JULITA ROBLEZA and JESUS ROBLEZA vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and INTER-ISLAND FISHING GEAR
& EQUIPMENT, INC.
G.R. No. L-80364 June 28, 1989
DOCTRINE:
MORAL DAMAGES – Awarded only to
enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion or amusement that
will alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of defendants
culpable action. 
FACTS:
It appears that on June 24, 1979, in
General Santos City, petitioner Julita A.
Robleza, with the consent of her husband,
petitioner Jesus Robleza, sold to spouses
Elpedio and Marianne Tan Lot No. 4735
(497 square meters) and Lot No. 4736
(495 square meter).
For said purpose, petitioners executed a
deed of absolute sale in favor of the Tan
spouses supposedly for and in
consideration of the sum of ten thousand
pesos (P l0,000.00) which was therein
acknowledged to have been allegedly
paid. Incidentaly, says the respondent
court, Elpedio Tan is the baptismal
godson of petitioners and his mother was
a schoolmate of petitioner Julita Robleza.
In fine, the parents of Elpedio Tan and
petitioners have known each other for
more than forty years and are close to
each other.
In July 1979, Elpedio Tan executed in
favor of respondent corporation (Inter-
Island) a promissory note in the sum of
P228,362.10. He also executed a deed of
mortgage over the two lots to secure
payment of said promissory note. The
mortgage was registered in the Register
Deeds of General Santos City.  other collaterals provided a partial
Petitioners, claiming that they did not
receive a single centavo from the Tans
and maintaining that the purchase price
of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00)
appearing on the face of the deed of sale
was not the true purchase price,
presented in evidence two checks issued
by Elpedio Tan which represented the
actual stipulated price. The first check
(RCBC) is in the amount of P50,000 and
the second check is for P44,000. Both
checks were dishonored (accounts
closed).
Thereafter, petitioners saw Elpedio Tan
who assured them that he would pay the
amount of the checks upon the release of
his loan from the Development Bank of
the Philippines. However, Elpedio Tan
failed to make good his promise. 
When it became clear to petitioners that
the Tan spouses did not really intend to
pay the agreed price of the subject lots,
they demanded the return of their
certificates of title. It was at this juncture
that Elpedio Tan admitted to petitioners
that he had transferred the titles to the
lots in his name and that he had
mortgaged the lots and turned over his
certificates of title to respondent
corporation. 
As confirmed by Romeo Uy, the general
manager of respondent corporation,
petitioner found out that the two lots
were used as collaterals and that the
certificates of title were in the possession
of the private respondent. Apprised of the
true facts on the status of the said two
lots and the non-payment of the purchase
price by the Tan spouses, said general
manager of respondent corporation
refused to return the certificates of title
but signified his willingness to accept
payment of fifty thousand pesos (P
50,000.00) would first be made by Elpedio
Tan.
Petitioner Jesus Robleza and Elpidio Tan
attempted to sell the said lots to a certain
Jong See but the transaction failed
because Jong See wanted the certificates
be given to him first.
For failure of the Tans to pay their
outstanding obligation to private
respondent, the mortgage on the two lots
was foreclosed and the same were sold in
favor of respondent corporation in a
public corporation.
Petitioners filed a civil case for the
nullification of the aforesaid deed of sale
for want of consideration and for the
cancellation of the transfer certificates of
title issued to private respondent.
Petitioners claim that they have always
been in possession of the subject
property, that neither the Tan spouses
nor private respondent ever took
possession thereof, and that respondent
corporation acted in bad faith.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the
Petitioners declaring them as absolute
owners of the lots and the Deed of Sale
null and void ab initio.
CA reversed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Petitioners are the true
owners of the subject lots.
2. WON the Petitioners are entitled to
damages.
HELD:
CA ruling reversed.
Basic is the rule that if the contract has
no cause, it shall not produce any effect
whatsoever 16and, therefore, it is
inexistent or void from the beginning. 17 It
is the total absence of cause or
consideration that renders such contract
absolutely void and inexistent. Where the
parties agreed upon a price but the
vendee did not in fact pay or failed to pay
in full the purchase price, the contract
may still be supported by some other
consideration. The fact of payment or
non-payment is not the controlling
criterion in declaring the contract null
and void for want of consideration. Non-
payment of the contract price results in a
breach of contract for non-performance
and warrants an action for rescission or
specific performance under Article 1191
of the Civil Code.
There are several indicia which lead Us to
the conclusion that respondent
corporation acted in bad faith in
foreclosing the subject properties, to the
prejudice of herein petitioners.
x x x as early as the time when
respondent corporation's lawyer went to
see the property, bad faith had set in
since, in that posture, it was incumbent
upon respondent corporation to initiate
the proper legal remedies for the
protection of its supposed alleged rights.
Its failure to do so is strongly indicative of
bad faith for, if it really believed that it
had every right to the possession of the
land as a mortgagee, it would not have
treated the matter so lightly and with
indifference. Its unexplained silence may
be deemed a recognition and an
admission on its part that petitioners are
the true owners of the subject lots. The
categorical refusal of petitioners to
surrender possession of the land and their
unequivocal declaration that they are the
true owners thereof, made in the
presence and within the observation of
private respondent's agents who did or
said nothing when the act or declaration
is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, may be given in
evidence against respondent
corporation 30 and, in this case, should be
considered as evidence adverse to it.
x x x there are insuperable features in
this case which compel Us to decree the
resolution of the deed of sale between the
parties. It was preponderantly established
that there was non-payment of the
purchase price. Also, petitioners were
never disturbed in their possession even
when the titles to the lots were
transferred to the Tan spouses up to the
time the same were mortgaged to
respondent corporation and were
eventually subjected to foreclosure
proceedings. In fact, Jong See who had
tried but failed to purchase one of the lots
and had constructed a building thereon,
was paying rentals on the premises to
herein petitioners. For these reasons,
there is no other legal or equitable
recourse but to declare, as We hereby
declare, the aforesaid deed of sale
rescinded and of on legal effect.
We agree with the trial court that based
on the evidence of record the petitioners
are entitled to damages. It is said,
however, that the law on damages is
merely intended to repair the damage
done by putting the plaintiff in the same
position, as far as pecuniary
compensation can do, that he would be
had the damage not been inflicted and the
wrong not committed. Moral damages are
not intended to enrich the plaintiff; they
are designed to compensate for the actual
injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer. 
Considering, further, that petitioners
were never dispossessed of the subject
lots, although their right of disposition
and alienation thereover was impaired, an
award of fifty thousand pesos (P
50,000.00) as moral damages, in addition
to the compensatory and exemplary
damages awarded by the trial court, is
deemed sufficient and reasonable.