CASES IN LAW OF EVIDENCE

1. Facts:

Petitioner, was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy,
he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a
Filipina, with whom he had four children. At the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended.

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. The trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship.

The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that
petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state
all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in
a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4)
has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and denied
petitioner's application for naturalization.

Issue:

Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appellant's brief used as basis
for reversal of the trial court’s decision but which were not formally offered as evidence can be
considered.

Held:

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note that the Rules of Court which
provides that –“These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except
by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now
being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance
upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the
more practical and convenient course of action considering that decision in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment
does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization
on the basis of the same documents.
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 Also, it was held that the publication of Immigrant Certificate of Residence cannot cure the
petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance
with 7, C.A. No. 473. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in
favor of the government and against the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly
provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former
places of residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization
cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the
Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied. G.R.
No. 127240. March 27, 2000, ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THE COURT OF APPEALS

  
2. Facts:

  Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of
her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between
Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence;

Held:
(1) No.  Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."  Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
 
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
 
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.  Neither may be examined without the consent of

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the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.  But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. ZULUETA VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

3. Facts:

Seventeen-year-old Kathylyn Uba was found in the house dead and naked with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Earlier at 10:00 a.m., Anita found the accused at the
back of the house who told her that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. At
12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw the accused descend
the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the
house.  She later noticed the accused, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants,
pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as the accused and
his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang. At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw the accused
when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and
blue pants. The accused told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and
that Isabel could use it. She noticed that the accused’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." He asked
her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then
arrived and thhe accused immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.

The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside
her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with
blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.

After trial, the accused convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise
known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.

Issues:
1. Is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt?
2. Is taking of sperm sample from accused a violation of his right against self-
incrimination?

Held:
1. The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-
settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution
to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and
five (5) incised, were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small

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intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr.
Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death
may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor
mortis. In other words, the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00
p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of
appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.

It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician,
Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were
noted on the victim, Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the
victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal
canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim. In addition, it is apparent
from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was
manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the
appellant’s assault on her virtue.

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the
sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s
gene type.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal
canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to
sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the
house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s
wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim,
Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4)
Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near
the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with
collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30
p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6)
Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina
Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on
the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of
Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood
with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang,
with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory
examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or
dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of
slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and
(13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such
flight being indicative of guilt.

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken

chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others,
is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence,
three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the

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inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

2. No. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting
from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to
be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples
were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is
the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin,

blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v.
Gallarde, where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused
without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-
incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine
his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling
which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post
facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The
science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence
obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of
law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence
presented. G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL
YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

Facts:

Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter Nena. Title over the subject
property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax
purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon. However, the land remained in possession of
Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had
actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was

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simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a
loan by... mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business
expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she
wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.

Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo,
Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein
petitioner.

In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they
discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they
are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of
Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.

Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint against Nena
praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor,
cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax
declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela.

Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos.

The RTC and the CA ruled that the contract of sale between Nena and Daniela was
simulated as it did not reflect their true intention

Issues:

Whether or not the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977 is sufficient
evidence to prove her intention in executing the Deed of Absolute Sale. (Question of
admissibility and probative value)

Ruling:

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of... evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of... evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his
own language in writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted or...
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for
being hearsay, unless the affiants... themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.

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 The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn
statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she
is... already dead, her sworn statement should not have been given probative value for purposes
of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a
consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their
allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed
the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the... plaintiff
to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Daniela's sworn
statement, no other documentary evidence was presented to prove their claim. Even the
testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she
entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.

The Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really
reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she never
told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing the... subject deed; she simply
chose to make known her true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on December
28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her declaration
therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the... subject lot, she never took any
concrete step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than ten years
later.

As to Daniela's affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed

the validity of the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the
sworn statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally, private respondents were... not
able to cross-examine the deceased-affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.

However, even if Daniela's affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that
private respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance of evidencethat the contract of sale between Daniela and... petitioner was
simulated. The legal presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who
impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its simulation. Since private respondents failed
to discharge the burden of proving their... allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner
and Daniela was simulated, the presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969
Deed of Absolute Sale stands. (G.R. No. 155208 TATING vS MARCELLA March 27, 2007)

 Facts:

At past midnight on July 31, 1993, Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports
Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon

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was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his
uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital
Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually
succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of
Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was
in the complex at the time.
 
Salafranca evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued.
He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail. After trial, the
RTC convicted Salafranca for murder taking into consideration the eyewitness account of
Mendoza and the corroborative testimony of Rodolfo Estao, the victim’s uncle who brought
Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and even on
their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was
able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.

Issue: Whether the statement of Salafrancas to Estao before his death is admissible as dying
declaration or res gestae.
 
Held:

The statement is admissible either as dying declaration or res gestae. An ante-mortem

declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of
admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying
declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

The Supreme Court notes Estao’s testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements
identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:
 
Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
 A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
 Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
 Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
 A Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako.
 Q What did you do?
 A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
 Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
 A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod
Salafranca.
 Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
 A Yes, Sir.
 
Q How long have you known him?
 A Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami.
 Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?

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 A Yes, Sir.
 Q Will you look around and point him to us?
 A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
 
COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
 A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he will just
suffer more.
 Q What happened when you told him that?
 A He kept silent.
 Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
 A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.
 Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?
 A He was brought to Emergency Room.
 Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?
 A He was pronounced dead.
 
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao,
his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly dressed
up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the
hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his
assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having
a hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten
minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had
been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying
declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the
statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the
earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an
exception to the hearsay rule.
 
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
 
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to
Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement,
Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and,
according to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in
the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours
after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the
imminence of his death can be shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial
evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of
his physician.  Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration

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had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder
in which Bolanon was the victim.
 
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
 
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein.
Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling
occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would
bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the
assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only
in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it
identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.
 
The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the undesigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act. In a
general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.  The test of admissibility of evidence as
a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as
a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose
to manufacture testimony. (People of the Philippines versus Rodrigo Salafranca, G.R. No.
173476, February 22, 2012)
 

 
Facts:

SCC through Arrieta and Halili obtained a loan from SIHI which was secured by a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation
on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters
to SCC, but no payment was made.

On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer
for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. In its answer, SCC asserted SIHIs lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the

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promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding
effect for lack or failure of consideration.

The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an
effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of
facts was agreed upon:

1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and that it
has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have
each the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;

2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC with a statement of
account of even date which were both received by the herein defendant; and

3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC, the latter acting through
defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note

The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were
liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.

SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim without presenting the original of the
promissory note. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed several times due to one
reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several times for
hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally
declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the
case was deemed submitted for decision.

On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.

Issues:
1. Whether or not there the failure to cross-examine the witness of SIHI resulted in waiver
to question inadmissibility of hearsay evidence;

2. Whether or not the stipulations made as regards the promissory note is a judicial
admission.

3. Whether or not there was violation of the Best Evidence Rule when the original of the
promissory note was not presented in court.

HELD:
.
1. Yes. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.
However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to
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 hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to
be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the
opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a
witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The
repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such
right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine
the other partys witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these
opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained
the trial courts finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the
opposing party’s witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of
hearsay evidence.

2. Yes. Petitioner’s admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through

private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of
the genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of
facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

3. No, there was no violation of the best evidence rule (NOW ORIGINAL
DOCUMENT RULE). Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the
documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the
execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late
for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of
these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. (SCC Chemicals
Corporation vs Court of Appeals, State Investment House Inc., Danilo Arrieta
and Leopoldo Halilil, G.R. No. 128538. February 28, 2001]

FACTS:

 Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte.   A portion of the land was
compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657,[1] as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988. Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary administrative
proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to
determine the valuation of the land.  Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the
Landbank’s valuation. Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the
RTC a petition for determination of just compensation.

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts
established in another case pending before it.

12
ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production
figures in another case pending before it and applying the same to the present case without
conducting a hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties

HELD:

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court or before the same judge. They may only do so “in the absence of objection” and
“with the knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not obtaining here.

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts.  In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is
explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

“SEC. 3.  Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the

trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.

“After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper

court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.” 

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.[G.R. No. 143276.  July 20, 2004]
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES versus SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and
LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL

Facts

On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government agencies,
organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect the Lincomo Elementary School. After
inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach
the place because on their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns
at them. The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their personal
belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader of the armed men who
introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos. While the group was walking in the mountain,
they encountered government troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were
able to regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others.

13
 The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During their
captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all times armed with guns.
Commander Falcasantos ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which demanded a
ransom of P100.000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform.

On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 oclock noontime, the victims were informed that
they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00 o clock in the evening of that
day. At around 12:00 o clock midnight, the victims were released after Commander Falcasantos
and Kamlon received the ransom money. The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The same was
reached after several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the
representatives of the kidnappers.

The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims
themselves. In the couse of the trial, the court took judicial notice of the testimony given in
another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops
that captured the accused.

On April 8, 1991, the court convicted all the accused, albei some as accomplices.
Accused Kulais filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the court could take judicial notice of the testimony of a witness in
another case pending before it.
2. Can the accused be convicted for the offense charged?
3. Which is afforded more probative value? Negative or positive testimony?

Held:

1. No, the court cannot take judicial notice thereof. True, as a general rule, courts
should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if
these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are
actually pending before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases,
where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him.

2. Yes, even if the court a quo erroneously did take judicial notice of the testimony of
Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was
based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims,
namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses
were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellants counsel. At
best, then, the trial courts mention of Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a decisional
surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially
prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

14
 3. Positive testimony. The appellant’s bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even
weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of
him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution
witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense. Between positive and
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial
on the other, the former generally prevails. Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their
testimonies were compatible on material points. (People verus Kulais, et al, [G.R.
Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998]

Facts:

Seventeen-year-old victim Onelia went her friend’s house together with her other friends.
Accused Roland Tacipit was already there with his friend Elmer when they arrived. After
partaking of a snack, the group decided to go home. Complainant was about to leave when the
accused restrained her, held her left hand and her notebooks and told her friends to go ahead.
Despite her cries and pleas for help, the owners of the house did nothing to help her. They left
the house together.

On the way, they passed through a coconut plantation of a certain Guillermo Agustin. By
then, it was already getting dark. There, the accused took hold of the wrists of the complainant
and wrestled her down to the ground. He tore off the T-shirt and skirt she was wearing and
pinned her hands across her stomach. The accused then removed her shorts and panty and
ravished her. After the carnal act, the accused accompanied the complainant to a point near her
home and before leaving her, threatened to kill her or her family if she reports the matter to
anyone. The complainant, however, did not heed the warning and immediately upon arriving at
her house, reported the incident to her uncle, Ernesto Marantan, with whom she was residing.
Marantan looked for the accused that same evening, but after failing in his search, he reported
the matter instead to the barangay captain. The following day, the complainant accompanied by
her mother, aunt and cousin, reported the incident to the police at the municipal building. She
submitted her clothing for examination and after being investigated, submitted herself for
medical examination.

The accused claimed that the sexual act was done with the consent of the victim. And to
disprove the same, the torn T-shirt worn by the victim at the time of the commission of rape was
presented in court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the sexual act was committed with the mutual consent of the parties.

Held:

1. The prosecution has proven that the sexual act was committed with force.
15
 Anent the contention of the accused that the sexual act was committed with the mutual
consent of the parties, the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently rebutted his point.
For one, although there was an absence of external injuries on the body of the complainant, the
clothes worn by her at the time of the offense speak well of the use of force and the presence of a
struggle.

Her T-shirt was torn which corroborates her testimony that it was forcibly removed. It
also proves that she offered resistance to the criminal advances of the accused. Her shorts, like
her panty, had blood stains. Her panty was detached from her shorts. Her bra was torn, also
denoting that it was forcibly removed. These physical evidence . . . are consistent only with the
force and compulsion applied on her; they prove she offered resistance and her defloration was
against her will. (People versus Roland Tacipit, G.R. No. 109140 March 8, 1995)

Facts:

Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. Upon
motion of prosecution, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, to submit her body to
the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The
accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a
violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found
in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit
the medical examination required by the court.

Issue:
Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to
determine if she is pregnant, violates right against self-incrimination.

Held:

The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is

a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The constitutional limitation was
said to be "simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips,
against his will, an admission of his guilt. An ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided.

It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians

due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is
absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family
doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. (Emeteria Villaflor versus
Ricardo Summers, G.R. No. 16444,  September 8, 1920)

16
Facts:

The dead bodies of Amparo and Luisa Jara were discovered in their room with P1,000.00
worth of money gone missing. Upon arrival at the scene of the crime, accused Felicismo Jara
who was then dressing raw chicken and who was Luisa’s husband, hugged Luisa’s bloodied
body. Later, two suspects in the killing, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas were
apprehended. After investigation, they confessed their guilt to the police investigators. They also
positively identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as the mastermind who had plotted the killing and
who promised them a fee of P1,000.00 each for their participation. Before the City Fiscal and
First Assistant Fiscal of Puerto Princesa City, respectively, Vergara and Bernadas subscribed and
swore to their extra-judicial statements wherein they narrated their role and that of Felicisimo
Jara in the killing.

Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa, together
with her friend, Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and testified that at the time
the killings took place at Alvin's Canteen at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, he was fast
asleep with his grandchildren at his step-daughter's house in Pineda Subdivision. The other
accused, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas retracted their respective extra-judicial
confessions admitting their participation in the crimes charged and Identifying their mastermind"
as the accused Jara during proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested the
admissibility of the extra-judicial confessions and the subsequent re- enactment of the crime on
the ground that their participations in these occasions were not free and voluntary and were
without the benefit of counsel.

After presenting testimony showing that the victims were living together as “husband and
wife” the prosecution presented an NBI expert to examine the splattered blood stains on accused
Jara’s trousers. The trial court ruled that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused Bernadas
and Vergara, together with the proof of corpus delicti of the special crime of robbery with
homicide established the guilt of the accused Felicisimo Jara beyond moral certainty.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of the accused is sufficent basis for
conviction of the accused?
2. Are the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution sufficient to convict the
accused?

Held:

1. No. The confessions in these cases were obtained in the absence of counsel. Though
there was a waiver by the accused of their right to counsel, the waiver is not valid.

Before the extrajudicial confession of appellant Bernadas was reduced to writing, Pfc.
Henry E. Pulga, in the presence of four other police officers, prepared an “Advice” followed by
the answer, "Opo". This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police

17
investigators either automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the
accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially
stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of
the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is
missing.

As to the re-enactment, the extra-judicial-confessions served as a script for what was to

follow. Pictures re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible confession are
themselves inadmissible.

Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other evidence to implicate Bernadas and
Vergara as perpetrators of the killing was introduced by the prosecution. Since these confessions
are inadmissible in evidence, the two appellants have to be acquitted.

The strongest evidence against Felicisimo Jara are the extra-judicial confessions of his
two co-accused. Bernadas and Vergara point to Jara as the one who bludgeoned the two victims
with a hammer and then used a pair of scissors in inflicting the stab wounds. He was also alleged
to have offered them P1,000.00 each if they would help him in the killing of his wife.

However, since the confessions of Bernadas and Vergara are inadmissible against them,
with more reason can they not be used against Jara.

2. Yes, as regards accused Jara only.

Apart from the above extra-judicial confessions, other circumstantial evidence was presented
to support a verdict of conviction. Such evidence in the absence of the extrajudicial confessions
is sufficient to overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused Jara.

Evidence attesting to the fact that accused Jara and his wife had not been in good terms for
about three years before the killings was presented. It was established that Luisa Jara and
Amparo Bantigue lived together as "husband and wife” which angered Felicisimo Jara and was a
cause of their frequent quarrels. He resented not only his wife but also her woman companion.

The nature and the number of wounds, reflected in the autopsy reports, convincingly show
that only a person who had harbored so much hate and resentment could have inflicted such
multiple fatal blows. It opined that accused Jara is the only person who would have sufficient
motive to wish the death of the deceased for he had not been treated well as a husband by his
wife.

During the investigation at the scene of the crime, blood stains were found splattered in the
trousers and shirt worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses were also smeared with blood. After a
laboratory examination of the eyeglasses, trousers, and shirt, the NBI biologist verified in her
report that the blood stains were not chicken blood but human blood. The blood stains found in
accused Jara's trousers formed certain Identical circular patterns, a splattering of blood which,
according to the NBI biologist, could be caused by an instrument like that of a hammner. Such

18
circular patterns will only occur at the time of the impact of the instrument, the very moment it
hits the victim. He further explained that there was no possibility of the splattering of blood if the
victim died hours before because blood starts to coagulate or clog 15 minutes after the wound is
caused. The blood of the deceased victims in the case at bar had already qqqcoagulated in the
morning of June 9, 1978 when accused Jara claimed that the blood stains on his shirt were
smudged when he hugged his wife.

The NBI biologist, whose findings were later signed by the Chief of the Forensic Chemistry
Division testified that human blood was found on the eyeglasses of appellant Jara, on the front
side lower portion of the left leg of the trousers, at the left buttocks of the pants and the back
portion near the trousers, and smudged human blood stains on the appellant's T-shirt. The human
blood stains were Type B. A failure to get evidence on the blood types of the two victims keeps
this second circumstantial evidence, together with the clear motive, from being well-nigh
conclusive. However, it is still strong evidence in the chain of circumstances pointing to Jara as
the killer of his wife.

Another circumstance is the cover-up attempt by Jara. He lied about the blood on his clothes
and eyeglasses. He falsely claimed that the blood came from the chickens he had been
slaughtering for the market. There is no explanation about the source and cause of the human
blood stains splattered all over him.

There is no question that appellant Jara was at the scene of the crime. Upon the discovery of
the bodies 'and the forcible opening of the door, Jara was with the group. He went through the
motions of embracing his wife although the observers noted that even in death there was no love
lost between husband and wife. One of the waitresses at the Alvin's Canteen who saw accused
Jara's reaction as he entered the room where the victims lay dead observed that he shed no tears
and his face did not show any indication of sorrow.

The hammer used in the killing is an instrument with which appellant Jara is familiar. It was
proven during the trial of the case that the hammer with the letter "A" on its handle which was
one of the instruments used in the perpetration of the crime belonged to Luisa Jara who had kept
it at Aileen's Canteen where her husband, appellant Jara helped as cook.

The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are present in this case.
The aforementioned circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the guilt of the accused Jara beyond reasonable doubt
(People v Jara, G.R. No. L-61356-57 September 30, 1986)

Facts:
At 1:00 in the afternoon, Nida Diolola sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their
neighbors house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of ‘the
accused, could help Daisy with her lessons.  An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-

19
appellant. They were looking for a book which accused-appellant could copy to make a drawing
or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused-
appellant went back to the latter’s house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 oclock after an
afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and
proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisys tutor. Aimee’s mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was
not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not
feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her brothers and
sisters houses, but she was not there, either. At about 7:00 oclock that evening, Ma. Nida went
back to her neighbor’s house, and there saw accused-appellant, who told her that Daisy had gone
to her classmates house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was told that
Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at
about 3:30 oclock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy was
playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in her house, but that
Daisy later left with accused-appellant.
The following day, Ma. Nida was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found
tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the compuerta by a certain Freddie Quinto. The
body was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her
pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. Barangay Councilmen Raul
Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the incident to the Rosario police. The other barangay
officers fetched accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall. At the
barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect
since he was with the victim when she was last seen alive.
Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon
of that day, she saw Daisy playing with other children outside her house. She asked Daisy and
her playmates to stop playing as their noise was keeping Jessiemins one-year old baby
awake. Daisy relented and watched television instead from the door of Jessiemins house. About
five minutes later, accused-appellant came to the house and told Daisy something, as a result of
which she went with him and the two proceeded towards the compuerta.
Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 oclock that afternoon, while she and her daughter
were in front of a store across the street from her house, accused-appellant arrived to buy a stick
of Marlboro cigarette. Accused-appellant had only his basketball shorts on and was just holding
his shirt. They noticed both his shorts and his shirt were wet. After lighting his cigarette,
accused-appellant left.
Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She said that at about 4:30
oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, while she and her husband and children were walking
towards the compuerta near the seashore of Ligtong, Rosario, Cavite, they met a fisherman
named Herminio who said that it was a good day for catching milkfish (bangus). For this reason,
according to this witness, they decided to get some fishing implements. She said they met
accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked
troubled. Charito said that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was unusual. She
also testified that accused-appellants shorts and shirt (sando) were wet, but his face and hair
were not.
SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report, Rosario Police Chief Ricardo B.
de la Cruz, Jr. responded to the call together with his men, PO2 Garcia, SPO1 Araracap and PO2

20
Lariza. When they arrived, Daisys body was already in the barangay hall. SPO1 Cuevas took
photographs of the body. At that time, Daisy was wearing pink short pants and a dirty white
panty with a dirty white sleeveless shirt wrapped around her neck. The body was afterwards
taken to the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite. The inquiries conducted by the police
showed that one Freddie Quinto was fishing near the compuerta when he accidentally hit the
body of Daisy, which was in the mud and tied to the root of an aroma tree.
Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for questioning. Two others, a certain
Raymond and Esting, were also taken into custody because they were seen with accused-
appellant in front of the store in the late afternoon of July 10 1999. Later, however, the two were
released. Based on the statements of Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, the
policemen went to the house of accused-appellant at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of July
11, 1999 and recovered the white basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at
the back, and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it, worn by accused-
appellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned over to the
NBI for laboratory examination.
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that at about 9:00 oclock in the
evening of July 11, 1999, he conducted a physical examination of accused-appellant and found
that the cause of death was asphyxia by manua strangulation. The child’s hymen had fresh
lacerations.
Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that he was informed of the
rape and murder at past 10:00 oclock in the evening of June 11, 1999.The mayor said he
immediately proceeded to the municipal jail, where accused-appellant was detained, and talked
to the latter.  The accused-appellant confessed having raped and killed the child.  The mayor
asked accused-appellant if he wanted to have the services of Atty. Lupo Leyva, a resident of
Rosario, as his lawyer. When accused-appellant said he did, Mayor Abutan fetched Atty. Leyva
from his house and took him to the police station about 11:00 oclock that evening.
When Atty. Lupo Leyva arrived, he asked accused-appellant if he wanted his services as
counsel in the investigation. After accused-appellant assented, Atty. Leyva testified that he sort
of discouraged the former from making statements as anything he said could be used against
him. But, as accused-appellant was willing to be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he advised him to
tell the truth. PO2 Garcia, the investigator, informed accused-appellant of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel and warned him that any answer he gave
could and might be used against him in a court of law. PO2 Garcia asked questions from
accused-appellant, who gave his answers in the presence of Atty. Leyva. After the statement was
taken, Atty. Leyva and accused-appellant read it and afterwards signed it. Atty. Leyva testified
that he did not see or notice any indication that accused-appellant had been maltreated by the
police. In his sworn statement, accused-appellant confessed to killing the victim by strangling
her to death, but denied having molested her.
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took blood
samples from accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his blood
type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused-appellant on the day the victim
was missing and the victims clothing were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the
NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite police for the purpose of determining the presence
of human blood and its groups.

21
 The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed accused-appellant
to belong to Group O. The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13 athletic basketball shirt,
with patches Grizzlies in front and SAMARTINO at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic
basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white small Hello Kitty T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4)
one (1) cut pink short pants with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) cut dirty white small panty
with reddish brown stains, were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the
reactions of Group A.
Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he had a conversation
with accused-appellant during which the latter admitted that he had raped and later killed the
victim by strangulation and stated that he was willing to accept the punishment that would be
meted out on him because of the grievous offense he had committed. Mr. Buan observed that
accused-appellant was remorseful and was crying when he made the confession in the presence
of SPO1 Amoranto at the NBI laboratory.
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest Prosecutor Elpidia J. Itoc at around
noon of July 13, 1999 in Cavite City, accused-appellant had with him a handwritten confession
which he had executed inside his cell at the Municipal Jail of Rosario. In his confession,
accused-appellant admitted not only that he killed the victim but that he had before that raped
her. Accused-appellant said he laid down the victim on a grassy area near the dike. He claimed
that she did not resist when he removed her undergarments but that when he tried to insert his
penis into the victims vagina, she struggled and resisted. Accused-appellant said he panicked and
killed the child. He then dumped her body in the shallow river near the compuerta and went
home.
Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office, testified that at noon of
July 13, 1999, while she was in their office in Cavite City, Prosecutor Itoc came together with
accused-appellant and some policemen. Prosecutor Itoc asked Atty. Agbunag to assist accused-
appellant about his confession. Atty. Agbunag read the document, informed accused-appellant of
his constitutional rights, and warned him that the document could be used against him and that
he could be convicted of the case against him, but, according to her, accused-appellant said that
he had freely and voluntarily executed the document because he was bothered by his
conscience. Accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Agbunag, then affixed his signature to the
document and swore to it before Prosecutor Itoc.
At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic Biologist Pet
Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well as buccal swabs
and hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo
Diolola. The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination.
Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on the
specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by
Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the victim.
The defense then presented as witnesses accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo and his sister
Aimee Vallejo. Their testimonies show that at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 10,
1999, accused-appellant, Aimee, and their sister Abigail were in their house in Barangay Talisay,
Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite when Daisy Diolola came to ask accused-appellant to draw her school
project. After making the request, Daisy left.[17] Accused-appellant did not immediately make the

22
drawing because he was watching television. Accused-appellant said that he finished the drawing
at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon and gave it to the victims aunt, Glory. He then returned
home to watch television again. He claimed he did not go out of the house until 7:00 oclock in
the evening when he saw Ma. Nida, who was looking for her daughter. Accused-appellant said
he told her that he had not seen Daisy. After that, accused-appellant said he went to the pilapil
and talked with some friends, and, at about 8:00 oclock that evening, he went home.
At 9:00 oclock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay officials fetched accused-appellant
from his house and took him to the barangay hall, where he was asked about the disappearance
of Daisy. He claimed that he did not know anything about it. Accused-appellant was allowed to
go home, but, at 11:00 oclock that morning, policemen came and invited him to the police
headquarters for questioning. His mother went with him to the police station. There, accused-
appellant was asked whether he had something to do with the rape and killing of Daisy. He
denied knowledge of the crime.
At 4:00 oclock that afternoon, accused-appellant accompanied the police to his house to get
the basketball shorts and shirt he was wearing the day before, which were placed together with
other dirty clothes at the back of their house. According to accused-appellant, the police forced
him to admit that he had raped and killed Daisy and that he admitted having committed the crime
to stop them from beating him up. Accused-appellant claimed the police even burned his penis
with a lighted cigarette and pricked it with a needle.
Accused-appellant confirmed that Mayor Renato Abutan and Atty. Lupo Leyva went to see
him in the investigation room of the police station and told him that they would help him if he
told the truth. Atty. Leyva asked him whether he wanted him to be his counsel, and accused-
appellant said he answered in the affirmative.He said Atty. Leyva informed him of his
constitutional rights. Accused-appellant claimed that, although he admitted to Mayor Abutan and
Atty. Leyva the commission of the crime, this was because the police had maltreated
him. Accused-appellant said he did not tell the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured
because the policemen were around and he was afraid of them. It appears that the family of
accused-appellant transferred their residence to Laguna on July 12, 1999 because of fear of
reprisal by residents of their barangay.  According to accused-appellant, Mayor Abutan and Atty.
Leyva were not present when he gave his confession to the police and signed the same. Accused-
appellant claims that although Exhibit N was in his own handwriting, he merely copied the
contents thereof from a pattern given to him by the police.
The RTC convicted the accused for rape with homicide.
Issues:
1. Was there sufficient circumstantial evidence presented to serve as basis for
conviction of the accused?
2. Is the extra-judicial confession of the accused admissible?

Held:
1. Yes.  An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused committed the crime.  In rape with homicide, the evidence

23
 against an accused is more often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of
the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its
commission, makes the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim
could no longer testify against the perpetrator. Resort to circumstantial evidence is
inevitable and to demand direct evidence proving the modality of the offense and the
identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable.

Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain a conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of accused-appellant:
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejos house, where accused-appellant was residing, at 1:00
oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for tutoring.
2. At around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and Daisy went together to the
latters house to get a book from which the former could copy Daisys school project. After
getting the book, they proceeded to accused-appellants residence.
3. From accused-appellants house, Daisy then went to the house of Jessiemin Mataverde where
she watched television. Accused-appellant thereafter arrived and whispered something to
Daisy, and the latter went with him towards the compuerta.
4. At about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and Charito Yepes saw
accused-appellant coming out of the compuerta, with his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-
shirt wet, although his face and hair were not. According to these witnesses, he looked pale,
uneasy, and troubled (balisa). He kept looking around and did not even greet them as was
his custom to do so.
5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a boat for catching fish with
dynamite) was docked by the seashore.
6. A little before 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde also saw accused-appellant
buying a Marlboro cigarette from a store. Jessiemen also noticed that accused-appellants
clothes were wet but not his face nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for her daughter, she was told
by accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to her classmate Rosarios house.The information
proved to be false.
8. Daisys body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near the compuerta.
9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had scratches on his feet similar to those
caused by the thorns of an aroma tree.

24
 10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were bloodstained. The
bloodstains on accused-appellants clothes and on Daisys clothes were found positive of
human blood type A.
11. Accused-appellant has blood type O.
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisys body contained her DNA profile as well as that of accused-
appellant.
Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his garments were not proven to
have been that of the victim as the victims blood type was not determined.
The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by Forensic Biologist Pet Byron
Buan of both accused-appellants and the victims clothing yielded bloodstains of the same blood
type A. Even if there was no direct determination as to what blood type the victim had, it can
reasonably be inferred that the victim was blood type A since she sustained contused abrasions
all over her body which would necessarily produce the bloodstains on her clothing.  That it was
the victim’s blood which predominantly registered in the examination was explained by Mr.
Buan, thus,
ATTY. ESPIRITU
Q: But you will agree with me that more probably than not, if a crime is being committed, and it
results in a bloody death, it is very possible that the blood of the victim and the blood of the
assailant might mix in that particular item like the t-shirt, shorts or pants?
A: It is possible when there is a huge amount of blood coming from the victim and the suspect, Sir. It
is possible. It will mix. Whichever is the dominant blood in it, it will be the one which will
register. For example, if there is more blood coming from the victim, that blood will be the one to
register, on occasions when the two blood mix.
Q: But in these specimens number 1 to 5, it is very clear now that only type A and no type O blood
was found?
A: Yes, sir.
Accused-appellant also questions the validity of the method by which his bloodstained
clothes were recovered. According to accused-appellant, the policemen questioned him as to the
clothes he wore the day before. Thereafter, they took him to his house and accused-appellant
accompanied them to the back of the house where dirty clothes were kept. There is no showing,
however, that accused-appellant was coerced or forced into producing the garments. Indeed, that
the accused-appellant voluntarily brought out the clothes sought by the police becomes more
convincing when considered together with his confessions. A consented warrantless search is an
exception to the proscription in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution. As we have held, the
consent of the owner of the house to the search effectively removes any badge of illegality.
The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-Magsipoc is also
questioned by accused-appellant. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that all the
samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated, considering that these specimens
were already soaked in smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory.
DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cells which contains his or her genetic
code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA profile is distinct and unique.

25
 When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victims body for the suspects DNA. This is the EVIDENCE SAMPLE. The evidence sample is
then matched with the REFERENCE SAMPLE taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile.  The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(EXCLUSION) This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have
similar DNA types (INCONCLUSIVE). This might occur for a variety of reasons including
degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the
analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive
result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (INCLUSION).
In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
others things, the following data: 
1. how the samples were collected,
2. how they were handled,
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
6. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-
appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her
tested negative for the presence of human DNA, because, as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc explained:
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: I noticed that specimens 1 to 5 consisting of bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and
of the accused gave negative results for the presence of human DNA. Why is it so? What is the
reason for this when there are still bloodstains on the clothing?
A: After this Honorable Court issued an Order for DNA analysis, serological methods were already
conducted on the said specimens. And upon inquiry from Mr. Buan and as far as he also knew of
this case, and we also interviewed the mother who came over to the laboratory one time on how
was the state of the specimens when they were found out.We found that these specimens were
soaked in smirchy water before they were submitted to the laboratory.  The state of the specimens
prior to the DNA analysis could have hampered the preservation of any DNA that could have
been there before. So when serological methods were done on these specimens, Mr. Byron could
have taken such portion or stains that were only amenable for serological method and were not
enough for DNA analysis already. So negative results were found on the clothings that were
submitted which were specimens no. 1 to 5 in my report, Sir.

26
 Q: I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B consisting of the smears taken from the victim also proved
negative for human DNA, why is it so?
A: Because when we received the vaginal smears submitted by Dr. Vertido, the smear on the slide was
very, very dry and could have chipped off. I already informed Dr. Vertido about it and he
confirmed the state of the specimen. And I told him that maybe it would be the swab that could
help us in this case, Sir. And so upon examination, the smears geared negative results and the
swabs gave positive results, Sir.
Q: How about specimen no. 7, the hair and nails taken from the victim, why did they show negative
results for DNA?
A: The hair samples were cut hair. This means that the hair did not contain any root. So any hair that is
above the skin or the epidermis of ones skin would give negative results as the hair shaft is
negative for DNA. And then the nails did not contain any subcutaneous cells that would be
amenable for DNA analysis also, Sir.
Q: So its the inadequacy of the specimens that were the reason for this negative result, not the
inadequacy of the examination or the instruments used?
A: Yes, Sir.
Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the
possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of
their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence
of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-
appellant
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: So based on your findings, can we say conclusively that the DNA profile of the accused in this case
was found in the vaginal swabs taken from the victim?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: That is very definite and conclusive?
A: Yes, Sir."
In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than
that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When
facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but
also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may
surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. This is how it is in this case.

2. Yes.
 Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and written confessions presented as
evidence against him. He alleges that the oral confessions were inadmissible in evidence for
being hearsay, while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation.
The claim is untenable. Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,

27
 preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional
provision: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture, force,
violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2)
uncounselled statements, given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of
paragraph 1 of the same section.
Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of Rosario,
Cavite and to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for being violative of his
constitutional rights as these were made by one already under custodial investigation to persons
in authority without the presence of counsel.With respect to the oral confessions, Atty. Leyva
testified:
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: Upon meeting this Gerrico Vallejo at the police station were you able to confer with him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did you ask him whether he really wants you to represent or assist him as a lawyer during that
investigation?
A: I did, as a matter of fact, I asked him whether he would like me to represent him in that investigation,
Sir.
Q: And what was his answer?
A: He said yes.
Q: After agreeing to retain you as his counsel, what else did you talk about?
A: I told him that in the investigation, whatever he will state may be used against him, so its a sort of
discouraging him from making any statement to the police, Sir.
Upon cross-examination, Atty. Leyva testified as follows:
Q: You stated that you personally read this recital of the constitutional rights of the accused?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: But it will appear in this recital of constitutional rights that you did not inform the accused that the
statement that he will be giving might be used against him in a court of justice?
A: I did that, Sir.
Q: But it does not appear in this statement?
PROSECUTOR LU

28
The best evidence will be the statement, your Honor.
ATTY ESPIRITU
The only thing that is stated here is that Maaaring gamitin pabor o laban sa iyo.
COURT
Let the witness answer.
A: I told him that, as a matter of fact, and I also told him to tell the truth and nothing but the truth.
The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the testimony of Mayor Renato
Abutan, it is also confirmed by accused-appellant who testified as follows:
ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Q: Did Atty. Leyva explain to you the meaning and significance of that document which you are
supposed to have executed and signed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What did Atty. Leyva tell you?
A: That they are allowing me to exercise my constitutional right to reveal or narrate all what I know about
this case, Sir.
Q: Did Atty. Leyva tell you that if you do not want, nobody can force you to give that statement?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And did he tell you that what you would be giving is an extra-judicial confession?
A: Yes, Sir.
Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of the
statements he was to make as well as the written confessions he was to execute. Neither can he
question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the
investigation. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being
propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Counsel should not
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
Accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the services of Atty.
Leyva before the latter acted as his defense counsel. And counsel who is provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection
against the formers appointment during the course of the investigation but, on the contrary,
thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Contrary to the
assertions of accused-appellant, Atty. Leyva was not the municipal attorney of Rosario, Cavite
but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan.
Indeed, the mayor’s questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of an interrogation, but
rather an act of benevolence by a leader seeking to help one of his constituents. Thus, Mayor
Abutan testified:
PROSECUTOR LU:

29
Q: And during the conversation you had with Accused Gerrico Vallejo, what exactly did he tell you?
A: At first he said that he did not do that. That was the first thing he told me. Then I told him that I will
not be able to help him if he will not tell me the truth.
Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
A: He had been silent for a minute. Then we talked about the incident, Sir.
Q: And what exactly did he tell you about the incident?
A: I asked him, Were you under the influence of drugs at that time?
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: I told him, What reason pushed you to do that thing? x x x
Q: Please tell us in tagalog, the exact words that the accused used in telling you what happened.
A: He told me that he saw the child as if she was headless at that time. That is why he strangled the child,
Sir. (Ang sabi niya po sa kin, nakita niya raw yung bata na parang walang ulo na naglalakad. Kaya po
sinakal niya.)
x x x x x x x x x
COURT:
Q: When you told the accused that you will help him, what kind of help were you thinking at that time?
A: I told him that if he will tell the truth, I could help give him legal counsel.
Q: And what was the answer of the accused?
A: Yes, he will tell me the truth, Your Honor.
For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to NBI Forensic Biologist
Pet Byron Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would have this Court exclude this confession
on the ground that it was uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the conversation with
accused-appellant, was part of the NBI.The issue concerning the sufficiency of the assistance
given by Atty. Leyva has already been discussed. On the other hand, the questions put by Mr.
Buan to accused-appellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity and clearly not as part of
his tasks. 
The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an ordinary
individual and is, therefore, admissible as evidence. (People v Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, July
16, 2002)

Facts:
 
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its
Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the
Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the
bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in.

30
 
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men,
because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other one sat two seats
behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15
passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he
approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers,
the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two
and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid
for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to
no good, and that there might be a holdup.
 
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the
bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back
appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out
and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the
man, the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the
suspicious characters to the police.
 
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men
insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let
them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at
designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight.
The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt
an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby
mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying
on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the Makati
Police Station narrating the whole incident.
 
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that
shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman
announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentines Day gift for former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of
more bomb attacks.
 
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive
interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day
bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise
admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The
bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the
two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
 
<embers of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo
Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and
other John and Jane Does were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated

31
murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused
remain at-large.
 
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan,
Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for
the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty.
Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During
the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated the following:
 
1.)                The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
 
2.)                That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted knowing
one another before February 14, 2005.
 
3.)                All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the RRCG
bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of the
Makati Commercial Center.
 
4.)                Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he claims
taught him how to make explosive devices.
 
5.)                The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14
bombing incident.
 
6.)                The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb
explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or less forty persons
injured.
 
7.)                Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March 20-24
each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network admitting their participation in the
commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
 
8.)                Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these crimes,
because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus that they had
entered.
9.)                Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a
television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the explosive devices which
resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the filing of these charges.
 
10.)            Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members of the
Abu Sayyaf.
 
After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge
of multiple frustrated murder.
 

32
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the
Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how
to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against the
government in the city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light
Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
 
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got
another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from
Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT
taken by Baharan and Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later,
Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly
received a call from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the mission.
According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.
 
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as
the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his
extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to
both conspirators. (People versus Janjalani, Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, Sali, Abdurrohim
G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011)

Facts:

On the strength of a search warrant, police officers led by Esternon raided the residence of
Mallillin in the presence of barangay kagawad which resulted in the confiscation of two (2)
plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance.

Officer Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found
behind the door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled
sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the items recorded
and marked. On cross, he admitted that it was he alone who conducted the search
because Bolanos was standing behind him in the living room portion of the house and that
petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which included the pillow in which the two
sachets of shabu were kept; that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police Station for a
true inventory, then to the trial court and thereafter to the laboratory.
 
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the examination on the
seized items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the
laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five
empty sachets, four were positive of containing residue of the same substance. She further
admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of
33
the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs.
Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory.
 
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by
the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom
with Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of
the police officers declared to Bolanos that petitioners wife, Sheila, was tucking something
inside her underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheilas body
inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the
room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by
the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby store
and when he returned from the errand, he was told that nothing was found on Sheilas body.Sheila
was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her children.
 
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by Esternon to the
bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the
bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the
headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed him sachet of shabu which according to him came
from a pillow on the bed. Petitioners account in its entirety was corroborated in its material
respects by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila
positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the search
because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was
being searched by the lady officer. Licup for his part testified on the circumstances surrounding
the discovery of the plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he
went out of the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who
was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets.
 
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The
accused went up on appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the chain of custody was complied with.

Held: 
NO.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in

34
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
the same.
 
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact
they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. Hence, in
authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects
which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original
item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
 
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact
with the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of
establishing the identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over
the confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom
Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory,
were not presented in court to establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject
items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly
seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence?
 
The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it
was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to
affirm whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of
seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who
could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the
items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until
before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.
 
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the identity of
the seized items because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also
any sufficient explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the
integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the
exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the
two filled sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu. (Mallillin
versus People, G.R. NO. 172953, April 30, 2008)
 
 

Facts:

Ater having received information that the appellant was selling illegal drugs in Nueva Vizcaya,
Captain Jaime de Vera called, on his cellular phone, PO3 Peter Almarez and SPO1 Domingo
Balido who were both in Santiago City and informed them of a planned buy-bust operation
against accused. They agreed to meet at the SSS Building near LMN Hotel in Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya. On their arrival there, Captain de Vera conducted a briefing and designated PO3

35
Almarez as the poseur buyer. Thereafter, Captain de Vera introduced PO3 Almarez to the police
informant (tipster), and gave him (PO3 Almarez) two P100 bills which the latter marked with his
initials.
 
At the target place, the buy-bust team arrived and saw the accused already waiting for the
informant. The informant approached the appellant and introduced PO3 Almarez to him as a
buyer. PO3 Almarez told the accused that he needed shabu worth P200, and inquired from him
(accused) if he had a stock. The appellant replied in the affirmative, and then handed one heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance to PO3 Almarez. PO3
Almarez, in turn, gave the two pre-marked P100 bills to the accused. Immediately after, PO3
Almarez made the pre-arranged signal to his companions, who then approached the accused.
Captain de Vera took the marked money from the accused’s right pocket, and then arrested him.
PO3 Almarez, for his part, marked the sachet with his initials. Thereafter, the buy-bust team
brought the accused to the Diadi Police Station for investigation.
 
At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory examination. The
appellant was transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained. Two days later, or
on December 29, 2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory examination,
and the seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by PO2
Fernando Dulnuan. Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination on the specimen submitted, and found it to be
positive for the presence of shabu .
 
The RTC convicted the appellant of the crime charged and on appeal, the judgment was
affirmed.

Issue:

Was the integrity and probative value of the subject drugs preserved during the chain of
custody?

Held:

No.

In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown
that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant.

The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the heat-sealed plastic sachet from
the appellant. PO3 Almarez mentioned on cross-examination that he placed his initials on the
confiscated sachet after apprehending the appellant. Notably, this testimony constituted the
totality of the prosecutions evidence on the marking of the seized evidence. PO3 Almarezs
testimony, however, lacked specifics on how he marked the sachet and who witnessed the
marking. In People v. Sanchez, we ruled that the marking of the seized items
to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2)

36
immediately upon confiscation. In the present case, nothing in the records gives us an insight on
the manner and circumstances that attended the marking of the confiscated sachet. Whether the
marking had been done in the presence of the appellant is not at all clear from the evidence that
merely mentioned that the evidence had been marked after the appellants apprehension.
 
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the apprehending team to the police
station. PO3 Almarez testified that the appellant was brought to the Diadi Police Station after his
arrest. However, he failed to identify the person who had control and possession of the seized
drug at the time of its transportation to the police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we
cannot presume that PO3 Almarez, as the poseur buyer, handled the seized sachet to the
exclusion of others - during its transfer from the place of arrest and confiscation to the police
station. The prosecution likewise failed to present evidence pertaining to the identity of the duty
desk officer who received the plastic sachet containing shabu from the buy-bust team. This is
particularly significant since the seized specimen was turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory only after two days. It was not, therefore, clear who had temporary custody of the
seized itemsduring this significant intervening period of time. Although the records show that the
request for laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachet was prepared by Captain de Vera,
the evidence does not show that he was the official who received the marked plastic sachet from
the buy-bust team.
 
As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the seized specimen
was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it
was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero. However, the person from
whom PO3 Almarez received the seized illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not
identified. As earlier discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu, as
well as the person who had temporary custody of the seized items for two days, had not been
established.
 
The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a
reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from the appellant were the same drugs that were
brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as
evidence. In the absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body of
the crime the corpus delicti has not been adequately proven. In effect, the prosecution failed to
fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating reasonable doubt on the appellants
criminal liability. (People versus Pagaduan, G.R.No. 179029, August 12, 2010)
 

G.R. No. 231989, September 04, 2018, PEOPLE versus ROMY LIM Y MIRANDA

Facts:

In the course of a buy-bust operation, PDEA poseur buyer IO1 Carin was able to buy

37
P500.00 worth of shabu from the accused Gorres and Lim. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda
rights to them and thereafter, conducted a body search on both. When he frisked Lim, no deadly
weapon was found, but something was bulging in his pocket. IOl Orellan ordered him to pull it
out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money and a transparent rectangular plastic box about
3x4 inches in size. They could see that it contained a plastic sachet of a white substance. As for
Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug was seized.

IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white
substance, and a disposable lighter. IOl Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet that she
bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. Despite
exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the media
and barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.

The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in
possession of the seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused and prepared the
letters requesting for the laboratory examination on the drug evidence and for the drug test on the
arrested suspects as well as the documents for the filing of the case. Likewise, IO1 Orellan made
the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there
was no signature of an elected public official and the representatives of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence seized were
taken.

The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens to
Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the sachets
of shabu from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic Chemist,
and Police Officer 2 (PO2) Bajas7personally received the letter-requests and the two pieces of
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PSI Caceres got
urine samples from Lim and Gorres and conducted screening and confirmatory tests on them.
Based on her examination, only Lim was found positive for the presence of shabu. The result
was shown in Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-196 and 197-2010. With respect to the two
sachets of white crystalline substance, both were found to be positive ofshabu after a
chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings were reflected in
Chemistry Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on the
cellophane containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them to the evidence
custodian. As to the buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's office during
the inquest.

The accused belied the version of the prosecution and alleged that Gorres was watching TV and
Lim was sleeping when the PDEA agents stormed into their house. Lim was apprised of his
Miranda rights. Thereafter, the two were brought to the PDEA Regional Office and the crime
laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim admitted, albeit without the assistance of a
counsel, ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he was afraid that the police would
imprison him. Like Gorres, he was not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest. Unlike him,
however, he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents but was acquitted in the case. Both
Lim and Gorres acknowledged that they did not have any quarrel with the PDEA agents and that
neither do they have grudges against them or vice-versa.

38
Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in Pita, Pasil,
Kauswagan the night when the arrests were made. The following day, she returned home and
noticed that the door was opened and its lock was destroyed. She took pictures of the damage
and offered the same as exhibits for the defense, which the court admitted as part of her
testimony.

The RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted
Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC Decision.

ISSUE: Was the chain of custody properly observed?

HELD:

NO. There was no compliance with Section 21 of the R.A. 9165 and its Implementing Rules.

Judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs are typically
made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings.

In order to weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or
poorly built up drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory
policy:

In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the
justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.

If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits,

the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she
must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence
of probable cause.

If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion
to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for
lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5,40
Rule 112, Rules of Court.

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013

NARCISO SALAS  versus ANNABELLE MATUSALEM
 
Facts:

39
 Anabelle Matusalem claims that petitioner Narciso Salas is the father of her son
Christian Paulo Salas who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at
the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower.
Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the
delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement.
However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her,
petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner
refused to support her and their child.

Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of
P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Petitioner filed his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He
described respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out of
wedlock when she went to work in Italy. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo;
he was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the
expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery and deceit designed to
“scandalize” him in exchange for financial favor.

At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was declared to have
waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision based on
respondent’s evidence.

Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his “kumadre” Felicisima de
Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their subsequent meeting, petitioner
told her he is already a widower and he has no more companion in life because his children are
all grown-up. She also learned that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a
housing subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village).
Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her former
boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of her and
marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought that she and her child
will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her money for
her child. When she became pregnant with petitioner’s child, it was only then she learned that he
is in fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he
wanted to have another child.

On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she stayed with a
housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December 28,
1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even
walked her at the hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his
wife. She filled out the form for the child’s birth certificate and wrote all the information
supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her
baby home. He was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is his “look-alike,”
and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment
unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the baby’s birth, petitioner went to Baguio

40
City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was also
informed about his having sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt the baby
and just give respondent money so she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner
stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the help of
relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought
to the hospital by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City
Police Station which set their meeting with petitioner. However, it was only petitioner’s wife
who showed up and she was very mad, uttering unsavory words against respondent.

Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to the payment by petitioner of apartment

rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his presence during and after
delivery of respondent’s baby, respondent’s attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose
and hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and
meeting with petitioner’s wife at the headquarters.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed the case
to the Court of Appeals which, however dismissed it.

Issue:

Whether or not the testimony of the respondent and her witness, together with the documentary
exhibits she presented in court sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate
child of petitioner.

Held:

NO. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)

Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit “A-1”) of Christian Paulo Salas in
which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it
was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it

41
was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.

We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand
in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and
it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.

As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit “B”) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner
as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates
so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with
respect to the child’s paternity.

The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital
bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.

Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. Exhibits “E” and “F” showing petitioner and
respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of
Account (Exhibit “C”) from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was
indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the
delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity.

As to the handwritten notes (Exhibits “D” to “D-13”) of petitioner and respondent showing their
exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish
Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes
were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family
Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of
respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.

The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian
Paulo, petitioner’s financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s apartment and his
regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the
“overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial” required.

42
 In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not
competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish
Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner.

People versus Ruper Posing y Alayon, G.R. No. 196973               July 31, 2013

Facts:

A buy bust operation was conducted against accused Posing after police authorities received
information from an asset about his illegal activities. During the operation, SPO1 Angeles,
acting as poseur buyer, was able to buy from the accused P100.00 worth of shabu which led to
the latter’s arrest. A body search further yielded another plastic sachet of shabu from the
accused’s possession. SPO1 Angeles placed his marking on the 2 items and turned them over to
the desk officer, PO2 Sales who prepared a request for laboratory examination.

On the same day, the specimens were delivered by PO1 Nicart to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for quantitative and qualitative examination, wherein each sachet was
found to contain 0.03 gram and tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug. Charges for selling and possession of drugs were filed against the accused for
which he pleaded not guilty in court. After trial, he was convicted.

Issue:
Were the elements of sale of drugs proven?
Was the proper chain of custody of buy-bust drug observed?
Were the elements of illegal possession of drugs proven?

Held:
Yes.

The illegal sale of shabu was proven beyond reasonable doubt. For the successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the
following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

SPO1 Angeles testified thus:

Q: Now Mr. Witness did you report for duty on August 13, 2003?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened while you were...What time did you report for duty?
A: I reported at around 10:00 in the morning.
Q: What happened while you were on duty on that date and time?

43
A: At around 5:30 in the afternoon, one of our asset which is based at Makabayan St., Brgy.
Obrero, came to our office and informed our duty officer about a certain Ruper Posing who was
known as drug pusher at their Barangay.
Q: What happened after this report was given to the desk officer?
A: Since the suspect is also included in our drug watch list, our Chief SAID immediately formed
a team to conduct buy-bust operation against the suspect.
xxxx
Q: What else transpired Mr. Witness?
A: After forming the said team, our Chief SAID P/Insp. Arturo Caballes gave me one (1) piece
Php 100.
Q: What did he do?
A: He gave me one (1) piece Php100 which will be used as the buy bust money.32
xxxx
Q: What happened next Mr. Witness after placing your initial on that Php 100?
A: After that we were immediately dispatched to the location at Makabayan St., Brgy. Obrero.
xxxx
Q: Where in Quezon City?
A: Kamuning, Your Honor.
Q: District of Kamuning?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What time was that when you were dispatched?
A: We were dispatched at about 5:40 and we arrived at the location at around 5:45. It was just a
5-minute drive from our station.
Q: And who were with you at that time, Mr. Witness?
A: PO1 Cortez and PO1 Nicart.
Q: Who else?
A: PO1 Cortez.
Q: Who else?
A: And the informant, Your Honor.
Q: So how many were you all in all?
A: Four (4), sir.
Q: What happened when you arrived there?
A: Upon arrival thereat, I, together with the informant went to the squatter’s area of Makabayan
St., and my companions positioned themselves in the viewing distance so that they will be able
to monitor the transaction. We were able to meet the suspect beside the basketball court of
Makabayan Street.
Q: And what happened when you met the suspect?
A: I was introduced by the informant as the buyer of shabu and I asked the suspect if I can
purchase worth Php100 just for my personal use?
Q: You asked him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was his reply?
A: Immediately, he pulled out one (1) transparent plastic sachet.
Q: Where did he get that plastic sachet?
A: Inside his pocket, sir.
Q: And what happened next Mr. Witness?

44
A: After the exchange, I immediately took out my cap signifying completion of the drug deal.
Q: After making the pre-arranged signal, what happened next? What is your pre-arranged signal?
A: Removing my cap, Your Honor. After that, my two (2) companions PO1 Nicart and PO1
Cortez immediately rushed to the scene, took hold of the suspect and introduced themselves as
police officers.
Q: How about you, what did you do?
A: I’m just beside the suspect.
Q: And what happened when your companion arrested the suspect?
A: Then I conducted body frisk on the suspect and I was able to recover the buy bust money and
another transparent plastic sachet inside his left palm.
Q: Which buy-bust money are you referring to?
A: Which I gave to the suspect.
Q: If that buy-bust money is shown to you will you be able to identify the same?
A: Yes, sir. I have already identified it.
xxxx
Q: I’m showing you Mr. Witness two (2) transparent plastic sachets marked as Exhibits "B-1"
and "B-2," kindly examine these two (2) plastic sachets and tell this Honorable Court the relation
of these sachets to the one you said you bought and recovered from the accused?
A: This one with marking RT1 is the one I bought from the suspect and the other heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet which is marked as RT2 which I recovered from his left palm.

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration
of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary. In this regard, the defense failed to show any ill motive or odious intent on the part of
the police operatives to impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and
liberty of an innocent person, such as in the case of appellant. Incidentally, if these were simply
trumped-up charges against him, it remains a question why no administrative charges were
brought against the police operatives.

Yes.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses that the
integrity of the seized item was preserved every step of the process. After the sale of shabu and
another sachet was discovered in the person of accused-appellant, SPO1 Angeles, who was the
poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, marked the drug specimens, and then turned over the
same to the desk officer, who in turn handed it to PO1 Sales. The latter then prepared a Request
for Laboratory Examination, and on the same day, the specimens were delivered by PO1 Nicart
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for quantitative and qualitative examination, conducted by Engr.
Jabonillo.

The same was corroborated by PO1 Sales and Engr. Jabonillo, whose testimonies were dispensed
with, and formed part of the stipulations of facts agreed upon by both the prosecution and
defense.

45
The defense kept on harping on alleged lapses in the procedure observed by the apprehending
officers, like SPO1 Angeles’ failure to recall the duty officer to whom he turned over the
specimens, and the officer who brought the specimens to the crime laboratory. Also, they
questioned the absence of an inventory report of the confiscated drugs and that there were no
photographs taken in the presence of the accused-appellant and that of a representative from the
media or the Department of Justice or any elected public officer.

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof; x x x

But time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that less than strict compliance with the
procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items
inadmissible.

Yes.

As to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the
following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be
a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drug. In the case at hand, the prosecution was able to prove
that the accused-appellant was in possession of one (1) plastic sachet of shabu, when he was
frisked on the occasion of his arrest. There was also no showing that he had the authority to
possess the drugs that was in his person. This Court held in a catena of cases that mere
possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession -
the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence·ofknowledge or animus
possidendi

In fine, considering the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the denial of the
accused-appellant fails. Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the
facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that is both
negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of the

46
prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various
aspects of the crime committed.

G.R. No. 198318               November 27, 2013

PEOPLE versus ASIR GANI y ALIH and NORMINA GANI y GALOS

Facts:

On May 5, 2004, SI Saul received information from a confidential informant that accused-
appellant Normina Gani (Normina), alias Rohaima, was looking for a buyer of shabu. SI Saul
agreed to meet the informant and accused-appellant Normina for negotiation at the Pearl Hotel in
Manila, just in front of the NBI Headquarters. They eventually met at Jollibee restaurant beside
the Pearl Hotel. SI Saul was introduced by the informant to accused-appellant Normina as an
interested buyer of shabu. Accused-appellant Normina initially offered to sell 500 grams of
shabu to SI Saul, but the two later on agreed on the sale of 100 grams of shabu for One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱150,000.00) to be consummated in the afternoon of the following day,
May 6, 2004, at FTI Complex corner Vishay Street, Taguig City.

After the meeting, SI Saul reported back to the NBI Headquarters to tell his superior, Atty. Ruel
Lasala (Lasala), about the transaction. Atty. Lasala instructed SI Saul to coordinate with the
PDEA and formed a buy- bust team composed of, among other people, SI Saul, SI Otic, SI
Arteche, SI Escurel, and Atty. Galicia. SI Saul was designated as the poseur-buyer and was given
the marked money constituting of two ₱1,000.00 bills, with several ₱20.00 bills in between, to
make it appear that the money was worth One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱150,000.00), the
purchase price agreed upon by SI Saul and accused-appellant Normina for the shabu.

At around 1:00 in the afternoon on May 6, 2004, the buy-bust team was dispatched to the
vicinity of FTI Complex in Taguig City. Upon their arrival, the members of the buy-bust team
strategically positioned themselves around the arranged meeting place. SI Saul arrived at around
2:00 in the afternoon; while accused-appellant got there at around 4:30 in the afternoon, riding in
tandem on a motorcycle with a man, later on identified as accused-appellant Asir Gani (Asir).
When SI Saul approached accused-appellants, the latter asked the former about the money. SI
Saul then showed them the marked money wrapped in transparent plastic inside a clutch bag. SI
Saul, in turn, asked accused-appellants about the shabu. Accused-appellants showed SI Saul the
plastic packs of shabu inside a blue bag. SI Saul handed over the marked money to accused-
appellant Gani. Accused-appellant Gani passed on the marked money to accused-appellant
Normina and turned over the possession of the shabu to SI Saul.

After the exchange of money and shabu , SI Saul lighted a cigarette, which was the pre-arranged
signal to the rest of the buy-bust team that the transaction had been consummated. When SI Saul
already saw the buy-bust team members approaching, he grabbed accused-appellant Asir’s hands
and introduced himself as an NBI agent. Accused-appellants were arrested and duly advised of
their constitutional rights. During the search incidental to accused-appellants’ arrest, the buy-bust

47
team seized from accused-appellants’ possession two other sachets of shabu, the marked money,
accused-appellant Asir’s .45 caliber pistol, and the motorcycle. The buy- bust team and accused-
appellants then proceeded to the FTI Barangay Hall.

At the FTI Barangay Hall, SI Saul conducted an inventory of the items recovered from accused-
appellants, including the two plastic sachets of shabu subject of the sale, which SI Saul marked
"ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," representing SI Saul’s initials and the date of the buy-
bust. All these were done in the presence of accused-appellants and two barangay officials. SI
Saul’s inventory report, however, did not include the two other sachets of shabu seized from
accused-appellants’ possession. Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought accused-appellants to the
NBI Headquarters in Manila.

At the NBI Headquarters, accused-appellants were booked and further investigated. The
following day, May 7, 2004, several members of the buy- bust team executed the Joint Affidavit
of Arrest of accused-appellants. SI Saul also executed an incident report, requested for laboratory
examination of the contents of the plastic sachets marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04,"
and submitted the said specimens to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division where they were
received by NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo.

The two plastic sachets submitted for laboratory examination had a combined weight of 98.7249
grams. Based on the forensic analysis by NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo and Forensic Chemist
III Viloria-Magsipoc, the contents of said sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride.

The evidence for the defense consisted of accused-appellants’ testimonies. Both denied the crime
charged against them and claimed that they were the victims of extortion. They were charged
only because they failed to produce the money demanded from them.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellants guilty of illegal sale of
drugs.

Issue:

Whether or not the chain of custody was complied with.

Held:

Yes. Contrary to accused-appellants’ averment, prosecution witness, SI Saul, was able to explain
why there were a total of four sachets of shabu presented during trial, when SI Saul only bought
two sachets during the buy- bust operation. SI Saul testified that in addition to the two plastic
sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-appellants, there were two more sachets of shabu
recovered from accused-appellants’ possession by the buy-bust team during the body search
conducted incidental to accused-appellants’ lawful arrest.

The Court further finds that the arresting officers had substantially complied with the rule on the
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs as provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

48
Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to
make a physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets
at the place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically
impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In this case, testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution proved that immediately
after accused-appellants’ arrest, they were brought to the FTI Barangay Hall. It was there, in the
presence of two barangay officials, that SI Saul conducted an inventory of the two plastic sachets
of shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, plus the other items seized from accused-appellants’
possession during the search conducted incidental to accused-appellants’ arrest. It was also at the
barangay hall where SI Saul marked the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-
appellants as "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," representing SI Saul’s initials and the date
of the buy-bust operation. Thereafter, the buy-bust team, with accused-appellants, proceeded to
the NBI Headquarters. At the NBI Headquarters, SI Saul made a request for examination of the
two plastic sachets of shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," and personally
handed the same to NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo. NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo, together
with NBI Forensic Chemist III Viloria-Magsipoc, conducted the laboratory examination of the
contents of the two sachets marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04" and kept said sachets
in his custody until the same were submitted to the RTC as evidence during trial.

Thus, the failure of the buy-bust team to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon
seizure and at the site of accused-appellants’ apprehension, and to mark and make an inventory
of the same in the presence of all the persons named in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, are
not fatal and did not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence given that the prosecution
was able to trace and establish each and every link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs
and, hence, the identity and integrity of the said drugs had been duly preserved. For the same
reasons, it was not imperative for the prosecution to present as witnesses before the RTC the two
barangay officials who witnessed the conduct of the inventory. At best, the testimonies of these
two barangay officials will only be corroborative, and would have no significant impact on the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs.

[G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003]

CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD, petitioner, vs. EFREN S. TEODORO, respondent.

49
Facts:

Respondent Teodoro made various purchases through his Citibank credit card. Accordingly, he
was billed by petitioner for those purchases, for which he tendered various payments. As of
January 20, 1995, the obligations of respondent stood at P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and
service charges. Several times it demanded payment from him, but he refused to pay, claiming
that the amount demanded did not correspond to his actual obligations. His refusal prompted
petitioner to file a Complaint for collection on January 25, 1996 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-092 and raffled to Branch
133.

The RTC, in an Order dated April 23, 1996, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the amount involved. The case was then transferred to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Makati City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 51586 and raffled to Branch 66.

During the trial, petitioner presented several sales invoices or charge slips, which added up to
only P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in
evidence as Exhibits F to F-4. Because all these copies appeared to bear the signatures of
respondent, the trial court deemed them sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of the
credit card. Accordingly, the MTC in its July 25, 2000 Decision ordered him to pay petitioner the
amount of P24,388.36 plus interest and penalty fee. 

Thereafter, respondent appealed the MTC judgment to the RTC which affirmed the MTC
Decision in toto.

Issue:

Whether the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips marked during trial as Exhibits F to
F-4 are admissible in evidence.

Held:
NO.

The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its case based on a
preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent had an obligation in the
principal amount of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the original sales invoices it had
presented in court were inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been admissible, they
would still have had little probative value.

The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible
because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well as the conditions of their admissibility.  Because of the

50
inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals, respondents obligation was not
established.

Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.

Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the
following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the
absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of
the court, this order may be changed if necessary.

In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the
photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the
originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable diligence and good
faith in searching for them.

Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions
that were not met, because the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez,
testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had
subsequently followed up the request.

Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A
photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals. Petitioner failed to show
that all three original copies were unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the
search for them.

G.R. No. 189404, December 11, 2013

WILGEN LOON, JERRY ARCILLA, ALBERTPEREYE, ARNOLD PEREYE,
EDGARDO OBOSE, ARNEL MALARAS, PATROCINO TOETIN, EVELYN

51
LEONARDO, ELMER GLOCENDA, RUFO CUNAMAY, ROLANDOSAJOL,
ROLANDO ABUCAYON, JENNIFER NATIVIDAD, MARITESS TORION, ARMANDO
LONZAGA, RIZAL GELLIDO, EVIRDE HAQUE,1 MYRNA VINAS, RODELITO
AYALA, WINELITO OJEL, RENATO RODREGO, NENA ABINA, EMALYN
OLIVEROS, LOUIE ILAGAN, JOEL ENTIG, ARNEL ARANETA, BENJAMIN COSE,
WELITO LOON and WILLIAM ALIPAO, Petitioners, 
vs.
POWER MASTER, INC., TRI-C GENERAL SERVICES, and SPOUSES HOMER and
CARINA ALUMISIN,Respondents.

Facts:

The petitioners were employed and assigned by the respondents as janitors in various PLDT
offices in Metro Manila. In suing the respondents, they alleged in their complaint that they were
not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth
month pays. They further averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll sheets. On
June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal dismissal as their
cause of action. They claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for
the filing of their original complaint.

In a decision7 dated March 15, 2002, Labor Arbiter (LA) Elias H. Salinas partially ruled in favor
of the petitioners. The LA awarded the petitioners salary differential, service incentive leave,
and thirteenth month pays but denied the petitioners’ claims for backwages, overtime,
holiday, and premium pays.

Both parties appealed. Respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal attaching thereto
photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine
(ATM)  cards to the supplemental appeal. 

Issue:

Whether or not the photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees are admissible in
evidence.

HELD:

NO. The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the
respondents' photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented
at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners' claim that
the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we generally admit in
evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings,
allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original
documents for inspection.  It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals,
especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the
respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the
alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no option

52
but to rule that the respondents' failure to present the originals raises the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

G.R. No. 201011               January 27, 2014

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all
surnamed DIMAGUILA vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO

Facts
,
Respondent spouses Monteiro filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before
the RTC, against the petitioners, the Dimaguilas,. The complaint alleged that all the parties were
co-owners and prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St.,
Liliw, Laguna, with an area of 489 square meters. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a
deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila (Pedro).

In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no
co-ownership to speak of in the first place. They alleged that the subject property, then owned by
Maria Ignacio Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and
Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern-half portion
assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the
heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they were
not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.

Later, spouses Monteiro were allowed to amend the Complaint whereby they abandoned their
original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of possession of a portion of the
subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other defendants, specifically, the portion sold
to the couple by the heirs of Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro were retained as
plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants.

In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their
original answer that the subject property had already been partitioned between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, and that during their
lifetime, the brothers agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern-half portion
and Vitaliano of the northern-half portion, which division was observed and respected by them
as well as their heirs and successors-in-interest.

Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro,
who had divided the southern-half portion equally amongst themselves, with their respective 1/3
shares measuring 81.13 square meters each; that Pedro's share pertains to the 1/3 of the southern-
half immediately adjacent to the northern-half adjudicated to the Dimaguilas as heirs of
Vitaliano; that on September 29, 1992, Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them through
a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza
and Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver; and that when they attempted

53
to take possession of the share of Pedro, they discovered that the subject portion was being
occupied by the Dimaguilas.

In their Answerto the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was
inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in
their original answer that it had been actually divided into southern and northern portions.
Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the subject
property "into two and share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a co-
owenrship, contrary to their original position. The Dimaguilas further argued that the Bilihan did
not specify the metes and bounds of the property sold, in violation of Article 1458 of the Civil
Code. Even assuming that such had been specified, they averred that the sale of a definite portion
of a property owned in common was void since a co-owner could only sell his undivided share in
the property.

During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta, brother of Sonia Monteiro (Sonia),
who testified that Perfecto was his grandfather and that at the time of Perfecto's death, he had
two properties, one of which was the subject property in Liliw, Laguna, which went to his
children, Esperanza, Leonardo and Pedro. Pedro was survived by his children Pedrito, Theresita,
Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their rights over the subject property to Sonia.

Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedro's son, Francisco, and was asked if she
was interested in purchasing Pedro's 1/3 share of the southern portion of the Bahay na Bato, and
that he showed her a deed of extrajudicial partition executed by and between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, as well as the tax declaration of the property to prove that the property had already
been partitioned between the two brothers.

Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic engineer hired by Spouses
Monteiro to survey the property in Liliw, and recounted that he checked the boundary of the
subject property, subdivided the lot into two and came up with a survey plan.

Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified
true copy of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners Dominga Tolentino, a
record officer of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testified that
as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed land, including cadastral
maps from the region.

One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the sole witness for the defendants. She testified that their
first counsel made a mistake when he alleged in their original answer that the property had
already been partitioned into northern and southern portions between the two brothers, as the
original answer had been rushed and they were never given a copy of it. She claimed that the
mistake was only pointed out to her by their new counsel after their former counsel withdrew due
to cancer. She further testified that there was no intention to partition the "bahay na bato" which
stood on the subject property, in order to preserve its historical and sentimental value.

54
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn over the
possession of  the subject 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property. The CA affirmed the
RTC ruling on appeal.

Issue:

Effect of the admission of the Dimaguilas in their original Answer.

HELD:

To prove their claim of partition, the Monteiro spouses presented the following: (1) the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, executed by and between the brothers Perfecto
and Vitaliano; (2) the cadastral map of Liliw Cadm-484, dated August 6, 1976, showing that the
subject property had been divided into southern and northern portions, registered as Lot Nos. 876
and 877; and (3) the Municipal Assessor's records showing that the said lots were respectively
claimed by Buenaventura and Perfecto.

It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated that Perfecto and Vitaliano agreed
"to divide between them into two and share and share alike" the subject property, including the
house situated thereon. It appears, however, that the property was actually partitioned into
definite portions, namely, southern and northern halves, as reflected in the cadastral map of
Liliw, which were respectively claimed by an heir of Vitaliano and Perfecto himself. It, thus,
appears that the subject property had already been partitioned into definite portions more than 20
years prior to the original complaint for partition filed in 1993, and that such division had been
observed by the brothers' heirs. As earlier pointed out, the petitioners Dimaguilas themselves
admitted to this very fact in their original Answer.

Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners
Dimaguilas argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his
rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them.

This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota

of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight
(8) years after their original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint of the
respondent spouses. In their original answer to the complaint for partition, their claim that there
was already a partition into northern-half and southern-half portions, was the very essence of
their defense. It was precisely this admission which moved the respondent spouses Monteiro to
amend their complaint. The petitioners cannot now insist that the very foundation of their
original defense was a palpable mistake.

Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so

55
amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of
the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove
that there was no partition of the property.

Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners
would actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the
respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to
corroborate the petitioners' admission.

The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the list of
claimants presented by the respondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule on
hearsay and the best evidence rule.

Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.  Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of
claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The cadastral
maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the
exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that
entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring
the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his
duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty.

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the
cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they
were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay
rule and are prima facieevidence of the facts stated therein.

[G.R. No. 121506. October 30, 1996]

56
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 9, CEBU CITY, MELBA
LIMBACO, LINDA C. LOGARTA and RAMON C. LOGARTA, respondents.

Facts:

Sometime in 1949, officers of the National Airport Corporation informed the owners of the
various lots surrounding the Lahug Airport that the government will purchase their lands for the
expansion of the airport. The landowners were convinced to sell their properties, otherwise, the
government will be forced to institute expropriation proceedings in courts. They were also
assured that their properties will be returned to them when these are no longer being used by the
airport

Initially, Inez Ouano did not want to sell her property because she does not have enough to
bequeath to her grandchildren and the price offered by the government was very
low.Nonetheless, she agreed to sell since the government was going to expropriate the land
anyway. She was also reassured by the promise that the land will be returned to her when it is no
longer in use.

Upon learning that other landowners were able to recover their properties and that the then Pres.
Aquino had ordered that the airport be transferred to Mactan, the appellees tried to repurchase
the properties originally owned by their grandmother. On 2 October 1991, they wrote to Capt.
Antonio Oppus, the manager of appellant, signifying their intention to repurchase the properties
originally owned by their grandmother. Capt. Oppus replied through a letter dated 17 October
1991 denying their request because the deed of sale covering the properties does not contain any
condition relating to the right to repurchase. These properties, it was explained, had become the
absolute properties of the NAC

Private respondents thereafter filed a case for reconveyance with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
which ruled in their favor. On appeal to the CA, the same was affirmed in toto. 

ISSUE:

Whether parol evidence is allowed to prove that the right to repurchase was granted to the
private resondents.

HELD:

Yes.
Under the parol evidence rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it
is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and
their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, the failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent of the parties thereto.

57
In the case at bench, the fact which private respondents seek to establish by parol evidence
consist of the agreement or representation made by NAC that induced Inez Ouano to execute the
deed of sale; that the vendors and their heirs are given the right of repurchase should the
government no longer need the property. Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the
moving cause of the written contract, or where the parol agreement forms part of the
consideration of the written contract, and it appears that the written contract was executed on the
faith of the parol contract or representation, such evidence is admissible.

 It is recognized that proof is admissible of any collateral parol agreement that is not inconsistent
with the terms of the written contract though it may relate to the same subject matter. The rule
excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the
admission of existing evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements
between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written
agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law
or in equity.

More importantly, no objection was made by petitioner when private respondents introduced
evidence to show the right of repurchase granted by the NAC to Inez Ouano. It has been
repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any
evidence must be made at the proper time, and if not so made, it will be understood to have been
waived.

G.R. No. L-5180 August 31, 1953

CONSEJO INFANTE, Petitioner, vs. JOSE CUNANAN, JUAN MIJARES and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION, Respondents.

Facts:

Consejo Infante, defendant herein, was the owner of two parcels of land, together with a house
built thereon, situated in the City of Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
61786.  On or before November 30, 1948, she contracted the services of Jose Cunanan and Juan
Mijares, plaintiffs herein, to sell the above-mentioned property for a price of P30,000 subject to
the condition that the purchaser would assume the mortgage existing thereon in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.  She agreed to pay them a commission of 5 per cent on the
purchaser price plus whatever overprice they may obtain for the property.  Plaintiffs found one
Pio S. Noche who was willing to buy the property under the terms agreed upon with defendant,
but when they introduced him to defendant, the latter informed them that she was no longer
interested in selling the property and succeeded in making them sign a document stating therein
that the written authority she had given them was already cancelled.  However, on December 20,
1948, defendant dealt directly with Pio S. Noche selling to him the property for P31,000.  Upon
learning this transaction, plaintiffs demanded from defendant the payment of their commission,
but she refused and so they brought the present action.

58
 Defendant admitted having contracted the services of the plaintiffs to sell her property
as set forth in the complaint, but stated that she agreed to pay them a commission of P1,200 only
on condition that they buy her a property somewhere in Taft Avenue to where she might transfer
after selling her property.  Defendant avers that while plaintiffs took steps to sell her property as
agreed upon, they sold the property at Taft Avenue to another party and because of this failure it
was agreed that the authority she had given them be cancelled.

The lower court found that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of the plaintiffs and
rendered judgment sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P2,500 with legal
interest thereon from February 2, 1949 plus the costs of action.  This decision was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not parol evidence may be given to prove the claim of the plaintiffs/respondents that
the petitioner gave them a verbal assurance that they would receive commission upon the sale of
the property to Pio Noche.

Held:

No, the parol evidence is inadmissible. The plea that oral evidence should not have
been allowed to prove the alleged verbal assurance is well taken it appearing that the written
authority given to respondents has been cancelled in a written statement.  The rule on this matter
is that "When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all those terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing." 
(Section 22, Rule 123, Rules of Court.)  The only exceptions to this rule are: "(a) Where a
mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings"; and (b) Where there
is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing."  (Ibid.)  There is no doubt that the point raised does not
come under any of the cases excepted, for there is nothing therein that has been put in issue by
respondents in their complaint.  The terms of the document, Exhibit 1, seem to be clear and they
do not contain any reservation which may in any way run counter to the clear intention of the
parties.

But even disregarding the oral evidence adduced by respondents in contravention of the
parole evidence rule, we are, however, of the opinion that there is enough justification that
respondents are entitled to the commission originally agreed upon.  After petitioner had given the
written authority to sell her land for the sum of P30,000, respondent found a buyer in the person
of one Pio S. Noche who was willing to buy the property under the terms agreed upon, and this
matter was immediately brought to the knowledge of petitioner.  But the latter, perhaps by way
of stratagem, advised respondents that she was no longer interested in the deal and was able to
prevail upon them to sign a document agreeing to the cancellation of the written authority.

59
This act is unfair as would amount to bad faith.  This act cannot be sanctioned without according
to the party prejudiced the reward which is due him.  This is the situation in which respondents
were placed by petitioner.  Petitioner took advantage of the services rendered by respondents, but
believing that she could evade payment of their commission, she made use of a ruse by inducing
them to sign the deed of cancellation Exhibit 1.  This act of subversion cannot be sanctioned and
cannot serve as basis for petitioner to escape payment of the commission agreed upon.

[G.R. No. 107372. January 23, 1997]

RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR
INOCENTES, AND ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents.
RESOLUTION

Facts:

On September 30, 1982, private respondents Inocentes sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of
registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively.
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the
titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said
titles. Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the
possession of another person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to
certain conditions.

Petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer
with counterclaim pivate respondents merely alleged the existence of oral conditions which were
never reflected in the deeds of sale.

During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that
the sale was subject to the above conditions, although such conditions were not incorporated in
the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of
said oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted
them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court aquo. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not parol eevidence is admissible to establish the verbal conditions to the
conract of sell.

Held:

NO. The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents' oral
testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of
the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks

60
of a uniform language.Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to
contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the
contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth,
whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the
parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject
to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties.

Secondly, the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any pre- conditions or other
agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.

Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that: The parol evidence rule forbids
any addition to x x x the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or
before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the
parties. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake."  No such
fraud or mistake exists in this case.

Fourth, there is no failure of the agreement to express the true intent of the parties. In this case,
the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity
or doubt in the terms thereof.

Fifth, private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it
did not reflect the intention of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). They
did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule.

G.R. No. L-29557, February 29, 1972 ]

ALFREDO D. TALOSIG, PETITIONER, VS. JULIANA PULANCO VDA. DE NIEBA,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Plaintiff Juliana Pulanco Vda. de Nieba was the grantee, in a contract to sell, of Lots 11 and 13,
Block No. 5, Quezon City, executed in her favor by the owner, Magdalena Estates, Inc.; that she
entered into a (verbal) "good understanding" with defendant Talosig for the transfer to him of
her rights over Lot 11 "with the assurance and promise" of Talosig to reimburse to her the down
and installment payments she had already made to Magdalena Estates, Inc., upon approval of
their deed of assignment and transfer by Magdalena Estates, Inc., and for Talosig to assume
payment of the balance of the consideration for the contract to sell; that Nieba and Talosig
executed a deed of assignment and transfer over Lot 11 on 6 December 1952, which was
approved by Magdalena Estates, Inc. on the same day; that both parties also agreed that Talosig
shall pay P2,400.00 for the improvements, consisting of a house and coconuts, on Lot 11 and

61
assume a mortgage on the house in the sum of P800.00; that Talosig redeemed the mortgage but
did not pay the P2,400.00; that Nieba demanded the reimbursement of P1,184.00 which she had
paid as down payment and installment payments to Magdalena Estates, Inc. before the execution
of the deed of assignment and transfer; that she demanded payment of the amount of P2,400.00
as the purchase price for the house and coconut trees; that she also demanded the delivery and
possession of the 26 square-meter portion of Lot 13, said portion being occupied by the house
and toilet; that Talosig promised to pay a monthly rent of P2.00 for the said 26 square-meter
portion; and that all of these demands and undertakings Talosig failed and refused to pay or
comply with. 

In answer to the complaint, Talosig denied having entered into the "good understanding" alleged
by Nieba; denied having promised to reimburse the down and installment payments; and denied
having agreed to pay the house and coconut trees for P2,400.00 or to assume payment of the
mortgage on the house.  As special and affirmative defenses, Talosig alleged that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of Lot 11, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32544
of Quezon City; that he is also the owner of the 26 square-meter portion of Lot 13 and the house
thereon, having purchased these properties from the plaintiff, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale,
dated 17 December 1952.  A copy of this deed was annexed to the answer.  Talosig further
alleged that the agreements alleged by Nieba in her complaint are not enforceable under the
Statute of Frauds. 

After trial, the Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant Talosig appealed
to the Court of Appeals, but the appealed judgment was sustained with slight modification, by
decreasing the balance of the purchase price for the house and rights to Lot 11 from P1,970.90 to
P1,870.00. 

ISSUE:

Whether the parol evidence presented by plaintiff Nieba is admissible.

HELD:

Yes, the parol evidence is admissible.

Not only because Talosig failed to object to the parol evidence introduced by plaintiff Nieba
which constituted a waiver to the admissibility of said parol evidence, but also because Nieba’s
payments for the land to MagdaleneEstates were evidenced by receipts.

62
[ G.R. NO. 118509, MARCH 29, 1996 ]
LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL.,

In this motion for reconsideration, the Court* is called upon to take a second hard look on its
December 1, 1995 decision reversing and setting aside respondent Court of Appeals judgment of
August 12, 1994 that dismissed petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling Inc.s complaint for specific
performance and damages against private respondents Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and
National Book Store (NBS). Petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc., opposed the motion and
filed its Consolidated Comment, to which private respondent NBS filed a Reply. Thereafter,
petitioner filed its Manifestation and Motion for the voluntary inhibition of Chief Justice Andres
R. Narvasa from taking part in any subsequent deliberations in this case. The Honorable Chief
Justice declined.[1]
The Court is swayed to reconsider.
The bottomline issue is whether or not a contract of sale of the subject parcel of land existed
between the petitioner and respondent BPI. A re-evaluation of the attendant facts and the
evidence on record, specifically petitioners Exhibits A to I, yields the negative. To elaborate:
Exhibit A[2] is a Deed of Trust dated May 14, 1976, entered into between Philippine Remnants
Co. Inc., as grantor, and respondent BPI, as trustee, stating that subject property covered by TCT
493122 (formerly TCT No. 27324)[3] has [been] assigned, transferred, conveyed and set over
unto the Trustee[4] expressly authorizing and empowering the same in its own name to sell and
dispose of said trust property or any lot or parcel thereof [5] and to facilitate [the] sale of the trust
property, the Trustee may engage the services of real estate broker or brokers, under such terms
and conditions which the Trustee may deem proper, to sell the Trust property or any lot or parcel
thereof.[6]
Exhibit B is a Letter of Authority for the petitioner issued by respondent BPI to Pedro A.
Revilla, Jr., a real estate broker, to sell the property pursuant to the Deed of Trust. The full text of
Exhibit B is hereby quoted:

Trust Account No. 75-09

23 June 1988

ASSETRADE CO.
70 San Francisco St.
Capitol Subdivision
Pasig, Metro Manila

Attention: Mr. Pedro P. Revilla, Jr.

Managing Partner .

Gentlemen:

63
This will serve as your authority to sell on an as is where is basis the property located at Pasig
Blvd., Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila, under the following details and basic terms and
conditions:

TCT No. : 493122 in the name of BPI as trustee of Philippine Remnants Co., Inc.
Area : 33,056.0 square meters (net of 890 sq. m. sold to the Republic of the Philippines due
to the widening of Pasig Blvd.)
Price : P1,100.00 per sq. m. or P36,361,600.000.
Terms : Cash
Brokers Commission : 2%

Others : a) Docuemntary (sic) stamps to be affixed to Deed of Absolute Sale, transfer tax,
registration expenses, and other titling expenses for account of the Buyer.

b) Capital gains tax, if payable, and real estate taxes up to 30 June 1988 shall be for the account
of the Seller.

This authority which is good for thirty (30) days only from date hereof is non-exclusive and on a
first come first-serve basis.

Very truly yours,

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

as trustee of
Philippine Remnants Co., Inc.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
FERNANDO J. SISON, III ALFONSO R. ZAMORA
Assistant Vice-President Vice President
[Note: Italics supplied]

security guard on duty at subject property to allow him (Revilla, Jr.) and his companion to
conduct an ocular inspection of the premises.[7]

Exhibit D is a letter addressed by Pedro Revilla, Jr. to respondent BPI informing the latter that
he has procured a prospective buyer.[8]
Exhibit E is the written proposal submitted by Alfonso Y. Lim in behalf of petitioner Limketkai
Sons Milling, Inc., offering to buy the subject property at P1,000.00/sq. m.[9]
Exhibit F is respondent BPIs letter addressed to petitioner pointing out that petitioners proposal
embodied in its Letter (Exhibit E) has been rejected by the respondent BPIs Trust Committee.[10]
Exhibit G is petitioners letter dated July 22, 1988 reiterating its offer to buy the subject property
at P1,000/sq. m. but now on cash basis.[11]

64
Exhibit H refers to respondent BPIs another rejection of petitioners offer to buy the property at
P1,000/sq. m.[12]
And finally, Exhibit I is a letter by petitioner addressed to respondent BPI claiming the existence
of a perfected contract of sale of the subject property between them.[13]
These exhibits, either scrutinized singly or collectively, do not reveal a perfection of the
purported contract of sale. Article 1458 of the Civil Code defines a contract of sale as follows:

ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in
money or its equivalent.

A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.

Article 1475 of the same code specifically provides when a contract of sale is deemed perfected,
to wit:

ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.

From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions
of the law governing the form of contracts.

The Court in Toyota Shaw, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[14] had already ruled that a definite
agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an essential element in the formation of a
binding and enforceable contract of sale. Petitioners exhibits did not establish any definitive
agreement or meeting of the minds between the concerned parties as regards the price or term of
payment. Instead, what merely appears therefrom is respondent BPIs repeated rejection of the
petitioners proposal to buy the property at P1,000/ sq.m.[15] In addition, even on the assumption
that Exhibit E reflects that respondent BPI offered to sell the disputed property for P1,000/sq. m.,
petitioners acceptance of the offer is conditioned upon or qualified by its proposed terms [16] to
which respondent BPI must first agree with.
On the subject of consent as an essential element of contracts, Article 1319 of the Civil Code has
this to say:

ART. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing
and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance
absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.

xxx xxx xxx.

The acceptance of an offer must therefor be unqualified and absolute. In other words, it must be
identical in all respects with that of the offer so as to produce consent or meeting of the
minds. This was not the case herein considering that petitioners acceptance of the offer was
qualified, which amounts to a rejection of the original offer.[17] And contrary to petitioners
assertion that its offer was accepted by respondent BPI, there was no showing that petitioner

65
complied with the terms and conditions explicitly laid down by respondent BPI for prospective
buyers.[18] Neither was the petitioner able to prove that its offer to buy the subject property was
formally approved by the beneficial owner of the property and the Trust Committee of the Bank,
an essential requirement for the acceptance of the offer which was clearly specified in Exhibits F
and H. Even more telling is petitioners unexplained failure to reduce in writing the alleged
acceptance of its offer to buy the property at P1,000/sq. m.
The Court also finds as unconvincing petitioners representation under Exhibits E, G, and I that
its proposal to buy the subject property for P 1,000/ sq. m. has been accepted by respondent BPI,
considering that none of the said Exhibits contained the signature of any responsible official of
respondent bank.
It is therefore evident from the foregoing that petitioners documentary evidence floundered in
establishing its claim of a perfected contract of sale.
Moreover, petitioners case failed to hurdle the strict requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
Article 1403 of the Civil Code states:

ART. 1403. - The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) xxx xxx xxx

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same,
or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by
his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a
secondary evidence of its contents:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) An agreement for the leasing for a long period than one year, or for the sale of real property
or of an interest therein.

xxx xxx xxx.

In this case there is a patent absence of any deed of sale categorically conveying the subject
property from respondent BPI to petitioner. Exhibits E, G, I which petitioner claims as proof of
perfected contract of sale between it and respondent BPI were not subscribed by the party
charged, i.e., BPI, and did not constitute the memoranda or notes that the law speaks of. [19] To
consider them sufficient compliance with the Statute of Frauds is to betray the avowed purpose
of the law to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations. We share, in this
connection, respondent Court of Appeals observation when it said:

xxx. The requirement that the notes or memoranda be subscribed by BPI or its agents, as the
party charged, is very vital for the strict compliance with the avowed purpose of the Statute of
Frauds which is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for
their evidence on the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated contracts
and transactions to be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged (Asia Production

66
Co., Inc. vs. Pano, 205 SCRA 458). It cannot be gainsaid that a shrewd person could easily
concoct a story in his letters addressed to the other party and present the letters to the court as
notes to prove the existence of a perfected oral contract of sale when in truth there is none.

In adherence to the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, the examination and evaluation of the
notes or memoranda adduced by the appellee was confined and limited to within the four corners
of the documents. To go beyond what appears on the face of the documents constituting the
notes or memoranda, stretching their import beyond what is written in black and white, would
certainly be uncalled for, if not violative of the Statute of Frauds and opening the doors to fraud,
the very evil sought to be avoided by the statute. In fine, considering that the documents adduced
by the appellee do not embody the essentials of the contract of sale aside from not having been
subscribed by the party charged or its agent, the transaction involved definitely falls within the
ambit of the Statute of Frauds.[20]

[Note: Italics added]

Corrolarily, as the petitioners exhibits failed to establish the perfection of the contract of sale,
oral testimony cannot take their place without violating the parol evidence rule.[21] It was
therefore irregular for the trial court to have admitted in evidence testimony to prove the
existence of a contract of sale of a real property between the parties despite de persistent
objection made by private respondents counsels as early as the first scheduled hearing. While
said counsels cross-examined the witnesses, this, to our view, did not constitute a waiver of the
parol evidence rule. The Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba,[22]  and Abrenica v. Gonda and de
Gracia[23]  cases cited by the Court in its initial decision, which ruled to the effect that an
objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, i.e., x x x at the
time question is asked,[24] and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived, do
not apply as these two cases involved facts [25] different from the case at bench. More importantly,
here, the direct testimonies of the witnesses were presented in affidavit-form where prompt
objection to inadmissible evidence is hardly possible, whereas the direct testimonies in these
cited cases were delivered orally in open court. The best that counsels could have done, and
which they did, under the circumstances was to preface the cross-examination with
objection. Thus:

ATTY. VARGAS:

Before I proceed with the cross-examination of the witness, your Honor, may we object to the
particular portion of the affidavit which attempt to prove the existence of a verbal contract to
sell more specifically the answers contained in page 3, Par. 1, the whole of the answer.

x x x x x x x x x.

COURT:

Objection overruled.

Atty. VARGAS.

67
Your Honor, what has been denied by the Court was the motion for preliminary hearing on
affirmative defenses. The statement made by the witness to prove that there was a verbal
contract to sell is inadmissible in evidence in this case because an agreement must be in writing.

COURT:

Go ahead, that has been already overruled.

ATTY. VARGAS:

So may we reiterate our objection with regards to all other portions of the affidavit which deal
on the verbal contract. (TSN, Feb. 28, 1989, pp. 3-5; Italics supplied.)[26]

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CORNAGO:

Before we proceed, we would like to make of record our continuing objection insofar as
questions and answers propounded to Pedro Revilla dated February 27, 1989, in so far as
questions would illicit (sic) answers which would be violative of the best evidence rule in
relation to Art. 1403. I refer to questions Nos. 8, 13, 16 and 19 of the affidavit of this witness
which is considered as his direct testimony. (T.S.N., June 29, 1990, p. 2)

ATTY. CORNAGO:

May we make of record our continued objection on the testimony which is violative of the best
evidence rule in relation to Art. 1403 as contained in the affidavit particularly questions Nos. 12,
14, 19 and 20 of the affidavit of Alfonso Lim executed on February 24, 1989 x x x. (T.S.N., June
28, 1990, p. 8).[27]

Counsels should not be blamed and, worst, penalized for taking the path of prudence by choosing
to cross-examine the witnesses instead of keeping mum and letting the inadmissible testimony in
affidavit form pass without challenge. We thus quote with approval the observation of public
respondent Court of Appeals on this point:

As a logical consequence of the above findings, it follows that the court a quo erred in allowing
the appellee to introduce parol evidence to prove the existence of a perfected contract of sale
over and above the objection of the counsel for the defendant-appellant. The records show that
the court a quo allowed the direct testimony of the witnesses to be in affidavit form subject to
cross-examination by the opposing counsel. If the purpose thereof was to prevent the opposing
counsel from objecting timely to the direct testimony, the scheme failed for as early as the first
hearing of the case on February 28, 1989 during the presentation of the testimony in affidavit
form of Pedro Revilla, Jr., plaintiff-appellees first witness, the presentation of such testimony
was already objected to as inadmissible. 

68
G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004]
LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING CORP., respondents

Sometime in 1977, petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President of the co-petitioner Lapulapu
Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from the respondent Allied Banking Corporation covered
by four promissory notes in the amounts of P100,000 each. The details of the promissory notes
are as follows:

P/N No. Date of P/N Maturity Date Amount as of 1/23/79

BD No. 504 Nov. 7, 1977 Feb. 5, 1978 P123,377.76
BD No. 621 Nov. 28, 1977 Mar. 28, 1978 P123,411.10
BD No. 716 Dec. 12, 1977 Apr. 11, 1978 P122,322.21
BD No. 839 Jan. 5, 1978 May 5, 1978 P120,455.54

As of January 23, 1979, the entire obligation amounted to P493,566.61 and despite demands
made on them by the respondent Bank, the petitioners failed to pay the same. The respondent
Bank was constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15, a complaint
seeking payment by the petitioners, jointly and solidarily, of the sum of P493,566.61
representing their loan obligation, exclusive of interests, penalty charges, attorneys fees and
costs.

In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the
respondent Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity,
for his own use and benefit and on the strength of the personal information he furnished the
respondent Bank. The petitioner Foundation maintained that it never authorized petitioner Tan to
co-sign in his capacity as its President any promissory note and that the respondent Bank fully
knew that the loans contracted were made in petitioner Tans personal capacity and for his own
use and that the petitioner Foundation never benefited, directly or indirectly, therefrom. The
petitioner Foundation then interposed a cross-claim against petitioner Tan alleging that he,
having exceeded his authority, should be solely liable for said loans, and a counterclaim against
the respondent Bank for damages and attorneys fees.

For his part, petitioner Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the respondent Bank in his
personal capacity. The parties, however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds
of petitioner Tans shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate
firm. The loans were covered by promissory notes which were automatically renewable (rolled-
over) every year at an amount including unpaid interests, until such time as petitioner Tan was
able to pay the same from the proceeds of his aforesaid shares.

According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Banks employee required him to affix two signatures
on every promissory note, assuring him that the loan documents would be filled out in
accordance with their agreement. However, after he signed and delivered the loan documents to
the respondent Bank, these were filled out in a manner not in accord with their agreement, such

69
that the petitioner Foundation was included as party thereto. Further, prior to its filing of the
complaint, the respondent Bank made no demand on him.

After due trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the court a quo by deleting the
award of attorneys fees in favor of the respondent Bank for being without basis.

Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to the Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether demand letters were sent and received by the petitioners as to make the loans
due and demandable.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are liable for the loans.
3. Whether or not Tan may present parol evidence to prove unwritten agreement between
him and the bank.

HELD:

1. YES.

The petitioners insist that there was no prior demand as they vigorously deny receiving those
letters. According to petitioner Tan, the signatures on the registry return cards were not his.

The petitioners denial of receipt of the demand letters was rightfully given scant consideration by
the CA as it held:

Exhibits R and S are two letters of demand, respectively dated January 3, 1979 and January 30,
1979, asking settlement of the obligations covered by the promissory notes. The first letter was
written by Ben Tio Peng Seng, Vice-President of the bank, and addressed to Lapulapu
Foundation, Inc., attention of Mr. Elias Q. Tan, President, while the second was a final demand
written by the appellees counsel, addressed to both defendants-appellants, and giving them five
(5) days from receipt within which to settle or judicial action would be instituted against them.
Both letters were duly received by the defendants, as shown by the registry return cards, marked
as Exhibits R-2 and S-1, respectively. The allegation of Tan that he does not know who signed
the said registry return receipts merits scant consideration, for there is no showing that the
addresses thereon were wrong. Hence, the disputable presumption that a letter duly directed and
mailed was received in the regular course of mail (per par. V, Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence) still holds.

There is no dispute that the promissory notes had already matured. However, the petitioners
insist that the loans had not become due and demandable as they deny receipt of the respondent
Banks demand letters. When presented the registry return cards during the trial, petitioner Tan
claimed that he did not recognize the signatures thereon. The petitioner’s allegation and denial
are self-serving. They cannot prevail over the registry return cards which constitute documentary

70
evidence and which enjoy the presumption that, absent clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, these were regularly issued by the postal officials in the performance of their official
duty and that they acted in good faith. Further, as the CA correctly opined, mails are presumed
to have been properly delivered and received by the addressee in the regular course of the mail.
As the CA noted, there is no showing that the addresses on the registry return cards were wrong.
It is the petitioners burden to overcome the presumptions by sufficient evidence, and other than
their barefaced denial, the petitioners failed to support their claim that they did not receive the
demand letters; therefore, no prior demand was made on them by the respondent Bank.

2. YES.

The Court particularly finds as incredulous petitioner Tans allegation that he was made to sign
blank loan documents and that the phrase IN MY OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY was
superimposed by the respondent Banks employee despite petitioner Tans protestation. The Court
is hard pressed to believe that a businessman of petitioner Tans stature could have been so
careless as to sign blank loan documents.

In contrast, the promissory notes clearly showed upon their faces that they are the obligation of
the petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan in his official and personal capacity.
Moreover, the application for credit accommodation,  the signature cards of the two accounts in
the name of petitioner Foundation, as well as New Current Account Record, all accompanying
the promissory notes, were signed by petitioner Tan for and in the name of the petitioner
Foundation. These documentary evidence unequivocally and categorically establish that the
loans were solidarily contracted by the petitioner Foundation and petitioner Tan.

3. NO.

As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans
claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the
payment of the obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
[w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-
in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank.
These promissory notes contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978,
April 11, 1978 and May 5, 1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is
clear and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year
basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the
Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not be made to
vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,

contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to
explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless

71
there has been fraud or mistake.  No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this
case.

G.R. No. 169985               June 15, 2011

MODESTO LEOVERAS, Petitioner, 
vs.
CASIMERO VALDEZ, Respondent.

Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners - three-fourths (¾) and
one-fourth (¼) pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of land located in Poblacion, Manaoag,
Pangasinan, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 24695, with an area of 28,171
square meters.

In September 1932, Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths (¾) share to Benigna Llamas. The sale was
duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695. When Benigna died in 1944, she willed her three-
fourths (¾) share equally to her sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas. Thus, Alejandra
and Josefa each owned one-half (½) of Benigna’s three-fourths (¾) share.

On June 14, 1969, Alejandra’s heirs sold their predecessor’s one-half (½) share (roughly
equivalent to 10,564 square meters) to the respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Also on June 14, 1969, Josefa sold her own one-half (½) share (subject property) to the
respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale. On even date, the
respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject
property.

WITNESSETH

That we [petitioner and respondent] are the absolute owners of [the subject property] which is
particularly described as follows:
Xxx

That our ownership over the said portion mentioned above is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale xxx

That in said deed of sale mentioned in the immediate preceding paragraph, our respective share
consist of 5, 282.13 [one-half of 10,564 square meters] square meter each.

That we hereby agreed and covenanted that our respective share shall be as follows:
Modesto Leoveras – 3,020 square meters residential portion on the northern part near the
Municipal road of Poblacion Pugaro, Manaoag, Pangasinan;

72
Casimero Valdez – 7,544.27 square meters of the parcel of land described above.

On June 8, 1977, the petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over
the subject property. The parties took possession of their respective portions of the subject
property and declared it in their name for taxation purposes.

In 1996, the respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on the
requirements for the transfer of title over the portion allotted to him on the subject property. To
his surprise, the respondent learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two
transfer certificates of title (TCTs): one, TCT No. 195812 - covering an area of 3,020 square
meters; and two, TCT No. 195813 - covering an area of 1,004 square meters (or a total of 4,024
square meters).

The Register of Deeds informed the respondent that they could not find the record of OCT No.
24695; instead, the Register of Deeds furnished the respondent with the following (collectively,
petitioner’s documents):

1. Two (2) deeds of absolute sale dated June 14, 1969, both executed by Sta. Maria, purportedly
conveying an unspecified portion of OCT No. 24695 as follows:
a. 11, 568 square meters to the respondent and petitioner
b. 8, 689 square meters to one Virgilia Li Meneses
2. Deed of Absolute Sale (Benigna Deed) also dated June 14, 1969 executed by Benigna which
reads:

I, Benigna Llamas, Fernandez xxx do sell xxx by way of ABSOLUTE SALE unto the said
Casimero Valdez, Modesto Leoveras and Virgilia Meneses their heirs and assigns, 7,544 sq.m.;
4,024 sq. m. and 8,689 sq. m. more or less respectively of a parcel of land which is particularly
described as follows:

"A parcel of land xxx covered by [OCT No.] 24695." (Emphases added)

3. Subdivision Plan of PSU 21864 of OCT No. 246952

4. Affidavit of Confirmation of Subdivision dated May 3, 1994 (Affidavit), which reads:
That we, Virgilia Li Meneses, xxx Dominga Manangan; Modesto Leoveras; and Casimero
Valdez xxx
xxx are co-owners of a certain parcel of land with an area of 28, 171 sq. m. more or less in
subdivision plan Psu 21864 xxx covered by [OCT No.] 24695 situated at Poblacion (now
Pugaro), Manaoag, Pangasinan;
xxx we agree xxx to subdivide and hereby confirmed the subdivision in the following manner
xxx:
Lot 2 with an area of 3, 020 sq. m. xxx to Modesto Leoveras xxx;
Lot 3 with an area of 1,004 sq. m. xxx to Modesto Leoveras xxx;
Lot 4 with an area of 7,544 sq. m. xxx to Casimero Valdez xxx;
Lot 5 with an area of 8, 689 sq. m. xxx to Virgilia Meneses;
Lot 6 with an area of 7,043 sq. m. xxx to Dominga Manangan (Emphasis supplied.)

73
On June 21, 1996, the respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion
(disputed property) covered by TCT No. 195813, on the ground that the petitioner is entitled
only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties’ Agreement.

The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioner’s titles by contesting the authenticity of
the petitioner’s documents. Particularly, the respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting
Benigna’s death certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed a deed,
which purports to convey 4,024 square meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because Benigna already
died in 1944. The respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the parties her
three-fourths (¾) share in 1969 because she had already sold her share to Benigna in 1932.  The
respondent denied his purported signature appearing in the Affidavit,  and prayed for:

a) xxx the cancellation of the [petitioner’s documents];

b) the cancellation of TCT No. 195813 in the name of Modesto Leoveras and that it be
reconveyed to the [respondent];
c) the cancellation and nullification of [TCT No. 195812] covering an area of 3,020 square
meters xxx;
d) [the issuance of] title xxx in the name of [respondent] over an area of 17, 104 square meters of
OCT 24695;  (Underscoring supplied)

In his defense, the petitioner claimed that the parties already had (i) delineated their respective
portions of the subject property even before they acquired it in 1969 and (ii) agreed that upon
acquisition, each would own the portion as delineated; that the area he actually possessed and
subsequently acquired has a total area of 4,024 square meters, which he subdivided into two
portions and caused to be covered by the two TCTs in question. The petitioner claimed that in
signing the Agreement, he was led to believe, based on the parties’ rough estimation, that the
area he actually possessed is only 3,020 square meters contrary to the parties’ real intention - i.e.,
the extent of their ownership would be based on their actual possession.

The petitioner further claimed that the respondent voluntarily participated in executing the
Affidavit, which corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed the
petitioner’s ownership over the disputed property. The petitioner asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and for a declaration that he is the lawful owner of the parcels of land covered by his
titles.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the
authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit.

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent adequately proved his ownership of the
disputed property by virtue of the (i) Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Josefa in favor of the
parties; (ii) the parties’ Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties’ Agreement, which cover
the subject property.

The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of these
documents, particularly the Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not

74
reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to
reflect the parties’ true intention.

The petitioner’s argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule,  i.e., when the
terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained
in the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived
and abandoned.

To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present
evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of
the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which
nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.

At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the
parties by presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously
executed Agreement and confirmed his ownership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. It
was the petitioner’s staunch assertion that the respondent co-executed this Affidavit supposedly
to reflect the parties’ true intention.

In the present petition, however, the petitioner made a damaging admission that the Benigna
Deed is fabricated, thereby completely bolstering the respondent’s cause of action for
reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground of fraudulent registration of title. Since the
Affidavit merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna Deed, the petitioner’s admission,
coupled with the respondent’s denial of his purported signature in the Affidavit, placed in serious
doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioner’s defense.

Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in the petitioner’s share the disputed property,
the petitioner obviously need not go at length of fabricating a deed of sale to support his
application for the transfer of title of his rightful portion of the subject property. Notably, there is
nothing in the Affidavit (that supposedly corrected the mistake in the earlier Agreement) that
supports the petitioner’s claim that the partition of the subject property is based on the parties’
actual possession.

By admitting the presentation of a false deed in securing his title, the petitioner rendered moot
the issue of authenticity of the Benigna Deed and relieved the respondent of the burden of
proving its falsity as a ground to nullify the petitioner’s titles.

By fraudulently causing the transfer of the registration of title over the disputed property in his
name, the petitioner holds the title to this disputed property in trust for the benefit of the
respondent as the true owner;  registration does not vest title but merely confirms or records title
already existing and vested. The Torrens system of registration cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to

75
permit one to enrich oneself at the expense of others.  Hence, the CA correctly ordered the
reconveyance of the disputed property, covered by TCT No. 195813, to the respondent.

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
[G.R. No. 152807. August 12, 2003]
HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S.
SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO
SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ
and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ
GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR., petitioners, vs. ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA,
HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO, REMEDIOS COMORPOSA,
VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO, BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H.
COMORPOSA, respondents.

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just because a
piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in
dispute.

The Facts

A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against
[respondents] before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.

The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No. 845. In
1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.

In 1965, Francisco Comorposa, a close family friend of [Marcos] Saez, was allowed by the
latter’s son, Adolfo Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, to occupy the land of Marcos
without paying any rental. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a
portion of the land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several people,
among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos
Saez property without paying any rental.

Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the
respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through
petitioner’s tolerance.

On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the
latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the
actual and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. Hence, after a failed amicable settlement before
the barangay, an action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents.

76
Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the [C]omplaint and alleged that
they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants,
possessors and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have
acquired just and valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary
prescription, and that the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their
possession over the land in question when it ruled that they [were] the rightful claimants and
possessors and [were], therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.

The MTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the RTC, on appeal, reversed and set
aside the said decision. The CA upheld the RTC decision.

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Courts consideration:
I
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in sustaining the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the regional
executive director?
II
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the Regional Trial
Courts ruling giving weight to the CENR Officers Certification, which only bears the facsimile
of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter raised for the
first time on appeal?

III
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in holding that the land subject
matter of this case has been acquired by means of adverse possession and prescription?
IV
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, neither is there
error on the part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the affidavits by
Gloria Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self serving?

To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and the third issues shall be discussed in reverse sequence.

First Issue:

The DENR Order of April 2, 1998

Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon the April 2, 1998 Order issued by the regional
director of the DENR was erroneous. The reason was that the Order, which had upheld the claim
of respondents, was supposedly not yet final and executory. Another Order dated August 23,
1999, issued later by the DENR regional director, allegedly held in abeyance the effectivity of
the earlier one.

Under the Public Land Act, the management and the disposition of public land is under the
primary control of the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau or

77
LMB),subject to review by the DENR secretary.  As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to
intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the LMB.

The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does not,
however, divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or
applicants to protect their respective possessions and occupations. The power to determine who
has actual physical possession or occupation of public land and who has the better right of
possession over it remains with the courts.  But once the DENR has decided, particularly through
the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a certificate of title, its decision on these
points will normally prevail.

Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to a piece of public land
remains pending with the DENR, the question of recovery of possession of the disputed property
is a matter that may be addressed to the courts.

Second Issue:
CENR Officers Certification

Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document,
because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they
cite Garvida v. Sales Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by
respondents for the first time on appeal.

We are not persuaded.

In Garvida, the Court held:

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of

printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. x x x

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact
copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining
whether they are genuine or authentic.

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the
signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as
that which is alluded to in  Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature,
which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in
banking, financial, and business transactions.

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional
director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998:
x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a CERTIFICATION dated 22 July 1997, certified
among others, that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x x was
not allocated to any person x x x.

78
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have
used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR
officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the formers direct control and
supervision.
 
Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As
early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had
already been marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The
Certification was not formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file
their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure  nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence that
has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to
ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-
blown trial is held.

Third Issue:
Affidavit of Petitioners Witnesses

Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that
the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits.They also claim that the failure
of respondents to file their position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an
admission by silence.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility
refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while
probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses respective

testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not  ipso facto render the facts, set
forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action,
because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.

Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription

For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first to prove that the possession
of respondents was by mere tolerance. The only pieces of evidence submitted by the former to
support their claim were a technical description and a vicinity map drawn in accordance with the
survey dated May 22, 1936. Both of these were discredited by the CENR Certification, which
indicated that the contested lot had not yet been allocated to any person when the survey was

79
conducted. The testimony of petitioner’s witnesses alone cannot prevail over respondents
continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a considerable length of time.

Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a rule, be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45.

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION VS. SSANGYONG CORPORATION,

G.R. NO. 170633, October 17, 2007
 

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC) and one of its suppliers, Ssangyong Corporation
(Ssangyong), conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel
product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on
the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.
 
During one of their transactions, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC a Pro Forma Invoice
containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the
invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan. As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment
for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight
in favor of Ssangyong. Following their usual practice, delivery of the goods was to be made after
the L/C had been opened.
 
After Ssangyong informed Chan, by way of a fax transmittal, that it was ready to
ship stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines,it requested that the opening of the L/C be
facilitated. Chan affixed his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to
Ssangyong. However, despite Ssangyongs letters, MCC failed to open a letter of credit.
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of
contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before
the RegionalTrial Court. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their
contract when they refused to open the L/C.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that
Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil
action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the
documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Order and
their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Considering that both testimonial and documentary evidence
tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyongs evidence sufficed for
purposes of a prima  facie case.
 
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Ssangyong. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the trial court, but absolved Chan of any liability. The appellate court

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ruled, among others, that Pro Forma Invoices were admissible in evidence, although they were
mere facsimile printouts of MCCs steel orders. 

 
ISSUE:

1.  Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic

evidence and admissible as such 
 
HELD:

1. YES.

R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic
document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by
the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said
Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the
data accurately.
 
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as
the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must
foremost be an electronic data message or an electronic document.
 
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and electronic
document as follows:
 
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are
defined, as follows:
 
xxx
 
c.                   Electronic Data Message refers to information generated,
sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
 
xxx
 
f. Electronic Document refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
 
 

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 The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court defines the said terms in the
following manner:
 
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules, the following
terms are defined, as follows:
 
xxxx
 
(g)                Electronic data message refers to information generated, sent,
received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
 
(h)                Electronic document refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written
expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or
an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which
is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document.For purposes of these Rules, the term electronic
document may be used interchangeably with electronic data message.
 
 
Given these definitions, we go back to the original question:  Is an original printout
of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic document?
 
There is no question then that when Congress formulated the term electronic data
message, it intended the same meaning as the term electronic record in the Canada law. This
construction of the term electronic data message, which excludes telexes or faxes, except
computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Laws focus on paperless
communications and the functional equivalent approach that it espouses. In fact, the deliberations
of the Legislature are replete with discussions on paperless and digital transactions.

Xxx xxx xxx 

Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, paperless, but verily are paper-based.
 
Thus, in Garvida v. Sales, Jr. where we explained the unacceptability of filing pleadings
through fax machines, we ruled that:
 
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to
reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct

82
 shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a
printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
 
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an
exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is
no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and
authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact,
be a sham pleading.
 
 
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original  paper-
based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the
receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress
intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal
function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically,
there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in
all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the laws definition of electronic data
message, which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with electronic document, could not have
included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and
a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and
have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of
technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a
newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when
it defined the term electronic data message.
 
We, therefore, conclude that the terms electronic data message and electronic
document, as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic
evidence.  It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and
is not admissible as electronic evidence.
 
Since a facsimile transmission is not an electronic data message or an electronic
document, and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater
reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence.

In the present case, therefore,  Pro Forma Invoices, which are mere photocopies of

the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both
the trial and the appellate courts.
 
 
Since these invoices are mere photocopies of their original fax transmittals, we apply the
ordinary Rules on Evidence, for as discussed above we cannot apply the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000 and the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
 

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Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are simply secondary evidence, admissible
only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states, [w]hen the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents
by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Furthermore, the offeror of secondary evidence must prove the
predicates thereof, namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part
of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of
destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as
to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be
shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in
the proper place or places. It has been held that where the missing document is the foundation of
the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally
involved.
 
Given these norms, we find that respondent failed to prove the existence of the original fax
transmissions of theh invoices, and likewise did not sufficiently prove the loss or destruction of
the originals. Thus, the invoices cannot be admitted in evidence and accorded probative weight.
 
It is observed, however, that respondent Ssangyong did not rely merely on the invoicesto prove
the perfected contract. It also introduced in evidence a variety of other documents, together with
the testimonies of its witnesses.

With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear that when petitioner did not open
the L/C for the first half of the transaction (100MT), despite numerous demands from respondent
Ssangyong, petitioner breached its contractual obligation. It is a well-entrenched rule that the
failure of a buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a breach of the contract between buyer
and seller. Indeed, where the buyer fails to open a letter of credit as stipulated, the seller or
exporter is entitled to claim damages for such breach. Damages for failure to open a commercial
credit may, in appropriate cases, include the loss of profit which the seller would reasonably
have made had the transaction been carried out. 

ELLERY MARCH TORRES VS. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011
 

Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine

Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report
of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila,
then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and internal security
personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent
PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify
the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was
committed by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a
digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR
of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of either P50,000.00

84
or P35,000.00. Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine
jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified
the members of the syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which included
herein petitioner.

On May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of Charges for

dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and violation of office rules and regulations which were
considered grave offenses where the penalty imposable is dismissal.

  On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr.,

Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge
of dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner was then required to
explain in writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof why he should not be
sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension effective
immediately until further orders.
 
On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation of the
charges against him. He denied any involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation
of the CMR or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal investigation of
the accusations against him.
 
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F.
Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's Human Resource and Development Department,
dismissing him from the service. 

On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and

its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other
benefits.
Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged, among others, that petitioner
failed to perfect an appeal within the period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law.

On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating petitioner's complaint as an appeal from the
PAGCOR's decision dismissing petitioner from the service, issued Resolution No. 081204
denying petitioner's appeal.

Petitioner's motion for a reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the twin resolutions issued by the CSC.
 
On April 22, 2010, the CA issued its assailed decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit. In dismissing the petition, the CA found that petitioner failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence that he had filed a motion for reconsideration. It found insufficient to merit
consideration petitioner's claim that he had sent through a facsimile transmission a
letter/reconsideration addressed to PAGCOR's Chairman, members of the Board of Directors and

85
the Merit Systems Protection Board; that assuming arguendo that a letter reconsideration was
indeed sent through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile transmission is inadmissible as
electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000;

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 30, 2010.

Hence, this petition where petitioner states the errors committed by the CA in this wise:

The threshold issue for resolution is whether the CA erred when it affirmed the CSC's
dismissal of the appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary period.

ISSUE:

Whether the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner sent through facsimileis is
admissible.

HELD: NO.
 
Section 38. Filing of motion for reconsideration. - The party adversely affected by the decision
may file a motion for reconsideration with the disciplining authority who rendered the same
within fifteen days from receipt thereof.
 
Section 39. When deemed filed. - A motion for reconsideration sent by mail shall be deemed
filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of
the case and in case of personal delivery, the date stamped thereon by the proper office.

 
Clearly, a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal
delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on
the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the
case. On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date
stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision
within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
 
Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the
motion for reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on
or before August 19, 2007. However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for
reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of petitioner's letter reconsideration
was duly supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.
 
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration
which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did
not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not
sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated
earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or
personal delivery.

86
 
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings
through fax machines and ruled that:
 
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental
area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of
electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines
or viamicrowave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental
area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or
other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.

x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was
originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x
 
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under
the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong
Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions
are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the
Electronic Commerce Act, and We said:
 
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include
a facsimile transmission.  Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered
as electronic evidence.  It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
 

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, G.R. No. 182835

- versus -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, 
April 20, 2010
 
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused
Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in AuroraProvince. Rustan courted Irish and
they became on-and-off sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that
Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up
with him.
 

87
 Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her
to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected
the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their
child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and
sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely,
0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to
leave her alone.
 
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service
(MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed on the
figure (Exhibit A). The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768,
one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a
shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).
 
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted
that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to
spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in
text messaging shorthand, read: Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring
send sa lahat ng chatter.
 
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the
police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used
in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess
Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he
walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched
him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was
being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: Malandi ka kasi!
 
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an
expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible
for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another
woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it
appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
 
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities:
the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the
picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit
B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to
a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
 
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in
October 2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their
relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that
his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
 

88
 Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at
Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place,
two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and
brought him to the police station.
 
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her
identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages.Rustan got the senders number
and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene
messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he
said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan
claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six
pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).
 
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustans wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six
pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that
contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of
Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked
as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish
denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the
picture was fully dressed.

After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience,
prompting the court to comment: Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the
acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim
during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of
human nature and experience. Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan
guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
 
On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA)  the latter rendered a decision
dated January 31, 2008, affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review
on certiorari.
 
The Issues Presented
 
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by
cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting
anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A.
9262.
 
The subordinate issues are:
 
1. Whether or not a dating relationship existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in
R.A. 9262;
 

89
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case,
already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
 
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his
constitutional rights; and
 
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case.
 
The Courts Rulings
 
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of
a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,
 
(a) Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.
 
xxxx
 
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any
form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:
 
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
 
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
 
xxxx
 
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
 
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment are:
 
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and

90
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
 
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had
a dating relationship with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a dating relationship includes a
situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during
the course of the relationship.Thus:
 
(e) Dating relationship refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during
the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
 
Here, Rustan claims that, being romantically involved, implies that the offender and the
offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, romance implies a sexual
act. He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a
colloquial or informal meaning to the word romance used as a verb, i.e., to make love; to make
love to as in He romanced her.
 
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb romance
that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have romanced the offended
woman. Rather, it used the noun romance to describe a couples relationship, i.e., a love affair.
 
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that violence against women x x x refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had
a sexual or dating relationship. Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a
dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines dating relationship while Section 3(f)
defines sexual relations. The latter refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in
the bearing of a common child. The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore,
exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.
 
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the on-and-
off variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed over time and on
a continuing basis. But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits,
from October to December of 2003.That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of
mutual trust and love.
 
An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their
taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken
up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what away-bati meant, Irish explained that at
times, when she could not reply to Rustans messages, he would get angry at her. That was
all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.[10]

Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be
considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set
a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes any act or series of acts that
constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates

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into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and
children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
 
Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that
her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial
emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures
with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.
 
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was
not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits
2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on
them.
 
Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent,
except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that
Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that
she did not have time to delete them. And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures
from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There
would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card,
there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous
to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to
her testimony.
 
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustans
low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to
an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each
case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and
face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any
woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she
sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan
sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a
nightmare.
 
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him
without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the
fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that
the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such
items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-
trial conference.
 
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irishs testimony that
she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the senders cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that
the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon

92
him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did. Consequently, the prosecution did not have to
present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.
 
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.  His defense
was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing
Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented
the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the
same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court.Besides, it was
most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the
sender.
 
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an
electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
 
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene
picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he
should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was
offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for
objection.
 
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.
 
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
 

G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGPIT, ARNOLD

GOMEZ YFABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS Y DELANTAR, AND ROGER
JALANDONI Y ARI, Appellants.

On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants Noel
Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar
(Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder before the Las Piñas Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854.

PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in the evening
of August 29, 2006, he and PO2 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the

93
vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously
parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-
Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as accused
Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but, having entertained doubts regarding the
veracity of documents shown them, they asked him to come with them to the police station in
their mobile car for further questioning.

Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind. On
reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped and
PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s door, however,
he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect
dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing
his death.

On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he
saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run
towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but
the men were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an
ambulance. On returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they
had with them had fled.

P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las Piñas
Police, testified that he and PO2 Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2
Gregorio’s urgent call. Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in
the attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas
apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its
incoming messages.

The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had killed was
someone named Reynaldo Mendoza who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police
found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-up operations at nearby
provinces resulted in finding the dead body of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro
South Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.

PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused
Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police
then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and
Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The
prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and
some of his co-accused.

The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son was at the time of his death
28 years old, unmarried, and was receiving police pay of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 per month.
Ricardo spent P99,999 for burial expense, P16,000.00 for the interment services, and P50,000.00
for purchase of the cemetery lot.

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 Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the
case,7 the accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense.
They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and
since the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.

On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified
by evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use
of unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
the possibility of parole and to indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with P165,999.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P2,080,000.00
as compensation for loss of earning capacity.

Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction of the accused.9 The CA, however,
found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution failed to prove that the several
accused planned the crime before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to this
Court.

The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the
accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.11 This
may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets
the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 

Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides
basis for the conviction of all the accused.

1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously
parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the
police station because of the questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent
inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages which led to the
entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.

2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station
where he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide.
He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.

3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away
from the scene of the shooting.

4. The text messages identified “Kua Justin” as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the
shootout; the messages also referred to “Kua Justin” as the one who was hit in such shootout and
later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.

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5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused
Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.

6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made
references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of “Kua Justin,” one of the gunmen, and his
subsequent death.

7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group of
taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.

8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call
numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that
accused Enojas left in his taxicab.13

The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating
circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of
PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In “aid of armed men,” the men act as accomplices only. They must
not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused,
otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed
firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide,
aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity
with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal
actions.15 Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to
the same or has personal knowledge of them.16Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused
Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to
testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But,
assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for
rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an
incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.17 The text
messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads
on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an
entrapment using this knowledge.

WHEREFORE, the Court   FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit,

Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of

96
the lesser crime of HOMICIDE with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms.

G.R. No. 200148               June 4, 2014

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG, Petitioner, 
vs.
TERESITA D. RIVERA, Respondent.

Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in
Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and
Development Corporation (BANFF) and likewise owns interests in construction, restaurant and
hospital businesses. On the other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF.

She was hired in September of 2002 with a monthly salary of Php 30,000.00. About three
years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on
February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of the
same year to complete the turn over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas),
who succeeded her.

Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her
remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be
paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on
hold by Syhunliong.

On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text message to one of
BANFF’s official cellular phones held by Lumapas:

I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talagasufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha nglast pay

ko. I don’t deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras[.] [S]ana
yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning. (Italics ours)

Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:

Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyanincluding incentive up to the last
datena nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor. (Italics ours)

Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and
incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund in the total sum of Php 698,150.48.

97
 On April 16, 2007, pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong
instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, the origin of the instant petition. The information,
dated June 21, 2007, charged Rivera with the following:

That on or about the 6th day of April, 2006, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, with malicious intent of impeaching the honor, virtue, character and reputation of one
RAMON A. SYHUNGLIONG [sic] and with evident intent of exposing the complainant to
public dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and maliciously publish in the form of text messages and/or caused to be publish[ed]
the following defamatory statements through the company’s cellular phone, to wit:
xxxx
that with the said text message, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in fact she did
mean and convey, malicious and offensive insinuations and imputations that tends [sic] to
destroy the good name and reputation of Ramon Syhunliong, with no good or justifiable motive
but solely for the purpose of maligning and besmirching the good name, honor, character and
reputation of the said complainant and to expose it, as in fact [he] was exposed to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Rivera filed a Motion to Quash the aforequoted information. She argued that the text
message, which was the subject of the libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she had
suffered due to the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries, benefits and incentives. Further,
the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of libel as the elements of malice
and the making of defamatory imputation for public consumption were wanting. Her text
message was not prompted by ill will or spite, but was merely sent as part of her duty to defend
her own interests.

During the arraignment on October 11, 2007, Rivera entered a plea of not guilty.15

On December 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 denying Rivera’s Motion to Quash on

these grounds:

[T]he grounds raised by [Rivera] in the motion to quash [are] evidentiary in nature[,]
which can only be threshed out in a full blown hearing to determine if said [t]ext message falls
squarely within the parameters of "Privileged Communication" or the elements of Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code [are] not fully established by the Prosecution’s evidence.

The Rule on Criminal Procedure in the prosecution of any felony or offense requires only
the existence of probable cause in order to indict an accused of the crime charged. x x x
[P]robable cause was established seasonably during the preliminary investigation. [Rivera]
should have participated during the preliminary investigation or filed a Motion for re-
investigation [if] she was not accorded such right and raised these grounds, before she enter[ed]
her plea during arraignment.

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 The Supreme Court ruled that "[i]t should be noted that the libelous material [or text]
must be viewed as a whole. In order to ascertain the meaning of [the] published article [or text
message], the whole of the article must be considered, each phrase must be construed in the light
of the entire publication."

The Supreme Court held that "writing [or texting] to a person other than the person
defamed is sufficient to constitute publication, for the person to whom the letter [text message] is
addressed is a third person in relation to its writer and the person defamed therein. In this case,
the wife of the complainant[,] who received the unsealed letter[,] is held a third person to whom
the publication is made.[ ] (Citations omitted)

The RTC thereafter issued an Order on June 18, 2009 denying Rivera’s motion for
reconsideration to the foregoing. Citing Lu Chu Sing and Lu Tian Chiong v. Lu Tiong Gui, the
RTC explained that the privileged character of a communication merely does away with the
presumption of malice. However, the plaintiff is not precluded from proving the existence of
such malice. The RTC once again concurred with the Public Prosecutor’s finding that there was
probable cause to indict Rivera for having ascribed to Syhunliong the possession of a vice or
defect, or for having committed an act, tending to cause dishonor or discredit to the latter’s
name.

Rivera challenged the orders issued by the RTC through a Petition for Certiorari filed
before the CA. Quoting Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), she emphasized that
"every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown," except in "a private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty."21 Citing Brillante v.
Court of Appeals,22 Rivera enumerated the requisites, compliance with which would make a
statement fall within the purview of a qualified privileged communication, viz: (1) the person
who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or
at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one [for] whom
it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the
statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.23 Rivera likewise
stressed that under Sections 3(a)24 and 9,25 Rule 11726 of the Rules of Court, an accused may
move to quash the information even after arraignment if the facts charged therein do not
constitute an offense. She thus concluded that the text message she sent to Lumapas was in the
nature of a qualified privileged communication, it being merely an expression of her legitimate
grievances over the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries and other entitlements. Rivera
texted Lumapas because the latter was in the best position to help expedite the release of the
checks. Rivera had no intent to injure anyone’s reputation. Lastly, Rivera labeled as erroneous
the RTC’s declaration regarding the necessity of a full blown trial since facts sufficient for the
resolution of the case were allegedly already extant in the records.

The CA Ruling

On July 11, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision27 directing the dismissal of the
information for libel filed against Rivera. The CA favorably considered her argument that when

99
the facts in an information fail to charge an offense, the said ground can be invoked by the
accused in a motion to quash filed even after arraignment. The CA likewise explained that:

The focal issue to the parties in the present case is whether the facts charged in the
information[,]as well as the undeniable facts appearing on the record[,] show that an offense of
libel has been committed. Our criminal law convincingly provide us with a definition of libel – It
is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect ... or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of ... a
person. x x x.
The first procedural requisite in the determination of the existence of libel is whether
there is a defamatory imputation. The history of the law on libel abounds in examples of
utterances or statements that are not necessarily considered libelous because they are a [sic] mere
expression[s] of an [sic] opinion[s] of a [sic] person[s] in connection with a [sic] plea[s] or
grievance[s]. Libel is inherently a limitation on the liberty of speech and press freedom, and must
be construed in a manner that does not trench upon constitutionally protected freedoms.

x x x There can be libel only if the words used are calculated to induce the hearer or reader to
suppose and understand them as impeaching the honesty, virtue or reputation of another. The
question is not what the writer or speaker meant by his words but what they convey to those who
heard or read them.
xxxx

We can break up the text message of [Rivera] to [Lumapas] into three parts. The
utterance is mercifully short so that it could not be difficult to infer the whole sense and
understanding of the message from the standpoint of Lumapas to whom the message was
conveyed. In context, [Rivera] was seeking payment of her wage claims consequent to her
resignation and receiving [BANFF’s] response through Lumapas. [Rivera] retorted with three
things in her message to Lumapas – (1) that she suffered a lot in collecting her last pay from
[BANFF] Grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng lastpay ko.[;] (2) that she does
not deserve to suffer this way [because she] did [her] job when [she was] still there[;] and (3)
turning to [Syhunliong] himself [she] said – God bless ras[.] [S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam
niya real meaning.

If libel is to be understood as an imputation of a crime, vice or defect to another, there

can be no libel in the first two of the three statements which announced only the sufferings, albeit
undeserved[,] of [Rivera]. The proposition gets to be dicey in the third statement because now
she makes a distinct reference to [Syhunliong][,] [b]ut is the imputation defamatory? We hesitate
to reach this conclusion, and all doubts in criminal law, we are basically taught, must be resolved
in favor of the accused. To articulate the legal wisdom, [Rivera] has the right to express an
opinion in a matter in which she has an undeniable interest.

[Rivera said] in the last part of the text that [Syhunliong] should understand the real
meaning of the masswhen he goes to attend it. It is in this tail end of the message that
[Syhunliong] is mentioned. But what is conveyed by the words ["]sana alam niya real meaning?
[ ] Does it impute a crime, vice or defect in [Syhunliong], either directly or by way of innuendo?
But the innuendo can only be explanatory of a libelous imputation and cannot alter the sense of

100
the words claimed to be libelous. If the publication is not actionable per se, an innuendo cannot
make it so, and if the publication is actionable per se, the innuendo would not even be necessary.
We hold that the text message is not actionable libel. It does not serve to cast a shadow on
[Syhunliong’s]character and integrity[,] there being no direct and personal imputation of a
venality to him. At best, the statement that [Syhunliong] should understand the meaning of the
mass suggests that [Syhunliong] should be more compassionate and caring to the employee. But
is being the converse of compassionate and caring suggestive of a vice or defect in the person
alluded to? We do not think so. Otherwise, even courts should be exposed to contempt and
ridicule for reaching at times decisions in favor of capital and against labor. x x x To follow the
intent of the message as ordinarily conveyed by the words and the context in which they are said,
it can only suggest the intention of [Rivera] to describe [Syhunliong] as strict and selfish. But[,]
there are legitimate reasons why a person who acts in the interest of the employer may appear
strict and selfish to the other side. One may have to be so to protect the interest of his company
and, indeed, the outcome of the labor case vindicates the stand of [Syhunliong] against giving
[Rivera] the claims she sought after.

A responsible officer whose decisions may affect the fortunes of others and who is faced
with criticism such as in this case should not be so onion-skinned as to react through the criminal
law. Instead, he should use methods of discussion and persuasion to dispel the misgivings over
his decisions. He should, in particular, explain through the same source that told him of the
comment why [BANFF]cannot satisfy all [of Rivera’s] claims.

x x x The matter contained in the text message is privileged communication under Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code which [negates] the existence of malice in – a private
communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, [moral] or social
duty. x x x It was Lumapas who told her of the stand of [Syhunliong] on the matter of her wage
claims, and her reaction through the text message may be deemed a part of her duty to seek
redress of her grievances through the same source. She was speaking in response to duty and not
out of an intent to injure the reputation of the person who claims to be defamed. There was no
unnecessary publicity of the message beyond the necessity of conveying it to the party
concerned. (Citations omitted and italics supplied)

The CA denied Syhunliong’s motion for reconsideration to the above through the herein
assailed Resolution dated January 6, 2012.

Issues and Arguments of the Parties

Undaunted, Syhunliong now presents to this Court the issues of whether or not: (a) the
trial court’s denial of a motion to quash information may be validly assailed through a special
civil action for certiorari; (b) Rivera may validly question the denial of her motion to quash
before the CA after voluntarily allowing herself to be arraigned even during the pendency of
such motion to quash; (c) the CA may validly review on certiorari what was, at best, an error of
judgment made by the RTC; (d) the CA correctly ruled that the facts charged in the information
do not constitute the offense of libel; and (e) the CA committed reversible error in ordering the
outright dismissal of Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802 on the putative ground that the allegedly
libelous text messages were privileged communication.

101
 In support of the petition, Syhunliong cites Soriano, et al. v. People, et al. where the
Court declared that in assailing the denial of a motion to quash an information, the accused
should not file a special civil action for certiorari. Instead, the accused should enter a plea, go to
trial sans prejudice to present the special defenses he or she had invoked in the motion to quash,
and if an adverse decision is rendered, file an appeal therefrom.

Syhunliong further avers that Rivera was arraigned on October 11, 2007. Section 1, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that the accused may only be allowed to file a motion
to quash at any time before entering a plea. In Rivera’s case, she had already voluntarily entered
a plea; hence, it was tantamount to an effective abandonment of her motion to quash.

It is also Syhunliong’s argument that the CA improperly arrogated unto itself the power
to review the Public Prosecutor and RTC’s uniform finding of the existence of probable cause.
Even if it were to be assumed that the RTC erred in its disposition, it was a mistake of judgment
and not of jurisdiction.

Syhunliong also refutes the CA’s finding that the facts charged in the information did not
constitute the crime of libel. The text message was apparently an indictment of his personality
and character since it portrayed him as a hypocrite.

Lastly, Syhunliong invokes People v. Judge Gomez which enunciated the doctrine that in
a libel case, the privileged nature of a communication is not a ground for a motion to quash, but
is merely a matter of defense to be proven during the trial.

In Rivera’s Comment, she reiterates the arguments in the Motion to Quash filed with the
RTC. Additionally, she contends that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Syhunliong’s complaint. The text message was sent on April 6, 2006.Per Syhunliong’s narration
in the instant petition, his complaint was filed on August 18, 2007, beyond the one year
prescriptive period for instituting actions for libel provided for in Articles 90 and 91 of the RPC.

Further, the ground that the facts charged in the information did not constitute an offense
can be raised even after arraignment and is broad enough to cover within its ambit lack of
probable cause. This, the court can re-assess in the exercise of its inherent power of judicial
review.

Rivera also laments that she was deprived of due process and of the opportunity to submit
countervailing evidence during preliminary investigation.

There is no merit in the instant petition.

Prescription had set in.

Syhunliong raised five issues before this Court, but the Court’s resolution of the same
would be a superfluity in the light of Rivera’s unrefuted averment that prescription had set in
before the complaint for libel was instituted.

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 In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,the Court, partially quoting People v. Moran,stressed the
reason behind and the character of prescription of penal offenses, to wit:

"Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and
declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a statute of
process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time
oblivion shall be cast over the offence; x x x that from henceforth[,] he may cease to preserve the
proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence[,] it is that statutes of
limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality
of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the
statute, is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually
wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys
proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting
prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public justice in the
attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of
the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should
be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State
upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best
evidence that can be obtained."

Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the
liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the
liberality of the State. x x x Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee
thereof, the accused. (Italics supplied)

In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed his complaint against
Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas. Whether
the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007, it would not alter the
fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for in Article 90 of the
RPC. The Court finds no persuasive reason why Rivera should be deprived of the benefits
accruing from the prescription of the crime ascribed to her.

People v. Castro,on the other hand, is instructive anent the effect in criminal proceedings
of the failure of an accused to raise prescription as a ground in a motion to quash an information,
viz:

Does the failure of the accused to move to quash before pleading constitute a waiver to
raise the question of prescription at a later stage of the case?

A case in point is People vs. Moran, 44 Phil., 387. x x x [T]he court ruled that the crime
had already prescribed holding that this defense can not [b]e deemed waived even if the case had
been decided by the lower court and was pending appeal in the Supreme Court. The philosophy
behind this ruling was aptly stated as follows: "Although the general rule is that the defense of
prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in that case it is
presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not

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always of absolute application in criminal cases, such as that in which prescription of the crime
is expressly provided by law, for the State not having then the right to prosecute, or continue
prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue punishing, the offense, or to continue holding the
defendant subject to its action through the imposition of the penalty, the court must so declare."
And elaborating on this proposition, the Court went on to state as follows:

"As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish
the same, it is absolutely indisputable that from the moment the State has lost or waived such
right, the defendant may, at any stage of the proceeding, demand and ask that the same be finally
dismissed and he be acquitted from the complaint, and such petition is proper and effective even
if the court taking cognizance of the case has already rendered judgment and said judgment is
merely in suspense, pending the resolution of a motion for a reconsideration and new trial, and
this is the more so since in such a case there is not yet any final and irrevocable judgment."

The ruling above adverted to squarely applies to the present case. Here, the rule provides
that the plea of prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the accused pleads to
the charge, as otherwise the defense would be deemed waived; but, as was well said in the
Moran case, this rule is not of absolute application, especially when it conflicts with a
substantive provisions of the law, such as that which refers to prescription of crimes. Since,
under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has only the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and cannot cover
substantive rights (section 13, article VIII, of the Constitution), the rule we are considering
cannot be interpreted or given such scope or extent that would come into conflict or defeat an
express provision of our substantive law. One of such provisions is article 89of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that the prescription of crime has the effect of totally extinguishing
the criminal liability. And so we hold that the ruling laid down in the Moran case still holds good
even if it were laid down before the adoption of the present Rules of Court.42 (Italics supplied)
While Castro is an old jurisprudence, it still finds application in the case at bench in view of
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which in essence partially provides that the defense of
extinction of criminal action or liability, e.g., prescription, is not deemed waived even if the
accused had not raised the same in a motion to quash. In Rivera’s case, the issue of prescription
is raised in her comment to the instant petition before this Court. Syhunliong does not
specifically refute Rivera’s averment, thus, it is deemed admitted.

In sum, even if the Court were to sustain Syhunliong’s stance that Rivera availed of the
wrong remedy when she resorted to filing a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the
RTC orders denying the motion to quash, the result would only prove circuitous. Even if the trial
proceeds and an adverse decision is rendered against Rivera, she can appeal the same, but the CA
and this Court would still be compelled to order the dismissal of the information on account of
prescription of the crime

Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to order the
dismissal of the libel information, but the Court still stresses that the text message which
Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication.

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 "The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good
faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning
which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty."

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own
or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a
board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to
furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in
good faith and without malice.

In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial
of the latter's claims for payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera
expressed through the subject text message her grievances to Lumapas. At that time,
Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite the release of Rivera's claims.

Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration
that Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication
since she "was speaking in response to duty [to protect her own interest] and not out of an
intent to injure the reputation" of Syhunliong. Besides, "[t]here was no unnecessary
publicity of the message beyond [that] of conveying it to the party concerned."

TESTIMONIAL EVID
Disqualifications
G.R. No. 198240               July 3, 2013
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS*, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE HEIRS OFTHE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA
NAVARRO, FRANCISCA NAVARRO MALAPITAN, SOLEDAD NAVARRO
BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA NAVARRO, ANDRES
NAVARRO III, MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA
NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-REJUSO, Respondents.

Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in 1958 and 1993,
respectively. They left behind several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject
lot) located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.

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 The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner,
and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of
Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.

Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive
ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.

Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres
Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2
Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted
standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person.

Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5215.
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that
the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that
presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due process since no
notice was given to them before the examination was conducted. Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is a
worthless piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant.

In its Order dated August 19, 2004, the RTC granted respondents’ motion and
disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony
would be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr.
Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert
witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.

The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their motion in an
Order dated October 11, 2005.

Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which however,
dismissed their petition in the assailed Decision dated February 28, 2011 on the ground that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s disqualification as a
witness.

Later, the CA likewise denied their motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated
July 29, 2011. The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of another CA Division
which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice cannot take judicial notice
of decisions or matters pending before another Division of the appellate court where he or she is
not a member. The CA also held that the sisters were negligent for belatedly informing it that
Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated.

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in refusing to reconsider the assailed decision in light
of the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 5215. Petitioner adds that the CA erred in not ruling that

106
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.They
stress that PO2 Alvarez will be presented as an expert witness to render an opinion on whether
the disputed handwriting was indeed made by Andres, Sr. or whether it is a forgery.
In their comment, respondents counter that the CA properly disqualified PO2 Alvarez. They also
agreed with the CA that her disqualification was mooted by the dismissal of Civil Case No.
5215.

We find in favor of petitioner.

The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2
Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness can no longer be justified. Hence, we reverse the CA
ruling. While we agree with the CA in considering the RTC’s Orders which dismissed Civil Case
No. 5215, we are unable to agree with its refusal to take judicial notice of the Decision of another
CA Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Subsequent proceedings were even held in
the reinstated Civil Case No. 5215 per Orders  issued by the RTC which were already submitted
to the CA. That Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated is a fact that cannot be ignored.
We also agree with petitioner that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally
refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution
or grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence.

In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v.

Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding

section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130
of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a
witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by
reason of privileged communication.

In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, we have held that the specific enumeration of disqualified
witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules.

107
 The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. We
said:

The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest in the
outcome of a case, conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief
are not grounds for disqualification.

Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19

disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity
renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on
conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on
privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of
witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he was called.

There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking
the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability
other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the
construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other
exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only
limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules
should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known
her perception to others.We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the
Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not
based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of
the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.

Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an
expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring

special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.

For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador,22 we were inclined to believe that Tamani’s

signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case
involved simulated or copied forgery, such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that
the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false

108
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.

Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be hearsay. Under
Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert
opinion, as the PNP document examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at
the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is offered and she
is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective
writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling.

True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on
the part of the courts. Jurisprudence is also replete with instances wherein this Court
dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. However, we have also
recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering the
technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents. More important,
analysis of the questioned signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres
Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the resolution of the case.

In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness. She has the
qualifications of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the Rules. The
Rules allow the opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used
the opinion of an expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be
determined if P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting examination she
conducted.

MENTAL INCAPACITY OR IMMATURITY

G.R. No. 145225             April 2, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 
vs.
SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @ "BADONG", appellants.

Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate. When her

mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2, 1996 to work as a domestic helper, she
entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her (Amparo’s) sister Jovita Guban and her husband
Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon.

Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a certain
Rosing, leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the situation, appellant instructed
private complainant to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her

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clothes. As he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his
penis into her vagina. His lust satisfied, appellant fell asleep.

When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita, however,
did not believe her and in fact she scolded her.

Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyn’s half-sister, received a
letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to
stay in Novaliches, Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately
repaired to appellant’s home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to Manila.

A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister was
pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor at the Pascual
General Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches, Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound examination.
Lorna’s suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed
pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that
appellant had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.

In February of 1997, the sisters left for Bulan, Sorsogon for the purpose of filing a
criminal complaint against appellant. The police in Bulan, however, advised them to first have
Evelyn examined. Obliging, the two repaired on February 24, 1997 to the Municipal Health
Office of Bulan, Sorsogon where Evelyn was examined by Dr. Estrella Payoyo. The Medico-
legal Report revealed that the hymen had old lacerations.

On the same day, the sisters went back to the Investigation Section of the Bulan
Municipal Police Station before which they executed their sworn statements.

On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for
rape16 against appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 6272.

In the meantime or on May 7, 1997, Evelyn gave birth to a girl, Joana Canchela, at
Guruyan, Juban, Sorsogon.

Appellant, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true
"[b]ecause her mind is not normal," she having "mentioned many other names of men who ha[d]
sexual intercourse with her."

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed Decision, convicted
appellant as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Salvador Golimlim having been found

guilty of the crime of RAPE (Art. 335 R.P.C. as amended by RA 7659) beyond reasonable doubt
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to indemnify the
offended party Evelyn Canchela in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and another
P50,000.00 as moral damage[s], and to pay the costs.

110
 SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present appeal.

In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the
findings of the trial court with respect to the assessment of Evelyn’s testimony.

That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her
testimony bereft of truth.

Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next

succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The
following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully.

In People v. Trelles,  where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded
private complainant’s testimony irregardless of her "monosyllabic responses and vacillations
between lucidity and ambiguity," this Court held:

A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a

witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally
accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to
the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable
narrative of the matter testified to.

It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or
her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is
admissible in court.

To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to

disqualify a witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who
may be the only person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules
follow the modern trend of evidence.

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 Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based
mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate.
From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s
credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her
feeblemindedness.

By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric

Department of the Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering
from moderate mental retardation with an IQ of 46,  she is capable of perceiving and relating
events which happened to her. Thus the doctor testified:

Q: So do you try to impress that although she answers in general terms it does not
necessarily mean that she might be inventing answers – only that she could not go to the specific
details because of dullness?

A: I don’t think she was inventing her answer because I conducted mental status
examination for three (3) times and I tried to see the consistency in the narration but very poor
(sic) in giving details.
xxx

Q: May we know what she related to you?

A: She related to me that she was raped by her uncle ‘Tatay Badong’. What she mentioned was
that, and I quote: ‘hinila ang panty ko, pinasok ang pisot at bayag niya sa pipi ko’. She would
laugh inappropriately after telling me that particular incident. I also tried to ask her regarding the
dates, the time of the incident, but she could not really…. I tried to elicit those important things,
but the patient had a hard time remembering those dates.
Q: But considering that you have evaluated her mentally, gave her I.Q. test, in your honest
opinion, do you believe that this narration by the patient to you about the rape is reliable?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you consider that reliable?
A: Being a (sic) moderately retarded, I have noticed the spontaneity of her answers during the
time of the testing. She was not even hesitating when she told me she was raped once at home by
her Tatay Badong; and she was laughing when she told me about how it was done on (sic) her.
So, although she may be inappropriate but (sic) she was spontaneous, she was consistent.
Q: Now, I would like to relate to you an incident that happened in this Court for you to give us
your expert opinion. I tried to present the victim in this case to testify. While she testified that
she was raped by her uncle Badong, when asked about the details, thereof, she would not make
(sic) the detail. She only answered ‘wala’ (no). I ask this question because somehow this seems
related to your previous evaluation that while she gave an answer, she gave no detail. Now, I was
thinking because I am a man and I was the one asking and the Judge is a man also. And while the
mother would say that she would relate to her and she related to you, can you explain to us why
when she was presented in court that occurrence, that event happened?
A: There are a lot of possible answers to that question; one, is the court’s atmosphere itself. This
may have brought a little anxiety on the part of the patient and this inhibits her from
relating some of the details relative to the incident-in-question. When I conducted my interview
with the patient, there were only two (2) of us in the room. I normally do not ask this question

112
during the first session with the patient because these are emotionally leading questions, and I do
not expect the patient to be very trusting. So, I usually ask this type of questions during the later
part of my examination to make her relax during my evaluation. So in this way, she will be more
cooperative with me. I don’t think that this kind of atmosphere within the courtroom with some
people around, this could have inhibited the patient from answering questions.
xxx
Q: What if the victim is being coached or led by someone else, will she be able to answer the
questions?
A: Yes, she may be able to answer the questions, but you would notice the inconsistency of the
answers because what we normally do is that we present the questions in different ways, and we
expect the same answer. This is how we try to evaluate the patient. If the person, especially a
retarded, is being coached by somebody, the answers will no longer be consistent.
Q: You also mentioned a while ago that the answers given by the patient, taken all in all, were
consistent?
A: Yes, sir.31 (Underscoring supplied)
As noted in the above-quoted testimony of Dr. Belmonte, Evelyn could give spontaneous and
consistent answers to the same but differently framed questions under conditions which do not
inhibit her from answering. It could have been in this light that Evelyn was able to relate in court,
upon examination by a female government prosecutor and the exclusion of the public from the
proceedings, on Dr. Belmonte’s suggestion,32 how, as quoted below, she was raped and that it
was appellant who did it:
Q: Lorna Hachero testified before this Court that you gave birth to a baby girl named Johanna, is
this true?
A: (The witness nods, yes.)
xxx
Q: Who is the father of Johanna?
A: Papay Badong
Q: Who is this Papay Badong that you are referring to?
A: The husband of Mamay Bita.
Q: Is he here in court?
A: He is here.
Q: Please look around and point him to us.
A: (The witness pointing to the lone man sitting in the first row of the gallery wearing a regular
prison orange t-shirt who gave his name as Salvador Golimlim when asked.)
Q: Why were you able to say that it is Papay Badong who is the father of your child Johanna?
A: Because then I was left at Mamay Bita’s house, although I am not there now.
Q: And that house where you were left is also the house of your Papay Badong?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: What did Salvador Golimlim or your Papay Badong do to you that’s why you were able to
say that he is the father of your child?
A: I was undressed by him.
xxx
Q: What did you do after you were undressed?
A: I was scolded by the wife, Mamay Bita.
Q: I am referring to that very moment when you were undressed. Immediately after your Papay
Badong undressed you, what did you do?

113
xxx
A: He laid on top of me.
Q: What was your position when he laid on top of you?
A: I was lying down.
Q: Then after he went on top of you, what did he do there?
A: He made (sic) sexual intercourse with me.
Q: When you said he had a (sic) sexual intercourse with you, what did he do exactly?
A: He kissed me.
Q: Where?
A: On the cheeks (witness motioning indicating her cheeks).
Q: What else did he do? Please describe before this Honorable Court the sexual intercourse
which you are referring to which the accused did to you.
A: ‘Initoy’ and he slept after that.
(to Court)
Nevertheless, may we request that the local term for sexual intercourse, the word
‘Initoy’ which was used by the witness be put on the record, and we request judicial notice of the
fact that ‘initoy’ is the local term for sexual intercourse.
xxx
Q: What did you feel when your Papay Badong had sexual intercourse with you?
A: I felt a knife; it was like a knife.
Q: Where did you feel that knife?
A: I forgot.
Q: Why did you allow your Papay Badong to have sexual intercourse with you?
A: I will not consent to it.
xxx
Q: Did you like what he did to you?
A: I do not want it.
Q: But why did it happen?
A: I was forced to.
xxx
Q: Did you feel anything when he inserted into your vagina when your Papay Badong laid on top
of you?
A: His sexual organ/penis.
Q: How did you know that it was the penis of your Papay Badong that was entered into your
vagina?
A: It was put on top of me.
Q: Did it enter your vagina?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
Q: Madam Witness, is it true that your Papay Badong inserted his penis into your vagina or
sexual organ during that time that he was on top of you?
A: (The witness nods, yes.) (Underscoring supplied)

Appellant’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by
clear and convincing evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who
convincingly identified him as her rapist.

114
 In convicting appellant under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659 (the law in force when the crime was committed in 1996), the trial court did
not specify under which mode the crime was committed. Under the said article, rape is
committed thus:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua or death.
xxx

It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes
statutory rape which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having
carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction. The fact of Evelyn’s mental retardation was not,
however, alleged in the Information and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction. Such
notwithstanding, that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime, the mode of
commission alleged in the Information, was adequately proven. It bears stating herein that the
mental faculties of a retardate being different from those of a normal person, the degree of force
needed to overwhelm him or her is less. Hence, a quantum of force which may not suffice when
the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when employed against an imbecile.36
Still under the above-quoted provision of Art. 335 of the Rev ised Penal Code, when the crime of
rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. In the case at bar, however, although there is adequate evidence showing that appellant
indeed used force and intimidation, that is not the case with respect to the use of a deadly
weapon.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 65 in Criminal Case No. 241 finding appellant, Salvador Golimlim alias
"Badong," GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape, which this Court finds to have been
committed under paragraph 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and holding him civilly
liable therefor, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against appellant.

115
 MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION

MAXIMO ALVAREZ versus SUSAN RAMIREZ, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005
 
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No.
19933-MN for arson pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The
accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister
of respondent.

On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as
the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
Esperanza testified as follows:
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
 
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor.
 
COURT:
 
Swear in the witness.
 
xxx
 
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
 
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving that the
accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged particularly that
accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9,
Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his sister-in-law Susan
Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of
Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the house
on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the
family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a consequence of
the accused in successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house
was burned and together with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and others.
 
COURT:
 
You may proceed.
 
xxx
 
DIRECT EXAMINATION
 
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
 
xxx

116
 
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that scent?
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of my sister
(and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room).
 
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
 
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
 
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he gave his name
as Maximo Alvarez.
 
 
In the course of Esperanzas direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed uncontrolled
emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza
from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification.

Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial
court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.

On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying
Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated
October 19, 1999.

This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No.
19933-MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside
the assailed Orders issued by the trial court.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband
in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor
the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in

117
a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants.
 
The reasons given for the rule are:
1.     There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2.     If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3.     The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk
of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4.     Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.
 
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses
committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound
reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For
instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason
based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law
aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home.
 
In Ordoo vs. Daquigan, this Court held:

We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down
in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow;
and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and
vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall
not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by)
one against the other.

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the

conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the
Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such
as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives
and flourishes.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan
Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of
injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation

118
which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had
the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact
that the marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become
so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The
Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals
which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v.
Castaeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital
Disqualification Rule.
 
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the
offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they
were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and
facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before
the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to
offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as
stated by this Court in Francisco, it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court,
RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against
petitioner, her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch III, and BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, respondents.

At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense
moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court
which provides:

SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following

persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or
indirectly as herein enumerated.
xxx xxx xxx

(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a
wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one
against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other.

119
 The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under
the exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, in an order dated
March 31, 1977. A motion for reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by respondent
Judge in an order dated May 19, 1977.

Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of
the People of the Philippines, seeking set aside the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and
praying that a preliminary injunction or a ternporary restraining order be issued by this Court
enjoining said judge from further proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal Case No. 1011.
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to issue a temporary restraining order, and (b) to
require the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Notice of Appearance on June 27, 1977, 4 and its Memorandum in support of
the Petition on August 30, 1977. 5 The respondents filed their Memorandum on September 5,
1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was considered submitted for decision. 7

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the sole issues
determinative of the instant petition, to wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of
Public Document filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto — who allegedly
forged the signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it
appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their
conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not — may be considered as a criminal
case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule
on marital disqualification.

We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification
rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.

1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the
forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein
that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership
when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot,
and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the
consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband Clearly, therefore,
it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged.
And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid
criminal case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such
criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to
advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant
case.

2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a
crime committed by one spouse against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus,

120
in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, 8this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the
criterion to be followed in resolving the issue, stating that:

We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down
in Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and the
rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is too broad.
The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY
AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE
EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.

Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoño v. Daquigan this Court held that
the rape committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime
committed by the husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime committed by the
accused in that can was not his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the
exception for the reason that said criminal act "Positively undermine(d) the connubial
relationship. 

With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of
the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a
third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the
wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her
insistent efforts  in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order
disqualified her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the
witness-wife underacore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out
in previous decisions, "identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of
private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial
disqualification rule.

3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be
disqualified from testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the
Solicitor General," (t)o espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a
husband committing as many falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter
in the anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret — all with
unabashed and complete impunity.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31,
1977, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin
Manaloto, in Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the

121
motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court is hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of
the case, allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify against her husband.
SO ORDERED.

DEATH OR INSANITY (DEAD MAN’S STATUTE)

G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992

ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner, 
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity
as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992

VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner, 
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON,
INC., respondents.

In his complaint filed on June 29, 1971, and amended on November 16, 1971, Vicente B.
Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc., Geronimo Velasco, Francisco
de Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo B. de Leon, Jr., Gabriel Llamas and Luis M. de Razon be
ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the shareholdings of the deceased Juan T.
Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to restrain the defendants from
disposing of the said shares of stock, for a writ of preliminary attachment v. properties of
defendants having possession of shares of stock and for receivership of the properties of
defendant corporation . . .
xxx xxx xxx

In their answer filed on June 18, 1973, defendants alleged that all the shares of stock in
the name of stockholders of record of the corporation were fully paid for by defendant, Razon;
that said shares are subject to the agreement between defendants and incorporators; that the
shares of stock were actually owned and remained in the possession of Razon. Appellees also
alleged . . . that neither the late Juan T. Chuidian nor the appellant had paid any amount
whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in question . . .
xxx xxx xxx

The evidence of the plaintiff shown that he is the administrator of the intestate estate of
Juan Telesforo Chuidian in Special Proceedings No. 71054, Court of First Instance of Manila.
Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the purpose of bidding for the
arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators consisted of Enrique Razon,

122
Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuason, Jr., Victor Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador
Perez de Tagle.

On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant
corporation was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian.

On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and after him, the
plaintiff-appellant, were elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of them actually served and
were paid compensation as directors of E. Razon, Inc.

From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to April 1971, Enrique
Razon had not questioned the ownership by Juan T. Chuidian of the shares of stock in question
and had not brought any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.
The certificate of stock was in the possession of defendant Razon who refused to deliver said
shares to the plaintiff, until the same was surrendered by defendant Razon and deposited in a
safety box in Philippine Bank of Commerce.
Defendants allege that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc., Enrique Razon distributed shares of
stock previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends
including Juan T. Chuidian

Stock Certificate No. 003 covering 1,500 shares of stock upon instruction of the late
Chuidian on April 23, 1986 was personally delivered by Chuidian on July 1, 1966 to the
Corporate Secretary of Attorney Silverio B. de Leon who was himself an associate of the
Chuidian Law Office (Exhs. C & 11). Since then, Enrique Razon was in possession of said stock
certificate even during the lifetime of the late Chuidian, from the time the late Chuidian delivered
the said stock certificate to defendant Razon until the time (sic) of defendant Razon. By
agreement of the parties (sic) delivered it for deposit with the bank under the joint custody of the
parties as confirmed by the trial court in its order of August 7, 1971.

Thus, the 1,500 shares of stook under Stock Certificate No. 003 were delivered by the
late Chuidian to Enrique because it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares
of stock in the defendant corporation and the understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was
the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have possession thereof until such time as he
was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders (TSN., pp. 4, 8, 10, 24-25, 25-
26, 28-31, 31-32, 60, 66-68, July 22, 1980, Exhs. "C", "11", "13" "14"). (Ro11o — 74306, pp.
66-68)

In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its
alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case.
Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony
regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership
of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the
same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such
testimony.

123
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence)
States:

Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is

prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or
against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing
before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
(Emphasis supplied)

x x x           x x x          x x x

The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:

The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased
or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased
person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter
can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or
unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to
give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party."
(Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622 [1955])

The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a

case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of
the deceased person. (See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])

In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
(petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent
Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in
the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned
by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.

It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition
of the rule. The case was not filed  against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed
upon claims against the estate.

Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the
testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder
Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private
respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the
prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is

124
deemed to have waived the rule. We ruled in the case of Cruz v. Court of Appeals (192 SCRA
209 [1990]):

It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be
incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object
thereto. Thus:
...
The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as the
allowance of improper questions that may be put to him while on the stand is a matter resting in
the discretion of the litigant. He may assert his right by timely objection or he may waive it,
expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests with him. Once admitted, the testimony is in
the case for what it is worth and the judge has no power to disregard it for the sole reason that it
could have been excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to strike it out on its own
motion (Emphasis supplied). (Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1.)

The issue as to whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible having been settled,
we now proceed to discuss the fundamental issue on the ownership of the 1,500 shares of stock
in E. Razon, Inc.

E. Razon, Inc. was organized in 1962 by petitioner Enrique Razon for the purpose of
participating in the bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators
were Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuazon, Jr., Victor L. Lim, Jose
F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle. The business, however, did not start operations until
1966. According to the petitioner, some of the incorporators withdrew from the said corporation.
The petitioner then distributed the stocks previously placed in the names of the withdrawing
nominal incorporators to some friends, among them the late Juan T. Chuidian to whom he gave
1,500 shares of stock. The shares of stock were registered in the name of Chuidian only as
nominal stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares of stock were owned and held
by the petitioner but Chuidian was given the option to buy the same. In view of this arrangement,
Chuidian in 1966 delivered to the petitioner the stock certificate covering the 1,500 shares of
stock of E. Razon, Inc. Since then, the Petitioner had in his possession the certificate of stock
until the time, he delivered it for deposit with the Philippine Bank of Commerce under the
parties' joint custody pursuant to their agreement as embodied in the trial court's order.

The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of his
agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is sufficient
to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock.

The petitioner's contention is not correct.

In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (188 SCRA 492 [1990]) we
ruled:
. . . For an effective, transfer of shares of stock the mode and manner of transfer as prescribed by
law must be followed (Navea v. Peers Marketing Corp., 74 SCRA 65). As provided under
Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Bilang, 68 otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, shares of stock may be transferred by delivery to the transferee of the certificate

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properly indorsed. Title may be vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed
certificate of stock (18 C.J.S. 928, cited in Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643). However, no
transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties until the transfer is properly recorded in the
books of the corporation (Sec. 63, Corporation Code of the Philippines; Section 35 of the
Corporation Law)

In the instant case, there is no dispute that the questioned 1,500 shares of stock of E.
Razon, Inc. are in the name of the late Juan Chuidian in the books of the corporation. Moreover,
the records show that during his lifetime Chuidian was ellected member of the Board of
Directors of the corporation which clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the corporation.
(See Section 30, Corporation Code) From the point of view of the corporation, therefore,
Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a case, the petitioner who claims
ownership over the questioned shares of stock must show that the same were transferred to him
by proving that all the requirements for the effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance
with the corporation's by laws, if any, were followed (See Nava v. Peers Marketing Corporation,
74 SCRA 65 [1976]) or in accordance with the provisions of law.

The petitioner failed in both instances. The petitioner did not present any by-laws which
could show that the 1,500 shares of stock were effectively transferred to him. In the absence of
the corporation's by-laws or rules governing effective transfer of shares of stock, the provisions
of the Corporation Law are made applicable to the instant case.

The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the
certificate must be properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested in the
transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsedcertificate of stock. (Section 35, Corporation
Code) Since the certificate of stock covering the questioned 1,500 shares of stock registered in
the name of the late Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to the petitioner, the inevitable conclusion
is that the questioned shares of stock belong to Chuidian. The petitioner's asseveration that he did
not require an indorsement of the certificate of stock in view of his intimate friendship with the
late Juan Chuidian can not overcome the failure to follow the procedure required by law or the
proper conduct of business even among friends. To reiterate, indorsement of the certificate of
stock is a mandatory requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock.

Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the appellate court's factual findings
that the shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was the legal
counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation. We give credence to the testimony of
the private respondent that the shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian in payment of his
legal services to the corporation. Petitioner Razon failed to overcome this testimony.

G.R. No. 148257. March 17, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CESARIO MONTAEZ and DANIEL
SUMAYLO, accused.

Edmundo Ollanes testified that in the evening of July 20, 1993, he was fishing along the
seashore at Pangabuan, Toledo City with Joven Hintogaya and his younger brother, Perlito

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Ollanes. They stopped fishing by 11:00 a.m., sold their catch, and went home. Edmundo took a
shortcut, while Joven and Perlito walked home together. He and Perlito had a flashlight with
them, while Joven carried a kerosene lamp. Perlitos house was only about forty meters from his,
and Joven lived only about eighteen meters away.

As Edmundo was climbing the stairs to his house, he heard gunshot coming from the
direction of the house of Perlito. He rushed to the scene and passed by Jovens house. He then
saw his brother lying prostrate nearby. As he was facing towards the ground, the left side of his
face tilted towards his left shoulder, he saw the appellant, who was armed with a long firearm.

Edmundo carried his brother in his arms and noticed the gunshot wounds on the latters
chest. He was still alive, but barely breathing. Perlito told him that he was on the verge of
death.When Edmundo asked Perlito who shot him, the latter declared that it was the
appellant. Perlito mentioned the appellants name three times. Edmundo carried Perlito to the
hospital, but the latter died on the way.

Joven Hintogaya corroborated Edmundos testimony. He testified that Perlito was his
brother-in-law. He was carrying a kerosene lamp as he and Perlito were on their way home that
fateful night. Perlito was about seven meters away from him. Suddenly, he heard a gunshot and
saw that Perlito was hit. He fell to the ground. Joven went near Perlito, still carrying the kerosene
lamp, and saw the appellant holding a long handgun in his right hand. In the meantime, the
appellant went near Perlito and dropped a piece of paper with writings in the Cebuano
dialect, then left. Momentarily, Edmundo arrived, carried Perlito and talked to him. Dadan
Ollanes and Cresing also arrived and helped Edmundo bring Perlito to the hospital. Perlito died
on the way.

Dr. Paulita Almendras performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Perlito and prepared her
report containing her postmortem findings, thus:
Front view
Multiple gunshot wounds chest, abdominal region, pubic region approximately numbering 25
with different sizes of wounds of entrance some cm. in diameter and some cm. in diameter.
Back view
Gunshot wounds of exit back, left side level of umbilicus 8 cms. from the spinal column &
another one 5 cms. from the spinal column.
The doctor also signed the Certificate of Death of Perlito Ollanes.
The Case for the Appellant
Emilia Antipolo testified that at around 8:00 p.m. on July 20, 1993, she was in her house in
Baybay, Pangabuan, waiting for the fishermen to arrive. The appellant, Elizabeth Robillos and
the latters husband were her regular customers and were with her that night. When the fishermen
arrived at 11:00 p.m., Emilia weighed the fish and sorted them with the help of Elizabeth and the
appellant. They finished the work at 2:00 a.m.
Emilia and her companions heard gunfire coming from the upper portion of Pangabuan. Not long
after, three CAFGUs arrived and asked Emilia if they heard the fire of the gun. She answered in
the affirmative. The following day, they learned that somebody had been killed at the upper
portion of Pangabuan where the victim lived.

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Danilo Ollanes testified that at midnight of July 20, 1993, he was at home. He heard gunfire and
rushed to the place with his brother Edmundo. He brought a small petroleum lamp with
him. They saw somebody lying on the ground, face down. Edmundo lifted the fallen Perlito, and
Danilo heard him say that the person who shot him was Alfredo Ollanes. He did not see Cesario
Montaez during the incident. On cross examination, Danilo testified that he arrived at the place
and he heard gunfire a minute later. He did not see the appellant nor Alfredo Ollanes. According
to his brother, the appellant was implicated in the killing of Perlito because the former was
involved in the plan.
Elizabeth, whom Emilia Antipolo alleged to be with the appellant at her house in the evening of
July 20, 1993, testified that she was also there with the appellant, CAFGUs Camilo Alipaopao,
Boy Aranilla and Eustaquio Abadia. She also heard the gunfire along with the others. She left the
house of Antipolo with the appellant at 2:00 a.m. Elizabeth also testified that she knew the
victim, a resident of Pangabuan who sometimes bought fish on the road.
Barangay Captain Rudy Matalines of Pangabuan, Tangub City, testified that the father of the
victim went to him for help when his son was killed. Rudy Matalines went to the place of the
incident and asked Edmundo whether he knew the culprit, and the latter answered in the
negative. Danilo went to his house to have his affidavit taken, where he stated that the person
responsible for the killing was Alfredo Ollanes. The affidavit was not sworn to and the barangay
captain gave a copy to the appellant.
Eutiquio Amodia corroborated the testimonies of witnesses Emilia Antipolo and Elizabeth
Robillos that the appellant was at the house of Emilio Antipolo at the time when they heard the
gunfire in the evening of July 20, 1993. When he left at about 1:00 a.m., the appellant
and Elizabeth were still there.
The appellant denied the allegations of Joven and Edmundo, reasoning that at the time of the
incident, he was in the house of Emilia Antipolo in Baybay Pangabuan, Tangub City, about one-
and-a-half kilometers away from the victims house. He testified that he arrived at the house of
Emilia at 8:00 p.m. to meet the fishermen and buy their catch. At 12:00 midnight, while he was
still in the house, he heard gunfire coming from the upper portion of Pangabuan. He denied
having known that the victim had impregnated Maricia Ollanes.
Daniel Sumaylo testified that Alfredo Ollanes ordered the killing of the victim and gave P100.00
for the assignment. He conspired with Alfredo Ollanes, Federico Ollanes, Roque Ollanes, Larry
Ollanes and Rogelio Aman, Jr. to kill the victim, because the latter impregnated his cousin,
Maricia Ollanes. It was Roque Ollanes who dropped the note near the victim. Sumaylo stated
that he used an unlicensed firearm owned by Rogelio Aman, Jr. in the shooting. After the killing,
he returned the gun to Aman, Jr. The appellant was implicated because he had the same body
built as Roque Ollanes. Sumaylo gave his sworn statement to SPO3 Ramon Daomilas, Jr. in the
presence of Erdie Quinto, a minister of the Iglesia ni Kristo.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on September 19, 1995, convicting the appellant of
murder as principal and convicting Sumaylo of homicide. The decretal portion of the said
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Cesario Montaez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, said accused Cesario
Montaez is hereby sentenced to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua while accused Daniel Sumaylo

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is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Homicide defined and penalized
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, said accused Daniel Sumaylo is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as its minimum period to 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as its maximum period.

Both accused Cesario Montaez and Daniel Sumaylo are to suffer the accessory penalties
provided by law, to solidarily and jointly indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum
of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

They must be credited of the time according to law of the time they were under preventive
imprisonment.

The appellant filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision. On November 17, 1995, the
court issued an order partially granting the motion and convicting the appellant of murder, but
only as an accomplice. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the decision dated September 19, 1995 is hereby
reconsidered and modified in the sense that accused Cesario Montaez is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Art. 248
in relation to Art. 52 of the Revised Penal Code and he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as its minimum to 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as its maximum period. All the other aspects of the penalty are
hereby sustained.

SO ORDERED.

The appellant appealed the decision, asserting that there was no proof of conspiracy between him
and Sumaylo; as such, he should be exonerated of the crime charged. Furthermore, he could not
be held criminally liable as an accomplice because there was no direct connection between his
presence at the scene of the crime and the killing of the victim.

On June 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the November 17, 1995
Order of the trial court and reinstating the trial courts September 19, 1995 Decision.

Neither the appellant nor the Office of the Solicitor General filed their respective supplemental
briefs. The appellant manifested that he was adopting his brief in the Court of Appeals in the
instant appeal, where he asserted that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CESARIO

MONTAEZ GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AN ACCOMPLICE OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER.

The appellant contends that both the trial court and the appellate court erred in giving credence
and full probative weight to the testimonies of Edmundo and Joven. He insists that he was in the
house of Emilia Antipolo, one-and-a-half kilometers away from the house of the victim, when

129
the latter was shot. Besides, Sumaylo already confessed to being the sole assailant, and thereby
absolved him of any criminal liability for the victims death. The appellant argues that it was
illogical for the trial court to convict him of murder as an accomplice, although Sumaylo, who
was the principal by direct participation for the killing of the victim, was convicted of
homicide. There is no evidence on record that he conspired with Sumaylo in killing the
victim. His mere presence at the scene of the killing did not render him criminally liable as an
accomplice.

The appellants submission has no merit.

We agree with the ratiocinations of the Court of Appeals in affirming the September 19,
1995 Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of murder as principal by direct
participation, thus:

CESARIO contends that [S]ince neither conspiracy nor unity of purpose and intention in the
commission of the crime charged on the accused-appellant was proven x x x [T]he accused-
appellant, therefore, deserves a verdict of acquittal.
The contention is without basis. The fact that CESARIO was at the scene of the crime is
established by JOVENs positive identification of him. Corollarily, the issue to be resolved is the
degree of his participation in the killing of JOVEN.

A reading of the prosecutions evidence shows that CESARIO is a principal by direct

participation in the killing of PERLITO.
...
The incriminating circumstantial evidence that point to CESARIO as the perpetrator of the crime
are the following:

(1) After a shot was heard, JOVEN saw PERLITO fall to the ground and thereafter, JOVEN saw
CESARIO approached PERLITO, drop a piece of paper beside him and leave immediately;
(2) At that time, CESARIO was seen carrying a firearm in his right arm; and
(3) A few moments later, EDMUNDO arrived and found out that PERLITO sustained a gunshot
wound in his chest. Upon inquiry, PERLITO answered, three (3) times, that it was CESARIO
who shot him. JOVEN saw them conversing but he could not hear what they were talking about.
Since the prosecution witnesses had no motive whatsoever to falsify the truth and impute to
CESARIO the commission of so grave an offense, the foregoing circumstances cannot be
seriously disputed.

The combination of the foregoing circumstances is sufficient to establish the guilt of CESARIO
beyond reasonable doubt.

In relation hereto, DANIELs testimony is given scant attention by this Court The Court has held
in a number of cases that a recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is
always the probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with
disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or for monetary consideration.

130
Crime committed

CESARIO assails the logic of the trial courts ruling on the ground that [T]he principal by direct
participation was convicted of the lesser offense of homicide while his accomplice in the
commission of the crime, herein accused-appellant, was convicted of the more serious crime of
murder.

Murder has been defined as the unlawful killing of any person which is not parricide or
infanticide, provided that any of the following circumstances is present: (a) With treachery x x x
The circumstance of treachery is attendant in the case at bar. The killing of the deceased is
murder for the victim was not only unarmed but also deprived of every means to defend himself
from the treacherous attack. As testified by Joven Hintogaya, the victim Perlito Ollanes was on
the process of placing his push net above the door and when he turned his side, he was shot.

Considering that treachery is present in the killing of PERLITO, the nature of the crime
committed is categorized as murder. The crime, as charged, remains notwithstanding DANIELS
plea of guilty to a lesser offense. That is, where the accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, regardless of whether the same is or is not necessarily included in the crime charged, no
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. This is so because [A] conviction under
this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double
jeopardy. As stated by the Solicitor General, [I]t appears that in the eyes of the law, the convicted
felone (sic) is still convicted of the crime charged although he was benefited by his entering a
plea of guilty to the lesser offense.

The conviction of the accused may be proved by the prosecution either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence. As we held in People vs. Delim:

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from

which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience. What was once a rule of account respectability is now entombed in Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence,
sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a
judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:

x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a

compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the
proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one
conclusion: the guilt of accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be
sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt

131
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to
controvert the evidence of the prosecution.

In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that the appellant
killed the victim. However, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove
that the culprit was the appellant, and no other.

First. Immediately after Joven and Edmundo heard the gunshot coming from the direction
of Perlitos house, they rushed to the place and saw Perlito sprawled on the ground, mortally
wounded.

Second. The only person near Perlito was the appellant, who was holding a long firearm
in his right hand. No other person was near the victim or within the periphery of the crime scene
when Edmundo and Joven arrived.

Third. The appellant went near Perlito and dropped an unsigned note written in the
Cebuano dialect purporting to be from the BHB. The appellant then immediately left the scene.

Q When you reached, Perlito was already lying face down. Were you bringing (sic) your
flashlight?
A I was bringing (sic) a flashlight because I was not able to go upstairs.
Q What did you see beside the body of Perlito?
A A letter.
Q What was written in that letter?
A There was a treat (sic) that they will kill two more others come (sic) from HB (sic).
Q Where is that letter now?
A It is in the possession of the city fiscal.
COURT:
Show it to the witness, Fiscal.
Q Will you examine carefully this letter brought out by Fiscal Inting and tell the Honorable
Court that is this (sic) letter. Is this the one?
A This is the one.
FISCAL INTING:
Few questions, Your Honor.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL INTING:
Q How far from the body of Perlito Ollanes did you find this letter?
A Very near beside him.
Translated in English, the note reads:
This man is not worth raising (sic), he is a garbage of society. This kind of man is not worth to
live; do not follow him (sic) because we oppose these works (sic). In this place there are two
whom we will eliminate.
The contents of the note is self-explanatory. Its sender had the victim killed by the appellant
because of the belief that the victim was not a good member of society; hence, not fit to live.

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Fourth. When Edmundo Ollanes asked his brother Perlito who shot him, Perlito replied three
times that it was the appellant. Perlito himself told his brother Edmundo that he was about to
die. In fact, the victim died on the way to the hospital.
Q Then what did you do after hearing the gun explosion coming from the direction of the house
of Perlito Ollanes?
A I ran towards their house.
Q And what did you observe when you arrived or when you were near the house of Perlito
Ollanes?
A I saw Perlito Ollanes lying with face downward.
Q What did you find on his body, if any?
A He was hit with the gun fire (sic).
Q How did you know that he was hit by the gunfire (sic)?
A I placed him in my arms.
Q How did you know that he was injured?
A I carried him in my arms because he was still alive.
Q Where did you find the injuries?
A On his breast. (Witness pointing from his breast to his stomach).
Q You said that when you placed Perlito Ollanes in your arms he was still alive, what did you
say, if any, to him?
FISCAL INTING:
Q (refer last).
A I asked him whether he recognized the one who shot him.
Q And what did he answer, if any?
A He answered 3 times that it was Cesar Montaez.
COURT:
Q Did your brother know that he was going to die because of that gunshot wound?
A Maybe he knew that he was about to die because he told me that he would die.
Q That was the time when you asked him who was responsible in shooting him?
A Yes.
Q And he answered you 3 times the name of Cesar Montaez?
A Yes.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL INTING:
Q How serious was the physical condition of Perlito Ollanes when you asked him and he
answered you?
A He was uneasy.
COURT:
Q After answering you the name of Cesar Montaez, what happened to your brother, Perlito?
A We carried him and brought him downward in order to bring him to the hospital.
Q He was still alive?
A Yes.
Q Until what point did you bring him downward?
A He died on the way.
Perlitos statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying declaration. The statement
is highly reliable, having been made in extremity when the declarant is at the point of death and

133
when any hope of survival is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the
mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth.  Even if the declarant did
not make a statement that he was at the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the words
and the fact that death superseded shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence
that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition.

The barefaced fact that Daniel Sumaylo pleaded guilty to the felony of homicide is not a bar to
the appellant being found guilty of murder as a principal. It bears stressing that Sumaylo plea-
bargained on his re-arraignment. Even if the public prosecutor and the father of the victim agreed
to Sumaylos plea, the State is not barred from prosecuting the appellant for murder on the basis
of its evidence, independently of Sumaylos plea of guilt.

Neither is the appellant entitled to acquittal merely because Sumaylo confessed, after the
appellant had rested his case, to being the sole assailant. The trial court disbelieved Sumaylos
testimony that he alone killed the victim and that the appellant was not at all involved in the
killing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It bears stressing that
when Sumaylo testified for the appellant on surrebuttal, he declared that he did not know who
killed the victim. He even declared that the appellant did not kill the victim. However, he made a
complete volte-face when he executed an affidavit and testified that he alone killed the victim
and that the appellant was not at all involved in the killing. We are convinced that Sumaylos
somersault was an afterthought, a last-ditch attempt to extricate the appellant from an inevitable
conviction. We agree with the ratiocinations of the trial court, thus:

There is great doubt to the mind of the Court on the testimonies of accused Daniel Sumaylo. He
was presented as surrebuttal witness to deny the allegation of the prosecution regarding the
presence of the accused Cesario Montaez in the house of Federico Ollanes on July 20, 1993. If it
was true that he, Daniel Sumaylo, was there, enabling him to tell whether accused Cesario
Montaez was present or not, why was he not able to give the date and time of said marriage
arrangement? He did not know the future groom and the future parents-in-law of the daughter of
Federico Ollanes. He could have, at least remembered any of the important matters about such
marriage arrangement if indeed he was there.

Accused Daniel Sumaylos affidavit was executed on May 14, 1994, a day after he was presented
as surrebuttal witness wherein he testified that he does not know who killed the victim. He
retracted such testimony given in Court for the reason that he was disturbed by his
conscience. However, the Court has looked with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies
previously given in Court. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable (People vs. Clamor,
G.R. No. 82708, July 1, 1991, 198 SCRA 642). 

The strategem of the appellant was evident. Sumaylo was to confess to having killed the victim,
and at the same time, absolve the appellant from any involvement in the crime. Sumaylo would
then plead guilty to the lesser felony of homicide and would be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty. He expected to be free, after serving the minimum of his sentence. If the trial court
believed Sumaylos recantation, the appellant would be acquitted of the crime charged and, as a
consequence, would be set free. Unfortunately for the appellant, although the trial court allowed

134
Sumaylo to plead guilty to homicide and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty, it
disbelieved the latters testimony exculpating the appellant.
The appellants strategy backfired. Instead of being content with his conviction of murder as an
accomplice, he appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found him guilty of murder as a
principal by direct participation.
On the civil liabilities of the appellant, the trial court did not award exemplary damages, contrary
to current jurisprudence.  The decision of the trial court shall, thus, be modified.

CASE:
Facts:

Petitioner wife filed against respondent husband a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, with the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains,
and the award of custody of their children to her, claiming that respondent
husband failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist
diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive
use of prohibited drugs. 

Respondent husband claims that it was the wife who failed in her duties. And
that he initially agreed to marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon
arriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another
gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as
proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital.
However, that same form carried a physician's handwritten note that the
husband suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol abuse. 

Based on the physician's handwritten statement, petitioner wife requested for

the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, for the
production of the Husband's medical records. The husband opposed, arguing
that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The
request of the wife was denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Did the CA err in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering the husband's hospital records on the ground
that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient
communication?

Held:

No. The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is premature. Petitioner wife

made the request before trial started. She will have to wait for trial to begin

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before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
her husband's hospital records. It is when those records are produced for
examination at the trial, that the husband may opt to object, not just to their
admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.

It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena

duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of
documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1,
Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: x x x
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the
documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.”

Petitioner wife, of course, claims that the hospital records subject of this case
are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that
may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, according to
her, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the
physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital

records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the
patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow
access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician
memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them
would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior
consent. (Chan vs. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013)

[ AC. NO. 5921, Mar 10, 2006 ]

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM v. ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA +

The Facts

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion

("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos
("Barrientos"). The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of
Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch
30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.

On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier
judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.

Veneracion's counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition).

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 On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and
explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and
humiliating" contents of the motion. In her Explanation, Comments and Answer Velasco-Jacoba
claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records
will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case."
Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity
of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts
of justice."

On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and

penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000. Velasco-Jacoba moved for
reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on her way out of the house
for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na
ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.)
She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband
of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." This pleading turned out to be
the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then suspension
from the practice of law.

Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without
conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta,"
ordering her imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija
Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over."

Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to
explain why he should not be held in contempt. Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with
Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001
motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba's statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital
privilege rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding Jacoba guilty of
contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.

On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Report and Recommendation of the IBP

Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by
IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP Commissioner Navarro") despite sufficient
notice.

IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002,

recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months.

Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of
her husband's request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of
signing each other's pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According to
Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this happens all the time.
Through the years, [she] already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is

137
signed by the other." By Velasco-Jacoba's own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of
Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground for
subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents
of the 30 July 2001 motion. We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not
appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba's statement
pointing to him as the author of the motion.

The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion
for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife's account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted
authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he
perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."

Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba's version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons:
(1) her reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba's defense which was
raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2)
Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-
Jacoba's assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied
consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001
motion.

 
G.R. No. 179448               June 26, 2013
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents were filed against petitioner. The RTC entered a plea of not guilty for
the petitioner after he refused to enter a plea.9 The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.

During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the jurisdiction of the court,
and that accused was the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from July 1997 to
December 1997, no other stipulations were entered into.

The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared

promissory notes and cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the bank
since he has substantial deposits in his account, in connection with the purported loans obtained
by the latter from the bank. Appellant approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch

138
manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be signed the
signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to
show that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the checks to the
Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents were forged and
falsified, appellant released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and
misappropriated the same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an
internal audit was conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of
Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement in the form of questions and
answers.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses:

Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank, testified

that he conducted and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant
admitted having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the
promissory notes; that the proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received by the
appellant although it should be the client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all
the answers of the appellant were contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed,
thumbmarked, and signed by him .

Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that the signatures appearing
on the promissory notes were not the signatures of Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not
bear her signature although it is required, due to the fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client and
her manager accommodated valued clients; that she signed the corresponding checks upon
instruction of appellant; and that after signing the checks, appellant took the same which
remained in his custody.

Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that the
signatures appearing on the promissory notes and specimen signatures on the signature card of
Romeo Tan were not written by one and the same person.

Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that
several cashier’s checks were issued in favor of Romeo Tan; that appellant instructed her to
encash the same; and that it was appellant who received the proceeds of the loan.

For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a Masters
degree from the Asian Institute of Management, and was the Branch Manager of Metrobank
Commercio Branch from 1994 until he was charged in 1998 [with] the above-named offense. He
was with Metrobank for nine (9) years starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmariñas
Branch, Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw the day to day operations of the branch,
solicited accounts and processed loans, among others.

Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a client-depositor when he
was the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo Tan was granted
a credit line for forty million pesos (₱40,000,000.00) by Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to

139
open a fictitious account for his personal use and was assisted personally by appellant in his
dealings with the bank. In the middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a fictitious account and used
the name Jose Tan. Such practice for valued clients was allowed by and known to the bank to
hide their finances due to rampantkidnappings or from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or
from their spouses.

According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line (through promissory notes)
for five (5) times on the following dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million pesos
(₱16,000,000.00), 2) 27 October 1997 for six million pesos (₱6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November
1997 for three million pesos (₱3,000,000.00), 4) 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos
(₱16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December 1997 for two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00). On all these
occasions except the loan on 24 July 1997 when Tan personally went to the bank, Tan allegedly
gave his instructions regarding the loan through the telephone. Upon receiving the instructions,
appellant would order the Loans clerk to prepare the promissory note and send the same through
the bank’s messenger to Tan’s office, which was located across the street. The latter would then
return to the bank, through his own messenger, the promissory notes already signed by him.
Upon receipt of the promissory note, appellant would order the preparation of the corresponding
cashier’s check representing the proceeds of the particular loan, send the same through the
bank’s messenger to the office of Tan, and the latter would return the same through his own
messenger already endorsed together with a deposit slip under Current Account No. 258-250133-
7 of Jose Tan. Only Cashier’s Check dated 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos
(₱16,000,000.00) was not endorsed and deposited for, allegedly, it was used to pay the loan
obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant claimed that all the signatures of Tan appearing on the
promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were the genuine signatures of Tan although he never
saw the latter affix them thereon.

In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the
Commercio Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked
by Elvira Ong-Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the
following day. When appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven
(7) other people present: two (2) senior branch officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen
(one in uniform and the other in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of
the bank, Valentino Elevado.

Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper in connection with the audit
investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any explanation;
that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be brought to the
precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of
the purpose of the meeting; and that "just to get it over with" he signed the paper which turned
out to be a confession. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was
unable to find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to no avail.

RTC rendered a decision convicting the acused which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

140
 Whether or not the written statement he signed which contained his admission is
admissible in evidence.

HELD:

YES. Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of

guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitutionis applicable only in
custodial interrogation.

Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities

after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights
which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other
rights above.19 In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled
written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are
clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an
internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his
liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be
under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during
the taking of his written statement.

Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, we declared that the right to

counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the
recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule
under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.\

Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted
by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course
of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in
evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no
constitutional impediment to its admissibility.

Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is
just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress and
intimidation.

141
Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is
proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." Petitioner failed to
overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been
executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such
nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish.

he written statement f appellant is replete with details which could only be supplied by
appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence which cannot be associated with a
mind to which intimidation has been applied. Appellant’s answers to questions 14 and 24 were
even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections made therein. The response to
every question was fully informative, even beyond the required answers, which only indicates
the mind to be free from extraneous restraints.

In People v. Muit, it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
petitioner’s extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge
and information given by him."

Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges,
criminal or administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly
intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and
intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion,
where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators,
where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be
considered as having been voluntarily executed.

Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before
affixing his signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant Petition. To recall,
petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and had been a bank
manager for quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend
the significance of signing an instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due
diligence in the conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.

G.R. No. 169777*             April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his

capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro
Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA,
LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON,
PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III,
RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
142
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of
the Philippines, Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169659             April 20, 2006
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO,
Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep.
TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND
GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by
ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169660             April 20, 2006
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR.,
in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as
AFP Chief of Staff, Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169667             April 20, 2006
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169834             April 20, 2006
PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 171246             April 20, 2006
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE
AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III,
MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA,
ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter
alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

143
 On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations
to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations 2
dated September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral
Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R.
Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and
Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to
attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the
following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005
entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive
Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator
Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping
Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1,
2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria
Ana Consuelo Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security
to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the
Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by
Senator Biazon – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to
Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the
Philippines.

Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP
Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter 3 dated September 27, 2005, requested
for its postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal
attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent
operational matters."

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the
postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the
Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation."
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators
"are unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and
arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week."

144
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter 6 from the President of
the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the
NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on
the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for
the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes," 7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In

accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement
the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in
executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –

(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive

privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No.
95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public
Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public to prejudice the public interest.

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information

between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order,
including:

Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public

official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367,
23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002);

Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the

interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R.
No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).

145
 Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion
of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential

Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public

Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive
order:

Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the

department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege;

Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief

superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National

Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All

public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent
of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure
the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule
on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing
in inquiries in aid of legislation.)

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For [w]hat republican
theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the

146
divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on
the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to
divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the
power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive
Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

[G.R. No. 147649. December 17, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS, MARLITO
LOBRIGAS (At Large) and TEODORICO MANTE (acquitted), accused.
FRANK LOBRIGAS, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

The victim Felix Taylaran was a regular farmhand of Castor Guden. On February 19,
1996, he asked for permission not to work for it was raining and he had to go to the store of
Teodorico Mante. At 4:00 p.m., Felix returned to Castor Guden’s house with bruises on his face
and injuries all over his body. He told Castor that he was mauled by accused-appellant Frank
Lobrigas, accused Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante at the store. Felix spent the night in
Castor’s house and left the following morning to go to the seaside house of Lorie Aguilar, his
cousin, to heal his wounds in the saltwater. However, the next day, Felix Taylaran died.

Frank Lobrigas, Marklito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante were chargd for Murder.

Rosa Taylaran Solarte, daughter of the victim, testified that a day after the mauling, her
father came to her house and told her that he was beaten up by Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas
and Teodorico Mante. He told her that he was in pain and felt weak. He then went to the house of
Lorie Aguilar apparently to recuperate.

Dr. Tito Miranda of the Municipal Health unit of Loon, Bohol conducted an autopsy on
the body of the victim and concluded that the immediate cause of death was internal hemorrhage
caused by the severe beating and mauling on the chest portion of the victims body.

On the other hand, accused-appellant had a different version of the events. He denied the
accusation and alleged that he was asleep at the time the incident took place. He admitted that he

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was at the store of Teodorico Mante having a drinking spree with his companions, Dennis Palma,
Mario Granderos, Marlito Lobrigas and Rufo Creta, Jr. They were later joined by the victim,
Felix Taylaran. When Felix had too much to drink, he became rowdy and drew his knife. This
was snatched from him by Mario Granderos and turned over to Mante, who was a barangay
councilman. Mante admonished Felix and accused-appellant told him to go home. When Felix
left, Mante and Marlito Lobrigas followed him. Accused-appellant stayed behind and lay down
on a bench outside the store until he fell asleep. He only learned about the mauling incident later
from Mario Granderos.

Accused-appellant likewise denied that he left his house to evade arrest. He claimed that
he did not know about the charge against him. He did not leave his house for one month after the
incident upon his fathers advice, for he might be investigated by the police. He went to Cebu
City on March 10, 1996 to work at Southern Island Hospital. When he came home months later
to attend the fiesta celebration on May 15, 1996, it was then that he came to know of the case
filed against him. Then on May 18, 1996, he was arrested and detained at the Municipal Jail of
Loon. Two months and four days later, he left his cell as the door was opened by a co-prisoner
and nobody was guarding them at that time.

After trial, the Lobrigas was found guilty for Murder.

The issue to be resolved is whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the
evidence of flight are sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.

In order to warrant a conviction, direct evidence is not always required. Conviction can
be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the appellant is the
author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain
the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

The circumstances proved by the prosecution and relied upon by the trial court to convict
accused-appellant clearly satisfied the foregoing requirements. First, the victim, accused
appellant and others were together having a drinking spree on the day the mauling happened.
Second, the victim declared to Castor Guden immediately after the incident that accused-
appellant and two others mauled him can be considered as part of the res gestae. Third, the
victim told his daughter immediately after the incident, that accused-appellant was one of the
persons who mauled him. Fourth, Dr. Tito L. Miranda found that the victim died due to massive
hemorrhage in his thoracic cavity caused by severe beating of his breast. Lastly, accused-
appellant evaded arrest and subsequently escaped from detention. The foregoing circumstances
knitted together proved accused-appellants culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant insists that the statements made by the victim to Castor Guden and
Rosa Solarte cannot be considered dying declarations for they were made not under the

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consciousness of an impending death. Neither can they be deemed part of the res gestae because
the victim was drunk and mad at Teodorico Mante for taking away his knife.

We agree in part with accused-appellant. Prosecution witness Castor Guden testified on

what the victim told him after the mauling incident, thus:
FISCAL:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What time did you arrive at your house coming from your farm that afternoon?
A. 4:00 p.m. more or less.
Q. Upon arrival, what did you see?
A. I saw Felix Taylaran whose face was swollen.
Q. Seeing Felix Taylarans face swollen, what did you ask him?
A. I asked him and he told me that he was beaten by three persons.
Q. Did he mention the names of that three persons?
A. Yes, Teodorico Mante, Frank Lobrigas and Marlito Lobrigas.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL:
Q. You mentioned about Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante, as the
names given to you by Felix Taylaran, are these the same persons whom you identified a while
ago?
A. Yes.
Q. What else did you ask of Felix Taylaran?
A. I asked him what was his offense committed why he was beaten?
Q. What was his answer?
A. He said, I did not know what was the cause but I saw when I passed by the store, they
were drinking and they told me to join them and even bought biscuit and cigarettes.
Q. Did Felix Taylaran tell you how he was mauled?
xxx xxx xxx
A. By boxing and kicking.
Q. What else, if any, you can remember your topic that afternoon?
A. That was all, but I told him to stay because it was getting dark.
The above testimony of Castor Guden was corroborated by Rosa Solarte, the daughter of the
victim, who testified in this wise:
Prosecutor Ligason:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, do you remember having met your father on February 20, 1996?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Where did you meet?
A. In our house, he came to me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the purpose of your father in going to your house on February 20, 1996?
A. He reported to me about his bruises.
Q. What time was that, in the morning or in the afternoon?
A. In the afternoon.
Q. Did you see also bruises in the part of his body?
A. Yes, Sir.

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Q. Where?
A. At his face and body.
Q. Did he tell you also who cause the bruises?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What did he tell you?
A. Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante.

The trial court held that although the foregoing declarations cannot be deemed a dying
declaration since they do not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of
a sure and impending death, the same are nonetheless part of the res gestae. However, only the
declaration made to Castor Guden are admissible in evidence as such.

A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.1 All these requisites concur in the case at bar. The principal act, the
mauling of the victim, was a startling occurrence. The declarations were made shortly after the
mauling incident while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the startling
occurrence, without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating accused-appellant. The
declaration concerns the circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran. However, the
declaration made by the victim to his daughter does not satisfy the second requirement of
spontaneity because they were made a day after the incident and the exciting influence of the
startling occurrence was no longer present. Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa Solartes testimony
on what her father told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct from hearsay, and
are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as proof of the fact that they had been
uttered.

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule
does not apply, hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of
such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

Finally, accused-appellants argument that the trial courts reliance solely on the evidence
of flight cannot overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence is not well-taken. In
criminal law, flight means an act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing
oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The
unexplained flight of the accused person may, as a general rule, be taken as evidence having
tendency to establish his guilt.

In the case at bar, not only did accused-appellant evade arrest when he went to Cebu
under the pretext that he was going to work at Southern Island Hospital, but justice was further
frustrated when he escaped from detention with the flimsy excuse that no one was guarding
them. These two instances of flight by accused-appellant, taken together with the other

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circumstances established by the prosecution, support the trial courts finding of accused-
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Courts go by the biblical truism that the wicked flee
when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion.

However, a there was no clear indication in this case that the accused-appellant and his
companions purposely used their joint efforts to consummate the crime, the crime committed by
accused-appellant was only homicide.

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