ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

PROJECT

DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL AND DOCTRINE OF

WAIVER

Submitted to - Assistant Professor Shruti Bedi

Submitted by- Uday Singh Cheema
Section –B (4th Semester)
Roll No.- 105/16
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Acknowledgement……………………………………………………………………..3

 List of Cases…………………………………………………………………………...4

 Introduction –Doctrine of Estoppel…………….………………………………….…..6

 Evolution………………………………….…………………………………………...7

 Doctrine of Waiver………………………...…………………..……………………....8

 Fundamental Rights and Waiver…………………...………………………………...10

 Difference .……………………………………………...................................……...12

 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………….16
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First and foremost, I would like to thank Assistant Professor Shruti Bedi for the valuable
guidance and advice. I also would like to thank her for showing us some example that related
to the topic of my project. Besides, I would like to thank the authority of Panjab University
for providing us with a good environment and facilities to complete this project. It gave me
an opportunity to learn about the various concepts of Administrative Law. Finally, an
honourable mention goes to my family and friends for their understandings and supports on
us in completing this project.
 LIST OF CASES
 Asst. comma. of commercial Taxes v. Dharmendra Trading co. 91988) 3 SCC 570
 Bashesher Nath v. C.I.T
 Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana. AIR 1980 SC 768
 Central London Properties Ltd.v. High Trees House Ltd. (1947) KB 130
 Delhi University v. Ashok Kumar. AIR 1968 Del 131
 Director of Inspection of Income tax v. Pooran Mal and Sons
 Krishna Bahadur v. M/S. PURNA THEATRE & Ors
 Lowe v. Bourverie. (1891) 3 Ch. 82, 105.
 McDonald v. Attorney – General 1991 Holland J.
 Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P 7 AIR 1979 SC 621
 Muralidhar v. State of U.P.
 Shri Krishna v. Kurukshetra University. AIR 1976 SC 376.
 State of Kerala v. Aluminum Industries Ltd.
 State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon and silk Mfg. Co. AIR 1973 SC 2754

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 DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
A. INTRODUCTION

The principle of Estoppel in India is a rule of evidence incorporated in Section 115 of The
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The section reads as follows:
“When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted
another person to believe such a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor
his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such
person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.”

The doctrine of promissory Estoppel is an equitable doctrine. Like all equitable remedies, it is
discretionary, in contrast to the common law absolute right like right to damages for breach
of contract. The doctrine has been variously called ‘promissory Estoppel’, ‘equitable
Estoppel’, ‘quasi Estoppel’ and ‘new Estoppel’. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid
injustice and though commonly named ‘promissory Estoppel’, it is neither in the realm of
contract nor in the realm of Estoppel.

The true principle of promissory Estoppel is where one party has by his words or conduct
made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations
or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted
upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the
other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled
to go back upon it. It is not necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of
promissory Estoppel that the promisee acting in reliance of the promise, should suffer any
detriment. The only thing necessary is that the promisee should have altered his position in
reliance of the promise.

This rule is applied by the Courts of Equity in England, as Estoppel is a rule of equity.
In India, however, as the rule of Estoppel is a rule of evidence, the ingredients of section 115
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, must be satisfied for the application of the doctrine. The
doctrine of promissory Estoppel does not fall within the scope of section 115 as the section
talks about representations made as to existing facts whereas promissory Estoppel deals with
future promises. The application of the doctrine would negate the constitutional provision, as
under Article 299, which affords exemption from personal liability of the person making the
promise or assurance.

Hence, as the doctrine is a principle of equity, the courts have taken a prerogative to lay
emphasis on equity and justice and have explained the doctrine of promissory Estoppel in
India. The ingredients for the application of the doctrine are:
• That there was a representation or promise in regard to something to be done in the future,
• That the representation or promise was intended to affect the legal relationship of the parties
and to be acted upon accordingly, and,
• That it is, one on which, the other side has, in fact, acted to its prejudice.

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Central London Properties Ltd.v. High Trees House Ltd1. Lord Denning, categorically
held Estoppel to be applicable if a promise made which was intended to create relations and
which , to the knowledge of the person making the promise ,was going to be acted on by the
person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted on.

B. EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE IN INDIA

The History of doctrine of promissory Estoppels in India can be traced to the case of Ganges
Mfg Co. v. Sourajmul2 , in this case C entered into a contract to purchase a particular
number of gunny bags from the appellant for the respondent and 107,500 bags remain
undelivered as R was unable to pay for them. When C represented that arrangements had
been made for the payment for 87,500 bags, delivery orders were given to C for delivery
against payment. C’s representative took a letter from C to the appellant requesting the
appellant to direct delivery of bags to the representative of the R who went along with the
representative of the C because the R had agreed to advance the necessary money to C. The
officer in charge of the appellant did so. Then A deliver 50.000 bags to the representative of
R but refused to deliver the rest because C failed to pay. Thereupon the R sued the A for
delivery of the remaining bags alleging that they had advanced the money to C on the A’s
representation that the goods will be delivered. HC decreed that the appellant was stopped
from denying and Calcutta High Court observed that “the doctrine of Estoppels was not only
limited to the law of evidence, but that a person may be prevented from doing any act or
relying upon any particular argument or connection, which the rules of equity and good
conscience prevent him from using as against the opponent.’’
In Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. Secretary of State3 appellant
surrendered its own land in favor of the Govt. in consideration of a lease of government lands
in favor of the appellant on a nominal rent. After getting possession, the appellant spent
enormous sums in making constructions. 27 years later, the respondent filed as suit claiming
a large amount as arrears of rent. HC allowed the parties to redefine their rights, namely, the
appellant’s right to leasehold and the R’s right to reasonable rent. It was observed by the
Bombay High Court that even though there is no formal contract as required by the statute,
the Govt. should be bound by a representation made by it.

The doctrine found a complete and eloquent exposition in the cases of U.O.I v. Anglo
Afghan Agencies4, the Government of India made announcement regarding certain
concessions with regard to the import of certain raw materials in order to encourage export of
woolen garments to Afghanistan. Subsequently, only partial concessions were allowed and
not full concessions were extended as promised. The Supreme Court held that the

1
legal (1947) KB 130 1
2
(1880) ILR 5 CAL 669
3
(1905) ILR 29 Bom. 580
4
AIR 1968 SC 718

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Government was estopped by its promise. And after this case the courts have applied the
doctrine of promissory Estoppel through the following case:

It was in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v Uttar Pradesh5  that the doctrine of promissory
Estoppel was expounded afresh and given its most liberal interpretation by the Supreme
Court. In this case, the Government of U. P. notified a sales tax exemption for three years to
all new industrial units with a view to increase industrial progress. The appellant company
wanted to avail of the exemption by setting up a hydrogen plant for Vanaspati manufacturing.
In answer to the appellant company’s enquiry, the Director of Industries confirmed the tax
concession as announced by the government. The appellant company thereupon took steps
towards getting finances for the project and the necessary machinery. The Chief Secretary
and advisor to the government made a further oral assurance about the exemption from sales
tax as well as gave a written confirmation. Later, the government announced only partial
sales tax concessions. The appellant agreed to these concessions. At an even later date,
however, the government rescinded the concessional rates and the appellant company
challenged it. The facts necessary for invoking the doctrine of promissory Estoppel were,
therefore, clearly present and the Government was bound to carry out the representation and
exempt the appellant from sales tax in respect of sales of Vanaspati effected by it in Uttar
Pradesh for a period of three years from the date of commencement of the production. The
Government was held bound to the principle of promissory Estoppel to make good the
prosecution made by it.6

However the Court takes a reverse direction in the following case:

In Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana7 , a municipality granted exemption from
octroi for developing a mandi, but subsequently is revoked the exemption. Later it again
granted the exemption in keeping with the terms of the original sale of plots, but levied taxes
again. Even so, a claim of Estoppel against its legislative power was not allowed.

So is the case with the tax laws. If the law requires that a certain tax be collected, it cannot be
given up, and any assurances by the Government that the taxes would not be collected would
not bind the Government, when it chooses to collect the taxes. Thus it was held that when
there was a clear and unambiguous provision of law that entitles the plaintiff to a relief, no
question of Estoppel arises.

The following conditions have been laid down as necessary to invoke the maxim of ‘No
Estoppel against a statute’:
• The parties must bilaterally agree to contract irrespective of statutory provisions of the
applicable Act.
• The agreement entered into by the parties must be expressly prohibited by the Act.
• The provision of law must be made for public interest and not pertain to a particular class of

5
AIR 1979 SC 621
6
https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/scope-of-promissory-Estoppel-
against-law-essays.php
7
AIR 1980 SC 1285

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persons.
• The agreement of the parties should not have been merged into an order of the court which
by the conduct of the parties had been dissuaded from performing its statutory obligations.

The court observed that the law laid down in the previous case is correct and did not approve
the observation in Jit Ram to r extent that they were contrary to each other.

C. NO ESTOPPEL AGAINST STATUTE AND LAW

The doctrine of Estoppel does not apply to statutes. In other words, a person who makes a
statement as to the existence of the provisions of a statute is not estopped, subsequently, from
contending that the statutory provision is different from what he has previously stated. A
person may not represent the true status of a statute or law, but the other person who relies on
such a representation is at liberty to find out the position of law on the matter and as the
maxim says, ignorance of law is no excuse. So a person can not take recourse to the defence
of Estoppel to plead that a false representation has been made regarding the provisions of a
statute or law. The principles of Estoppel can not override the provisions of a statute. Where a
statute imposes a duty by positive action, Estoppel can not prevent it. The doctrine cannot
also be invoked to prevent the legislative and executive organs of the Government from
performing their duties.

Asst. comma. of commercial Taxes v. Dharmendra Trading co.8 In this case . the
government granted exemption from payment of sales Tax. later, the exemption was
curtailed. but, when the government action was challenged, the assistant commissioner
pleaded that the exemption granted was ultra vires the Act. Rejecting the contention Kania,J.
observed: “we totally fail to see how an Assistant commissioner or deputy commissioner of
sales Tax who are functionaries of a state can say that a concession granted by the state itself
was beyond the powers of the state or how the state can say so either”.

The classic decision of the Supreme Court of India on the doctrine of Estoppel is in the case
of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh9. In this case, the
doctrine of promissory Estoppel was applied to the executive action of the state government
and the doctrine of executive necessity was denied to the state as a valid defence. It was held
that in a republic governed by rule of law, no one high or low, is above the law. Every one is
subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception.
Equity will, in a given case where justice and fairness demands, prevent a person from
exercising strict legal rights even where they arise not in contract, but on his own title deed or
in statute. It is not necessary that there should be some pre-existing contractual relationship
between the parties. The parties need not be in any kind of legal relationship before the
transaction from which the promissory Estoppel takes its orgin.

8
91988) 3 SCC 570
9
AIR 1979 SC 621

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 D. ESTOPPEL AS A RULE OF EVIDENCE

The law for Estoppel or the rule of exclusion of certain evidence under certain circumstances,
like between tenant and landlord, licensee of person in possession and licensor (s. 116), or as
between acceptor and drawer of a bill of exchange, as between Bailee and bailor and licensor
and license (s. 117). Estoppel is a procedure of proof.

Section 115 of evidence act reads: “When one person has, by his declaration, act or
omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to
act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or
proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that
thing”.

Illustration: “A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A,
and thereby induces B to buy and pay for it; The land afterwards becomes the property of A,
and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that, at the time of the sale, he had no title. He
must not be allowed to prove his want of title”. The doctrine embodied under this section is
not a rule of equity, but is a rule of evidence formulated and applied in courts of law.

Delhi University v. Ashok Kumar10

A student who had passed the secondary school certificate examination of the Gujarat Board
was previously admitted to B.A., I year course of the Delhi University. After over a year , he was
informed by the university that he was not eligible to join the course because the Gujarat
examination had been recognized by the university as equivalent to metric examination where
as the qualification to join B.A., was passing the Higher secondary Examination. During this
period, the student passed the annual examination as the action of the university through a
write petition. The question was whether Estoppel could operate against the university for not
taking any action for over a year . It was contended by the university that there was no question
of Estoppel against a statute . Rejecting the contention, the Delhi High court held that Estoppel
would apply against the university.

10
AIR 1968 Del 131

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 DOCTRINE OF WAIVER
The Doctrine of Waiver seems to be based on the premise that a person is his best judge and
that he has the liberty to waive the enjoyment of such rights as are conferred on him by the
state.

Waiver proceeds on the basis that a man not under legal liability is the best judge of his own
interest and if with knowledge of a right or privilege conferred on him by the statute, contract
or otherwise for his benefit, he intentionally gives up the right or privilege, or chooses not to
exercise the right or privilege, and that the right or privilege is conferred principally for the
interest of himself not the interest of general public

Black’s Law Dictionary defines Waiver as “the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment

(express or implied) of a legal right or advantage”. It also says that the party alleged to have
waived a right must have had both knowledge of the existing right and the intention of
forgoing it.

The Doctrine of Waiver seems to be based on the premise that a person is his best judge and
that he has the liberty to waive the enjoyment of such rights as are conferred on him by the
state.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines Waiver as “the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment

(express or implied) of a legal right or advantage”. It also says that the party alleged to have
waived a right must have had both knowledge of the existing right and the intention of
forgoing it.

Various Legal luminaries and scholars have also tried to explain the Doctrine of Waiver.

1. William R. Anson11 – The term waiver is one of those words of indefinite concoction in
which our legal literature abounds; like a cloak, it covers a multitude of sins.

2. Restatement (Second) of Contracts12 – Waiver is often inexactly defined as the

‘voluntary relinquishment of a known right’. When the waiver is reinforced by reliance,
enforcement is often to rest on ‘Estoppel’. Since the more common definition of Estoppel is
limited to reliance on a misrepresentation of an existing fact, reliance on a waiver or promise
as to the future is sometimes said to create a ‘promissory Estoppel’. The common definition
of waiver may lead to the incorrect inference that the promisor must know his legal rights and
11
 Principles of the Law of Contract.
12
84 cmt. b (1979).

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must intend the legal effect of the promise. But it is sufficient if he has reason to know the
essential facts.

3.  Keeton – Waiver is often asserted as the justification for a decision when it is not
appropriate to the circumstances.

4.  Farnsworth on Contracts – Although it has often been said that a waiver is ‘the intention
relinquishment of a known right’, this is a misleading definition. What is involved is not the
relinquishment of a right and the termination of the reciprocal duty but the excuse of the non-
occurrence of or delay in the occurrence of a condition of a duty.

American Conception of Doctrine of Waiver

In the famous case of Miranda v. Arizona13, the Supreme Court laid down certain
requirements known as the Miranda Rights. These requirements include stipulations such as
the right to remain silent and that they may have an attorney present questioning.

However, in USA, a Criminal Defendant may waive the right to remain silent as well as the
other Miranda Rights and make a confession, but the Prosecution must demonstrate to the
court that the ‘waiver’ was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than a decision
based on intimidation, coercion, force or deception. It must also be proved that the defendant
was fully aware of the Miranda rights being abandoned and the consequences thereof.

A. Doctrine of Waiver and Fundamental Rights in India

Fundamental Rights are the most special of the rights in Indian Context. These rights though
sacrosanct are not absolute in nature. Our Constitution imposes various imposes various
reasonable restrictions upon the exercise of fundamental rights.

As stated above, we saw that a right can be waived subject to the condition that no public
interest is involved therein. However, the scope of the Doctrine of Waiver with respect to
Fundamental rights is a bit different. It was discussed in the case of Basheshr Nath v.
Income Tax commissioner14. The Court said that:

13
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
14
AIR 1959 SC 149

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“Without finally expressing an opinion on this question we are not for the moment convinced
that this Doctrine has any relevancy in construing the fundamental rights conferred by Part III
of our Constitution. We think that the rights described as fundamental rights are a necessary
consequence of the declaration in the preamble that the people of India have solemnly
resolved to constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic and to secure to all its
citizens justice, social, economic and political; liberty, of thought, expression, belief, faith
and worship; equality of status and of opportunity. These fundamental rights have not been
put in the Constitution merely for the individual benefit though ultimately they come into
operation in considering individual rights. They have been put there as a matter of public
policy and the ‘doctrine of waiver’ can have no application to provisions of law which have
been enacted as a matter of Constitutional policy. Reference to some of the articles, inter alia,
Articles 15(1) 20, 21, makes the proposition quite plain. A citizen cannot get discrimination
by telling the State 'You can discriminate', or get convicted by waiving the protection given
under Articles 20 and 21.”

We find that the primary objective of Fundamental Rights is based on Public Policy. Thus,
individuals are not allowed to waive off such fundamental rights. Also, it is the constitutional
mandate of the Courts to see that Fundamental Rights are enforced and guaranteed even if
one might wish to waive them.

An advance opinion was given by the apex court in a recent decision namely Nar Singh Pal
v. Union of India15 . The court held that “fundamental rights cannot be bartered away. They
cannot be compromised nor there do any Estoppel against the exercise of fundamental right
available under the constitution". In this case a telecom labourer(casual) had worked
continuously for 10 years and had thus acquired the temporary status. He was prosecuted for
a criminal offence but was ultimately acquitted. In the mean time he was terminated from
service. He questioned the order of termination but accepted retrenchment benefit. The
supreme court told that his service could not be terminated without a departmental enquiry
and without giving him a hearing. Acceptance of retrenchment benefits by him did not mean
that he had surrendered all his constitutional rights. Accordingly the order of termination was
quashed by the supreme court and he was reinstated in service.

B. Waiver of Statutory Rights

Whether a person can waive his rights or not depends on consideration of two factors. First,
whether the statute guaranteed rights exclusively in the favour of the person concerned or
third persons as well. The doctrine of waiver cannot be applied in the latter case. Secondly if
the statute vests rights exclusively in the person waiving that right, still the waiver would not
be allowed on the grounds of the public policy, public interest or public morality. Thus in
Murlidhar V. State of U.P. 16, it was held by the court that section 3 of the U.P. control of
rent and Eviction act, 1947 was founded on public policy and was intended to protect the
weaker section of the society by creating equality in bargaining power.
15
Date of judgment: March 28, 2000
16
AIR 1975 SC 1924

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 C. Waiver of the Natural Justice

A person may waive his objection to the matter being decided by a person subject to the
disqualification of the bias. Thus in R.C. Cooper V. Union Of India17, the bench
abjudicating upon the constitutionality of the statute nationalising 14 banks consisted of two
judges having shares in some of those banks. On behalf of the Government of India the
Attorney general waived the objection against those judges hearing the case. Thereafter the
bench proceeds the hearing.

It is true that the waiver always cannot and in every case be inferred merely for the failure of
the party to take the objection. Waiver can be inferred only if and after the party knew about
the relevant facts and was aware of his rights to take the objection in question.

D. Government Contracts and The Waiver

The fundamental principle is that waiver is the question of the fact and it must be properly
pleaded and proved. In Motilal padampat, the government raised the plea of waiver. But
Bhagwati J. did not allow this plea on the base that the government had not raised in its
affidavit filed in reply to the writ petition. Here the government had not taken the plea of
waiver at the first opportunity. It was raised by the government for the first time at the time of
hearing of the writ petition. In view of the court it was not the right approach.

There have been plethora of cases that have discussed the doctrine of Waiver. Some of the
important ones are.

1. Jaswantsingh Mathurasingh & Anr. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & Ors.18– In

this case, the court said that everyone has a right to waive an advantage or protection which
seeks to give him/her. For e.g. In case of a Tenant-Owner dispute, if a notice is issued and no
representation is made by either the owner, tenant or a sub-tenant, it would amount to waiver
of the opportunity and such person cannot be permitted to turn around at a later stage.

2. Krishna Bahadur v. M/s. Purna Theatre & Ors.19 – This case made a differentiation
between the principle of Estoppel and the principle of Waiver. The court said that “the
difference between the two is that whereas Estoppel is not a cause of action; it is a rule of
evidence; waiver is contractual and may constitute a cause of action; it is an agreement

17
AIR 1970 SC 564
18
(1992) Supp. 1 SCC 5.
19
AIR 2004 SC 4282.

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between the parties and a party fully knowing of its rights has agreed not to assert a right for
a consideration”.

The court also held that:

“A right can be waived by the party for whose benefit certain requirements or conditions had
been provided for by a statute  subject to the condition that no public interest is involved
therein. Whenever waiver is pleaded it is for the party pleading the same to show that an
agreement waiving the right in consideration of some compromise came into being. Statutory
right, however, may also be waived by his conduct.”

3. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association &

Ors.20 – This case said that even though Waiver and Estoppel are two different concepts, still
the essence of a Waiver is an Estoppel and without Estoppel, there cannot be any Waiver.
The court also said “Estoppel and waiver are questions of conduct and must necessarily be
determined on the facts of each case”.

Doctrine of Waiver and Fundamental Rights in India

Fundamental Rights are the most special of the rights in Indian Context. These rights though
sacrosanct are not absolute in nature. Our Constitution imposes various imposes various
reasonable restrictions upon the exercise of fundamental rights.

As stated above, we saw that a right can be waived subject to the condition that no public
interest is involved therein. However, the scope of the Doctrine of Waiver with respect to
Fundamental rights is a bit different. It was discussed in the case of Basheshr Nath v.
Income Tax commissioner21. The Court said that:

“Without finally expressing an opinion on this question we are not for the moment convinced
that this Doctrine has any relevancy in construing the fundamental rights conferred by Part
III of our Constitution. We think that the rights described as fundamental rights are a
necessary consequence of the declaration in the preamble that the people of India have
solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic and to secure to
20
AIR 1988 SC 233.
21
AIR 1959 SC 149.

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all its citizens justice, social, economic and political; liberty, of thought, expression, belief,
faith and worship; equality of status and of opportunity. These fundamental rights have
not been put in the Constitution merely for the individual benefit though ultimately they
come into operation in considering individual rights. They have been put there as a matter
of public policy and the ‘doctrine of waiver’ can have no application to provisions of law
which have been enacted as a matter of Constitutional policy.  Reference to some of the
articles, inter alia, Articles 15(1) 20, 21, makes the proposition quite plain. A citizen cannot
get discrimination by telling the State 'You can discriminate', or get convicted by waiving the
protection given under Articles 20 and 21.”

We find that the primary objective of Fundamental Rights is based on Public Policy. Thus,
individuals are not allowed to waive off such fundamental rights. Also, it is the constitutional
mandate of the Courts to see that Fundamental Rights are enforced and guaranteed even if
one might wish to waive them.

Difference-

Krishna Bahadur v. M/S. Purna theatre & Ors22- This case made a differentiation between
the principle of Estoppel and the principle of wavier . The court said that “the difference
between the two is that where as Estoppel is not a cause of action; it is a rule of evidence ;
waiver is contractual and may constitute a cause of action; it is an agreement between the
parties and a party fully knowing of its rights has agreed not assert a right for a consideration
The court also held that: “A right can be waived by the party for whose benefit certain
requirement or conditions had been provided for by a statute subject to the condition that no
public interest is involved therein. whenever waiver is pleaded it is for the party pleading the
same to show that an agreement waiving the right in consideration of some compromise came
into being. Statutory right, however, may also be waived by his conduct.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 Dr. Upadhyaya, Administrative Law, Central Law Agency, edition 2014
22
AIR 2004 SC 4282.

15 | P a g e
 Takwani, Thakker, C.K Lectures on Administrative Law, 3rd Ed. 2003, Eastern Book
Company, Lucknow
 Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law, 9th Ed., 2004, Oxford University Press,
Oxford Jain,
 M.P. and Jain, S.N.Principles of Administrative Law, 5th Ed. 2007 Wadhwa and Co.
Delhi Upadhya , JJR, Administrative Law, Central Law Agency, 7th Ed. (2006)

WEBLIOGRAPHY
 https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/the-doctrine-of-
waiwer-administrative-law-essay.php
 https://www.academia.edu
 https://www.lawnotes.com
 https://www.scribd.com/
 https://www.casemine.com/home

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