HISTORICAL LESSONS LEARNED FOR TODAY’S INTELLIGENCE

PRACTICES

Paula-Diana MANTEA*, Teodoru ȘTEFAN **

*PhD, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy

pauladiana.mantea@gmail.com
**Professor at “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy
teos1965@yahoo.com

Abstract
Intelligence over the years remains one important pillar within the structure of both state and non-state actors,
fundamental in terms of maintaining its security and development. Even if the present is dominated by an era of technology,
freedom of information and economic development with no precedent, we observe that intelligence’s core principles promoted
by ancient authors, as Sun Tzu and Kautilya are still available and applicable.
It is important to analyze how spying – the initial form used since ancient times – worked, evolved and its importance
within the state/kingdom. Looking back and analyzing its evolution and history we observe an important aspect, that intelligence
exists and have been mentioned in classic strategic papers like the well-known Sun Tzu’s Art of War,
or Kautilya’s Arthashastra – masterpieces used by Asian leaders in war in order to ensure their kingdom’s supremacy.
This paper intends to review these historical references and point out their relevance to today’s practices in the security
field. We observe how the initial intelligence institutions were organized, how they functioned and their evolution in accordance
to the dynamics registered within the international scene providing extremely valuable lessons learned a genuine best
organizational practices guideline to be applied within today’s politics and security management activities.

Keywords: intelligence history, lessons learned, practices, principles, espionage

Introduction
History, as the science that studies the past events, represents one of our main research database when
analyzing how the intelligence concept has evolved in time (both in terms of practices and institutions). Various
ancient papers describe how intelligence was perceived in early days in the Far East, how leaders handled it and its
strategical place within the state/empire. These works have become masterpieces and genuine treaties for those rulers
who understood the importance of building a strong strategy and allocating the right resources for its implementation.
These documents are extremely modern and seem to have inspired rulers worldwide in organizing their
internal and foreign affairs in the attempt to grant their people high levels of security. We consider these veritable
lessons learned, an equivalent of a best business practices guideline which must be taken into consideration, analyzed
and adjusted as much as possible to the nowadays security context/reality.
The two papers representative and that help in the argumentation of the above hypothesis are the Art of War,
written by Sun Tzu, and Arthashastra, written by Kautilya, millennia ago, in Asia. They are important pillars in
framing the intelligence principles and practices, setting patterns that proved to be immutable in time.
Below we will concisely review the core principles they promoted, their development, the defining aspects
and how the intelligence practices evolved in time.

Historical references
Intelligence as a process of collecting and processing information, having a crucial role for the decision
makers, both political and military, existed and was utilized since ancient times, in an inchoate phase.
 This process became more and more important since last century and especially nowadays, as current
promoter and protector of national security interests.
Therefore, rulers of all times used important pieces of information to the state security (even in ancient times,
prior to the development of the idea of the state and its evolution to modernity) from both internal and external sources,
and they even payed a tribute to it. In the very beginning, it was known as spying and it seems to have been used since
the beginning of history, the upgrade to intelligence being generated in the 20 th century by the decision makers as
they understood and became aware of the fact that owning strategic information in terms of ensuring national security
and integrity represented the real power.
This represented the moment when intelligence was defined as well as system that manages the espionage
and the counterintelligence services at a national level, as the collecting of secret and non-secret information through
various national institutions and agencies like ministries or military commanders, but also the cooperation with allied
intelligence agencies or the product generated by these functions. This type of cooperation was soon a sine qua non
area in this field as the results of these activities were often classified as strategic intelligence. (1)
At a first glance, trying to tell the story of intelligence might appear odd, as it refers to that specific story that
was intended to be kept secret since ever and for whose protection great resources were paid. Throughout the 20th
century, thousands of persons were responsible for ensuring the secrecy of the intelligence operations and of the
intelligence collected. Nevertheless, our understanding regarding the models and specificities of the secret practices
grew extremely in the past years.
Ancient authors from the Far East like Sun Tzu and Kautilya managed to shortly describe the espionage
practices specific to the era they were contemporary with (it is considered to have lived in China in the 4 th of 5th
century B.C. for Sun Tzu, respectively the 2nd century B.C. India, for Kautilya). What surprises even more is the fact
that its techniques and characteristics presents in their books were so thoroughly elaborated that part of them are still
being found, even if there are no specific examples described from that époque, but suggestions which must have
been taken into consideration within their strategies by the commanders and the leaders ruling those territories. (2)
Additionally, numerous leaders and researchers began to study closely the intelligence agencies and their
operations only during the second half of the 20th century. Recently, only in the past few years, the intelligence
services began, more or less voluntarily, to make document public and to allow authorized personnel to analyze them
transforming intelligence from a royal hobby to an open resource in ensuring people’s well-being and security, and
maybe even more important, turning it into both a profession and an academic field.
At the same time, it is worth mentioning that these evolutions brought changes in intelligence, like adjusting
its practices in less bloody ones, less outrageous and much more responsible, proving that this story of the evolution
of intelligence is worth being told.
First references were found in Europe in the second half of the 19 th century, determined mainly by
technological and ideological factors when the un-chevalier techniques of espionage and letter evasion started to be
seen differently in the West. Within the Christian society, these techniques were generating repulsion and a necessaire
evil during war. The same attitude was observed in non-occidental states, where they decided that it turned out much
convenient to hire well-paid spies instead of the efforts and resources required to protect and look after the war
victims. (3)
The attitude towards the topic began to change, mostly since the religious wars and the Industrial revolution.
The Western states tried desperately to adapt to the new era and to identify efficient methods and techniques to keep
away both the domestic enemies and to counteract and fight against foreign attacks. In this perspective, they had to
adapt and face some much stronger and better-prepared enemies who were taking advantage of the benefits of using
the innovations of those times – steam engine, better performing armament improved by technological inventions,
capable of a greater destruction power – unbelievable until then, radical political groups aiming to defeat capitalism.
Espionage would thus turn into intelligence, overthrowing the history course itself.
Hence, we can make references of spies even before history, as we know it. One relevant example, within the
ruins of the Sumerian city, Uruk from Mesopotamia, they discovered the first known forms of writings, the cuneiform
writing, dated before 3200 B.C., containing valuable details regarding the defense of the castle but also regarding the
type of information their spies were collecting.
Other historical references appeared in various places in ancient states. There are different writings from the
Ancient Rome or China, which describe spy’s actions and their destinies. Even in the Old Testament there are similar
references related to Joseph, who in order to test his brothers, was accusing them of espionage in revealing Egypt’s
weaknesses. Other two references appear in the Exodus book which state that Moses sent his spies in reconnaissance
operations in Canaan.
 Similar references describe spying actions and efficient methods of being utilized also in Alexander the
Great’s campaign in Asia, in the 4th century, territories which will later turn into China and India, framing the basis
of espionage, which included advanced cryptographic techniques and a systemic approach in managing and
recompensing their spies. (4)
Likewise, we see similar references regarding Ramses the 2nd’s actions, who used to torture his prisoners of
war in order to reveal their army’s location/field position.
Moreover, in 207 B.C. the romans tapped the messages sent between Hasdrubal and his brother Hannibal,
before the latter being able to offer his brother a back-up troop. Additionally, Caesar’s legions did that as well; they
tailed the enemy camps by hiring foreign spies and the so known Speculatores – soldiers who later became roman
elite troops and personal guards. This model was implemented within the Roman-Catholic Church as well, by the
creation of the Swiss Guard (in 1506, Pope Julius the 2nd invited to Rome Swiss soldiers – famous for their courage
and loyalty; he hired them and this guard is still operating today). (5)
The Venetian Republic represented, though, the one that developed first a structured system of business
intelligence, by teaching and training young people as ambassadors who were expected to report home any piece of
information that could turn into a commercial advantage to their competitor.
Looking further, up to the totalitarian era, the ambassadors were well known for paying informers, while on
the opposite side, there were experts in opening diplomatic mails, in secret, by using hot wires to open wax seals.
Other examples can be found in 1914, when Germany managed to listen in Russian messages via radio signals
and succeeded in re-locating its Northern troops to the East, and thus to defeat the Russians, while throwing their
country into ruin. In 1917, Great Britain intercepts and broadcasts the Zimmermann telegram in which the German
Minister of Foreign Affairs promises Mexico the lost territories – Texas, New Mexico and Arizona – if becoming
their ally against the US. Broadcasting the telegram contributed to the US involvement in the War and to all that
followed this decision. (6)
At the same time, obtaining the German naval codes helped the royal British navy in blocking all attacks
against them while during the Second World War, by deciphering the Enigma, to help shorten the battle in the Atlantic
by months and contributing in revealing the tactic plans, as it represented Hitler’s main source of information
regarding his intentions in Europe. (7)
These are only few examples from history which emphasize the importance and the power intelligence has
in the decision making process and in setting up a solid strategy.

Great strategists
We were mentioning above some reference works regarding espionage and collecting intelligence. Therefore,
the two masterpieces from Asia, written more than 2000 years ago, represent a guideline of tactics and strategies in
which both Sun Tzu and Kautilya managed to elaborate some core principles to follow for their kings and emperors
in order to win in war and keep the supremacy in time of peace as well. They emphasized the importance of hiring
good spies in the attempt to obtain and maintain political and military supremacy.
Kautilya, in his paper Arthashastra, provided one of the most detailed reflection on espionage. He was one
of Chandragupta’s counselors who presented an organizational and institutional model which foreseen a special office
dedicated to spies – who, under his opinion, were considered extremely useful and indispensable within all levels of
power. They brought their contribution in surveilling all the ministers and in identifying the corrupt functionaries;
they were monitoring the prince’s relatives to identify possible discontents or possible conspiracies against the throne,
and even its people’s complaints.
Likewise, they had as objective also detecting foreign spies and collecting secret intelligence against rival
empires, being empowered, where necessary, to act in order to protect the king, to intentionally mislead and to create
dissensions within the rival troops, as well as to take violent measures like poisoning his opponents. (8)
Kautilya dedicated an entire chapter to spies, called The Spies Institution, where he identified different spy
categories infiltrated within all social layers, both internal and external, disguised in disciples, priests, ascetics or
monks, farmers, craftsmen, beggars or merchants etc. The beautiful women who lived close to the king and who used
their attractiveness to seduce different opponents, to generate divergences or to obtain relevant information regarding
possible conspiracies, define another special spy category. (9)
In Kautilya’s opinion, spies did not only collect vital information for the domestic or foreign politics, but they
also ensured they promoted and amplified the king’s image and authority, making him look similar to gods. Moreover,
in different situations, spies themselves could pretend being gods hiding behind false god images, idols, or predicting
numerous prophecies in order to create confusion among the king’s enemies. (10)
 It is surprising thus, that this work is, unfortunately, only slightly promoted in the academic field.
Nevertheless, it remains a reference work and one of great actuality, which encompasses important aspects regarding
the domestic and foreign security, as well as fundamental concepts and ideas which can be used in analyzing different
approaches and problems in the political science and international relations field, or in the intelligence studies, mainly
in intelligence analysis, evaluating and prospective studies. (11)
The second example, represented by the much well-known strategy work, The Art of War, written by Sun
Tzu, presents the competencies and the capabilities a commander needs to possess in order to win in combat.
Possessing strong spy networks stood out as one of the main assets for obtaining vital data regarding the opponents’
situation as well as for their kingdom’s prosperity.
In his book, Sun Tzu also dedicates an entire chapter to espionage, called The use of secret agents, chapter
which impresses by bringing up core principles which are still applicable nowadays and this is really fantastic if
compared to the incredible progress today’s society went through.
An important aspect the strategist described, included references regarding the notion of foreknowledge,
which, as presented by the author, it cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,
nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men. (12)
This remark emphasizes the very importance and power of strategic information in the decision-making process when
assessing different options for preserving the state’s security and integrity, as well as for ensuring the well-being of
its people.
This chapter contains also references regarding the classification of these spy networks. Sun Tzu includes
them within five classes: local spies, inward spies, converted spies, doomed spies and surviving spies. (13) When these
five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called “divine manipulation of the
threads.” It is the sovereign’s most precious faculty. (14)
Another great observation is represented by the fact that, as per Sun Tzu, the spy should stand closest to the
chief-commander, hence the importance of offering him the biggest payment, a very modern idea, which forecasted
the importance of the role this position and afterwards institution would occupy within the state’s structure. By
embracing and internalizing this idea while approving and allocating the necessary budget for running secret activities
and operations reduces the risks and threats against the security of the state, increasing the response rate to crisis and
diminishing the failure rate in combat. Therefore, becomes clear that having and using spies in the army becomes
crucial, even the use of double spies caught in combat, which can afterwards be used in their king’s advantage.
After reviewing these chapters, we can conclude that both strategists emphasized that the commanders who
ruled back then had the responsibility to handle efficiently the threats around him by the use of information obtained
from his spies. It emerges thus that the idea was modern and that their leaders were not thought to be simple pawns
of fate, or of their gods, they had to be strong and be surrounded by powerful strategists and counsellors and by a
competitive net of spies in order to gain supremacy in the international scene.
Both papers represent, in fact, reflections of the way the intelligence cycle was used by ancient societies long
before the creation of the modern state as a specific political and social set up. These people understood the advantages
intelligence could bring to their empires, in similar ways to the ones used nowadays by modern states, organizations
and institutions, the initial goal of the secret operations – that of understanding and influencing rival forces and
enemies – lasting across centuries. (15)

The way to modernity

The level of knowledge of spies, their methods and techniques was preserved in time, in areas that never
heard of Sun Tzu or Kautilya. However, the situation changed, especially since the last century, when the civil society
started to question and complain against the way their leaders made use of secret information, the way used for
obtaining it and those who worked to obtain it.
Once the foundation of the modern state, intelligence went through an institutionalization process, altogether
with setting up the legal framework for the activities and operation of collecting intelligence – we are referring here
to that type of information which brings value to the decision-makers in terms of national security, which will later
produce effects at the decisional level. This data comes from different sources which imply different secrecy levels
in order to protect their validity. It was this specific effort of protecting the secrecy, which generated the need to
supervision, to implement a legal democratic control mechanism.
A conclusive moment, which generated this change, was represented by the Industrial Revolution and the
industrialization of war, the technological innovations used in combat (infrastructure, logistics, weaponry, intelligence
and surveillance, etc.), which positively impacted and improved the way the information reaches the commanders,
reducing at the same time the uncertainty level in terms of decision making. Therefore, states began to implement
dedicated divisions to control their empires both old and new, and for preventing any threats generated by anarchists
and revolutionaries.
Hence, different intelligence systems developed according to the regimes that promoted them. For example,
the Czarist Russia, menaced by domestic and foreign enemies, led to an extremely efficient intelligence service which
developed both internal and external operations. Likewise, the Imperial England, focused on launching an efficient
intelligence service that operated within all its remote dominions, and concentrated quite late on surveilling foreign
agents and saboteurs located within its own borders. Another example is represented by the USA, which did not focus
from the beginning on developing their own intelligence services, which remained kind if behind the rest of the
powers, these differences becoming more and more visible with the beginning of the First World War. (16)
Once the creation of the nation-states and the reshaping of polls of power after the two global conflagrations,
the intelligence services went through a series of evolutions, it put the basis of official professions and institutions,
emphasizing their crucial role in the flow of events and in deciding the winners. Two models stood out, the Western
one, Anglo-American, and the Eastern one, dominated by the Russian system, which led to the fierce confrontations
during the Cold War, out of which, the most notable, took place on the secret front.
The Anglo-American intelligence alliance after the periods of war proved to be a powerful one, especially
because of the use of technological innovations of collecting data, but even more in data processing and analysis,
strengthening its capabilities. On the other hand, the Eastern alliance, the Soviet one, was comparable to the one of
the Axis states in terms of field capabilities, but stood out with their unbelievable force of the human resource. Known
also as HUMINT (human intelligence), it easily bypassed their adversaries’, at a strategical level.
The importance of this period is reflected also by the fact that it denoted one of the most dangerous phases in
human history. The nuclear capabilities owned and developed by the two superpowers in the arming race that
characterized the Cold War emphasized at the same time the lack of a preemptive intelligence and of a suitable
awareness system, preserving the nuclear alert level extremely high, causing a continuous tension between the two
sides. It was well known during the Cold War years that both sides were hoping to maintain peace but they were
constantly prepared for war, the status quo of a risky draw being preserved by their intelligence services. (17)
The situation began to change at the beginning of 1970, when the USA became the global unquestionable
leader in terms of intelligence, a premiere in the modern intelligence history, promoting an expensive platform system
and efficient agencies with which no other country could compete. Nevertheless, there were quite few situations, in
which the Soviet agencies were as competitive and even superior to the American ones, keeping an open question and
some tension on the shape the global system would take at the end of the Cold War.
Once the Iron Curtain dropped and the Unites States’ supremacy in intelligence, the 90s’ brought along new
challenges in terms of security, influenced by the technologic revolution, which changed the world as it was perceived
until then, facilitating the access to information at a global scale by the creation and spreading of internet. At the same
time, new risks and threats spread out, like terrorism, transboundary delinquency, traffic of persons, drugs and
armament, cyber-attacks, which proved how imperative a revolution in intelligence affairs was on a global scale, in
the attempt to adjust the necessary resources, combat all these threats and hence to reach the main objective, ensuring
citizens’ security.

Conclusions
Looking at past event and learning from the precursors of modern intelligence, we understand that strategists
from ancient times considered espionage as a sine qua non structure within any empire. Sun Tzu and Kautilya are
only two examples of highly qualified experts who provided counselling to their rulers, at the highest management
level, while their work stood out in time and became masterpieces in the universal literature and reference papers
when thinking of strategies and tactics both in combat and in time of peace.
We also learn from these papers how intelligence was perceived almost two millennia ago, core functioning
principles, main agents typologies and best practices, which can be easily applicable nowadays.
Looking back at how the espionage activities developed and transformed into intelligence, which evolved
until the current set up to include references of a complex profession, institution or academic field, proof of the fact
that history is a cyclical process and that references from the past can easily become relevant in todays’ society.
An important aspect though, even if the international security environment evolved a lot in the past century,
shaped by defining moments like the two global confrontations, the Cold War, different economic and political
regimes, crisis, new risks and threats, all this require a greater attention to the lessons learned from the past. In order
to avoid unnecessary escalations and losses and to be able to perform efficiently in the intelligence field, leaders from
both national and supra-national level must acknowledge the important role intelligence can have in protecting their
security interests.
Since information is power in todays’ society, and since it became extremely accessible worldwide with the
spread of the internet, it also became mandatory to adapt the intelligence services in order to align to the national and
international security context.

References
1. Michael Warner, “The Rise and fall of Intelligence. An International Security History”, Washington DC, 2014, p.3.
2. Ibidem, p.12.
3. Ibidem, p.11.
4. Klaus Solberg Soilen, ”Introduction to Private and Public Intelligence”, Studentlitteratur, Sweden, 2005, p.3.
5. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/vaticancityandholysee/8873853/A-history-of-the-Vaticans-
Swiss-Guard.html, accessed at 17.08.2018.
6. David Kahn, “Historical Theory of Intelligence“, pp. 4-8, published in “Intelligence Theory“, edited by Peter Gill,
Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, Ed. Routledge London and New York, 2009.
7. Ibidem.
8. Michael Warner, op. cit., p.12.
9. Kautilya, “Arthashastra”, p. 26, http://www.lib.cmb.ac.lk/wp-content/uploads/ 2014/01/Arthashastra of_ Chanakya
_-_English.pdf
10. Ibidem, p.564.
11. Michael Liebig, “Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra: A Classic Text of Statecraft and an Untapped Political Science Resource”,
2014, p.19, article available at: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/17144/2/Heidelberg%20Papers_
74_Liebig_revised.pdf.
12. Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”, pp.59-60.
13. Ibidem, p.60.
14. Ibidem.
15. Michael Warner, “Intelligence as risk shifting”, published in “Intelligence Theory”, Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin,
Mark Phytian, Routledge, New York, 2009, p.22.
16. Michael Warner, “The Rise and fall of Intelligence. An International Security History”, Washington DC, 2014,
pp.25-35.
17. Ibidem, p.164.