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Madras High Court

12 January 1959

Muppudathi Pillai
v

Krishnaswami Pillai and Others

Case No : Second Appeal No. 1080 of 1953, Against Decree of Sub-J., Ramanathapuram,
Madurai, In A. S. No. 78 of 1952

Bench : RAMACHANDRA IYER, P. V. RAJAMANNAR, GANAPATIA PILLAI

Citation : 1959 Indlaw MAD 147, AIR 1960 MAD 1

The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA IYER

(1) This appeal involves the determination of a question as to the scope of S. 41 of the Specific
Relief Act.

(2) One Vinayagam Pillai owned the suit properties. He executed a sale of them to his second
wife, Vallayammal. She predeceased her husband. Her mother, Krishnammal, claiming to be
her heir sold the properties, which, ultimately vested in cer-tain alienees of whom the
appellant is one. Vina-yagam Pillai died leaving behind him his first wife, the respondents 1
and 2, his sons through her. Respondents 1 and 2 filed the suit, out of which this appeal
arises, for recovery of possession of the properties from the alienees on the footing that they
as the heirs of Vinayagam were entitled to the same. They impugned the binding nature of the
sale by their father to Vellayammal and also of Krishnam-mal's right to convey the suit
properties.

(3) The alienees resisted the suit by pleading that Krishnammal was the lawful heir of
Vellayammal as according to them the latter's marriage to Vinayagam was in the Asura form.
They also pleaded that if Krishnaramal's sale were held to be not binding on respondents 1 and
2, they should reimburse the alienees to the extent to which the consideration for the sale
went in discharge of the debts

Vinayagam. The appellant was the 2nd defendant to the suit. He claimed that the
consideration of Rs. 900 paid by him went in discharge of a decreet against Vinayagam and
that therefore in equity, the respondents should pay him that amount before possession of the
properties was directed to be delivered.

(4) Both the lower courts found that the respondents 1 and 2 were not bom on the date of the
conveyance by their father to his second wife, that the marriage between the said two persons
was in the Brahma form, and that the former succeeded to the properties left by latter on her
death. The appellant, the second defendant to the action, one of the alienees, has filed this
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second appeal.

(5) Krishnaswami Nayudu J. who heard the appeal, accepted the finding of the lower court that
the marriage being in the Brahma form, Vinayagam would succeed to the properties left by
Vellayammal in preference to her mother. On the alternative claim for repayment of the
consideration for the sale, the learned Judge was of the view that the rule enunciated in S. 41
of the Specific Relief Act could be applied only when the court adjudged cancellation of an
instrument in the cases provided for in Sec. 39 of the Specific Relief Act. But he held that there
was a conflict between the decisions in Ammani Ammal v. Ramaswami Naidu, 37 Mad LJ 113 :
(AIR 1919 Mad 105) and Venkama Naidu v. S. V. Chisty, 1950-2 Mad LJ 587 : (AIR 1951 Mad
399), and the appeal was thereupon directed to be posted before us.

(6) The appellant who derives title under Krishnammal acquired no title by the purchase.
Krishnammal's claim was adverse to the real owner Vinayagam and the sale by the former
could in no-sense be on behalf of the latter. It is no doubt true that the price paid by the
appellant was utilised for the payment of a decree debt of Vinayagam for which the property
sought to be conveyed was attached but that payment was made under the con-tract with
Krishnammal. The claim of the respondents is by virtue of their own title which remained
unaffected by the sale deed executed by Krishnammal. That sale was in assertion of a title
hostile to Vinayagam and could neither avail against the respondents' title nor cast a cloud on
it. The question then is whether in such a sale where the consideration went for the benefit of
the owner, the alienee could invoke the provisions of S. 41 of the Specific Relief Act as to claim
compensation from the owner of the property to the extent to which his moneys went in for his
benefit.

(7) In 37 Mad LJ 113 : (AIR 1919 Mad 105), a minor owned the property. His guardian claim-
ing the property to be his own purported to sell the same and part of the consideration for the
sale went in discharge of debts binding on the minor. On attaining age of majority the minor
sued for a declaration that the sale was not bindig on him, and sought to recover possession
and mesne profits from the alienee. The sale having been held not to con-vey a valid title to
the alienee, the latter claimed to be paid out the amount of binding debts discharged out of his
moneys. The learned Judges held that the alienees would not be entitled to be paid those
sums.

(8) 1950-2 Mad LJ 587 : (AIR 1951 Mad 399) was a case in which a minor co-sharer, a
Muham-madan, filed a suit for partition and recovery of possession of certain lands impugning
the alienation made by his mother, who could under the personal law be only a de facto
guardian. Out of the consideration for the sale certain debts binding on the minor were
discharged, and the question arose when declaring the sale to be void and not binding on the
quondom minor whether the court had jurisdiction to award compensation to the disappointed
alienee under S. 41 of the Specific Relief Act. The learned Judges answered the question in the
affirmative. Delivering the judgment of the Bench, Viswanatha Sastri J. observed at p. 590 (of
Mad LJ) : as follows :

"Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act empowers the Court to adjudge a written instrument void
and order its cancellation at the instance of a party who may be injured by the instrument, if
left outstanding. That the person seeking cancellation need not himself be a party to the
instrument is shown by illustrations (b) and (c) to Sec. 39."

The learned Judges held that although the alienation by the de facto guardian of a
Muhammadan minor was void in law, there was jurisdiction in the court to award
compensation to the alienee to the extent of the consideration utilised for the benefit of the
minor under S. 41 of the Specific Relief Act.

(9) Krishnaswami Nayudu J. in his order has pointed out that the learned Judges who decided
1950-2 Mad LJ 587 : (AIR 1951 Mad 399), did not consider the decision in 37 Mad LJ 113 :
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(AIR 1919 Mad 105), and that there was conflict between the two decisions. We are unable to
share this view. In our opinion, there is no conflict between the two decisions aforesaid,
though the observations of Viswanatha Sastri J. extracted above taken out of their context
may appear Do be a little broadly stated.

(10) In Nathu v. Balwantrao, ILR 27 Born 690 a Hindu mother sold as her own a property
belonging to her minor adopted son. The purchase money was however applied by her in
payment of debts for which the adopted son would be liable under the law and thereby be
benefited by it. The minor had a guardian of property appointed by Court. The adopted son on
attaining majority sued to set aside the alienation. On the sale being found to be invalid the
alienee claimed compensation in equity. The learned Judges rejected the claim.

(11) In order to appreciate the principle on which the aforesaid decisions are based, it is
necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act. S. 41 of the said Act is
contained in Ch. V which deals with the cancellation of the instruments. It runs :

"On adjudging the cancellation of an instrument, the court may require the party to whom
such relief is granted to make any compensation to the other which justice may require."

It is clear from the provisions of the section that the jurisdiction to award compensation would
arise when the court adjudges the cancellation of an instrument. The relief as to cancellation of
an instrument is provided for under S. 39 of the Act, It becomes, therefore, relevant to
consider as to what are the cases to which Sec. 39 would apply and whether it would
comprehend the case of an instrument executed by a person claiming under a title different
from and hostile to the person seeking cancellation. Sec. 39 states :

"Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, who has reasonable
apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, may sue
to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may. in its discretion, so adjudge it and
order it to be delivered up and cancelled.

If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act. the court shall also
send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered;
and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its
cancellation." It may be noticed that the above section applies not merely to the case of an
instrument which is voidable but also one that is void. S. 35 provides for the case of rescission
of voidable contracts. It is evident that S. 39 covers not only a case contemplated under S. 35,
but also a wider field, that is, | a case of a void document, which under the law need not be
set aside.

(12) The principle is that such document though not necessary to be set aside may, if left
outstanding, be a source of potential mischief. The jurisdiction under S. 39 is, therefore, a
protective or a preventive one. It is not confined to a case of fraud, mistake, undue influence
etc. and as it has been stated it was to prevent a document to remain as a menace and danger
to the party against whom under different circumstances it might have operated. A party
against whom a claim under a document might be made is not bound to wait till the document
is used against him. If that were so he might be in a disadvantageous position if the impugned
document is sought to be used after the evidence attending its execution has disappeared.
Section 39 embodies the principle by which he is allowed to anticipate the danger and institute
a suit to cancel the document and to deliver it up to him. The principle of the relief is the same
as in quia timet actions.

(13) Whitley Stokes in the Anglo Indian Codes, Vol. I, dealing with Ch. V of the Specific Relief
Act states at page 934, as follows :

"Chapter V declares that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable,
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who has reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause him serious injury, may
obtain an adjudication that it is void or voidable and an order that it be delivered up and
cancelled. The relief extends to a forged instrument, and also to one originally valid but which
has subsequently become forged. The chapter applies to cases not infrequent in India, where a
party gets possession of a document, on which he might not indeed be able to found a claim in
a court of justice, but which might give him such prima facie right against the other as would
expose him to vexatious demands and liti-gation."

The learned author points out that S. 89 of the Specific Relief Act was taken for the most part
from the Draft New York Civil Code, Arts. 1906 and 1908. That principle has been set out in
Story on Equity Jurisprudence, English Edn. 1920, in Art. 694 thus :

"It is obvious that the jurisdiction, exercised in cases of this sort, is founded upon the
administration of a protective or preventive justice. If, therefore, the instrument was void for
matter apparent upon the face of it, there was no call to exercise the jurisdiction, with the
possible exception of instruments forming a cloud upon the title to land. The party is relieved
upon the principle, as it is technically called quia timet; that is, for fear that such agreements,
securities, deeds, or other instruments may be vexatiously or injuriously used against him,
when the evidence to impeach them may be lost; or that they may now throw a cloud or
suspicion over his title or interest."

The provisions of S. 39 make it clear that three conditions are requisite for the exercise of the
jurisdiction to cancel an instrument: (I) the instrument is void or voidable against the plaintiff;
(2) plaintiff may reasonably apprehend serious injury by the instrument being left outstanding;
(3) in the circumstances of the case the court considers it proper to grant this relief of
preventive justice. On the third aspect of the question the English and American authorities
hold that where the document is void on its face the court would not exercise its jurisdiction
while it would if it were not so apparent. In India it is a matter entirely for the discretion of the
court.

(14) The question that has to be considered depends on the first and second conditions set out
above. As the principle is one of potential mischief, by the document remaining outstanding, it
stands to reason the executant of the document should be either the plaintiff or a person who
can in certain circumstances bind him. It is only then it could be said that the instrument is
voidable by or void against him. The second aspect of the matter emphasises that principle.
For there can be no apprehension if a mere third party, asserting a hostile title creates a
document. Thus relief under S. 39 would be granted only in respect of an instrument likely to
affect the title of the plaintiff and not of an instrument executed by a stranger to that title.

(15) Let us take an example of a trespasser purporting to convey the property in his own right
and not in the right of the owner. In such a case a mere cancellation of the document would
not remove the cloud occasioned by the assertion of a hostile title, as such a document even if
cancelled would not remove the assertion of the hostile title. In that case it would be the title
that has got to be judicially adjudicated and declared, and mere cancellation of an instrument
would not achieve the object. S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act would apply to such a case. The
remedy under S. 39 is to remove a cloud upon the title, by removing a potential danger but it
does not envisage an adjudica-tion between competing titles.

That can relate only to instruments executed or purported to be executed by a party or by any
person who can bind him in certain circumstances. It is only in such cases that it can be said
there is a cloud on his title and an apprehension that if the instrument is left outstanding it
may be a source of danger. Such cases may arise in the following circumstances : A party
executing the document, or a principal in respect of a document executed by his agent, or a
minor in respect of a document executed by his guardian de jure or de facto, a reversioner in
respect of a document executed by the holder of the anterior limited estate, a real owner in
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respect of a document executed by the benami-dar etc. This right has also been recognised in
respect of forged instruments which could be cancelled by a party on whose behalf it is
purported to be executed. In all these cases there is no question of a document by a stranger
to the title. The title is the same. But in the case of a person asserting hostile title, the source
or claim of title is different. It cannot be said to be void against the plaintiff as the term void or
voidable implies that but for the vitiating factor it would be binding on him, that is, he was a
party to the contract.

(16) There is one other reason for this conclusion. Section 39 empowers the court after
adjudicating the instrument to be void to order the instrument to be delivered up and
cancelled. If the sale deed is or purported to have been executed by a party, the instrument
on cancellation could be directed to be delivered over to the plaintiff. If on the other hand such
an instrument is executed by a trespasser or a person claiming adversely to the plaintiff it is
not possible to conceive the instrument being delivered over not to the executant but his rival,
the plaintiff.

(17) In 37 Mad LJ 113 : (AIR 1919 Mad 105), Napier J. after referring to the provisions of
Sections 39 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act observed at page 121 (of Mad LJ) : (),

"To my mind it is clear that there is no necessity to have this document cancelled. The
illustration to Sec. 39 indicates that it is only where a party cannot get his legal remedy
without first having the document set aside that he comes within the section. This is a suit by
the true owner to recover possession of the property. The title adverse to him is not one
procured from him or from any one under whom he claims or from any one who purported to
convey an interest of his. It seems to me therefore that there can be no necessity for him to
apply to have the document cancelled and further that the court would have no jurisdiction to
do so."

We accept this statement of the law. We already referred to a passage in the judgment of
Viswanatha Sastri J. in 1950-2 Mad LJ 587 : (AIR 1951 Mad 399). There the learned Judge
referred to the fact that illustrations (b) and (c) to S. 39 refer to cases where the person
seeking cancellation need not himself be a party to the instrument. But it may be noticed that
in the cases referred to in those illus-trations the title is the same. Illustration (b) refers to a
case of forged instrument. That would be a case where the instrument is purported to be
executed on behalf of the plaintiff, and if that instrument were kept outstanding it may be a
case of danger to his title. Illustration (c) is again a case where the vendor after parting with
the property grants a lease. In such a case the purchaser would be entitled to have the lease
cancelled.

Those cases are only illustrations of the proposition that the court has the power to cancel the
sale deed executed or purported to be executed by the plaintiff or persons who could
otherwise bind him. The decision in 1950-2 Mad LJ 587 : (AIR 1951 Mad 399), is a case where
the sale was executed by a de facto guardian of a Muhammadan minor. Such a conveyance
would be void in law. But nevertheless the de facto guardian purported to act on his behalf and
the deed if left outstanding could cast a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff. The case would
obviously come under S. 39.

The learned Judges in that case have exhaustively referred to the various cases on the subject
in support of their conclusion. It is unnecessary to deal with them here beyond stating that all
those cases were cases of documents executed either by the minor alleging himself to be a
major or by his guardian, de jure or de facto, but always purporting to act on his behalf. That
case would be entirely different from a case of sale by a person asserting, a title hostile to that
of the plaintiff, as in the cases referred to above, namely ILR 27 Bom 390 and 37 Mad LJ 113 :
(AIR 1919 Mad 105). It is true that S. 39 may apply to persons other than the actual party to
the instrument, for instance to the case of an agent selling without authority, or a case where
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the person commits forgery purporting to sell on behalf of the plaintiff.

It is even possible to conceive that a creditor can in certain circumstances impugn the
document created by his debtor. In all those cases as pointed out already the title which is
sought to be protected is the title of the plaintiff, and not an adjudication as against any rival
claimant. 1950-2 Mad LJ 587 : (AIR 1951 Mad 399) relates to a case where a document was
executed purporting to bind the plaintiff. 37 Mad LJ 113: (AIR 1919 Mad 105), is a case of the
latter category, that is. where a document is executed by a person claiming hostile title. That
would not be comprehended by S. 39. There is, therefore, no conflict between the decision in
37 Mad LJ 113 : (AIR 1919 Mad 105) and that in 1950-2 Mad LJ 587 : (AIR 1951 Mad 399).

(18) In our opinion, Sec. 39 will not apply to a case like the present where the sale was
executed by a person claiming title adverse to that of Vinayagam Pillai, and therefore, the
court would have no jurisdiction under S. 41 to direct payment of compensation by the plaintiff
to the appellant before obtaining relief as to possession. To hold otherwise would mean that a
mere volunteer who paid the debt of the plaintiff would be able to recover the same.

(19) As the question whether the appellant will be entitled to be paid back his moneys on any
principle like salvage lien, unjust enrichment or under the provisions of Ss. 69 and 70 of the
Contract Act has still to be considered before the appeal could be finally disposed of, the
appeal will be posted in the usual course for disposal.

(This second appeal coming on for final hearing before Ramaswami J. after the expression of
the Opinion of the Full Bench, the Court delivered the following) :

JUDGMENT (25-2-1959).

(20) This second appeal is preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned
Subordinate Judge of Ramanathapuram at Madurai in A.S. No. 78 of 1952, confirming the
decree and judgment of the learned District Munsif in O. S. No. 178 of 1950.

(21) The suit properties originally belonged to one Vinayagam Pillai. The plaintiffs are the sons
of Vinayagam Pillai by his first wife. Vinayagam Pillai married a second wife Vellayammal in
whose favour he executed a sale deed of these properties on 5-9-1930. Vellayammal died in
1935 leaving no issue. Vinayagam Pillai died in 1940 leaving the plaintiffs, his undivided sons,
and his first wife who is the 5th defendant. On 7-5-1940 Vellayammal's mother Krishnammal,
claiming to be her stridhana heir, sold these properties to one Sankarapandia Thevar and
eventually the 2nd defendant purchased them under Ex. B. 4 dated 3-3-1945 from the 1st
defendant, to whom Sankarapandia Thevar sold the properties in 1944. Regarding the sale in
favour of the 2nd defendant, a suit was filed in pauper form by Krishnaswami Pillai and his
minor son, Sundaram Pillai, to declare that the plaint A schedule properties belong to the
plaintiffs and for recovery of possession of the same with future mesne profits.

(22) The suit was based on the question as to who would be the lawful heir of Vellayammal,
whether the mother who purported to deal with the properties, or her husband and his heirs,
namely, the plaintiffs and the 5th defendant, which again depended on the form of
Vellayammal's marriage with Vinayagam Pillai. Both the courts held that it was in the Brahma
form with the result that the mother could not be a stridhana heir, but only the plaintiffs. As
Krishnammal had no title to the properties, the sales in favour of the 2nd defendant and others
were held to be void and wholly inoperative. This, however, is not the controversy which is the
subject matter before us now.

(23) The present controversy before us is as to whether notwithstanding the void nature of the
sale the 2nd defendant is not entitled to be paid the amount which was utilised for the
discharge of the decree debt of Vinayagam in O.S. No. 193 of 1936. on the file of the District
Munsif's court, Sattur. In view of the plaintiffs having derived benefit by the sale of item 9 in
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favour of the 2nd defendant, the 2nd defendant claims entitled on equitable grounds to be paid
the sum of Rs. 900 which was the consideration which he parted with.

(24) Both the courts below did not order refund in setting aside the sale. Therefore, there was
a second appeal in this court before Krishnaswami Nayudu J. In that second appeal the point
concentrated upon was S. 41 of the Specific Relief Act, Krishnaswami Nayudu J. held that
there was a conflict of decisions as to the application of S. 41 of the Specific Relief Act.
Therefore, the following question was formulated for decision by a Full Bench :

"Where the sale was for the purpose of discharging the binding debt on the minor plaintiffs and
the plaintiffs having had the benefit of the payment by the property becoming free from the
said attachment, are they liable to recoup the purchaser amount in respect of which they had
the benefit." The learned Chief Justice directed the matter to be posted before a Full Bench,
and it has been heard by a Full Bench consisting of my Lord, the Chief Justice, Ramachandra
Iyer and Ganapatia Pillai JJ.

(25), The learned Judges were of opinion that S. 39 would not apply to a case like the present
one where the sale was executed by a person claiming title adverse to that of Vinayagam Pillai,
and therefore, the court would have no jurisdiction under S. 41 to direct payment of
compensation by the plaintiff to the appellant before obtaining relief as to possession. To hold
otherwise would mean that a mere volunteer who paid the debt of the plaintiff would be able
to recover the same.

(26) The learned Judges proceeded further to point out that the question whether the
appellant would be entitled to be paid back his moneys on any principle like salvage, unjust
enrichment or under the provisions of Ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act had still to be
considered before the appeal could be finally disposed of. and the learned Chief Justice has
directed this appeal to be posted before me.

(27) I have been taken through the records by the learned advocates on both sides before me.
1 have not the slightest doubt in coming to the conclusion that this is a case of unjust
enrichment, and that the plaintiffs are bound to reimburse the second defendant in a sum of
Rs. 900. In this case all the requirements for granting relief under the doctrine of unjust
enrichment stand fully made out. The consideration which D-2 paid went to avert the sale of
the land for the decree debt of Vinayagam Pillai, It stands to reason that when the plaintiffs
wanted to take possession of the land, they must pay the debt which that land was bound to
satisfy by reason of it being the decree debt of Vinayagam Pillai. It is also seen that the
plaintiffs in the execution proceedings have taken time for payment of the amount. Therefore,
the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and play fast and loose and assume
different postures in the course of the same proceedings or even in subsequent proceedings
which directly arose from the previous suit.

(28) This doctrine of unjust enrichment has been the subject matter of three decisions of this
court namely, Paboodan Goolabchand v. M.J.V. Miller. 1938-2 Mad LJ 688 : (AIR 1938 Mad
966), Mahalingam Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, Appeal No. 665 of 1948 (Mad) and
Govindarajulu Naidu v. S. S. Naidu, 1958-2 Mad LJ 148, wherein I have dealt with the entire
case law and the settled principles in England, America and India and reproduced the following
:

"The doctrine of restitution may now be summed up in the language of the American Re-
statement of the Law of "Restitution" in Ch. 1 S. 1 at page 12 and following. A person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.
A person is enriched if he has received a benefit. A person confers a benefit upon another if he
gives to the other possession of or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in
action, performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty
of the other, or in any way adds to the other's security or advantage-saves the other from
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expenses or loss. The word "benefits" therefore denotes any form of advantage ...... Even
where a person has received a benefit from another he is liable to pay therefor only if the
circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust
for him to retain it. The mere fact that a person benefits another is not of itself sufficient to
require the other to make restitution therefor ...... Ordinarily the benefit to the one and the
loss to the other are co-extensive, and the result of the remedies given under the rules stated
in the restatement of this subject is to compel the one to surrender the benefit which he has
received and thereby to make restitution to the other for the loss which he has suffered ......
Where benefit and loss do not coincide the amount of recovery is usually limited to the amount
by which he has been benefited ...... A person who officiously

confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor."

(29) This is certainly not a case of a person who conferred a benefit upon another officiously
and is therefore not entitled to restitution therefor.

(30) In addition to these three decisions, the learned Advocate, Mr. Vaidheeswaran, brings to
my notice the decision of the Privy Council in Govinda-ram Gordhandas v. State of Gondal,
1950 -2 Mad LJ 1: (AIR 1950 PC 99), wherein it is laid down: the words "bound by law to pay"
in S. 69 of the Contract Act do not exclude those obligations of law which arise inter partes
whether by contract or tort and is not confined only to those public duties which are imposed
by statute or general law. They extend to any obligation which is an effective bond in law.

(31) It is not correct to say that a person could not be "interested in the payment of money"
within the meaning of S. 69 of the Contract Act unless he was at the same time entitled to
some legal interest in the property in respect of which such payment might be made. The
words themselves do not require that a person to be interested in a payment should at the
same time have a legal proprietary interest in respect of which the payment is made.

(32) S had become the purchaser of certain mills and was handed over possession on 9-9-
1937. On 29-11-1937, S entered into an agreement by way of sub-sale with a company under
which he agreed to sell the mills to the company at the same price as that at which he bought
them. Before that date, it was found that large amounts were outstanding in respect of
municipal taxes on the mills and in spite of correspondence between the original owners and S
and the company which purchased from him, the latter company was forced to pay that sum
to avoid legal proceedings for the enforcement of the statutory charge. In a suit by the
company and its vendor against the original owners for the recovery of the sum so paid,

Held: the payment made can in no sense be said to be voluntary one. The company had
contracted to buy the mills and they were imminently threatened with a forced sale which
would defeat its purchase. No one was disposed to pay the taxes due and so the company
paid. To describe it in such circumstances as having made a voluntary payment) would involve
some misuse of language. The company was also interested in the payment of taxes though
the actual sale deed in their favour was executed subsequently.

(33) The net result of this analysis is that the decrees and judgments of the lower Courts have
to be modified, and the plaintiffs, before recovering possession of the land, will have to
reimburse the 2nd defendant in a sum of Rs. 900. I am not providing for interests, because
the 2nd defendant had been in enjoyment of the land, and mesne profits and interest can be
equated. The decrees and judgments of the lower Courts will stand modified accordingly.

(34) This second appeal is allowed with costs.

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