Negros

Occidental interposes no objection for the lower courts judges have been vindicated, and justice has been

served with the affirmation of the Court of the indirect contempt committed by petitioner and the

corresponding penalty of 20 days imprisonment and fine of P4,000.00. Moreover, petitioner Atty. Romulo A.

Deles appears to be contrite and sincere in his plea for clemency.

 
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Clemency Ad Cautelam is GRANTED. The penalty of imprisonment of 20 days
is SET ASIDE. In its stead Atty. Romulo A. Deles is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 60 days
which is immediately executory from receipt of this Resolution. The fine of P4,000.00 originally imposed
stands.
 
 
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10138               June 16, 2015
(Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1876)
ROBERTO P. NONATO, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
We resolve the administrative complaint1 filed by Roberto P. Nonato (complainant) charging Atty. Eutiquio M.
Fudolin, Jr. (respondent) with gross neglect of duty.
Factual Background
In a verified complaint dated October 18, 2006, the complainant alleged that his father, the late Restituto
Nonato (Restituto), was the duly registered owner of a 479-sq.m. Real property ( property) at Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental. The property became the subject of ejectment proceedings filed by Restituto against
Anselmo Tubongbanua ( Anselmo), before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Hinigaran, Province of Negros
Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. MTC-282. When the complaint was filed, Restituto was represen ted by
Atty. Felino Garcia (Atty. Garcia). However, at the pre-trial stage, Atty. Garcia was replaced by Atty. Fudolin,
the respondent in the present case.
The complainant alleged that although his father Restituto paid the respondent his acceptance fees, no formal
retainer agreement was executed. The respondent also did not issue any receipts for the acceptance fees paid.
The respondent, on the other hand, averred that Restituto, and not the complainant, engaged his services on
Restituto’s representation that they were relatives. For this reason, he accepted the case on a minimal
acceptance fee of ₱20,000.00 and appearance fee of ₱1,000.00, and did not execute any formal retainer
agreement.
The complainant asserted that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings before the MTC, the
respondent failed to fully inform his father Restituto of the status and developments in the case. Restituto
could not contact the respondent despite his continued efforts. The respondent also failed to furnish Restituto
copies of the pleadings, motions and other documents filed with the court. Thus, Restituto and the
complainant were completely left in the dark regarding the status of their case.
After an exchange of initial pleadings in the ejectment proceedings, the MTC ordered the parties to submit
their respective position papers. Since neither party complied with the court’s directive, the MTC dismissed
the complaint as well as the counterclaim on May 26, 2005.
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of dismissal. He justified his failure to file
the position paper by arguing that he misplaced the case records, adding that he was al so burdened with
numerous other cases. The MTC denied the motion.
The respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, this time alleging that the ejectment case was a me
ritorious one such that its dismissal would cause injustice to Restituto (the plaintiff). He also filed a
supplemental motion, but the court denied both motions.
On September 15, 2005, Restituto died and all his properties passed on to his heirs, the complainant among
them.
The complainant alleges that he and his father Restituto did not know of the ejectment suit’s dismissal as the
respondent had failed to furnish them a copy of the MTC’s dismissal order. The complainant also asserts that
the respondent did not inform them about the filing of the motion for reconsideration or of its denial by the
MTC. The complainant claims that he only found out that the case had been dismissed when he personally
went to the Office of the MTC Clerk of Court and was informed of the dismissal.
Because of the patent negligence, the complainant informed the respondent that his failure to file the position
paper could be a ground for his disbarment. Furthermore, the complainant, without the respondent’s
intervention, entered into an oral extrajudicial compromise with the daughter of defendant Anselmo.
On August 17, 2007, the respondent wrote the complainant and apologized for his repeated failure to
communicate with him. He reasoned out that he failed to file the position paper due to his poor health. He
also claimed that he had suffered a stroke and had become partially blind, which caused the delay in the
preparation of the pleadings in the ejectment case.2
In his Answer3 dated December 22, 2006, the respondent asserted that at the time he received the MTC’s di
rective to submit a position paper, he was already suffering from "Hypertensi ve Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial
Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II." The respondent also alleged that further
consultations confirmed that he had an undetected stroke and arterial obstruction during the previous
months. His health condition led to his loss of concentration in his cases and the loss of some of the case
folders, among them the re cords of the ejectment case. The respondent also claimed that he focused on his
health for self-preservation, and underwent vascular laboratory examinations; thus, he failed to communicate
with the late Restituto and the complainant.
The respondent further averred that his failure to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings was not
due to willful negligence but to his undetected stroke. He never revealed the gravity of his illness to his clients
or to the court out of fear that his disclosure would affect his private practice.
Lastly, the respondent alleged that after the ejectment suit’s dismissal, he exerted all efforts, to the point of
risking his poor health, by filing successive pleadings to convince the court to reconsider its dismissal order.
Because the dismissal was purely based on a technical ground, he maintained that his failure to file the
position paper did not amount to the abandonment of his client’s case.
 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
IBP Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco issued his Report and Recommendation, finding the
respondent guilty of both negligence and betrayal of his client’s confidence. The Investigating Commissioner
found that the respondent’s failure to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings and to apprise the
client of the status of the case demonstrated his negligence and lack of prudence in dealing with his clients.
The Investigating Commissioner likewise held that the respondent’s failure to promptly inform his client s,
including the complainant, of his medical condition deprived them of the opportunity to seek the services of
other lawyers. Had he notified the complainant’s father of his illness before the case was dismissed, the latter
could have engaged the services of another lawyer, and the case would not have been dismissed on a mere
technical ground.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the respondent’s suspension for one (1) month from the
practice of law.
In a Resolution4 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation after finding it to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and by the applicable laws and rules.
The complainant moved to reconsider the resolution but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a
resolution5 dated June 21, 2013.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not the respondent could be held administratively liable for negligence in
the performance of duty.
The Court's Ruling
Except for the recommended penalty, we adopt the findings of the IBP.
A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.6 He
should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at
least equal to that which he, himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By
consenting to be his client’s counsel, a lawyer impliedly represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or
that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by his profession, and his client may reasonably expect him
to perform his obligations diligently.7The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action.
In this case, the record clearly shows that the respondent has been remiss in the performance of his duties as
Restituto’s counsel.1avvphi1 His inaction on the matters entrusted to his care is plainly obvious. He failed to
file his position paper despite notice from the MTC requiring him to do so. His omission greatly prejudiced his
client as the Court in fact dismissed the ejectment suit.
In addition, the respondent fa iled to inform Restituto and the complainant of the status of the case. His
failure to file the position paper, and to inform his client of the status of the case, not only constituted
inexcusable negligence; but it also amounted to evasion of duty.8 All these acts violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility warranting the court’s imposition of disciplinary action. The pertinent provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon,9 we considered a lawyer’s failure to file a brief for his client
to be inexcusable negligence. We held that the lawyer’s omission amounted to a serious lapse in the duty he
owed his client and in his professional obligation not to delay litigation and to aid the courts in the speedy
administration of justice.
Similarly in Uy v. Tansinsin,10 we ruled that a lawyer’s failure to file the required pleadings and to inform his
client about the developments in her case fell below the standard and amounted to a violation of Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We emphasized the importance of the lawyers’ duty to keep their
clients adequately and fully informed about the developments in their cases, and held that a client should
never be left in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the
retained lawyer and in the legal profession as a whole.
We also emphasized in Villaflores v. Limos1 that the trust and confidence reposed by a client in his lawyer
impose a high standard that includes the appreciation of the lawyer’s duty to his clients, to the profession, to
the courts, and to the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.12
Because a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence, there is a need for the client to be
adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be left groping in the
dark; to allow this situation is to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer and in
the legal profession in general.13
The respondent has apparently failed to measure up to these required standards. He neglected to file the
required position paper, and did not give his full commitment to maintain and defend his client’s interests.
Aside from failing to file the required pleading, the respondent never exerted any effort to inform his client of
the dismissal of the ejectment case.
We also find the respondent’s excuse – that he had an undetected stroke and was suffering from other
illnesses – unsatisfactory and merely an afterthought. Even assuming that he was then suffering from
numerous health problems (as evidenced by the medical certificates he attached), his medical condition
cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse the omission to file the necessary court pleadings. Th e respondent
could have requested an extension of time to file the required position paper, or at the very least, informed
his client of his medical condition; all these, the respondent failed to do.
Furthermore, the respondent’s subsequent filing of successive pleadings (after the ejectment case had been
dismissed) significantly weakens his health-based excuse. His efforts not only contradict his explanation that
his physical predicament forced him to focus on his illnesses; they also indicate that his illnesses (allegedly
"Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II") were not
at all incapacitating.
All told, we find that the respondent violated Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We, however, find the IBP’s recommended penalty (one (1)month suspension
from the practice of law) to be a mere slap on the wrist considering the gravity of the infractions committed.
Thus, we deem it appropriate to impose the penalty of two (2) years suspension, taking into account the
respondent's acts and omissions, as well as the consequence of his negligence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby SUSPEND Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years for violating Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon' 18, and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We also WARN him that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. is DIRECTED to formally MANIFEST to this Court, upon receipt of this Decision, the
date of his receipt which shall be the starting point of his suspension. He shall furnish a copy of this
Manifestation to all the courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Fudolin's records with the Office of the Bar Confidant and
posted on the Supreme Court website as a notice to the general public.
SO ORDERED.
June 20, 2017
A.C. No. 11480
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1558]
ARLENE VILLAFLORES-PUZA, Complainant 
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO B. ARELLANO, Respondent
DECISION
Per Curiam,
Subject of this disposition is the February 25, 2016 Resolution 1 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board
of Governors (IBP-BOG), which adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation 2 of
the Investigating Commissioner.
In her Complaint, 3 dated August 26, 2005, Arlene 0. Villaflores-Puza (complainant) accused Atty. Rolando B.
Arellano (respondent) of notarizing affidavits of his witnesses without a notarial commission.
The Complaint
Complainant was the defendant in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by her husband, Ernesto
Puza (Puza), who was represented by respondent as his counsel. On July 21, 2005, Puza, through respondent,
filed his formal offer of evidence, which included some affidavits of witnesses notarized by him.
In the aforesaid affidavits, it was indicated that respondent was issued a notarial commission in Mandaluyong
City. Upon inquiry, however, complainant discovered that he was never issued a notarial commission in
Mandaluyong City. In support thereof, she attached a Certification, 4 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, attesting that he was not a commissioned notary public
in said city.
Report and Recommendation
5
In her Report and Recommendation,   dated February 10, 2016, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-
Maala (Commissioner VillanuevaMaala) recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for a
period of five (5) years. She stressed that respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him, in spite of
due notice and order to attend the scheduled hearings, illustrated his flouting resistance to the lawful orders
of the court, which deserves disciplinary action. In addition, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala noted that
notarizing documents without a notarial commission constituted gross misconduct and deserved to be
punished.
In its February 25, 2016 Resolution, 6 the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala. The resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT with modification the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner reducing the
penalty to THREE (3) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW to make it commensurate with the
gravity of the offense committed. 7
Hence, the case was transmitted to the Court for review.
 The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG but modifies the penalty imposed.
In Mariano v. Atty. Echanez,  8 the Court reiterated that notarization is not a hollow act which may be brushed
aside lightly:
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is
invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document into
a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. 9
Any transgression of the notarial rules should not be treated trivially but must be punished accordingly to
preserve the integrity of notarization.1âwphi1 Under the rules, only persons who are commissioned as notary
public may perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the
commission. 10
In the present case, it was sufficiently established that respondent was without a notarial commission when
he notarized the affidavits he offered in evidence. This was supported by the certification issued by the RTC of
Mandaluyong City that from January 1998 until August 2005, respondent was never commissioned as a notary
public. A lawyer who notarizes documents without a valid notarial commission is remiss in his professional
duties and responsibilities. 11
Further, it is noteworthy that respondent did not even attempt to answer the accusations against him. He
failed to comply with the orders of the investigating commissioner and he did not attend the scheduled
hearings. On this ground alone, respondent could have been penalized more heavily because he was bound to
comply with all the lawful directives of the IBP, not only because he is a member, but more importantly
because the IBP is the Court-designated investigator of his case. 12
Thus, the Court agrees with the suspension meted against respondent. In addition, he should be forever
barred from being commissioned a notary public all over the Philippines after exhibiting conduct, which
renders him unfit to perform the sacred duties of a notary public. Respondent deliberately performed notarial
acts despite full knowledge that he was never commissioned as a notary in Mandaluyong City.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rolando B. Arellano is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years
and PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a Notary Public.
This order is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to the personal record of
Atty. Rolando B. Arellano; the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all lower courts; and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for proper guidance and information.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11380, August 16, 2016
JEN SHERRY WEE-CRUZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHICHINA FAYE LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
1
This administrative case arose from a Complaint  for disbarment or suspension filed by Jen Sherry Wee-Cruz
(complainant) against Atty. Chichina Faye Lim (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The IBP found respondent guilty of gross misconduct because of her issuance of worthless checks to
complainant's brother. The IBP Board of Governors thereafter resolved to disbar respondent from the practice
of law.2chanrobleslaw

As a preliminary matter, this Court reiterates that it alone has the power to discipline lawyers and remove
their names from the rolls.3 The IBP Board of Governors may only recommend the dismissal of a complaint or
the imposition of disciplinary action on a respondent lawyer.4chanrobleslaw

While it adopts the factual findings of the IBP, this Court finds that the penalty of suspension for two years will
suffice.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The parties to this case were childhood friends.5 This relationship enabled respondent to borrow substantial
amounts of money from complainant and the latter's brother.6 Complainant enumerated three instances
when her trust was abused by respondent in order to obtain loans the latter could not pay.

First instance. In 2008, respondent asked if she could use the credit card of complainant to purchase
something.7 As the latter was then unable to get out of the house because of a delicate pregnancy, she had to
ask respondent to withdraw PI0,000 from her ATM card to pay for her credit card bill.8Complainant tendered
both her ATM card, which had an available balance of P78.000, and her credit'card.9 She later found out that
respondent had depleted all the funds in the ATM card and used up a considerable amount from the cash
advance limit of the credit card.10 Despite the repeated demands of complainant and the consequent
execution of a promissory note by respondent, the latter still failed to pay the principal amount of P1 42,000
and the interests thereon that had accrued.11chanrobleslaw

Second instance. Also in 2008, respondent incurred a P1.055 million loan from complainant's brother.12The
loan was covered by postdated checks, which were later dishonored and returned by the bank for the reason
that the account had been closed.13 In September 2010, respondent issued a promissory note, which remained
unfulfilled as of the date of filing of the Complaint.14chanrobleslaw

Third instance. In February 2010, respondent issued postdated checks payable to "Cash" as partial payment of
the outstanding loan accommodation for more than f 3 million, which had been extended to her by
complainant.15 These checks were later dishonored and returned by the bank for the reason that the account
had been closed.16chanrobleslaw

Complainant and her brother repeatedly called and sent text messages to petitioner to inform her that her
checks had been dishonored and to demand that she make good on her checks.17 On 7 October 2010,
complainant personally handed a demand letter to respondent.18 As the latter still failed to honor her
promises to pay, complainant instituted a criminal complaint. The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable
cause to indict respondent for four counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (B.P. 22); and Article 315,
par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.19chanrobleslaw

On 15 March 2011, complainant lodged a Complaint against respondent before the IBP.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE IBP

Despite due notice, respondent did not submit an Answer, appear at the mandatory conference, or submit a
position paper.20chanrobleslaw

IBP Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III took the silence and nonparticipation of respondent as an admission
of guilt.21 He pointed out that her attitude was a clear defiance of the commission and the institution it
represented.22 Hence, he recommended that respondent be suspended until she is able to pay in full her
indebtedness to complainant's brother.23chanrobleslaw

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Abelita
with the modification that respondent be disbarred, not merely suspended. The board considered her
disrespect and disregard of its orders as an aggravating circumstance.24chanrobleslaw

On 14 April 2016, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. She asserts that she
did not exhibit any immoral or deceitful conduct because the acts were done in her private
capacity.25cralawred She insists that she exhibited good faith and an honest intention to settle, as she made
partial payments amounting to P1.2 million.26 She blames complainant for not giving adequate time for the
former to settle the face value of the checks.27 In closing, respondent submits that disbarment would be too
harsh a penalty, considering the absence of bad faith, malice or spite on her part.28chanrobleslaw

THE RULING OF THE COURT

Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Respondent cannot evade disciplinary sanctions by implying that there was no attorney-client relationship
between her and complainant. In Nulada v. Paulma,29 this Court reiterated that by taking the Lawyer's Oath,
lawyers become guardians of the law and indispensable instruments for the orderly administration of justice.
As such, they can be disciplined for any misconduct, be it in their professional or in their private capacity, and
thereby be rendered unfit to continue to be officers of the court.30chanrobleslaw

In this case, complainant and her brother categorically stated that they had agreed to lend substantial
amounts of money to respondent, because "she's a lawyer."31 Indeed, lawyers are held by the community in
very high esteem; yet respondent eroded this goodwill when she repeatedly broke her promises to pay and
make good on her checks.

On several occasions, this Court has had to discipline members of the legal profession for their issuance of
worthless checks. In Enriquez v. De Vera,32 the correlation between BP 22 and administrative cases against
lawyers was explained:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not, he was
nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the
unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the
pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath
that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws.
This Court, however, agrees with respondent that the penalty of disbarment would be too harsh. Recognizing
the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of an erring lawyer, this Court held in Anacta
v. Resurrection33 that disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe would accomplish
the end desired.

In Nulada, this Court cited Heenan v. Espejo34 A-l Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,35Dizon v. De

Taza,36 and Wong v. Moya 37 as basis for meting out two-year suspensions to lawyers who had issued in
worthless checks and failed to pay their debts. In Sanchez v. Torres,38 the same penalty was imposed. The
respondent lawyer therein was found guilty of wilful dishonesty and unethical conduct for failing to pay his
debt and for issuing checks without sufficient funds. As in this case, Atty. Torres exploited his friendship with
the complainant therein in order to borrow a substantial amount of money. We find it appropriate to impose
the same penalty on respondent in this case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Chichina Faye Lim is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in her personal record at the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in
the land.

SO ORDERED.

Ernesto Y. Wee, complainant v. Attys. Roger Z. Reyes and Romeo G. Bernaje, reposndents

Source: SUN Star Bacolod

2 lawyers in Bacolod sanctioned for notarizing forged documents

THE Supreme Court (SC) has penalized two lawyers for allegedly notarizing several forged documents.
In a full court ruling promulgated by Deputy Clerk of Court Anna-Li Papa-Gombio dated April 18, 2017 but was
released to the media only recently, the SC found lawyers Roger Reyes and Romeo Bernaje guilty of violation
of the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
“Here, the failure of Attorneys Reyes and Bernaje to observe the utmost diligence in the performance of their
duties as notaries public not only damaged to Wee who was directly affected by the documents which they
notarized, but also eroded the public’s confidence in the notarial system, and brought disrepute to the legal
profession,” the SC said.
According to Reyes, “the court immediately revokes his notarial commission; perpetually disqualifies him from
being commissioned as a notary public; and suspends him from practice of law for two years.”
Bernaje was only reprimanded.
"Furthermore, this court warns both [Reyes and Bernaje] that repetition of the same or similar conduct shall
be dealt with more severely," the court held.
The case stemmed from the complaint of Ernesto Wee who narrated that sometime in December 2005, doctor
Marichi Ramos bought on installment his Toyota Hi-Ace Grandia van. Their transaction was completed with
Ramos eventually paying in full the amount of the purchase price.
In 2009, Ramos offered to buy another vehicle from Wee, his Nissan Frontier pick-up truck; however, Wee
found out that Ramos had already sold the same to a car dealer named Ricardo Uy who subsequently sold it to
another person, a certain Harjender Gill.

The car documents containing Wee’s name and forged signature were notarized by Reyes. Only the deed of
sale executed by Uy in favor of Gill was notarized by Bernaje.
This led to the filing of disbarment complaint against Bernaje and Reyes. (PNA)
A.C. No. 2404, August 17, 2016
NILO B. DIONGZON, Petitioner, v. ATTY. WILLIAM MIRANO, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who agrees to represent a client's interests in the latter's business dealings is duty-bound to keep the
confidence of such client, even after their lawyer-client relationship had ended. If he represents any other
party in a case against his former client over a business deal he oversaw during the time of their professional
relationship, he is guilty of representing conflicting interests, and should be properly sanctioned for ethical
misconduct.

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for review of the Resolution No. 2013-160 adopted by the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on the complaint for disbarment filed by the complainant against
respondent Atty. William Mirano,1 whereby the IBP Board of Governors found the respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interest, and recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
one year. The respondent assails the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

Antecedents

On the dates material to this case, the complainant was a businessman engaged in the fishing industry in
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. In 1979, he retained the respondent as his legal counsel to represent him as
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 10679 then pending in the City Court of Bacolod City (Branch 1). In November
1981, the complainant again retained the respondent as his lawyer in relation to the execution of two deeds
of sale covering the boats the former was selling to Spouses Almanzur and Milagros Gonzales (Gonzaleses).2  In
January 1982, the parties herein signed a retainer contract for legal services that covered legal representation
in cases and transactions involving, the fishing business of the complainant.3chanrobleslaw

In February 1982, the Gonzaleses sued the complainant for replevin and damages, and sought the annulment
of the aforementioned deeds of sale.4 They were represented by Atty. Romeo Flora, the associate of the
respondent in his law office. It appears that the bond they filed to justify the manual delivery of the boats
subject of the suit had been notarially acknowledged before the respondent without the knowledge and prior
consent of the complainant;5 and that the respondent eventually entered his appearance as the counsel for
the Gonzaleses against the respondent.6chanrobleslaw

On May 24, 1982, therefore, the complainant initiated this administrative complaint for disbarment against
the respondent by verified letter-complaint.7chanrobleslaw

The respondent thereafter sought several times the extension of the time for him to file his comment.

In the meantime, Atty. Flora, in an attempt to explain why the respondent had appeared as counsel for the
Gonzaleses, filed a manifestation claiming that the Gonzaleses had been his own personal clients, and that he
had only requested the respondent's appearance because he had been indisposed at the time.8chanrobleslaw

The complainant belied the explanation of Atty. Flora, however, and pointed out that Atty. Flora was actually a
new lawyer then working in the law office of the respondent.9 As proof, the complainant submitted the
stationery showing the letterhead of the law office of the respondent that included Atty. Flora's name as an
associate.10chanrobleslaw

In his answer dated September 9, 1982,11 the respondent stated that the complainant had been his client in a
different civil case; that the complainant had never consulted him upon any other legal matter; that the
complainant had only presented the deeds of sale prepared by another lawyer because he had not been
contented with the terms thereof: that he had not been the complainant's retained counsel because the
retainer agreement did not take effect; that he had returned the amount paid to him by the complainant; that
he had appeared for the Gonzaleses only after their evidence against the complainant had been presented;
that the complainant had approached him when he needed a lawyer to defend him from an estafa charge:
and that the complainant had even wanted him to falsify documents in relation to that estafa case, but
because he had refused his bidding, the complainant had then filed this administrative case against
him.12chanrobleslaw

Proceedings before the IBP

The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. The case was heard over a long period of time
spanning 1985 to 2003,13 and the IBP Board of Governors finally recommended on February 13, 2013 that the
respondent be held guilty of conflict of interest for appearing as the counsel for the opponents of the
complainant with whom he had an existing lawyer-client relationship, a gross violation of his ethical duties as
an attorney; and that he should be punished with suspension from the practice of law for one year.

The Court noted the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors on April 1, 2014.

The respondent filed in this Court a Manifestation with Motion and a Supplement to Manifestation with
Motion, wherein he proceeded to argue against the findings although he initially claimed not to have been
furnished with the IBP Board of Governors' recommendation. He posited that he still had a pending Motion for
Reconsideration in the IBP, and requested that this case be remanded to the IBP for disposition.

Ruling of the Court

We uphold the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors because they were substantiated
by the records.

On the preliminary matter of procedure being raised by the respondent, it is unnecessary to remand this case
to the IBP for further investigation and disposition by the IBP. Remanding the case to the IBP would be
superfluous and unnecessary. The complaint was filed in 1982, and since then the case underwent three
decades of hearings before different investigating commissioners of the IBP. The matters subject of the
complaint were extensively covered and sifted. In our view, the records are already adequate for resolution of
the charge against the respondent, which, after all, is something that only the Court can ultimately do.

Was the respondent guilty of representing conflict of interest?

The lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a legal concern.
The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or other legal concerns, or for representation of the client
in an actual case in the courts or other fora. From that moment on, the lawyer is bound to respect the
relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of his client. No written agreement is necessary to
generate a lawyer-client relationship, but in formalizing it, the lawyer may present a retainer agreement to be
considered and agreed to by the client. As with all contracts, the agreement must contain all the terms and
conditions agreed upon by the parties.

In this case, the respondent presented such a retainer contract to the complainant, the terms of which are
stated below:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CLIENT retains and employs the ATTORNEY to take charge of the legal matters of the former in connection
with his fishing business, and the attorney accepts such retainer and employment subject to the following
terms and conditions, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 1. That the term of this contract shall be for two "2" years beginning February, 1982 but is deemed
automatically renewed for the same period if not terminated by both parties by virtue of an agreement
to that effect and signed by them;

2. That the compensation to be paid by the client for the services of the attorney, .shall be three hundred
pesos (P300.00) a month;

3. That the attorney may be consulted at all times by CLIENT on all business requiring his professional
advice and opinion and when the ATTORNEY gives a written opinion, a copy shall be sent to the CLIENT;

4. That the duties of the attorney in this retainer contract shall include consultations,  opinions,  legal 
advices, preparations and drafting of contracts and other legal papers, and other legal works, in
connection with the business of the CLIENT, except those cases involving trials  in  court,  which  if they 
are  entrusted to  the ATTORNEY, shall be subject to a new agreement;14
Both parties signed their retainer contract on January 20, IS82. Contrary to the assertion of the respondent,
the retainer agreement did not contain a suspensive condition that affected its effectivity as of the date of its
execution. It simply stipulated that the respondent would represent the interests of the complainant in all
matters pertaining to his fishing business, thereby formalizing their lawyer-client relationship. The
respondent's insistence that the complainant should return all the checks to the Gonzaleses relative to the
sale of the fishing boats was clearly not part of the contract.

The lawyer-client relationship between the parties was duly established beginning in 1979 and lasted until
1982. The respondent's claim that he returned the retainer fee did not alter the juridical existence of their
lawyer-client relationship. When the complainant consulted him on the sale of the boats to the Gonzaleses,
the respondent reviewed the contracts of sale in the capacity of the complainant's lawyer, and even notarized
the same. He became aware of the details of the sale by virtue of the confidentiality generated by his lawyer-
client relationship with the complainant.

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Specifically, Canon 15.03 demands that: "A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts." A conflict of interest exists where a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two opposing parties,
like when the lawyer performs an act that will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represented him, or when the lawyer uses any knowledge he previously acquired from his first client against
the latter.15 The prohibition against conflict of interest is founded on principles of public policy and good taste,
inasmuch as the lawyer-client relationship is based on trust and confidence.16 A lawyer has a duty to preserve
his client's confidence in him, even if their relationship ends. The purpose is to assure freedom of
communication between the lawyer and the client in order to enable the former to properly represent and
serve the latter's interests. To use against the latter any information the former gains during the relationship is
deplorable and unethical.

When he appeared in court for the benefit of the Gonzaleses to try the case against the complainant, the
respondent unquestionably incurred a conflict of interest. Having become privy to the terms of the sale
subject of the civil case, the conflict of interest became unmitigated because the complainant had not
expressly consented in writing to his appearing in behalf of the Gonzaleses. It would have been more prudent
for him to have excused himself from representing either party in the civil case.

In cavalier fashion, the respondent has cited his accomplishments as a member and officer of the IBP in his
region to buttress his claim of being more credible than the complainant, supposedly a convicted felon. But
such a defense is unworthy of consideration in this instance because the praiseworthiness of one's
accomplishments and professional reputation never furnishes the license for any ethical lawyer to flagrantly
and knowingly violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On the penalty, we note that suspension from the practice of law for one year was imposed on the lawyer who
had appeared as defense counsel for the accused in an estafa case despite having written and sent the
demand letter for the complainant in the same case.17 In another case, the same penalty was imposed on the
lawyer who had initially drafted a deed of sale for the client, and who eventually filed a case against said client
to annul the same contract.18 Such penalty is appropriate and commensurate for this case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution adopted on February 13, 2013 by the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; FINDS and DECLARES Atty. William N. Mirano guilty of ethical
misconduct due to conflict of interest, and, ACCORDINGLY, SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for ONE
YEAR, effective immediately upon receipt of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Mirano in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Minerva T. Correa vs. Atty. Gabirle Quemado

 A.C. No. 10465, June 08, 2016
SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA J. EUSTAQUIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR R.
NAVALES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated January 16, 2010 filed by complainants spouses Lamberto V.
Eustaquio and Gloria J. Eustaquio (complainants) against respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales (respondent),
praying that respondent be meted the appropriate disciplinary sanction/s for failing to pay rent and to vacate
the apartment he is leasing despite demands.

The Facts

Complainants alleged that they are the owners of an apartment located at 4-D Cavite St., Barangay Paltok,
SFDM, Quezon City, which they leased to respondent under a Contract of Lease2 dated April 16, 2005.
However, respondent violated the terms and conditions of the aforesaid contract when he failed to pay
monthly rentals in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and to vacate the leased premises despite repeated
oral and written demands.3 This prompted complainants to refer the matter to barangay conciliation, where
the parties agreed on an amicable settlement, whereby respondent promised to pay complainants the amount
of P131,000.00 on July 16, 2009 and to vacate the leased premises on July 31, 2009. Respondent eventually
reneged on his obligations under the settlement agreement, constraining complainants to file an ejectment
case4 against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 40 (MeTC-Br. 40),
docketed as Civil Case No. 09-39689. Further, complainants filed the instant case before the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), contending that respondent miserably failed to
exemplify honesty, integrity, and respect for the laws when he failed and refused to fulfil his obligations to
complainants.5chanrobleslaw

Despite notices,6 respondent failed to file his Answer, to appear in the mandatory conference, and to file his
position paper.
Meanwhile, the MeTC-Br. 40 promulgated a Decision7 dated December 8, 2009 in the ejectment case in favor
of the complainants and, accordingly, ordered respondent to vacate the leased premises and to pay
complainants the following amounts: (a) P139,000.00 representing unpaid rentals as of July 2009; (b) further
rental payments of P8,000.00 per month starting August 17, 2009 until the actual surrender of said premises
to complainants; (c) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and (d) cost of suit.8chanrobleslaw

During the pendency of the case, respondent was appointed as an Assistant City Public Prosecutor of Quezon
City.9chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation10 dated February 8, 2011, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found
respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same shall be dealt with more severely.11 It was found that respondent displayed unwarranted obstinacy in
evading payment of his debts, as highlighted by his numerous promises to pay which he eventually reneged
on. In this light, the IBP Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and, thus, should be held administratively
liable.12chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution13 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid
report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution14 dated September 15, 2014 adopting
and approving the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of the IBP and, accordingly,
meted respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

As per Registry Return Card No. 957,15 respondent received the Court's order of suspension on October 16,
2014.16 Records are bereft of any showing that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and, thus, the
Court's order of suspension against him became final and executory.

Events Following the Finality of Respondent's Suspension

On September 7, 2015 and upon request from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a
Certification17 was issued by the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC-Br. 38) stating that respondent has
been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present. In
connection with this, the MeTC-Br. 38 wrote a letter18 dated September 8, 2015 to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC), inquiring about the details of respondent's suspension from the practice of law. In view of
the foregoing, the OCA indorsed the matter to the OBC for appropriate action.19chanrobleslaw

Despite due notice from the Court,20 respondent failed to file his comment to the aforementioned Certification
issued by MeTC-Br. 38.

The OBC's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation21 dated February 10, 2016, the OBC recommended that respondent be
further suspended from the practice of law and from holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for a
period of six (6) months, thus, increasing his total suspension period to one (1) year, effective immediately.22 It
found that since respondent received the order of suspension against him on October 16, 2014 and did not
move for its reconsideration, such order attained finality after the lapse of 15 days therefrom. As such, he
should have already served his suspension. In this relation, the OBC ratiocinated that since respondent was
holding a position .which requires him to use and apply his knowledge in legal matters and practice of law, i.e.,
Assistant City Prosecutor, he should have ceased and desisted from acting as such. However, as per the
Certification dated September 7, 2015 of the MeTC-Br. 38, respondent never complied with his order of
suspension. In view thereof, the OBC recommended to increase respondent's suspension from the practice of
law and from holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for an additional period of six (6)
months.23chanrobleslaw

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

After due consideration, the Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the OBC and adopts the same
in its entirety.

It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. As such, when the
Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from
holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.24 The practice of law embraces any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and
experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind
of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's Resolution26 dated September 15, 2014
suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final and executory
fifteen (15) days after respondent received a copy of the same on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent should
have already commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension. However, respondent never heeded the
suspension order against him as he continued discharging his functions as an Assistant City Prosecutor for
Quezon City, as evidenced by the Certification27 issued by MeTC-Br. 38 stating that respondent has been
appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071,28 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 2010,"
provides the powers and functions of prosecutors, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor. - The provincial prosecutor or
the city prosecutor shall:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Be the law officer of the province of the city officer, as the case may be;

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal
laws and ordinances within  their  respective jurisdictions,  and  have  the  necessary information or complaint
prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he/she or any
of his/her assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral evidence of witnesses, and for this
purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath before him/her, and the
attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to any trial court;
and cralawlawlibrary
(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances
in the courts at the province or city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal
actions, subject to the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof.
Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows that the government office of Assistant City
Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent's continuous discharge of
his functions as such constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court's order of suspension
against him.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court
and wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so - acts which respondent is guilty of in this case
- are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court, in Lingan v. Calubaquib,29Feliciano v.
Bautista-Lozada30 and Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya31 consistently imposed an additional six (6)-month
suspension from the practice of law to erring lawyers who practiced law despite being earlier suspended.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it proper to mete the same penalty to respondent in
addition to the earlier six (6)-month suspension already imposed on him, as recommended by the OBC. Thus,
respondent's total period of suspension from the practice of law - and necessarily, from the holding the
position of Assistant City Prosecutor as well - should be fixed at one (1) year.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "[d]isbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law
profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court,
in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the
end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible."32chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales is found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months
from his original six (6)-month suspension, totalling one (1) year from service of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Dialoson A. Amil vs. Atty. Naguib G. Sinarimbo

______________________________________________________________________________________
Meriam G. Balagtas v. Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez

A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016

TERESITA P.
FAJARDO, Co mplainant, v. ATTY.
NICANOR C.
ALVAREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This administrative case involves the determination of whether a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the
National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health is authorized to privately practice law, and
consequently, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable under the
principle of quantum meruit.

Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She
hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and administrative cases
before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The parties have differing versions of the facts as summarized by the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Teresita's version of the facts is as
follows:

Around 2009, Teresita hired Atty. Alvarez to handle several cases filed against her before the Office of the
Ombudsman.1 Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental
Health.2 He asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.3 However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his appearance
before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the Ombudsman who could
help with dismissing her case for a certain fee.5 Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the amount of
P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases
against Teresita dismissed.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal
from service, respectively.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she gave.8 Atty. Alvarez
promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to fulfill this promise.9 Teresita sent a demand
letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On the other hand, Atty. Alvarez claims the following:

Atty. Alvarez is Legal Officer III of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health.11 He
has authority to engage in private practice of the profession.12 He represented Teresita in several cases before
the Office of the Ombudsman.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Atty. Alvarez and Teresita had an arrangement that Teresita would consult Atty. Alvarez whenever a case was
filed against her.14 Atty. Alvarez would then advise Teresita to send him a copy of the complaint and its
attachments through courier.15 Afterwards, Atty. Alvarez would evaluate the case and call Teresita to discuss
his fees in accepting and handling the case.16 A 50% downpayment would be deposited to Atty. Alvarez's or his
secretary's bank account.17 The balance would then be paid in installments.18 The success fee was voluntary on
Teresita's part.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On July 10, 2009, Atty. Alvarez received a call from Teresita regarding a meeting at Shangri-La Mall to discuss
the decision and resolution she received from the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing her from service for
dishonesty and indicting her for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, respectively.20 Atty. Alvarez
accepted the case and asked for P500,000.00 as acceptance fee.21According to Atty. Alvarez, he arrived at the
amount after considering the difficulty of the case and the workload that would be involved, which would
include appeals before the Court of Appeals and this Court.22 However, the fee is exclusive of filing fees,
appearance fees, and other miscellaneous fees such as costs for photocopying and
mailing.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Atty. Alvarez claimed that he prepared several pleadings in connection with Teresita's case:

(1) motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in

connection with the administrative case;
(2) motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in connection with the criminal case;
(3) petition for injunction filed on October 15, 2009 before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City; and
(4) petition for preliminary injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed before the Court of
Appeals on November 18, 2009, and the amended petition on November 26, 2009.24

Atty. Alvarez also said that he prepared several letters to different government officials and
agencies.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Atty. Alvarez alleged that Teresita made staggered payments for the amounts they agreed on.26 Teresita only
paid the balance of the agreed acceptance fee equivalent to P450,000.00 on February 11, 2010.27While
Teresita paid P60,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses, she did not pay the expenses for other legal work
performed and advanced by Atty. Alvarez.28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On the last day for filing of the petition for review of the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision, Teresita
informed Atty. Alvarez that she was no longer interested in retaining Atty. Alvarez's services as she had hired
Atty. Tyrone Contado from Nueva Ecija, who was Atty. Alvarez's co-counsel in the cases against
Teresita.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On June 1, 2011, Teresita filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant a Verified Complaint praying for the
disbarment of Atty. Alvarez.30 This Court required Atty. Alvarez to file his comment on the complaint within 10
days from notice.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On December 7, 2011, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report,
and recommendation.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In his Report and Recommendation33 dated November 12, 2012, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A.
Villamayor found Atty. Alvarez guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended
Atty. Alvarez's suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.34 Atty. Alvarez was also ordered to return
the amount of P700,000.00 to Teresita with legal interest from the time of demand until its full payment.35 The
dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding Respondent guilty of committing unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts of the Canon of
Professional Responsibility, [it] is recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year in the practice of law
and he be ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to the Complainant within two (2) months from
receipt of this order with legal interest from the time of demand, until fully paid, with a warning that
repetition of [a] similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.36cralawred
On the unauthorized practice of law, the Investigating Commissioner found that while Atty. Alvarez claimed
that he was authorized by his superior to privately practice law, the pleadings he allegedly prepared and filed
did not bear his name and signature.37 Hence, the Investigating Commissioner stated
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The time that Respondent spent in following up the case of Complainant in the Office of the Ombudsman is a
time lost to the government which could have been used in the service of many taxpayers[.]38cralawred
In any case, granting that Atty. Alvarez was authorized by his superior to practice his profession, the
Investigating Commissioner stated that Atty. Alvarez was prohibited to handle cases involving malversation of
funds by government officials such as a municipal treasurer.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found that the attorney's fees Atty. Alvarez asked for were
unreasonable:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
From all indication, Complainant was forced to give to the Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00 because
of the words of Respondent that he has friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who can help with a fee. That
because of that guarantee, Complainant was obligated to shell out every now and then money for the
satisfaction of the allege[d] friend of the Respondent[.]

Complainant is an ordinary Municipal Treasurer of a 4th or 5th class municipality and the amount of attorney's
fees demanded by the Respondent is very much excessive. . . . The exorbitant amount that he demanded from
complainant is too much for a lowly local government employee. What the Respondent did is not only illegal,
immoral and dishonest but also taking advantage of a defenseless victim.

....

While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable fees, no hard and fast rule may be set in the
determination of what a reasonable fee is, or what is not. That must be established from the facts of each
case[.]

....

The fees claimed and received by the Respondent for the alleged cases he handled despite the fact that the
records and evidence does not show that he ever signed pleadings filed, the amount of P700,000.00 is
reasonable, thus, fairness and equity dictate, he has to return the excess amount of P700,000.00 to the
complainant[.]40cralawred
In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-77841 dated June 21, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors adopted the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that complaint [sic] is guilty of unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts,
Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with [a] Warning that
repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more sever[ejly. Further, he is Ordered to Return the amount of
P700,000.00 to complainant with legal interest from the time of demand.42 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
Atty. Alvarez moved for reconsideration of the Resolution,43 but the Motion was denied by the Board of
Governors in Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-28644 dated May 3, 2014. The Resolution
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-778 dated
June 21, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.45 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
We resolve the following issues:

First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National
Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health, is authorized to engage in the private practice of
law; and

Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle
of quantum meruit.

The Investigating Commissioner did not make a categorical declaration that respondent is guilty of
unauthorized practice of his profession. The Investigating Commissioner merely alluded to respondent's
unauthorized practice of law.

We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.

Respondent claims that he is authorized to practice his profession46 as shown in the letter dated August 1,
2001 of National Center for Mental Health Chief Bernardino A. Vicente.47 The letter
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
TO           :            ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ
                            Legal Officer III 
                            This Center

Subject    :            Authority to engage in private practice of profession

This refers to your request for permission to engage in private practice of your profession.

In accordance with Administrative Order No. 21, s. 1999 of the Department of Health, which vested in the
undersigned the authority to grant permission for the exercise of profession or engage in the practice of
profession, you are hereby authorized to teach or engage in the practice of your profession provided it will not
run in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a whole. In the exigency of the
service however, or when public interest so requires, this authority may be revoked anytime.

Please be guided accordingly.

[sgd.]
BERNARDINO A. VICENTE, MD, FFPPA, MHA, CESO IV
Medical Center Chief II48 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this case, his surreptitious
actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized practice, his acts also show badges of offering
to peddle influence in the Office of the Ombudsman.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,49 the modern concept of the term "practice of law" includes the more traditional
concept of litigation or appearance before courts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending
or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts
for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who,
in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law."cralawred
....

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975)
listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at
law within the meaning of the statute."cralawred
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

....

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law," particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Arty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.50 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib:51
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill."

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law. In Cayetano v.
Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work
rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent" is
practice of law.52 (Citations omitted)cralawred
By preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to complainant, respondent practiced law.

Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 1986,53government
officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their profession unless authorized by
their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the practice of profession must not conflict nor tend
to conflict with the official functions of the government official or employee:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Republic Act No. 6713:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:. . . .

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions[.]

Memorandum Circular No. 17:

The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head of the ministry or
agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any real or
apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge
of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer or member
of the board of directors",cralawred
subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in
the interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service Commission.cralawred
In Abella v. Cruzabra,54 the respondent was a Deputy Register of Deeds of General Santos City. While serving
as an incumbent government employee, the respondent "filed a petition for commission as a notary public
and was commissioned . . . without obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of the Department of
Justice."55 According to the complainant, the respondent had notarized around 3,000 documents.56 This Court
found the respondent guilty of engaging in notarial practice without written authority from the Secretary of
Justice. Thus:

It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she did not obtain a
written permission from the Secretary of the D[epartment] [of] J[ustice]. Respondent's superior, the Register
of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming
that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that written permission.
Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed her petition for commission as a
notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center for Mental Health,
whose authority was designated under Department of Health Administrative Order No. 21, series of
1999.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and against government
in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.

Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the requirement that his
practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a
whole."59ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local Government,60 the petitioner was an incumbent City Councilor
or member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bago City. He was a lawyer by profession and had continuously
engaged in the practice of law without securing authority from the Regional Director of the Department of
Local Government.61 In 1989, the petitioner acted as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang and
filed a case for Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages against Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia, City
Engineer of Bago City.62ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an administrative case before the Department of Local Government for
violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 and relevant Department of Local Government
memorandum circulars on unauthorized practice of profession, as well as for oppression, misconduct, and
abuse of authority.63 While the case was pending before Department of Local Government, the petitioner was
able to secure a written authority to practice his profession from the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, "provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions."64ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This Court in Javellana observed that the petitioner practiced his profession in conflict with his functions as
City Councilor and against the interests of government:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of
their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public
office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer
Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which
petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a
judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting
them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum
Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of R[epublic] A[ct] [No.] 6713) prohibiting a government official
from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to
the government.

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor
the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law.
The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for
public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private
practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.65cralawred
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of government. The Office
of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is
going against the same employer he swore to serve.

In addition, the government has a serious interest in the prosecution of erring employees and their corrupt
acts. Under the Constitution, "[p]ublic office is a public trust."66 The Office of the Ombudsman, as "protectors
of the [P]eople,"67 is mandated to "investigate and prosecute . . . any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient."68ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee represents another government
employee or public officer in a case pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. The incumbent officer
ultimately goes against government's mandate under the Constitution to prosecute public officers or
employees who have committed acts or omissions that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.69 Furthermore, this is consistent with the constitutional directive that "[p]ublic officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the [P]eople, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the erring officer or employee but to continue to uplift the
People's trust in government and to ensure excellent public service:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]hen an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of that officer or
employee, but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence
in the government. . . . These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere
rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the public
service.71cralawred
Having determined that respondent illicitly practiced law, we find that there is now no need to determine
whether the fees he charged were reasonable.

In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the complainant must prove his or her
allegations through substantial evidence.72 In Advincula v. Macabata,73 this Court dismissed a complaint for
disbarment due to the lack of evidence in proving the complainant's allegations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit
probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at
bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or
allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.74 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)cralawred
Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or penalized unless it is shown that they committed a
transgression of their oath or their duties, which reflects on their fitness to enjoy continued status as a
member of the bar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct
which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those
acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction
unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfltness to continue in the
practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer
to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered.75cralawred
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew people from the
Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in complainant's case.

Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their
profession.76Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a favorable outcome for
complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff in the Office where the case was
pending.77ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.0278prohibit
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.79 Respondent's act of ensuring
that the case will be dismissed because of his personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of
the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 780 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."

In relation, Canon 1381 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client
violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.82 This act of influence peddling is highly immoral
and has no place in the legal profession:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge—or a judge evincing a willingness—to discuss,
in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judge's sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that
Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla,
leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his client's favor.
This conduct is not acceptable in the legal profession.83cralawred
In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr.,84 we disciplined the respondent for preparing a release order for his clients using the
letterhead of the Department of Justice and the stationery of the Secretary:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration
from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the
codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may
be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people's faith in the judicial process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To that end, their clients'
success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer,
even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.

....

Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must always be within the bounds of the law. A self-
respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of
the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import
of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the
offense.85cralawred
Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Rañeses,86 we disbarred a lawyer who solicited bribe money from his
client in violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Rañeses
merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications
of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer's relations to the
client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.

First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent. It is false because no
bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed
purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by
giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means—a decidedly
black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his
cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.

From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as
an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as
these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all—to all lawyers, their clients and the general
public—that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of
the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not
compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.87 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage influence peddling, and in the interest of
maintaining the high ethical standards of employees in the judiciary, this Court did not hesitate in dismissing
its own employee from government service when she peddled influence in the Court of Appeals:88
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring court personnel
peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately
resulting in the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the
so-called "bad eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme
penalty of dismissal in an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.89cralawred
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant was "forced to give . . . Respondent the amount of
P1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that he ha[d] friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who
c[ould] help with a fee."90 It is because of respondent's assurances to complainant that she sent him money
over the course of several months.91 These assurances are seen from the text messages that respondent sent
complainant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

SUBJECT:

Cnbi ko dun sa kontak dati na magbibigay tayo na pera sa allowance lang muna later na ang bayad pag labas
ng reso at kaliwaan pero sbi nya mas maganda kung isasabay na ang pera pagbgay ng letter mo sa omb..
Parang dun tayo nagkamali pero ang solusyon ay sana ibalik nila ang pera . . in d meantime hindi dapat
apektado ang kaso at kailangan an Appeal sa CA at may deadline yun

DATE: 31-05-2010 

TIME: 5:24 pm 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Gud pm pnro, naLBC n b ang Reso? Kung Jan un pnrmahn ... 

DATE: 21-05-2010 

TIME: 5:13 pm 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Pnro sbi ng Dep Omb la png cnabi sa knya ng Omb. Ang CA Reso pnaiwan n Orly @ studyohn nya (txt kontal)
DATE: 15-04-2010 

TIME: 6:07 pm 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Yung blessing pala ni gutierez ang hnhntay ng overall dep omb si orly at dun din siya subok kuha letter pero
nasbhan na si gutierez ng dep omb for Luzon sbi ko pwwde b nila gawin total alam na ni gutierez. . . Maya
tawag ko sayo update

DATE: 15-04-2010 

TIME: 12:44 pm 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

SUBJECT:

Gud mrng Tess hindi na svmagot kahapon tnxt ko pero minsan hndi tlga sumasagot yun nag ttxt lang
pagkatapos kaya lang d mo pala naiintindihan ang txt nya bisaya "istudyahun" ibig sabihn kausapin pa so nasbi
na nya sa omb yung letter at istudzahan pa

DATE: 31-03-2010

TIME: 8:25 am 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Ok panero update ko na lang client pero nag txt tlga kailangan daw nya letter habang wala pa omb reso., Txt
mo lang ko panero, have a nice holidays., (sagot ko yan tess)

DATE: 03-03-2010 
TIME: 5:03 pm 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Sa dep omb for Luzon na nya follow up ang MR at saka overall dep omb si orly dun nya kukunin letter

DATE: 30-03-2010 

TIME: 5:00 pm 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Gud pm pnro. Ang Dep. Omb. My closd dor mtng pro pnkta s knya ang note q at sabi rw bumalik aq aftr Holy
wk. C Orly nman ay ngsabi n es2dyuhn p rw nya.

DATE: 30-03-2010

TIME: 4:52 pm 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Binigay ko na pera kahapon at kinausap ko para sa letter magkikita pa kami marnaya las 2 at kukunin nya copy
letter natin kay sales at CA reso

DATE: 15-04-2010 

TIME: 12:32 pm 

TYPE: Text Message
....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Tess ndpst mo na? Kakausapin ko kasi na qc na lang kami kita at malapit ako dun maya at hindi na sa crsng.
Tnx

DATE: 14-04-2010 

TIME: 1:29 pm 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Gud pm pnro. Ok ba ang 15k rep maya 6pm? Thnx (txt ng kontak tess kausapin ko mbuti sa letter)

DATE: 14-04-2010 

TIME: 10:25 am 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

SUBJECT:

Pnro ung rep alo n bngay mo 1st Mar 24 ay ok Ing pra s 2 falo-ups q Mar 25 @ Mar 30. As usual, magkita tau
Apr 14 @ kunin q 20th para sa falo-up Apr 15 thnx

DATE: 08-04-2010 

TIME: 10:58 am 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:
Ok panero kailangan malinaw din ang presentation lp sa client panero at ang impression nya yun na ang hningi
natin... so april 15 panero an balik mo sa MR at yung letter form omb to dof bhala ka na sa diskarte panero pag
nakakuha tayo nakahanda na 150k dun

DATE: 08-04-2010 

TIME: 10:56 am 

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Pnero dapat maalala mo n ung purpose ng 400th hindi directly delivery ng Reso granting d MR pro ung delivery
by the Dep Omb ng letr of appeal 2 d Omb at pgpaliwang nya sa Omb. Re sa hnhngi ng rspondnt n modfcation
ng Dcsion. Nung 1st mtng ntn Mar 24, ngin4m q sau n ngawa n i2 ng Dep Omb pro kausapn p ng Omb c Orly.
Itong huli ang nabtn p, pro yon ay dscrtion n ng Omb@ wing control d2 and Dep. Omb.

DATE: 08-04-2010 

TIME: 10:55 am

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

SUBJECT:

Tess gud mrng, wag mo kalimutan mgdpst 25k today 6pm mtng naming omb tnx.

DATE: 24-03-2010 

TIME: 10:23 am

TYPE: Text Message

....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> 

SUBJECT:

Gud pm uli pnro. Kung subukan q n lkrn ky Orly ung cnabi mong letr adrsd 2 DOF Sec @ synd n Orly ang letr,
pktanong s rspndnt kung ok b s knya nab yarn nya aq ng Atty's fee n 75thou upfront @ another 75thou upon
receipt of a DOF ordr holdng n abyans implmntation of hr dsmsal due 2 Orly's letr? thnx

DATE: 11-03-2010 

TIME: 7:03 pm

TYPE: Text Message92cralawred
In response to his alleged text messages, respondent claims that complainant must have confused him with
her other contacts.93 Respondent found it "mesmerizing" that complainant was able to save all those alleged
text messages from two (2) years ago.94 Moreover, assuming these messages were "true, still they [were] not
legally admissible as they [were] covered by the lawyer-client privileged communication as those supposed
texts '[had been] made for the purpose and in the course of employment, [were] regarded as privileged and
the rule of exclusion [was] strictly enforced.'"95ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, "[t]he transaction is always done in secret and often only
between the two parties concerned."96 Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner and as
shown by the records, we rule that there is enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.

We agree with the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. We
find respondent's acts of influence peddling, coupled with unauthorized practice of law, merit the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law. To be so bold as to peddle influence before the very
institution that is tasked to prosecute corruption speaks much about respondent's character and his attitude
towards the courts and the bar.

Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with regulators, investigators,
judges, or Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and debase themselves even as they claim to
be members of a noble profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to one's ability to have illicit access.
Rather, it should be about making an honest appraisal of the client's situation as seen through the evidence
fairly and fully gathered. It should be about making a discerning and diligent reading of the applicable law. It is
foremost about attaining justice in a fair manner. Law exists to temper, with its own power, illicit power and
unfair advantage. It should not be conceded as a tool only for those who cheat by unduly influencing people or
public officials.

It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even imply to a client that a lawyer knows who will make a
decision is an act worthy of the utmost condemnation. If we are to preserve the nobility of this profession, its
members must live within its ethical parameters. There is never an excuse for influence peddling.

While this Court is not a collection agency for faltering debtors,97 this Court has ordered restitution of amounts
to complainants due to the erroneous actions of lawyers.98 Respondent is, therefore, required to return to
complainant the amount of P500,000.00—the amount that respondent allegedly gave his friends connected
with the Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00
with legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
April 18, 2017
A.C. No. 9209
NENITA DE GUZMAN FERGUSON, Complainant 
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR P. RAMOS, Respondents
DECISION
Per Curiam,
Before the Court is the Complaint-Affidavit, 1 filed by Nenita De Guzman Ferguson (complainant), seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Salvador P. Ramos (Atty. Ramos) for falsification, violation of notarial law and engaging in
private practice while employed in the government service.
The Antecedents
Complainant alleged that on November 25, 2007, she purchased a house and lot located in San Rafael,
Bulacan, for the sum of ₱800,000.00; that without her knowledge, the seller obtained a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) mainly to.transfer the title of the said property to her name; that the seller was
unaware that the said CLOA was void ab initio as the subject land was not an agricultural land and there
existed a 10-year prohibition to transfer the subject land; that in 2009; complainant instituted a petition for
the cancellation of the CLOA before the DAR Office; that the defendants were represented by Atty. Ramos,
who was the Chief Legal Officer of DAR-Provincial Office in Bulacan; that complainant withdrew the petition
before the DAR and filed the case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos City (RTC); that upon
receipt of the Answer, complainant found out that it was strikingly similar to the one filed by the defendants in
the DAR, which was prepared by Atty. Ramos; that complainant discovered that the Deed of Sale,2 dated April
24, 2009, which became the basis of the transfer of title was fraudulently altered as it only covered the sale of
the land, not the house and· lot, and the price indicated was only ₱188,340.00, not the amount of
₱800,000.00 3 that she actually paid; that her signature and that of her husband, Douglas Ferguson -
(Douglas), were forged; that Atty. Ramos notarized the deed of Sale without their presence;· and that
complainant and her husband neither appeared, executed nor acknowledged any document before Atty.
Ramos as they never met him in person.
In his Comment, 4 Atty. Ramos denied that he represented the defendants in· the case before the DAR but he
admitted that he notarized their Answer. With respect to the charge of falsification of the April 24,
2009 Deed of Sale and the notarization of the aforementioned deed, Atty. Ramos likewise denied any
participation and countered that his signature as a notary public was forged. Atty. · Ramos, nonetheless,
admitted that he notarized the "genuine" Deed of Sale, 5 dated May 12, 2009, executed between vendor
Alfredo Inosanto, and vendees complainant and her spouse, involving the same property for the amount of
₱300,000.00.6 Atty. Ramos surmised that whoever benefited from such dastardly act could be the culprit in
the falsification of the document as the forged deed of sale which indicated a lesser purchase price was the
one presented in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan in order to evade payment of a higher capital gains tax.
In its Resolution, 7 dated February 29, 2012; the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The case was then set by the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP for mandatory conference.
Thereafter, parties were required to submit their respective position papers.
In its Report and Recommendation,8 dated November 21, 2014, the CBD found Atty. Ramos guilty of violating
the law on notarial practice and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year and, in case he held a commission as a notary public; that it be revoked and that he be
disqualified to act as a notary public for a period of two (2) years to be counted after his suspension. The CBD
stated that the defense of forgery, without any corroborative evidence, was not credible. As to the charge that
of engaging in a private practice while employed in the government service against Atty. Ramos, the
CBD'opined that it should be addressed to the Civil Service Commission for the determination of his
appropriate administrative liability.
In its Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2015-458,9 dated June 6, 2015, the IBP-Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the report and recommendation of the CBD, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part· of this
Resolution as Annex "A", finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and
applicable laws and Respondent's notarization of a document in the absence of the parties'· in violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Thus, Respondent Atty. Salvador P. Ramos' notarial commission, if presently
commissioned, is immediately REVOKED. Furthermore, he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
Notary Public for two (2) years and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but differs on the imposed penalty.
Section1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states:
The acknowledgment shall be before· a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to
take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or
the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is·
his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he isrequired by law to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
The importance of the affiant's personal appearance was further emphasized in Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the
Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which specifically provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The afore-quoted rules clearly mandate that a notary public, before notarizing a document, should require the
presence: of the very person who executed the same. Thus, he certifies that it was the same person who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what were stated
therein. 10 The presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary ·public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the affiant. 11
In the present case, Atty. Ramos denied having notarized the April 24, 2009 deed of sale and claimed that his
signature was forged. He even alluded that the person who benefited from it could be the forger as the capital
gains tax liability was reduced. He, nonetheless, admitted notarizing the "genuine" deed of sale, dated May 12,
2009.
Regardless of who the culprit was and the motive of such forgery, Atty. Ramos .cannot be exonerated from
liability.
A perusal of the record would reveal that Douglas, one of the parties in the; deed of sale, was not in the
Philippines on May 12, 2009, the day the "genuine" deed of sale was notarized. Complainant presented a copy
of Douglas' passport indicating that he entered the Philippines only on May 26, 2001 and left on June 12, 2001.
This substantially established that indeed Douglas could not have personally appeared before Atty. Ramos
when he notarized the deed.
Moreover, an examination of the April 24, 2009 and May 12, 2009 deeds of sale disclosed that both
documents bore the same document number, page number and book number of the notarial registry of Atty.
Ramos. If, indeed, the April 24, 2009 deed of sale, which was issued earlier was forged, how would the
purported culprit know the details of Atty. Ramos' notarial registry?
It must be emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It is imbued with
public interest and only those who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries public. 12 In the case
of Gonzales v. Ramos,  13 the Court explained the significance of the act of notarization, thus:
By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a
private document into a public document. Such act is no empty gesture. The principal function of a notary
public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a
document under his hand and ··seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the
purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity
which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given
without further proof of their execution and delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgement executed before a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Hence, a notary
public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and
fidelity.
Not only did Atty. Ramos fail to comply with the Rule on Notarial Practice when he notarized the deed of sale
without the presence of the parties but he likewise violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which obliges a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes; and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. 14
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, Atty. Ramos was mandated to exercise the function of his office
and must observe with utmost care the basic formalities of his office and requisites in the performance of his
duties. 15When Atty. Ramos affixed his signature and notarial seal on the deed of sale, he led us to believe that
the parties personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents thereof. His
conduct was fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a
document that our courts and the public accord on notarized documents. 16 Certainly, Atty. Ramos failed to
exercise the functions of the office and to comply with the mandates of the law.
In the case of Santuyo v. Atty. Hidalgo, the respondent lawyer similarly denied having notarized the subject
deed of sale. The Court found him negligent not only in the supposed notarization but in allowing the office
secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by
him alone. He was suspended from his commission as notary public and was disqualified from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two years.
In the case of Ocampo-lngcoco v. Atty. Yrreverre, Jr.,  18 the respondent lawyer was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for notarizing a document without the appearance of the parties.
The Court held that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the truth of the contents
therein.
In line with these cases, the Court finds the suspension of Atty. Ramos for six (6) months in order.1âwphi1
With respect to the allegation that Atty. Ramos was engaged in a private practice while employed in the
government service, the Court agrees with the CBD that the issue should be brought before the Civil Service
Commission for the determination of his appropriate administrative liability, if any.
Finally, this Court cannot ignore the averments of Atty. Ramos that there were two (2) deeds of sale covering
Transfer Certificate of Title No. CLOA-T-15831. One was the April 24, 2009 Deed of Sale which was presented
to the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, and the other one was the May 12, 2009 Deed of Sale which was kept on
file at the Notarial Section of the RTC. Both deeds were registered in the Notarial Registry of Atty. Ramos with
document number 354, page number 71 and Book VII series of 2009. Because of this irregularity, the Court
deems it proper to refer this matter to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the assessment of the correct tax
and for, investigation for possible prosecution of the criminal liability of the culprits under the National
Internal Revenue Code.
WHEREFORE, finding Atty. Salvador P. Ramos GUILTY of violating the Rule on Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01
and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for six (6) months; REVOKES his notarial commission, effective immediately; and PERMANENTLYBARS him
from being commissioned as notary public, with a STERNWARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
conduct will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to the personal record of
Atty. Salvador P. Ramos; the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all lower courts; and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for proper guidance and information.
The Civil Service Commission and the Bureau of Internal Revenue should likewise be given copies of this
decision for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED.

Melinda P. Tiongson
represented by Primo S.
Tiongson v. Atty. Reginal L. Jose
Joie S. Ramos v. Atty. Teresita C. Marbibi

NOTE: Wala pong Jung 7, 2017, April 19, 200

lang po.

REMBERTO C. KARA-AN, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1674

Complainant, [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1550-MTJ]

 
Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,

CARPIO,

JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO, CARPIO MORALES,

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, TINGA, and

BRANCH 55, JUDGE EDISON VELASCO, JR., JJ.

F. QUINTIN, METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURT BRANCH 56;

and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT

MA. FE BRENDA J. TRAVINO,

Respondents. Promulgated:

April 19, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed against respondents Judge Fransciso S. Lindo (Judge Lindo), Presiding

Judge of Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 55, Judge Edison F. Quintin (Judge Quintin), Presiding Judge
of MeTC, Branch 56, and Fe Brenda J. Travino (Ms. Travino), Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC Branch 55, all
of Malabon City, for Dishonesty; Gross Misconduct; Gross Ignorance of the Laws, Rules and Procedures;
Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); Violation of Articles
171, 172, 206 and 220 of the Revised Penal Code; and Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons of
Judicial Ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to Civil Case No. JL00-128 (the Civil Case)
for damages entitled Remberto C. Kara-an v. Hector Villacorta, et al.

In a Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated 8 March 2004, complainant Remberto C. Kara-an alleges that respondent

Judge Lindo issued an Order[2] dated 6 March 2002 voluntarily inhibiting himself from trying the Civil Case. On
even date, the order of inhibition was transmitted to and was received by Branch 56, presided over by
respondent Judge Quintin who was then the Executive Judge of Malabon MeTC.[3]
Complainant claims that although Judge Quintins office received a copy of Judge Lindos order of inhibition on
the same date, Judge Quintin did not take any action thereon until 3 February 2004.[4]Complainant contends
that Judge Quintin violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case within three (3) months
from 6 March 2002, citing Section 16, Article III and Section 15 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.[5]

Complainant moreover alleges that Judge Lindo and Ms. Travino violated Articles 207 (malicious delay in the
administration of justice) and 220 (illegal use of public funds or property) of the Revised Penal Code. He avers
that it took Judge Lindo and Ms. Travino from 6 March 2002 to 28 January 2004 to transmit the records of the
case from Branch 55 to Branch 56 upon Judge Lindos inhibition.[6]

Complainant also assails the Order dated 6 March 2002 issued by Judge Lindo and the Order dated 3 February
2004 issued by Judge Quintin for treating the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the Civil Case as a
pending incident even if said motion does not contain any notice of hearing and is therefore a mere scrap of
paper.[7]

Complainant alleges that when the respondent judges committed the illegal acts, they took advantage of their
positions and illegally used public funds and properties which are intended only for lawful purposes.[8]

Complainant Kara-an thus charges the respondents with the following:

1. Violation of Article 171 (falsification by public officer, employee); Article 172 (use of falsified
document); Article 206 (knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order or negligently
rendering such interlocutory order); Article 207 (malicious delay in the administration of
justice); Article 220 (illegal use of public funds or property), all penalized under the Revised
Penal Code:

2. Dishonesty and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019);

3. Willful violation and/or gross ignorance of the law, rules and procedure;

4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars;

5. Untruthful statements in the narration of facts which violates the lawyers oath;

6. Gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Lawyers Oath,
Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, such as:
a. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Rule 1.01- A judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, probity and independence;

b. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Rule 1.02- A judge should administer justice

impartially;

c. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, Rule 2.01- A judge should at all times promote

public confidence in the integrity and the impartiality of the judiciary;

d. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, Rule 2.03- A judge should not allow family, social
or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment;

e. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Rule 3.09- A judge should organize and supervise
the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require
at all time the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity;

f. Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct;

g. Lawyers Oath;

h. Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 1.01- A lawyer should not engage

in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct;

i. Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 10.01- A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any, nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice;

j. Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 10, Rule 10.03-A lawyer shall observe the

rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice;

k. Canons of Judicial Ethics (Administrative Order No. 162) Canon 3- Avoidance of

Impropriety;

l. Canons of Judicial Ethics (Administrative Order No. 162) Canon 22 Infractions of Law;

m. Canons of Judicial Ethics (Administrative Order No. 162) Canon 30- Social Relations;
and

n. Canons of Judicial Ethics (Administrative Order No. 162) Canon 31- Summary of
Judicial Obligations.

7. Violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) xxx causing undue injury to any party
(complainant), or giving any private party (the defendants in the Civil Case) any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of respondents official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
[9]
  

Complainant prays that judgment be rendered against respondents ordering their disbarment and dismissal
from public service.[10]

In his Comment[11] dated 12 April 2004, Judge Lindo avers that simultaneous with the filing of the instant
complaint, complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon a complaint alleging violation
by the respondents of Articles 171, 172, 206, 207 and 220 of the Revised Penal Code arising from
Judge Lindos disposition of the Civil Case.[12]

Judge Lindo next states that complainant had previously filed on 26 February 2002 an administrative
complaint against Judge Lindo, Ms. Travino and Deputy Sheriff Ruben C. Tan for their acts performed in
connection with the Civil Case. The case, docketed as A.M. OCA I.P.I.-02-5203-MTJ, was dismissed by the
Second Division of the Court on 8 September 2003.[13]

Judge Lindo avers that such acts amount to willful and deliberate forum shopping which is a ground for the
summary dismissal of the instant complaint with prejudice. He also asserts that such acts constitute direct
contempt and calls for administrative sanction.[14] Judge Lindo contends that complainant is a losing and
disgruntled litigant, acting as counsel for himself, who filed the instant unfounded and malicious case and the
criminal cases before the prosecution office to put him to shame, public ridicule or contempt.

With regard to the charge of making untruthful statements in violation of Article 171 (falsification by public
officer) of the Revised Penal Code, Judge Lindo contends, in refutation, that he cannot find any order or orders
issued by him that violate said provision.[15]

Concerning the charge of violation of Article 172 (falsification by private individual and use of falsified
documents) of the RPC, Judge Lindo asserts that the charge is not only preposterous but also without sense.
Judge Lindo also denies giving unwarranted benefits or causing injury to any person. He likewise claims that
the orders he issued in the Civil Case were in accord with law and procedure.[16]

Further, Judge Lindo argues that he cannot be faulted for the delayed transmittal of the records of the Civil
Case. He points to the Courts Circular No. 10, dated 22 May 1987 which states that with respect to
multiple sala courts, only the order of inhibition shall be forwarded to the Executive Judge for appropriate
action. The records of the case shall be kept in the docket of the court concerned while awaiting instruction
and/or action of the Executive Judge thereon.[17]

 
Finally, Judge Lindo states that complainant should have resorted to judicial review of the orders instead of
filing the instant complaint which is not a substitute for such review.[18]

By way of a 2nd Indorsement[19] dated 14 April 2004, Judge Quintin contends that complainants charges stem

from two (2) acts attributed to him, viz: (1) his alleged failure, as Executive Judge of MeTC, to timely act on the
order of inhibition; and (2) his issuance of an Order dated 3 February 2004 setting the Civil Case for further
proceedings, as there was a pending motion to dismiss filed by defendants which had not been acted upon by
Judge Lindo.[20]

Judge Quintin states that although the order of inhibition had been received by his office on 6 March 2002, the
same did not reach his personal attention until Judge Lindo asked him to duly act on it. Since the order could
not be located, Judge Quintin requested the transmittal of the records of the Civil Case. Upon receipt of the
records on 28 January 2004, he issued the assailed Order dated 3 February 2004.[21]

Judge Quintin claims that he had no alternative but to set the Civil Case for hearing to tackle the pending
motion to dismiss. Judge Quintin maintains that even if the notice in the motion is defective for failing to state
the date of hearing, the defect is cured by the courts cognizance thereof and by the fact that the adverse party
had been notified of the existence of the pleading.[22]

Lastly, Judge Quintin submits that there is no probable cause against him for malicious delay in the
administration of justice. For delay to be malicious, there must be a deliberate intent to inflict damage on the
complainant and there is none shown in this case.[23] Judge Quintin thus prays that the instant complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit.

For her part, Ms. Travino categorically denies all the accusations against her. She claims that the charges were
intended to harass her as the first administrative complaint had been dismissed by

the Court.[24] Ms. Travino also stresses that she is not guilty of delay in the transmittal of the records of the
Civil Case. She had merely relied on the Circular which states that only the order of inhibition should be
transmitted to the Executive Judge.[25]

Thereafter, complainant filed his Reply and five (5) more supplemental replies reiterating his previous
submissions.

Records show that the case started when complainant, as attorney-in-fact for Teofila Beduya Cinco, filed a
claim for survivorship with the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO). Because of the alleged delay in the
processing of Cincos claim, complainant filed a case against Hector Villacorta, Ferdinand Paler and John Does,
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 6713. In
August 2000, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.

As a result, complainant filed the Civil Case against Villacorta and Paler of the PVAO and
Alan Caares, Rudiger Falcis II and Orlando Casimiro of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the military.
The case was raffled to Branch 55 of the MeTC of Malabon presided over by Judge Lindo. Summonses issued
by said court were served only on Caares, Falcis II and Casimiro. The other two defendants connected with the
PVAO could not be served. Then, Caares, Falcis II and Casimiro filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action. The motion was set for hearing by Judge Lindo on 1 March 2002 but complainant filed an ex-
parte motion for inhibition. Judge Lindo issued the assailed Order dated 6 March 2002 voluntarily
inhibiting himself from hearing the Civil Case. The order of inhibition was sent to and received by Branch 56
presided over by Judge Quintin. However, it appears that Judge Quintin did not act on it until 3 February 2004,
when he issued the Order of even date noting the inhibition and setting the motion to dismiss for hearing on 5
March 2004.[26]

In its Report[27] dated 30 June 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the instant
case be re-docketed as an administrative matter and that Judge Quintin be fined in the amount of
P5,000.00 for his delayed action on the order of inhibition. With respect to Judge Lindo, the OCA
recommended that he be reprimanded as his failure to devise an efficient recording and filing system in
his sala contributed to the undue delayed action on his inhibition. The OCA likewise recommended that
Ms. Travino be fined for her failure to report the inactive status of the Civil Case to the presiding judge.

The matter was thereafter referred to Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., Vice-Executive Judge of the RTC
of Malabon City for investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Aquino, however, failed to terminate
the case as complainant moved for his inhibition. Upon receipt of the motion, Judge Aquino voluntarily
inhibited himself from trying the administrative case. Thus, the Court referred the case to a consultant at the
OCA for investigation, report and recommendation. Justice Romulo S. Quimbo was designated as Hearing
Officer of the case.[28]

In his Report dated 2 March 2007, Justice Quimbo recommended that Judge Quintin be held guilty of delay in
the resolution of the inhibition of Judge Lindo and that a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) be imposed
on him. Justice Quimbo further recommended that the case be dismissed against Judge Lindoand Ms. Travino.
[29]
Justice Quimbo held that Judge Lindo and Ms. Travino were not under any obligation to follow up on the
status of the order of inhibition after they have duly transmitted the same to Judge Quintin.[30]

Notably, Justice Quimbo opined that respondents are charged with a litany of imagined sins without evidence
to support the same except the vivid imagination of the complainant and his self-serving and dogmatic
interpretation of the law and rules.[31]

In the course of his investigation, Justice Quimbo suspected that the Civil Case may not be the only case where
complainant was appearing. A cursory look at complainants stationery (envelop) would lead one to assume
that he is practicing law. Thus, Justice Quimbo recommended that the first level courts, particularly in Metro
Manila, be asked to report to the Court whether complainant has any other appearances in their salas.[32]

After a careful study, the Court is of the opinion that Judge Quintin is guilty of delay in resolving the order of
inhibition.

Record reveals that Judge Lindos order of inhibition dated 6 March 2002 was received by

Judge Quintinssala on the same day. Records also show that no action had been taken on the order until 3
February 2004. It appears that the order of inhibition was misplaced and could not be found as
Judge Quintin required the transmittal of the records of the Civil Case. Nevertheless, Judge Quintin cannot
escape liability simply because the order was not brought to his personal attention.

If indeed the order got lost or misplaced, Judge Quintin should have conducted an inquiry into the matter.
While it may be true that the instant he received the records of the Civil Case on 28 January 2004, he
immediately issued an order 3 February 2004, still his inaction on the order for almost two (2) years is not
excused.

Judge Quintin likewise cannot escape liability by ascribing blame to his court employees in that the order was
never brought to his attention. Judges are ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in their courts. They
cannot be allowed to use their staffs as shields to evade responsibility for mistakes and mishaps in the course
of the performance of judicial duties. The subordinates are not the guardians of the judges responsibilities.[33]

It is the duty of judges to devise an efficient recording and filing system in their courts to enable them to
monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition.[34] In Ricolcol v. Camarista,[35] the
Court aptly ruled:

 
 A judge ought to know the cases submitted to her for decision or resolution and is expected to
keep her own record of cases so that she may act on them promptly. It is incumbent upon her
to devise an efficient recording and filing system in her court so that no disorderliness can
affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management is
as much her responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her
official functions.[36]

 The Court however increases the amount of the fine imposed to Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) pursuant
to jurisprudence.[37]

With respect to Judge Lindo and Ms. Travino, the Court is also of the opinion that after duly transmitting the
order of inhibition to Branch 56, they were under no obligation to inquire into its status. However, had both
closely supervised the preparation of the trial courts semestral docket reports, they would have noticed the
pending incident and would have promptly called the attention of Judge Quintin on the matter. Thus, the
Court reminds Judge Lindo and Ms. Travino of their duty to closely supervise and monitor
the semestral docket inventories to forestall future occurrences of this nature. Pertinently, the Court held
in Gordon v. Lilagan:[38]

The physical inventory of cases is instrumental to the expeditious dispensation of justice.

Although this responsibility primarily rests in the presiding judge, it is shared with the court
staff. This Court has consistently required Judges for a continuous inventory of cases on a
monthly basis so that a trial judge is aware of the status of each case. With the assistance of
the branch clerk of court, a checklist should be prepared indicating the steps to be taken to
keep the cases moving. In Juan v. Arias [72 SCRA 404 (1976)], the Court underscored the
importance of this physical inventory stressing it is only by this that the judge can keep himself
abreast of the status of the pending cases and informed that everything is in order in his court.
[39]

Finally, the Court adopts Justice Quimbos recommendation to require the first level courts, particularly in
Metro Manila, to report whether complainant has made any appearances therein.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Edison F. Quintin of Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 56, is hereby
found guilty of GROSS INEFFICIENCY and FINED in the amount of three thousand pesos (P3,000.00). He is
further ADMONISHED to be circumspect in the performance of his judicial functions. A repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The complaint against Judge Francisso S. Lindo Presiding Judge of Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon, Branch
55, and Fe Brenda J. Travino Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC of Malabon, Branch 55 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. However, they are REMINDED of their duty to diligently supervise the preparation of
their semestral docket inventories.

The First Level Courts of Metro Manila are hereby directed to report to the Court whether
complainant Remberto C. Kara-an has any other appearances in their salas.

SO ORDERED.

March 8, 2017
A.C. No. 11043
LIANG FUJI, Complainant 
vs
ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ, Respondent
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the immigration records of an alien, which resulted in the
alien's wrongful detention, opens the special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration to administrative
liability.
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 dated November 23, 2015 filed by Liang Fuji (Fuji) and his
family, against Bureau of Immigration Special Prosecutor Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz (Special Prosecutor Dela
Cruz) for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her issuance of a Charge Sheet against
Fuji for overstaying.
Through a letter2 dated December 8, 2015, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B.
Layusa directed the complainants to file a verified complaint "with supporting documents duly authenticated
and/or affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged"3 in the complaint.
Complainants replied4 by furnishing this Court with copies of the Verified Petition to Reopen S.D. O. No. BOC-
2015-357 (B.L.O. No. SBM- 15-420) and for Relief of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for Immediate
Consideration, and Administrative Complaint (Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint),5 which Fuji filed
with the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, and prayed that the same be treated as their
verified complaint. Complainants further informed this Court that they had difficulty obtaining certified true
copies of the November 21, 2013 Order of the Board of Commissioners, which granted Fuji's Section 9(g) visa,
Summary Deportation Order dated June 17, 2015, and Warrant of Deportation from the Bureau of
Immigration personnel who just gave them the "run[-]around."6 They alleged that the Bureau of Immigration
personnel were not particularly helpful, and did not treat Fuji's case with urgency.7
The facts of this case show that in a Summary Deportation Order8 dated June 17, 2015, Fuji, a Chinese
national, was ordered deported for overstaying. From the Order, it appears that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz
was the special prosecutor who brought the formal charge against Fuji and another person upon her finding
that Fuji's work visa had expired on May 8, 2013, with extension expired on December 6, 2013.9 Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz found that Fuji had overstayed for one (1) year and six (6) months in violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 37(a)(7).10 Her investigation was triggered by a complaint-affidavit dated
April 30, 2015 of a certain Virgilio Manalo alleging that Fuji and another person had defrauded him.11
On June 29, 2015, Fuji filed his Motion for Reconsideration.12
On July 28, 2015, the Bureau of Immigration Intelligence Division served Fuji's Warrant of Deportation, and
thereafter arrested him at Brgy. Maloma, San Felipe, Zambales with the assistance from local police.13 Fuji was
brought to and detained at the Bureau of Immigration Detention Facility, National Capital Region Police Office,
Taguig City.14
On October 9, 2015, the Board of Commissioners denied Fuji's Motion for Reconsideratios.15
On November 23, 2015, Fuji filed his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint.16 Subsequently, on March
10, 2016, Fuji filed an Omnibus Motion to Reopen and Lift S.D.O. BOC-2015-357, and Release on Bail through
counsel.17
On March 22, 2016, the Board of Commissioners issued a Resolution dismissing the deportation charge against
Fuji on the ground that "[t]he records show that Liang has a working visa valid until 30 April 2016 under Jiang
Tuo Mining Philippines, Inc. as Marketing Liason."18 Fuji was directed to be released from Bureau of
Immigration-Warden's Facility on March 23, 2016.19
In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to due process were violated since he was not
afforded any hearing or summary deportation proceedings before the deportation order was issued against
him.20 Fuji further alleged that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably in discharging her duties because
a simple initial review of the Bureau of Immigration records would have revealed that he was not overstaying
because his Section 9(g) work visa was valid until April 30, 2016.21
In her August 25, 2016 Comment,22 respondent Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she committed any
grave misconduct.23 She claimed that Fuji was accorded due process during the summary deportation
proceedings.24 He was directed, through an Order dated May 14, 2015 of the Legal Division, to submit his
Counter-Affidavit/Memorandum, which he failed to do.25 Fuji was also able to file his motion for
reconsideration and verified petition to reopen the case.26
Respondent further claimed that the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the Bureau of Immigration -
Management Information System (BI-MIS) constituted a substantial evidence of Fuji's overstay in the country,
hence, her formal charge had legal basis.27
Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of her
duties.28 She had no intention to violate any law and did not commit any flagrant disregard of the rules, or
unlawfully used her station to procure some benefit for herself or for other persons.29 Respondent pointed out
that the Ombudsman had in fact dismissed the complainant's charges against her.30 She added that Fuji stated
in his March 29, 2016 Affidavit of Desistance that he had mistakenly signed some documents including the
administrative complaint.31
We find respondent administratively liable for her negligence in her failure to ascertain the facts before
levying the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying.
I
Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers in government
service arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint first either to the proper
administrative body that has disciplinary authority over the erring public official or employee or the
Ombudsman.32
For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales,33 this Court dismissed the disbarment complaint against former
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez, former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr., and former
Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, holding that the respondents were public officials being charged for
actions involving their official functions during their tenure, which should be resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman.34 In that case, one (1) of the respondents sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
forum-shopping because he allegedly received an order from the Office of the Ombudsman directing him to
file a counter-affidavit based on the same administrative complaint filed before the Office of the Bar
Confidant.35
Again, in the fairly recent case of Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay,36 the Court dismissed the complaint against
respondents - government lawyers in the Civil Service Commission. The Court held that the acts or omissions
alleged in the complaint were "connected with their . . . official functions in the [Civil Service Commission] and
within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their superior or the Office of the Ombudsman."37 It would
seem that the complainant directly instituted a disbarment complaint with this Court instead of filing an
administrative complaint before the proper administrative body.
This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in Spouses Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records here show
that the Office of the Ombudsman had previously dismissed Fuji's administrative complaint due to the
pendency of his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint before the Bureau of Immigration, and
considered the case closed.38
The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition to reopen his case and ordered his release.
However, it was silent as to the culpability of respondent on the charges levelled by Fuji.
Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman and the
apparent inaction of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's administrative complaint, this Court
considers it proper to take cognizance of this case, and to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
discipline respondent under its "plenary disciplinary authority"39 over members of the legal profession.40
Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported Affidavit of Desistance is not sufficient cause to dismiss this
administrative complaint. This Court has previously held that proceedings of this nature cannot be
"interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."41 The primary object of disciplinary proceedings
is to determine the fitness of a member to remain in the Bar. It is conducted solely for the public
welfare,42 and the desistance of the complainant is irrelevant. What will be decisive are the facts borne out by
the evidence presented by the parties. In Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:43
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff
and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.44
II
Respondent Dela Cruz claimed that she issued the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying on the basis of
the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the BI-MIS.45 A copy of the Memorandum with attachments was
attached to respondent's Comment.46
However, nowhere in the Memorandum was it stated that Fuji "overstayed" or that "Liang's working visa
expired on 8 May 2013 and his TVV expired on 6 December 2013"47 as respondent claims. Relevant portions of
the Memorandum read:
For : ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ
From : ACTING CHIEF, MIS DIVISION
Re : REQUEST FOR IMMIGRATION STATUS; VISA EXTENSION
PAYMENT, LATEST TRAVEL AND DEROGATORY OF THE
FOLLOWING:
1. MR.IMS. LIANG FUJI
2. MR./MS. CHEN XIANG HE
3. MR.IMS. JACKY CHANG HE
Date : 04 June 2015

Further to your request for verification of Immigration Status; Visa Extension

Payment and TRAVEL RECORD/S, please find the result/s as follows:
...
Result/s : 1. LIANG FUJI

- Derogatory Record Not Found

- Latest Travel Record Found (Please see the attached files
for your ready reference. NOTE:
DOB: 18 October 1991)
- Immigration Status Found
- Latest Payment Record Found in BI-Main (Please see the
attached files for your ready reference. NOTE: DOB: 18
October 1991)48

The Memorandum merely transmitted copies of immigration records showing details of filing of applications,
such as official receipts, - and travel record of Fuji. It was respondent Dela Cruz who made the determination
that Fuji overstayed on the basis of the documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS.
Among the documents transmitted by the BI-MIS were computer print-outs showing details of official receipts
dated June 14, 2013, August 7, 2013, and November 19, 2013 for temporary visitor visa extension and official
receipt dated July 15, 2013 for an application for change of immigration status. Also, the travel records of Fuji
show the following details:
Date & Time : 4 June 2015 3:05 PM
Verifier : DIMARUCOT J
Database : TRAVEL-ARRIVAL
TRAVEL TRAVEL FLIGHT IMMIG PORT OFFICER ACTION REMARKS
DATE TIME NO. STATUS
10- 11:34P CZ377 9G NAIAI MIJARES ALLOWED  
FEBRUARY- M
2014
06- 11:51P CZ377 9A NAIAI PARANGU ALLOWED  
JANUARY- M E
2012
22- l CZ377 9A NAIAI NUNEZ ALLOWED49  
 SEPTEMBER- 1:25PM
2011
Fuji's travel records as of June 4, 2015, show his arrival in the Philippines on February 10, 2014 under a work
visa immigration status.50 Simple prudence dictates that respondent Atty. Dela Cruz should have verified
whether or not the July 15, 2013 application for change of status had been approved by the Bureau of
Immigration Commissioners, especially since she had complete and easy access to the immigration records.
Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties. Special prosecutors in the Bureau of Immigration
should exercise such degree of vigilance and attention in reviewing the immigration records, whenever the
legal status and documentation of an alien are at issue. For while a deportation proceeding does not partake
of the nature of a criminal action, it is however, a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting
the freedom and liberty of a person.511âwphi1
Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in her review of the documents transmitted to her by
the BI-MIS, especially as it may ultimately result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective deportee. She
should not have simply relied on the handwritten note by a personnel from the BI-MIS at the bottom portion
of the receipt dated November 19, 2013 for 9A visa extension stating "Valid until: 06-Dec-2013." Had she
inquired further, she would have discovered that Fuji's application dated July 15, 2013 for conversion from
temporary visitor visa (9A) to work visa (9G) was approved by the Board of Commissioners on November 21,
2013 - or one (1) year and seven (7) months earlier - with validity until April 30, 2016. Thus, even if Fuji's
temporary visitor (9A) visa had expired on December 6, 2013 his stay in the country was still valid under the
9G work VISa.
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a government official.52 However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility,53 then she may be subject to disciplinary sanction by this Court.1avvphi1
Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code of the Professional Responsibility, which mandates
that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable." As a special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration, she is the representative, not of
any private party, but of the State. Her task was to investigate and verify facts to determine whether a ground
for deportation exists, and if further administrative action - in the form of a formal charge - should be taken
against an alien.
Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji, she would have found out about the approval of Fuji's
application, which would negate her finding of overstaying. Because of her negligence, Fuji was deprived of his
liberty for almost eight (8) months, until his release on March 23, 2016.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to, give attention to a task due to carelessness or indifference.54 In
this case, respondent's negligence shows her indifference to the fundamental right of every person, including
aliens, to due process and to the consequences of her actions.
Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional obligations consistent
with the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust.55 The ethical standards under the Code of
Professional Responsibility are rendered even more exacting as to government lawyers because they have the
added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics, competence, and
professionalism in public service.56 In this case, respondent's negligence evinces a failure to cope with the
strict demands and high standards of public service and the legal profession.
The appropriate sanction is discretionary upon this Court.57 Under the Civil Service Rules,58 the penalty for
simple neglect of duty is suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. In previous
cases,59 this Court imposed the penalty of suspension of three (3) months to six (6) months for erring lawyers,
who were negligent in handling cases for their clients. We find appropriate the penalty of suspension of three
(3) months considering the consequence of respondent's negligence. This suspension includes her desistance
from performing her functions as a special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz 1s SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months.
The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution, shall immediately serve her suspension. She shall formally
manifest to this Court that her suspension has started, and copy furnish all courts and quasi-judicial bodies
where she has entered her appearance, within five (5) days upon receipt of this Resolution. Respondent shall
also serve copies of her manifestation on all adverse parties in all the cases she entered her formal
appearance.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to Atty. Gemma Armi
M. Dela Cruz's personal record. Copies of this Resolution should also be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its proper disposition, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.

Adm. Matter No. P-17-3754 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-42……….. Magdalena R. Joven, Jose Raul C. Joven and
Nona Catherine Natividad Joven Carnacete v. Lourdes G. Caoli, Br. Clerk of Court, MTCC, Br 1, Baguio City,
Sept. 26, 2017

SOURCE: Midland Courier

SC orders local court worker’s dismissal for grave misconduct

The Supreme Court has found the clerk of court of a municipal trial court in Baguio City guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court personnel and was ordered dismissed from service for giving
improper services to a party to a case in exchange for monetary and other benefits.

In a 10-page en banc decision promulgated on Sept. 26, the Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal from
service of Lourdes G. Caoili, MTC in Cities Baguio Branch 1 clerk of court III, is with prejudice or permanently
precludes re-employment in any government office, branch or instrumentality, including government-owned
or government controlled corporations, with forfeiture of all benefits, except for accrued leave credits.

The SC decision stemmed from a complaint filed by Maria Magdalena R. Joven, Jose Raul C. Joven, and Nona
Catharina Natividad Joven Carnacete in May 16, 2014 charging Caoili with impropriety, conduct unbecoming a
court employee, and grave misconduct.

The complainants claimed that the court employee gave improper services to Margarita Cecilia Rillera, who
was embroiled in various civil cases with the Jovens; and the latter, later with Rillera’s predecessors-in-interest
– by supplying Rillera with spurious court files she later used as documentary evidence, resulting to rulings
against the complainants.

The Jovens alleged that Caoili was giving improper services to aid Rillera in her cases such as securing court
documents, releasing a copy of an unsigned court order, and procuring lawyers for Rillera in exchange for
money and other benefits, such as employing Caoili’s daughter as Rillera’s secretary.
The act was discovered when the complainants filed perjury, use of falsified documents, and falsification of
public documents against Rillera, who testified that Caoili was the source of the spurious documents.

The court employee vehemently denied the allegations and averred there was nothing dishonest or improper
in her act of assisting Rillera to obtain a document as she also extended help to the complainants in some
occasions.

Regional Trial Court Executive Judge Mia Joy O. Cawed, to whom the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
referred the case for investigation, recommended the filing of an administrative case against Caoili after
finding substantial evidence that she violated the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, particularly canons on
fidelity of duty, conflict of interest, and performance of duties.

The OCA adopted the investigating judge’s ruling.

The SC en banc agreed that it has been established through factual findings and conclusions that the
respondent gave aid to Rillera using her employment as stenographer, among others; that she gave advice and
updates to Rillera as regards the case; and she was receiving monthly remuneration from the latter for such
aid, and her daughter was employed as the latter’s private secretary, which is another form of remuneration. 

“Without doubt, respondent’s actions damaged the integrity of the service, jeopardized the public’s faith in
the impartiality of the court, and eroded the public’s respect for the institution,” the SC ruled.

“Time and again, we have emphasized that the conduct of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk must always be beyond reproach and
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
All court personnel should be reminded that they have no business getting personally involved in matters
directing emanating from court proceedings unless expressly provided law. The reason is that the image of the
courts of justice is reflected in the conduct, official or otherwise, of even its minor employees,” the High Court
added.

The SC also noted that the respondent had been previously held liable for falsification of official document
with regard to her daily time record.
Calinico P. Alcano v. Atty. Teodoro D. Nano Jr.
 March 14, 2017
A.C. No. 11385
ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by JANICE MONTERO, Complainant 
vs
ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is sworn to respect the law and
legal processes, and any violation thereof merits condign disciplinary action against the lawyer.
The present complaint asks for the disbarment of Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak for his participation in the forcible
intrusion into the complainant's property.
Antecedents
Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of land located in Ortigas Avenue
Extension, Pasig City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-126797 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal (property).
The complainant alleges that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29, 2012, Atty. Tumulak, accompanied by
uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency, Inc., unlawfully entered and took control of the
entrance and exit of the property. It appears that prior to the incident, Atty. Tumulak had furnished several
documents to the complainant, including the deed of assignment executed by one Henry F. Rodriguez as the
administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes R. Rodriguez designating Atty. Tumulak as an
assignee.1 The documents furnished by Atty. Tumulak were all related to the intestate proceedings of the
Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez docketed as S.P. No. IR-1110 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
34, in Iriga City (RTC), which involved the claim of the heirs of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez to several
parcels of land situated all over the country, including the Provinces of Rizal, Quezon, and Bulacan, and
Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, Antipolo City, Muntinlupa City, Parafiaque City, Marikina City, Baguio
City, Angeles City, San Fernando City and Tagaytay City.2
The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming to have coordinated
with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and forcible intrusion.3 The complainant manifests
that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of his principal in the property was barred by res
judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under its name. Accordingly, his conduct constituted
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of sanction.4
In his answer to the complaint,5 Atty. Tumulak denies having been present when the security guards of
Nationwide Security Agency entered the complainant's property. He insists that the allegations against him
were pure hearsay because Ms. Montero, the representative of the complainant, had no personal knowledge
of the incident; that the documents he had furnished to the complainant included records of the intestate
proceedings in the R TC involving the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez;
that he had no hand in procuring the documents; that he did not himself enter the property; and that the
entry into the property was effected by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution. Report and
Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
After due hearing, IBP Commissioner of Bar Discipline Ricardo M. Espina submitted his Report and
Recommendation,6 wherein he found Atty. Tumulak to have violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Espina recommended the suspension of Atty. Tumulak from the
practice of law for two years.
On October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXII-2015-57 adopting the findings
and recommendation of Commissioner Espina,7 viz.:
RESOLUTION NO. XXII-2015-57
CIBD Case No. 13-3707
Ortigas Plaza Dev't Corp. vs.
Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak
RESOLVED to ADOPT the .findings o.f facts and recommended penalty of 2 years suspension of Atty. Eugenio S.
Tumulak by the Investigating Commissioner.
 Issue
Did Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
facilitated the implementation of the writ of execution and the entry into the complainant's property?
Ruling of the Court
Atty. Tumulak deserves to be severely sanctioned for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Pertinent portions of Commissioner Espina's Report and Recommendation, which adequately illustrated Atty.
Tumulak's transgressions, are worth quoting verbatim, viz.:
We enumerate respondent lawyer's violation of the following rules/principles when he led the forcible
intrusion into OPDC office in Pasig City:
a) Atty. Tumulak knew, or ought to know, that property claims based on Spanish title can no longer be cited
as legitimate basis for ownership as of 16 February 1976 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892;
b) Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner (admitted to the Bar in 1971), is presumed to know that the
Supreme Court has promulgated a case specifically addressing the fake titles arising from spurious "Deed of
Assignment" of the supposed Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. This is the 2005 case of Evangelista, et
al. vs. Santiago [G.R. No. 157447; April 29, 2005] where the same modus as the one adopted by respondent
lawyer, was used by an "assignee" in claiming properties located in Paranque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa,
Cavite, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal,
allegedly as part of the Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez;
c) xxxx;
d) While respondent lawyer claims that the "deed of assignment" in his favor has a consideration,
unfortunately we did not see any agreed consideration in the document. If there is no monetary
consideration, it will be treated as a donation with the corresponding payable taxes. Respondent lawyer's
documents don't show that taxes have been paid for the document to be legally binding;
e) Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally but can only be questioned in a principal action x x x. If
respondent lawyer thinks that OPDC's title on the Pasig property is questionable, he could have filed an action
to annul OPDC's title and not bring in the cavalry, so to speak, in the form of uniformed security guards, to
take over the property; and
f) We find respondent's actions highly questionable and contrary to legal protocol; (i) the court documents
were issued by the RTC-Iriga City, Br. 94; (ii) it "affects" a property located in Pasig City; (iii) respondent lawyer
became the "assignee" of a Pasig City prope11y; (iv) no taxes were paid for the "assignment"; (v) assistance of
the Sheriff of Pasig was not enlisted by respondent, instead, he enlists the help of the Sheriff of Manila; (vi) all
that the Sheriff of Manila did was to deliver the RTC-Iriga, Br. 34 court documents to complainant but with a
twist; the Sheriff and respondent lawyer were escorted by a phalanx of security guards; (vii) the uniformed
guards, obviously upon instruction, took over and/or controlled the gates of OPDC offices with attendant force
and intimidation. Respondent lawyer's claimed innocence cannot prevail over these illegalities of which he, or
his agents, had a hand.
With the above highly questionable acts totally irreconcilable with a seasoned practitioner like respondent
lawyer, we find Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak liable for violation of Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Rule 1.01 and 1.02 thereof. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Commissioner Espina correctly observed that the Court in the 2005 ruling in Evangelista v. Santiago8 had
already enjoined the successors and heirs of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez from presenting the Spanish
title as proof of their ownership in land registration proceedings, as follow:
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous
possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. Yet,
the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their
Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the
Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property on their
possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. If the
Subject Property was already private property before the Spanish conquest, then it would have been beyond
the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced only
as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the
Subject Property by assigmnent, could acquire no better title to the said portions than their predecessors-in-
interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking the Spanish title as basis of their
ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by discontinuing the system
of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands recorded under the
latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It further provides that within six months
from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their land under what
is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no
longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over
real property. P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject
Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners' Complaint that petitioners predecessors-in-interest
complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply
with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting
the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm and record
title already created and vested. By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings under the
Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore
dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in
some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of
ordering its recording or registration.1âwphi1 To rule otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of
P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would
never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration.1âwphi1 This would definitely undermine the
Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to
eliminate.9
Moreover, in Santiago v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,10 the Court denied the petition of the successors
of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by applying the principle of stare decisis, ruling therein that the
applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence were identical to those in the
situation in Evangelista v. Santiago, thusly:
The present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had already expressed in the case of Nemencio C
Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelina M Santiago, that the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de
Propriedad de Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any evidentiary value to establish ownership over real
property.
Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago anchor their right to recover
possession of the subject real property on claim of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez being the sole heir of
the named grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos.
xxxx
Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue of the principle of stare
decisis. Not only are the legal rights and relations of herein parties substantially the same as those passed
upon in the aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the
testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case, under the principle of stare
decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.11
Finally, the 2011 ruling in Pascual v. Robles12 affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) setting aside
the amended decision rendered in S.P. No. IR-1110 by the RTC. This ruling should have alerted Atty. Tumulak
from taking the actions giving rise to the complaint against him inasmuch as he has admitted to have derived
his rights from the deed of assignment executed in his favor by Henry Rodriguez as the administrator of the
Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez pursuant to said amended decision. Moreover, Atty. Tumulak is
presumed as a lawyer to know the developments in S.P. No. IR-1110 not only by virtue of his becoming an
assignee of the estate but also because of his being a lawyer with the constant responsibility of keeping
abreast of legal developments.13
Atty. Tumulak cannot shield himself from personal responsibility behind the deed of assignment. The deed
was doubtful on its face, as borne out by the text, to wit:
DEED OF ASSIGNMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS
This Deed of Assignment is made and executed by and between
The INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE HERMOGENES R. RODRIGUEZ AND ANTONIO R.
RODRIGUEZ, represented by HENRY F. RODRIGUEZ, of legal age, widower, Filipino, x xx Judicial Heir and
Court-Appointed Administrator by virtue of AMENDED DECISION dated August 13, 19999 of Fifth Judicial
Region, RIC
Branch 34, Iriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship, Administratorship and
Settled [sic] of the Estate of Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate, hereinafter referred to as the
ASSIGNOR;
-and-
EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, of legal age, widower x x x hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNEE:
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the ASSIGNOR is the Court-Appointed Administrator and one of the Judicial heirs of the Intestate
Estate of the late HERMOGENES and ANTONIO RODRIGUEZy REYES Estate by virtue of AMENDED DECISION
dated Augsut 13, 1999 of Fifth Judicial
Region, RTC Branch 34, Iriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship,
Administratorship and Settlement of the Estate of Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate,
thereafter, petitions for certiorari filed with the SUPREME COURT assailing the aforesaid Amended Decision
were DENIED and declared FINAL & EXECUTORY in G.R. Nos. 140271, 140915, 168648, 142477 and 182645,
affirming the same Amended Decision;
Whereas, the ASSIGNEE has secured the property and actual occupant/s over the same property they are
presently occupying and initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel and has shown exemplary loyalty and
faithfulness to the ASSIGNOR and also consistently protected the rights and interest of the Estate against
intruder, impostor, usurpers and false claimant with spurious title/s over the same property;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing, the ASSIGNOR has agreed to execute this DEED
OF ASSIGNMENT and the ASSIGNEE, has accepted and both parties have mutually agreed to the following
terms and conditions herein stipulated;
A parcel of land situated in Ortigas A venue corner Raymundo Avenue, Barangay Rosario, Pasig City, Metro
Manila, Island of Luzon, with containing an area of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGTH [sic] HUNDRED AND
NINE[TY] ONE SQUARE METERS (35,891) more or less technical description described below, to
xxxx
1. That the ASSIGNEE shall shoulder all the expenses in the performance of the task as indicated x x x above
such as payment for the real taxes, titling, researching, liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers
involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the said transaction;
2. That the ASSIGNEE shall secure and facilities [sic] all documents from Land Registration Authority, DENR-
LMB, DENR-LMS, Register of Deeds and such other goverm11ent agencies concerned for the completion of
titling process subject to the existing laws, rules and regulation in accordance to Land Registration Act;
3. That the ASSIGNEE shall perform the task of relocation and verification[,] land survey, possessing, fencing,
guarding, surveying and or reviving plans, paying taxes, titling, selling, leasing, developing, segregating and
mortgaging;
4. That the ASSIGNEE shall be the AD-LITEM representative of the ASSIGNOR, before of [sic] any Court[,]
Administrative and Quasi-Judicial body and to bring suit, defend, in connection with the actions brought for or
against the ASSIGNOR of whatever nature and kind; and
5. That the ASSIGNEE shall report regularly to the ASSIGNOR per the above tasks and accomplishment.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their respective signatures on the date 22 March 2010
and place QUEZON CITY above written.14 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible intrusion into the property
just because the complainant did not establish his physical presence thereat at the time. In fact, such physical
participation was not even necessary in order to properly implicate him in personal responsibility for the
intrusion after he admitted having furnished to the complainant the deed of assignment and other documents
as the source of his authority. Specifically, his duties under the deed of assignment included "shoulder[ing] all
the expenses in the performance of [securing the property x x x and initiating steps for recovery of the same
parcel] x x x such as x x x or payment for the real taxes, titling, researching, liaising with government agencies,
paying lawyers involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the
said transaction;" and ''possessing, fencing, [and} guarding" the property.
It is notable in this connection that Atty. Tumulak had been discharging his role as the assignee since the time
of the execution of the deed of assignment on March 22, 2010. Considering that he had been in charge of
doing all the actions necessary to enforce the interest of his principal since March 22, 2010, and that the
forcible intrusion complained about occurred on November 29, 2012, or more than two years from the
execution of the deed of assignment, he is reasonably and ineluctably presumed to have coordinated all the
actions leading to the intrusion.
Finally, even assuming that the amended decision was valid and enforceable, Atty. Tumulak could not
legitimately resort to forcible intrusion to advance the interest of the assignor. The more appropriate action
for him would be to cause the annulment of the complainant's title instead of forcibly entering the property
with the aid of armed security personnel.
All told, Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding settled
rulings in order to commit injustice against the complainant. His conduct betrayed his Lawyer's Oath "to
support [the} Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein." He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.
To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law, and to avoid any act or
omission that is contrary thereto.1âwphi1 The lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his or
her commendable character but also inspires in the public a becoming respect and obedience to the law.15
The sworn obligation of every lawyer under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility to
respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing condition for retaining membership in the Legal
Profession. The lawyer must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession.16 Members of the Bar are reminded, therefore, that their
FIRST Duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than to seek exceptions as loopholes.17 A lawyer
who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act that warrants
disciplinary action against him or her.18
The suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of a lawyer is justified if he or she proves unworthy of
the trust and confidence imposed by the Lawyer's Oath, or is otherwise found to be wanting in that honesty
and integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their professional
duties.19 Although the Court imposed a six-month suspension from the practice of law on erring lawyers found
violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02,20 we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Tumulak
from the practice of law for a period of two years. Such penalty was appropriate and condign in relation to the
misconduct he committed as well as to the prejudice he caused the complainant.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK guilty of violating
the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 1, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of TWO (2) YEARS EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the respondent's
personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the Philippines for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Melgre Granada vs. Atty. Leonardo E. jiz

 _________________________________________________________________________________________
August 9, 2016
A.C. No. 11350
[Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4211]
ADEGOKE R. PLUMPTRE, Complainant 
vs.
ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera for absconding with money
entrusted to him and soliciting money to bribe a judge, On May 13, 2014, complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre
filed a complaint for disbarment1 against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Complainant alleges that on March 7, 2014, he called respondent and asked for help in his application for a
work permit from the Bureau of Immigration.2 They met a few days later, and complainant paid respondent
₱10,000.00 as professional fee. 3
They met again, and complainant gave respondent another Pl 0,000.00, together with his passport. This was
allegedly for the processing of his work permit. 4
They met for a third time since respondent asked complainant to submit ID photos. 5 Respondent asked
complainant for another ₱10,000.00, but complainant refused as they only agreed on the amount of
₱20,000.00.6
Respondent also asked complainant for P8,000.00, allegedly for complainant's other case, which respondent
was also working on.7 He explained that P5,000.00 would be given to a Las Pifias judge to reverse the motion
for reconsideration against complainant, while P3,000.00 would be used to process the motion for
reconsideration. Complainant gave him the P8,000.00.8
Complainant claims that after respondent received the money, he never received any updates on the status of
his work permit and pending court case.9 Further, whenever he called respondent to follow up on his work
permit, respondent hurled invectives at him and threatened him and his wife.10
Complainant would retort by saying that he would file complaints against respondent if he did not give back
the money and passport. That was the last time complainant heard from respondent. 11
After inquiring -and researching on respondent's whereabouts, 12 complainant was able to track down
respondent and get back his passport, which respondent coursed through complainant's aunt. 13 However,
despite the return of complainant's passport, respondent still refused to return the ₱28,000.00 earlier
endorsed to him. 14
Complainant then decided to file a complaint against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. 15
On May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued the Order16 directing respondent to file an
answer to the complaint.
Respondent failed to show up at the September 17, 2014 mandatory conference, 17 as well as at the second
mandatory conference set on October 22, 2014. 18 The parties were directed to submit their verified position
papers, after which the case was submitted for resolution. 19
On May 27, 2015, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent's suspension for two (2) years
from the practice of law and the return of P28,000.00 to complainant.20
On June 20, 2015, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and approved21 the
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation, but modified it to disbar respondent from the practice of law,
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A ", for Respondent's violation of Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17 and
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by his failure to file Answer and to appear in
the Mandatory Conference. Thus, Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys and Ordered to Return the Twenty Eight Thousand
(₱28,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.22(Emphasis in the original)
On April 20, 2016, the Integrated Bar of the, Philippines transmitted the case to this Court for final action
under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.23
This Court modifies the findings of the Board of Governors.
I
Respondent's repeated failure to comply with several Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
requiring him to comment on the complaint lends credence to complainant's allegations. It manifests his tacit
admission. Hence, we resolve this case on the basis of the complaint and other documents submitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
In Macarilay v. Serina,24 this Court held that "[t]he unjustified withholding of funds belonging to the client
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against the lawyer."25 By absconding with the money entrusted
to him by his client and behaving in a manner not befitting a member of the bar, respondent violated the
following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
for legal processes.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the integrated bar.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.1âwphi1 Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.1âwphi1
Rule 18.04. - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.
As his client's advocate, a lawyer is duty-bound to protect his client's interests and the degree of service
expected of him in this capacity is his "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability."26 The lawyer also
has a fiduciary duty, with the lawyer-client relationship imbued with utmost trust and confidence.27
Respondent failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence, and diligence. He not only neglected the
attorney-client relationship established between them; he also acted in a reprehensible manner towards
complainant, i.e., cussing and threatening complainant and his family with bodily harm, hiding from
complainant, and refusing without reason to return the money entrusted to him for the processing of the
work permit. Respondent's behavior demonstrates his lack of integrity and moral soundness.
Del Mundo v Capistrano28 has reiterated the exacting standards expected of law practitioners:
To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency
and morality, including honesty, integrity_ and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will
not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion in consideration of the surrounding facts. 29(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A lawyer must, at no time, lack probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership. 30
II
When complainant refused to give respondent any more money to process his work permit, respondent
persuaded complainant to give him an additional ₱8,000.00 purportedly to ensure that a motion for
reconsideration pending before a Las Pifias judge would be decided in complainant's favor. 31 However, after
receiving ₱28,000.00 from complainant for the work permit and ensuring the success of complainant's court
case, respondent made himself scarce and could no longer be contacted.
Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case was indeed decided in complainant's favor,
respondent's act of soliciting money to bribe a judge served to malign the judge and the judiciary by giving the
impression that court cases are won by the party with the deepest pockets and not on the merits. 32
"A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system."33 Further, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body."34
By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling for the sum of ₱8,000.00, respondent trampled upon the
integrity of the judicial system and eroded confidence on the judiciary. This gross disrespect of the judicial
system shows that he is wanting in moral fiber and betrays the lack of integrity in his character. The practice of
law is a privilege, and respondent has repeatedly shown that he is unfit to exercise it.
III
As for the sufficiency of notice to respondent of the disbarment proceedings against him, this Court notes that
on May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed respondent to answer the complaint against
him, but he failed to file his answer.35 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines set two (2) separate dates for
mandatory conferences36 after respondent failed to attend the first setting, but he failed to appear in both
instances.37 All issuances from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines had the requisite registry receipts attached
to them.
Stemmerik v. Mas38 discussed the sufficiency of notice of disbarment proceedings. This Court held that lawyers
must update their records with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by informing it of any change in office or
residential address and contact details.39 Service of notice on the office or residential address appearing in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines records shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for administrative
proceedings against him or her.40
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera 1s SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.
He is ORDERED to return to complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre the amount of ₱28,000.00 with interest at
6% per annum from the date of promulgation of this Resolution until fully paid. He is likewise DIRECTED to
submit to this Court proof of payment of the amount within 10 days from payment.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in respondent's personal record as a member of the bar, and be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9807, February 02, 2016

ERLINDA SISTUAL, FLORDELISA S. LEYSA, LEONISA S. ESPABO AND ARLAN C. SISTUAL, Complainants, v. ATTY.
ELIORDO OGENA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint,1 dated June 1, 2006, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainants
Erlinda C. Sistual, Flordelisa2 S. Leysa, Leonisa S. Espabo, and Arlan C. Sistual (complainants) alleged that
respondent Atty. Eliordo Ogena (Atty. Ogena), who was the legal counsel of their late father, Manuel A. Sistual
(Manuel), wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified several documents which included, among others, a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA), Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate, Affidavit of Identification of Heirs, Deed of
Donation, and a Deed of Absolute Sale by making it appear that all the children of Manuel and their mother,
Erlinda Sistual (Erlinda), executed the documents; that as a result of the falsification of the said documents,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 60467, registered in the name of "Heirs of Martin Sistual, represented by
Manuel Sistual,"3 was cancelled and was subdivided into several lots; and that these lots were sold to
interested buyers.

In his Answer with Affirmative/Special Defenses and Motion to Dismiss,4 Atty. Ogena denied the allegations.
He averred that in 1987, he was engaged by Manuel to represent the heirs of Martin Sistual in a complaint for
recovery of possession filed by Abid Mendal (Abid) and Abundio Sistual (Abundio)5 that Manuel was the
representative of the Heirs of Martin Sistual; that the heirs of Martin Sistual were able to obtain a favorable
decision6 in the said case; that pursuant to the said decision, Lot 464 was awarded to the heirs of Martin
Sistual and TCT No. T-60467 was issued in their names; that when Manuel died on November 15, 1993, the
heirs of Martin Sistual executed an SPA,7 dated December 31, 1993, designating Bienvenido Sistual
(Bienvenido) as their attorney-in-fact; that Erlinda, the wife of Manuel, manifested her desire to represent the
heirs of Martin Sistual, so her two children, Isidro Sistual and Flordelisa Sistual, also executed an SPA in her
favor; that the heirs of Martin Sistual opposed the appointment of Erlinda and executed another SPA,8 dated
October 5, 1995, in favor of Bienvenido; and that in the October 5, 1995 SPA, Atty. Ogena wrote the names of
complainants Erlinda and Flordeliza Sistual but they did not sign it.

As to the incident that led to the subdivision of TCT No. T-60467, Atty. Ogena explained that Bienvenido, upon
the prodding of the heirs of Martin Sistual with the exception of the complainants, caused the subdivision of
the property covered by TCT No. T-60467 into several sub-lots identified as TCT Nos.
76078,9 76079,10 76080,11 76081,12 76082,13 76083,14 76084,15 76085,16 and 76086,17 and that the corresponding
subdivision plans and technical descriptions thereof were duly approved by the Regional Director, Bureau of
Lands, Davao City; and that the subdivided lots were in the names of all the heirs of Martin Sistual including
the complainants.

On September 7, 1996, the heirs of Dolores Sistual Tulay executed an Extrajudicial Settlement18whereby the
1/7 share of their mother in the lot covered by TCT No. T-60467 was waived, repudiated and relinquished in
favor of their father, Domingo Tulay; that the heirs of Manuel Sistual also executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement19 waiving their 1/7 share in the same property in favor of their mother, Erlinda.
On April 10 and 15, 1997, the heirs of Martin Sistual including complainants executed two deeds of
donation20 in favor of Barangay Lamian conveying the lot covered by TCT Nos. T-76083 and T-76086 to be used
for its public market.

Atty. Ogena denied that the aforementioned documents were falsified as they were actually executed and
duly signed by all the parties therein; and that all the signatures of complainants appearing in the
aforementioned documents were identical; that the deeds of donation were duly attested to by Barangay
Captain Conrado Toledo and the barangay kagawads;21 and that the aforementioned documents did not in any
way prejudiced the complainants. The execution thereof did not defraud them or any of the heirs of Martin
Sistual as the issuance of the nine (9) new and separate titles in the names of all the heirs, as co-owners, was
beneficial and favorable to all of them.

Finally, as to the Absolute Deed of Sale,22 dated July 18, 1989, executed by spouses Manuel and Erlinda in
favor of Socorro Langub, Atty. Ogena also denied that this was falsified as this was duly executed, signed and
subscribed by all the parties. Atty. Ogena submitted a copy of the said deed of sale23 to prove that it was duly
executed and signed by Manuel and Erlinda, as the vendors; and Socorro Langub, as the vendee.

In its Report and Recommendation,24 the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) stated that it is bereft of any
jurisdiction to determine whether Atty. Ogena committed forgery in the aforementioned documents. It,
however, found several irregularities in the documents notarized by Atty. Ogena. First, in the SPA, the
signatures of Flordelisa Sistual and Isidro Sistual were absent and the Community Tax Certificates (CTC) of the
signatories namely: Bernardina Sistual Anson, Jesusa Sistual Español, and Erlinda, were not indicated. In the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Manuel, although all the heirs signed, only the CTC of Erlinda
and Flordelisa were indicated. In the Affidavit of Identification of Heirs of Martin Sistual, the CTC of Solfia S.
Maribago was absent; and in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Dolores Sistual with Waiver of
Hereditary Shares, only the CTC of Domingo Tulay was indicated. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty.
Ogena's notarial commission be revoked and that he be permanently disqualified from reappointment as
Notary Public; and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The IBP Board of Governors revoked Atty. Ogena's commission as notary
public and permanently disqualified him from reappointment as Notary Public. It, however, deleted the
penalty of suspension.25cralawred

On March 29, 2012, Atty. Ogena filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP.

In a Resolution, dated November 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration
and affirmed with modification its earlier resolution, revoking Atty. Ogena's notarial commission indefinitely.

The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty it imposed. To begin with, complainants'
allegation of forgery was not clearly substantiated and there was no concrete proof that the complainants
were prejudiced. They submitted a copy of the affidavits26 for falsification executed by Erlinda and Flordelisa,
both subscribed before the City of Prosecutor on February 20, 2006; Memoranda for Preliminary
Investigation27 issued by Office of the City Prosecutor, Koronadal, South Cotabato;
Letter,28 Memorandum,29 and Order30 issued by the Bureau of Lands, but these do not suffice to prove the
allegation of forgery and/or falsification.

Atty. Ogena, however, violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice specifically Rule IV, Section 2(b), which
provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 2. Prohibitions. - (a) x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document
-
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Doubtless, Atty. Ogena was negligent in the performance of his duty as a notary public. He failed to require
the personal presence of the signatories of the documents and proceeded to notarize the aforementioned
documents without the signatures of all the parties. Likewise, Atty. Ogena failed to comply with the most basic
function that a notary public must do -to require the parties to present their residence certificates or any
other document to prove their identities. This Court, in Gonzales v. Atty. Ramos,31 wrote:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. The
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. A notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of the document would be undermined.
By notarizing the aforementioned documents, Atty. Ogena engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.32 His conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the
due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord to notarized documents.33 His failure to
perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging complainants' rights but also in undermining
the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Thus, Atty. Ogena should be
liable for such negligence, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

Pursuant to the pronouncement in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice,34 Atty. Ogena should be
suspended for two (2) years from the practice of law and forever barred from becoming a notary
public.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eliordo Ogena is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and
is BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished all courts in the country and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
their information and guidance. Let also a copy of this decision be appended to the personal record of Atty.
Eliordo Ogena in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7330, June 14, 2016
JUDGE GREGORIO D. PANTANOSAS, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ELLY L. PAMATONG, Respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions and is reserved only for those who meet the twin
standards of legal proficiency and morality.1 It is so delicately imbued with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of this Court to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.2 In this regard, this Court will not hesitate to hold its officers accountable for misconduct and the
violation of the duty to respect the courts.

The facts culled from the records follow.

During the time period material to this case, complainant Judge Gregorio D. Pantanosas, Jr. (Pantanosas) was
the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20 (RTC).3Respondent Atty. Elly
L. Pamatong (Pamatong) was the counsel of plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2006-176, entitled Nick Otero, et al. v.
Sheriff of the MTCC Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City, et al. for injunction with damages, which was then pending
before the RTC.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On September 8, 2006, during the hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) in Civil Case No. 2006-176, respondent Pamatong was allegedly asked by complainant Pantanosas to
remove his copia (a hat worn by Muslims) in open court.5 Respondent Pamatong requested to be exempted
allegedly due to religious grounds and embarrassment towards his "bald pate".6 Complainant Pantanosas
thereafter obliged with a caveat that at the next hearing, he would no longer tolerate the wearing of the copia
inside the courtroom.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Three (3) days after, or on September 11, 2006, respondent Pamatong filed an Extremely Urgent
Motion/Demand for Inhibition or Recusal in Civil Case No. 2006-176 (Motion for Inhibition), which contained
the following remarks:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
6. Finally, in my thirty (30) years of law practice, I never encountered a Judge who appears to be as corrupt as
you are, thereby giving me the impression that you are a disgrace to the Judicial System of this land who does
not deserved (sic) to be a member of the Philippine Bar at all.8cralawred
On the same day, complainant Pantanosas issued an Order refuting all allegations of abusive language and
corruption and denying the Motion for Inhibition for lack of basis while ordering respondent Pamatong to
show cause why he should not be cited in contempt of court.9 In compliance with the directive of the RTC,
respondent Pamatong filed his Answer to the Order to Show Cause and Motion for
Reconsideration.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On September 18, 2006, complainant Pantanosas filed a Complaint for Disbarment dated September 15, 2006
(Disbarment Complaint)11 before this Court against respondent Pamatong on the following grounds: (i)
violation of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)12 for the language employed by
respondent Pamatong in the Motion for Inhibition, and (ii) violation of Canons 113 and 1114of the CPR for
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct by supposedly causing the publication of an alleged bribe in a
local newspaper and maliciously imputing motives to complainant Pantanosas, thereby casting dishonor to
and distrust in the judicial system.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On October 25, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution, requiring respondent Pamatong to file his comment to
the Disbarment Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On December 28, 2006, respondent Pamatong timely filed his Comment on the Complaint for Disbarment and
Counter-Complaint (Comment).17 Following the September 8, 2006 incident, respondent Pamatong alleged in
his Comment that he filed a complaint against complainant Pantanosas with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on September 12, 2006, which was docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2541-RTJ.18 Notably,
said complaint with the OCA was eventually dismissed through a Resolution dated February 28, 2007 issued by
this Court.19 Respondent Pamatong also alleged in his Comment that he caused the filing of two (2) separate
complaints with two (2) separate offices, namely the Commission on Human Rights20 and the Office of the
Ombudsman21.

In the main, respondent Pamatong averred in his Comment that the actual courtroom demeanor of
complainant Pantanosas during the September 8, 2006 hearing was overbearing, arrogant and derogatory,
while also maintaining the truth of the bribery allegations launched against complainant Pantanosas.22 By way
of counter-complaint, respondent Pamatong claimed that the alleged discriminatory conduct of complainant
Pantanosas violated Canons 1,23 2,24 and 325 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent Pamatong alleged
that in a meeting with complainant Pantanosas in his chambers two (2) days before the September 8, 2006
hearing, the latter allegedly solicited from him One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for the issuance
of a TRO in Civil Case No. 2006-176.26Respondent Pamatong countered that during the TRO hearing on
September 8, 2006, he was initially asked by the complainant-judge to approach the bench in order to inquire
about the alleged bribe.27Upon disclosing that he was unable to secure the money, respondent Pamatong
claimed that he was subjected to anti-Islamic comments and humiliating conduct by complainant
Pantanosas.28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On February 5, 2007, this Court issued a Resolution referring the Disbarment Complaint to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.29 The case was initially set
for mandatory conference on July 23, 2007.30 After due proceedings, the mandatory conference was
terminated and both parties were required to file their respective position papers by the investigating
commissioner, Commissioner Manuel M. Maramba.31 Accordingly, both parties filed their position papers
dated January 5, 200932 and January 16, 2009,33 respectively.

On April 19, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution, requiring the IBP to inform the Court of the status of the
case.34 In compliance with this Court's directive, the IBP, through Commissioner Albert R. Sordan (Sordan),
filed its Compliance dated June 25, 2010,35 informing this Court that the case was among those re-assigned to
Commissioner Sordan for investigation, report and recommendation, which was duly noted by this Court in
its Resolution dated September 8, 2010.36ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, on August 6, 2010, Commissioner Sordan rendered a Report and Recommendation, the dispositive
portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that for violation of the lawyer's oath and breach of ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Elly V.
Pamatong be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.37cralawred
On December 15, 2012, in a Resolution of even date, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve, with modification the Report and Recommendation dated August 6,
2010:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's violation of the Lawyer's Oath and
breach of ethics of the legal profession, Atty. Elly V. Pamatong is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) years with a stern Warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.38cralawred
Respondent Pamatong then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Complaint vs. Commissioner Albert R.
Sordan and the IBP Board of Governors dated March 14, 2013,39 which was subsequently denied through a
Resolution dated March 22, 2014.40ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated January 13, 2016, this Court noted the transmittal of the documents
pertaining to the case, as well as the notices of resolution dated December 15, 2012 and March 22, 2014,
respectively.41 In view of the penalty imposed, the case was referred to this Court En Banc.

For our resolution therefore is the liability of respondent Pamatong under the CPR and for violation of his oath
as a member of the bar.

After a judicious examination of the records and the submissions of the parties, we find no cogent reason to
disagree with the findings of the IBP in its Resolution dated December 15, 2012.42 However, we modify the
penalty accordingly for the reasons to be discussed below.

It cannot be overemphasized that it is the sworn duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."43 It is precisely for this reason that the Lawyer's Oath enjoins all members of the bar to
conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts44 in order not to erode the faith and trust of the
public in the judiciary.

As succinctly held in our previous ruling in Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,
to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.45 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
It is with this exacting standard that we measure respondent Pamatong, and find him wanting.

It is not disputed that the Motion for Inhibition filed by respondent Pamatong contained blatant accusations of
corruption against complainant Pantanosas., and then some. As counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
2006-176, it was incumbent upon respondent Pamatong to observe and maintain respect towards the judicial
office then being occupied by complainant Pantanosas.46 Instead of insisting on similar conduct from his
clients, respondent Pamatong was the first to cast doubt on the impartiality and independence of the court.
Worth repeating below are the invectives directed by respondent Pamatong against complainant Pantanosas:

6. Finally, in my thirty (30) years of law practice, I never encountered a Judge who appears to be as corrupt as
you are, thereby giving me the impression that you are a disgrace to the Judicial System of this land who does
not deserved (sic) to be a member of the Philippine Bar at all.47 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
That the slanderous remarks cited above were inserted in no less than a public record, i.e., Motion for
Inhibition, makes matters even worse. Even granting that the bribery charges were true, such personal attacks
against the person of complainant Pantanosas should have been reserved for a different forum and certainly
not included in a motion filed before a court of law. To be sure, a lawyer is obliged to abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language before the courts.48 As a supposed officer of the court, such behavior
exhibited by respondent Pamatong only serves to betray his utter lack of reverence towards the courts, which
promotes nothing but the degradation of the administration of justice.

The records also disclose that a news article detailing the events that precipitated the bribery charge against
complainant Pantanosas was published on September 15, 2006 with the participation of respondent
Pamatong. At the outset, it bears stressing that lawyers should refrain from attributing to a judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.49ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Here, respondent Pamatong had no reason to divulge his grievances before the public as he had already
lodged a complaint against complainant Pantanosas with the OCA on September 12, 2006.50 Accordingly,
owing to the baseless and impulsive charges filed by respondent Pamatong, the OCA disposed of the
complaint using the following language:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2541-RTJ (Rev. Sultan Elly Velez Lao Pamatong, Esq. vs. Judge Gregorio D. Pantanosas,
Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) - The Court NOTES the Report
dated 12 January 2007 of the Office of the Court Administrator on the verified complaint dated 11 September
2006 x x x finding the complaint devoid of merit because complainant did not present any evidence, other
than his bare allegation, to prove the charge of bribery.

Upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, the Court resolves to DISMISS the instant
administrative complaint against Judge Gregorio D. Pantanosas, Jr. for lack of merit.51 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawred
Moreover, such action by respondent Pamatong of resorting to the press was highly irresponsible and is
contrary to his duty to submit grievances against judges to the proper authorities only.52 Clearly, respondent
Pamatong was motivated solely by improper motives in connection with the TRO application in Civil Case No.
2006-176.

As regards the recommended penalty of the IBP of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years, we
note that, in similar situations, we had imposed a suspension of less than three (3) years.

In Judge Lacurom v. Atty. Jacoba, which involved similar facts to the case at bench, this Court suspended the
respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years for using offensive language directed towards the
complainant judge in a motion filed before the court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba
to defend ably his client's cause. We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity,
legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an
anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created "a cacophonic
picture of total and utter disrespect."

Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July 2001 motion
was warranted. We disagree.

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. However, even the most
hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge
Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according
to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary
language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.

In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language but
also to pursue the client's cause through fair and honest means. 53 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
Similarly, in Judge Baculi v. Atty. Battung, this Court meted the penalty of suspension for one (1) year for the
violation of Rule 11.03 of the CPR by the respondent therein due to his in-court demeanor during a motion
hearing:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We agree with the IBP's finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom
during court proceedings in the presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The
respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be
allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly
showed disrespect for his position even after the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially
leaving the court, the respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These
actions were not only against the person, the position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court
as well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the
respondent.

Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts,
cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. x x
x54 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
Meanwhile, in Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo,55 this Court imposed the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year for the respondent's act of resorting to the press instead of availing himself only of judicial
remedies in airing out his grievances:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the
bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a
lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on
similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a
judge to the proper authorities only."

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference
where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case
No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial
arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to
bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's
statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated
Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party." (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
From the foregoing, we therefore deem it proper to reduce the period of suspension from three (3) years, as
recommended, to two (2) years only.

In closing, we find it befitting to reiterate that lawyers have the right, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.56 However, closely linked to such rule is the cardinal condition that criticisms, no matter how truthful,
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.57 To that end, the duty of a lawyer to his client's success
is wholly subordinate to the administration of justice.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

True, lawyers must always remain vigilant against unscrupulous officers of the law. However, the purification
of our justice system from venal elements must not come at the expense of decency, and worse, the
discrediting of the very system that it seeks to protect.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Elly L. Pamatong from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon
finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN the respondent that a repetition of the same or similar infraction
shall merit a more severe sanction.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10568               January 13, 2015
[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2753]
MARILEN G. SOLIMAN, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is an administrative complaint1 filed by Marilen G. Soliman (Soliman) against Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy
(Atty. Amboy) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In her complaint, Soliman claimed that she engaged the services of Atty. Amboy on May 27, 2007 in
connection with a partition case. In accordance with the Retainer Agreement between the parties, Soliman
agreed to pay Atty. Amboy ₱50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the latter’s engagement, Soliman paid her
₱25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no longer institute a partition case since the other co-
owners of the property were amenable to the partition thereof. Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the
issuance of the titles to the said property from the coowners to the individual owners; the ₱25,000.00 already
paid to her was then treated as payment for her professional services.2
In November 2008, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy ₱16,700.00 as payment for the transfer tax. In the second
quarter of 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that there was a delay in the issuance of the titles to the property
because of the failure of the other co-owners to submit certain documents. Atty. Amboy then told Soliman
that someone from the Register of Deeds (RD) can help expedite the issuance of the titles for a fee of
₱80,000.00. On June 17, 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that her contact in the RD agreed to reduce the
amount to ₱50,000.00.3
Meanwhile, Soliman deposited the amount of ₱8,900.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as payment for the
real property tax for the year 2009. Thereafter, Soliman deposited the amount of ₱50,000.00 to Atty. Amboy’s
bank account as payment for the latter’s contact in the RD.4
On October 16, 2009, Atty. Amboy informed Soliman that the certificates of title to the property werethen
only awaiting the signature of the authorized officer. However, Atty. Amboy failed to deliver the respective
certificates of title of Soliman and her co-owners to the subject property.5 On January 6, 2010, Atty. Amboy’s
secretary informed Soliman that their contact in the RD was asking for an additional ₱10,000.00 to facilitate
the release of the said certificates of title. Soliman then refused to further pay the amount being asked by
Atty. Amboy’s secretary.6Thereafter, Soliman kept on asking Atty. Amboy for any update on the release of the
said titles, but the latter was not responding to her queries. On July 7, 2010, Soliman and Atty. Amboy’s
secretary went to the office of a certain Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman asked Atty. Marasigan
if he received the 50,000.00as payment for the release of the said titles. Atty. Marasigan denied having
received any amount to facilitate the release of the titles and claimed that the reason why the same could not
be processed was that Atty. Amboy failed to file certain documents.7
Soliman further claimed that Atty. Amboy thereafter refused to release the pertinent documents she gave to
her for the processing of the titles to the property or give back the ₱50,000.00 that was already paid to her.8
For her part, Atty. Amboy admitted that she had a retainer agreement with Soliman, but denied having
received any amount from the latter pursuant to the said agreement. She claimed that the retainer agreement
was not implemented since the partition case was not instituted. She claimed that she merely undertook to
research, gather and collate all documents required in the partition and in the transfer of the titles from the
co-owners to the individual owners. She denied having failed to submit the relevant documents to the RD
which caused the delay in the processing of the said titles. She likewise denied having asked Soliman for
₱50,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said titles.9
On May 29, 2012, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a Report and Recommendation,10 which recommended the
suspension of Atty. Amboy from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Investigating Commissioner opined
that Atty. Amboy violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to observe due diligence in dealing
with Soliman. It also opined that she failed to inform the latter of the status of the proceedings for the
issuance of the said titles.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,11 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the modification that the period of Atty.
Amboy’s suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to two (2) years and that she
was ordered to return the entire amount she received from Soliman.
Atty. Amboy sought a reconsideration12 of the Resolution dated March 20, 2013, but it was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution13 dated March 21, 2014.
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the
Court affirms the penalty imposed by the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his clientand
that he should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.14 A lawyer is mandated to serve his
client with competence and diligence;to never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; and to keep his client
informed of the status of his case and respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.15
The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after receiving ₱25,000.00 as payment for her
professional services, failed to submit material documents relative to the issuance of separate certificates of
title to the individual owners of the property. It was her negligence which caused the delay in the issuance of
the certificates of title.
To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal act when she asked from Soliman
the amount of ₱50,000.00 to be paid to her "contact" inside the office of the RD in order to facilitate the
release of the said certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the payment of ₱50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still
failed to obtain issuance of the said certificates of title. Insteadof procuring the release of the certificates of
title as she promised, Atty. Amboy asked for an additional ₱10,000.00 from Soliman.
Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel in dealing with a
client.1âwphi1 Atty. Amboy’s acts undermined the legal processes, which she swore to uphold and defend. In
swearing to the oath, Atty. Amboy bound herself to respectthe law and legal processes.
The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the amount of ₱50,000.00 which she
paid inorder to facilitate the release of the certificates of title. To reiterate, upon inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the
Deputy RD of Manila, denied having received any amount from Atty. Amboy. In not returning the money to
Soliman after a demand therefor was made following her failure to procure the issuance of the certificates of
title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof,
which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client upon demand. It is settled that
the unjustified withholding of money belonging to a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.16 "A
lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment."17
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 16.03, Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. Furthermore, she is ORDERED to return to Marilen G. Soliman the entire amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00) she received from the latter, plus legal interest thereon, reckoned from finality of this
Resolution until fully paid. The respondent is further DIRECTED to promptly submit to this Court written proof
of her compliance within thirty (30) days from notice of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Ditas
Lerios-Amboy's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
January 26, 2016
A.C. No. 10753
(Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2703)
ATTY. PABLO B. FRANCISCO, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. ROMEO M. FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Failure of counsel to act upon a client's case resulting in the prescription of available remedies is negligence in
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The general rule is that notice to counsel is
notice to client. This rule remains until counsel notifies the court that he or she is withdrawing his or her
appearance, or client informs the court of change of counsel. Untruthful statements made in pleadings filed
before courts, to make it appear that the pleadings are filed on time, are contrary to a lawyer's duty of
committing no falsehood.
Atty. Pablo B. Francisco (Atty. Francisco) filed an administrative Complaint1 for violation of Canons 10 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility against Atty. Romeo M. Flores (Atty. Flores) before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, alleging dishonesty and negligence on the part of Atty. Flores.
Atty. Francisco alleged that he filed a Complaint for forcible entry against Rainier Fineza and his mother,
Teodora Fineza, (Finezas) before the Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal.2 The Finezas were represented
by Atty. Flores.3
The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the Finezas.4 Atty. Francisco filed an appeal before the Regional Trial
Court of Binangonan, Rizal.5 However, the appeal was denied.6
Atty. Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was granted by the Regional Trial Court in an
Order8dated January 23, 2009. The Finezas were then ordered to vacate the property and to pay rentals.9
Atty. Flores filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the trial court's Order granting Atty. Francisco's Motion for
Reconsideration. Atty. Francisco filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.11 In an Order12 dated
March 26, 2009, Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Flores.
The registry return receipt shows that Atty. Flores received a copy of the Regional Trial Court's Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration on April 3, 2009, while the Finezas received their copy of the Order on April 7,
2009.13
On April 7, 2009, Atty. Francisco filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Remand Records of the case to the Municipal Trial
Court for Execution of Judgment. He alleges that a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion was served on Atty. Flores
through registered mail.14
On May 20, 2009, Analiza P. Santos, Officer-in-Charge of Branch 67, Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal,
issued a Certification15 stating that:
This is to certify that the Order of this Court dated January 23, 2009 relative to the above-entitled case
[referring to Pablo B. Francisco v. Rainier Fineza and Teddy Fineza] has never been amended, appealed or
modified; hence, this Order is now considered final and executory.16
Atty. Francisco filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution17 on June 3, 2009. Atty. Francisco alleges that a
copy of the Motion was personally served on Atty. Flores on the same day.18
Atty. Francisco also alleges that hearings on the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution were scheduled on
June 17 and 24, 2009, which were attended by Atty. Flores and the Finezas. Atty. Francisco's Motion was
granted on June 30, 2009, and a writ of execution was issued.19
On July 8, 2009, the Finezas filed a Petition20 for Relief from Judgment with application for temporary
restraining order and injunction. They also attached a Joint Affidavit of Merit21 to the Petition. The Petition was
signed by the Finezas and not by Atty. Flores.22 Atty. Francisco claims that the Petition, while not signed by
counsel, "was ostensibly prepared by respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores[.]"23 The Petition for Relief from
Judgment was docketed as SCA 09-015.24
The allegations in the Petition for Relief from Judgment stated:
3. Defendants did not receive a copy or have no knowledge of the Order dated 26 March 2009 denying
their motion for reconsideration, hence, was not able to hire the services of other lawyer to seek relief
from the adverse consequences of the said Order;
4. It was only on June 29, 2009 that defendants through their lawyer came to know of the Order dated
March 26, 2009[,] denying their "Motion for Reconsideration" of the decision/Order dated January 15,
2009 reversing the Order of Dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2, Binangonan, Rizal;
5. This petition is being filed within sixty days after the petitioners obtained knowledge on June 29,
2009 of the Order/decision dated March 26, 2009 denying the motion for reconsideration and not
more than six (6) months after judgment was entered on May 20, 2009[.]25 (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Francisco filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 13, 2009, alleging that the Petition for Relief from Judgment
was filed out of time.26 He also alleged that:
2. The petition was filed in SCA No. 09-015, not in SCA No. 08-018 of the same Regional Trial Court, in
violation of Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court;
....
4. It can not be that petitioners came to know through their lawyer of the Order, dated March 26, 2009
only on June 29, 2009. That allegation is a travesty of facts because on June 3, 2009, respondent
[referring to Atty. Francisco] filed his motion for issuance of writ of execution of the RTC decision with
the Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan and furnished a copy of said motion to petitioners' counsel
[referring to Atty. Flores] on the same day of June 3, 2009. Said motion was heard on June 17, 2009,
with Atty. Romeo M. Flores in attendance and manifesting before the court that petitioners have
vacated the parcel of land in question[.]27
Atty. Flores entered his appearance in SCA Case No. 09-015 on August 20, 2009. Atty. Francisco claims that
Atty. Flores knew about the untruthful allegations and frivolous character of the Petition for Relief from
Judgment, yet he sought to pursue the Petition through the filing of a Motion to Admit Supplemental
Pleading.28
The Petition for Relief from Judgment was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court in an Order29 dated August 28,
2009.
On February 8, 2010, the Finezas were evicted.30 Their "personal properties were levied upon, then sold on
execution to settle their judgment debt[. ]"31
Atty. Francisco alleges that Atty. Flores thereafter "induced Rainier Fineza and Teodora Fineza to file a
complaint against [Atty. Francisco] [before] the Supreme Court[.]" 32 The case was docketed as Administrative
Case No. 8563.33
Atty. Francisco contends that Atty. Flores was negligent when he "did not make himself available"34 during that
period when his clients could still question the trial court's denial of the Motion for Reconsideration by filing a
Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals.35
Atty. Francisco prays that Atty. Flores "be found guilty of violation of Canons 10 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and be meted the corresponding penalty. " 36
On the other hand, Atty. Flores alleges that he was on vacation from February 9, 2009 until May 2009.37 The
copy of the trial court's Order sent to the Finezas was received by Glen Fineza on April 7, 2009, but allegedly,
Glen Fineza did not inform Teodora Fineza and Rainier Fineza that he received the trial court's Order.38 Atty.
Flores claims that he only learned about the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration when he received
a copy of Atty. Francisco's Motion for Issuance of a Writ ofExecution.39
Regarding the Finezas' Petition for Relief from Judgment, Atty. Flores alleges that he only assisted in the filing
of the Petition.40 He could not act as counsel because he had "no personal knowledge as to when the [Finezas]
learned ... of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. "41
Atty. Flores also argues that he did not violate Canon 18 because in another case, docketed as Civil Case 384-B
for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Restraining Order/Injunction,42 which also involved Atty. Francisco and the
Finezas, he was able to prevent the demolition of the Finezas' family home.43
In the Report and Recommendation44 of the Commission on Bar Discipline dated April 15, 2011, the
Commission found that the allegations in the Petition for Relief from Judgment were "false and
frivolous"45 because when the Petition for Relief from Judgment was filed, more than 60 days elapsed from the
time that Atty. Flores and the Finezas had received copies of the trial court's Order.46 Atty. Flores received a
copy of the trial court's Order dated March 26, 2009, on April 3, 2009, while the Finezas received their copy on
April 7, 2009.47 Glen Fineza, who acknowledged receipt of the trial court's Order, is the son of Teodora Fineza
and the brother of Rainier Fineza.48When the Petition for Relief from Judgment was filed on July 8, 2009, it was
beyond the 60-day period.49
The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. Flores be found guilty of violating Rules 10.01 and
10.03 of Canon 10, and that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months "with
stem warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely"50 be imposed.51 No
pronouncement was made on the issue of whether Atty. Flores violated Canon 18.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in a Resolution52 dated June 20, 2013. However, the
Board of Governors Resolution is also silent on the issue of whether Atty. Flores violated Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Flores filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration53 and a Motion for
Reconsideration,54arguing that he was on vacation from February 11, 2009 up to "June_, 2009[.]"55 During that
period, his staff received the trial court's Order dated March 26, 200956 on April 3, 2009.57 Hence, Atty.
Francisco's allegation that he received the trial court's Order on April 31, 2009 is not true.58 In addition, Glen
Fineza did not give a copy of the trial court's Order to Rainier Fineza or Teodora Fineza.59 Further, the charge
of perjury against him, Atty. Flores, was dismissed by the prosecutor.60 Atty. Flores also argues that he properly
observed the rules of procedure in the forcible entry case, thus, he should not be found guilty of violating
Canon 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.61
Atty. Flores reiterated that this administrative Complaint originated from a civil case filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, involving Atty. Francisco and the Finezas.62 While the Finezas lost their
property in that case, he, as counsel of the Finezas, was able to prevent Atty. Francisco "from implementing
the demolition of the Fineza's family home."63
The Board of Governors, through Dominic C.M. Solis, Director for Bar Discipline, required Atty. Francisco to
submit a Comment on Atty. Flores' Motion for Reconsideration.64
Atty. Francisco reiterated in his Comment65 that the Finezas knew about the trial court's dismissal of their
Motion for Reconsideration because they received a copy of the trial court's Order on April 7, 2009.66 Also,
Atty. Flores received a copy of the same Order on April 3, 2009 and not April 31, 2009.67 Further, when Atty.
Francisco sought to execute the trial court's Decision, Atty. Flores and the Finezas attended "the hearing on
the motion for execution of the final judgment"68 on June 1 7 and 24, 2007.69
Atty. Francisco prayed in his Comment that Atty. Flores "be suspended from the practice of law for at least six
(6) months."70
In a Resolution71 dated August 9, 2014, the Board of Governors denied Atty. Flores' Motion for
Reconsideration but increased the penalty recommended from three (3) months to six (6) months suspension
from the practice of law.72
The issue in this case is whether respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores violated Canons 10 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This court accepts the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Based on the records of this
administrative Complaint, respondent is guilty of violating Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03, and Canon 18,
Rule 18.03.
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent was not entirely truthful. He alleged in his Position Paper that:
4. Herein respondent himself only came to know of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration in June, 2009
when he received a copy of the motion of complainant for issuance of a writ of execution against the
FINEZA[S]. This fact was immediately relayed to the FINEZA[S].
....
6. FINEZAS in filing the petition for relief from judgment believe in good faith that they have complied with the
requirement of the rule. They learned only of the judgment on June 29, 2009.
Herein RESPONDENT only assisted the FINEZA[S] in filing the petition for relief from judgment. He could not
personally act as counsel considering that he has no personal knowledge as to when the FINEZA[S] learned or
had knowledge of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration.
Although the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration was received in his office on April 3, 2009, respondent
was in the United States of America (U.S.A.) for a 3-month vacation from February 9, 2009 to May, 2009. He
had given instructions to his staff to furnish copies of all court processes to his clients and to refer all legal
matters to either Atty. Leonardo C. Aseoche or Atty. Baltazar O. Abasolo as collaborating counsels, both
practicing lawyers in Binangonan, Rizal.73 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent did not state the exact date when he received a copy of the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution. The record shows that he received it on June 3, 2009.74 Respondent then alleges that he
immediately informed the Finezas about the matter, but later on contradicted himself when he stated "that he
has no personal knowledge as to when the Fineza[s] learned or had knowledge of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration."75
Respondent's statement that he had no knowledge when the Finezas learned about the denial of their Motion
for Reconsideration is also contradicted by the Finezas' allegations in their Petition for Relief from Judgment
that:
4. It was only on June 29, 2009 that defendants through their lawyer came to know of the Order dated
March 26, 2009[,] denying their "Motion for Reconsideration" of the decision/Order dated January 15,
2009 reversing the Order of Dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2, Binangonan,
Rizal[.]76 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, respondent does not deny complainant's allegation that he and the Finezas were present when the
Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution was heard by the trial court on June 17 and 24, 2009.77
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent and the Finezas knew about the trial court's Order denying their
Motion for Reconsideration before June 29, 2009.
While the Complaint is limited to the allegations in the Petition for Relief from Judgment, this court notes that
respondent was also not truthful in his Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he alleged that:
The allegation of complainant that respondent received on April 3 1, 2009 the Order of March 26, 2009
denying his motion for reconsideration is not correct. It was the law office through his staff that
received on 26 March 2009 the Order of Denial, per Reg. Receipt No. 190. Herein respondent was on
vacation in U.S.A. from February 11, 2009 up to June _y 2009.78 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's allegations are conflicting. He initially claimed that he was on vacation from February 9, 2009 to
May 2009.79 He subsequently claimed that his vacation was from February 11, 2009 to June 2009.80
The glaring inconsistencies in respondent's statements are sufficient to show that he is guilty of violating
Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
The importance of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 was extensively discussed in Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,81 which
involved the submission of a falsified affidavit in an electoral protest. This court discussed that:
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be
honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the
professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full
expression in the Lawyer's Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona
fide member of the Law Profession, thus:
I,_________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an
exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice. "82 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original, citations omitted)
This court also finds that respondent violated Rule 10.03 of Canon 10, which provides:
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
Respondent admitted that he assisted the Finezas "in filing the petition for relief from
judgment."83 Subsequently, respondent moved to withdraw the Petition for Relief from Judgment after
recognizing that it was filed erroneously.84As stated in the trial court's Order:
Nevertheless, the court interposed clarificatory questions to the petitioners and as a result of the discussion
this morning, petitioners' counsel moved for the withdrawal of his Petition for Relief from Judgment after
realizing that he erroneously filed the petition before another court and in another case in violation of Section
1 of Rule 3 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, on motion of the petitioners through counsel, the Court resolved to consider the instant petition
for Relief from Judgment docketed as SCA Case No. 09-015 entitled Ranier [sic] B. Finez.a and Teodora B.
Fineza versus Pablo B. Francisco filed on July 8, 2009 and raffled to this court on July 13, 2009 as WITHDRAWN,
and this case is hereby DISMISSED.85 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's attempts to rectify are further evidence that what he did-file a Petition for Relief docketed as a
different case before a different trial court-was wrong in the first place.86
Furthermore, this court finds respondent guilty of violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
....
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Respondent's explanation that he was on vacation is not sufficient. Being the lawyer who filed the Motion for
Reconsideration, he should have been prepared for the possibility that his Motion would be acted upon by the
trial court during the time that he was on vacation. In addition, he does not deny that his office, through his
staff, received by registered mail a copy of the trial court's Order on April 3, 2009.
Respondent argues that he instructed his staff to inform his clients of court processes and to refer legal
matters to Atty. Leonardo C. Aseoche or Atty. Baltazar O. Abasolo.87 However, respondent did not present
evidence to support his argument.
Respondent further argues that he was not negligent and explained that in the case docketed as Civil Case
384-B for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Restraining Order/Injunction, he successfully prevented the
demolition of the Finezas' family home.88
Respondent may not have been negligent in handling Civil Case No. 384-B, but he was negligent in handling
SCA No. 08-018. When he allegedly informed the Finezas of the trial court's Order, he should have
immediately discussed the matter with his clients. The records of this case show that he did not consult his
clients on what legal remedies they would like to avail themselves of after the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondent attended the hearing on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, and that it was allegedly
the Finezas, on their own, who filed the Petition for Relief from Judgment. Respondent claims that he merely
assisted the Finezas in filing the Petition for Relief, but was not representing them.89 He argues that he could
not represent the Finezas because "he has no personal knowledge as to when the Fineza[ s] learned or had
knowledge of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration."90
Respondent also seems to have forgotten the general rule that notice to counsel is also notice to
client.1âwphi1 Thus, when his office received a copy of the trial court's Order on April 3, 2009, his clients are
also deemed as having been notified on the same date.
Manaya v. Alabang Country Club, Inc.91 involved the dismissal of an appeal before the National Labor Relations
Commission due to its late filing.92 Respondent Alabang Country Club filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals and argued that its lawyer abandoned it, thus, it was "not effectively represented by a
competent counsel."93 The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari.94 Petitioner Fernando G.
Manaya then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court, which was granted.95 This court
explained that:
It is axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client. In the absence
of a notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel, the Court will rightly assume that the counsel of record
continues to represent his client and receipt of notice by the former is the reckoning point of the reglementary
period. As heretofore adverted, the original counsel did not file any notice of withdrawal. Neither was there
any intimation by respondent at that time that it was terminating the services of its counsel.96 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,97 this court found Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo guilty of violating Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because she failed to file the appellant's brief within the
reglementary period that resulted in the loss of available remedies for her client.98
Assuming that the Finezas learned about the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration only on June 29, 2009,
this would further support the allegations in the Complaint that respondent violated Canon 18. Respondent
alleges that he learned about the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration when he received a copy of the
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. While he did not state the exact date when he received a copy of the
Motion, the record shows that he received it on June 3, 2009. If it were true that the Finezas learned about
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on June 29, 2009, then it shows that respondent did not
immediately inform his clients about the status of the forcible entry case. It took him more than 20 days to
inform his clients on the matter. Respondent's failure to immediately update his clients and act upon the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, which resulted in the expiration of the period for filing a Petition for
Relief from Judgment, clearly points to negligence on his part.
This court takes judicial notice that respondent was previously suspended from the practice of law for two
years in Serzo v. Atty. Flores99 because he notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale when the vendor was already
deceased.100His notarial commission was also revoked, and this court disqualified him from being reappointed
as notary public for two years.101
It is deplorable that respondent, despite having been sanctioned by this court, once again violated his oath as
a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated June
20, 2013 and August 9, 2014 are ACCEPTED and APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores is found guilty
of violating Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores is suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent Atty.
Romeo M. Flores' personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. Esutaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., et al. v. Atty. Robert Peneyra

Clarissa Victoria Umale v. Attys. Alfredo Villamor, Jr. and Raul Ibay Tolentino
Vivial D. Sumile-Walsh v. Atty. Faustino C. Tumamak, Jr.
Maria Bella C. Borja represented by Fernando Aneslagon v. Atty. Erwin B. Vergara
 A.C. No. 11323, September 14, 2016
NICOLAS ROBERT MARTIN EGGER, Complainant, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. DURAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated November 27, 2014 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) by complainant Nicolas Robert Martin Egger (complainant) against respondent Atty. Francisco
P. Duran (respondent), praying that the latter be meted disciplinary sanctions for his failure to perform his
undertaking as counsel and to return complainant's money despite demand and earlier promise to do so, in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

Complainant alleged that on January 22, 2014, he engaged respondent's services to file on his behalf a petition
for the annulment of his marriage. As consideration therefor, complainant deposited the total amount of
P100,000.00 to respondent's bank account, spread over two (2) tranches of P50,000.00 each. Despite such
payment, respondent never prepared, much less filed, said petition. This prompted complainant to terminate
respondent's services due to loss of trust and confidence. Further, complainant, through his wife,2 Dioly Rose
Reposo (Reposo), wrote a letter3 demanding for the return of the P100,000.00 he gave to respondent as
lawyer's fees. In reply, respondent wrote complainant a letter4promising the return of the aforesaid amount
before the end of May 2014. However, respondent did not fulfill his promise, prompting complainant to hire a
new counsel, who in turn, wrote another letter5demanding for the return of the said lawyer's fees. As the
second demand letter went unheeded, complainant filed the instant case against respondent.6chanrobleslaw

In various issuances, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) required respondent to file his
Answer,7 as well as to appear in the mandatory conference,8 but the latter failed to do so. Resultantly, the IBP
issued an Order9 dated March 18, 2015 submitting the case for report and recommendation.

On March 26, 2015, however, respondent belatedly filed his Answer10 praying for the dismissal of the instant
complaint. Respondent averred that he had no lawyer-client relationship with complainant as his client was
the latter's wife, Reposo. Further, while respondent admitted the receipt of P100,000.00 and that no petition
for annulment was filed, he denied being remiss in his duties as a lawyer, explaining that such non-filing was
due to, inter alia, Reposo's failure to pay the full acceptance fee amounting to P150,000.00, as well as to
produce her psychiatric evaluation report. Finally, respondent claimed that his failure to return the
P100,000.00 fee he collected was due to the fact that he lost most of his assets due to Typhoon Yolanda.
Nevertheless, he signified his intention to return said fee as soon as he recovers from his dire financial
condition.11chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation12 dated April 21, 2015, the IBP-CBD found respondent administratively
liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months and ordered to return the amount of P100,000.00 with legal interest from April25,
2014 to complainants. It was likewise recommended that respondent show compliance with such directives
within thirty (30) days from the finality of the suspension order by the Court.13 Essentially, the IBP-CBD found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 18 of the CPR for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him (i.e., the filing
of the petition for annulment of marriage), and Canon 16 of the same for his failure to hold in trust all the
money he received from complainant.14chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution15 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid report
and recommendation with modification deleting the imposition of legal interest.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating
the CPR.

The Court's Ruling

A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in January 2014, complainant and Reposo had
already forged a lawyer-client relationship with respondent, considering that the latter agreed to file a petition
for annulment of marriage in their behalf, and in connection therewith, received the aggregate amount of
P100,000.00 representing legal fees. Case law instructs that a lawyer-client relationship commences when a
lawyer signifies his agreement to handle a client's case and accepts money representing legal fees from the
latter,16 as in this case. Respondent's contention that he only has a lawyer-client relationship with Reposo but
not with her husband, the complainant, is belied by the letter17 dated April 25, 2014 signed by no less than
Reposo herself which shows that she and complainant jointly sought the services of respondent to work on
their annulment case, but had to eventually withdraw therefrom on account of respondent's failure to render
any actual legal service despite their agreement and payment of legal fees amounting to P100,000.00.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to
attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.18 This is
commanded by Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03- A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
However, respondent admittedly breached this duty when he failed to prepare, much less file, the appropriate
pleading to initiate complainant and Reposo's case. before the proper court. Respondent's additional
contention that his failure to file the petition was due to complainant and Reposo's failure to remit the full
acceptance fee of P150,000.00 is not an excuse to abandon his client's cause considering that his duty to
safeguard his client's interests commences from his retainer until his effective discharge from the case or the
final disposition of the entire subject matter of litigation. To reiterate, respondent's act of agreeing to handle
complainant's case, coupled with his acceptance of the partial payment of P100,000.00, already established an
attorney-client relationship that gave rise to his duty of fidelity to the client's cause.19 Indubitably,
respondent's neglect of a legal matter entrusted him by complainant and Reposo constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held administratively liable.

Further, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to return the
amount of P100,000.00 representing the legal fees that complainant paid him, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME
INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. 

xxxx

Rule 16.03 -A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
"The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity
and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account
for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics."20chanrobleslaw

Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty to be
imposed upon him.

Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers neglected their client's affairs and at the same time
failed to return the latter's money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer
for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with
his client and to return the money given to him by the latter.22 Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino,23 the same
penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed to render any legal service to his client, as well as to return the
money he received for such purpose.24 These pronouncements notwithstanding, there have been instances
where the Court tempered the penalty imposed upon a lawyer due to humanitarian and equitable
considerations.25cralawred In view of the foregoing, and taking into consideration respondent's dire financial
condition brought by Typhoon Yolanda and his willingness to return the money he received from complainant
as soon as he recovers from such economic status, the Court finds it appropriate to sustain the recommended
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount of
P100,000.00 he received from complainant as legal fees. It is well to note that "while the Court has previously
held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's
administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed
liabilities which are purely civil in nature for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer
from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement."26 Hence, since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court
finds the return thereof to be in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Duran is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16
and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon the finality of this
Decision, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Nicolas Robert Martin Egger the legal fees he
received from the latter in the amount of P100,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision.
Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9226 (Formerly CBD 06-1749), June 14, 2016
MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C, ADVINCULA, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint for disbarment dated June 16, 2006 brought to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula (Atty. Advincula) by no less than his
wife, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula (Dr. Advincula).

In her complaint,1 Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula committed unlawful and immoral acts;2that
while Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he had extra-marital sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz
Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga);3 that the extra-marital relations bore a child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga
Advincula (Alexandria);4 that Atty. Advincula failed to give financial support to their own children, namely: Ma.
Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his having sufficient financial resources;5 that
he admitted in the affidavit of late registration of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted another marriage
with Ms. Gonzaga;6 that even should Atty. Advincula prove that his declaration in the affidavit of late
registration of birth was motivated by some reason other than the fact that he truly entered into a subsequent
marriage with Ms. Gonzaga, then making such a declaration was in itself still unlawful;7 that siring a child with
a woman other than his lawful wife was conduct way below the standards of morality required of every
lawyer;8 that contracting a subsequent marriage while the first marriage had not been dissolved was also an
unlawful conduct;9 that making a false declaration before a notary public was an unlawful conduct punishable
under the Revised Penal Code;10 and that the failure of Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to his
children showed his moral character to be below the standards set by law for every lawyer.11 Dr. Advincula
prayed that Atty. Advincula be disbarred.12chanrobleslaw

In his answer,13 Atty. Advincula denied the accusations. He asserted that during the subsistence of his marriage
with Dr. Advincula but prior to the birth of their youngest Jose Leandro, their marital relationship had
deteriorated; that they could not agree on various matters concerning their family, religion, friends, and
respective careers; that Dr. Advincula abandoned the rented family home with the two children to live with
her parents; that despite their separation, he regularly gave financial support to Dr. Advincula and their
children; that during their separation, he got into a brief relationship with Ms. Gonzaga; and that he did not
contract a second marriage with Ms. Gonzaga.14chanrobleslaw

Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that as a result of the relationship with Ms. Gonzaga, a child was bom
and named Alexandra;15 that in consideration of his moral obligation as a father, he gave support to
Alexandra;16 that he only learned that the birth of Alexandra had been subsequently registered after the child
was already enrolled in school;17 that it was Ms. Gonzaga who informed him that she had the birth certificate
of Alexandria altered by a fixer in order to enroll the child;18 that he strived to reunite his legitimate family,
resulting in a reconciliation that begot their third child, Jose Leandro; that Dr. Advincula once again decided to
live with her parents, bringing all of their children along; that nevertheless, he continued to provide financial
support to his family and visited the children regularly; that Dr. Advincula intimated to him that she had
planned to take up nursing in order to work as a nurse abroad because her medical practice here was not
lucrative; that he supported his wife's nursing school expenses;19 that Dr. Advincula left for the United States
of America (USA) to work as a nurse;20 that the custody of their children was not entrusted to him but he
agreed to such arrangement to avoid further division of the family;21 that during the same period he was also
busy with his law studies;22 that Dr. Advincula proposed that he and their children migrate to the USA but he
opposed the proposal because he would not be able to practice his profession there;23 that Dr. Advincula
stated that if he did not want to join her, then she would just get the children to live with her;24 that when Dr.
Advincula came home for a vacation he was not able to accompany her due to his extremely busy schedule as
Chief Legal Staff of the General Prosecution Division of the National Bureau of Investigation;25cralawred and
that when they finally met arguments flared out, during which she threatened to file a disbarment suit against
him in order to force him to allow her to bring their children to the USA.26 Atty. Advincula prayed that the
disbarment case be dismissed for utter lack of merit.27chanrobleslaw

Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD

After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
rendered the following findings and observations, and recommended the following sanctions, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers comes this provisions (sic): "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

This means that members of the bar ought to possess good moral character. Remember we must (sic) that the
practice of law is a mere privilege. The moment that a lawyer no longer has the required qualifications
foremost of which is the presence of that character earlier mentioned, the Honorable Supreme Court may
revoke the said practice.

No doubt, Respondent Leanardo (sic) C. Advincula, probably due to the weakness of the flesh, had a romance
outside of marriage (sic) with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga. This he admitted.

From such affair came a child named Ma. Alexandria. He supported her as a moral obligation.

How, then, must we categorize his acts? It cannot be denied that he had committed an adulterous and
immoral act.

Was his conduct grossly immoral?

Before answering that, let us recall what the highest Court of the Land defined as immoral conduct: "that
conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community."28chanrobleslaw

xxxx

It is the Commissioner's view that what he did pales when compared to Respondent Leo Palma's case earlier
cited.

In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court stressed that Atty. Palma had made a mockery of marriage, a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.

The highest Court of the Land intoned in the same case: "But what respondent forgot is that he has also duties
to his wife. As a husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and fidelity: and render
help and support."

Deemed favorable to Respondent's cause were the various exhibits he presented evidencing the fact that he
supported their children financially. Such conduct could not illustrate him as having championed a grossly
immoral conduct.

Another factor to consider is this: Complainant should share part of the blame why their marriage soured.
Their constant quarrels while together would indicate that harmony between them was out of the question.

The possibility appears great that she might have displayed a temper that ignited the flame of discord
between them.

Just the same, however, while this Commissioner would not recommend the supreme penalty of disbarment
for to deprive him of such honored station in life would result in irreparable injury and must require proof of
the highest degree pursuant to the Honorable Supreme Court's ruling in Angeles vs. Figueroa, 470 SCRA 186
(2005), he must be sanctioned.

And the proof adduced is not of the highest degree. 

VI. RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, having, in effect, Respondent's own admission of having committed
an extra-marital affair and fathering a child, it is respectfully recommended that he be suspended from the
practice of law for at least one month with the additional admonition that should he repeat the same, a more
severe penalty would be imposed.

It would be unjust to impose upon him the extreme penalty of disbarment. What he did was not grossly
immoral.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner with slight modification of the penalty, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's admission of engaging in a simple
immorality and also taking into account the condonation of his extra-marital affair by his wife, Atty. Leonardo
C. Advincula is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as final and executory, and manifested
in his compliance dated February 26, 2013, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That on 28 November 2011 this Honorable Court issued a resolution suspending the undersigned
Attorney from the practice of law for two (2) months under "A.C. No. 9226 (formerly CBD Case No. 06-
1749) (Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula) x x x

2. That on 30 October 2012 in faithful compliance with the above order, the undersigned attorney
applied for Leave for two (2) months starting November up to December thereby refraining himself
from the practice of law as Legal Officer on the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x

3. That the undersigned Attorney would like to notify this Honorable Court of his compliance with the
above resolution/order so that he may be able to practice his law profession again.31
Ruling of the Court

The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their application for
admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice of law. In this regard,
the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good
moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is
required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice
of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should
not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than
the possession of legal learning.32

Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary
action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to
virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.33chanrobleslaw

On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality based on the surrounding
circumstances of each case. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,34 the extreme penalty of disbarment was
imposed on the respondent who had abandoned his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman.
Likewise, disbarment was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a married
woman prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void, while he himself was also
married.35 In another case we have suspended for two years, a married attorney who had sired a child with a
former client.36 In Samaniego v. Ferrer,37 suspension of six months from the practice of law was meted on the
philandering lawyer.

Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring the child with a woman
other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality, he committed the immoral conduct when he was not
yet a lawyer. The degree of his immoral conduct was not as grave than if he had committed the immorality
when already a member of the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative liability. Taking all the
circumstances of this case into proper context, the Court considers suspension from the practice of law for
three months to be condign and appropriate.

As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013 that he had immediately
accepted the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for two
months as final and executory; that he had then gone on leave from work in the NBI for two months starting in
November and lasting until the end of December, 2012; and that such leave from work involved refraining
from performing his duties as a Legal Officer of the NBI.

The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to know that it is only the Court that
wields the power to discipline lawyers. The IBP Board of Governors did not possess such power, rendering its
recommendation against him incapable of finality. It is the Court's final determination of his liability as a
lawyer that is the reckoning point for the service of sanctions and penalties. As such, his supposed compliance
with the recommended two-month suspension could not be satisfied by his going on leave from his work at
the NBI. Moreover, his being a government employee necessitates that his suspension from the practice of
law should include his suspension from office. A leave of absence will not suffice. This is so considering that his
position mandated him to be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing. The suspension from the
practice of law will not be a penalty if it does not negate his continuance in office for the period of the
suspension. If the rule is different, this exercise of reprobation of an erring lawyer by the Court is rendered
inutile and becomes a mockery because he can continue to receive his salaries and other benefits by simply
going on leave for the duration of his suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA GUILTY of immorality;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of THREE MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE
HEREOF, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same
offense or a similar offense; DIRECTS ATTY. ADVINCULA to report the date of his receipt of the Decision to this
Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the Personnel Division of the National Bureau of Investigation to implement
the suspension from office of ATTY. ADVINCULA and to report on his compliance in order to determine the
date of commencement of his suspension from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of the respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant;
and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Service Commission for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

February 1, 2017
A.C. No. 5819
HEIRS OF SIXTO L. TAN, SR., represented by RECTO A. TAN, Complainants 
vs.
ATTY. NESTOR B. BELTRAN, Respondent
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint against respondent, Atty. Nestor B. Beltran. His derelictions
allegedly consisted of his belated filing of an appeal in a criminal case and failure to relay a court directive for
the payment of docket fees in a civil case to his clients - complainants Heirs of Sixto L. Tan, Sr. represented by
Recto A. Tan. The latter also accused him of unduly receiving ₱200,000 as payment for legal services.
FACTS OF THE CASE
After agreeing to pay attorney's fees of ₱200,000, complainants engaged the services of respondent counsel
for the filing of cases to recover their commercial properties valued at approximately ₱30 million.
On July 2001, complainants filed a criminal action for falsification of public documents and use of falsified
documents against Spouses Melanio and Nancy Fernando and Sixto Tan, Jr. Docketed as LS. No. 2001-
037,1 this case was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor of Albay.
Respondent was notified of the order of dismissal on 18 October 2001.2 On 6 November 2001, he filed an
appeal via a Petition for Review before the Secretary of the Department of Justice (SOJ). It was, however, filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal.3 Consequently, in his Resolution promulgated on
5 March 2002,4the SOJ dismissed the belated Petition for Review. Respondent no longer filed a motion for
reconsideration to remedy the ruling.
On 11 September 2001, complainants instituted a related civil suit to annul the sale of their commercial
properties before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2001-0329.5 After
being given ₱7,000 by his clients, respondent tasked his secretary to pay the docket fees computed at ₱1,722.
Unfortunately, the Clerk of Court erred in the assessment of the docket fees. To correct the error, the RTC
required the payment of additional docket fees through an Order dated 20 May 2002,6 which respondent
received on 29 May 2002.7 However, two weeks earlier, on 13 May 2002, he had moved to withdraw as
counsel with the conformity of his clients.8 No separate copy of the Order dated 20 May 2002 was sent to any
of the complainants.9
The balance of the docket fees remained unpaid. Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the civil case, citing the
nonpayment of docket fees as one of its bases.10
Aggrieved by their defeat, complainants wrote this Court a letter-complaint11 asking that disciplinary actions
be meted out to respondent. They likewise contended that he had unduly received ₱200,000 as attorney's
fees, despite his failure to render effective legal services for them.
Respondent claimed12 that he could no longer move for the reconsideration of the SOJ's dismissal of his
belated Petition for Review as he had only learned of the dismissal after the period to file a motion for
reconsideration had lapsed. He argued that while he prepared the Petition for Review, his clients themselves,
through Nilo Tan and Recto Tan, signed and filed the same. Thus, he imputed to complainants the belated
filing of the appeal.
As for the dismissal of the civil action for nonpayment of docket fees, respondent disclaimed any fault on his
part, since he had already withdrawn as counsel in that case.1âwphi1
Anent his receipt of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees, respondent denied collecting that amount. He only admitted
that he had received ₱30,000 to cover expenses for "the preparation of the complaints, docket fee, affidavits,
and other papers needed for the filing of the said cases."13 He did not deny his receipt of ₱7,000 for fees and
other sundry expenses, of which ₱l,722 had already been paid to the Clerk of Court for docket fees. In any
event, Atty. Beltran argued that ₱200,000 as attorney's fees was inadequate, considering that the property
under dispute was worth ₱30 million.
FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In a Resolution dated 12 March 2003,14 this Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, in a Report dated 24 July 2006,15 found respondent guilty of
neglect in handling the criminal case and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three
months. The gist of the report reads:16
The Respondent admits that the Petition for Review in this case was not filed. This key detail leads the
Commissioner to conclude that the Respondent was negligent in failing to seasonably file the Petition for
Review in LS. No. 2001-037.
The Respondent's bare defense is that he allegedly left the filing of this petition to the Complainants, who filed
it out of time. Even assuming this is true, the Respondent cannot disclaim negligence, being the lawyer and
knowing that the case related to the Complainants' claims on properties the Respondent himself states are
worth about PHP30 million. xxx.
Some of the Respondent's pleadings instead focus to the Motion for Reconsideration regarding the late
Petition for Review's dismissal, which the Respondent explains by stating that the Complainants informed him
of this when the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration had already lapsed. Even assuming this is true, it is
irrelevant since it is clear that the Petition for Review itself was not seasonably filed. x x x. (Emphasis in the
original)
With respect to dismissal of the civil case, the Investigating Commissioner cleared respondent of any liability.
The former gave credence to the fact that by the time respondent received the directive of the RTC requiring
the payment of the balance of the docket fees, the latter had already filed his withdrawal from the case.
Finally, as regards the factual claim of complainants that they paid respondent attorney's fees amounting to
₱200,000, the Investigating Commissioner determined that their allegation was unfounded, as none of them
produced receipts evidencing payment. At most, what the Investigating Commissioner found was that
respondent only admitted to receiving ₱30,000 for expenses, aside from ₱5,278.17 The former recommended
that respondent be ordered to restitute these sums to complainants.
In its Resolution dated 1 February 2007,18 the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to fully dismiss the
administrative case against respondent without any explanation. Neither party has filed a motion for
reconsideration or petition for review thereafter.19
ISSUES OF THE CASE
l. Whether respondent neglected legal matters entrusted to him when he belatedly filed an appeal before the
SOJ, resulting in the dismissal of LS. No. 2001-03 7
II. Whether respondent is guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and other ethical
standards for failing to inform complainants of the RTC Order to pay the balance of the docket fees in Civil
Case No. 2001-0329
III. Whether respondent unduly received ₱200,000 as attorney's fees
RULING OF THE COURT
We set aside the unsubstantiated recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Its resolutions are only
recommendatory and always subject to this Court’s review.20
Respondent filed a belated appeal
before the SOJ.
In Reontoy v. Ibadlit,21 we ruled that failure of the counsel to appeal within the prescribed period constitutes
negligence and malpractice. The Court elucidated that per Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."
In the case at bar, respondent similarly admits that he failed to timely file the Petition for Review before the
SOJ. As a result of his delayed action, his clients lost the criminal case. Straightforwardly, this Court sanctions
him for belatedly filing an appeal.
The excuse forwarded by respondent - that he delegated the filing of the Petition for Review to complainants -
will not exculpate him from administrative liability. As correctly explained by the Investigating Commissioner
of the IBP, respondent cannot disclaim negligence, since he was the lawyer tasked to pursue the legal
remedies available to his clients.
Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure. A client who deals with
counsel has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence, but also a
wholehearted fealty to the client's cause.22 Thus, we find that passing the blame to persons not trained in
remedial law is not just wrong; it is reflective of the want of care on the part of lawyers handling the legal
matters entrusted to them by their clients.23
After surveying related jurisprudence,24 the Investigating Commissioner recommended the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for three months given his infraction of filing a belated appeal before the
SOJ. Yet, without explanation, the Board of Goven1ors resolved to ignore the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
Accordingly, this Court will not adopt an unsubstantiated resolution of the Board of Governors, especially
when jurisprudence shows that we have penalized lawyers for filing belated motions and pleadings. In the
resolution of this Court in Reontoy,25 we suspended the counsel therein from the practice of law for two
months, given that his belated filing of an appeal caused his client to lose the case. In Fernandez v. Novero,
Jr.,26 we likewise suspended the respondent counsel for a month after he filed a motion for reconsideration
outside the reglementary period. In Barbuco v. Beltran,27 this Court imposed a six-month suspension on the
lawyer, who had belatedly filed a pleading, among other derelictions. We stressed in that case that the failure
to file a brief within the reglementary period certainly constituted inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay
of 43 days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
Respondent failed to inform
complainants of the RTC Order
requiring the payment of full docket
fees.
Respondent argues that he was no longer bound to inform complainants of the RTC Order requiring the
payment of full docket fees, given that he had already moved to withdraw as counsel with the conformity of
the latter. We find that argument unjustified.
Mercado v. Commission on Higher Education28 is instructive on the effect of the withdrawal of counsel with the
conformity of the client:
As a rule, the withdrawal of a counsel from a case made with the written conformity of the client takes effect
once the same is filed with the court. The leading case of Arambulo v. Court of Appeals laid out the rule that,
in general, such kind of a withdrawal does not require any further action or approval from the court in order
to be effective. In contrast, the norm with respect to withdrawals of counsels without the written conformity
of the client is that they only take effect after their approval by the court.
The rule that the withdrawal of a counsel with the written conformity of the client is immediately effective
once filed in court, however, is not absolute. When the counsel's impending withdrawal with the written
conformity of the client would leave the latter with no legal representation in the case, it is an accepted
practice for courts to order the deferment of the effectivity of such withdrawal until such time that it
becomes certain that service of court processes and other papers to the party-client would not thereby be
compromised - either by the due substitution of the withdrawing counsel in the case or by the express
assurance of the party-client that he now undertakes to himself receive serviceable processes and other
papers. Adoption by courts of such a practice in that particular context, while neither mandatory nor
sanctioned by a specific provision of the Rules of Court, is nevertheless justified as part of their inherent power
to see to it that the potency of judicial processes and judgment are preserved. (Emphasis in the original)
On 29 May 2002, when respondent herein received the RTC Order dated 20 May 2002, complainants still had
no new counsel on record. Therefore, Atty. Beltran should have acted with prudence by informing his previous
clients that he had received the directive of the court requiring the payment of docket fees. After all, lawyers
are officers of the court. Like the court itself, respondent is an instrument for advancing the ends of justice and
his cooperation with the court is due whenever justice may be imperiled if cooperation is withheld.29
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.30 In this case, we consider the fact that not only did respondent file a belated appeal before
the SOJ, but he also failed to act with prudence by failing to inform complainants of the RTC Order dated 20
May 2002.
However, we cannot put the blame solely on Atty. Beltran for the nonpayment of the docket fees in the civil
case. Although not discussed by the Investigating Commissioner, the records reveal that even if complainants'
new counsel learned about the ruling on 30 May 2002, the former still failed to pay the additional docket
fees.31
Taking into consideration the attendant circumstances herein vis-à-vis the aforementioned administrative
cases decided by this Court, we deem it proper to impose on Atty. Beltran a two-month suspension from the
practice of law for belatedly filing an appeal before the SOJ. We also admonish him to exercise greater care
and diligence in the performance of his duty to administer justice.
Complainants failed to prove that
respondent received ₱200,000 as
attorney's fees.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence.32Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior
to or has greater weight than that of the other.33
Complainants have the burden to discharge that required quantum of proof.34 Here, as accurately assessed by
the Investigating Commissioner, the records do not bear any receipt proving Atty. Beltran's collection of
₱200,000 as attorney's fees.
Complainants venture to argue that these sums were paid to respondent without receipts. However, that bare
argument has no other supporting evidence - object, documentary, or testimonial. Even during the hearing of
this case before the IBP, when confronted with particular questions regarding the sums paid to respondent,
complainants could not answer when and where they gave installment payments to Atty. Beltran.35
General allegations will not meet the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence.36 Hence, we adopt
the factual finding of the Investigating Commissioner that complainants failed to prove their claim of payment
to respondent of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees.
As a final point, the Court must clarify that the resolution of this case should not include a directive for the
return of the ₱35,278 as the Investigating Commissioner recommended.
The Investigating Commissioner did not explain the recommendation for the restitution of that sum.
Moreover, complainants do not contest that respondent received this sum for fees and other sundry
expenses. Neither do the records show that they demanded the return of this amount from respondent. In
consideration of these facts, the proper corrective action is to order the accounting of the full sum of ₱35,278.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nestor B. Beltran is SUSPENDED FOR TWO
MONTHS from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely. He is ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his
duties. He is also ORDERED TO ACCOUNT for the ₱35,278 he received from his clients, with the obligation to
return the entire amount, or so much thereof remaining, to complainants.
This Decision shall take effect immediately upon receipt by Atty. Nestor B. Beltran of a copy of this Decision.
He shall inform this Court and the Office of the Bar Confidant in writing of the date he received a copy of this
Decision. Copies of this Decision shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Office of the Court Administrator
is directed to circulate copies of this Decision to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016
SPOUSES MANOLO AND MILINIA NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO V. VILLAGARCIA,Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Spouses
Manolo and Milinia Nuezca (complainants) against respondent Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia (respondent) for
grave misconduct, consisting of alleged unethical conduct in dealings with other persons.

The Facts

In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand letter2 dated February
15, 2009, copy furnished to various offices and persons, which contained not only threatening but also libelous
utterances. Allegedly, the demand letter seriously maligned and ridiculed complainants to its recipients.
Complainants likewise posited that several news clippings3 that were attached to the demand letter were
intended to sow tear in them, and claimed that the circulation thereof caused them sleepless nights, wounded
feelings, and besmirched reputation. 4 Thus, they maintained that respondent should be held administratively
liable therefor.
In a Resolution5 dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the verified
complaint. However, for failure to serve the aforesaid Resolution at respondent's address given by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complainants were then ordered6 to furnish the Court the complete
and correct address of respondent. Still, complainants failed to comply with the Court's directive; thus, the
Court resolved,7 among others, to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation,
which set the case for a mandatory conference/hearing.8chanrobleslaw

Unfortunately, despite notices,9 complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings.
Likewise, the notices sent to respondent were returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and
"RTS Unknown." Thus, in an Order10 dated October 24, 2014, the IBP directed the parties to submit their
respective verified position papers together with documentary exhibits, if any.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation11 dated May 29, 2015, the IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
through Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR). Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter recommended that respondent be declared
in contempt of court and fined the amount of PI,000.00, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.12chanrobleslaw

The IBP found that respondent failed to rebut complainants' allegations in their verified complaint. Moreover,
despite repeated notices and directives from the IBP to appear for the mandatory hearings, as well as to file
his pleadings, respondent failed to do so, which was tantamount to defiance of the lawful orders of the IBP
amounting to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Finding that respondent did not intend to file any comment
and in the process, purposely delayed the resolution of the instant case, the IBP recommended that
respondent be held in contempt of court.13chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution14 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the May 29, 2015 Report and Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending respondent
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed on him.

The Issue Before the Court    

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based
on the allegations of the verified complaint.    

The Court's Ruling    

The Court has examined the records of this case and partially concurs with the findings and recommendations
of the IBP Board of Governors.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.15 Rule 8.01, Canon 8
of the CPR provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants contained not merely a demand for them
to settle their monetary obligations to respondent's client, but also used words that maligned their character.
It also imputed crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally liable for worthless or bum checks
and estafa. The relevant portion of the demand letter states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An early check on the records of some courts, credit-reporting agencies and law enforcement offices revealed
that the names 'MANOLO NUEZCA' and/or 'MANUELO NUEZCA' and 'MILINIA NUEZCA' responded to our
search being involved, then and now, in some 'credit-related' cases and litigations. Other record check
outcomes and results use we however opt to defer disclosure in the meantime and shall be put in issue in the
proper forum as the need for them arise, [sic]

All such accumulated derogatory records shall in due time be reported to all the appropriate entities, for the
necessary disposition and "blacklisting" pursuant to the newly-enacted law known as the "Credit Information
Systems Act of 2008."

x  x x x

II.    Your several issued BDO checks in 2003 and thereabouts were all unencashed as they proved to be
"worthless and unfounded." By law, you are liable under BP 22 (Boun[c]ing Checks Law) and Art. 315, Par. 2 (d)
SWINDLING/ESTAFA, RPC.

III.    For all your deceit, fraud, schemes and other manipulations to defraud Mrs. Arcilla, taking advantage of
her helplessness, age and handicaps to her grave and serious damage, you are also criminally liable under ART.
318, OTHER DECEITS. RPC.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of
complainants to his client, made the demand for settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of
criminal offenses against them, especially considering that there is a proper forum therefor and they have yet
to be found criminally liable by a court of proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and immoderate
language put complainants in shame and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider that several other
persons had been copy furnished with the demand letter. As such, respondent could have besmirched
complainants' reputation to its recipients.

At this juncture, it bears noting that respondent failed to answer the verified complaint and attend the
mandatory hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainants remain
uncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade, 17 the Court ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint
against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, ifules
of Court."18chanrobleslaw

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no
place in the dignity of judicial forum.19 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic
but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.20 In this regard, all lawyers
should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.21Thus, respondent ought to
temper his words in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the court.

Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court takes into consideration the case of Ireneo L.
Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino v. Jose Concepcion Javier 22 where respondent-lawyer was suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) month for employing offensive and improper language in his
pleadings. In light thereof, and considering that the IBP's recommended penalty is not commensurate to
respondent's misdeed in this case, the Court finds that the penalty of suspension for one (1) month from the
practice of law should be meted upon respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
month, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.    

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let
copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7388, October 19, 2016
ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case concerns the respondent, a retired judge who took on the case that he had
intervened in during his incumbency on the Bench. The complainant was the counsel of record of the plaintiff
in the case. The charge specified that the respondent was guilty of "representing adverse interest, illegal
practice of law, conduct and (sic) becoming as a former member of the bench and conduct unbecoming in
violation of the canons of legal ethics with prayer for disbarment"1chanrobleslaw

Antecedent

The antecedents summarized in the Report and Recommendation submitted by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)2 are as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Complainant alleged that respondent was the former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 35,
Ozamis City and retired as such. But before his appointment as RTC Judge, he was the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities 10th Judicial Division, Tangub City where he presided [over] a Forcible Entry case
docketed as Civil Case No. 330 entitled "Ronald Rupinta vs. Sps. Pacifico Conol and Malinda Conol."
Complainant was the counsel of Rupinta and the decision was rendered against him by respondent.

Sometime on 24 November 1994 and while respondent was still the Presiding Judge of MTCC, Tangub City,
another civil complaint was filed by Ronald Rupinta with his mother, Anastacia Rupinta, as co-plaintiff, against
Carmen Alfire and Pacifico Conol, docketed as Civil Case No. 357, for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute
Sale, Reconveyance of Ownership, Accounting of Rents and Fruits and Attorney's Fees and Damages with
Petition tor the Appointment of a Receiver. Complainant represented the plaintiffs and the complaint was
heard by respondent as Presiding Judge of MTCC, 10th Judicial Region, Tangub City. When the case was already
scheduled for trial on the merits, respondent suspended the scheduled hearing "motu proprio" for reason that
there was still affirmative defenses raised by the defendants, like the issue of lack of jurisdiction which
prompted the plaintiff to file a Manifestation and Memorandum which made respondent to (sic) inhibit
himself from trying the case.

Since 17 January 1996, the aforesaid case hibernated and respondent was appointed Presiding Judge of RTC
Branch 35, Ozamis City. Sometime on 23 March 2006, the newly appointed Presiding Judge of MTCC
10th Judicial Region, Tangub City, Judge Rodolfo L. Vapor, issued an Order informing the parties on the
aforesaid case whether they were amenable for him to render judgment on the case of which complainant's
client agreed and filed their Memorandum. However, complainant was surprised when he received a
Manifestation from the defendants that they are now represented by respondent, the former judge who once
presided over the aforesaid case. 

Plaintiffs, through complainant, filed their Memorandum within 30 days. However, Judge Vapor, instead of
rendering judgment based on the merits and evidences (sic) already presented, issued an Order dated 26 May
2006, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the complaint being denominated as an annulment of a
Deed of Sale, is by nature a claim beyond pecuniary estimation, hence the court has no jurisdiction. xxx

The Decision dismissing the complaint was appealed to the RTC, Branch 16, Tangub City presided by Judge
Sylvia Singidas-Machacon who directed the appellant to submit their Memorandum. Despite the warning of
the complainant that the appearance of respondent is highly illegal, immoral, unethical and adverse to the
interest of the public, respondent, being the previous presiding judge, continued on with his appearance for
the appellees by filing a Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Memorandum. On appeal, Judge Machacon,
reversed the Decision of Judge Vapor sustaining the stand of the client of respondent that the original
jurisdiction of the case is vested with the MTCC, Tangub City.

While the aforesaid appealed case was pending before Judge Machacon, complainant filed a Motion to
Expunge from the Court Records the Memorandum filed by the Defendants-Appellees through their counsel
Ex-MTC and RTC Judge Felipe G. Zapatos, on the ground that as the former presiding judge of the MTCC,
Tangub City, he is, disqualified to appear as counsel for the defendants. For allegedly failing to attend the
hearing of the above-mentioned Motion, the same was denied by Judge Machacon despite the fact that
respondent admitted in his Comment to the said Motion the allegations of complainant. Respondent raised as
his defense that he cannot be charged nor penalized of any violation as the counsel of the defendants because
when he rendered the first judgment in the Forcible Entry case, he believes he was completely in absolute
neutrality. Respondent, likewise, justified his appearance as counsel for the defendants on the ground that he
is encountering extreme poverty due to the absence of adequate income and as a source of livelihood he was
constrained to handle the aforesaid case.

Respondent admits that complainant filed Civil Case No. 330 entitled "Rupinta vs. Conol" before the MTCC,
Tangub City where respondent was the presiding judge. As a result of that case, respondent rendered a
decision dismissing the same on 23 September 1993. After the aforesaid case was dismissed, complainant, as
counsel of Anastacia Rupinta Largo and Ronald Rupinta, filed Civil Case No. 357 for Declaration of Nullity of
Deed of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance of Ownership, Accounting of Rents and Fruits and Attorney's Fees and
Damages with [Petition for the] Appointment of a Receiver and Civil Case No. 356 entitled "In the Matter of
the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Perfecto Rupinta, Petition for Letters of Administration, Mrs. Anastacia
Rupinta Largo, Petitioner". Respondent as Presiding Judge inhibited himself from conducting the trial of the
two (2) cases as provided for in his Order dated 17 January 1996 on the ground that complainant as counsel
for the plaintiffs and petitioner in the aforesaid cases have doubted the absolute neutrality or impartiality of
respondent.

After inhibiting himself from these cases, respondent was promoted as Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch
35, Ozamis City on 28 October 1997 until he retired from the Judiciary on 14 November 200 I. Thereafter, on
account of the fact that respondent needs income in order to survive or he would die of starvation, he
engaged in the private practice of law. Four (4) years after he retired from the judiciary and more than ten (1
0) years after he inhibited himself from conducting trial on Civil Case No. 357, respondent filed a Manifestation
for the defendants in Civil Case 357.3
Ignoring the warnings of the complainant, the respondent persisted in his representation of the defendants in
Civil Case No. 357. Hence, the complainant commenced this administrative case.

After being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his comment, to which the complainant filed a
rejoinder. Thereafter, the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

Report and Recommendation 

of the IBP-CB

After the parties submitted their position papers, the IBP-CBD issued its Rep01i and Recommendation dated
July 9, 2008,4 whereby it found and held the respondent guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law and as a
member of the Bar for one (1) month. It observed that under Rule 6.03, "a lawyer shall not, after leaving the
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service;" and that the words or phrases any matter and he had intervened qualifying
the prohibition were very broad terms, and included any conceivable subject in which the respondent acted
on in his official capacity.5chanrobleslaw

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-403 adopted on August 14, 2008,6 the IBP Board of Governors approved the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-4347 denying the respondent's
motion for reconsideration, and affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2008-403.

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the records to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice or law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

Ruling of the Court

We adopt and affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

Rule 6.03 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

This rule, according to Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan,8 traces its lineage to
Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has
previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in
such office or employ.

To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must be
shown to have accepted the engagement or employment in relation to a matter that, by virtue of his judicial
office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.9  That showing was
sufficiently made herein. The respondent, in his capacity as the judge of the MTCC of Tangub City, presided
over the case before eventually inhibiting himself from further proceedings. His act of presiding constituted
intervention within the meaning of the rule whose text does not mention the degree or length of the
intervention in the particular case or matter. It is also plain and unquestionable that Canon 36, supra, from
which the canon was derived, prohibited him as a former member of the Bench from handling any case upon
which he had previously acted in a judicial capacity. In this context, he not only exercised the power to
influence the outcome of the proceedings but also had a direct hand in bringing about the result of the case by
virtue of his having the power to rule on it.

The restriction extended to engagement or employment. The respondent could not accept work or
employment from anyone that would involve or relate to any matter in which he had intervened as a judge
except on behalf of the body or authority that he served during his public employment.10 The restriction as
applied to him lasted beyond his tenure in relation to the matters in which he had intervened as
judge.11 Accordingly, the fact that he was already retired from the Bench, or that he was already in the private
practice of law when he was engaged for the case was inconsequential.

Although the respondent removed himself from the cases once his neutrality and impartiality were
challenged, he ultimately did not stay away from the cases following his retirement from the Bench, and acted
thereon as a lawyer for and in behalf of the defendants.

The respondent has pleaded for the sympathy of the Court towards his plight of "poverty." Although we can
understand his current situation and symphatize with him, his actuations cannot be overlooked because they
contravened the express letter and spirit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In any case,
his representing the defendants in the civil cases was not the only way by which he could improve his dire
financial situation. It would not be difficult for him, being a lawyer and a former member of the Bench, to
accept clients whom he could ethically represent in a professional capacity. If the alternatives open to him
were not adequate to his liking, he had other recourses, like serving as a notary public under a valid
commission. His taking on of the defendants' civil cases despite his previous direct intervention thereon while
still a member of the Bench was impermissible. He should have maintained his ethical integrity by avoiding the
engagement by the defendants.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period
of ONE (1) MONTH effective immediately upon receipt of this decision, with warning that a similar offense by
him will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of the respondent and be entered in his file in
the Office of the Bar Confidant; and be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all lower courts in the country, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
April 20, 2016
A.C. No. 7110
ARTHUR S. TULIO, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. GREGORY F. BUHNAGIN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment filed by Arthur S. Tulio (Tulia) against respondent Atty. Gregory F.
Buhangin (Atty. Buhangin), docketed as A.C. No. 7110 for Gross Dishonesty in violation of the Lawyer's Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his Complaint dated March 8, 2006, 1 Tulio narrated that he became acquainted with Atty. Buhangin even
during the time when he was a surveyor and not yet a lawyer. He alleged that as a surveyor then, Atty.
Buhangin was the one who prepared survey plans for the complainant in connection with the estate left by his
mother. Eventually, when he became a lawyer, Tulio sought his legal advice concerning a property owned by
his mother which was then transferred in the names of third parties.
On June 29, 2000, by virtue of Tulio's agreement with his siblings, Atty. Buhangin prepared and notarized a
Deed of Waiver of Rights dated June 29, 2000 which was signed by all of his siblings in his favor. Thereafter,
Tulio engaged the services of Atty. Buhangin to represent him in filing a case for specific performance and
damages which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4866-R entitled "Heirs of Angeline S. Tulia, represented
by Arthur S. Tulia vs. fleirs of Artemio E. Patacsil, represented by Lennie Ayuste" before the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 3.2Through his efforts, Tulio claims that he and the defendants in Civil Case No.
4866-R agreed to a settlement and that he exclusively paid the defendants.
On December 10, 2005, to Tulio's surprise, Atty. Buhangin represented his siblings and filed a complaint
against him over legal matters which he had entrusted to him. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
6185-R pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7 and entitled "Deogracias S. Tulia,
et.al. vs. Arthur S. Tulia" for rescission of the deed of waiver of rights which he himself prepared and
notarized. Tulio further averred that Atty. Buhangin made misrepresentations in the complaint since he knew
beforehand that his siblings waived their rights in his favor over the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 67145
even before Civil Case No. 4866-R was filed.
On January 2, 2006, Tulio immediately filed a Motion to Disqualify3 Atty. Buhangin for his unethical conduct in
gross violation of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer. Subsequently, on January 11, 2006, Atty. Buhangin
filed a Motion to Withdraw4 as counsel. It was stated in the said motion that Atty. Buhangin: "due to conflict of
interest, undersigned respectfully requests that he be allowed by this If onorable Court to withdraw his
appearance in this case as counsel for the plaintiff."
Complainant alleged that the actions of Atty. Buhangin were deliberate and intentional in order to serve his
own personal interests against his interests as his client, hence, constitutes gross dishonesty in violation of his
oath and responsibility as a lawyer and notary public.
Thus, the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Buhangin.
On April 5, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Buhangin to file his Comment relative to the complaint
filed against him. 5
In compliance, Atty. Buhangin submitted his Comment6 on January 12, 2007, where he admitted that indeed
he had been engaged as legal counsel of the Estate of Angeline Tulio, represented by the heirs of Angeline
Tulio which included among others Deogracias S. Tulio, Gloria TulioBucaoto, Tita Tulio-Guerrero, Anthony
Tulio and complainant Tulio. He, however, asserted that his legal representation was neither personal nor
directed in favor of complainant Tulio alone but instead in the latter's capacity as an heir of Angeline Tulio.
Atty. Buhangin disputed Tulio's claim that the latter personally engaged his services as legal counsel for Civil
Case No. 4866-R and insisted that his legal representation was made for and in behalf of the heirs of Angeline
Tulio. Atty. Buhangin alleged that
Tulio abused the confidence lodged upon him by his siblings by executing the deed of waiver of rights in his
favor, for the purpose of depriving the other heirs of Angeline Tulio their lawful shares in the estate of their
mother.
He maintained that there was no conflict of interest when he filed the complaint for the declaration of nullity
of the waiver of rights as he was in fact merely protecting the interests of the other heirs of Angeline Tulio.
On February 14, 2007, the Court then resolved to refer the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation/ decision. 7
Mandatory conferences between the parties were set on July 24, 2007 and September 3, 2007. However, only
complainant appeared without counsel, while Atty. Buhangin failed to appear in both instances despite prior
notice. Thus, the IBP, in its Order dated September 3, 2007, directed Atty. Buhangin to show cause why he
should not be given anymore the chance to participate in the proceedings before the Commission. Both
parties were likewise directed to submit their verified Position Papers. Again, only Tulio submitted his Position
Paper while Atty. Buhangin failed anew to comply with the Order of the Commission.
In his Position Paper dated October 9, 2007, Tulio refuted Atty. Buhangin's allegation that he represents the
heirs of Angeline Tulio, and that his legal representation is not personal to him alone. Tulio pointed out that in
his motion to withdraw as counsel, Atty. Buhangin had, in fact, admitted that he is withdrawing from the case
due to conflict of interest. Tulio likewise denied that he meant to defraud and deprive his siblings of their
shares. He asserted that it was actually Atty. Buhangin who drafted, prepared and even notarized the deed of
waiver of rights, thus, if he knew the same to be fraudulent, why then would he prepare and even notarize,
the same.
To prove that he had, in fact, engaged the legal services of Atty. Buhangin for his own benefit and personal
interest, Tulio submitted the correspondences made and prepared by Atty. Buhangin prior to the institution of
Civil Case No. 4866-R addressed to Rebecca F. Patacsil which were dated August 29, 2000 and October 16,
2000, respectively. Thus, Tulio maintains that Atty. Buhangin violated his lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he acted as counsel for his siblings in Civil Case No. 6185-R.
In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Buhangin to have violated not only his lawyer's
oath but also the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension for two (2) months.
The IBP-CBD found Atty. Buhangin guilty of violating the rule on conflict of interest since it believed that in Civil
Case No. 4866-R, there was indeed an attorney-client relationship existing between Tulio and Atty. Buhangin,
and not between the latter and the heirs of Angeline Tulio. It further held that when Atty. Buhangin filed a
complaint against Tulio in representation of his other siblings over legal matters which the former entrusted to
him, he clearly violated the trust and confidence reposed to him by his client.
In a Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-599 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP-Board of Governors adopted and
approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
No motion for reconsideration has been filed by either party.
RULING
We concur with the findings of the IBP-CBD except as to the imposable penalty.
Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:
Canon 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients.
Rule 15 .03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or
on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 8
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,  9 the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is
his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. 10
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same
way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter
that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The
rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship,
the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the
case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and
guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
Hornilla case provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the
same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latter's opponent
in the same case, as in this case.
Atty. Buhangin's allegation that he represents for and in behalf of the Heirs of Angeline Tulio and not personal
or exclusive to complainant cannot be given any credence. First, Atty. Buhangin himself admitted in
his Motion
to Withdraw that he was withdrawing his appearance in Civil Case No. 6185 against Tulio due to conflict of
interest. Secondly, it cannot be denied that there was an exclusive attorney-client relationship between Tulio
and Atty.
Buhangin as evidenced by the demand letters which Atty. Buhangin prepared specifically as counsel of
Tulio. Thirdly, as correctly observed by the IBP, other than his bare assertion that he was representing the
estate and the Heirs of Angeline Tulio, Atty. Buhangin failed to satisfactorily show any circumstance that he
was actually representing the Heirs of Angeline Tulio and not solely for Tulio.
Also, we take note that in both Civil Case No. 4866-R (Heirs of Angeline S. Tulia represented by Arthur S. Tulia
vs. 1-feirs of Artemio Patacsil) and Civil Case No. 6185-R (Deogracias S. Tulia, et.al. vs. Arthur Tulia), the
subject property under dispute, particularly TCT No. T-67145, is one and the same. This is also the same
subject property of the Deed of Waiver of Rights which the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6185-R have executed
and signed in favor of Tulio, which Atty. Buhangin later on used against Tulio. Clearly, the series of Atty.
Buhangin's actions in protecting the rights and interest of Tulio over the subject property before and after the
filing of Civil Case No. 4866-R, to the preparation of the Deed of Waiver of Rights in favor of Tulio runs counter
and in conflict to his subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 6185-R and his imputation of fraud against Tulio. There
is no question that Atty. Buhangin took an inconsistent position when he filed Civil Case No. 6185-R against
Tulio whom he has defended and protected as client in the past. Even if the inconsistency is remote or merely
probable or even if he has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests, it is still
in violation of the rule of conflict of interest.
Atty. Buhangin's subsequent withdrawal of his appearance as counsel in Civil Case No. 6185-R came too late as
by the mere filing of the complaint against Tulio, it manifested his disloyalty and infidelity to Tulio as his client.
That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the
lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative. 11
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest and most unquestioned
duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given to the client is
perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to
employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives
the death of the client. 12
Likewise, Atty. Buhangin's conduct in the course of the proceedings before the IBP is also a matter of concern.
Despite due notices, he failed to attend all the mandatory conferences set by the IBP. He also ignored the
IBP's directive to file his position paper. Indubitably, because of Atty. Buhangin's refusal to comply with the
orders and directives of the IBP, the case which was filed in 2006 dragged on for several years. Clearly, this
conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyer's oath
which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice.1avvphi1
In Ngayan v. Atty. Tugade,  13 we ruled that [a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint against him and his
failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Atty. Buhangin's failure to submit his position paper without any valid explanation is enough reason to make
him administratively liable since he is duty-bound to comply with all the lawful directives of the IBP, not only
because he is a member thereof, but more so because IBP is the Courtdesignated investigator of this
case. 14 As an officer of the Court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere
request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders
of the IBP. 15
We would have merely affirmed the recommended penalty by the IBP-CBD on Atty. Buhangin, i.e., suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) months. However, considering that aside from his violation of the rule on
conflict of interest, he has also shown wanton disregard of the IBP' s orders which caused undue delay in the
resolution of this case and we deemed it appropriate to modify and increase the recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from two (2) months to six ( 6) months.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregory F. Buhangin is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting interests
in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Buhangin's
personal record. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
infonnation and guidance.
SO ORRDERED.
Ruby F. Tipon v. Atty. Wilfredo Lina-ac