THE OVEN BUILDERS OF THE HOLOCAUST: A Case Study of Corporate Complicity in

International Crimes
Author(s): Annika Van Baar and Wim Huisman
Source: The British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 52, No. 6 (November 2012), pp. 1033-1050
Published by: Oxford University Press
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doi:10.1093/bjc/azs044 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. (2012) 52, 1033-1050
Advance Access publication 27 August 2012

THE OVEN BUILDERS OF THE HOLOCAUST

A Case Study of Corporate Complicity in International Crimes

Annika Van Baar and Wim Huisman*

Corporate complicity in international crimes is a largely neglected phenomenon that exists on the
border of the criminological study of international crimes and the study of corporate crime . In this
article , the German corporation Topf & Söhne is analysed as a case study of corporate involvement
in international eûmes. Topf built the cremation ovens for various concentration and extermina-
tion camps in Nazi Germany. It is clear that existing explanations of corporate crime such as the
urge to survive, competition between sub-units , corporate culture, normalization and neutraliza-
tion are applicable. However ; the extraordinary circumstances of the Nazi regime had a crucial
influence on the motivations, opportunity and lack of control that caused Topfs involvement in
the Holocaust.

Keywords: international crimes, the Holocaust, corporate crime, state-corporate

crime, Topf & Söhne

Introduction

In contemporary criminology, there is a growing interest in gross human rights viola-

tions (Smeulers and Haveman 2008; Tonry 2007; Bijleveld 2005; Friedrichs 2000). This
type of conduct is criminalized by the international community in treaties creating
the status of international crimes.1 International crimes within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) include crimes against humanity, war crimes, gen-
ocide and the recently included crime of aggression. The development of international
law and thereby the codification of international crimes has accelerated since 1945.
After the end of the Second World War, the world was collectively shocked by the crimes
perpetrated by the Nazis. The Holocaust, the mass murder of over six million Jews,
homosexuals, gypsies and other 'unworthy of life', for a substantial part in concentra-
tion and extermination camps, is often seen as the archetype of international crimes.
The emerging field of criminological research on international crimes has a focus on
individuals and states. Individuals who have committed torture or genocide and those
who ordered such crimes can be held accountable by international tribunals or the
ICC. Legal disputes among states, also about violations of international humanitarian
law, can be brought before the International Court of Justice. Although corporations
and their agents are often not the physical perpetrators of international crimes, they
can fulfil an important and even vital supporting or profiting role (Huisman 2008;

♦Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, VU University, De Boelelaan 1105 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands; a.van.baar@vu.nl.
'This term should not be confused with forms of criminality that, by character, cross borders, such as human trafficking and
drugs trafficking. These types of criminality are generally termed transnational crimes.

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 VAN BAAR AND HUISMAN

2010). Therefore, it is quite remarkable that this important category of perpetr

has largely been ignored until now in the criminological study of international
Corporate complicity in international crimes is a phenomenon that exists on t
der of the (criminological) study of international crimes and the study of c
crime. According to Brants (2007), there are significant similarities in explanati
international crimes such as the Holocaust and explanations of corporate crime.
these similarities can be found in the bureaucratic nature of organizations
emphasis on goal attainment, along with the division of labour. These make it u
sary for employees to think beyond what they are told to do, causing managers to
concerned with reaching targets, and victimization disappears behind cost and b
analysis. Second, similarities between international crime and corporate crim
found in the moral ambiguity surrounding these crimes: it is often unclear
and which rules of law are broken, authorities are reluctant to take action again
crimes and, moreover, the conduct is usually not seen as deviant within a comm
group (Brants 2007). When these two forms come together - when corpora
involved in international crimes - this moral ambiguity may be amplified.
Remarkably, studies of corporate crime as well as studies of internationa
have largely neglected this specific type of perpetrator of international cri
this interesting context for corporate crime. This is particularly striking becau
founding father of research into white-collar crime, Edwin Sutherland, gave co
able attention to American corporate involvement in war crimes (Galliher a
2009). In a more recent exception, Matthews (2006) used the criminological
of state-corporate crime to describe and explain the involvement of the Americ
porations IBM, Ford and General Motors in Nazi Germany. When studying c
involvement in international crimes, corporations are the central subject of inv
tion and, when corporations are involved in crime, corporate crime theory seem
the appropriate tool for analysis.
In this article, the first aim is to use criminological explanations of corporate
to analyse historical data and historical explanations on corporate involvemen
Holocaust. We use historical literature because historians are one of the excep
the general lack of attention for the corporate actors in international crimes, p
larly for the period before and during the Second World War. We will study th
Topf & Söhne, the corporation that built the ovens in which the corpses of hun
of thousands of victims of the concentration and extermination camps wer
(Assmann et al., 2002; Schûle 2003; 2010; Kratz 2008; Knigge 2005). The sec
is to see whether and how historical explanations - of the Topf case, but also of
well-known cases of corporate involvement in the Holocaust - fit or complemen
nological explanations of corporate crime.
The article will first provide a brief overview of historical research on co
involvement in the crimes committed by the Nazi regime, followed by a synthesi
ory on corporate crime. Then, the case of the company Topf will be described bri
enable application of theory to assess how the involvement of Topf in the Holoc
be explained. In these sections, historical explanations will be compared to c

2Another reason why criminology should include this category of perpetrators in their field of study is that, recen
have started exploring the possibility of making corporations accountable under international criminal law (Stoic
Clapham 2008).

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 THE OVEN BUILDERS OF THE HOLOCAUST

crime explanations. The conclusion will offer a reflection on the meaning

sis in order to reach a better understanding of the causes of corporate inv
international crimes.

Business and the Nazi Regime

The Nuremburg Trials convicted not only Nazi leaders, but also managers of several
corporations for their complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity. In fact,
the role of German industrialists in the persecution of Jews before and during the
Second World War was emphasized by the prosecutors in Nuremberg (Bush 2009)
German corporations, such as I.G. Farben, Hoeschst, Flick, Krupp, Ford Werke and
others, benefited from and contributed to the Aryanization of German business, per-
secution of Jews, slave labour in the concentration camps and the destruction in th
extermination camps (Lindner 2008; Manchester 2003; Stallbaumer 1999). Degesh,
subsidiary of the German chemical industry conglomerates I.G. Farben and Degussa
produced the deadly gas Zyklon B, which was used in the gas chambers of the exter
mination camps (Lindner 2008; Hayes 2001). The German financial sector was also
involved in these international crimes; Deutsche Bank, Allianz and Dresdner Bank,
among others, profited from the Third Reich economic sanction against the German
Jews (Feldman 2001; 2004; James 2004). 3
Historians have investigated the role of the German business sector in the National
Socialist Party's rise to power in 1933, the (economic) persecution of German Jews,
the war effort and, to a lesser extent, their role in the annihilation and plunder of the
European Jews during the Second World War.4 Most historians agree that it was not the
big industrialists that brought Hitler to power (Barkai 1991; Turner 1985) and that the
large corporations in fact initially rejected most economic measures by the Nazi regime
(Hayes 1987: 209-10). 5 Although there have undoubtedly been more ethical, more ide-
ological as well as greedier exceptions, the majority of German businesses and their
representatives dealt with the Nazi regime in a pragmatic way, neglecting principles
and moral considerations. They quite quickly appear to have adopted the conviction
that, to be able to head off trouble with the Nazi regime as well as to be able to com-
pete in their markets, there was no alternative to joining Aryanization takeovers (or
providing loans to enable them) and accepting concentration camp inmate labourers
(Hayes 1998). For most corporations, it was necessary to comply with Nazi measures not
just because the regime had almost total control over the supply of raw materials and
the purchase of produce in an autarkic, closed economy, but also because they had to
compete within their markets. At this point, many corporations came to see economic
advantages in collaborating in the persecution of Jews. According to Hayes, this proves

3Also corporations outside the Third Reich contributed to Nazi policy and crimes. To give some examples, the American
company IBM delivered Hollerith punch cards and tabulating machines for part of the administration of the Endlösung and
trained personnel on how to use them (Allen 2002; Black 2001). Swiss banks confiscated bank accounts of Jewish victims for
the Nazis (Levin 1999). In the Netherlands, a removal company profited from the deportation of Dutch Jews by emptying and
looting their houses (De Jong 1975). Belgian corporations delivered 65 billion Belgian Francs-worth of industrial goods to the
Nazi regime (Gillingham 1974).
4For a more extensive overview of the historiography and history of corporate involvement in Nazi Germany, see Berghahn
(2004) and Hayes (1998).
5There are some exceptions to this view; see Pauwels (2009).

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 VAN BAAR AND HUISMAN

the success of the Nazi regime in manipulating the business sector into
with their social and economic policies by using the dynamics of commercia
tion in a state-controlled and increasingly militarized economy (Hayes 1998)
The above-mentioned historical case studies situate corporations and their
the Nazi economy and show that corporations were sometimes willing an
reluctant collaborators (Berghahn 2004; Feldman 2004). However, these
studies usually do not link corporate involvement to broader theoretical exp

Explaining Corporate Crime

Theories developed to explain corporate crime often stem from general crim
theories which try to explain regular forms of crime. For example, strain t
corporate crime as an illegal way out of frustrated realization of organiz
(Passas 1990). Rational choice theory regards corporate crime as the outcome
nal cost and benefit analysis in a company (Simpson 2002). Differential assoc
ory approaches organizational crime as a social learning process in which
and rationalizations of lawbreaking are transmitted and normalized with
tions (Coleman 1987). It is typical for the explanation of corporate crim
explanations are derived from the organizational context in which indiv
bers of corporations act and the environment in which corporations operate
(1999; 2007) emphasizes that, in order to properly understand corporate
essential to gain insight into the interplay between explaining variables on t
levels (macro-meso-micro).
Several authors have tried to bring the possible explanations together
grated theoretical framework that distinguishes between three categorie
atory variables to be found on these three levels: motivation, opportuni
of) control (Coleman 1987; Shover and Bryant 1993; Kramer and Michało
Using the three levels of analysis, the framework can be seen as a matr
cells, in which the possible explaining variables can be allocated. Some e
as follows: on the macro level, motivation is operationalized by the culture o
tition characteristic for business; on the meso level, this poses economic
corporations to set ambitious targets that, on the micro level, can provid
managers with neutralizations to break rules to attain these goals; on the m
the structure of the market determines the distribution of legitimate and i
means to accomplish goals; while, at the meso level, the opportunities to
are determined by the organizational structure. This can result in individua
ees experiencing illegal means as the only or most attractive options of achi
At the macro level, the element of control points at the lack of administrat
and social control on the conduct of organizations. At the meso level, this m
the internal control structure is ineffective or lacking, resulting in an orga
culture in which the personal morality of managers and employees is mainl
rationalizing the illegal way in which organizational goals are attained. In th
informal social control can lead to sanctioning of non-cooperation in illegal

6Hayes appropriately points out how large corporations' often ambiguous pattern of behaviour can easily b
distorted into a simplification of corporations as Nazi puppets (Hayes 1987: 218).

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 THE OVEN BUILDERS OF THE HOLOCAUST

The next section consists of an introduction of the case of Topf & Söhne. S
the three explanatory variables outlined in this section - motivation, oppo
control - will be applied to this case.

The Company Topf àf Söhne

The company Topf & Söhne was founded by Johann Andreas Topf in 1
business of the company consisted of constructing installations for bre
neys, silos and ventilation installations. Johann's son Ludwig Topf (sen
from the booming economy during the turn of the century and, after
remained an icon for the company. The corporation's production of crema
in 1914, providing only a small part of the total turnover. At that time in
cremation was generally considered to be unholy. Therefore, in their adve
Topf emphasized the technical opportunities their ovens provided to en
dignified cremation. No smoke or odour was produced by the crematio
fire would not touch the body. Instead, the high temperature would transfo
into ashes. This type of cremation became obligatory in a 1934 law8 an
a leading manufacturer of crematoria. Topf was a family business and, dur
days, it had 1,150 employees. After the outbreak of the Second World War,
ber of men were drafted into military service. As elsewhere in Nazi Ge
workers were substituted by forced labourers.
On 17 May 1939, Topf received its first order by the SS. At the end of the
ered a mobile oven that was used in the nearby concentration camp, Buche
transaction was initiated by the SS because abject conditions in the camp,
more and more crowded after the start of the war in September 1939, pr
a level of sickness and death that the cremation capacity had to be exp
this time, the dead were cremated in the city crematoria. Now, they could
within the camp's fences. The first oven was very similar to a type that ha
produced by Topf a number of years before, designed for the burning of
That this oven was now used to burn human remains meant an estrangeme
previously held principles of piety and dignity regarding cremation; th
directly exposed to the fire and were often not completely burned. Technic
nothing new. Morally, however, a border had been crossed. Swift and effi
fuel now had priority over piety and dignity.
Pleased with the increased demand for incineration ovens by the SS, Kur
ambitious engineer - started perfecting the design for the 'special' inciner
In the spring of 1940, he had distributed the new product to five location
Dachau, Mauthausen, Gusen and Auschwitz I.9 Topf had to compete w
pany Heinrich Kori that also delivered ovens to the SS.10 Topf 's engineers

7The description in this section is based on Schûle (2010).

8Gezetz über die Feuerbestattung, 15 May 1934. This cremation act, passed by the Nazi regime, prescribed (am
consent by the deceased to be cremated, a medical doctor confirming clinical death and containing the
containers (so not mixing them).
9Auschwitz I was predominantly a concentration camp. The gassings and large-scale murder mainly took
mination camp Auschwitz-Birkenau at a later point in time (Gutman and Berenbaum 1998)
,0Kori had also produced the cremation ovens that were used at the 'T4' euthanasia programme in which
ill and disabled persons were killed between October 1939 and August 1941 (Schüle 2010: 114).

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 VAN BAAR AND HUISMAN

products to the wishes of the SS: the ovens had to be quick and use a minimal a
of scarce fuel. In the oven manual, it was prescribed how a new body could
before the old one was completely perished and how the remaining body parts
be dispersed throughout the oven using a poker.
In the autumn of 1941, the firm Topf received the first order for oven
Auschwitz-Birkenau. This camp was initially built to incarcerate Soviet prisoner
but, from June 1942, it had evolved from a concentration camp to an exter
camp in which large numbers of people (mostly Jews) who were found unfit fo
were murdered in the gas chambers upon arrival (Friedländer 2007: 501; Gut
Berenbaum 1998). At this stage, the numbers of deceased and murdered bod
becoming increasingly large, not just in Auschwitz, but also in other concentrat
extermination camps. In addition to the ovens, Topf now also delivered ven
systems for the gas chambers. Prüfer and other employees were present at
during tests of the gas chambers and the ovens. If there were any complaints a
installations in the camps, the engineers at Topf were the first to be consul
corporation received a request to build even more efficient ovens, upon which P
developed an oven that could burn multiple bodies at a time, even frozen bodies
With the start of systematic mass murder in the extermination camps in 194
role of Topf & Söhne changed. Previously, the ovens were used to burn the
of people who had died due to exhaustion, diseases or violence in the concen
camps. Now, the ovens also burned the bodies of victims of genocide and m
der that were systematically murdered in the gas chambers. Moreover, Topf's v
tion systems and ovens now enabled a more efficient execution of that mass
(Gerlach 2002).11 These ventilation systems were used to get rid of the cyanide af
use of the gas chambers in order to speed up the process, thereby playing an im
role in the process of mass murder.12
Within Topf & Söhne, the owners Ludwig and Ernst-Wolfgang Topf, engineer
Prüfer, three other engineers and several fitters were involved in the delivery an
lation of the incineration ovens. The contact with the SS mostly went through
All men were members of the Nazi party, but none of the men fulfils the
profile of a fanatical Nazi (Gerlach 2002; Knigge 2005; Schüle 2003). For in
they kept Jewish and Communist workers in service also when the persecution
groups was intensified as a result of the 1935 Nuremberg laws.
Soon after the Second World War had ended, Prüfer and the other enginee
arrested by the Soviets and sentenced to 25 years' incarceration in a prison cam
evening after the arrest of Prüfer, Ludwig Topf committed suicide. Prüfer died
and the others were released in 1955. Ernst-Wolfgang Topf fled to Western Ger
start a new corporation solely producing crematoria. The Allied and later west-G
legal authorities started several criminal investigations into Topf's role in the H
Due to the fact that the evidence was mostly located in Eastern Germany, and c
tion between West Germany and East Germany was limited, these investigation

"Incidentally, however, camp inmates were killed by being thrown into the ovens alive (Schûle 2010: 152).
12Topf's involvement was quite far-reaching. To compare: Degesh, the corporation that produced the Zyklon B th
to kill prison camp inmates in the gas chambers, did not tailor its products (Zyklon B was a pesticide that was already
to the camp long before the mass killings started) and only delivered them from a distance (Lindner 2008). This makes
case very suited for this explorative case study.

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 THE OVEN BUILDERS OF THE HOLOCAUST

unsuccessful. In 1957, the role of Topf & Söhne was described in the book M
Moral by journalist Schnabel (1957). In his reaction, Ernst-Wolfgang denied a
tions and stated that the documents used as evidence were falsified. It is pos
this negative publicity contributed to the bankruptcy of his company some
The latest legal inquiry to hold Topf accountable was carried out in 1989 but
cessful because Topf died in 1979 (Kratz 2008).

Motivation

Matthews (2006) provided three possible motivations for German corporations to

get involved in the Holocaust. First, he mentions ideological national-socialist or
anti-Semitic ideas. Second, the prospect of a large demand for goods for the war effort
and the revenues coming from those transactions is a possible economic impetus.
Finally, according to Matthews, corporations were often not in the position to disobey
orders, out of fear for concentration camp sentences or confiscation of the company by
the Nazis. At first sight, these motivations might also be plausible for Topf & Söhne. We
will consider all three to see whether they apply to Topf 's involvement in the Holocaust
and introduce a fourth motivation.

Ideology ?

The research by Knigge indicates that, despite being members of the National
Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) since 1933, the brothers Topf and engi-
neer Prüfer were not distinct national socialists. There is no indication that
they differed from millions of Germans of the time, or were in any
posed to aid the purposes of the Holocaust and mass murder' (Knig
Ernst-Wolfgang Topf declared after the war that he and his brother had bec
of the NSDAP during a period of looming bankruptcy and a struggle for po
the company. By becoming a member, the brothers wanted to prevent the
of their corporation by employees - NSDAP members - who had accused the
Judengenossen (allies of Jews) not worthy of leading the company (Schûle 20
There are more indications that Ludwig and Ernst-Wolfgang Topf did not
ideology of the regime. As stated, the corporation kept employingjews and
Ernst-Wolfgang Topf repeatedly tried to free his Jewish employees Willy
Hans Fels after they had been arrested by the Gestapo (Schûle 2010: 91-
war, 15 employees solemnly declared that Erst Wolfgang Topf did not supp
ideologically (Schûle 2010: 93). Furthermore, the Communists within
were able to form a well-organized Communist faction within the com
2010: 93, 213). The Topf brothers became party members in a period du
many opportunists did the same (Gerlach 2002: 77). Furthermore, in the
the policy of the NSDAP was largely aimed at rebuilding Germany and
economy, which must have been appealing to businessmen and entrepreneu
likely that the membership of the NSDAP was mostly instrumental. Sch
that the brothers Topf as well as the engineers were not anti-Semites or ze
(Schûle 2010: 67-8). All things considered, ideology does not seem to be t
motive for Topf 's involvement in the Holocaust.
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 VAN BAAR AND HUISMAN

Profit seeking ?

Topf & Söhne had some economic troubles during the 1930s. The econom
the 1920s had forced the corporation to fire many employees and had a
the bankruptcy of the corporation. After the NSDAP seized power in 1933,
economy somewhat recovered and the corporation was able to pick itself up
other German corporations hit by the economic crisis, Topf took the op
doing business brought by the Nazis (Feldman 2004; Hayes 1987). The bu
the SS led to extra turnover in actual figures but the production of cremat
eration ovens and ventilation systems formed only a small portion of the to
(2-3 per cent) (Gerlach 2002).
While force and ideology are not common criminological explanations
rate behaviour, profit seeking is. Nevertheless, criminological research has s
when commercial motives are at the basis of corporate crime, this not alway
of desire for profit maximization, but often an attempt to minimize loss (P
Piquero and Piquero 2011). Especially corporations in financial trouble or cor
recovering from a difficult period appear to be less discriminating abou
they take. Additionally, the prospect of receiving new orders for other com
produced by Topf in the future by becoming a business partner of the S
been a motive for the management of Topf & Söhne (Gerlach 2002: 77).
Matthews explains the motivation of American corporations in becomi
in the Nazi crimes using a neo-liberal perspective: the only moral obligation
poration is maximizing profit for the shareholders (Matthews 2006: 130
businesses, however, whose directors are also the owners of the firm (such
business like Topf), this may be very different. Ludwig and Ernst-Wolfgan
over the corporation from their father. Before that, during the difficult y
economic crisis, they worked in the company as employees while employees
lowered several times to avoid bankruptcy. On the whole, it seems that surv
than profit was one of the main goals for the corporation when the compan
onto its feet.

The growth of the corporation during the 1930s was not accompanied by substantial
rises in profit. Therefore, the company was still labouring under some financial pres-
sure during these years. In 1942, the situation improved because of enhanced liquid-
ity, due to loans by the Deutsche Bank , and elimination of problems such as the lack of
employees. The corporation was registered as a W-Betrieb - a corporation important
for the war effort - which brought along certain privileges and made it possible to use
forced labour (Dickhaus 2002: 111). Nevertheless, given the small proportion of turno-
ver from the oven department and the way in which the corporation and engineers
contributed to Nazi crimes, explaining the extent of Topf 's involvement necessitates
looking at different motivation.

Force ?

After the war, Ernst-Wolfgang Topf denied culpability by saying that the requests by
the SS had the character of a command. 'The sentence "No, Topf & Sons will not
deliver to the camps" was equal to a concentration camp and death', according to Topf
(Kratz 2008: 262). The facts, however, do not indicate that the corporation was forced
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 THE OVEN BUILDERS OF THE HOLOCAUST

to cooperate with the SS. First, the correspondence between the corpo
SS shows that the business relationship was based on equality. The cor
reminders for payment when invoices were not paid and argued about wh
bility it was to pay for malfunctioning installations (Schüle 2010: 230). Sec
the innovations and ideas for more efficient ovens came from the enginee
corporation; we will discuss this more thoroughly below. Force does no
plausible motive for Topf 's involvement in the Holocaust.

Innovation and technical perfection?

Instead of amoral profit seeking, striving for innovation and technical pe

to be the most prominent motivation for Topf & Söhne. The engineer
competed to design the best ovens and offered innovations and ideas o
initiative. They were present when the ovens were tested and they were c
improving their designs. This central value of innovation and technical
clear from the way the company designed and built the ovens and was
reflected in their corporate culture. Moreover, this emphasis on techn
fits in with historical analysis of other corporations at the time and can b
the nature of bureaucracies.
The clearest argument for innovation and technical perfection being the main moti-
vation within Topf is that the initiative for innovation most often came from the engi
neers rather than the SS. Prüfer repeatedly designed larger ovens and connected th
muffles to speed up the burning process. In 1943, Prüfer proposed to warm the ga
chambers with heat from the ovens. Zyklon B needs a temperature of 26°C in order to
evaporate and become lethally toxic (Schůle 2010: 176-84). Interestingly, while Prüfe
was working on design innovation of the ovens for the concentration and exterminatio
camps, he also continued to design and deliver conventional cremation ovens for which
he emphasized innovations made to improve compliance with the 1934 Cremation Ac
(Schüle 2010: 119).
The design for the four-storied 'continuous-operation corpse incineration oven fo
mass use' patent application by engineer Sander in 1942 is a good example of the desire
for innovation. After a warming-up period of two hours, this oven could stay in opera-
tion without any added fuel other than bodies. In a letter to the management, Sander
wrote how this oven 'should only be seen as a facility for incineration. Therefore the
principles of respect, separating the ashes and emotions of any nature should be ban-
ished' (Schüle 2010: 169). This is a perfect display of replacement of moral responsibil-
ity with technical responsibility that Bauman (2006) describes as one of the effects of
modern bureaucracies that enabled the Holocaust. The cold technocratic attitude is
also displayed by the explicit and detailed instructions that were provided for the ovens
(Schüle 2010: 433).
Such emphasis on technological advancement had long been embedded in the cor-
porate culture at Topf & Söhne. At the 60th anniversary of the corporation in 1938,
the brothers Topf wrote to their employees: '... this corporation always puts invention,
creativity and proficiency before capital.' In a memo dated March 1944, the board
instructed the heads of department not to worry about additional costs in production
because every technical improvement was beneficial for the corporation. Anxiety about
costs would only diminish the joy of experimentation (Lüdtke 2002: 125). In the same
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 VAN BAAR AND HUISMAN

memo, a lot of attention was paid to the 'principle of quality' that was also cons
an important value within the company.
Research into causes of corporate crime emphasizes how top management c
an important impact on the culture within an organization, which influe
behaviour of individuals within that organization (Shover and Hochstetler 20
emphasis placed on innovation and technical quality by the brothers Topf undou
had an impact on the employees. Interestingly, other documents show similar m
tions. Schule (2003) derives some motivations from the writings of the chief en
Sander and Prüfer: professional ambition, the desire to create a distinct pro
desire for recognition and, partly as a result, competition about the best design
at I.G. Farben, competition between corporations (Hayes 1998) was an important
nation for their involvement in the Holocaust, at Topf, it was mostly competitio
the corporation that explains their involvement.
Admiration of innovation and technological perfection is not unique to th
Topf. Lûdtke relates this to the German working ethos {Deutsche Qualitätsarbei
emphasized not only the quality of an end product, but also the pride of the em
and the joy they had in their work. The destructive use of that end product wa
fore not considered to be important (Lûdtke 2002). Other studies on the inv
of German corporations in Nazi crimes (also) found an explanation in this co
Moral der Effizienz (morality of efficiency) (Hayes 2001; Budraß and Grieger 19
The emphasis on technical perfection also seems to fit in the (pseudo) sc
bureaucratic, orderly and efficiency-minded mode of operation that was pu
several fields of policy in Nazi Germany. The systematic nature of the mass
in the extermination camps, sometimes called 'factories of death', in which
'production' can be distinguished - concentration, deportation, deprivation,
and finally burning - seems to fit within this body of ideas. Bauman descri
ernism as the most important prerequisite for both the way the Holocaust was
out and the occurrence itself (Bauman 2006 [1989]). Topf's manufacturing of
ingly efficient incineration ovens used in the last 'production phase' of the mas
der fits this image.13 Not so much a 'culture of competition', often seen as
to business and providing a motive for corporate crime (Coleman 1987; 199
'culture of perfection' seems to form an explanation for the involvement of
the Endlösung.

Opportunity

The opportunity for Topf & Söhne to contribute to the crimes in the concentra
extermination camps was for the largest part created at the macro level of anal
the policy of the Nazi regime and the SS purchasing Topf's installations. On
hand, the Nazi regime held an increasingly tighter grip on German businesses,
to create an autarkic economy that was to a large extent self-sufficient. Busine
confronted with more and more restrictions and requirements. On the other h

13Although this aspect of Bauman's work clearly applies to the case of Topf, Bauman's projection of streamlin
bureaucracies and meticulous division of labour does not exist for Topf; Topf was not solely responsible toward
relationship between Topf and the SS was largely equal and the outcome of the genocidal process was hardly remot
for the engineers and other employees at Topf.

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 THE OVEN BUILDERS OF THE HOLOCAUST

increased demand for goods by the new German government provided

with opportunities. Although some corporations made large profits, fo
rations, the opportunities provided by the regime were crucial for sur
the Nazi period, according to Hayes (2004: 87), German businesses wer
by profits and more by political duties and economic necessities, leavin
for manoeuvre or choice. Nicosia and Huener (2004) characterize the b
German businesses as a 'complex mix of greed and survival in a rigid an
trolled economic environmenť (Nicosia and Huener 2004: 87).
At the micro level, the party membership of the Topf brothers and Kur
sibly played a role in the company getting the order for the production a
the installations. But it seems that the personal contacts between engineer
and the SS were most important in this regard. They enabled the corp
their expertise and competence to help the execution of the Holocaust.

State-corporate symbiosis

Many studies into corporate crime find opportunities in the character

product, the organization and the industry (Clinard and Yeager 1980; H
Instead, the opportunities in this case study are connected to the natu
tomer and their order. In this example, the government does not only fal
traditional role as regulator or supervisor; the government is the custome
Because of the symbiosis of interests and personal contacts between the
and the SS, the case of Topf & Söhne can be regarded as an example of
rate crime. This concept is developed by Kramer and Michałowski, to desc
organizational crime that originate from close collaboration between corpo
governments and that are explained by mutually reinforcing interacti
dependency (Kramer and Michałowski 2006b: 20). This concept has b
cases mostly within the United States, where criminal conduct of corp
fraud or environmental pollution, was facilitated or initiated by the gover
role of primate military corporations (PMCs) and their collaboration with
haps one of the most thoroughly explored examples of state-corporat
studies of PMCs during and after the invasion of Iraq (Kramer and Michał
Rothe 2006; Ruggiero 2010) as well as other situations show that the symb
states and corporations is usually fluid, complex and fluctuating (O'Reilly
2003).
Matthews (2006) argues that the state-corporate crime perspecti
reversed when looking at the involvement of corporations in the crim
regime: corporations facilitate state crime. The systematic murder of larg
people by means of gassing was facilitated by Topf & Söhne's innovative an
ventilation systems and ovens. The corporation enabled the fast and ef
of the mass murder with relatively few traces and less psychological b
perpetrators than more traditional means of systematic murder (Hilbe
this point of view, the case can be considered an example of corporate-fac
crime. Seen from the perspective of Topf, the Nazi regime provided th
that explains the company's involvement in the Holocaust. However, perha
more sense to see Topf as providing the Nazi regime with the opportunity
out their mass murder and genocide more effectively.
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 VAN BAAR AND HUISMAN

Control

In explaining corporate crime, governmental control is often seen as a negativel

variable: monitoring and sanctioning to prevent corporations from breaking
The tight control that the Nazi regime held on the German industry, however,
lated collaboration with the regime and thereby involvement in its crimes. Furth
in the case of Topf, the state was the customer of the products and services th
& Söhne provided, so there was only control on fulfilling the contractual obliga
Control as inhibitor or incentive for organizational crime also exists on th
level of the organization and the micro level of social interactions between indi
and their self-control. Social transmission of moral norms and social control on the
adherence to these norms are important factors on the organizational level (Sho
and Hochstetler 2002). These social norms are important in relation to neutralizat
techniques that justify breaking the law (or a norm) by using those internal norms
reversely, the internal norm that prevents breaking the law - techniques of restrain
(Coleman 1995; Shover and Bryant 1993). We have already described how the emphasi
on innovation and technical perfection and the substitution of moral responsibil
with technical responsibility appeared to have been important within the corpor
culture at Topf; these must have influenced the social norms. The effect of such a co
porate culture may have been intensified by the cooperation and close contact w
the SS officials at the concentration and extermination camps, indicating possible dif
ferential association and 4 learning' to further normalize what happened in the camp
Although the archive of the Topf corporation contains many documents, there are
no indications or pieces of evidence showing objection to the collaboration with the S
Moral considerations seem not to have played a role in the personal strife for innova
tion.14 Although the post-1945 interrogations show that every employee was aware o
the horrible conditions in the camps, this was not discussed within the company. Th
correspondence between the company and the SS does contain euphemisms indica
some form of neutralization. For example, one letter mentioned that the cremat
will be constructed next to the Badeanstalten für Sonderaktionen ('Bathing facilities
special treatment'; Schüle 2010). Minutes of a conversation between Kurt Prüfer
Hans Kammler, a high-ranking SS officer and engineer in charge of building the cre
matoria, show how Prüfer speaks of the rise of capacity from 250 to 800 per day wi
out mentioning that he was speaking about bodies (Schüle 2010: 164). This is anot
clear example of the dehumanization of the victims that were burned in Topf 's oven
Nevertheless, most cooperation was out in the open. When Buchenwald was libera
the American soldiers found the logo of Topf & Söhne neatly placed on the side of t
ovens.15
The available documents show hardly any clear neutralization before the end of th
Second World War. After the war, however, the neutralizations and denial commenc
There are some clear examples of denial of knowledge and denial of injury (see Cohen
2001: 76-88). During a meeting with the work council, Ernst-Wolfgang Topf decl

'interestingly, Hayes has also not found any evidence that the board of I.G. Farben morally evaluated or even debated
decision to use slave labour (Hayes 1987: 343). Similarly, Hayes characterizes the board of I.G. Farben as pragmatists; ambi
achievement and professionalism permitted them to reason only within the demands of efficiency (Hayes 1987: 31-2).
15In this context, it would be very interesting to conduct an analysis of corporate involvement in the Holocaust as example
'banality of evil' (Arendt 1963), but such an analysis is outside the scope of this article.

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 THE OVEN BUILDERS OF THE HOLOCAUST

that business relations with the SS had been completely normal. Furth
stated that the company had prevented worse things from happening, such
epidemics. After Ludwig Topf committed suicide, a letter was found in whic
that he felt unjustly accused and a victim of the circumstances: 'Contrary to
I have always stayed decent.' In a reaction to the refusal of a loan for his ne
Ernst-Wolfgang Topf denied any guilt with respect to the Nazi crimes. He st
only standard ovens had been delivered and that the killing and the burning
killed were not connected. Referring to the book by journalist Schnabel
qualified his role as Moral ohne Macht ('Morality without power'), a powe
ment in the hands of the amoral Nazis.
Techniques of neutralization developed by Sykes and Matza (1957) have been used
and extended for explanations of both corporate crime (Punch 1996: 225; Colema
1987) and the Holocaust (Alvarez 1997; Cohen 2001; Neubacher 2006). Althoug
Coleman (1987: 411) sees neutralizations as an integral part of the motivation befor
the corporate crime is committed, the neutralizations in this case are likely to hav
been created only afterwards. In the case of Topf, the need for justification of the ove
deliveries and ventilation systems to the extermination camps did not occur until the
end of the war. After the Nazi regime had collapsed, 'after-the-fact neutralization
were formed as a reaction to the accusations of involvement in the Holocaust, perhaps
awaking pre-existing suppressed feelings of guilt. The reason why these neutraliz
tions only appeared after the war had ended can be found in the reversed normativ
framework in which the actions of Topf & Söhne were judged, socially and officially.
During the war, the corporation provided a product and service that was desired b
the government and thereby contributed to a public policy goal: the extermination of
the Jews. Because this was not a goal of Topf & Söhne, this kind of involvement bears
resemblance to the way professionals such as jurists, doctors, police officers and engi-
neers collaborated to the Endlösung without being confronted with moral doubts, o
effectively coping with these qualms. In the national-socialist society, which endured
a continuing process of radicalizing anti-Jewish policy and propaganda, professiona
could embed their actions, socially and morally, in a socially accepted 'normalize
model of exclusion, robbery and expropriation (Welzer 2002).
In the understanding of those involved, there was possibly no criminal behaviour tha
needed to be neutralized; the behaviour was, presumably, not considered a crime. Th
use of euphemistic language does, however, show processes of depersonalization tha
enable neutralization. In general, however, the corporation did not undertake any actio
to cover their activities. Although involvement in the systematic killing of Jews would al
at the time have been reprehensible from a moral and humanist point of view, the politi
cal and legal criminalization of what was later called the Holocaust only came into exist
ence after the war, for instance by the Nuremberg Trials (Friedrichs 2000).

Conclusion

It is clear that the role of corporations should not be ignored by criminologists study-
ing international crimes. The case of Topf represents an extensive form of involvement
in the Holocaust and is a strong example of how corporations can contribute to and
exacerbate international crimes. This article aimed to use criminological explanations
of corporate crime to analyse historical data on the case of Topf and to see whether
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 VAN BAAR AND HUISMAN

historical explanations of corporate involvement in international crimes fit

ment these criminological explanations.
On the whole, the three explanatory variables - motivation, opportuni
trol - seem to fit. Striving for technical innovation and perfection, rather
mal profit, seemed to be the main motivation for the extensive involvemen
Söhne in the mass murder of the Jews. This finding fits in the culture of G
ness before and during the war: technical quality and efficiency were centr
determined the corporate culture within Topf. Opportunity was provide
the Nazi regime, but also by the technical knowledge and competence withi
pany and the contacts of chief engineer Prüfer with the SS. The 'Nazificatio
German society and economy and the emphasis on technical aspects and
allowed for justification and normalization of involvement in the disposal o
neutralizing this as contributing to hygiene in the camps. In addition to th
the political and economical environment and Topf 's corporate culture,
tion and contact with the SS may have socially transmitted a further dehum
of the SS's 'burning problem'.
This case study shows several explanations that can also be found in
lar organizational crime, such as the urge to survive as an organization,
between relatively autonomous sub-units and an organizational context that
influenced by the top management's vision and expressions. The domina
tional values at Topf helped to enable normalization of involvement in crim
ties. This proposes the assumption that theories on corporate crime, such as
or corruption, can also provide an explanation for the involvement of corpo
international crimes.
Nevertheless, the Nazi regime and thereby the context of international crimes had
a crucial influence on the motivations, opportunities and lack of control that cause
Topf 's involvement in the Holocaust. Within Topf, the striving for technical perfection
was most important. That the outcome of this strife was the burning of corpses result-
ing from persecution and extermination, however, was the result of the policies of the
Nazi state. Contribution to the autarkic Nazi economy, the war effort and the persecu-
tion and extermination of Untermenschen were central values heavily endorsed by the
regime. This provided Topf - and other corporations - with motivations and opportu-
nities that are extremely unusual in democratic societies. Moreover, social control was
probably diminished by this context of a criminal regime. Legal control was absent or
even reversed.

Brants (2007) emphasized the parallel of ambiguity that can be found in both inter-
national crimes and corporate crime: it is often unclear whether and which rules of
law have been violated, governments are not willing deal with these crimes and the
conduct is not seen as deviant within the particular social environment. Although the
firm Topf used euphemistic language and the employees - as well as the Nazi leaders
Himmler and Eichmann (Friedrichs 2000: 27) - were probably not completely unaf-
fected by the human suffering, the moral ambivalence is striking. The corporation did
not try to cover up their actions, but was proud of the products they sold. The norma-
tive framework, condemning the Holocaust as the international crime of genocide,
was developed after the Second World War, largely because of the Holocaust. It is the
coincidence of international crimes and corporate crime that creates the most crimi-
nogenic motivations, opportunities and lack of control.
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 THE OVEN BUILDERS OF THE HOLOCAUST

The neutralizations that corporations derive from the possibility of esc

responsibility for involvement in international crimes are still very topical
2010). International criminal law does not allow for private corporations
accountable for their involvement in international crimes (Stoichkova 2010). Even
today, corporations complicit in international crimes like Topf & Söhne cannot be adju-
dicated by the court set up to end impunity, the International Criminal Court.

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