ALFONSO SINGSON CORTAL v.

INAKI LARRAZABAL
G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017
Facts
Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises owned three (3) parces of land which were
placed in the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme. Larrazabal Enterprises filed an
action before the Regional Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), to recover these parcels of land alleging non-
payment of just compensation. The Regional Adjudicator ruled that there was no
payment of just compensation, and ruled in favor of Larrazabal. Petitioners
appealed to the DARAB who reversed the ruling of the Regional Adjudicator.

Larrazabal then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the DARAB’s

decision, which was granted by DARAB, who reversed its earlier decision.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA,
however, dismissed the Petition on purely technical and procedural errors, such as:
(a) an inconsistency between the listing of petitioners' names in their prior Motion
for Extension of Time and subsequent Petition for Review, in which the
accompanying verification and certification of non-forum shopping were laden
with this same inconsistency and other defects; (b) non-inclusion of the original
Complaint filed by the adverse party, now private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal
Enterprises, before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of the Department
of Agrarian Reform; and (c) petitioners' counsel's failure to indicate the place of
issue of the official receipt of his payment of annual membership dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal of petitioners’ appeal was justified by these
errors

Ruling
No. Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases
so courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules." They
provide a system for forestalling arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality
in dispute settlement. Thus, they are not to be ignored to suit the interests of a
party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance on a policy of
liberal construction. In this case, the CA should have been impelled by the greater
interest of justice. It should have enabled a better consideration of the intricate
issues of the application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, social
justice, expropriation, and just compensation. The reversals of rulings at the level
of the DARAB could have been taken as an indication that the matters at stake
were far from being so plain that they should be ignored on mere technicalities.
The better part of its discretion dictated a solicitous stance towards petitioners.
 VIVENCIO, EUGENIO, JOJI, AND MYRNA MATEO v. DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND
MARIANO T. RODRIGUEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 186339, February 15, 2017
Facts
A portion of the Mateos’ (petitioners) land was brought under the coverage
of the CARP and for this reason, the government, through the DAR, entered the
premises sometime in June 1994. LBP valued the Mateos’ land at P52,000 per
hectare, which the Mateos rejected. On April 30, 1997, the Mateos filed a
complaing against LBP, DAR, and the farmer beneficiaries of the land for just
compensation.

The RTC, sitting as the SAC, fixed the amount of just compensation to P71,
143, 623.00 and ordered LBP to pay the Mateos the said amount. LBP appealed to
the CA, arguing that the complaint of the Mateos was premature as the DARAB
had not yet made an administrative valuation of the subject property. The CA set
aside the SAC’s judgement and dismissed the case on the ground of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the ground of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies

Ruling
Yes. While the Court recognizes the primacy of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies in our judicial system, it bears emphasizing that the
principle admits of exceptions, among which is when there is unreasonable delay
or official inaction that irretrievably prejudices a complainant. This exception is
attendant herein where the LBP and the DAR entered the property of the Mateos
sometime in 1994, but deposited cash and Agrarian Reform Bonds as payment
therefor only on December 13, 1996 and February 11, 1997. The LBP and the
DAR were indisputably aware that the Mateos rejected the price offered as just
compensation for the subject property. Still, at the time the Mateos filed their suit
before the SAC, no summary administrative proceeding was yet initiated by the
DAR to make further valuation. The SAC even had to issue no less than three
orders dated November 12, 1997, January 7, 1998 and March 18, 1998 for the
DAR to conduct the necessary proceedings. DAR's delay and inaction had unjustly
prejudiced the Mateos and precluding them from filing a complaint before the SAC
shall result in an injustice, which the law never intends.
 PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE v. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, et al.
G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012
Facts
Faced with Priscilla's refusal to comply, Javellana commenced an action for
specific performance, injunction, and damages against Priscilla in the Regional
Trial Court.

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already
barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The
RTC initially denied Priscilla's motion to dismiss on February 4, 1998. However,
upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and
granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause of action against
her. Javellana moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC. Javellana
filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 1999 order to the CA. Before the CA,
Priscilla argued that the appeal was not filed on time.

The CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the RTC and remanded the
case to the RTC. Before the SC, Priscilla argues that Javellana filed his notice of
appeal out of time. She points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999
order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or
after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration
through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July 13, 2000;
that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within
which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19,
2000, his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond
the expiration of the reglementary period.

Issue
Whether or not the appeal was filed on time

Ruling
Yes. The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld,
however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the ‘fresh period rule’ in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an
adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. The ‘fresh period rule’ may
be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively extended the fresh
period rule to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and
this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
 FREDESVINDO S. ALVERO v. M. L. DELA ROSA
G.R. No. L-286, March 29, 1946
Facts
Respondent Victoriano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against herein petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero and Margarita Villarica. The
respondent judge Dela Rosa rendered his decision in favor of Victoriano. On
November 28, 1945, Alvero was notified of such decision. On December 27, 1945,
he filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial which was denied on January 3,
1946, of which Alvero was notified of on January 8, 1946. On January 8, 1946,
Alvero filed a notice of appeal without paying the P 60.00 appeal bond, which was
paid only on January 15, 1946. Respondent judge ordered the dismissal of the
appeal on the ground that although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had
been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.

Issue
Whether or not the appeal was filed on time

Ruling
No. In his motion for reconsideration and new trial, dated December 27,
1945, he did not point out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment,
which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making
express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions, as expressly
required by Rule 37, section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of that
kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely to delay the
proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt or suspend the period
of time for the perfection of the appeal. Hence, the period for perfecting herein
petitioner's appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of
the judgment rendered in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; and,
therefore, his notice of appeal and record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were
filed out of time, and much more so his appeal bond, which was only filed on
January 15, 1946.

The attorney for petitioner Alvero could have asked for an extension of time,
within which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court below; but he had failed to
do so, and he must bear the consequences of his act. A strict observance of the
rules of court, which have been considered indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial business, is an
imperative necessity.
 RODANTE GUYAMIN, et al. v. JACINTO FLORES, et al.
G.R. No. 202189, April 25, 2017
Facts
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for recovery of possession
of a parcel of land in General Trias, Cavite, which petitioners have been occupying
by tolerance. Respondents allege that in view of their plans to sell the parcel of
land, they reminded the petitioners to vacate the same, which the latter refused.
Summons were served upon the Petitioners, however they refused to sign the
receipt. Respondent filed a motion to declare petitioners in default contending that
despite service of summons they still failed to appear. The RTC granted the same,
and later ruled in favor of respondents.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding no merit in petitioners’

argument that the trial court erred in rendering its decision favorable to the
respondents without the latter filing their formal offer of evidence.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

Ruling
No. Since respondents’ exhibits were presented and marked during the ex
parte hearing of August 7, 2008, the trial court judge committed no error when he
admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case notwithstanding that no
formal offer of evidence was made. the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at
facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid
application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the
primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other
party.

By not attaching a copy of their Answer to their Petition, petitioners are

shielding themselves from a perusal of their defense; in a sense, this is quite
revealing of the merits of their claim, and in another, it is an ingenious scheme that
the SC censures. Indeed, they failed to realize that the Court is not composed of
machines that will mindlessly and mechanically solve a problem at the touch of a
button; it will not be forced into motion on petitioners' turn of a key. They must be
reminded that the Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth
guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but not to bind and chain the hand that
dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical
rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering
justice, have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the
norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and
not the other way around. As applied to the instant case, in the language of then
Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, technicalities 'should give way to the realities of
the situation'.
 DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS v. ANTONIO G. LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068, March 8, 1940
Facts
The present case stemmed from a previous decision by the Supreme Court
wherein the Court said that “The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted
by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the
absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront
witness. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with
entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due
process clause to a fair trial.” In said case, the petitioner wanted the case to be
remanded to the justice of the peace court, the court of origin, in order that
petitioner may cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection
with their testimony. The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking Sec.
11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Issue
Whether Sec. 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court impairs substantive rights
granted under Sec. 13, Art. VIII of the Constitution

Ruling
No. While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-
examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses
remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges
against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter
stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes
into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to
cross- examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a
preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this
formality is frequently waived.
 PANAY RAILWAYS, INC. v. HEVA MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, et al.
G.R. No. 154061, January 25, 2012
Facts
After realizing that the extrajudicial foreclosure included some excluded
properties in the mortgage contract, petitioner filed a Complaint for Partial
Annulment of Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum.
Respondents moved to dismiss the Complaint, which was granted by the RTC.
Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal without paying the prescribed docket fees.
Immediately thereafter, respondents moved to dismiss the appeal for non-payment
of docket fees. The RTC dismissed the appeal, citing Sec. 4, Rule 41 of the Rules.
Before the CA rendered its decision on petitioner’s petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC
which took effect on 1 May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial
courts may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss an appeal for being filed out of
time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period.

By virtue of this amendment, the CA upheld the RTC dismissal. Petitioner

argues that the circular should not be given retroactive effect.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in giving retroactive effect to the
amendment/circular

Ruling
No. Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect
of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not
violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or
arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that "a person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure."
 FELIX MARTOS, et al. v. NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS, INC.
G.R. No. 192650, October 24, 2012
Facts
One of the projects of New San Jose Builders (New San Jose) was the San
Jose Plains Project (SJPP) which is also called the “Erap City” wherein New San
Jose agreed to construct low cost housing for the deserving poor families. Due to
lack of funds from the NHA, New San Jose was forced to stop its operations n
SJPP. Consequently, it laid off many of the workers, and issued new appointments
to those retained, including herein petitioner Martos, which indicated therein that
they are project employees. Martos, et al. refused to sign such appointments and
instead filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. The LA declared only
Martos to have been illegally dismissed. Petitioners appealed the dismissal of their
complaints except to that of Martos’. The NLRC ordered that all petitioners be
reinstated to their former positions. The CA held that the NLRC erred in reviving
the complaint of petitioners despite their failure to verify the same. Petitioners
argue before the SC that in labor cases, adherence to stringent technical rules may
be relaxed in the interest of the working man.

Issue
Whether or not petitioners may invoke the liberal construction of the Rules

Ruling
No. The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where
there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided
that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least
connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. Besides, fundamental
is the precept that rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but to facilitate the
attainment of justice; hence, their rigid application may, for deserving reasons, be
subordinated by the need for an apt dispensation of substantial justice in the normal
course. They ought to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even substantial
compliance, consistent with the policy of liberality espoused by Rule 1, Section 6.
Not being inflexible, the rule on verification allows for such liberality.

The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an

assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed
in good faith. The absence of proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as
unsigned and dismissible. The lone signature of Martos would have been sufficient
had he shown that he had been properly authorized by the rest of the petitioners.
Considering that the LA’s dismissal was expressly made without prejudice,
petitioners should have corrected the flaw by immediately filing another complaint
this time, with the proper verification.
MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL v. SPOUSES MARILYN and
GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA CITY
G.R. No. 191837, September 19, 2012
Facts
Petitioner Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 before the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA resolved to require Consolacion's counsel to
submit within five (5) days from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended Verification and
Certification Against Non- Forum-Shopping. Apparently, Consolacion's counsel
failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption
Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of Consolacion's
verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to indicate any
competent evidence of Consolacion's identity apart from her community tax
certificate. For failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply with such
directive, the CA dismissed the petition.

Consolacion now comes before the SC, claiming that the CA’s summary
dismissal on technical grounds was unwarranted, and that procedural rules or
technicalities are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid
application should be avoided if this would frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.

Issue
Whether or not liberal construction may be afforded Consolacion

Ruling
No. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the
opportunity afforded to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While there was
compliance, this took place, however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of
Consolacion's petition and without reasonable cause proffered to justify its
belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but
they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling
reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules
appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted.
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. MIRANT PAGBILAO
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 159593, October 16, 2006
Facts
Respondent MPC filed an application for tax credit or refund of unutilized
VAT paid on capital goods. Without waiting for an Answer from the BIR, MPC
filed a petition for review before the CTA in order to toll the running of the two-
year prescriptive period for claiming a refund under the law. In answer to the
Petition, the BIR Commissioner advanced as special and affirmative defenses that
MPC's claim for refund is still pending investigation and consideration before the
office of the BIR Commissioner accordingly, the filing of the present petition is
premature; well-settled is the doctrine that provisions in tax refund and credit are
construed strictly against the taxpayer as they are in the nature of a tax exemption.
The CTA ruled in favor of MPC.

The CIR filed a petition for review before the CA, where the CIR identified
and discussed arguments that were totally new and were never raised before the
CTA. The CA dismissed CIR’s petition holding, among others, that the CIR cannot
validly change his theory of the case on appeal. The CIR filed the instant Petition
arguing, among others, that observance of procedural rules may be relaxed
considering that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and
promote the substantive rights of the parties.

Issue
Whether or not the case merits the relaxing of the observance of procedural
rules

Ruling
No. The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural
rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant
or when the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient
cause that would merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the courts.
There is no sufficient cause to warrant the relaxation of technical or procedural
rules in the instant case. The general rules of procedure still apply and the BIR
Commissioner cannot be allowed to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. The
BIR Commissioner has the burden of persuading this Court that the same causes or
circumstances that justified the suspension of or exception to the technical or
procedural rules in the other case are also present in the case at bar.
 SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. v. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, et al.
G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017
Facts
Petitioner Estipona is an accused in a criminal case for violation of Sec. 11,
Art. II of R.A. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002. Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to
enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates, among others, the rule-
making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and the principle of separation of powers among the three equal
branches of the government.

Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court Legazpi City, Albay,
denied Estipona’s motion. Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied, hence, this petition.

Issue
Whether or not Sec. 23 of R.A. 9165 is constitutional

Ruling
No. The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now the Supreme Court’s exclusive domain and no longer shared with the
Executive and Legislative departments. The 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. Considering the presence of
mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take
away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right
by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them.
 SM LAND, INC. and WATSONS PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS.,
INC. v. CITY OF MANILA, et al.
G.R. No. 197151, October 22, 2012
Facts
On the strength of the provisions of Tax Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011,
which amended Ordinance No. 7794, also known as the Revenue Code of Manila,
herein respondent City of Manila assessed herein petitioners, together with their
other sister companies, increased rates of business taxes for the year 2003 and the
first to third quarters of 2004. After paying their taxes under protest, petitioners
and their sister companies filed with the RTC of Pasay City a Complaint for
Refund and/or Issuance of a Tax Credit of Taxes Illegally Collected. The RTC
summarily granted the complaint in favor of petitioners.

The RTC held that Tax Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011, which were the
bases of the City of Manila in imposing the assailed additional business taxes on
petitioners and their co-plaintiffs, had already been declared null and void by the
Supreme Court in the case of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of
Manila. On this ground, the RTC ruled that respondents cannot use the assailed
Ordinances in imposing additional taxes on petitioners and their co-plaintiffs. The
respondents filed a petition for review before the CTA who sustained the RTC’s
ruling regarding the nullity of Tax Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 but nevertheless
did not grant petitioners’ claims for tax refund due to their failure to attach to the
complaint filed with the RTC their respective Secretary’s Certificates authorizing
Atty. Cruz to file the complaint on their behalf; and petitioner SM Land’s non-
inclusion in the in the list of companies represented by the person who executed
verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the complaint.

Issue
Whether or not the CTA erred in not granting petitioners’ claims based on
the aforementioned procedural infirmities

Ruling
Yes. In Vda. De Formoso v. PNB, the Supreme Court held that the rules on
certification against forum shopping may be relaxed on the ground of “substantial
compliance” or presentment of “special circumstances.” Moreover, the Court also
held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. In this case, the
unquestioned nullity of the above assailed Tax Ordinances upon which petitioners
were previously taxed, makes petitioners' claim for tax refund clearly meritorious.

Moreover, petitioners and their co-plaintiffs in the trial court filed their
claim for tax refund as a collective group, because they share a common interest
and invoke a common cause of action. Hence, the signature of the representative of
the other co-plaintiffs may be considered as substantial compliance with the rule
on verification and certification of non-forum shopping, consistent with this
Court's pronouncement that when all the petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in
the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules.
 EDUARDO PINGA v. HEIRS OF GERMAN SANTIAGO, represented by
FERNANDO SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 170354, June 30, 2006
Facts
Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one of two defendants in a
complaint for injunction filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Miguel,
Zamboanga del Sur, by respondent Heirs of German Santiago, represented by
Fernando Santiago. The Complaint alleged in essence that petitioner and co-
defendant Vicente Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the
respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut
trees therein. Respondents prayed that petitioner and Saavedra be enjoined from
committing "acts of depredation" on their properties, and ordered to pay damages.
Petitioner and his co-defendant filed their Amended Answer with Counterclaim,
praying that they be awarded damages in amounts totaling to P 2,100,000.00 plus
costs of suit.

At a hearing on July 27, 2005, the plaintiff/respondents’ counsel failed to

appear. Thus, counsel for the defendants moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of failure to prosecute, which the RTC granted. The RTC also allowed
defendants to present their evidence ex-parte. Respondents then sought for
reconsideration, and prayed that the counterclaim be dismissed as well, citing City
of Manila v. Ruymann and Domingo v. Santos where the Supreme Court held that a
counterclaim could not remain pending for independent adjudication. The RTC
granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents, and dismissed the
counterclaim as well.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the counterclaim

Ruling
Yes. The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice
and procedure necessarily carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on
points of remedial law through the amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the
notable changes introduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the explicit
proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff, such dismissal
is "without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action." The innovation was instituted in spite of previous
jurisprudence holding that the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was sufficient
to justify the dismissal as well of the compulsory counterclaim. In granting this
petition, the Court recognizes that the former jurisprudential rule can no longer
stand in light of Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA v. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, et
al.
G.R. Nos. 189689-91, November 13, 2012
Facts
Petitioners in this case share the common circumstance of having their
names in the Order of Battle List (OB List). They perceive that by the inclusion of
their names in the OB List, they become easy targets of unexplained
disappearances or extralegal killings — a real threat to their life, liberty and
security. In fine, petitioners were one in asserting that the OB List is really a
military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that there have already been three
victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the
OB List.

Thus, on June 16, 2009, petitioners separately filed before the RTC a
petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo. The RTC issued separate Writs of
Amparo in each of the three (3) cases filed by petitioners, directing respondents to
file a verified written return within seventy-two (72) hours and setting the case for
summary hearing. The RTC subsequently issued the three separate but similarly-
worded Orders finding no substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to
petitioners' life, liberty and security was attributable to the unlawful act or
omission of the respondents.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred

Ruling
No. The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-
making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings. The present petitions do not involve
actual cases of abduction or disappearance that can be the basis of an investigation.
Petitioners would insist that respondents be investigated and directed to produce
the Order of Battle that they have admitted to be in their safekeeping and justify
the inclusion of petitioners' names therein. However, without substantial evidence
of an actual threat to petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security that consists
more than just the inclusion of their names in an OB List, an order for further
investigation into, or production of, the military's Order of Battle, would have no
concrete basis.
 BP OIL AND CHEMICALS INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. v.
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS SYSTEMS, INC.
G.R. No. 214406, February 6, 2017
Facts
A Complaint for Sum of Money was filed by petitioner BP Oil against
respondent Total Distribution & Logistic Systems, Inc. (TDLSI) on April 15, 2002,
seeking to recover the sum of P36,440,351.79 representing the total value of the
moneys, stock and accounts receivables that TDLSI has allegedly refused to return
to BP Oil. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Respondent elevated the case to
the CA who reversed and set aside the RTC decision ruling, among others, that an
admission made by the respondent in one of the exhibits presented has no
evidentiary weight thus, petitioner was not able to preponderantly establish his
claim.

Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where
petitioner asserts, among others, that the CA committed serious errors of law in
ruling that without the exhibit aforementioned, BP Oil had not met the quantum of
proof necessary to prove its claim.

Issue
Whether or not the Supreme Court may entertain the present petition

Ruling
Yes. The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised
in petitions filed under Rule 45. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It will
not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are
“final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon it when supported by
substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed
nor disturbed on appeal to the Supreme Court. However, these rules admit of
exceptions. In Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., the following exceptions were laid
down: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

A close reading of the present petition shows that what the Court is being
asked to resolve is, what should prevail — the findings of facts of the RTC or the
findings of facts of the CA on the alleged misapprehension of facts of the RTC.
The findings of facts of both Courts are obviously conflicting, hence, the need for
the Court to rule on the present petition.
 SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA v. HON. JUANITA GUERRERO, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 24, et al.
G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017
Facts
The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on
the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP),
inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies. These
legislative inquiries thereafter led to the filing of three (3) Informations against
herein petitioner and several co-accused before the RTC of Muntinlupa City.

Immediately, petitioner moved to quash the Informations. On February 23,

2017, respondent judge issued the assailed Order, finding probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused. On February
27, 2017, petitioner filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court asking for
various reliefs. The OSG contended that petitioner violated the hierarchy of courts.

Issue
Whether or not the petitioner violated the hierarchy of courts

Ruling
Yes. The rule on hierarchy of courts is an important component of the
orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical and
arbitrary reasons. Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and
direct resort to this Court were allowed in some instances. These exceptions were
summarized in a case of recent vintage, Aala v. Uy, as follows: (1) when genuine
issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when
the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of
the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order
complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an
inappropriate remedy.

Unfortunately for petitioner, none of these exceptions were sufficiently

established in the present petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the
rules on the hierarchy of courts. Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked
national and international interest is obviously not covered by the exceptions to the
rules on hierarchy of courts. That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not
also merit a special treatment of her case.
 AUDI AG v. HON. JULES A. MEJIA, in his capacity as Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Alaminos City
G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007
Facts
On March 21, 2005, respondents filed with the RTC, Alaminos City a
complaint for specific performance and injunction (with application for a
temporary restraining order [TRO] and preliminary injunction) against petitioner
Audi AG, docketed as Civil Case No. A-3010. The complaint prays, among others,
that pending the determination of the merits of the case, a TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued ordering petitioner, its representative, or any
person claiming rights under it, to maintain the status quo ante, and restrain them
from doing any act contrary to the parties' existing agreements.

On March 29, 2005, after conducting a hearing wherein respondents

presented two witnesses, respondent Executive Judge issued the Order in question
directing the issuance of a TRO effective for twenty (20) days, enjoining petitioner
from terminating the contracts executed by the parties, and directing it or any
person claiming rights under it, to maintain the status quo ante. The raffle of the
case was set on April 8, 2005 at two o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioner filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court contending that
respondent Executive Judge's Order granting a TRO was "issued in a capricious,
arbitrary, and whimsical manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" because (a) the Order violates the second
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended;
and (b) it was issued even before Civil Case No. A-3010 was raffled to a ponente.

Issue
Whether or not the principle of judicial hierarchy has been violated

Ruling
Yes. Petitioner, by filing directly with the Supreme Court its petition, has
ignored the established rule on hierarchy of courts. It must be stressed that the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have original concurrent jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari. The rule on hierarchy of courts determines the venue of
appeals. Such rule is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's
precious time and attention which are better devoted to matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. Thus,
petitioner should have filed with the Court of Appeals its petition, not directly with
the Supreme Court. While such rule may be relaxed for special and important
reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition, however, in the instant case,
petitioner failed to discharge that burden.
 DESIDERIO DELOS REYES and MYRNA VILLANUEVA v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 138297, January 27, 2006
Facts
An Information was filed before the MTC against petitioners for violation of
R.A. 8048 or the Coconut Preservation Act of 1995. On June 4, 1997, petitioners
filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground that the allegations therein
failed to constitute an offense. The MTC denied the motion, and ordered the
petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits within five (5) days from notice.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the
RTC who denied the same holding that the MTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. The CA affirmed the RTC orders.

Issue
Whether or not the petitioners availed of the correct remedy

Ruling
No. It is a dictum that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied,
the remedy is not certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. In the event that
an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom is the
next legal step.
 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. v. JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-
PADILLA, et al.
G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002
Facts
Photokina emerged as the winning bidder for the installation of information
technology equipment and ancillary services to the COMELEC for its VRIS
project, in implementing R.A. 8189 or the Voters’ Registration Act. However, after
a change in the composition of the COMELEC, then Chairman Benipayo
announced that the VRIS project would be scrapped. Photokina then filed with the
RTC a petition for mandamus, prohibition, and damages against the COMELEC
stating three causes of action: first, the deliberate refusal of the COMELEC and its
Commissioners to formalize the contract rendered nugatory the perfected contract
between them; second, in announcing that the VRIS Project has been junked and
that he has plans to re-engineer the COMELEC’s entire modernization program,
Chairman Benipayo committed grave abuse of discretion; and third, the
COMELEC’s failure to perform its duty under the contract has caused
PHOTOKINA to incur damages since it has spent substantial time and resources in
the preparation of the bid and the draft contract.

Respondent judge Quijano-Padilla granted the first assailed Resolution

granting PHOTOKINA’s application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction. Subsequently, respondent judge issued the second assailed resolution
which denied COMELEC’s omnibus motion for reconsideration and granting
Photokina’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The COMELEC,
through the OSG, directly filed the instant petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether or not the hierarchy of courts had been violated

Ruling
No. Anent the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it
to say that it is not an iron- clad dictum. On several instances where this Court was
confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never
hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the
case. The case at bar is of similar import. It is in the interest of the State that
questions relating to government contracts be settled without delay. This is more so
when the contract, as in this case, involves the disbursement of public funds and
the modernization of our country’s election process, a project that has long been
overdue.
 UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA (UNICAN), et al. v.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, et al.
G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012
Facts
This is an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the
implementation of Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and September
3, 2003, respectively, otherwise known as the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by respondent NEA Board of
Administrators (NEA Board). Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were
terminated from their employment with the implementation of the assailed
resolutions. Respondents in their Comment argue that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition. Respondents essentially argue that petitioners
violated the principle of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition
should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with this
Court directly.

Issue
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the present petition

Ruling
Yes. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as
an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set
aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case
involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700
employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift
stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.
 EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO v. EMERSON S. CARLOS
G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013
Facts
Petitioner was appointed as Assistant General Manager of Operations
(AGMO) of the MMDA by then-president GMA. However, Executive Secretary
Paquito Ochoa subsequently issued Memorandum No. 2, series of 2010, which
states that all non-CESO occupying CES positions shall resign from their posts.
Thus, then-MMDA Chairman Tolentino appointed respondent to the post of
AGMO.

Petitioner thus filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of quo
warranto seeking to oust respondent from the position of AGMO of MMDA.

Issue
Whether or not the hierarchy of courts had been violated

Ruling
Yes. Although Section 5 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the
Court of Appeals and regional trial courts and does not give petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly
observed. Settled is the rule that “the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.” A disregard of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.
 UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA (UNICAN), et al. v.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, et al.
G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012
Facts
This is an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the
implementation of Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and September
3, 2003, respectively, otherwise known as the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by respondent NEA Board of
Administrators (NEA Board). Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were
terminated from their employment with the implementation of the assailed
resolutions. Respondents in their Comment argue that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition. Respondents essentially argue that petitioners
violated the principle of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition
should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with this
Court directly.

Issue
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the present petition

Ruling
Yes. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as
an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set
aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case
involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700
employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift
stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.
 PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL
AUTHORITY v. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT CO., INC.
G.R. No. 127371, April 25, 2002
Facts
Pursuant to a Cabinet Memorandum, respondent Cagayan Electric Power
and Light, Co. (CEPALCO), grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute electric
power to certain municipalities of Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition docketed as ERB Case No. 89-430, seeking the
discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO's franchise area. After due notice and
hearing, the ERB granted the petition. NAPOCOR filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the ERB denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that
the motion for reconsideration filed by NAPOCOR with the ERB was out of time
and, therefore, the assailed decision became final and executory. The Supreme
Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

To implement the decision in ERB Case No. 89-430, CEPALCO advised

Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC) of its desire to have the power supply of PSC,
directly taken from NAPOCOR, disconnected, cut and transferred to CEPALCO.
PSC is an entity operating its business within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate. The
Estate is managed and operated by the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA). To
restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for
injunction against CEPALCO which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, the petition.

Issue
Whether or not injunction lies against the final and executory judgement of
the ERB

Ruling
No. An injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except
only after a showing that facts and circumstances exist which would render
execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in the situation of the parties
occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated. To
disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to
brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments.
VICENTE E. OMICTIN v. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division)
and GEORGE I. LAGOS
G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint for two counts of estafa with the OCP Makati
against private respondent, alleging that the latter refused to return the two
company vehicles entrusted to him upon demand by petitioner when he was still
the president of Saag Phils., Inc. An Information was then filed against private
respondent before the RTC. Private respondent filed a motion to suspend
proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending petition
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) involving the same parties. It
appears that private respondent sought before the SEC the declaration of nullity of
the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan and petitioner as President Ad Interim
and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., declaration of dividends,
recovery of share in the profits, involuntary dissolution and the appointment of a
receiver, recovery of damages and an application for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and injunction against Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo, Tan
and petitioner.

The trial court denied the private respondent’s motion. Private respondent
then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the said orders. The CA
suspended the proceedings and held that there exists a prejudicial question in this
case as “if the SEC should rule that the dissolution of Saag Phils. is proper, or that
the appointments of private respondents are invalid, the criminal case will
eventually be dismissed due to the absence of one of the essential elements of the
crime of estafa.”

Issue
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling
No. By analogy, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied in this
case. The issues raised by petitioner particularly the status of Saag Phils., Inc. vis-
à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the question regarding the supposed authority of
the latter to make a demand on behalf of the company, are proper subjects for the
determination of the tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case which in this case is
the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These issues would have been referred to
the expertise of the SEC in accordance with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
had the case not been transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong. Hence, the RTC of
Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is pending has the primary
jurisdiction to determine the issues under contention relating to the status of the
domestic corporation, Saag Phils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the authority
of petitioner to act on behalf of the domestic corporation, the determination of
which will have a direct bearing on the criminal case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, et al. v. CARLITO LACAP
G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007
Facts
Respondent entered into a contract with petitioner. Accordingly, respondent
undertook all the works, made advances for the purchase of the materials, and
payment for labor costs. On October 29, 2002, personnel of the Office of the
District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the
project and found it 100% completed in accordance with the approved plans and
specifications. Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed
project. However, the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District
Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds
on the ground that the contractor's license of respondent had expired at the time of
the execution of the contract.

This led respondent to file a complaint for specific performance and

damages against petitioner before the RTC. Petitioner, through the OSG, filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of
the action since respondent failed to appeal to the COA the decision of the District
Auditor to disapprove the claim. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, and
subsequently held that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price. The
CA sustained the RTC decision.

Issue
Whether or not respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies

Ruling
No. Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy
and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. Among the exceptions to the
rule are: (a) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; and (b) where the question involved is
purely legal and will have to be decided by the courts of justice.

In this case, notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal

Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to a contractor with an
expired contractor's license is proper, respondent remained unpaid for the
completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable delay
and official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent. Furthermore, whether a
contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of its contract is
entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law.
 ABAD, et al. v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH LII –
HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. L-65505, October 12, 1987
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent PHILMAGEN before the
Court of First Instance for enforcement of contract and recovery of loss of money
basically praying for, among other things, payment of the money value of the
respective accumulated sick leave with pay of the separated employees of
respondent company either thru retirement, retrenchment or resignation. Instead of
filing an Answer, PHILMAGEN moved to dismiss the complaint which was
granted by the trial court. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court who
reinstated the dismissed complaint.

On January, 1983, judicial reorganization took place by the passage of

Executive Order No. 864 and the case at bar was re-raffled to respondent Regional
Trial Court of Manila, which was presided over by Judge David G. Nitafan.
Respondent court motu proprio dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 82-1324
declaring that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, being money claims
arising from employer-employee relations. Motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was denied by respondent judge.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal was proper

Ruling
Yes. The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is finally resolved or
adjudicated does not apply when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character.
Thus in the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Courts of First
Instance/Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over aforesaid monetary
claims of labor. One of the important features in the Judiciary Reorganization
effected through B.P. Blg. 129 is the addition of paragraph (6), Sec. 19, in defining
the jurisdiction of RTCs, reading as follows: “In all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.” Art. 217 of the Labor Code provides that monetary claims of
labor are within the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the LAs. Hence, the RTC which
took the place of the abolished CFI no longer has jurisdiction over the case even if
the CFI had previously acquired jurisdiction.
OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION v. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS,
INC.
G.R. No. 183035, January 9, 2013
Facts
Optima is engaged in the business of leasing and renting out commercial
spaces. It rented out a commercial space to Hertz. The terms of the contract state
that the same could be renewed only by a new negotiation between the parties and
upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor at least 90 days before the
termination of the contract period. Because Hertz failed to comply with the said
conditions, Optima was constrained to file a complaint for unlawful detainer and
damages against the former. Summons for Hertz in said case was served to Henry
Bobiles, upon instruction of Hertz’ manager. In Hertz’ Motion for Leave to File
Answer with Counterclaim and Admit Answer with Counterclaim, Hertz stated that
in spite of the defective service of summons, it still opted to file the said Answer
with Counterclaim. The MeTC ruled for Optima, which the RTC affirmed. The
CA, however, reversed such rulings and held that due to the improper service of
summons, the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over Hertz.

Issue
Whether or not jurisdiction had been acquired over Hertz

Ruling
Yes. Generally, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject only to the
concept of conditional appearance, which must comply with the following
standards in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Sps. Dy:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary

appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court.

The Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the defense of
improper service of summons. The defenses that it pleaded were limited to litis
pendentia, pari delicto, performance of its obligations and lack of cause of action.
Finally, it even asserted its own counterclaim against Optima. Moreover, the
Answer with Counterclaim failed to satisfy the standards set forth in Phil.
Commercial International Bank which would have operated to constitute Hertz’
Answer with Counterclaim as its conditional appearance.
 ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL and FATIMA A. AFDAL v. ROMEO CARLOS
G.R. No. 173379, December 1, 2010
Facts
Carlos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners claiming
that they were merely occupying, by means of tolerance, a parcel of land in Carlos’
name. Per the records, there were 3 attempts to serve the summons and complaint
to the petitioners – 14 January, and 3 and 18 February. The MTC ruled in favor of
Carlos. Petitioners, after realizing that an earlier petition for relief they filed with
the MTC is a prohibited pleading, filed a petition for relief from the MTC
judgement before the RTC, which the latter dismissed, alleging that they were not
properly served with summons.

Issue
Whether jurisdiction over Carlos had been acquired

Ruling
No. The SC held that an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a
real action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal
obligation on the defendant for the latter to vacate the property subject of the
action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages
by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.
Record shows that there were three attempts to serve the summons to the
defendants. The first was on January 14, 2004 where the same was unserved. The
second was on February 3, 2004 where the same was served to one Gary Akob and
the last was on February 18, 2004 where the return was duly served but refused to
sign. The SC held that the sheriff failed to comply with the requisites set forth by it
in the case of Manotoc in that the process server failed to specify Gary Acob’s
age, his relationship to petitioners and to ascertain whether he comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to deliver it to petitioners
or at least notify them of said receipt of summons.
 JOSEPH O. REGALADO v. EMMA DELA RAMA vda. DELA PEÑA, et al.
G.R. No. 202448, December 13, 2017
Facts
Respondents are the owners of two parcels of land in Negros Occidental.
Purportedly, in 1994, without the knowledge of respondents, petitioner entered,
took possession of, and planted sugar cane on the subject properties without paying
rent. Thus, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
with injunction against petitioner before the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.

The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It held that it had jurisdiction over
the case because the area of the subject properties was 44 hectares, more or less,
and “it is safe to presume that the value of the same is more than P20,000.00.” The
CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling
No. Jurisdiction is determined not only by the type of action filed but also by
the assessed value of the property. It follows that in accion publiciana and
reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of the real property is a jurisdictional element
to determine the court that can take cognizance of the action. In this case, the
Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that the same is an accion publiciana, and
that there was no clear showing that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. When
respondents filed the Complaint, RA 7691 was already in force as it was approved
on March 25, 1994 and took effect on April 15, 1994. As such, it is necessary that
the assessed value of the subject properties, or its adjacent lots (if the properties are
not declared for taxation purposes) be alleged to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over the case.

As argued by petitioner, the Complaint failed to specify the assessed value

of the subject properties. Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly acquired
jurisdiction, or the MTC has jurisdiction, over respondents' action.

Also worth noting is the fact that the RTC took cognizance of the Complaint
only on the presumption that the assessed value of the properties exceeds
P20,000.00. Aside from affirming such presumption, the CA, in turn, declared that
the RTC had jurisdiction because the parties stipulated on it. However, jurisdiction
cannot be presumed. It cannot be conferred by the agreement of the parties, or on
the erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction over a case.
 UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL
AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER, et al.
G.R. No. 200369, March 1, 2017
Facts
Petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) is the duly registered
owner of land located at Barangay Bunggo, Calamba, Laguna covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-137846 and T-156610 of the Registry of Deeds
of Laguna with areas of 1,083,250 and 260,132 square meters, respectively.

Union Bank filed a petition for cancellation of CLOAs against the Regional
Agrarian Reform Officer (RARO), PARO, MARO, and 28 agrarian reform
beneficiaries of the land covered by TCT No. T-156610 with the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Laguna. The petition was
dismissed without prejudice for being premature in view of Union Bank’s pending
request for withdrawal of its VOS and exemption from CARP coverage. Union
Bank appealed to the DARAB who denied the appeal for lack of merit. Union
Bank then filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA. The CA denied
the petition in view of its findings that the properties were not exempt from CARP.

Union Bank filed a similar petition for cancellation of CLOAs against 141
beneficiaries before the PARAD of Laguna. The petition thereafter found its way
before the CA, who, this time, notably ruled that for the DARAB to have
jurisdiction in cases involving cancellation of the CLOAs, there must be an
agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants who are recipients of the CLOAs.

Issue
Whether or not the petitions filed by Union Bank is within the jurisdiction of
the DARAB

Ruling
No. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
the complaint. For the PARAD and DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case,
there must be a prima facie showing that there is a tenurial arrangement or tenancy
relationship between the parties. The records clearly show that the two petitions
filed by Union Bank with the PARAD did not involve agrarian disputes.
Specifically, Union Bank's petitions failed to sufficiently allege — or even hint at
— any tenurial or agrarian relations that affect the subject parcels of land. In both
petitions, Union Bank merely alleged that respondents were beneficiaries of the
CLOAs.
 JONATHAN Y. DEE v. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, et al.
G.R. No. 224834, March 15, 2017
Facts
Harvest All, et al. are minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods
International, Inc. (Alliance). In a Special Board of Directors Meeting, the Board
of Directors passed a Board Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015
Annual Stockholders’ Meeting (ASM) pending complete subscription to its Stock
Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of P1 Billion which
was earlier approved in a Board Resolution passed on February 17, 2015. Per
Alliance, such postponement was to give way to the Board’s better representation
in the annual meeting, taking into account their subscription to the SRO of
Alliance.

This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file the instant complaint where it
principally claimed that the subscription to the new shares through the SRO cannot
be made a condition precedent to the exercise by the current stockholders of their
right to vote in the 2015 ASM. For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of
lack of jurisdiction in view of Harvest All, et al.’s failure to pay the correct docket
fees as the Alliance Board claims that the docket fees must be based on the SRO
which was valued at P1 Billion, thus, Harvest All, et al. must have paid a total of
P20 Million in docket fees.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction for failure of Harvest
All, et al.’s failure to pay the correct docket fees. Citing Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, and the Court's pronouncement in Lu
v. Lu Ym, Sr. (Lu), the RTC found that the basis for the computation of filing fees
should have been the P1 Billion value of the SRO, it being the property in
litigation. The CA agreed with the RTC that the filing fees should have been P20
Million based on the P1 Billion SRO.

Issue
Whether or not Harvest All, et al. paid insufficient filing fees for their
complaint, as the same should have been based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO

Ruling
No. The passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves
a property in litigation" and that "there can be no case of intra-corporate
controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" are clearly
non- determinative of the antecedents involved in that case and, hence, cannot be
controlling jurisprudence to bind our courts when it adjudicates similar cases upon
the principle of stare decisis. This is because depending on the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought, an intra-corporate controversy may involve a
subject matter which is either capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation.

This case is a precise illustration as to how an intra-corporate controversy

may be classified as an action whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. A cursory perusal of Harvest All, et al.'s Complaint and Amended
Complaint reveals that its main purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on
the date set in the corporation’s by-laws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO has
yet to fully materialize, so that their voting interest with the corporation would
somehow be preserved. Thus, Harvest All, et al. sought for the nullity of the
Alliance Board Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which indefinitely postponed
the corporation's 2015 ASM pending completion of subscription to the SRO.
 FE V. RAPSING, et al. v. HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, of RTC-
Branch 47, Masbate City, et al.
G.R. No. 171855, October 15, 2012
Facts
Respondents were charged with multiple murder in an Information which
was field before the RTC Branch presided by herein respondent judge. On July 28,
2005, a warrant for the arrest of respondents was issued by the RTC of Masbate
City, Branch 47, but before respondents could be arrested, the Judge Advocate
General's Office (JAGO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) filed an
Omnibus Motion dated July 20, 2005, with the trial court seeking the cases against
respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. The trial court
granted the Omnibus Motion and the entire records of the case were transferred.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case

Ruling
Yes. It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all
or some of the claims asserted therein. In the case at bar, the Information states that
respondents, “conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, taking
advantage of their superior strength, as elements of the Philippine Army, armed
with their government-issued firearms with intent to kill, by means of treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot the victims, hitting them on different parts of their bodies,
thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths."
Murder is a crime punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
as amended, and is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence, irrespective of
whether the killing was actually justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime
charged against the respondents has been vested upon the RTC by law.
 JOSE MENDOZA v. NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO GERMINO
G.R. No. 165676, November 22, 2010
Facts
Petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza (plaintiffs) filed a complaint for forcible
entry against respondent Narciso Germino before the MTC of Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija. Respondent Narciso filed his Answer, claiming, among others, that his
brother, respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiffs' agricultural lessee and he
merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm
household. Upon motion by the plaintiffs to remand the case to the DARAB, in
view of the tenancy issue raised by Narciso, the MTC remanded the same to
DARAB, Cabanatuan City for further proceedings.

Issue
Whether or not it is the DARAB had jurisdiction over the case

Ruling
No. Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or
special defense in his answer, this did not automatically divest the MTC of
jurisdiction over the complaint. It continued to have the authority to hear the case
precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit
on its merits. After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up
by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.
 REMEDIOS ANTONINO v. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI
CITY and TAN TIAN SU
G.R. No. 185663, June 20, 2012
Facts
Antonino was leasing a residential property in Makati City which was
owned by private respondent Tan Tian Su. Under the lease contract, Antonino was
accorded the right of first refusal. On July 7, 2004, the parties executed an
Undertaking Agreement whereby Su agreed to sell to Antonino the subject
property for P39,500,000.00. However, in view of a disagreement as to who
between them would shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did not
proceed as intended. On July 9, 2004, Antonino filed an amended complaint to
enforce the Undertaking Agreement and compel Su to sell her the subject property.

The RTC dismissed Antonino’s complaint on the grounds of improper venue

and non-payment of the appropriate docket fees. According to the RTC, Antonino's
complaint is one for specific performance, damages and sum of money, which are
personal actions that should have been filed in the court of the place where any of
the parties resides. Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and Manila, respectively,
thus Makati City is not the proper venue.

Antonino filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgement alleging

that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ruled that her action for the enforcement of the Undertaking
Agreement was personal. The CA dismissed Antonino’s petition.

Issue
Whether or not Antonino’s use of the remedy of annulment of judgement
was proper

Ruling
No. A petition for annulment of judgment can only be based on “extrinsic
fraud” and “lack of jurisdiction" and cannot prosper on the basis of "grave abuse of
discretion". By anchoring her petition on the alleged grave abuse of discretion that
attended the dismissal of her complaint and the denial of her two (2) motions for
reconsideration, Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the concept of "lack of
jurisdiction". As the Supreme Court previously clarified in Republic of the
Philippines v. "G" Holdings, Inc., "lack of jurisdiction" as a ground for the
annulment of judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. It does not contemplate
"grave abuse of discretion" considering that "jurisdiction" is different from the
exercise thereof.
 LOLOY UNDURAN, et al. v. RAMON ABERASTURI, et al.
G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017
Facts
Petitioners except for Brazil and Macapayag are members of Talaandig tribe
who claimed to have been living since birth on the land in Bukidnon, which they
inherited from their forefathers. Respondents claimed to be the lawful owners and
possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land which appears to be located
within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe. Respondents filed an original
complaint for accion reivindicatoria against petitioners with the RTC. The
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the case. Respondents filed a Motion to Amend the complaint to one for injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case and to issue a writ of injunction therein.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint

Ruling
Yes.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined
by the allegations in the complaint. Here, the allegations in respondents' original
complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an
interest in a real property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the
allegations in their amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil
action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or
among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. While most of the petitioners belong
to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, the RTC
has jurisdiction.
 DELFIN LAMSIS, et al. v. MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E
G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010
Facts
Margarita claims ownership over the lot (Lot No. 1) subject of this case,
which she traced back to her grandfather Ap-ap. She alleged that since 1983, after
inheriting the property from Gilbert Semon, Margarita had been paying the realty
tax over the property in question, occupied and improved the same together with
her husband, while, at the same time, tolerating her first cousins’ (petitioners)
possession of a portion of the said lot. This state of affairs changed when
petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on the
subject property and selling portions thereof. Delfin allegedly sold a 400-square
meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard Mondiguing (Maynard) while
Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose).

With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of

ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of
Lot No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The complaint
prayed for the annulment of the sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to
vacate the portions of the property which exceed the areas allowed to them by
Margarita. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent which was affirmed by the CA.

Before the Supreme Court, however, petitioners raise the issue of lack of
jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the
NCIP.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the case in view of
the effectivity of R.A. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997
at the time the complaint was instituted

Ruling
Yes. As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at
any time of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the
parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law,
which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint. An exception to this rule
has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the
Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the court's
lack of jurisdiction.

In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the
presence of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches
for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for
petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue for the first time in their petition
before the Supreme Court. At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998,
the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a
ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
value of the property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They
obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration.
 CORAZON JALBUENA DE LEON v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION) and ULDARICO INAYAN
G.R. No. 96107, June 19, 1995
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City for "Termination of Civil Law Lease; Recovery of
Possession; Recovery of Unpaid Rentals and Damages." Private respondent, in his
Answer, claimed that the land had been tenanted by his father since 1938 and that
he has already been issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) for the subject
property. On April 11, 1984, the lower court issued an order adopting the
procedure in agrarian cases. Thereafter, it ruled in favor of petitioner.

On appeal to the CA, respondents raised the sole issue of jurisdiction and
alleged that the trial court, acting as a Court of Agrarian Relations, had no
jurisdiction over the action. The CA affirmed the trial court decision and held that
while jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law, private respondent's attack on the
jurisdiction of the lower court must fail for he is guilty of estoppel.

Issue
Whether or not estoppel applies in this case

Ruling
Yes. The trial court’s recourse to agrarian procedure was undoubtedly
provoked by private respondent Inayan's insistence on the existence of a tenancy
relationship with petitioner. Private respondent cannot now use these same
misrepresentations to assert the court's lack of jurisdiction. He cannot invoke the
court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief against petitioner and, after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

Estoppel is generally not appreciated where a mistaken belief in the court's

jurisdiction is maintained. But private respondent's case is different for it does not
involve an honest mistake. He is directly responsible for the trial court's use of the
special rules of agrarian procedure. His insistence brought about the want of
jurisdiction he conveniently asserted before the appellate court, and only after an
adverse decision was levelled against him. Private respondent cannot be allowed to
seek refuge under the protective mantle of the law after he has abused and made a
mockery of it. He is, therefore, considered estopped from asserting the court's want
of jurisdiction to try the case.
 SERAFIN TIJAM, et al. v. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY, et al.
G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968
Facts
This case stemmed from a decision by the Court rendering judgement in
favor of the plaintiffs for the respondents to pay the sum of P1,908.00 with legal
interest. Since the writ of execution remained unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety’s bond, against which the Surety
filed a written opposition. The Court denied the motion solely on the ground that
no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the
judgement. Thereafter, the necessary demand was made and upon failure of the
Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution
against the counter-bond. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the
motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.

Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the
same was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17
of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety
appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one
denying its motion for reconsideration. Although the appellees failed to file their
brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming the
orders appealed from.

The Surety filed a MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that

appellees' action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948
for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date
Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already
become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter
or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and
costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide
the case.

Issue
Whether or not the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction

Ruling
No. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question by laches,
which is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.
Here, the Surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court,
but it only did so after receiving the appellate court's adverse decision. Hence, it is
barred by laches. The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became
a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of
jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason
of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the CA,
it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted
its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
If such conduct is to be sanctioned, the SC would in effect be declaring as useless
all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more.
 ATTY. RESTITUTO CUDIAMAT, et al. v. BATANGAS SAVINGS AND
LOAN BANK, INC. et al.
G.R. No. 182403, March 9, 2010
Facts
Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were the registered co-
owners of the disputed property located in Balayan, Batangas. Perfecto mortgaged
the said property to Batangas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (the bank) as security
for a loan he obtained therefrom but this was made without the knowledge and
consent of Atty. & Mrs. Restituto Cudiamat. Eventually, the same was foreclosed.
A complaint for quietingof title with damages was consequently filed by Restituto,
et al with the RTC of Balayan. In its Answer, the bank alleged that the Balayan
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the bank had been placed under
receivership and under liquidation by the PDIC to which a petition for assistance in
the liquidation has been filed with the RTC of Nasugbu. Thus, it is the latter court
which jurisdiction to adjudicate disputed claims against it. The Balayan RTC
rendered a judgment in favor of Restituto et al. Upon appeal, the CA ruled in favor
of the bank. Hence, this petition.

Issue
Whether the Balayan RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting
of title

Ruling
Yes. While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter
can be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by laches, the present case is
an exception. To compel petitioners to re-file and relitigate their claims before the
Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already been given the opportunity to present
their respective evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC which had,
in fact, decided petitioners' complaint (about two years before the appellate court
rendered the assailed decision) would be an exercise in futility and would unjustly
burden petitioners.
 FIRST CORPORATION v. FORMER SIXTH DIVISION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007
Facts
The corporate officers of petitioner corporation convinced private
respondent Sacris to invest in their business as the petitioner corporation needed a
fresh equity infusion, particularly in its Rema Tip Top Division, to make viable its
continuous operation. The petitioner corporation made a promise of turning such
equity into shareholding in the petitioner corporation. While the conversion of such
investment into shareholding was still pending, private respondent Sacris and the
petitioner corporation agreed to consider the same as a loan which shall earn an
interest of one percent per month. Petitioner corporation failed to convert private
respondent Sacris' investment/loan into equity or shareholding in the petitioner
corporation. Private respondent Abillar, by virtue of the Deed of Assignment, filed
a Complaint for Sum of Money with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment
and Damages before the RTC of Pasig City against the petitioner corporation.

The RTC ruled in favor of private respondents. The CA affirmed the same.
Petitioner now comes before the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of RTC Quezon City, and presenting the following issues for
consideration: (a) private respondent’s claims of a purported loan were not
supported by preponderance of evidence; (b) petitioner did not benefit from the
loan from private respondent Sacris; and (c) private respondent Abillar was not
authorized by petitioner to borrow money from private respondent Sacris.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner availed of the correct mode of appeal

Ruling
No. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is
one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. Since the issues raised by the petitioner corporation in its Petition for
Certiorari are mainly factual, as it would necessitate an examination and re-
evaluation of the evidence on which the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate
court based their Decisions, the Petition should not be given due course.
 TGN REALTY CORPORATION v. VILLA TERESA HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 164795, April 19, 2017
Facts
Petitioner TGN Realty (TGN) is the owner and developer of Villa Teresa
Subdivision. Respondent Villa Teresa Homeowners Association, Inc. (VTHAI)
was the association of residents and homeowners of the subdivision. In a letter to
TGN, VTHAI laid down the following complaints and demands: (1) immediate
opening of Aureo St. and the closed section of Flora Avenue; (2) Completion of all
fencing at the perimeter of Villa Teresa; (3) Closure of all openings at the
perimeter fence (Pritil gate); (4) Construction of adequate drainage at Ma. Cristina
and along Flora Avenue; (5) Construction of a Guard House and gate at the 2nd
Gate and reimburse the VTHA, Inc. for the costs (sic) construction of a Guard
House at 3rd gate; (6) Completion of all sidewalks; (7) Development of the open
space; (8) Use of residential lots not for residential purposes (HAU) in clear
violation of restrictions in the title; (9) Plan of HAU to construct an overpass
across Flora Ave.; (10) Severe pruning of all Talisay trees.

Due to TGN’s failure and refusal to heed the aforementioned demands,

VTHAI filed with the HLURB a complaint for specific performance and violation
of P.D. 957 and P.D. 1216. The HLURB Arbiter ruled in favor of VTHAI, which
was affirmed by the OP, and the CA. Before the SC, TGN raises the following
issues in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45: that VTHAI did not cite
any basis for its demands; that VTHAI did not present any evidence to show that
the approved subdivision plan required its demands; that VTHAI did not establish
that the petitioner had violated Section 22 of P.D. No. 957; that VTHAI did not
present evidence proving that the petitioner was the party responsible for the acts
being attributed to it, like the closure of Aureo Street and a section of Flora
Avenue, the use of residential lots for other purposes, the proposed construction of
an overpass, and the pruning of Talisay trees along the perimeter of the Holy Angel
University; and that the petitioner had not complied with its obligations to
complete the development of the project.

Issue
Whether or not the SC may entertain the present petition

Ruling
No. The issues raised by TGN are essentially factual in nature. Ordinarily,
the appeal by petition for review on certiorari should not involve the consideration
and resolution of factual issues. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court limits the
appeal to questions of law because the Court, not being a trier of facts, should not
be expected to re-evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in the fora
below.
 CHESTER DE JOYA v. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZin his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 40, Manila-RTC, et al.
G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006
Facts
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify
and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts
that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.

Issue
Whether or not the Court may entertain the present petition

Ruling
No. Petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from the Court nor from the trial
court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is acquired by the voluntary
appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by
coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons.
There is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from
the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued
refusal to submit to the court's jurisdiction gave the Court more reason to uphold
the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place
the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against
him. His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of
this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the court's
jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.
 FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
G.R. No. 189434, March 12, 2014
Facts
On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009
Decision of the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an
entity created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines. Petitioner seeks a reconsideration arguing that the Sandiganbayan
does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the Arelma proceeds, which
are held by Merrill Lynch in the United States. In essence, he objects to the graft
court's purported lack of territorial jurisdiction on the theory that forfeiture is an
action in rem. He argues that the Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial
jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds before the judgment may be enforced.

Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the Arelma
proceeds

Ruling
Yes. To rule otherwise contravenes the intent of the forfeiture law, and
indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the
reach of the courts and their recovery by the State. Forfeiture proceedings are
actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such
that Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all
times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of
said court.
 ESPERANZA SUPAPO and the HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO v. SPOUSES
ROBERTO and SUSAN DE JESUS, et al.
G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
Facts
The spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto
and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons
claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City. After filing their Answer, respondents
moved to set their affirmative defenses for hearing. The MeTC denied such motion
on the ground that the arguments raised by respondents are evidentiary in nature.
From the MeTC’s ruling, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC.

The RTC granted the petition for certiorari holding, among others, that
accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. In their
motion for reconsideration, the Spouses Supapo emphasized that the court's
jurisdiction over an action involving title to or possession of land is determined by
its assessed value; that the RTC does not have an exclusive jurisdiction on all
complaints for accion publiciana; and that the assessed value of the subject lot falls
within MeTC's jurisdiction. The RTC denied the same. The CA dismissed Sps.
Supapo’s appeal and affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue
Whether or not jurisdiction over the case properly belongs to the RTC

Ruling
No. R.A. No. 7691 divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and
granted the first level courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions
where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20, 000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in
Metro Manila. In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving
title to or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value.

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of
the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax
declaration issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents
do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration. Given that the
Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that
the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for
accion publiciana.
 TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ, et al. v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, et al.
G.R. No. 168065, September 6, 2017
Facts
The Saclolos filed before the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial
Court, Naic, Cavite, a joint application for registration of title over three (3) parcels
of land located at Sitio Sinalam, Bario Sapang, Ternate, Cavite. The government,
through the Director of Lands, Abdon Riego de Dios, and Angelina Samson filed
oppositions to the application. Diaz-Enriquez also moved to intervene alleging that
the Saclolos had sold to her all their interests and rights over the subject lands.

The RTC ruled that the subject lands are alienable and disposable, and
ordered the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of Diaz-Enriquez. The
CA reversed the RTC holding that the subject lands are all within the Calumpang
Point Naval Reservation, as testified to by Eleuterio R. Paz, Chief of the Survey
Division of the Bureau of Lands — Region 4; thus, the said lands could not be
privately titled. It held that even if Proclamation No. 307 qualifies the reservation
as being subject to private rights, the Saclolos have not established by adequate
proof their open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession over the subject
lands. It further noted that the trial court's jurisdiction to entertain the application
was not established since the plans had not been verified by the Bureau of Lands as
required by P.D. No. 239 and the alleged verifications in the plans were not
authentic.

Issue
Whether or not the CA may resolve issues which are not raised as errors on
appeal

Ruling
Yes. As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be
resolved. The exceptions to this rule have been enumerated in Catholic Bishop of
Balanga v. Court of Appeals, which held that the appellate court is accorded a
broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to
consider errors not assigned. It is clothed with ample authority to review rulings
even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal. Inasmuch as the Court of
Appeals may consider grounds other than those touched upon in the decision of the
trial court and uphold the same on the basis of such other grounds, the Court of
Appeals may, with no less authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the
basis of grounds other than those raised as errors on appeal. In this case, there is no
doubt that the application for registration of title hinges upon the determination of
whether the subject lands are alienable and disposable. Further, this is consistent
with the appellate court's authority to review the totality of the controversy brought
on appeal.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. COURT OF APPEALS, et
al.
G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017
Facts
PBCOM filed a complaint for sum of money against private respondents
before the RTC Makati City. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
complaint arguing, among others, PBCOM’s failure to pay the docket fees. On 29
September 2010, the RTC ordered PBCOM to pay the docket fees within 15 days
from receipt. On 21 October 2010, PBCOM paid the docket fees, but was only able
to file its compliance on 11 November 2010.

In the interim, the RTC dismissed the complaint on 04 November 2010.

PBCOM filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied. PBCOM timely
filed a notice of appeal, which the RTC denied for being the wrong remedy. The
CA denied PBCOM’s petition for certiorari and mandamus and affirmed the RTC
ruling.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

Ruling
Yes. Sec. 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provide that “prior to the
transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the
trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been
taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.” In other words, the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a notice
of appeal on an entirely different ground – such as “that an appeal is not a proper
remedy,” which is what the RTC did in this case. The authority to dismiss an
appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and not
the RTC. In fine, the assailed RTC Order, denying due course to PBCOM's notice
of appeal on the ground that it was a wrong remedy, is a patent nullity. The RTC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
 MERCEDITA C. COOMBS v. VICTORIA C. CASTAÑEDA, et al.
G.R. No. 192353, March 15, 2017
Facts
This case stemmed from a petition for annulment of judgement filed by
petitioner, seeking to declare the RTC Muntilupa City’s Decision in LRC Case No.
04-035 null and void. In her petition, petitioner alleges that she was the owner of a
real property covered by TCT No. 6715, located in Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa
City. Petitioner averred that in the LRC Case No. 04-035, RTC Muntinlupa
ordered TCT No. 6715 cancelled and issued a second owner’s duplicate copy. In
fine, Petitioner Coombs anchored her prayer for the annulment of the RTC
Decision on the ground that, since the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715
had never been lost as it had always been in her custody, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 04-035. The CA dismissed
her petition.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred when it dismissed outright the petition for
annulment of judgement

Ruling
Yes. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26 vests the RTC with jurisdiction over
the judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed owner's duplicate of the certificate
of title. However, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the subject matter
of LRC Case No. 04-035 was within the RTC's jurisdiction, being a court of
general jurisdiction. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the
RTC has no jurisdiction when the certificate sought to be reconstituted was never
lost or destroyed but is in fact in the possession of another person. In other words,
the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional.

Thus, petitioner Coombs' mere allegation that the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 7615 was never lost and has in fact always been with her gave rise to a
prima facie case of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the proceedings in LRC
Case No. 04-035. This is exactly the situation a petition for annulment of judgment
aims to remedy.
 THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL
NORTE v. HON RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Shari’a District Court, 4th Judicial District, Marawi City, et al.
G.R. No. 193340, January 11, 2017
Facts
The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a
Complaint with the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City (Shari'a District Court)
against the petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery of possession and
ownership of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 25 hectares located at
Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte. They alleged that Macalabo was
the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an agreement with the
Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow" the land to pave the way
for the construction of the municipal hall and a health center building. The
agreement allegedly imposed a condition upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay
the value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the
land would revert to Macalabo. Private respondents claimed that the Municipality
of Tangkal neither paid the value of the land within the agreed period nor returned
the land to its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be returned to them as
successors-in-interest of Macalabo. The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It
argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic
tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws. Shari'a District Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal's motion to
dismiss. Municipality of Tangkal elevated the case to the via petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order.

Issue
Whether or not the Shari’a court has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling
No. There is no disagreement that private respondents, as plaintiffs below,
are Muslims. The only dispute is whether the requirement is satisfied because the
mayor of the defendant municipality is also a Muslim. When Article 143(2)(b)
qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions "wherein the parties involved are
Muslims," the word "parties" necessarily refers to the real parties in interest. It is
clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was
impleaded only in a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local
government of Tangkal. When an action is defended by a representative, that
representative is not- and neither does he become-a real party in interest. To satisfy
the requirement, it is the real party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who
must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is a legal impossibility. The Shari'
a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded
that the Municipality of Tangkal “is neither a Muslim nor a Christian.” Yet it still
proceeded to attribute the religious affiliation of the mayor to the municipality.
This is manifest error on the part of the Shari' a District Court. It is an elementary
principle that a municipality has a personality that is separate and distinct from its
mayor, vice-mayor, sanggunian, and other officers composing it. And under no
circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations-
as the Shari' a District Court has done-without running afoul the inviolability of the
separation of Church and State enshrined in the Constitution.
 A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. v. EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her
husband, EFREN MONDEJAR
G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014
Facts
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect
from respondent the amount of P23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water
bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005. On June 10, 2011, the
MTCC rendered a Decision holding that since petitioner was issued a Certificate of
Public Convenience (CPC) by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only
on August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of
P75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum of P1,050.00 for the period June 1, 2002
to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that respondent had made total payments equivalent
to P1,685.99 for the same period, she should be considered to have fully paid
petitioner.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
RTC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC. The RTC
dismissed the petition, finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent
the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 23 of
the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65

Ruling
No. Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the
above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party
may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on
appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an
available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Verily, a petition for certiorari,
unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction
and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner
to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision.
 FIORELLO R. JOSE v. ROBERTO ALFUERTO, et al.
G.R. No. 169380, November 26, 2012
Facts
Chua Sing leased his property to petitioner. Herein respondents had been
occupying the subject property prior to the contract of lease entered into by Chua
Sing and petitioner. Due to respondents’ refusal to vacate and to pay rent when
demanded by petitioner, the latter instituted an ejectment case against respondents
before the Parañaque MeTC. The MeTC resolved the case in petitioner’s favor.
The RTC affirmed the MeTC Decision. The CA, however, reversed both the
MeTC and the RTC and found that petitioner’s claim is based on accion
publiciana because he asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of
lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the land.

Before the Supreme Court, petitioner argues that assuming this case should
have been filed as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, the Court should
still resolve the case, as requiring him to properly refile the case serves no other
ends than to comply with technicalities.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner’s argument is tenable

Ruling
No. The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and
expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from
unjustly taking and continuing his possession during the long period it would take
to properly resolve the issue of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring
the maintenance of peace and order in the community. An ejectment case cannot
be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining rights of
possession or ownership.

If we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider them as an

accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to simply
file ejectment cases instead of plenary actions. Courts would then decide in
summary proceedings cases which the rules intend to be resolved through full-
blown trials. Because these "summary" proceedings will have to tackle
complicated issues requiring extensive proof, they would no longer be expeditious
and would no longer serve the purpose for which they were created.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VALENTINA ESPINOSA, et al.
G.R. No. 186603, April 5, 2017
Facts
On October 26, 1955, Valentina Espinosa was issued a cadastral decree. By
virtue of the decree, she was issued a OCT on October 15, 1962. On June 17, 1976,
Espinosa sold the property to Leonila B. Caliston who was later issued a TCT for
that purpose. Subsequently, the State, through the OSG, filed a complaint for
annulment of title and/or reversion of land with the RTC. The State claimed that
the subject property is inalienable public land because it fell within a timberland
area. Relying on LC Map no. 2978, the trial court ruled in favor of the State and
ordered the reversion of the subject property to the public domain.

The CA, however, found that the State failed to prove fraud on the part of
Espinosa when she was issued the OCT in 1962, and that the State further failed to
prove that the subject property is forest land. The only piece of evidence consisting
of LC Map No. 2978, certified by the Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986,
was not authenticated pursuant to Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Issue
Whether the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of
inalienable forest land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and
issued a title

Ruling
No. Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the
burden is on the State to prove that the property was classified as timberland or
forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa. Here, the State hinges its whole
claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land classification map prepared in 1986.
The records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in
evidence. The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally offered in
evidence after the presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally,
or if allowed by the court, in writing. Due process requires a formal offer of
evidence for the benefit of the adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate
courts. This gives the adverse party the opportunity to examine and oppose the
admissibility of the evidence.

Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted in evidence, this
will not help to further the State's cause. This is because the only fact proved by the
map is one already admitted by the State, that is, that the land was reclassified in
1986. This fact does not address the presumption/conclusion that Espinosa has, at
the time of the cadastral proceedings conducted in 1955, proved that the land is
alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the decree issued in his favor in 1962.
 JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, et al. v. SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO
and ELSA CLARITO
G.R. No. 211966, August 7, 2017
Facts
Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against
respondents before the MTCC of Roxas City. Notably, the Complaint alleged that
prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as a pre-condition for the
filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are residents of Roxas City.
Specifically, petitioner Jimmy C. Abagatnan (Jimmy) resided in Laguna, while
petitioner Jenalyn A. De Leon (Jenalyn) resided in Pasig City. The MTCC ruled in
favor of petitioners. The RTC denied respondents’ appeal for lack of merit.

The CA, however, dismissed petitioners’ complaint without prejudice for

lack of referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay. It pointed out that majority of
petitioners actually resided in Barangay Cogon, Roxas City, while the two non-
residents of Roxas City already executed an SPA in favor of Josephine, whom they
authorized, among others, to enter into an amicable settlement with respondents.
Since respondents also reside in the same barangay, the dispute between the parties
is clearly within the ambit of the Lupon Tagapamayapa's (Lupon) authority. Thus,
the CA concluded that petitioners’ complaint was prematurely filed.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioners’ complaint for
prematurity

Ruling
Yes. The requirement under Section 412 of the LGC that a case be referred
for conciliation before the Lupon as a precondition to its filing in court applies only
to those cases where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or
municipality. In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC
specifically alleged that not all the real parties in interest in the case actually reside
in Roxas City: Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while Jenalyn
resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over
their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a pre-
condition to its filing in court.

This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already
authorized their sister and co-petitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact
in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC. As previously explained, the
residence of the attorney-in- fact of a real party in interest is irrelevant in so far as
the "actual residence" requirement under the LGC for prior barangay conciliation
is concerned.
 NAPOLEON GEGARE v. COURT OF APPEALS (ELEVENTH DIVISION)
and ARMIE ELMA
G.R. No. 83907, September 13, 1989
Facts
Petitioner and respondent filed an application for the subject lot in the Board
of Liquidators who later issued a resolution disposing the lot in favor of petitioner
by way of negotiated sale. Private respondent then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was favorably acted upon by the Board who directed the
chief of LADESCO to investigate the occupancy and area of the lot. In this
investigation, it was found that only private respondent was the actual occupant so
the LASEDECO chief recommended the division of the property between
petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the Board passed Resolution No. 272
approving said recommendation and dividing the lot equally between parties.

Petitioner then filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of partition

before the RTC of General Santos City. Private respondent moved to dismiss the
case citing as grounds, among others, the lack of conciliation efforts pursuant to
Sec. 6 of P.D. 1508. The motion was granted. The CA directed the dismissal of the
case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner argues that it was erroneous for the
appellate court to hold that the case should be dismissed by the lower court for
failure to comply with a provision of Presidential Decree No. 1508 before filing
the complaint. He alleges that this rule is not applicable in said case for one of the
parties therein is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof
which is excepted from this requirement under Section 2 of said law.

Issue
Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of conciliation efforts
pursuant to Sec. 6 of P.D. 1508

Ruling
Yes. True it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the
petitioner and private respondent who are also contending parties in the case are
residents of the same barangay so Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508
should apply to them. The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to
settle their differences amicably. If the other only contending party is the
government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the exception
but when it is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be
undertaken among the other parties.
 CLAUDIA RIVERA SANCHEZ v. HONORABLE MARIANO C. TUPAS, et
al.
G.R. No. 76690, February 29, 1998
Facts
Private respondent filed with the City Court of Davao an ejectment case
against petitioner. The City Court of Davao then rendered a judgement by
compromise. Petitioner subsequently filed with the Regional Trial Court of Davao
a petition to annul the aforesaid judgement of the City Court of Davao. Private
respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that the records of the case failed to
show prior referral to the barangay court for conciliation proceedings as required
under Sec. 6 of P.D. 1508. Respondent Judge sustained the motion and dismissed
the case for prematurity for not having passed by the barangay court.

Issue
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in dismissing the case for
prematurity

Ruling
Yes. The ejectment case in the City Court of Davao was filed on September
18, 1980, when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was already enforced. However, the
records do not show that there was an opposition to the filing of the said ejectment
case on the ground that the dispute had not been submitted to the Barangay Court
for possible amicable settlement under P.D. 1508. The only logical conclusion
therefore is that either such requirement had already been complied with or had
been waived. Under either circumstance, there appears to be no reason, much less a
requirement that this case be subjected to the provisions of P.D. 1508. In fact, the
present controversy is an action for annulment of a compromise judgment which as
a general rule is immediately executory and accordingly, beyond the authority of
the Barangay Court to change or modify.
 PETRA Vda. De BORROMEO v. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY, et al.
G.R. No. L-63277, November 29, 1983
Facts
Private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate and a
resident of Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the
overdue rentals corresponding to the period from March to September 1982, and
thereafter to vacate the premises. As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes
instituted on September 16, 1982 an ejectment case against the former in the
Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. R- 23915 and assigned to the sala of respondent judge. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the complaint alleging failure to refer the dispute to a Barangay Court as
required under P.D. 1508 or the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Respondent
judge denied the motion to dismiss.

Issue
Whether the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to
comply with P.D. 1508

Ruling
No. Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the
Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals". An
"individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or
institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and
not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership,
corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc. In Civil Case No. R-23915,
plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without
joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is
indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate
estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person plaintiff
administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being
coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
 ELMER PEREGRINA, et al. v. HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS, et al.
G.R. No. 56011, October 31, 1984
Facts
Spouses Procopio and Carmelita Sanchez filed a complaint against
petitioners for damages for alleged disrespect for the dignity, privacy and peace of
mind of the spouses under Article 26 of the Civil Code, and for alleged defamation
under Article 33 of the same Code. Admittedly, the parties are actual residents of
the same barangay in Olongapo City. In fact, they are neighbors. Unquestionably,
too, no conciliation proceedings were filed before the Lupon. Petitioners then
moved to dismiss the complaint. Before filing an Opposition, spouses applied for a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment and thereafter presented their Opposition stating
that under Section 6(3) of P.D. No. 1508, the parties may go directly to the Courts
if the action is coupled with a provisional remedy such as preliminary attachment.
Respondent judge initially dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the
provisions of P.D. 1508 but thereafter reconsidered the dismissal and denied the
motion to dismiss filed by petitioners.

Issue
Whether or not respondent judge erred in denying the motion to dismiss
filed by petitioners

Ruling
Yes. P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a
condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with
that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of
action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of
cause of action or prematurity. It will have to be held, therefore, that respondent
Judge erred in reconsidering his previous Order of dismissal on the ground that the
provisional remedy of attachment was seasonably filed. Not only was the
application for that remedy merely an afterthought to circumvent the law, but also,
fundamentally, a Writ of Attachment is not available in a suit for damages where
the amount, including moral damages, is contingent or unliquidated. Prior referral
to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings, therefore, was indubitably called for.
 LIBRADA M. AQUINO v. ERNEST S. AURE
G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008
Facts
Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. filed a complaint for ejectment
against Aquino before the MeTC. The MeTC rendered a decision and dismissed
the complaint for ejection for non-compliance with the barangay conciliation
process, among other grounds. The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are
residents of the same barangay but there was no attempt to settle the case amicably
at the barangay level. The RTC affirmed the dismissal of the case on the same
ground. The CA reversed the MeTC and the RTC and remanded the case to the
MeTC for further proceedings.

Issue
Whether or not the conciliation process is a jurisdictional requirement

Ruling
No. The conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-
compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise
acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. By Aquino's
failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to
have already acquiesced or waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently,
Aquino cannot thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and
Aure Lending's failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since she is
already precluded from doing so. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during
the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-
recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
 CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL v. JERRY D. MONTAÑEZ
G.R. No. 191336, January 25, 2012
Facts
Due to the respondent's failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos
wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in installments in the amount of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per month, and in the event the house and lot given as
collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the balance of the loan in full.
However, the respondent still failed to pay, and on December 13, 2004, the Lupong
Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court in favor of the
petitioner.

Petitioner then filed before the MeTC of Makati City a complaint for
collection of sum of money. The MeTC rendered a decision ordering Montanez to
pay the plaintiff. Respondent appealed to the CA raising the issue of whether or not
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos effectively novated the loan agreement. The CA ruled
in the negative.

Issue
Whether or not a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for
petitioner, notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pag-aayos

Ruling
Yes. Enforcement by execution of the amicable settlement, either under the
first or the second remedy, is only applicable if the contracting parties have not
repudiated such settlement within ten (10) days from the date thereof in accordance
with Section 416 of the Local Government Code. If the amicable settlement is
repudiated by one party, either expressly or impliedly, the other party has two
options, namely, to enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local
Government Code or Rules of Court as the case may be, or to consider it rescinded
and insist upon his original demand. This is in accord with Article 2041 of the
Civil Code, which qualifies the broad application of Article 2037 which provides
that “if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other
party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon
his original demand.”

In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and
conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be construed
as repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did not intend to be bound by
the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which it was executed.
Perforce, the petitioner has the option either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos,
or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, in accordance with
the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action for
collection of sum of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos. As such, it is error on the part of the CA to rule that
enforcement by execution of said agreement is the appropriate remedy under the
circumstances.
 REMEDIO V. FLORES v. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-
PHILLIPPS, et al.
G.R. No. L-66620, September 24, 1986
Facts
Petitioner appealed by certiorari from the order of herein respondent judge
of the RTC which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The order
appealed from states that the first cause of action alleged in the complaint was
against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on
various occasions from August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action
was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount
of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.

Herein respondents filed motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction since the amounts claimed from each of them amount to less than
P20,000.00 which is below the threshold amount in order for money claims to be
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioner maintains that the lower court has
jurisdiction over the case citing Sec. 33(1) of B.P. 129 and Sec. 11 of the Interim
Rules. It is the theory of petitioner that with the deletion of the proviso in the
former rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the
jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner is correct

Ruling
Partly. Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where
two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a
single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action
against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes
of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more
defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and
there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule
3.

In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as

plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims
shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining
or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties,
the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test. In the
case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to
the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule
3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears
that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against
respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which
falls within its jurisdiction.
 RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. v. HON. JANSEN
R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 6, et al.
G.R. No. 192828, November 28, 2011
Facts
Joseph Cheng, et.al. filed a Complaint against Ching, et. al and all persons
claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.
In the Complaint, they alleged six causes of action, emphasizing on Ramon
Ching’s fraudulent acts which resulted to the latter claiming the entire estate of the
late Antonio Ching, Cheng et. al’s predecessor-in-interest.

Ching, et.al filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Motion to Dismiss.
The RTC denied said motion. Thereafter, Cheng, et.al filed an amended complaint
adding a seventh cause of action (release of CPPA totalling P4M in the custody of
Metrobank) and impleading a new party-defendant (Metrobank). Ching, et.al again
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the
RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. They argued
that jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as
an ordinary court. The RTC denied the said motion. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s denial of the Amended
Complaint as the latter arguably sought the release of the trust funds c/o of
Metrobank to Cheng et.al., the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the
propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, which suit partakes of the nature of a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity

Ruling
Although the Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the
disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the Cheng, et.al of the CPPA
now under Metrobank's custody, the civil case remains to be an ordinary civil
action, and not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court. An action for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding. Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court
agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the Complaint and Amended
Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned.
Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, the civil case does not
partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate
court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
 PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and HEALTH
MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012
Facts
Paglaum co-owns parcels of land located in Cebu City with Benjamin Dy,
HealthTech’s president, and Dy’s family and siblings. Respondent Union Bank
extended a credit line to HealthTech. To secure this obligation, Paglaum instituted
3 REMs on behalf of HealthTech and in favor of Union Bank. The original REM
stipulates that the venue of all actions arising out of or in connection with the
mortgage shall be exclusively in Makati, Metro Manila. The 2 REMs executed on
11 February 1994, however, stipulate that the venue shall be “in Cebu City, Metro
Manila, or in the place where any of the mortgaged properties are located, at the
option of the mortgagee.” Subsequently, due to financial struggles, the parties
executed a Restructuring Agreement which stated that any action shall be
commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other venue. Due to
HealthTech’s default, Union Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the properties.
HealthTech then filed a complaint to annul the sale before RTC Makati. Union
Bank moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. The RTC dismissed the
case. On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal.

Issue
Whether or not Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of
the subject real estate mortgage

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, venue of real actions is
in the court which has jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated.
However, the Rules provide for an exception, which is that real actions can be
commenced and tried in a court other than where the property is located in
instances where the parties have previously and validly agreed in writing on the
exclusive venue thereof. The Supreme Court held that the Restructuring
Agreement shall be controlling for purposes of determining venue for it modified
the entire loan obligation. The provisions of the Restructuring Agreement clearly
revealed the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation,
which applies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the mortgages.
Moreover, even assuming that the venue stipulations in the REMs are controlling,
the SC found them to lack words of “exclusivity” to preclude any other venue
other than that stipulated.
 UNITED ALLOY PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, et al. v. UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK
G.R. No. 175949, January 30, 2017
Facts
Petitioner UNIALLOY was granted a credit accommodation by respondent
UCPB. UNIALLOY failed to pay its loan obligations. As a result, UCPB filed a
complaint against petitioners for sum of money. The collection case was filed with
the RTC Makati City. On the other hand, UNIALLOY also filed against UCPB a
complaint for annulment and/or reformation of contract with damages. Claiming
that it holds office and conducts its business operations in Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental, UNIALLOY filed the case with the RTC of Cagayan De Oro City.

The RTC of CDO dismissed UNIALLOY’s complaint for annulment of

contract for improper venue, among others. UNIALLOY then filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the CA questioning the said dismissal. The CA
dismissed UNIALLOY’s certiorari petition and affirmed the RTC of CDO.

Issue
Whether or not venue was improperly laid

Ruling
Yes. The RTC was correct in dismissing UNIALLOY’s Complaint on the
ground of improper venue. In the case at bench, paragraph 18 of the LPA expressly
provides that “any legal action arising out of or in connection with this Agreement
shall be brought exclusively in the proper courts of Makati City, Metro Manila.”
Hence, UNIALLOY should have filed its complaint before the RTC of Makati
City, and not with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City. But to justify its choice of
venue, UNIALLOY insists that the subject matter of its Complaint in Civil Case
No. 2001-219 is not the LPA, but the fictitious loans that purportedly matured on
April 17, 2001. UNIALLOY’s insistence lacks merit. Its Complaint unequivocally
sought to declare “as null and void the unilateral rescission made by defendant
UCPB of its subsisting Lease Purchase Agreement with UNIALLOY.” What
UCPB unilaterally rescinded is the LPA and without it there can be no unilateral
rescission to speak of. Hence, the LPA is the subject matter or at least one of the
subject matters of the Complaint. Moreover, and to paraphrase the aforecited
paragraph 18 of the LPA, as long as the controversy arises out of or is connected
therewith, any legal action should be filed exclusively before the proper courts of
Makati City. Thus, even assuming that the LPA is not the main subject matter,
considering that what is being sought to be annulled is an act connected and
inseparably related thereto, the Complaint should have been filed before the proper
courts in Makati City.
 SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN and DOMINGA P. BELEN v. HON. PABLITO
R. CHAVEZ, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas
G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008
Facts
The case arose from an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgement
against herein petitioners filed by private respondents before the RTC Rosario,
Batangas. The summons was served on petitioners’ address in San Gregorio,
Alaminos, Laguna. Atty. Reynaldo Alcantara entered his appearance as counsel for
petitioners, and subsequently filed an answer stating that petitioners were residents
of California, USA.

Petitioners and Atty. Alcantara failed to attend the rescheduled pre-trial

conference which caused the RTC to declare them in default. The RTC
subsequently ruled in favor of private respondents. Atty. Culvera, in behalf of
petitioners, then filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution of the RTC
decision which the latter denied. Petitioners then filed a Rule 65 petition before the
CA imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in, among others,
rendering a decision in the case despite the fact that it had not yet acquired
jurisdiction over their persons in view of the improper service of summons. The
CA dismissed the petition.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
petitioners

Ruling
Yes. The action filed against petitioners, prior to the amendment of the
complaint, is for the enforcement of a foreign judgment in a complaint for breach
of contract whereby petitioners were ordered to pay private respondents the
monetary award. It is in the nature of an action in personam because private
respondents are suing to enforce their personal rights under said judgment.
However, the records reveal that petitioners have been living in California, USA
since the filing of the action up to the present. That being the case, the service of
summons on petitioners’ purported address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna
was defective and did not serve to vest in the court jurisdiction over their persons.
Nevertheless, the appearance of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous
pleadings were sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners.
 PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. JULIE CHANDUMAL
G.R. No. 195619, September 5, 2012
Facts
The case stemmed from a contract to sell between BF Homes (as seller, later
substituted by PDB by virtue of assignment) and Chandumal (as buyer). Due to
Chandumal’s failure, despite demand, to settle her outstanding obligations to PDB,
an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession
was filed by PDB against Chandumal. Summons were served by deputy Sheriff
Galing to Chandumal. According to his return, Sheriff Galing attempted to
personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on July 15, 19 and 22, 1999 but it
was unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff
caused substituted service of summons on August 5, 1999 by serving the same
through Chandumal’s mother who acknowledged receipt thereof. For failure to pay
her Answer on time, Chandumal was declared in default, and a judgement by
default had been rendered against her by the RTC. On appeal to the CA, the latter
nullified the RTC decision due to invalid and ineffective substituted service of
summons. For her part, Chandumal asserts that she never received a copy of the
summons or was ever notified of it and she only came to know of the case
sometime in July or August 2000, but she was already in the United States of
America by that time, and that the CA correctly ruled that there was no valid
service of summons; hence, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

Issue
Whether or not there was a valid substituted service of summons

Ruling
No. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines,
service of summons may be made through personal service, that is, summons shall
be served by handing to the defendant in person a copy thereof, or if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant cannot be personally
served with summons within a reasonable time, it is then that substituted service
may be made. In this case, there was invalid substituted service of summons. In
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid
substituted service of summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of
prompt personal service – the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff
must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service; (2) specific details in the return – the sheriff must describe in the
Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service; (3) a person of suitable age and discretion – the sheriff must
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is
of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether
said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his
duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of
said receipt of summons, which matters must be clearly and specifically described
in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons. In this case, none of these requisites were complied with. The Return of
Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of
efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process server in attempting to
serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return merely states the
alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.
 MA. TERESA CHAVEZ BIACO v. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL
BANK
G.R. No. 161417, February 8, 2007
Facts
Due to failure to pay their loans with Phil. Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB),
the latter instituted a complaint for foreclosure of real estate mortgage which the
Sps. Biaco executed as security for their loan. Summons were served through
Ernesto at his office. Ernesto received the same but for unknown reasons, he failed
to file an Answer. Hence, Sps. Biaco were declared in default, upon motion of
PCRB, and the latter was allowed to present its evidence ex parte. The trial court
rendered a decision ordering Sps. Biaco to pay their outstanding obligations within
90-100 days and, in case of failure, their property subjected to REM would be sold
at an auction sale. Ma. Teresa Biaco sought to have the RTC decision annulled on
the ground that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the proceedings,
and that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not
personally served with summons. On the validity of summons, the CA held that
since judicial foreclosure proceedings were actions quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
her person is not required. The purpose of notifying her was nevertheless for
purposes of due process.

Issue
Whether or not a judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem

Ruling
Yes. The SC held that a judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in
rem. Thus, jurisdiction over the person of Biaco is not required, it being sufficient
that the trial court had jurisdiction over the res. Nevertheless, the trial court noted
that Ma. Teresa Biaco was not afforded due process because she was not
sufficiently informed of the present case. The violation of petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of summons
on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court. There is more, the
trial court granted respondent PCRB’s ex-parte motion for deficiency judgment
and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the spouses Biaco to satisfy
the remaining balance of the award. In short, the trial court went beyond its
jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal judgment against the spouses
Biaco.
 SPS. ERNESTO V. YU and ELISE ONG YU v. BALTAZAR N. PACLEB, et
al.
G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009
Facts
Respondent Baltazar Pacleb and his wife are the registered owners of a
parcel of land hereinafter named as the “Langcaan Property” in Dasmariñas,
Cavite. The Langcaan Property became the subject of three (3) documents
purporting to transfer its ownership. On February 27, 1992, a Deed of Absolute
Sale was entered into between Spouses Baltazar N. Pacleb and Angelita Chan and
Rebecca Del Rosario. On May 7, 1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into
between Rebecca Del Rosario and Ruperto L. Javier (Javier). On November 10,
1992, a Contract to Sell was entered into between Javier and petitioner spouses
Ernesto V. Yu and Elsie Ong Yu. Javier undertook to deliver possession of the
Langcaan Property and to sign a deed of absolute sale within thirty (30) days from
execution of the contract.

The spouses Yu (petitioners) then filed with the RTC of Imus, Cavite a
Complaint for specific performance and damages against Javier to compel the
latter to deliver to them ownership and possession, as well as title to the Langcaan
Property docketed as Civil Case No. 741-93. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent with
the MTC. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners which was affirmed by the RTC.
The CA reversed its earlier ruling and ruled in favor of respondents, declaring that
petitioners are not purchasers in good faith and that the RTC decision in Civil Case
No. 741-93 did not transfer ownership over the Langcaan Property to them.

Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 741-93 as to the rightful owner of the Langcaan Property is
conclusive and binding upon respondent even if the latter was not a party thereto
since it involved the question of possession and ownership of real property, and is
thus not merely an action in personam but an action quasi in rem.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner spouses are correct

Ruling
No. Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and
damages filed by petitioner spouses against Javier to compel performance of the
latter's undertakings under their Contract to Sell. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, its object is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase
price, and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the Langcaan Property in their
favor. The obligations of Javier under the contract to sell attach to him alone, and
do not burden the Langcaan Property. Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case
No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly
heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, it cannot bind respondent
since he was not a party therein. Neither can respondent be considered as privy
thereto since his signature and that of his late first wife, Angelita Chan, were
forged in the deed of sale.
 MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al. v. COURT OF
APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987
Facts
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development
Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to
execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land
forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing
damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in
the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same
complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is
premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific
performance, hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

When this under-assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the
attention of the Supreme Court together with similar other cases, an investigation
was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another
counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint for the inclusion of Philips
Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by eliminating any mention of the
amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original
complaint was maintained. After the Supreme Court issued an order on October
15, 1985 ordering the re-assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other
cases that were investigated, the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the
amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only
then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in
the reduced amount of P10 Million but no damages, whatsoever, were alleged in
the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.

Issue
Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted

Ruling
No. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of
damages as alleged in the original complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Thus, in
the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the
payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the
complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there is
no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.

The Court also frowned at the practice of counsel who filed the original
complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in
the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment
of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the
filing fee.
 SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), et al. v. HON. MAXIMIANO C.
ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, et al.
G.R. No. 79937-38, February 13, 1989
Facts
Private respondent filed a complaint for refund of premiums before the RTC
of Quezon City against petitioner SIOL. Although the prayer in the complaint did
not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the
body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). Initially,
only P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee.

Respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom this case was

thereafter assigned, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to
comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in
complying with the Resolution of the Supreme Court of October 15, 1985 since the
pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to
be recovered. Private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended
Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual
compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended
complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages
and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70. Respondent Judge
Asuncion admitted the second amended complaint.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning Judge
Asuncion’s admittance of the second amended complaint. The CA denied due
course to the petition.

Issue
Whether or not respondent Judge Asuncion erred in admitting the second
amended complaint

Ruling
No. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester
Development v. CA. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that a more liberal
interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private
respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester
must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the
additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change for
stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be
ordered.
 EDEN BALLATAN, et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 125683, March 2, 1999
Facts
Petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents Go Civil Case No. 772-
MN for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. The
Go’s filed their answer with third-party complaint impleading as third-party
defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, AIA, and Engineer Quedding. The trial
court ruled in favor of petitioners. The CA modified the decision of the trial court.
Petitioners question the admission by respondent Court of Appeals of the third-
party complaint by respondents Go against the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li Ching
Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party complaint should not have been
considered by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to third-party
plaintiffs' failure to pay the docket and filing fees before the trial court.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in giving consideration to the third-party
complaint for plaintiff’s failure to pay the docket and filing fees

Ruling
No. The Answer with Third-Party Complaint was admitted by the trial court
without the requisite payment of filing fees, particularly on the Go's prayer for
damages. 19 The trial court did not award the Go's any damages. It dismissed the
third-party complaint. The Court of Appeals, however, granted the third-party
complaint in part by ordering third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding to pay the
Go's the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
damages despite the Go's failure to specify the amount prayed for and pay the
corresponding additional filing fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees refers to
damages arising after the filing of the complaint against the Go's. The additional
filing fee on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment award.
 THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR. v. COURT OF
APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 116121, July 18, 2011
Facts
Due to a collision of a passenger jeepney and a truck, Ruben Reinoso, Sr.
was killed. Thus, his heirs filed an action for damages against the owners of the
truck and the jeepney, respectively. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
petitioners and against Guballa. On appeal, the CA dismissed the case outright for
non-payment of docket fees.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. As a rule, payment of docket fees in full is mandatory for a court to
have jurisdiction over a particular case. This strict interpretation was the ruling in
Manchester v. CA. However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, the Court
relaxed the same and held that since the plaintiff therein manifested his willingness
to abide by the rules in paying the docket fees required, the payment of the same
could still be made within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Thus, the Court held that
notwithstanding the mandatory nature of payment of docket fees, its strict
application is qualified by the following: (1) failure to pay docket fees on time
allows only discretionary, and not automatic, dismissal; and (2) such power should
be used by the court in accordance with its sound discretion based on justice and
fair play.

In this case, it was only in the CA that the payment of docket fees was
raised. There is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so that the
petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at
the appellate level rather than fail to secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed,
the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to
hinder but to promote the administration of justice.
 RE: IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM
PAYMENT OF ALL COURT AND SHERIFF’S FEES OF COOPERATIVES
DULY REGISTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9520 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PHILIPPINE COOPERATIVE
CODE OF 2008, PERPETUAL HELP COMMUNITY COOPERATIVE
(PHCCI)
A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012
Facts
In a Petition dated 24 October 2011, Perpetual Help Community
Cooperative (PHCCI), through counsel, requests for the issuance of a court order
to clarify and implement the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court
and sheriff’s fees pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9520, otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008. PHCCI
contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the exemption provided for under Section
6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520, which states that cooperatives shall be
exempt from the payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the Philippine
Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or
where such actions is brought by the Authority before the court, to enforce the
payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

It avers that despite the exemptions granted by the aforesaid laws and
issuances, PHCCI had been continuously assessed and required to pay legal and
other fees whenever it files cases in court.

Issue
Whether or not cooperatives are exempt

Ruling
No. The term “all court fees” under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act
No. 9520 refers to the totality of “legal fees” imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court as an incident of instituting an action in court. These fees include filing or
docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees,
sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees and commissioner’s fees.

With regard to the term “sheriff’s fees,” this Court, in an extended minute
Resolution dated 1 September 2009, held that the exemptions granted to
cooperatives under Section 2, paragraph 6 of Republic Act No. 6938; Section 6,
Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520; and OCA Circular No. 44-2007 clearly do
not cover the amount required “to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff,
process server or other court-authorized person in the service of summons,
subpoena and other court processes issued relative to the trial of the case, which
are neither considered as court and sheriff’s fees nor are amounts payable to the
Philippine Government. In fine, the 1 September 2009 Resolution exempted the
cooperatives from court fees but not from sheriff’s fees/expenses.
 RICARDO RIZAL, et al. v. LEONCIA NAREDO, et al.
G.R. No. 151898, March 14, 2012
Facts
Petitioners commenced a civil case against respondents for the accretion of a
parcel of land. In a decision in 1947, the CFI ruled in favor of petitioners. To
satisfy the money judgement in the case, the sheriff levied upon Lots No. 252 and
269 of the Calamba Estate. Several third-party complaints were filed for this, but
the CFI still upheld the validity of the execution sale of Lots Nos. 252 and 269.
After the said decision, petitioners filed an action for partition, accounting, and
recovery of possession of Lot No. 252 from respondents, which thereafter
culminated into a Compromise Agreement approved by the CFI. Several years
after, on 1987, petitioners filed a Complaint before the RTC for the immediate
segregation, partition, and recovery of shares and ownership of Lot No. 252 with
damages. The RTC dismissed the case for res judicata. The CA affirmed such
dismissal, and found that it was not specified both in the prayer and the body of the
complaint the specific amounts of petitioners’ claim for actual, moral, exemplary,
and compensatory damages.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming such dismissal

Ruling
No. The petitioners failed to pay the prescribed docket fees, thus, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction, enunciating its ruling in Siapno v. Manalo to the
effect that any complaint, petition, answer and other similar pleading, which does
not specify both in its body and prayer the amount of damages being claimed,
should not be accepted or admitted, or should be expunged from the records, as
may be the case. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they suffered actual
loss from the time they had been deprived of their share on Lot No. 252 by the
respondents, as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses. However, the only claims they specified in their prayer were for the
attorney's fees in the amount of ₱30,000.00 and ₱500.00 for every court
appearance of the counsel. In Siapno, a similar complaint was dismissed by the
Court and explained that the rule – requiring the amount of damages claimed to be
specified not only in the body of the pleading but also in its prayer portion – was
intended to put an end to the then prevailing practice of lawyers where the
damages prayed for were recited only in the body of the complaint, but not in the
prayer, in order to evade payment of the correct filing fees.
 MANUEL C. UBAS, JR. v. WILSON CHAN
G.R. No. 215910, February 6, 2017
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent Chan
alleging that respondent was indebted to him in the amount of P1,500,000
representing the price of sand, gravel, boulders, and other construction materials
bought by respondent from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that respondent issued 3
checks worth P500,000 each but when petitioner presented the same for
encashment, the same were dishonored. Respondent moved to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action, as the checks do not belong to
him but to Unimasters Corp. and that if petitioner had a right of action, it should
have been filed against Unimasters Corp. The RTC ruled that petitioner had a
cause of action against respondent. The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that
petitioner’s complaint lacks a cause of action, considering that the drawer of the
checks was Unimasters, a corporate entity separate and distinct from respondent.

Issue
Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC

Ruling
Yes. In a suit for recovery of sum of money, the plaintiff-creditor has the
burden of proving that defendant failed to pay the loan. Where the plaintiff-creditor
possesses and submits in evidence an instrument showing indebtedness, a
presumption that the credit has not been satisfied arises in his favor. In this case,
petitioner showed the 3 checks which were issued and signed by respondent. This
fact is admitted to by the respondent during trial. Moreover, under the NIL, the
checks are presumed to be issued for a valuable consideration. Respondent’s
defense that the checks were lost was a factual matter already passed upon by the
RTC. It is contrary to human nature for petitioner to write respondent a demand
letter detailing the contents of the checks if they were, indeed, lost. Moreover, as to
the argument that Unimasters is the proper party in this case, the SC held that the
manner or mode of payment does not alter the nature of the obligation. The source
of obligation, as claimed by petitioner in this case, stems from his contract with
respondent.
 GOODLAND COMPANY, INC. v. ASIA UNITED BANK, et al.
G.R. No. 195546, March 14, 2012
Facts
Goodland mortgaged 2 parcels of land in Laguna in favor of AUB to secure
the loans extended by AUB to Smartnet, Inc. Goodland also mortgaged a parcel of
its land in Makati City in favor of AUB. AUB subsequently registered both real
estate mortgages (REM). Subsequently, Goodland repudiated the validity of the
REMs claiming that AUB unlawfully filled up the blank mortgage forms and
falsified the entries therein. It also alleged that there existed an agreement that
AUB will not register the REMs unless and until it demands for Goodland to
execute such, and that the REMs executed were mere “comfort documents”. Thus,
Goodland filed before the RTC of Biñan a complaint to annul the REMs. Pending
the same, Smartnet defaulted in its obligations which caused AUB to foreclose the
Laguna properties. Goodland then filed a second complaint for the issuance of an
injunction to enjoin the consolidation of titles in favor of AUB over the foreclosed
properties principally on the ground that the REMs were invalid and falsified.

Goodland also filed a similar complaint before the RTC of Makati City, to annul
the REM executed over its Makati property on the ground that it is, again falsified.
Goodland also filed a subsequent complaint seeking injunction to enjoin the
foreclosure of the Makati property by AUB on the ground that the REM, which
was the basis of the same, was falsified.

The RTC denied petitioner’s application for injunction, while another RTC in
Makati denied its complaint for annulment of REM. The CA denied petitioner’s
appeal and held that the twin complaints asked for a common relief: nullification of
the REM over the Makati Property, cancellation of its annotation, and return of the
property to petitioner.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The essence of forum shopping is similarity in the cause of action. a
cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates the right
of another. In the first case, petitioner alleged the fraudulent and irregular
execution and registration of the REM which violated its right as owner who did
not consent thereto, while in the second case petitioner cited further violation of its
right as owner when AUB foreclosed the property, consolidated its ownership and
obtained a new TCT in its name. Considering that the aforesaid violations of
petitioner’s right as owner in the two cases both hinge on the binding effect of the
REM, i.e., both cases will rise or fall on the issue of the validity of the REM, it
follows that the same evidence will support and establish the first and second
causes of action.

While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the
REM) is ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case
(nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation
of title), the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains
the same — the alleged nullity of the REM.
 IMELDA RELUCIO v. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ
G.R. No. 138497, January 16, 2007
Facts
Respondent Lopez filed a petition for appointment as sole administratrix of
the conjugal partnership of properties against Alberto Lopez and herein petitioner
Imelda Relucio. Respondent Lopez alleged that Alberto abandoned their family
and cohabited with his illicit partner, herein petitioner. Together, petitioner and
Alberto amassed a fortune. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that it does
not state a cause of action against her. Respondent judge denied such motion
holding that petitioner is a necessary party because some of the properties are
registered in petitioner’s name, or co-owned by her and Alberto. The CA dismissed
petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari of the RTC’s order.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) right in favor of the plaintiff;
(b) obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) act or
omission of the defendant violating such right of the plaintiff or breaching his
obligation to the latter. Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is
sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of action were all against her
husband.

The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as

administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising
from her marriage to Alberto. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of
action. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them,
to the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is
her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There
is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly
support a cause of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action
exists.

The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent

husband." The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of
marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent
Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this
ground.

The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez'

share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of
validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is
whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if any there be, in
property co-owned by him with petitioner. Respondent's asserted right to forfeit
extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone.
 JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. FIL-
ESTATE LAND, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012
Facts
Juana Complex I Homeowners’ Assoc. (JCHA), together with concerned
residents of Juana Complex I filed a complaint for damages alleging that herein
respondent Fil-estate deprived them of the use of La Paz road. JCHA, et al. alleged
that they were regular commuters who constantly use La Paz road in travelling
towards Manila and Calamba. However, their use of the same was hampered when
Fil-estate started excavating La Paz road, which is the road that led to SLEX. Fil-
estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint fails to state
a cause of action. The RTC denied the motion, as well as the subsequent motion
for reconsideration of Fil-Estate. The CA affirmed the denial, and held that the
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their
complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and
that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road.

Issue
Whether or not the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action

Ruling
Yes. First, JCHA, et al.’s averments in the complaint show a demandable
right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of
their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2)
an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads. There is
no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest,
convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists
may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-
Estate, et al. when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and
motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury
and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief
sought therein.
 ASIA BREWERY, INC. and CHARLES GO v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK
G.R. No. 190432, April 25, 2017
Facts
10 checks and 16 demand drafts were issued in the name of Charlie Go. The
instruments bore the annotation “endorsed by PCI Bank, Ayala Branch, All Prior
Endorsement And/Or Lack of Endorsement Guaranteed.” In their Complaint,
petitioners aver that none of the above checks and drafts reached the payee, co-
plaintiff Charlie Go, and that all of the checks and drafts fell into the hands of
Raymond U. Keh, who was an impostor. In demanding for payment from
respondent bank, petitioners invoke the ruling in Associated Bank v. CA, which
held that "the possession of check on a forged or unauthorized indorsement is
wrongful, and when the money is collected on the check, the bank can be held for
moneys had and received.” Respondent bank argues that the Complaint failed to
state a cause of action citing as basis, among others, the fact that Go never became
the holder of the instruments due to non-delivery hence, did not acquire any right
or interest. The RTC agreed with respondent bank and held that petitioners could
not have any cause of action against respondent, because the instruments had never
been delivered. It then dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of
action; the terms are not interchangeable. It may be observed that lack of cause of
action is not among the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a
motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive pleading is filed; and the issue
can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory pleading. On
the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must
be filed after the plaintiff has rested its case. In the first situation, the veracity of
the allegations is immaterial; however, in the second situation, the judge must
determine the veracity of the allegations based on the evidence presented. In this
case, the arguments raised by both of the parties to this case require an examination
of evidence. Even a determination of whether there was "delivery" in the legal
sense necessitates a presentation of evidence. It was erroneous for the RTC to have
concluded that there was no delivery, just because the checks did not reach the
payee. It failed to consider Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which
envisions instances when instruments may have been delivered to a person other
than the payee. Hence, in order to resolve whether the Complaint lacked a cause of
action, respondent must have presented evidence to dispute the presumption that
the signatories validly and intentionally delivered the instrument.

Even assuming that the trial court merely used the wrong terminology, that it
intended to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, the Complaint would still have to be reinstated. The test to determine
whether a complaint states a cause of action against the defendants is this:
admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint,
may a judge validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint? In this case,
petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action. First, applying Associated Bank v.
CA, they had a legal right to be paid for the value of the instruments. Second,
respondent bank has the correlative obligation to pay, having guaranteed all prior
endorsements. Third, it is glaring that respondent bank refused to pay on demand.
 BUTUAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. TWENTY-FIRST
DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 197358, April 5, 2017
Facts
Butuan Dev’t. Corp. (BDC), through its president, purchased a parcel of land
in Butuan City. Subsequently, on 05 May 1998, Max L. Arriola, Jr. representing
himself as the chairman of the BDC and armed with a purported resolution from
the Board of Directors, mortgaged the said property to De Oro Resources, Inc.
(DORI) and its president, Libarios. On 13 May 2002, the certificate of
incorporation of BDC was issued by the SEC. BDC filed a complaint to declare
null and void the REM constituted over the parcel of land which they own on the
ground that Max, Jr. misrepresented himself to be a chairman of the BDC. As
special and affirmative defenses, Libarios and DORI Libarios and DORI claimed
that the complaint filed by BDC should be dismissed outright for failing to state a
cause of action since at the time of the execution of the REM on May 5, 1998,
BDC did not yet exist, having been incorporated only on May 23, 2002, and,
hence, could not have claimed ownership of the subject property. The RTC ruled in
favor of BDC, while the CA dismissed the complaint holding that the personality
of a corporation begins only upon the issuance of a certificate of incorporation by
the SEC. Thus, having no right over the subject property, no cause of action could
have accrued in favor of BDC when the same was mortgaged as it was non-
existent at that time.

Issue
Whether the CA erred in doing so

Ruling
Yes. In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only
the facts alleged in the complaint are considered. The test is whether the court
can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and
the prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary
facts, are considered for purposes of applying the test.

Based on the foregoing allegations, BDC's complaint sufficiently stated a

cause of action for declaration of nullity of the REM. Basically, BDC alleged in its
complaint that it is the owner of the subject property as evidenced by a TCT, which
was issued in its name after it purchased the subject property, through Satorre,
from the Spouses Sering.

The respondents' affirmative defense that BDC, at the time of the execution
of the REM, had no right to hold the subject property in its name being merely an
unincorporated association, if at all, amounts to an allegation that BDC has no
cause of action against the respondents. However, failure to state a cause of action
is different from lack of cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action refers to
the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation
where the evidence does not prove the cause of action dismissal of the pleading,
while the remedy in the second is to demur to the alleged in the pleading. The
remedy in the first is to move for the dismissal of the case, while in the second is to
demur the evidence.
 MIGUEL “LUCKY” GUILLERMO, et al. v. PHILIPPINE INFORMATION
AGENCY, et al.
G.R. No. 223751, March 15, 2017
Facts
In the last few months of the Arroyo administration, Acting Secretary of
DPWH Victor Domingo entered into a contract with herein petitioners for the
production of an advocacy campaign to counteract the public’s negative perception
of the outgoing Arroyo administration. Petitioners were able to produce a
documentary film called “Joyride”. The total consideration for the project was P
25,000,000. After the deliverables have been delivered, petitioners followed up on
the payments but to no avail. Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for sum of money.
The OSG moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The
RTC dismissed the complaint and held that although there exists a contract
between the parties in this case, such contract does not bind the government as
petitioners failed to allege compliance with the legal requirements in entering
contracts with the government. The CA affirmed the dismissal of the case.

Issue
Whether or not the complaint failed to state a cause of action

Ruling
Yes. To determine the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to
dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered, in relation to
whether its prayer may be granted. Assuming that the Complaint's factual
allegations are true, they are not sufficient to establish that the RTC could grant its
prayer. The Complaint attempts to establish a contract that involves expenditure of
public funds. As pointed out by respondents, contracts involving the expenditure of
public funds have additional requisites to be valid. Sections 46, 47, and 48 of Book
V, Title I, Subtitle B, Chapter 8 of the Administrative Code provides for essential
requisites for the validity of contracts, viz: (1) there must be appropriation before
entering into contracts; and (2) there must be a certificate showing appropriation to
meet the contract. The Complaint, however, completely ignored the foregoing
requisites for the validity of contracts involving expenditure of public funds. Thus,
the RTC could not order the enforcement of the alleged contract on the basis of the
Complaint, and the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action. In other words, there was no valid contract between the government and
petitioners.
 JOSE DIAZ, JR., et al. v. SALVADOR VALENCIANO, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 209376, December 6, 2017
Facts
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners Jose Diaz, Jr.
against Salvador Valenciano, Sr. (Salvador, Sr.). Petitioners and Salvador, Sr.
entered into a Compromise Agreement, which was approved by the MTCC. For
failure of Salvador Sr. and his family to vacate the subject property in accordance
with the Compromise Agreement, Diaz filed on February 1, 1994 an Ex-Parte
Motion for Execution. The MTCC granted the motion for execution. By sheer
tolerance, petitioners allegedly chose not to implement the writ of execution, and
allowed Salvador Sr. and his family to stay on the property, subject to the
condition that they will vacate the same when petitioners need it. Meanwhile,
Salvador Sr. passed away. Petitioners then sent a demand letter to Salvador, Jr.,
who refused to vacate the property despite due notice, prompting petitioners to file
a complaint for unlawful detainer against him.

Salvador, Jr. contended that the complaint was barred by res judicata in
view of the judicially-approved Compromise Agreement. The MTCC dismissed
the complaint on such ground. Petitioners filed an appeal before the RTC who
found the appeal meritorious. The CA held that the RTC erred in ruling that there
is no identity of parties in the two unlawful detainer cases, and that there is no
judgment on the merits in the first case.

Issue
Whether or not there is identity of cause of action

Ruling
No. The refusal to comply with the earlier demand letter sent to Salvador,
Sr. creates a different cause of action different from the one created by the refusal
to comply with the second demand letter by Salvador, Sr. The first deals with
possession by mere tolerance while the second refers to possession by tolerance
which only arose when they neglected to execute the earlier judgment.

The CA thus committed reversible error when it overlooked that fact that the
cause of action in the first unlawful detainer case is Salvador Sr.'s breach of the
implied promise to vacate the property being occupied by his family by mere
tolerance of petitioners, whereas the cause of action in the second case is another
breach of implied promise to vacate the same property by Salvador Jr., the son and
successor-in-interest of Salvador Sr., despite the judicially-approved Compromise
Agreement which petitioners neglected to enforce even after the issuance of a writ
of execution.
 MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE, INC. v. VIRGILIO S.
DAVID
G.R. No. 129928, August 25, 2005
Facts
Private respondent Virgilio S. David filed a complaint for specific
performance against herein petitioner MOELCI II. The said case was predicated on
a document attached as Annex “A” to the Amended Complaint which, according to
David, is the contract pursuant to which he sold to MOELCI II one (1) unit of 10
MVA Transformer. MOELCI II filed its Answer to Amended Complaint 11 which
pleaded, among others, affirmative defenses which also constitute grounds for
dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were lack of cause of action, there being
allegedly no enforceable contract between David and MOELCI II under the Statute
of Frauds. MOELCI II also filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative
Defenses and Deferment of Pre-trial Conference, which the trial court denied.

The CA dismissed MOELCI II’s petition for review on certiorari holding

that its contention that David’s complaint is dismissible as Annex “A”, upon which
David’s claim is based was not a contract of sale but a quotation letter, requires the
evidence aliunde which is not allowed in determining whether the complaint
sufficiently states a cause of action.

Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari
and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's Motion

Ruling
No. To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in
the complaint may be properly considered. The ambiguity of the import and nature
of Annex "A" which necessitates a resort to its proper interpretation, fortifies the
propriety of the trial court's denial of MOELCI II's Motion. The interpretation of a
document requires introduction of evidence which is precisely disallowed in
determining whether or not a complaint states a cause of action. The Court of
Appeals therefore correctly dismissed MOELCI II's petition and upheld the trial
court's ruling. Now, whether in truth Annex "A" is, as entitled, a mere quotation
letter is a matter that could best be proven during a full-blown hearing rather than
through a preliminary hearing as this may involve extensive proof.
 JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. FIL-
ESTATE LAND, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012
Facts
Juana Complex I Homeowners’ Assoc. (JCHA), together with concerned
residents of Juana Complex I filed a complaint for damages alleging that herein
respondent Fil-estate deprived them of the use of La Paz road. JCHA, et al. alleged
that they were regular commuters who constantly use La Paz road in travelling
towards Manila and Calamba. However, their use of the same was hampered when
Fil-estate started excavating La Paz road, which is the road that led to SLEX. Fil-
estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint fails to state
a cause of action. The RTC denied the motion, as well as the subsequent motion
for reconsideration of Fil-Estate. The CA affirmed the denial, and held that the
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their
complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and
that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road.

Issue
Whether or not the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action

Ruling
Yes. First, JCHA, et al.’s averments in the complaint show a demandable
right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of
their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2)
an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads. There is
no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest,
convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists
may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-
Estate, et al. when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and
motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury
and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief
sought therein.
 BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS v. FELICIANO P. LEGASPI
G.R. No. 205966, March 2, 2016
Facts
Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of
certificate and damages (with application for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction)
against Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., Luningning G. De Leon, Engr. Ramon C.
Angelo, Jr., Ex-Mayor Matilde A. Legaspi and respondent Feliciano P. Legaspi
before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent Legaspi filed a Motion to
Dismiss alleging various grounds. The RTC dismissed such motion.

Respondent Legaspi filed a motion for reconsideration adding that the RTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the action as the complaint, a real action, failed
to allege the assessed value of the subject property. Petitioner BSP countered that a
tax declaration showing the assessed value and the latest zonal value of the subject
property was attached to the complaint.

The RTC denied respondent Legaspi’s motion for reconsideration. The CA,
in the assailed Decision, granted Legaspi’s petition.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. In determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the courts should
also consider the attachments to the complaint. It must be emphasized that annexes
to a complaint are deemed part of, and should be considered together with the
complaint. The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the
property, however, is not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax
declaration. In connection therewith, the RTC, therefore, committed no error in
taking judicial notice of the assessed value of the subject property. Since a copy of
the tax declaration, which is a public record, was attached to the complaint, the
same document is already considered as on file with the court, thus, the court can
now take judicial notice of such.
 GOODLAND COMPANY, INC. v. ASIA UNITED BANK, et al.
G.R. No. 195546, March 14, 2012
Facts
Goodland mortgaged 2 parcels of land in Laguna in favor of AUB to secure
the loans extended by AUB to Smartnet, Inc. Goodland also mortgaged a parcel of
its land in Makati City in favor of AUB. AUB subsequently registered both real
estate mortgages (REM). Subsequently, Goodland repudiated the validity of the
REMs claiming that AUB unlawfully filled up the blank mortgage forms and
falsified the entries therein. It also alleged that there existed an agreement that
AUB will not register the REMs unless and until it demands for Goodland to
execute such, and that the REMs executed were mere “comfort documents”. Thus,
Goodland filed before the RTC of Biñan a complaint to annul the REMs. Pending
the same, Smartnet defaulted in its obligations which caused AUB to foreclose the
Laguna properties. Goodland then filed a second complaint for the issuance of an
injunction to enjoin the consolidation of titles in favor of AUB over the foreclosed
properties principally on the ground that the REMs were invalid and falsified.

Goodland also filed a similar complaint before the RTC of Makati City, to annul
the REM executed over its Makati property on the ground that it is, again falsified.
Goodland also filed a subsequent complaint seeking injunction to enjoin the
foreclosure of the Makati property by AUB on the ground that the REM, which
was the basis of the same, was falsified.

The RTC denied petitioner’s application for injunction, while another RTC in
Makati denied its complaint for annulment of REM. The CA denied petitioner’s
appeal and held that the twin complaints asked for a common relief: nullification of
the REM over the Makati Property, cancellation of its annotation, and return of the
property to petitioner.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The essence of forum shopping is similarity in the cause of action. a
cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates the right
of another. In the first case, petitioner alleged the fraudulent and irregular
execution and registration of the REM which violated its right as owner who did
not consent thereto, while in the second case petitioner cited further violation of its
right as owner when AUB foreclosed the property, consolidated its ownership and
obtained a new TCT in its name. Considering that the aforesaid violations of
petitioner’s right as owner in the two cases both hinge on the binding effect of the
REM, i.e., both cases will rise or fall on the issue of the validity of the REM, it
follows that the same evidence will support and establish the first and second
causes of action.

While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the
REM) is ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case
(nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation
of title), the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains
the same — the alleged nullity of the REM.
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GATEWAY PROPERTY HOLDINGS,
INC.
G.R. No. 181485, February 15, 2012
Facts
Respondent GPHI filed a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage
against herein petitioner Philippine National Bank. GPHI principally alleged in its
complaint that "the understanding between GEC and PNB is that the GPHI
properties would stand merely as a 'temporary security' pending the outcome of
Civil Case No. 98-782 which was filed by GEC against LBP. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. TM-1022. GPHI filed a Petition for Annulment of
Foreclosure of Mortgage with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Docketed as Civil Case
No. TM-1108, the petition was also raffled in Branch 23 of the RTC of Trece
Martires City.

PNB filed a motion to dismiss arguing that GPHI resorted to splitting a

cause of action by first filing a complaint for annulment of the contract of real
estate mortgage and then filing a petition for the annulment of the subsequent
foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC dismissed Civil Case No. TM-1108. The
CA reversed the RTC and ruled that an adjudication holding the real estate
mortgage valid does not preclude an action predicated on or involving an issue
questioning the validity of the foreclosure.

Issue
Whether or not there was splitting of a cause of action

Ruling
Yes. A perusal of the allegations in Civil Case Nos. TM-1022 (Annulment
of the Real Estate Mortgage) and TM-1108 (Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale)
reveal that the said cases invoke the same fundamental issue, i.e., the temporary
nature of the security that was to be provided by the mortgaged properties of
GPHI. In the original complaint in Civil Case No. TM-1022 (Annulment of the
Real Estate Mortgage), GPHI's main argument was that the agreement between
GEC and PNB was that the mortgaged properties of GPHI would merely stand as
temporary securities pending the outcome of Civil Case No. 98-782, the case filed
by GEC against LBP. The mortgaged properties were never contemplated to stand
as bona fide collateral for the loan obligations of GEC to PNB.

On the other hand, in its petition in Civil Case No. TM-1108 (Annulment of
the Foreclosure Sale), GPHI asserted that PNB knew that the mortgaged properties
were "never intended to be used as permanent collateral for GEC, but one which
was simply used as an unregistered security until [GPHI] incurs in default if sold
and the proceeds of which should be used in payment for the obligation of GEC."
 JOVITO R. SALONGA v. WARNER BARNES & CO.
G.R. No. L-2246, January 31, 1951
Facts
Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York entered into a contract
with Tina J. Gamboa whereby said company insured one case of rayon yardage
which Gamboa shipped from San Francisco, California, on steamer Clovis Victory
to Manila, Philippines and consigned to plaintiff Jovito Salonga. When the
shipment arrived, the surveyors found a shortage in the shipment in the amount of
Php 1,723.12.

Plaintiff filed a claim for against herein defendant Warner Barnes & Co., an
agent of Westchester Fire Insurance in the Philippines. Defendant argues that the
trial court erred in holding that it is liable upon the insurance claim of the plaintiff
as the agent of Westchester Fire Insurance Company of new York.

Issue
Whether or not defendant should be liable

Ruling
No. the defendant has not taken part, directly or indirectly, in the contract in
question. The evidence shows that the defendant did not enter into any contract
either with the plaintiff or his consignor — Tina J. Gamboa. The contract of
marine insurance, Exhibit C, was made and executed only by and between the
Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York and Tina J. Gamboa. The real
party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
the "party entitled to the avails of the suit." The defendant did not assume any
obligation thereunder either as agent or as a principal. It cannot, therefore, be made
liable under said contract, and hence it can be said that this case was filed against
one who is not the real party in interest.
 HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, et al. v. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, et al.
G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998
Facts
The alleged farmer-beneficiaries strikers protested the March 29, 1996
decision of the Office of the President (OP), which approved the conversion of a
144-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial institutional area. This led the
OP, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-
called "Win-Win" Resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its
earlier decision after it had already become final and executory. The said
Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion only to the extent of 44
hectares, and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries.

The petitioners now seek to annul and set aside the "Win Win" Resolution
and to enjoin respondent Secretary Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform
from implementing the said Resolution. Movants contend that they are the farmer-
beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove
this, they attached as Annex "I" in their motion a Master List of Farmer-
Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the
directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which
directs the DAR "to carefully and meticulously determine who among the
claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries."

Issue
Whether or not the movants are real parties in interest

Ruling
No. A perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those
purportedly "Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval." In other words,
movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy.
Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
 ANTONIO (ANTONINO) SAMANIEGO, et al. v. VIC ALVAREZ AGUILA,
et al.
G.R. No. 125567, June 27, 2000
Facts
Salud Aguila owns a land identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) as covered by the Operation Land Transfer Program of the government.
Petitioners are tenants of the said land. In 1976, Aguila, in behalf of her children,
herein private respondents, filed a petition for exemption from the coverage of P.D.
No. 27. Petitioners opposed the application. The Regional Director, in its decision,
granted the application for exemption. On appeal to the DAR, the decision was
affirmed. However, on motion of petitioners, the DAR reversed its ruling and
denied private respondents' application for exemption and declared petitioners the
rightful farmer-beneficiaries of the land. Private respondents appealed to the Office
of the President which, in a decision dated January 1, 1995, confirmed and
reinstated with modification the earlier order of the DAR. Petitioners appealed to
the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' petition, ruling that in appeals

from decisions of the Office of the President, the latter is an indispensable party.
Failure to implead said office is fatal to the petitioners' cause and, hence, should be
dismissed. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, contending that under
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the Office of the President need not be
impleaded. However, their motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue
Whether or not the Office of the President is an indispensable party

Ruling
No. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action without that party being impleaded.
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed
without their presence. "Interest," within the meaning of this rule, should be
material, directly in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from a
mere incidental interest in question involved.

On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined as a
plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real interest in the subject
matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the technical rules of
pleadings require the presence of such party on the record. In the case at bar, even
assuming that the Office of the President should have been impleaded by
petitioner, it is clear that the Office of the President is merely a pro forma party, in
the same way that a respondent court is a pro forma party in special civil actions
for certiorari.
 THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B.
ACERON v. SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG
G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012
Facts
Respondents Sps. Alan and Em Ang obtained a loan from herein petitioners.
Due to respondents’ continued failure to settle their obligations, petitioners, who
were residents of Los Angeles, California, executed an SPA in favor of Atty.
Aceron for the purpose of filing a case for collection of sum of money against the
respondents. Atty. Aceron, a resident of Quezon City, filed the instant case before
the RTC of Quezon City. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of improper venue, arguing that the complaint may only be filed in the
court of the place where either they, respondents, or the petitioners, reside. Since
Atty. Aceron is not privy to the contracts and is not a real party in interest, Quezon
City was an improper venue. The RTC QC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA,
however, reversed the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed by
Atty. Aceron. The CA held that the residence of the petitioners’ attorney-in-fact is
of no moment when it comes to ascertaining the venue of cases filed in behalf of
the principal since what should be considered is the residence of the real parties in
interest.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA. The instant case is a personal
action. The Rules on venue of personal actions give the option to the plaintiff to
file the complaint where: (1) he himself or any of them resides; or (2) the
defendant or any of the defendants reside. However, if the plaintiff does not reside
in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the
place where the defendant resides. In this case, petitioners are residents of Los
Angeles, California, while respondents are residents of Bacolod City. The action
should have been filed in Bacolod, and not in the RTC. Atty. Aceron, despite being
vested with an SPA, did not make himself a real party in interest. Such an
appointment given to him did not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of
petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest.
 TEODULFO E. LAO, JR., et al. v. LGU OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, et
al.
G.R. No. 187869, September 13, 2017
Facts
The City Council of Cagayan De Oro City passed City Ordinance No.
10557-2007 which approved See’s unsolicited proposal for the redevelopment of
the Agora Complex, which would be under a build-operate-transfer scheme. At the
time, the City Mayor was Vicente Y. Emano. It is worth noting, however that the
City Council deferred consideration on the proposed Ordinance No. 2007-210,
which authorized the mayor to enter into the contract, and referred it to the
Committee on Economic Enterprises. Subsequently, Mega Farm, through See, and
the then newly-elected Mayor Jaraula executed the Build-Operate-Transfer
Contract for the Redevelopment of Agora Complex (Agora Complex BOT
Contract).

Petitioners filed their Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Re-

Development of Agora Market and Terminal Contract under Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) Scheme and All Ordinances, Resolutions and Motions of the City
Council Relative Thereto with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) &
Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction with Damages with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. It held that petitioners were not parties to
the contract and that they could not file the complaint because the Agora Complex
BOT Contract did not involve any appropriation of public funds.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the case

Ruling
Yes. Petitioners, as members of the City Council of Cagayan De Oro, may
file a case to question a contract entered into by the city mayor allegedly without
the City Council's authority. City councilors may file a suit for the declaration of
nullity of a contract on the basis that the city mayor had no authority to do so
because the city mayor's authority to bind the city to obligations must emanate
from the City Council. Under Title III, Chapter III, Article I, Section 455 (b) (1)
(vi) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
the city mayor may sign all bonds, contracts, and obligations on behalf of a city
only upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or
ordinance.

It is undisputed that petitioners are members of the City Council of Cagayan

De Oro. They have alleged that public respondent Mayor Jaraula entered into the
Agora Complex BOT Contract without being authorized by the City Council of
Cagayan De Oro, in violation of the requirement in Title III, Chapter III, Article I,
Section 455 (b) (1) (vi) of the Local Government Code. Clearly, as they are part of
the very body in which authority is allegedly being undermined by the city mayor,
they have the right and duty to question the basis of the mayor's authority to sign a
contract which binds the city.
 MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, et al. v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, et al.
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014
Facts
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental
damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the
institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation
of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.

Issue
Whether or not petitioners have standing to sue

Ruling
Yes. Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case
where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being
challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." However, the
rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar

as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules
which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on
citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature."
 RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE
TAÑON STRAIT, e.g. TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES,
AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, et al. v. SECRETARY ANGELO
REYES, et al.
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
Facts
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident
Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and
other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait.
They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio
(Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as
"the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.

Issue
Whether or not petitioners have standing to sue

Ruling
Yes. The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here
that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-
Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to
possess the legal standing to file this petition.
 PHILIPPINR VETERANS BANK v. SPOUSES RAMON and ANNABELLE
SABADO
G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017
Facts
HTPMI and respondents entered into a Contract to Sell whereby HTPMI
agreed to sell a real property located in Antipolo City. Respondents paid HTPMI a
consideration of P869,400.00 consisting of a P174,400.00 down-payment leaving a
balance of P695,000.00 to be paid in 120 equal monthly installments. as the
cancellation and rescission of the Contract to Sell in accordance with law. Shortly
thereafter, HTPMI executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of petitioner assigning,
among others, its rights and interests as seller in the aforesaid Contract to Sell with
respondents, including the right to collect payments and execute any act or deed
necessary to enforce compliance therewith.

Petitioner sought for the cancellation of the contract to sell in view of

respondents’ failure to pay their outstanding obligations, and demanded
respondents to vacate the subject property, but to no avail. Thus, petitioner was
constrained to file the complaint for ejectment and unlawful detainer against
respondents before the MTCC of Antipolo. Respondents argued that petitioner is
not the real party-in-interest because ownership over the subject property remained
with HTPMI. The MTCC ruled in petitioner’s favor, which was affirmed in toto by
the RTC. The CA, however, reversed the RTC, holding that HTPMI was an
indispensable party.

Issue
Whether HTPMI is an indispensable party

Ruling
No. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the
court’s action in litigation, and without whom no final determination to the case
can be had. In this case, HTPMI’s assignment of rights to petitioner must be
deemed to include the rights to collect payments from respondents, and in the
event of the latter’s default, to cancel or rescind the Contract to Sell, and,
resultantly, recover actual possession over the subject property.
 SPRING HOMES SUBDIVISION CO., INC., et al. v. SPOUSES PEDRO
TABLADA, JR. and ZENAIDA TABLADA
G.R. No. 200009, January 23, 2017
Facts
Spring Homes entered into a contract to sell with respondents Sps. Tablada
over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 284037. Meanwhile, Sps. Lumbres filed
with the RTC of Calamba City a complaint for sum of money, specific
performance, and damages against Spring Homes for its alleged failure to comply
with the Joint Venture Agreement. While waiting for the RTC Calamba City’s
decision, Sps. Lumbres and Spring Homes entered into a Compromise Agreement
whereby Spring Homes conveyed the property covered by TCT No. 284037 to Sps.
Lumbres. By virtue of said agreement, the Spouses Lumbres were authorized to
collect Spring Homes' account receivables arising from the conditional sales of
several properties, as well as to cancel said sales, in the event of default in the
payment by the subdivision lot buyers.

When no payment was received, Sps. Lumbres cancelled the contract to sell
entered into by Spring Homes with Sps. Tablada. Then, Sps. Lumbres and Spring
Homes executed a deed of absolute sale over the subject property, and a new TCT
was issued in favor of Sps. Lumbres. Sps. Tablada filed a complaint for
nullification of title, and reconveyance against Spring Homes and Sps. Lumbres.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of Spring
Homes, an indispensable party. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision
finding that Spring Homes is not an indispensable party.

Issue
Whether or not Spring Homes is an indispensable party

Ruling
No. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court defines indispensable
parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of
an action and who, for this reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as
defendants. By virtue of the second Deed of Absolute Sale between Spring Homes
and the Spouses Lumbres, the Spouses Lumbres became the absolute and
registered owner of the subject property herein. As such, they possess that certain
interest in the property without which, the courts cannot proceed for settled is the
doctrine that registered owners of parcels of land whose title is sought to be
nullified should be impleaded as an indispensable party. Spring Homes, however,
which has already sold its interests in the subject land, is no longer regarded as an
indispensable party, but is, at best, considered to be a necessary party whose
presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are
so far separable that a final decree can be made in its absence without affecting it.
 SIMNY G. GUY, et al. v. GILBERT G. GUY
G.R. No. 189486, September 5, 2012
Facts
Gilbert G. Guy had 519,997 shares of stock, which is almost 80% of the
subscribed capital stock of GoodGold Realty & Development Corporation.
GoodGold's remaining shares were divided among Francisco Guy (Francisco) with
130,000 shares, Simny Guy (Simny), Benjamin Lim and Paulino Delfin Pe, with
one share each, respectively. Accordingly, some of GoodGold's certificates were
cancelled and new ones were issued to represent the redistribution of GoodGold's
shares of stock. The new certificates of stock were signed by Francisco and Atty.
Emmanuel Paras, as President and Corporate Secretary, respectively.

In September 2004, Gilbert filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, a Complaint for the "Declaration of Nullity of Transfers of Shares in
GoodGold and of General Information Sheets and Minutes of Meeting, and for
Damages with Application for a Preliminary Injunctive Relief," against his mother,
Simny, and his sisters, Geraldine, Grace, and Gladys. He subsequently withdrew
his complaint after an NBI report authenticating Gilbert’s signature in the
certificates. In 2008, Gilbert again filed a complaint this time with the RTC of
Mandaluyong against his mother, Simny, his sisters, Geraldine, Gladys, and the
heirs of his late sister, Grace. The RTC dismissed the case for being a nuisance and
harassment suit. The CA, however, gave credence to Gilbert’s contention that the
complaint should be heard on the merits.

Issue
Whether or not Gilbert failed to implead indispensable parties

Ruling
Yes. Francisco, in both the 2004 and 2008 complaints, is an indispensable
party without whom no final determination can be had for the following reasons:
(a) the complaint prays that the shares now under the name of the defendants and
Francisco be declared fraudulent; (b) Francisco owns 195,000 shares some of
which, Gilbert prays be returned to him; (c) Francisco signed the certificates of
stocks evidencing the alleged fraudulent shares previously in the name of Gilbert.
The inclusion of the shares of Francisco in the complaint makes Francisco an
indispensable party. Gilbert should have also impleaded GoodGold as a defendant.
 LIVING @ SENSE, INC. v. MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 193753, September 26, 2012
Facts
Petitioner entered into a sub-contract agreement with DMI. Petitioner
required DMI to give a bond, in the event that DMI fails to perform its obligations
under the agreement. Thus, DMI secured surety and performance bonds, both in
the amount of P5,171,488.00, from respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.
(respondent) to answer: (1) for the unliquidated portion of the down-payment, and
(2) for the loss and damage that petitioner may suffer, respectively, should DMI
fail to perform its obligations under the Agreement. Under the bonds, respondent
bound itself jointly and severally liable with DMI.

Petitioner eventually terminated the agreement and sought indemnification

from respondent. Respondent effectively denied petitioner’s claim on the ground
that the liability of its principal, DMI, should first be ascertained before its own
liability as a surety attaches. Hence, the instant complaint. Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint claiming that DMI is an indispensable party. The RTC
dismissed the case without prejudice.

Issue
Whether or not DMI is an indispensable party

Ruling
No. The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one
an indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined
mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants. In this case, DMI is not an
indispensable party because petitioner can claim indemnity directly from
respondent, having made itself jointly and severally liable with DMI for the
obligation under the bonds. Therefore, the failure to implead DMI is not a ground
to dismiss the case, even if the same was without prejudice.

Moreover, even on the assumption that DMI was, indeed, an indispensable

party, the RTC committed reversible error in dismissing the complaint. Failure to
implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as the
remedy in such case is to implead the party claimed to be indispensable,
considering that parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action.
 PHILIP L. GO, et al. v. DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT
AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 194024, April 25, 2012
Facts
Phillip Go, one of the incorporators and president of DPDCI, executed a
Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (MDDR) of Phoenix Heights
Condominium, which was filed with the RD. As the developer, DPDCI undertook
the marketing aspect of the project, which included the sale of the units and
distribution of flyers. Thereafter, Phoenix Heights Condominium Corporation
(PHCC) was organized and incorporated. DPDCI turned over to PHCC the
ownership and possession of the units, except for 2 commercial/saleable
units/spaces. Although used by PHCC, DPDCI was assessed association dues for
these units. PHCC then approved a settlement offer from DPDCI for the set-off of
the latter’s association dues arrears with the conversion of several portions of the
condominium into common areas. With conformity of PHCC, DPDCI’s
application for alteration was approved by the HLURB. Petitioners, as
condominium unit owners, filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI
for unsound business practices alleging that DPDCI misrepresented the facilities
and amenities that would be available in the condominium in their brochures and
flyers.

The HLURB rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. DPDCI filed with

the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The CA ruled again in favor of
DPDCI holding that HLURB had no jurisdiction over this case. Moreover, the CA
held that jurisdiction over PHCC, an indispensable party, had not been acquired in
this case.

Issue
Whether or not PHCC is an indispensable party

Ruling
Yes. PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded,
either as a plaintiff or as a defendant, in the complaint filed before the HLURB as
it would be directly and adversely affected by any determination therein. To
belabor the point, the causes of action, or the acts complained of, were the acts of
PHCC as a corporate body. Note that in the judgment rendered by the HLURB, the
dispositive portion in particular, DPDCI was ordered (1) to pay P998,190.70, plus
interests and surcharges, as condominium dues in arrears and turnover the
administration office to PHCC; and (2) to refund to PHCC P1,277,500.00,
representing the cost of the deep well, with interests and surcharges. Also, the
HLURB declared as illegal the agreement regarding the conversion of the 22
storage units and Units GF4-A and BAS, to which agreement PHCC was a party.
Without PHCC as a party, there can be no final adjudication of the HLURB's
judgment. The CA was, thus, correct in ordering the dismissal of the case for
failure to implead an indispensable party.
 PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS,
administratrix of his estate v. ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ
G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005
Facts
Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against Pedro
Sepulveda for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land. During the
presentation of evidence for the plaintiff, Sepulveda died. Thus, his lawyers, Attys.
Antigua and Branzuela, manifested in open court that their client Sepulveda had
died, and that their contract with them had also expired. Notwithstanding said
manifestation, the trial judge set the case for hearing and even sent notices to
Attys. Antigue and Branzuela. The trial judge then substituted the heirs of the
deceased Sepulveda, and ordered the counsel of the plaintiff to present their
evidence even in the absence of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela. The trial court then
rendered a decision against the deceased Sepulveda. Thereafter, petitioner, who
had just been appointed as administratrix of Sepulveda’s estate, moved to intervene
and substitute the deceased. The trial court denied the same holding that the
decision had already become final. Petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA to nullify the proceedings but the latter was denied.

Issue
Whether or not the trial judge erred

Ruling
Yes. Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a
party’s death and the claim is not thereby extinguished, to order the proper legal
representative of the deceased to appear within a period of 30 days or such time as
it may grant. In this case, in view of the pendency of a Special Proceeding and
petitioner’s application to be the judicial administratrix of the deceased’s estate,
the trial judge should have waited first for the appointment of the petitioner and
granted her motion to substitute the deceased Sepulveda.
 SOCORRO LIMOS, et al. v. SPOUSES ODONES, et al.
G.R. No. 186979, August 11, 2010
Facts
Respondent Spouses Odones filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title
and Damages against Petitioners Socorro Limos, et al. The complaint alleged that
spouses Odones are the owners of the disputed property by virtue of an
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale executed by the heirs of Donata
Lardizabal who is the registered owner thereof. However, it was later found out
that the same had already been cancelled and registered in the names of Socorro
Limos, et al. In their answer, the latter pleaded affirmative defenses which also
constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint one among which is the non-
joinder of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable parties.

Spouses Ordones, in their reply, denied the foregoing affirmative defenses

and insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was valid. Socorro
Limos, et al thereafter served upon the Spouses Ordones a Request for Admission
of matters in support of their defense. Spouses Ordones failed to respond to the
Request for Admission, prompting Socorro Limos, et al to file a Motion to Set for
Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses. The RTC denied the
Motion which was likewise affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue
Whether the non-joinder of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as
indispensable parties a ground for the dismissal of the action?

Ruling
No. It is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. In
Plasabas et al., v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that it is only when the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court,
that the latter may dismiss the complaint. In this case, no such order was issued by
the trial court. In this case, no such order was issued by the trial court.
HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, represented
by NORMAN MESINA v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., represented by
THERESA FIAN YRAY, et al.
G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013
Facts
Spouses Mesina during their lifetime bought from Spouses Fian two parcels
of land on installment. Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs — whose
names do not appear on the records, claiming ownership of the parcels of land and
taking possession of them — refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots and
denied that their late parents sold the property to the spouses Mesina. Meanwhile,
the spouses Mesina passed away.

Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the

lots and to turn possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina. Thus, Norman,
as attorney-in-fact of his siblings Victor, Maria and Lorna, filed an action for
quieting of title and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 in
Baybay, Leyte against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa)
as the representative of the Heirs of Fian.

Respondent Theresa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground

that it states no cause of action as the names of all the heirs of Sps. Mesina and
Sps. Fian were not individually named. The RTC dismissed the case on such
ground. The CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

Ruling
Yes. By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of
action, it can be readily seen that the inclusion of Theresa's co-heirs does not fall
under any of the above elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a
cause of action but a non-joinder of an indispensable party. This is properly a non-
joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable parties who were not included in
the complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action.

That said, the proper course of action on the part of course in case of non-
joiner of indispensable parties would be to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Thus, what the trial court should have done is to direct petitioner
Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within
a reasonable time from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall mean
dismissal of the complaint.
 POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION (PSALM) v. COURT OF APPEALS (21ST Division), et al.
G.R. No. 194226, February 15, 2017
Facts
National Power Corporation (NPC) set a public bidding for the security
package in NPC MinGen. Among the participating bidders was San Miguel
Protective Security Agency (SMPSA) which had been disqualified by the NPC.
Said disqualification prompted Labao, the general manager of SMPSA, to bring a
petition for certiorari against NPC and its officials in the RTC of Lanao del Norte.
The RTC ruled in favor of SMPSA. NPC appealed to the CA.

In the meantime, NPC and PSALM entered into an operation and

maintenance agreement (OMA) whereby the latter, as owner of all assets of NPC,
had the obligation to provide for the security of all the plants, assets, and other
facilities.

Notwithstanding the fact that PSALM was not a party in the case brought by
Labao against NPC, and the fact that PSALM was not furnished a copy of Labao's
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction, the CA issued the assailed resolution granting the TRO in order to
maintain the status quo, and expressly included PSALM as subject of the writ.

Issue
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling
Yes. Labao was quite aware that under EPIRA, PSALM became the owner
as early as in mid-2001 of all of NPC's existing generation assets, liabilities, IPP
contracts, real estate and all other disposable assets, as well as all facilities of NPC.
NPC-MinGen was among the assets or properties coming under the ownership of
PSALM. As such owner, PSALM was an indispensable party without whom no
final determination could be had if not joined. An indispensable party is one who
has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
cannot be made in its absence without injuring or affecting that interest. As such,
Labao should have impleaded PSALM in the proceedings in the RTC, or the RTC
should have itself seen to PSALM's inclusion as an indispensable party.
 THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B.
ACERON v. SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG
G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012
Facts
Respondents Sps. Alan and Em Ang obtained a loan from herein petitioners.
Due to respondents’ continued failure to settle their obligations, petitioners, who
were residents of Los Angeles, California, executed an SPA in favor of Atty.
Aceron for the purpose of filing a case for collection of sum of money against the
respondents. Atty. Aceron, a resident of Quezon City, filed the instant case before
the RTC of Quezon City. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of improper venue, arguing that the complaint may only be filed in the
court of the place where either they, respondents, or the petitioners, reside. Since
Atty. Aceron is not privy to the contracts and is not a real party in interest, Quezon
City was an improper venue. The RTC QC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA,
however, reversed the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed by
Atty. Aceron. The CA held that the residence of the petitioners’ attorney-in-fact is
of no moment when it comes to ascertaining the venue of cases filed in behalf of
the principal since what should be considered is the residence of the real parties in
interest.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA. The instant case is a personal
action. The Rules on venue of personal actions give the option to the plaintiff to
file the complaint where: (1) he himself or any of them resides; or (2) the
defendant or any of the defendants reside. However, if the plaintiff does not reside
in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the
place where the defendant resides. In this case, petitioners are residents of Los
Angeles, California, while respondents are residents of Bacolod City. The action
should have been filed in Bacolod, and not in the RTC. Atty. Aceron, despite being
vested with an SPA, did not make himself a real party in interest. Such an
appointment given to him did not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of
petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest.
 CRISANTA F. SENO, et al. v. MARCOS MANGUBAT, et al.
G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987
Facts
Plaintiff Crisanta Seno approached defendant Marcos Mangubat for a
mortgage of a parcel of land. On the assurance of defendant Marcos Mangubat that
he will respect their true agreement as regards the mortgage, plaintiff agreed to the
execution of a deed of absolute sale over the subject property for a consideration of
P5,000.00 in favor of defendant Mangubat and a certain Andres Evangelista and
Bienvenido Mangubat. Andres and Bienvenido then sold the subject property to
Mangubat, which resulted in the latter obtaining title thereto. Plaintiff continued
paying the usurious interest of 2% per month, and when she failed to pay the same,
she was sued for ejectment by Mangubat for failure to pay rentals. Thereafter,
plaintiff also learned that Mangubat sold the subject property to Spouses Luzame
and Vergita Peñaflor.

Thus, plaintiffs filed a complaint for reformation of the deed of sale

executed in favor of defendant Marcos Mangubat; and the annulment of the
subsequent sale to spouses Peñaflor. On motion of spouses Peñaflor, the trial court
ordered the inclusion as defendants of Andres and Bienvenido, on the ground that
they are indispensable parties. The newly-impleaded defendants then moved to
dismiss the case on the ground of prescription which the trial court granted.
Thereafter, the same court dismissed the case against all defendants.

Issue
Whether or not Andres and Bienvenido are indispensable parties

Ruling
No. Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate
the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree
can be made in their absence without affecting them. In the present case, there are
no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat to be
safeguarded if the sale should be held to be in fact an absolute sale nor if the sale is
held to be an equitable mortgage. Defendant Marcos Mangubat became the
absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the sale to him of the shares of
the aforementioned defendants in the property. Said defendants no longer have any
interest in the subject property. However, being parties to the instrument sought to
be reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the possible issues of
the controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an absolute sale or an
equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will have been amply protected.
Defendants-spouses Luzame in any event may enforce their rights against
defendant Marcos Mangubat.
 IN THE MATTER OF HEIRSHIP (INTESTATE ESTATE) OF THE LATE
HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, MACARIO J.
RODRIGUEZ, DELFIN RODRIGUEZ, AND CONSUELO M. RODRIGUEZ
AND SETTLEMENT OF THEIR ESTATES
RENE B. PASCUAL v. JAIME M. ROBLES
G.R. No. 182645, December 15, 2010
Facts
A petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator
and Settlement of the Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes)
and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the RTC was filed by Henry
Rodriguez, Certeza Rodriguez, and Rosalina R. Pellosis. Subsequently, six groups
of oppositors entered their appearance, including Jaime Robles.

The basic contention of Robles in the instant Motion is that he is a party-in-

interest who stands to be adversely affected or injured or benefited by the judgment
in the instant case. In his Comment and Opposition, petitioner contends that Robles
has no legal standing to participate in the instant petition. Petitioner argues that in
an original action forcertiorari, the parties are the aggrieved party against the lower
court and the prevailing party. Petitioner claims, however, that Robles was never
impleaded, because he was not the prevailing party in the assailed Decision of the
CA as well as the questioned Order of the RTC. Petitioner further avers that the
inclusion of Robles' name as respondent in the caption of the instant petition was a
result of a clerical error which was probably brought about by numerous cases filed
with this Court involving Robles and the subject estate.

Issue
Whether or not Robles is an indispensable party

Ruling
Yes. Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited
by the outcome of the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that the courts cannot proceed
without his presence. Moreover, as provided for under Section 5, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, Robles is interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision,
considering that he would benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion
would render the petition for certiorari defective. Petitioner, thus, committed a
mistake in failing to implead Robles as respondent.

The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a

ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion
of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times
as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
plaintiff's/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.

Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court allowed Robles to file his
comment to the petition.
 VICTORIANI BORLASA, et al. v. VICENTE POLISTICO, et al.
G.R. No. L-22909, January 28, 1925
Facts
Plaintiffs and defendants formed an association named Turuhan Polistico &
Co. In the by-laws of the association, every member was obligated to pay Vicente
Polistico, the President-Treasurer. The plaintiffs moved to dissolve the association
and to compel the defendants to account for and surrender the money and property
of the association so that its affairs may be liquidated and its assets be applied
according to law. Defendants moved to dismiss citing the lack of parties and set
out a list of a hundred names which should have been named as parties defendant
on the suit on the ground of their default in paying. The trial court dismissed the
case.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court erred

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the instant case is a class suit. The class
suit is an exceptional situation where there are numerous persons all in the same
plight and all together constituting a constituency whose presence in litigation is
indispensable to the administration of justice. The addition of hundreds of names
as plaintiffs to the case was unnecessary. The rule on indispensable parties is
relaxed as when the class is sufficiently represented to enable the court to deal
properly and justly with that interest and with all interest involved in the suit.
 NEWSWEEK, INC. v. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, et al.
G.R. No. L-63559, May 30, 1986
Facts
Herein private respondents were sugarcane planters in Negros. They filed a
complaint for damages against herein petitioner Newsweek for allegedly
committing libel against them by the publication of an article which portrayed
Negros as a place dominated by big landowners who exploited sugarcane planters.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss arguing among others that the complaint does
not state a cause of action. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The IAC
affirmed the trial court. Petitioner argued that the complaint failed to allege
anything in the subject article referring to them particularly; that libel can only be
committed against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to
have been directed against a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel
can be said to reach beyond the collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual
group member’s reputation.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner is correct

Ruling
Yes. Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a particular
group or class, the statement must be so sweeping as to apply to every individual in
that group or class, sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group
can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him. In this case,
each of the plaintiffs have a separate and distinct reputation in the community thus,
they do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the
controversy.
 JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO, and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors, et al. v. HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
Facts
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit and alleged that
plaintiffs are entitled to the full benefit, use, and enjoyment of the natural resources
of the country’s virgin tropical forests. It sought to nullify the numerous TLAs
granted by herein respondent. Respondent Factoran argues that the plaintiffs have
no cause of action against him, and that the issue raised by the plaintiff is a
political question which is best left to Congress.

Issue
Whether or not the case is a class suit

Ruling
Yes. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest
to all citizens of the Philippines. Petitioners, minors, can rightfully sue in behalf of
their generation and generations yet unborn under the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as their right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.
 ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. HON. VIVENCIO
M. RUIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Branch XV), et al.
G.R. No. L-33952, March 9, 1987
Facts
The instant case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction seeking to prohibit the trial court from proceeding with the civil case
field by herein private respondents on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In the said
civil case, private respondents filed a class suit, and sought to nullify the titles
obtained by petitioner for lack of publication in the land registration proceeding
from which they were acquired, and alleged fraud in registering the parcels of land
in Quezon City, Pasig, and Rizal, which now form part of the Mandaloyon Estate.
Petitioner argues that a class suit is not proper in this case because it presupposes a
common and general interest by several plaintiffs in a single, specific thing.

Issue
Whether or not a class suit is proper in this case

Ruling
No. A class suit will not lie because each of the defendants has an interest
only in the particular portion of land he is actually occupying and not in the
portions individually occupied by defendants. They do not have a common and
general interest over the subject matter of the controversy. Thus, only the principal
plaintiff named in the complaint, Inocencio Bernardo, may remain as party
plaintiff.
 ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, et al. v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.
G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
Facts
PGMA issued EO 378 which removed the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Printing Office (NPO) over the printing services requirements of
government agencies and instrumentalities. Herein petitioners instituted the case as
a class suit to challenge the constitutionality of EO 378 perceiving the same to be a
threat to their security of tenure.

Issue
Whether or not a class suit was proper

Ruling
No. An element of a class suit is adequacy of representation. In determining
this, the Court must consider (1) whether the interest of the named party is
coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion
of the named party to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor
bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the class. In this case, a
Manifestation of Desistance with an Affidavit of Desistance was filed by the
President of the NPO Workers Association opposing the filing of the instant case.
there is thus, an apparent conflict between petitioners’ interest and those they claim
to represent.
 JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. FIL-
ESTATE LAND, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012
Facts
JCHA, together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other
neighboring subdivisions instituted a complaint for damages as a class suit
representing the regular commuters of Juana Complex I against Fil-Estate for the
latter’s continued excavation of the La Paz Road which is the only road that leads
to SLEX for the petitioners. The RTC granted a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The CA affirmed the same, and held that the case was properly instituted as a class
suit.

Issue
Whether or not a class suit was proper

Ruling
Yes. The elements of a class suit are: (1) the subject matter of controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons; (2) the parties affected are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and (3) the parties
bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and
can fully protect the interests of all concerned. The records of this case reveal that
numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court conveying
their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are
similarly situated as they were also prejudiced by Fil-Estate’s closing and
excavating of the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented
by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join
them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These
individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Biñan, Laguna and other
barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
 PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION v. EXPLORER
MARITIME CO., LTD., et al.
G.R. No. 175409, September 7, 2011
Facts
PCIC filed a complaint against herein respondents, including the unknown
owner of the Vessel “MV Explorer” for damages. The unknown owner of the MV
Explorer filed their respective answers with counterclaims. On December 5, 2000,
the unknown owner moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to
prosecute for an unreasonable length or period of time. PCIC allegedly filed its
Opposition thereto, arguing that the trial court has not yet acted on its Motion to
Disclose which it filed last November 19, 1997. In said Motion to Disclose, PCIC
supposedly prayed for the trial court to order Wallem Phils. Shipping, Inc. to
disclose the true owner and whereabouts of the unknown owner. The trial court
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Upon receipt of the dismissal, PCIC
realized that its Motion to Disclose had been inadvertently filed with a wrong RTC
branch. The CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal was correct

Ruling
Yes. The alleged Motion to Disclose was filed on November 19, 1997, while
the Motion to Dismiss by the unknown owner was filed on December 5, 2000. By
then, it is clear that PCIC really failed to prosecute its action, after allowing the
lapse of about 3 years. The only justification offered by PCIC for failing to move
for the pretrial conference was because its Motion to Disclose has yet to be
resolved. The Court disagreed, and held that the unknown owner had been properly
pleaded pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which allows unknown
defendants to be pleaded as “unknown owners, devisees, or by such other
designation as the case may require; when his identity is discovered, the pleading
must be amended accordingly.
 RIVIERA FILIPINA, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 117355, April 5, 2002
Facts
For failure to pay his obligations to Prudential Bank, Reyes’ land which he
leased to Riviera was extrajudicially foreclosed. Prudential Bank gave Reyes until
March 7, 1989 within which he could exercise his right of redemption. Realizing
that he could not immediately raise the money to redeem the property, Reyes
decided to sell the same to Riviera pursuant to a clause providing for a right of first
refusal in favor of the latter in the lease contract. Due to Riviera’s obstinate refusal
to accede to Reyes’ offers, the latter offered to sell the property to another party.
For this reason, Riviera filed a case to compel Reyes and the third parties to
transfer the title to the land upon its payment of the price the third party paid
Reyes. The trial court dismissed the complaint, which was affirmed by the CA in
toto. On October 27, 1994, while the case was pending before the CA, Riviera
manifested that Reyes is already dead. Due to the same, the CA ordered Reyes’
counsel to furnish the death certificate of Reyes. Reyes’ heirs belatedly filed their
motion to substitute Reyes, who actually died on January 7, 1994. According to
Riviera, however, the CA failed to acquire jurisdiction due to the same.

Issue
Whether the failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Sec. 16, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court to inform the court of the death of his client does not
invalidate the proceedings

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the failure of counsel to comply with his
duty under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to inform the court of the death of
his client does not invalidate the proceedings and the judgement thereon if the
action survives the death of such party, as this case does, since the death of Reyes
did not extinguish his civil personality.
 SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. L-45809, December 12, 1986
Facts
Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against Pedro
Sepulveda for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land. During the
presentation of evidence for the plaintiff, Sepulveda died. Thus, his lawyers, Attys.
Antigua and Branzuela, manifested in open court that their client Sepulveda had
died, and that their contract with them had also expired. Notwithstanding said
manifestation, the trial judge set the case for hearing and even sent notices to
Attys. Antigue and Branzuela. The trial judge then substituted the heirs of the
deceased Sepulveda, and ordered the counsel of the plaintiff to present their
evidence even in the absence of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela. The trial court then
rendered a decision against the deceased Sepulveda. Thereafter, petitioner, who
had just been appointed as administratrix of Sepulveda’s estate, moved to intervene
and substitute the deceased. The trial court denied the same holding that the
decision had already become final. Petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA to nullify the proceedings but the latter was denied.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court erred

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in considering Attys.
Antigua and Branzuela as the counsels for the deceased. Under the Rule, it is the
court that is called upon, after notice of a party’s death and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, to order the proper legal representative of the deceased to appear
within a period of 30 days or such time as it may grant. In this case, in view of the
pendency of a Special Proceeding and petitioner’s application to be the judicial
administratrix of the deceased’s estate, the trial judge should have waited first for
the appointment of the petitioner and granted her motion to substitute the deceased
Sepulveda.
 CONCHITA S. UY, et al. v. CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO, et al.
G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017
Facts
The case is an offshoot of a case for quieting of title, reconveyance,
damages, and attorney’s fees filed by Crispulo Del Castillo on November 12, 1996.
However, since Jaime Uy died 6 years earlier or in 1990, Crispulo amended his
complaint and impleaded the Uy siblings, as defendants. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Crispulo’s heirs, who validly substituted Crispulo. Petitioners
then moved to quash the writ of execution claiming that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the Uy siblings in the Queting of Title case as they were never
served with summons in relation thereto. The RTC denied such motion and on
appeal to the CA, petitioners argue that Jaime’s estate should instead be liable for
the adjudged amount and that respondents should have just brought their complaint
against the estate. The CA found no merit in this and dismissed petitioners’ appeal.

Issue
Whether or not Sec. 20, Rule 3 is applicable

Ruling
No. The SC held that Sec. 20, Rule 3 which petitioners invoke is not
applicable to the case at bar. Jaime died 6 years before the complaint for Quieting
of Title was instituted. The Rules of Court provisions on substitution of parties do
not apply and the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in place of Jaime in the
Quieting of Title Case. Instead, they were impleaded in their personal capacities.
 SPOUSES AMADO O. IBAÑEZ and ESTHER R. IBAÑEZ v. JAMES
HARPER as representative of the heirs of Francisco Muñoz, Sr., et al.
G.R. No. 194272, February 15, 2017
Facts
Sps. Ibañez borrowed from Francisco, Consuelo, and Ma. Consuelo the
amount of P1,300,000 which they secured with a real estate mortgage. Alleging
that the conditions of the mortgage had been violated, Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo
applied for foreclosure of the REM. Sps. Ibañez then filed with the RTC Manila a
complaint ofr injunction and damages against Francisco, Consuelo, and Ma.
Consuelo. Thereafter, the parties executed an Amended Compromise Agreement.
The RTC approved the Amended Compromise Agreement as its Hatol. Thereafter,
Atty. Bermejo filed a notice of Francisco’s death, and named James Harper as his
legal representative. The Sps. Ibañez then moved to consider the Hatol as the final
and executory decision. The RTC granted such motion. James then sought
reconsideration of the same, arguing that the trial court erred in holding that the
stipulations in the compromise agreement had all been complied with because
according to him, Sps. Ibañez made it appear that only Ma. Consuelo and Consuelo
remained as parties thereto after Francisco’s death. The RTC denied the same,
which compelled James to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA.

Meanwhile, Sps. Ibañez filed a motion for execution and prayed that Ma.
Consuelo and Consuelo be ordered to turn over the TCT of the property
mortgaged, which James opposed and thereafter prayed for the RTC to suspend the
proceedings pending the resolution of their petition for certiorari before the CA.
The trial court denied James’ motion to suspend, and held that since there was no
valid substitution, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over James.

The CA held that there was a valid substitution in this case, and the belated
filing of the notice of death did not divest the RTC of jurisdiction to favorably act
on the heirs’ motion for execution.

Issue
Whether or not there was valid substitution in this case

Ruling
The SC held that while there may have been no formal substitution of the
heirs, the heirs of Francisco, represented by James, voluntarily appeared and
actively participated in this case. The rationale behind the rule on substitution is to
apprise the heir or the substitute that he is being brought to the jurisdiction of the
court in lieu of the deceased party by operation of law. It serves to protect the right
of every party to due process. Under the circumstances of the case, formal
substitution is no longer necessary. The trial court therefore committed grave abuse
of discretion when it declared that Harper cannot be made a party in the case
because of the lack of a valid substitution. Its refusal to recognize Francisco's heirs
deprived them of the opportunity to exact compliance with whatever rights they
may have under the terms of the Amended Compromise Agreement.
 PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. VICTORIANO and MELANIE
RAMOS
G.R. No. 228617, September 20, 2017
Facts
In 2012, Spouses Victoriano and Melanie Ramos (Spouses Ramos) applied
for several credit lines with Planters Development Bank (PDB) for the construction
of a warehouse in Barangay Santo Tomas, Nueva Ecija. The said application was
approved and was secured by Real Estate Mortgage over properties owned by the
spouses. Due to financial woes, Spouses Ramos were not able to pay their
obligations as they fell due. They appealed to PDB for the deferment of debt
servicing and requested for a restructuring scheme but the parties failed to reach an
agreement. PDB filed a Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage under Act 3135, as amended, before the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva
Ecija. The Spouses Ramos filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate
Mortgages against PDB and its officers also before the RTC of San Jose City,
Nueva Ecija. Instead of filing an Answer, PDB filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that the venue of the action was improperly laid considering that the real
estate mortgages signed by the parties contained a stipulation that any suit arising
therefrom shall be filed in Makati City only. The RTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss, ruling that pursuant to autonomy of contract, Venue can be waived. Rule
5, Section 4(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties to validly agree
in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. Indeed, on
the defendants they have the contract where the venue allegedly agreed upon by
them with the plaintiffs is Makati City. However, one of the contentions of the
plaintiffs is that the contracts between them and the defendants take the form of an
adhesion contract. As such, this Court has to apply Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the venue of real actions to avoid ruling on the
merits without any evidence that would sufficiently support the same. Unyielding,
PDB filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order, instead of filing an answer to
the complaint. This prompted Spouses Ramos to file a motion to declare PDB in
default.
Aggrieved, PDB filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the RTC for denying its motion to dismiss, despite the fact that the
venue was clearly improperly laid. The CA denied the petition.

Issue
Whether or not the stipulation on venue should govern the parties

Ruling
Yes. In view of the predilection to view a stipulation on venue as merely
permissive, the parties must therefore employ words in the contract that would
clearly evince a contrary intention. In Spouses Lantin v. Judge Lantion, the Court
emphasized that "the mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to
preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to
show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place." In the instant case, there is an
identical stipulation in the real estate mortgages executed by the parties, pertaining
to venue.
 PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. ROYAL FERRY
SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017
Facts
Royal Ferry is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine law.
Under its Articles of Incorporation, Royal Ferry’s principal place of business is at
Makati City. However, it currently holds its office at Intramuros Manila. Royal
Ferry filed a petition for voluntary insolvency before the RTC Manila. The latter
granted such petition. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell, a creditor of Royal Ferry, filed a
Motion to Dismiss arguing, among others, that the Insolvency Law provides that
petitions for insolvency should be filed before the court with territorial jurisdiction
over the petitioner’s residence. Since Royal Ferry’s Articles of Incorporation states
that its principal place of business is at Makati City, Pilipinas Shell argues that the
petition should have been filed in Makati City. The RTC denied such motion. The
CA found that the RTC Manila had jurisdiction over the case.

Issue
Whether or not Pilipinas Shell’s contentions are tenable

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court held that Pilipinas Shell confuses jurisdiction with
venue. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong. It is a matter of substantive law.
Objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived, and can be made at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. The court may motu proprio dismiss a case for lack
of jurisdiction.

Venue, on the other hand, is the geographical location in which an action or

proceeding shall be brought. It is a matter of procedural law. An objection to venue
must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it is waived. The court cannot
motu proprio dismiss a case for improper venue.

Sec. 14 of the Insolvency Law provides that the proper venue for a petition
for insolvency is the RTC of the province/city where the insolvent corporation has
resided for a period of 6 months prior to the filing of the petition. If there is a
conflict between the place stated in the AOI and the physical location of the
corporation’s main office, the actual place of business shall control. Royal Ferry in
this case is a resident of Manila, and since such fact is uncontroverted, the place of
residence under the AOI must yield to fact. The petition was correctly filed before
RTC Manila.
 ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC. v.
LUCIO TAN
G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005
Facts
Lucio Tan filed a complaint against Nocum, et al. with the RTC Makati
seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory
imputations contained in a news article. Respondents filed their Answer, arguing
that the venue was improperly laid. The RTC Makati thus dismissed the case
without prejudice on the ground of improper venue. Tan then filed an Amended
Complaint alleging that the subject article was printed and first published in the
City of Makati. The court admitted the same. Petitioners appealed the RTC
decision to the CA which dismissed the same for lack of merit. Petitioners argue
that Art. 360 of the RPC vests jurisdiction over civil and criminal actions for libel
on the RTC having territorial jurisdiction over the place: (1) where the libelous
article was printed and first published; (2) where the complainant, if a private
person, resides; (3) where the complainant, if a public official, holds office. Since
the original complaint, according to petitioners, only contained the office address
of Tan, the original complaint failed to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court.

Issue
Whether or not petitioners are correct

Ruling
No. The additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article
was printed and first published in the City of Makati only refer to the question of
venue, and not jurisdiction. The dismissal of the original complaint by the lower
court was proper considering that the complaint, on its face, failed to allege neither
the residence of the complainant Tan nor the place where the libelous article was
printed and first published. Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the
same may still be amended as in fact the amended complaint was admitted, in view
of the court a quo’s jurisdiction, of which it was never divested. In so doing, the
court acted properly and without any grave abuse of discretion.
 PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and HEALTH
MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012
Facts
Paglaum co-owns parcels of land located in Cebu City with Benjamin Dy,
HealthTech’s president, and Dy’s family and siblings. Respondent Union Bank
extended a credit line to HealthTech. To secure this obligation, Paglaum instituted
3 REMs on behalf of HealthTech and in favor of Union Bank. The original REM
stipulates that the venue of all actions arising out of or in connection with the
mortgage shall be exclusively in Makati, Metro Manila. The 2 REMs executed on
11 February 1994, however, stipulate that the venue shall be “in Cebu City, Metro
Manila, or in the place where any of the mortgaged properties are located, at the
option of the mortgagee.” Subsequently, due to financial struggles, the parties
executed a Restructuring Agreement which stated that any action shall be
commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other venue. Due to
HealthTech’s default, Union Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the properties.
HealthTech then filed a complaint to annul the sale before RTC Makati. Union
Bank moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. The RTC dismissed the
case. On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal.

Issue
Whether or not Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of
the subject real estate mortgage

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, venue of real actions is
in the court which has jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated.
However, the Rules provide for an exception, which is that real actions can be
commenced and tried in a court other than where the property is located in
instances where the parties have previously and validly agreed in writing on the
exclusive venue thereof. The Supreme Court held that the Restructuring Agreement
shall be controlling for purposes of determining venue for it modified the entire
loan obligation. The provisions of the Restructuring Agreement clearly revealed
the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which
applies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the mortgages. Moreover,
even assuming that the venue stipulations in the REMs are controlling, the SC
found them to lack words of “exclusivity” to preclude any other venue other than
that stipulated.
 THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B.
ACERON v. SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG
G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012
Facts
Respondents Sps. Alan and Em Ang obtained a loan from herein petitioners.
Due to respondents’ continued failure to settle their obligations, petitioners, who
were residents of Los Angeles, California, executed an SPA in favor of Atty.
Aceron for the purpose of filing a case for collection of sum of money against the
respondents. Atty. Aceron, a resident of Quezon City, filed the instant case before
the RTC of Quezon City. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of improper venue, arguing that the complaint may only be filed in the
court of the place where either they, respondents, or the petitioners, reside. Since
Atty. Aceron is not privy to the contracts and is not a real party in interest, Quezon
City was an improper venue. The RTC QC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA,
however, reversed the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed by
Atty. Aceron. The CA held that the residence of the petitioners’ attorney-in-fact is
of no moment when it comes to ascertaining the venue of cases filed in behalf of
the principal since what should be considered is the residence of the real parties in
interest.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA. The instant case is a personal
action. The Rules on venue of personal actions give the option to the plaintiff to
file the complaint where: (1) he himself or any of them resides; or (2) the
defendant or any of the defendants reside. However, if the plaintiff does not reside
in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the
place where the defendant resides. In this case, petitioners are residents of Los
Angeles, California, while respondents are residents of Bacolod City. The action
should have been filed in Bacolod, and not in the RTC. Atty. Aceron, despite being
vested with an SPA, did not make himself a real party in interest. Such an
appointment given to him did not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of
petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest.
SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSARIO SARAZA v. WILLIAM FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013
Facts
Respondent and Fernando Saraza entered into an agreement whereby the
latter agreed to sell his 100-square meter share in a lot situated in Makati City to
respondent for the amount of P3,200,000. The amount of P1,200,000 was paid
upon execution of the Agreement while the payment of the P2,000,000 was agreed
upon to be paid on installments with the PNB to cover a loan of Sps. Saraza,
Fernando’s parents. It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail to transfer
to respondent the title to the Makati City property, Rosario and Fernando’s lot
encumbered to PNB shall be considered to be the collateral in favor of respondent.
When respondent tried to make petitioners execute an SPA for him to receive from
PNB the title of the property constituted as a collateral, petitioners refused.
Respondent further found that petitioners executed an Amended Authority which
states that upon payment of the Sps. Saraza’s loan with the PNB, the title of the
collateral shall be returned to petitioners, as mortgagors. Thus, respondent filed a
civil case for specific performance before RTC Imus, Cavite. The RTC ruled in
favor of respondent.

On appeal to the CA, Fernando argued that RTC Imus lacked jurisdiction
over the case because it involved an adjudication of a property located in Makati
City. The CA affirmed the RTC, and held that the instant case was a personal
action thus, the venue of the action was the plaintiffs’ (respondent’s) or the
defendants’ (petitioner’s) residence, at the election of the plaintiff.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. Although the end result of respondent’s claim was the transfer of title
over a real property to his name, he suit was still essentially for specific
performance, a personal action, since it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of
absolute sale based on a contract he previously made. Sec. 2, Rule 4 then governs
the venue for the instant case, which provides that “personal actions "may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of
a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.”
Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus,
Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.
 PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. VICTORIANO and MELANIE
RAMOS
G.R. No. 228617, September 20, 2017
Facts
In 2012, Spouses Victoriano and Melanie Ramos (Spouses Ramos) applied
for several credit lines with Planters Development Bank (PDB) for the construction
of a warehouse in Barangay Santo Tomas, Nueva Ecija. The said application was
approved and was secured by Real Estate Mortgage over properties owned by the
spouses. Due to financial woes, Spouses Ramos were not able to pay their
obligations as they fell due. They appealed to PDB for the deferment of debt
servicing and requested for a restructuring scheme but the parties failed to reach an
agreement. PDB filed a Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage under Act 3135, as amended, before the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva
Ecija. The Spouses Ramos filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate
Mortgages against PDB and its officers also before the RTC of San Jose City,
Nueva Ecija. Instead of filing an Answer, PDB filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that the venue of the action was improperly laid considering that the real
estate mortgages signed by the parties contained a stipulation that any suit arising
therefrom shall be filed in Makati City only. The RTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss, ruling that pursuant to autonomy of contract, Venue can be waived. Rule
5, Section 4(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties to validly agree
in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. Indeed, on
the defendants they have the contract where the venue allegedly agreed upon by
them with the plaintiffs is Makati City. However, one of the contentions of the
plaintiffs is that the contracts between them and the defendants take the form of an
adhesion contract. As such, this Court has to apply Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the venue of real actions to avoid ruling on the
merits without any evidence that would sufficiently support the same. Unyielding,
PDB filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order, instead of filing an answer to
the complaint. This prompted Spouses Ramos to file a motion to declare PDB in
default.
Aggrieved, PDB filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the RTC for denying its motion to dismiss, despite the fact that the
venue was clearly improperly laid. The CA denied the petition.

Issue
Whether or not the stipulation on venue should govern the parties

Ruling
Yes. In view of the predilection to view a stipulation on venue as merely
permissive, the parties must therefore employ words in the contract that would
clearly evince a contrary intention. In Spouses Lantin v. Judge Lantion, the Court
emphasized that "the mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to
preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to
show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place." In the instant case, there is an
identical stipulation in the real estate mortgages executed by the parties, pertaining
to venue.
 LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
represented by its President, JANET C. LEY v. MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO,
doing business under the name and style “LOLA TABA LOLO PATO
PALENGKE AT PALUTO SA SEASIDE”
G.R. No. 222711, August 23, 2017
Facts
Petitioner leased a parcel of land in Pasay City from Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC). It subleased the same to herein respondent
Sedano. Respondent allegedly failed to pay the rentals and despite demands,
refused to settle his obligations. Thus, petitioner filed the instant complaint for
collection of sum of money with damages before RTC Valenzuela. After moving
for an extension of time to file his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,
respondent moved to dismiss petitioner’s complaint on the ground that Sec. 21 of
the lease contract provides that all actions or cases in connection with this case
shall be filed with the RTC Pasay City, “exclusive of all others.” Petitioner
countered by saying that respondent submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court by seeking affirmative reliefs such as extensions of time, and even set up
counterclaims. RTC Valenzuela dismissed the case on the ground that the
aforementioned Sec. 21 of the lease contract validly limited venue to Pasay City
RTCs.

Issue
Whether or not RTC Valenzuela erred

Ruling
No. As a general rule, venue for personal actions shall lie with the court
which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election
of the plaintiff. As an exception to this rule, the parties may, through a written
instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue. An
exclusive venue stipulation is valid provided: (1) the stipulation on the chosen
venue is exclusive by nature or intent; (2) expressed in writing by the parties
thereto; and (3) entered into before filing the suit.

In this case, Sec. 21 of the lease contract validly limited the venue of all
actions arising from the lease contract to Pasay City. This is evident from the use
of the phrase “exclusive of all others.” That respondent filed motions for extension
of time to file his responsive pleading, or that he interposed counterclaims does not
necessarily mean that he waived the affirmative defense of improper venue. The
rule is that objections on venue must be raised at the earliest opportunity, such as
in an answer or in a motion to dismiss. Here, respondent timely raised the
objection of improper venue since it was one of his affirmative defenses in his
Answer with Third-Party Complaint.
 THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B.
ACERON v. SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG
G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012
Facts
Respondents Sps. Alan and Em Ang obtained a loan from herein petitioners.
Due to respondents’ continued failure to settle their obligations, petitioners, who
were residents of Los Angeles, California, executed an SPA in favor of Atty.
Aceron for the purpose of filing a case for collection of sum of money against the
respondents. Atty. Aceron, a resident of Quezon City, filed the instant case before
the RTC of Quezon City. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of improper venue, arguing that the complaint may only be filed in the
court of the place where either they, respondents, or the petitioners, reside. Since
Atty. Aceron is not privy to the contracts and is not a real party in interest, Quezon
City was an improper venue. The RTC QC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA,
however, reversed the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed by
Atty. Aceron. The CA held that the residence of the petitioners’ attorney-in-fact is
of no moment when it comes to ascertaining the venue of cases filed in behalf of
the principal since what should be considered is the residence of the real parties in
interest.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA. The instant case is a personal
action. The Rules on venue of personal actions give the option to the plaintiff to
file the complaint where: (1) he himself or any of them resides; or (2) the
defendant or any of the defendants reside. However, if the plaintiff does not reside
in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the
place where the defendant resides. In this case, petitioners are residents of Los
Angeles, California, while respondents are residents of Bacolod City. The action
should have been filed in Bacolod, and not in the RTC. Atty. Aceron, despite being
vested with an SPA, did not make himself a real party in interest. Such an
appointment given to him did not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of
petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest.
 PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and HEALTH
MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012
Facts
Paglaum co-owns parcels of land located in Cebu City with Benjamin Dy,
HealthTech’s president, and Dy’s family and siblings. Respondent Union Bank
extended a credit line to HealthTech. To secure this obligation, Paglaum instituted
3 REMs on behalf of HealthTech and in favor of Union Bank. The original REM
stipulates that the venue of all actions arising out of or in connection with the
mortgage shall be exclusively in Makati, Metro Manila. The 2 REMs executed on
11 February 1994, however, stipulate that the venue shall be “in Cebu City, Metro
Manila, or in the place where any of the mortgaged properties are located, at the
option of the mortgagee.” Subsequently, due to financial struggles, the parties
executed a Restructuring Agreement which stated that any action shall be
commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other venue. Due to
HealthTech’s default, Union Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the properties.
HealthTech then filed a complaint to annul the sale before RTC Makati. Union
Bank moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. The RTC dismissed the
case. On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal.

Issue
Whether or not Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of
the subject real estate mortgage

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, venue of real actions is
in the court which has jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated.
However, the Rules provide for an exception, which is that real actions can be
commenced and tried in a court other than where the property is located in
instances where the parties have previously and validly agreed in writing on the
exclusive venue thereof. The Supreme Court held that the Restructuring
Agreement shall be controlling for purposes of determining venue for it modified
the entire loan obligation. The provisions of the Restructuring Agreement clearly
revealed the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation,
which applies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the mortgages.
Moreover, even assuming that the venue stipulations in the REMs are controlling,
the SC found them to lack words of “exclusivity” to preclude any other venue
other than that stipulated.
 POLYTRADE CORPORATION v. VICTORIANO BLANCO
G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969
Facts
Plaintiff corporation has its principal office and place of business in Makati,
Rizal, while defendant is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan. The present suit is
commenced before the CFI of Bulacan on 4 causes of action to recover the
purchase price of rawhide delivered by plaintiff to the defendant. Defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue, claiming that by their
contract, suit may only be lodged in the courts of Manila. The Bulacan court
overruled him. The contractual provision upon which defendant bases his cause
read: “The parties agree to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila.”

Issue
Whether or not this was enough to preclude the filing of suits in the
residence of plaintiffs or defendant

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court held that this was not enough to preclude the filing
of suits in the residence of plaintiffs or defendant. The plain meaning is that the
parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words
which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent
therefrom.
 SWEET LINE, INC. v. HON. BERNARDO TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of
Misamis Oriental, Branch VII, et al.
G.R. No. L-37750, May 19, 1978
Facts
Private respondents bought tickets at the branch office of herein petitioner.
Respondents, bound for Tagbilaran, transferred to M/S “Sweet Town” after
learning that the vessel they were about to board, M/S “Sweet Hope”, was not
proceeding to Bohol. Because the said vessel was filled to its capacity, respondents
were made to hide in the cargo section of the vessel to avoid inspection of the
Philippine Coastguard. As a result, respondents endured the scorching heat of the
sun and the dust coming from the ship’s cargo of corn grits. Respondents sued
petitioner for damages and breach of contract of carriage. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the same on the ground of improper venue. Petitioners base their claim on
Condition No. 14 in the tickets issued to respondents which states that “any and all
actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of
where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts of the City of Cebu.” The
motion was denied by the trial court.

Issue
Whether or not Condition No. 14 was valid

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court held that Condition No. 14 was void and
unenforceable for being subversive of the public policy behind transfers of venue
of actions. The philosophy underlying the transfer of venue of actions is the
convenience of the plaintiffs and his witnesses to promote the ends of justice. In
this case, the expense and trouble of a person residing outside Cebu City, where
Condition No. 14 limited the filing of actions to, would probably compel aggrieved
persons to not pursue their claims at all. This condition will defeat, instead of
enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has branches or
offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any
of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was
done in the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice,
petitioner.
 PHILIP L. GO, et al. v. DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT
AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 194024, April 25, 2012
Facts
Phillip Go, one of the incorporators and president of DPDCI, executed a
Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (MDDR) of Phoenix Heights
Condominium, which was filed with the RD. As the developer, DPDCI undertook
the marketing aspect of the project, which included the sale of the units and
distribution of flyers. Thereafter, Phoenix Heights Condominium Corporation
(PHCC) was organized and incorporated. DPDCI turned over to PHCC the
ownership and possession of the units, except for 2 commercial/saleable
units/spaces. Although used by PHCC, DPDCI was assessed association dues for
these units. PHCC then approved a settlement offer from DPDCI for the set-off of
the latter’s association dues arrears with the conversion of several portions of the
condominium into common areas. With conformity of PHCC, DPDCI’s
application for alteration was approved by the HLURB. Petitioners, as
condominium unit owners, filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI
for unsound business practices alleging that DPDCI misrepresented the facilities
and amenities that would be available in the condominium in their brochures and
flyers. The HLURB rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. DPDCI filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The CA ruled again in favor of
DPDCI holding that HLURB had no jurisdiction over this case. Moreover, the CA
held that jurisdiction over PHCC, an indispensable party, had not been acquired in
this case. Petitioners then filed the present action before the SC, arguing that they
were not suing in behalf of PHCC, but in their capacities as condominium unit
owners. DPDCI, on the other hand, contends that HLURB had no jurisdiction over
the complaint filed as the allegations raised therein are in the nature of “intra-
corporate disputes”.

Issue
Whether or not DPDCI was correct

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause
of action. In this case, the complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action
which apparently are not cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the
action and the reliefs sought. Based on the complaint, considering that petitioners,
who are members of the PHCC, are ultimately challenging the agreement entered
into by PHCC with DPDCI, they are, in effect, assailing PHCC’s acts as a body
corporate. This partakes of the nature of an intra-corporate dispute, the jurisdiction
over which is transferred to the RTC. An intra-corporate dispute is one which
"pertains to any of the following relationships: (1) between the corporation,
partnership or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership
or association and the State in so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is
concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders,
partners or associates themselves.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
et al.
G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
Facts
Petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of USD356
million deposited in escrow in the PNB as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were
previously held by 5 account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain
Swiss Banks. Respondents filed their Answers to the same. In paragraph 23 of the
petition for forfeiture, petitioner accused respondents of clandestinely stashing
away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hiding the same under layers upon
layers of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through
their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those foundations or
corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts.
Respondents denied the allegation in this wise: “Respondents specifically DENY
paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the
country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of
foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents'
aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.”

Issue
Whether or not respondents denial is proper

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court found this denial to be a negative pregnant. A
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It
is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. The material allegations in par. 23 of the petition were not specifically
denied. The denial in par. 22 of the Answer was focused on the averment in par. 23
in the petition that respondents clandestinely stashed the country’s wealth in
Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate
entities. Paragraph 22’s denial was pregnant with the admission of the fact that: (a)
the Swiss bank deposits existed; and (b) the estimated sum thereof was USD 356
million as of December 1990.
 EDRON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and EDMER Y. LIM v. THE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, et al.
G.R. No. 220211, June 5, 2017
Facts
Petitioners entered into 3 separate construction agreements with respondent.
Petitioners claimed that despite their completion and respondent’s consequent
acceptance of the works as evidenced by Certificates of Final Acceptance, the
latter had yet to pay the consideration for the construction works. For refusal to pay
despite numerous demands, petitioners filed the instant case for the same plus
damages. Respondent admitted the existence of the aforesaid construction
contracts and raised the following defenses: (a) there is no unpaid balance; (b)
petitioners are liable for underruns and defective works; (c) petitioners had already
waived or abandoned the right to collect any amount on the ground of prescription;
and (d) petitioners failed to observe the specifications in the construction contracts.
More than a year later, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
failure to state cause of action. It argued that Par. 4.3, Article IV of the
construction agreements provide that “final payment to petitioners shall be made
only after the submission of a sworn statement attesting to the fact that all of the
latter’s obligation for labor and materials have been fully paid.” The motion was
denied by the RTC, who later ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondent
to pay. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling and dismissed the case for
lack of cause of action heavily relying on the aforementioned Par. 4.3, Article IV
of the construction agreements.

Issue
Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC

Ruling
Yes. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a Motion to Dismiss or in
the Answer are deemed waived. The exceptions to this rule are: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata;
and/or (d) prescription. As stated above, respondents’ Answer did not raise as an
issue petitioners’ non-execution of the sworn statement pertained to in Par. 4.3,
Article IV of the construction agreement. In fact, such matter was raised only in the
Motion to Dismiss which was belatedly filed as well more than a year after the
filing of the Answer. It must be pointed out, however, that the Motion and the
arguments supporting it cannot be considered as it was filed out of time since the
Rules require that motions to dismiss shall be filed “within the time for but before
the filing of an Answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.”
 MANUEL C. BUNGCAYAO, SR. v. FORT ILOCANDIA PROPERTY
HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010
Facts
Petitioner and other D’Sierto members applied for a foreshore lease
application with the CENRO, for which they were given a provisional permit.
Subsequently, respondent filed a foreshore application over a 14-hectare area
abutting the Fort Ilocandia property, including the 5-hectare portion applied for by
D’Sierto members. This resulted in a conflict as the foreshore lease applications of
the latter fell within the titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for by
respondent. In a luncheon meeting called for the purpose, Atty. Marcos, wife of
Governor Bongbong Marcos, offered P300,000 as financial settlement per claimant
in consideration of the improvements introduced on the condition that the
claimants would vacate the area. Petitioner alleged that his son manifested in the
meeting that he would cal his parents regarding the offer, but Atty. Marcos’ undue
pressure made him sign the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
in favor of respondent. Petitioner then filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
the contract. Respondent countered and interposed 3 counterclaims, viz: (1)
respondent prayed that petitioner be required to return the amount of P400,000 to
respondent; (2) to vacate the portion of respondent’s property he was occupying;
and (3) to pay damages. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, while the CA
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. The CA further found that the counterclaims
raised by respondents were compulsory in nature, as they arose of or were
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and did not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court could not acquire jurisdiction.

Issue
Whether respondent’s counterclaim is compulsory

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court held that of respondent’s 3 counterclaims, only one
remained in force, as the first counterclaim was rendered moot by the issuance of
the 6 November 2003 Order confirming the agreement of the parties to cancel the
Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and to return the P400,000 to
respondent. Respondent also waived and renounced the third counterclaim for
damages.

The only counterclaim that remained was for the recovery of possession of
the subject property. The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive are as follows: (a) Are issues of fact and law raised by
the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendant's claim, absent the compulsory rule? (c) Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as
defendant's counterclaim? (d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and
the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim is compulsory. While this counterclaim was an offshoot of the same
basic controversy between the parties, it is very clear that it will not be barred if
not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Respondent's second
counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is
only a permissive counterclaim. It is not a compulsory counterclaim. It is capable
of proceeding independently of the main case.
 PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. v. FELIX PARAS AND
INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC. and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012
Facts
Paras boarded a bus owned and operated by Inland on his way back to
Manila from Bicol. While the said bus was travelling along Maharlika Highway, it
was bumped at the rear by another bus owned and operated by Philtranco. As a
result of this collision, Inland’s bus smashed onto a cargo truck parked at the outer
right portion of the highway, which caused the death of the Inland truck’s driver,
and severe injuries to Paras which required 2 operations. Paras sued Inland for
damages before the RTC. Inland filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco. In
this third-party complaint, Inland sought to be exonerated from its liabilities to
Paras, asserting that the latter’s cause of action should be directed instead to
Philtranco considering that the accident was caused by Philtranco’s negligence.
The RTC ordered Philtranco and its driver to pay Paras, while the CA affirmed the
same. Before the SC, Philtranco argues that the CA erred in awarding moral
damages to Paras despite the fact that the complaint had been anchored on breach
of contract of carriage.

Issue
Whether or not the lower courts erred

Ruling
No. The requisites for a third-party complaint are: (1) the party to be
impleaded must not yet be a party to the action; (2) claim against the third-party
defendant must belong to the original defendant; (3) claim of the original
defendant against the third-party defendant must be based upon the plaintiff’s
claim against the original defendant; and (4) the defendant is attempting to transfer
to the third-party defendant the liability against him asserted by the plaintiff. The
claim that the third-party complainant asserts against the third-party defendant
must be predicated on substantive law. Here, the substantive law upon which the
claim of Inland is based was Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Paras’
cause of action against Inland (which was for breach of contract of carriage) need
not be the same with Inland’s cause of action against Philtranco and its driver.
 FELIX MARTOS, et al. v. NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS, INC.
G.R. No. 192650, October 24, 2012
Facts
One of the projects of New San Jose Builders (New San Jose) was the San
Jose Plains Project (SJPP) which is also called the “Erap City” wherein New San
Jose agreed to construct low cost housing for the deserving poor families. Due to
lack of funds from the NHA, New San Jose was forced to stop its operations n
SJPP. Consequently, it laid off many of the workers, and issued new appointments
to those retained, including herein petitioner Martos, which indicated therein that
they are project employees. Martos, et al. refused to sign such appointments and
instead filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. The LA declared only
Martos to have been illegally dismissed. Petitioners appealed the dismissal of their
complaints except to that of Martos’. The NLRC ordered that all petitioners be
reinstated to their former positions. The CA held that the NLRC erred in reviving
the complaint of petitioners despite their failure to verify the same. Petitioners
argue before the SC that the lack of a verification is only a formal, and not a
substantial defect which could have been cured by simply requiring them to submit
the required verification.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the complaints filed by
petitioners for their failure to verify their position papers

Ruling
Yes. The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed
in good faith. The absence of proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as
unsigned and dismissible. The lone signature of Martos would have been sufficient
had he shown that he had been properly authorized by the rest of the petitioners.
Considering that the LA’s dismissal was expressly made without prejudice,
petitioners should have corrected the flaw by immediately filing another complaint
this time, with the proper verification.
 GEORGIA T. ESTEL v. RECAREDO P. DIEGO, SR. and RECAREDO R.
DIEGO, JR.
G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012
Facts
Respondents entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land with
petitioner. After receiving the purchase price, petitioner voluntarily surrendered
possession over the said property to herein respondents. Around 8:30 in the
morning of July 20, 1995, petitioner, together with his 2 grown-up sons, uprooted
the fence built by respondents after which they entered the premises, cut the trees,
and destroyed the plants therein. Respondents thus filed a complaint for forcible
entry, among others, against petitioner. The MTCC ruled in respondents’ favor,
while the RTC affirmed such decision, which was also affirmed by the CA
thereafter. Before the SC, petitioner points to the defective verification, and
contends that it should be based upon respondents’ personal knowledge, and not
simply on “knowledge, information, or belief.”

Issue
Whether the verification executed by respondents conformed with the Rules

Ruling
Yes. The verification is substantially complied with when, as in the instant
case, one who has ample knowledge to swear as to the truth of the allegations in
the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when the matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. In this case, the
addition of the words “to the best” before the words “of our own personal
knowledge” did not violate the requirement under the Rules, it being sufficient that
the respondents declared that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct
based on their personal knowledge.
 ATTY. EMMANUEL D. AGUSTIN, et al. v. ALEJANDRO CRUZ-
HERRERA
G.R. No. 174564, February 12, 2014
Facts
The complainants herein, represented by Atty. Agustin, were terminated due
to financial reverses. After verifying from the DOLE that no such financial reverse
were filed by herein respondent Herrera, complainants/petitioners filed an illegal
dismissal case against their former employer, Podden, and respondent Herrera. The
complainants obtained a favorable ruling from the LA, which lapsed into finality
due to lack of appeal taken therefrom. Herrera moved to deny the issuance of the
writ of execution of the LA decision on the ground that 9 of the 11 complainants
had executed waivers and quitclaims rendering any execution of the judgement
inequitable. The LA then reversed itself and sustained the waivers and quitclaims
executed by the complainants. The NLRC reversed the LA for unlawfully
reversing the final LA decision. Herrera filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
assailing the issuances of the NLRC. During the pendency of the petition, however,
a joint compromise agreement was submitted to the CA, who approved the same.
Thus, Atty. Agustin’s present petition before the SC.

Issue
Whether Atty. Agustin’s petition should prosper

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court denied Atty. Agustin’s petition on the ground that it
should have been dismissed outright for being accompanied by a defective
certification against forum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead
of complainants as the principal parties. It is settled that for natural persons, the
certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties, and
not their lawyer. This is because the certification is a peculiar personal
representation of a party, an assurance to the courts that there are no pending cases
involving the same parties, issues, and causes of action. The present case was
found by the SC to be borne out of Atty. Agustin’s belief that the joint compromise
agreement was “unconscionable” as it was relatively smaller than the LA award in
its previous decision.
 PASCUAL AND SANTOS, INC. v. THE MEMBERS OF TRAMO WAKAS
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 144880, November 17, 2004
Facts
Respondents filed a petition before the Presidential Action Center requesting
that ownership over parcels of land in Parañaque City be awarded to them. The
petition was referred to the LMB, who found for respondents. Petitioner then
lodged an appeal before the DENR, who affirmed in toto the LMB. The OP
likewise affirmed the LMB. Petitioner then filed its petition for review before the
CA. The CA dismissed the said petition for defective certification against forum
shopping as Lombos and Pascual, who signed the same, failed to show proof that
they were authorized by petitioner’s board of directors to file such a petition. In
their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner attached a Secretary’s Certificate
showing that petitioner’s BOD approved a resolution appointing Lombos and
Pascual, incumbent directors of the corporation, as its representatives to file the
petition for review before the CA.

Issue
Whether or not petitioners are correct

Ruling
Yes. The requirement that petitioner should sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping applies even to corporations, considering that the mandatory directives of
the Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and juridical persons.
However, the Court nevertheless noted that the subsequent submission of proof of
authority to act on behalf of a petitioner corporation justifies the relaxation of the
rules for the purpose of allowing its petition to be given due course. In this case, it
is undisputed that after the CA’s initial denial of the petition, petitioners attached a
Secretary’s Certificate to their Motion for Reconsideration which evidence their
authority to file the Petition for Review as resolved by its BOD.
 ELSA D. MEDADO v. HEIRS OF LATE ANTONIO CONSING
G.R. No. 186720, February 8, 2012
Facts
Sps. Medado bought from the Estate of Consing a property in Cadiz City.
After the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the property to the DAR for
its Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) program. The Estate of Consing then instituted
an action for rescission and damages before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
00-11320, due to the alleged failure of the spouses to meet the conditions in their
agreement. Fearing that LBP would release the full proceeds of the VOS program
to the Estate of Consing, Sps. Medado instituted Civil Case No. 797-C which
sought to enjoin LBP from releasing the full amount under the VOS program to the
Estate of Consing and instead, release the same to them. The RTC ruled in favor of
Sps. Medado. The Estate of Consing questioned via petition for certiorari the RTC
decision, moving to dismiss the case on the ground of litis pendentia and violation
of the rule against forum shopping. The CA ruled that the RTC erred in taking
cognizance of Civil Case No. 797-C despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 00-
11320 for rescission and damages as it violates the rule on forum shopping. Before
the SC, petitioner contends that the consolidated verification and certification
against forum shopping was defective for being signed only by Soledad, instead of
all petitioners.

Issue
Whether or not the VCNFS is still valid

Ruling
Yes. Soledad signed the VCNFS with an SPA from her co-petitioners, which
included the filing of an appeal before the CA. The SC reiterated that where
petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the subject of
the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners signed the VCNFS will not deter
the court from proceeding with the action.

Nevertheless, the SC held that there was forum shopping in this case. There
is forum shopping where the elements of litis pendentia exist, viz: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interest; (2) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, founded on the same facts; (3) identity of the
aforementioned such that any judgement rendered in one will amount to res
judicata in the other. in this case, there is clearly (1) an identity of parties in Civil
Case Nos. 00-11320 and Civil Case 797-C; (2) there is also an identity of rights
asserted, Sps. Medado as buyers and Estate of Consing as sellers, and reliefs
prayed for with the reliefs founded on the same set of facts; and (3) since both
actions involve a ruling on the validity of the contract, a ruling in one will
necessarily amount to res judicata in the other.
 VIVIAN RAMIREZ, et al. v. MAR FISHING CO., INC., et al.
G.R. No. 168208, June 13, 2012
Facts
Mar Fishing Co. sold its principal assets to Miramar. The proceeds of the
sale would satisfy Mar Fishing Co.’s outstanding obligations to TIDCORP. In a
Memorandum of Agreement between Mar Fishing Labor Union and Miramar, the
latter agreed to absorb the regular rank and file employees of Mar Fishing.
However, petitioners, who were also rank and file employees, were not absorbed
and were not even given their separation pay. Thus, they filed an illegal dismissal
case. the LA ruled in their favor, which had been affirmed by the NLRC. On
appeal to the CA, the latter found that only 3 out of the 228 petitioners signed the
VCNFS. Thus, it instantly dismissed the case against the 225 who failed to sign.
Petitioners moved to reconsider and attached to their MR a verification containing
a VCNFS executed by 161 petitioners. The CA, nevertheless, denied their motion.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case

Ruling
No. A petition for certiorari must be accompanied by a VCNFS. Failure to
comply with this rule shall be a cause for dismissal of the action. Subsequent
compliance with the requirements will not excuse a party’s failure to comply
therewith at the first instance. Thus, on procedural aspects, the CA rightfully
dismissed the case.
 MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., et al. v. EMMA CONCEPCION L.
LIM
G.R. No. 207277, January 16, 2017
Facts
For failure to pay her fire insurance claims, Lin filed a civil case for the RTC
to order Malayan Insurance to make good on the fire insurance claims Lin is
entitled to. Several months later, Lin also filed an administrative case before the IC
against Malayan for unfair claim settlement practice. In the civil case, Malayan
moved to dismiss based on forum shopping, citing the pending administrative case
before the IC. The RTC denied such motion, which was affirmed by the CA
holding that of the three elements of forum shopping only the first, i.e., identity of
parties or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in the subject
matter of the action, is present. There is no identity of rights and reliefs prayed for
because in the civil case, Lin was praying for the recovery of her insurance claims,
while in the administrative case, Lin was praying for the IC to suspend and/or
revoke the license of Malayan Insurance.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. As held in Go v. Ombudsman, a civil case before the trial court
involving the recovery of payment of the insured’s claim can proceed
independently and simultaneously with an administrative case before the IC. The
circumstances in Go are very similar to the case at bar thus, there is no violation of
the rule against forum shopping.
 ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR v. CONSTANTINO ANGELES,
substituted by LUZ G. ANGELES
G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012
Facts
Angeles leased a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila to Galiga. Galiga
allegedly sold the same to herein petitioner Salvador, representing to the latter that
he was the owner of the land. Respondent Angeles sent a letter demanding that
petitioner Salvador vacate the property but to no avail. Thus, Diaz, allegedly in
behalf of respondent Angeles, filed a case for ejectment with the MeTC of Manila
against Salvador, who ruled in favor of respondent Angeles. In his appeal to the
RTC, petitioner Salvador alleged that Diaz, who filed the complaint for ejectment
purportedly in behalf of respondent Angeles, had no authority to do so. The RTC
ignored the same and dismissed the appeal. The CA, in its decision, failed to
discuss the issue altogether.

Issue
Whether or not the lower courts erred

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court held that all the lower courts erred because the
MeTC did not have jurisdiction to entertain the instant case to begin with. A
complaint filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is not authorized to do
so is not deemed filed. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff. At the time
Diaz filed the complaint in behalf of Angeles, Diaz failed to show any proof that
she was authorized to do so. Thus, the MeTC should not have delved into the
merits of the same because legally, there was no complaint to speak of.
 CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERNESTO D. SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 139539, February 5, 2002
Facts
Ceroferr filed a complaint against Santiago for damages and injunction.
Ceroferr averred that Santiago and his agents claimed ownership over a portion of
Lot 68 which had been owned by Ceroferr, and prevented the latter from using it as
a jeepney terminal. In his Answer, Santiago averred that the vacant lot subject of
Ceroferr’s complaint is within his lot, Lot 90. Subsequently, Santiago filed a MD
premised on his argument that the trial court cannot adjudicate the issue of
damages without passing over the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties
over the disputed portion. The trial court thus dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that a Torrens certificate of title is not subject to collateral
attack. The CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

Issue
Whether or not there exists a cause of action in this case

Ruling
Yes. A complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the
essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A complaint states a
cause of action when it has 3 indispensable elements: (a) a right in favor of the
plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect or not violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission by such defendant violating the right of the
plaintiff. Moreover, the test of sufficiency of the facts found in the complaint is
whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgement
upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. In this case, Ceroferr’s cause
of action had been sufficiently established as if it were admitted that the right of
ownership of Ceroferr over the subject portion of Lot 68 had been violated by
Santiago, Ceroferr would be entitled to damages.
 ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v.
LOURDES K. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 176949, June 27, 2012
Facts
Respondent Mendoza, sole proprietor of Highett, alleged that from August 7,
1997 to March 4, 1998, petitioner Asian Construction purchased from Highett
various fabricated steel materials and supplies which Asian Construction failed to
pay despite numerous demands. Asian Construction moved for a bill of particulars,
arguing that Mendoza failed to attach the purchase orders and invoices to her
complaint, which would have enables Asian Construction to prepare an intelligent
responsive pleading. The RTC denied such motion, and Asian Construction filed
its Answer alleging that there is lack of cause of action in this case. The RTC ruled
in favor of Mendoza, which was affirmed by modification by the CA. In the
present action, Asian Construction argues that the charge invoices were not
actionable documents thus, their failure to specifically deny their genuineness and
due execution under oath does not constitute an admission thereof.

Issue
Whether or not the charge invoices are actionable documents

Ruling
Yes. A document is actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon
such written instrument or document. In this case, the charge invoices merely
provide details on the alleged transactions. Thus, these documents need not be
attached to the complaint as they are evidentiary in nature. In fact, respondent’s
cause of action is not based on these documents but on the contract of sale between
her and Asian Construction.
 SPOUSES FERNANDO and MA. ELENA SANTOS v. LOLITA ALCAZAR,
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, DELFIN CHUA
G.R. No. 183034, March 12, 2014
Facts
Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC), filed a complaint against
herein petitioners Sps. Santos for sum of money for the latter’s failure to pay the
value of paint and construction materials they obtained from LCC. Respondent’s
cause of action was based on a document entitled “Acknowledgement” which had
been executed by hand by petitioner Fernando Santos. Alcazar, moreover, claimed
that Sps. Santos obligated themselves to pay 3% interest per month as cost of
money thus, the amount she claimed from petitioenrs is a staggering P 1,465,000.
In their Answer, petitioners sought the dismissal of the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) the actionable document is incorrect as it did not reflect the correct
amount of the loan (which is P600,000 according to petitioners) thus, the
Acknowledgement must be reformed. After presenting Alcazar’s evidence,
petitioners demurred to evidence and argued that the Acknowledgement which was
presented in court was not the original copy and thus, inadmissible. The trial court
denied the demurrer. On the supposed day of petitioners’ presentation of evidence,
both petitioners and their counsel failed to appear. Thus, the trial court declared
that they have waived their right to present evidence and submitting the civil case
for decision. The RTC then ruled in favor of Alcazar. The CA held that petitioners
failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
Acknowledgement thus, they were deemed admitted, there was no need to present
the original thereof, and that petitioners’ liability had been established.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The SC agreed with the CA that since petitioners failed to deny
specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
Acknowledgement in their Answer, the same is deemed admitted. Nevertheless, as
correctly pointed out by petitioners, only petitioner Fernando was liable for the
amount of P 1,465,000 as his spouse, petitioner Ma. Elena, was not a signatory to
the Acknowledgement. Petitioner Ma. Elena, however, may be liable to the amount
of P600,000 which she and Fernando admitted in their Answer. The rule that the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless
the adverse party specifically denies the same under oath, applies only to parties to
the document.
 FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991
Facts
Petitioner Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in RP v. Benjamin
Romualdez, et al. on the theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert with the
principal defendants in the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of
the nation’s wealth, etc.; (2) he acted as dummy, nominee, or agent by allowing
himself to be incorporator, board member, and/or stockholder of corporations
beneficially held by the principal defendants; (3) he took advantage of his position
as COA Chairman, in concert with President Marcos and Imelda Marcos in
facilitating the withdrawals, disbursements, and questionable use of public funds.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Bill of Particulars asking for: (1) the dates of the
resolutions and/or acts which facilitated the withdrawals, disbursements, and
questionable use of public funds; (2) the ministries, Departments, offices or
agencies of the government involved in the questionable use of public funds; (3)
the names of the auditors who had the original jurisdiction over the questionable
withdrawals; and (4) the particular contracts, transactions, corporations, wherein he
acted as a dummy, nominee, or agent, among many others. The Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that the particulars sought by him are
evidentiary in nature. Thus, the instant case where petitioner argues that the
allegations in this case against him pertain only to conclusions of fact and law,
which are not the ultimate facts required by the Rules.

Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan’s denial of petitioner’s motion was correct

Ruling
No. The SC agreed with petitioner. The ultimate facts are the essential facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken
without leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. The evidentiary
facts, on the other hand, are those which are necessary for the determination of the
ultimate facts; the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are based.
Where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of
conclusions, the proper recourse would be not a motion to dismiss but a motion for
bill of particulars. In the present complaint, the allegations that President Marcos
and the defendants, including herein petitioner, “embarked upon a systematic plan
to accumulate ill-gotten wealth” and that said defendants “acted in flagrant breach
of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and
scandalous abuse of right” are mere conclusions of law unsupported by factual
premises. The allegation that petitioner acted as a dummy to be used by the
Marcoses in accumulating ill-gotten wealth is also a conclusion of law without
factual basis. The particulars asked by petitioner are, therefore, not evidentiary in
nature but are material facts that should be definitely averred in the complaint in
order for petitioner to properly and intelligently be informed thereof and prepare
his Answer and defenses.
 D.M. FERRER AND ASSOCAITES CORPORATION v. UNIVERSITY OF
SANTO TOMAS
G.R. No. 189496, February 1, 2012
Facts
Petitioner and UST Hospital, Inc. (USTHI) entered into a Project
Management Contract for the renovation of the 4 th and 5th floors of the UST
hospital. On various dates, petitioner demanded from USTHI the payment of the
construction costs which had been denied by Fr. Dela Rosa, UST’s rector, for lack
of prior approval of the Board of Trustees. Petitioner then filed a complaint for
sum of money against UST and USTHI. In impleading UST, petitioner invoked the
doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil” arguing that UST and USTHI are one and
the same. UST then filed its MD on the ground of failure to state a cause of action,
and that the petitioner’s claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The
RTC dismissed the case and held that UST was not privy to the contract executed
by USTHI and petitioner. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of said
dismissal on the ground that the RTC should have considered only the allegations
in the complaint, and not the attached documents, like the contract between USTHI
and petitioner. The RTC denied the MR, which the CA affirmed.

Issue
Whether or not the lower courts erred

Ruling
Yes. The SC reversed both courts. Only the ultimate facts and not legal
conclusions or evidentiary facts, which should not be alleged in the complaint in
the first place, are considered for purposes of applying the test of sufficiency. The
trial court erred when it relied on the contract executed between petitioner and
USTHI, when the court should have instead considered merely the allegations
stated in the Complaint.
 LA MALLORCA v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. L-20761, July 27, 1966
Facts
Mariano Beltran and his family (plaintiffs) boarded the Pambusco bus bound
for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. When they reached Anao, the plaintiffs alighted
from the bus. Mariano had to go back to the bus as he left his bayong. When he
was on his way, he did not notice that his daughter, Racquel, followed him.
Thereafter, the bus started to move, crushing Racquel. This became the basis of the
plaintiffs’ claim for damages which they sought against defendant. The trial court,
on the basis of these facts, found defendant liable for breach of contract of
carriage. The CA also found La Mallorca guilty of quasi-delict. La Mallorca
contends that the CA erred in holding it liable for quasi-delict despite the
complaint being one for breach of contract.

Issue
Whether or not La Mallorca is correct

Ruling
No. The SC held that the relation between a carrier and a passenger does not
end at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place
selected by the carrier but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time
or opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. What is reasonable depends on a
case to case basis. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the contract of
carriage has already been terminated in this case, herein petitioner could still be
held liable under Art. 2180. Paragraph 7 of the complaint clearly imputes
negligence on the part of the defendants (petitioners). This is sanctioned under the
Rules of Court which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative,
whether they be compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in
the controversy may be resolved and determined.
 ANITA A. LEDDA v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. No. 200868, November 12, 2012
Facts
BPI issued a credit card in favor of Ledda. The latter then defaulted in
payment of her credit card obligation, which BPI claimed in their complaint to be
P548,143.73. Despite demands, Ledda still failed to pay, prompting BPI to file a
case for collection of sum of money against her before RTC Makati. the trial court
initially declared Ledda in default for failing to file the Answer within the
prescribed period of time, despite notice. Nevertheless, it lifted the default order
and admitted Ledda’s Answer Ad Cautelam. While she filed a Pre-trial Brief, her
and her counsel failed to appear during the continuation of the Pre-trial
proceedings, thus, BPI was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The trial court
ruled in favor of BPI, while the CA affirmed the same ruling, rejecting Ledda’s
claim that the ‘Terms and Conditions’ governing the use of the BPI credit card is
an actionable document governed by the Rules.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The SC agreed with the CA that the ‘Terms and Conditions’ was not an
actionable document. BPI’s cause of action is primarily based on: (1) Ledda’s
acceptance of the BPI credit card; (2) Ledda’s use of the BPI credit card; and (3)
her non-payment of the amounts due for the credit card transactions. BPI’s cause
of action is not based solely upon the ‘Terms and Conditions’ thus, the same is not
an actionable document that needs to be set forth and attached to the complaint.
 ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v.
LOURDES K. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 176949, June 27, 2012
Facts
Respondent Mendoza, sole proprietor of Highett, alleged that from August 7,
1997 to March 4, 1998, petitioner Asian Construction purchased from Highett
various fabricated steel materials and supplies which Asian Construction failed to
pay despite numerous demands. Asian Construction moved for a bill of particulars,
arguing that Mendoza failed to attach the purchase orders and invoices to her
complaint, which would have enables Asian Construction to prepare an intelligent
responsive pleading. The RTC denied such motion, and Asian Construction filed
its Answer alleging that there is lack of cause of action in this case. The RTC ruled
in favor of Mendoza, which was affirmed by modification by the CA. In the
present action, Asian Construction argues that the charge invoices were not
actionable documents thus, their failure to specifically deny their genuineness and
due execution under oath does not constitute an admission thereof.

Issue
Whether or not the charge invoices are actionable documents

Ruling
Yes. A document is actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon
such written instrument or document. In this case, the charge invoices merely
provide details on the alleged transactions. Thus, these documents need not be
attached to the complaint as they are evidentiary in nature. In fact, respondent’s
cause of action is not based on these documents but on the contract of sale between
her and Asian Construction.
 BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS and
LOLITA G. TOLEDO
G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against Spouses Manuel and
Lolita Toledo. Respondent Lolita Toledo (Lolita) filed her Answer, alleging that at
the time petitioner filed its complaint against them, her spouse, Manuel Toledo,
had already been dead for 2 years. Petitioner then moved for substitution of
Manuel by his children as party-defendants which the court appeared to have
granted. On 07 October 2004, after requesting for extension of time to file their
demurrer to evidence, respondent Lolita filed a MD arguing, among others, that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel. The trial court
denied the MD for being filed out of time. Lolita then filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA, who granted the same and held that since the issue on jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal, by
timely raising the issue on her MD, Lolita is not estopped from questioning the
trial court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, since Manuel had already been dead at the time
the complaint was filed, petitioner should have impleaded his estate as an
indispensable party.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case
is not one of those defenses that are deemed waived under Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, they must be raised in the Answer or in a MD, otherwise, it
is deemed waived. In this case, Lolita raised such defense in a belatedly filed MD.
She should have raised the same at the time she filed her Answer. Moreover, the
SC held that Lolita could not even claim such defense as the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which
can only be set up by the party who can thereby waive it by silence. In any case,
the SC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Manuel as there was no valid
service of summons upon him for the simple reason that he was already dead at the
time the case was instituted. Lastly, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable
party in this case because the liability of Manuel and Lolita is solidary, therefore,
the collection case can proceed and can be satisfied by Lolita only.
 FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION v. FORBES PARK
ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 133119, August 17, 2000
Facts
The USSR owns a residential lot in Forbes Park, Makati City. USSR then
engaged the services of Financial Building for the construction of a multi-level
office and staff apartment building at the said lot. Forbes Park reminded the USSR
of its existing regulations authorizing only the construction of single-family
residential buildings in each lot within the village. Financial Building then
submitted to the Makati City Government a second building plan for the
construction of a multi-level apartment building which was different from the first
plan for the construction of a residential building submitted to Forbes Park. The
latter discovered this, and enjoined Financial Building from further work. Financial
Building then filed before the RTC a complaint for damages and injunction against
Forbes Park. The latter filed a MD on the ground of lack of cause of action stating
that Financial Building was not the real party-in-interest. The RTC issued a WPI
but the CA reversed the same and dismissed the case altogether. To vindicate its
rights, Forbes Park filed a complaint against Financial Building for damages before
the Makati RTC. The trial court ruled in favor of Forbes Park, which was affirmed
by the CA.

Issue
Whether or not the case is barred due to Forbes Park’s failure to set it up as a
compulsory counterclaim in the earlier case instituted by Financial Bank

Ruling
Yes. A compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action
but it should instead be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or
occurrence, which gave rise to it. The tests to determine whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or not, we have devised the following tests: (1) Are the issues of fact
or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (4) Is there any
logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? Affirmative answers to
the above queries indicate the existence of a compulsory counterclaim. The earlier
civil case and the instant case arose from the same occurrence – the construction
work done by Financial Building in USSR’s lot in Forbes Park. The issues of fact
and law in both cases are identical. The factual issue is whether the structures
erected by Financial Building violate Forbes Park’s rules and regulations, whereas
the legal issue is whether Financial Building, as an independent contractor working
for the USSR, could be enjoined from continuing with the construction and be held
liable for damages if it is found to have violated Forbes Park’s rules. The two cases
also involve the same parties.

Lastly, the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint is an implied waiver

of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the motion ultimately results
in the dismissal of the counterclaim – they are incompatible remedies. The ground
for dismissal invoked by Forbes Park in the earlier civil case was lack of cause of
action, which need not be pleaded since the same is not deemed waived even if not
pleaded. Forbes Park, however, exercised bad judgement in still filing a MD. Thus,
it has only itself to blame for its predicament.
 NATIVIDAD LIM v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, et al.
G.R. No. 178789, November 14, 2012
Facts
NPC filed an expropriation case against Lim before RTC Pangasinan.
Subsequently respondent Sps. Arcinue filed a motion for leave to admit their
complaint-in-intervention, which alleged that they were the owners of one of the
lots in the expropriation proceeding. The RTC ordered NPC and Lim to file their
Answers. NPC and Lim both failed to file their Answers. After 10 months, the
Arcinues filed a motion for judgement by default. At the scheduled hearing
therefor, Lim’s counsel failed to appear. Thus, the RTC declared Lim in default.
Lim moved for the RTC to reconsider such default order, but the RTC denied such
motion. The CA affirmed the RTC’s order of default. Lim argues that failure to file
an answer-in-intervention will not give rise to default.

Issue
Whether Lim’s argument is tenable

Ruling
No. The Rules require the original parties to file an Answer to the
complaint-in-intervention within 15 days from notice of the order admitting the
same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. Thus, Lim’s failure to file the
required Answer did give rise to her default.
 MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION, et al. v. THE MANILA
BANKING CORPORATION, et al.
G.R. No. 195592, September 5, 2012
Facts
For failure to pay their outstanding obligations despite demands, herein
respondent The Manila Banking Corp. (TMBC) filed the instant complaint for sum
of money against herein petitioners. Instead of filing a responsive pleading with the
RTC, however, the petitioners filed on 12 October 2000, beyond the 15-day
reglementary period within which the responsive pleading should have been filed,
a motion for leave to admit the attached motion to dismiss and the said MD. The
RTC rendered an Order declaring petitioners in default, finding that the summons
had been served by way of substituted service to one Linda Manlimos on 19
September 2000. Thus, petitioners should have filed their responsive pleading on
02 October 2000. Petitioners’ MR was denied hence, they filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA which was likewise denied. The SC denied petitioners’
petition for review for lack of merit.

Meanwhile, TMBC was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before RTC
Makati Presiding Judge Oscar B. Pimentel. The RTC ruled in favor of TMBC.
Petitioners then appealed said RTC decision to the CA imputing error on the RTC
in, among others, declaring them in default. The CA dismissed their appeal.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred

Ruling
No. The SC ruled that the issue regarding the declaration of petitioners in
default had already been settled in its very own Resolutions. Where defendants,
like petitioners, are declared by the trial court in default, they thereby lose their
right to object to the reception of the plaintiff’s evidence establishing his cause of
action. Thus, since they are deemed to have failed to object to TMBC’s evidence in
this case, the SC found no reason to deviate from the RTC’s ruling.
 SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUEL v. RAMON ONG
G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
Facts
Ong filed against Sps. Manuel before the RTC of Benguet a complaint for
accion reivindicatoria. On 03 February 2010, summons was issued to Sps. Manuel.
Subsequently, Ong moved to declare Sps. Manuel in default. The sheriff’s return
reveals that on 12 February 2010, the sheriff attempted to personally serve
summons upon Sps. Manuel at their address. However, they requested that
summons be made at another time due to the fact that Sandra Manuel’s mother was
critically ill. On 16 March 2010, another attempt at serving the summons was
made. After sheriff Sales explained to petitioner Sandra Manuel the contents of the
summons and the complaint, the latter refused to receive the same. Sheriff Sales
was thus forced to merely tender the summons and advise petitioner Sandra to file
their answer within 15 days. As Sps. Manuel utterly failed to do so, they were
declared in default by the RTC upon Ong’s motion. Sps. Manuel filed a motion to
lift the order declaring them in default, interposing the following defenses: (1) they
alleged that it was the siblings of Sandra Manuel who resided in the address stated
in the summons; (2) Ong and his companions mistook Sandra’s siblings as Sandra
when they served the summons; and (3) they only subsequently received via
registered mail copies of a compliance and manifestation filed by Ong and the
RTC order setting the presentation of evidence ex parte. The RTC denied their
motion on the ground that their motion was not sworn to and that they did not
show that their failure to file an answer was due to “fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence”. The CA denied for lack of merit Sps. Manuel’s petition for
certiorari.

Issue
Whether the CA erred

Ruling
No. Preliminarily, the SC determined that the RTC had acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of Sps. Manuel when it served the summons on 16 March 2000.
The SC held that Sheriff Sales’ service of summons upon petitioner Sandra
enjoyed the presumption of regularity, and it was incumbent upon petitioners to
prove otherwise. The SC held that petitioners were not entitled to relief from order
of default. There are 3 requisites in order to warrant the lifting of a default order:
(1) it must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts;
(2) it must be shown that the failure to file the answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the
existence of a meritorious defense. it is through an affidavit of merit that a
defendant seeking relief from an order of default shows that "the failure to file
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence."

In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the Spouses Manuel’s motion to
lift order of default was not made under oath. The motion was not accompanied by
an affidavit of merit specifying the facts which would show that their non-filing of
an answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2010 was due to fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
 PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY v. PHILIPPINE GOLF
DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 176628, March 19, 2012
Facts
Phil. Tourism Authority (PTA) entered into a contract with Atlantic
Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the expansion of the Intramuros Golf Course. Since AEI
could not construct the golf course aspect of the project, it subcontracted with
PhilGolf. The latter then sued PTA for collection of sum of money before the RTC
Muntinlupa. PTA, despite 2 extensions of time, failed to file its Answer. Thus, the
RTC declared PTA in default. PTA seasonably filed an appeal before the CA.
However, pending such appeal, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC and a
notice of garnishment was issued against PTA’s LBP account. PTA filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA imputing error on the RTC for granting the writ of
execution despite the pendency of its appeal. The CA ruled in favor of PTA and set
aside the RTC decision. Curiously, PTA withdrew its appeal from the RTC
decision and instead, filed a petition for annulment of judgement under Rule 47,
premised on the fact that PTA’s default was due to the gross negligence of its
counsel. The CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgement for lack of
merit.

Issue
Whether or not annulment of judgement is the proper remedy

Ruling
No. Annulment of judgement under Rule 47 is a recourse equitable in
character and is allowed only in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of petitioner. In this case, an appeal was available as a
remedy. There was also no extraordinary reason for an annulment of judgement.
The Court is actually at a loss why PTA had withdrawn a properly filed appeal and
substituted it with another petition, when PTA could have merely raised the same
issues through an ordinary appeal.
 LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA
DIONA v. ROMEO A. BALANGUE, et al.
G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013
Facts
Respondents obtained a loan of P45,000 from petitioner payable in 6 months
and secured by a REM over their property in Valenzuela. When the debt became
due, respondents failed to pay, prompting petitioner to file a complaint praying for
respondents to be ordered to pay the principal obligation of P45,000 with interest
at 12% per annum. For failure to file their answer, and upon motion by petitioner,
respondents were declared by the RTC in default. In a Decision dated October 17,
2000 (Oct. 17 Decision), the RTC granted petitioner’s complaint ordering
respondents to pay the P45,000 plus 5% monthly interest from March 2, 1991 until
fully paid. Petitioner then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution in view of
respondents’ failure to appeal the Oct. 17 Decision despite the receipt thereof by
their counsel. The RTC issued a writ of execution. However, since the writ could
not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction of the properties subjected
to the REM. Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgement and to
Set Aside Execution Sale. In view of the same, the RTC thus reduced the interest
rate from 5% monthly to 12% per annum. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA,
who declared that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the grossly
excessive 5% interest per month. Petitioner now comes before the SC invoking the
doctrine of immutability of judgements.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred

Ruling
Yes. The SC held that the RTC erred in awarding the grossly
unconscionable interest of 5% monthly. The Rules of Court provide that a
judgement rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount nor be
different from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages. In this case,
petitioner only prayed in her complaint for payment of the P45,000 with interest at
the rate of 12% per annum. She did not allege nor pray for the disputed 5%
monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly,
the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and
disregards due process.
 REBECCA T. ARQUERO v. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Thirteenth
Division), et al.
G.R. No. 168053, September 21, 2011
Facts
Congress approved RA 6765 entitled "An Act Integrating Certain High
Schools in the City of Puerto Princesa and in the Province of Palawan with the
Palawan National School and Appropriating Funds Therefor," which integrated
with the Palawan National School (PNS) various schools as branches thereof. The
law provides that the Palawan Integrated National Schools (PINS) shall be headed
by a Vocational School Superintendent (VSS) who shall be chosen and appointed
by the DepEd Secretary. No VSS was appointed, instead, the DECS Region IV
Office designated then PNS Principal Eugenio J. Dela Cuesta in a concurrent
capacity as OIC of the PINS. After Dela Cuesta’s retirement, petitioner Arquero
took over as Secondary School Principal of the PNS. She was thereafter appointed
by DECS Region IV as OIC of the PINS. On 19 September 2002, Dr. Giron
withdrew the designation of petitioner as OIC of PINS and enjoined her from
submitting to the RO all appointments and personnel movement involving the PNS
and the satellite schools. Subsequently, DepEd Secretary designated Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent Norma Brillantes in a concurrent capacity as OIC
of the PINS. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondents,
including Norma Brillantes, alleging that the latter’s designation violated
petitioner’s security of tenure for she was allegedly designated in a permanent
capacity thus, null and void. The respondents failed to file their Answers thus,
were declared in default. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a judgement by default.
The CA, however, reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. Petitioner insists that
respondents could not appeal after being declared in default.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner is correct

Ruling
No. The SC held that a defendant declared in default retains the right to
appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove
the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law,
even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default
except that he does not regain his right to adduce evidence.
 LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. BDO, et al.
G.R. No. 14264, April 23, 2012
Facts
Petitioner Lisam Enterprises, Inc. (LEI) through Lolita Soriano, a
stockholder thereof, filed a complaint against herein respondents for annulment of
mortgage with the RTC of Cebu City, after it had found that the late Leandro
Soriano, Jr., and defendant Lilian Soriano, as president and treasurer, respectively,
of LEI, without authority and consent of the board, and with the use of a falsified
board resolution, executed a REM over a parcel of land owned by LEI in Legaspi
City to secure a loan which Sps. Leandro and Lilian obtained in their personal
capacities. Respondents Lilian Soriano and the Estate of Leandro Soriano filed an
Answer, while respondent PCIB file a MD arguing that Lolita Soriano had no legal
capacity to sue. The RTC dismissed the complaint. Pending the resolution of their
MR, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint which included the
following allegation: “that plaintiff Lolita Soriano made demands upon the BOD of
LEI to make the necessary legal steps to protect the interest of the corporation from
the fraudulent transaction, but unfortunately until now, no such legal step was ever
taken by the Board hence, this action for and in behalf of the corporation.” The
RTC refused to admit the Amended Complaint because the same absolutely
changed petitioner’s cause of action.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred in refusing to admit the Amended Complaint

Ruling
No. While it may be true that the granting of leave to file amended
complaints after a responsive pleading has been filed is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, the SC said that the courts should be liberal in allowing
amendments to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on
the merits without unnecessary delay. In this case, since trial proper had not yet
even begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover,
doing so would have served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the
best opportunity for the issues among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and
the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the SC overruled the trial court's
denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and orders the admission of
the same.
 MA. MERCEDES BARBA v. LICEO DE CAGAYAN UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. 193857, November 28, 2012
Facts
Barba used to be the Dean of the College of Physical Therapy of Liceo De
Cagayan University (LDCU). However, due to the significant drop in the number
of enrollees, the College of Physical Therapy ceased its operations thus, LDCU
made Barba an instructor in the College of Nursing and directed her to report to the
latter’s dean. Barba argued that this amounted to constructive dismissal, and filed a
case before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter found that LDCU did not
constructively dismiss Barba. The NLRC reversed the LA and found that Barba
had been constructively dismissed. LDCU filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA arguing that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
Thereafter, LDCU filed a Supplemental Petition arguing that the LA did not have
jurisdiction over the case because Barba’s position as dean is considered a
corporate office. The CA did not give credence to this argument and held that the
By-laws of LCDU merely provided for the position of a College Director which is
available only for a single person. If it was LCDU’s intent to have all college deans
as college directors, LCDU should have amended its By-laws. Moreover, the CA
held that it is too late for LCDU to assert lack of jurisdiction as it actively
participated in the proceedings before the NLRC and LA, and did not raise the said
issue before said tribunals. The CA, however, thereafter abandoned the said
Decision after the MR filed by LCDU and held this time that Barba was a
corporate officer.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. The SC upheld the CA’s prior decision. The SC held that the CA
correctly ruled that Barba could not be deemed to be a college director for her
appointment as dean did not specify that she was appointed also as college
director. Moreover, it agreed with the CA that LCDU should have amended its By-
laws if it considers its deans to be its College Directors. Lastly, the SC agreed with
the CA in holding that LCDU is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
NLRC and the CA. Under the Rules, the admission of supplemental pleadings is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Nevertheless, as found above, the
SC gave no credence to LCDU’s assertion that Barba was a corporate officer.
 CENTRAL BANK BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS v. BANCO FILIPINO
SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK
G.R. No. 173399, February 21, 2017
Facts
Banco Filipino filed 3 complaints against CB and its MB for the latter to
annul its resolutions: (a) placing it under conservatorship; (b) placing it under
receivership and ordering its closure; and (c) ordering its liquidation. It eventually
reached the Supreme Court which annulled the resolution ordering Banco
Filipino’s closure and placing it under receivership. On 1994, pursuant to said SC
decision, CB allowed Banco Filipino to resume its business. Thereafter, Banco
Filipino moved for the trial court to admit the Second Amended/Supplemental
Complaint in the 3 consolidated cases before the trial court based, primarily, on
grounds which occurred after 1994, when it resumed business. The CB-BOL,
substituting the CB and MB, opposed the admission of the Second
Amended/Supplemental Complaint on the following grounds: (a) it raised new and
independent causes of action against BSP – who was not an original party; (b) the
Second complaint violated the rules on joinder of parties for it alleged causes of
action which did not arise out of the same contract, transaction, or relation; (c) the
admission of the Second complaint would result to an expansion of the scope of
dispute to include new causes of action not previously included. The RTC,
nevertheless, still admitted the same. The CA affirmed said admission.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The SC held that amendment is not allowed if the purpose is to set up a
cause of action not existing at the time of the filing of the complaint. In this case,
the cause of action for the Second Amended Complaint clearly arose after the filing
of the original complaint.

The SC also held that a supplemental complaint must be founded on the same
cause of action as that raised in the complaint. The matter newly raised must be
germane and intertwined with the cause of action stated in the original complaint
so that the principal and core issues raised by the parties in their original pleadings
remain the same. In this case, Banco Filipino attempted to raise new and
independent causes of action which arose only in the year 1994, which had no
relation whatsoever to the original complaint. If this was to be allowed, there
would be no end to amending pleadings.
 SPOUSES VILLUGA v. KELLY HARDWARE & CONSTRUCTION
SUPPLY, et al.
G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012
Facts
Kelly Hardware sued Sps. Villuga for the amount of P259,809.50 as value of
the construction materials the latter purchased from the former. In their Answer,
Sps. Villuga argued that they made partial payments in the amounts of
P110,301.80 and P20,000. Nevertheless, they manifested their willingness to pay
P259,809.50 to buy peace. Kelly Hardware filed an Amended Complaint arguing
that the original obligation was P279,809.50 and Sps. Villuga paid P20,000 thus,
the balance of P259,809.50. Kelly Hardware thereafter filed a Request for
Admission for Sps. Villuga to admit the genuineness of various documents.
Thereafter, Kelly Hardware filed Second Amended Complaint modifying the
period covered by the original complaint and arguing that the P110,301.80 was
applied to other obligations. It reiterated that Sps. Villuga’s obligations still
amounted to P259.809.50. The RTC ruled in favor of Kelly Hardware, which the
CA affirmed. Before the SC, Sps. Villuga argued that Kelly Hardware waived its
Request ofr Admission when it filed the Second Amended Complaint and that all
motions and requests based on the complaint, which was amended, should no
longer be considered.

Issue
Whether or not Sps. Villuga’s contentions are tenable

Ruling
No. An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However,
admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the
pleader; and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended
pleading shall be deemed waived. From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent's
Request for Admission is not deemed abandoned or withdrawn by the filing of the
Second Amended Complaint.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148154, December 17, 2007
Facts
In this complaint for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, former GSIS chief
Roman Cruz, Jr. in blatant abuse of his position as Chairman and General Manager
of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as President and Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), and as Executive
Officer of the Commercial Bank of Manila, by himself and/or in unlawful concert
with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, was charged for the
following acts: (1) the purchase of a lot and building in California using GSIS
funds and Cruz's allowing Lichauco as broker in the sale of the lot and building
contrary to PAL policies; (2) Cruz's appropriating to himself CBM funds; (3)
Cruz's disbursement of P81,152 CBM funds for personal services rendered to him
by Tuazon; (4) Cruz's entering into an agency agreement for GSIS with IFC to
solicit, insure, and effect reinsurance of GSIS, as result of which IFC effected a
great part of its reinsurance with INRE Corporation, a London- registered non-
insurance company, of which Cruz was one of the directors; (5) Cruz's allowing
IFC to service the accounts emanating from government agencies which were
required under the law to insure and deal directly with the GSIS for their insurance
needs; (6) the GSIS-AIC agreement wherein GSIS ceded and conveyed to AIC five
parcels of land in Manila in exchange for AIC's Pinugay Estate in Tanay, Rizal;
and (7) PAL's purchase of three Airbus 300 jets for a higher price than the market
price. Respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the executor of the Estate of former
President Marcos, seeks to clarify his father’s participation in the foregoing via a
motion for bill of particulars. The Sandiganbayan granted such motion, and held
that the accusations did not specify the ultimate facts of former President Marcos'
participation in Cruz's alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, effectively
preventing respondent from intelligently preparing an answer.

Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the motion

Ruling
Yes. While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear,
they were vague and unclear as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were
allegedly "in unlawful concert with" the former. There was no factual allegation in
the original and expanded complaints on the collaboration of or on the kind of
support extended by former President Marcos to Cruz in the commission of the
alleged unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the allegations against
the Marcoses, aside from being maladroitly laid, were couched in general terms.
 BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.
G.R. No. 89070, May 18, 1992
Facts
Peter Cosalan was the General Manager of Benguet Electric Cooperative
(Beneco). In several COA audit memorandums, the COA noted several
discrepancies committed by Cosalan, such as: (a) writing off cash advances of
employees and officers of Beneco without NEA’s approval; (b) inconsistencies
between the per diems and allowances received by officials and Board Members of
Beneco with the directives of the NEA; and (c) irregularities in the use of funds
amounting to P37 million released by NEA to Beneco. Thereafter, the Board
Members of Beneco issued several resolutions, one of which ousted Cosalan as
GM. Despite the same, however, Cosalan continued to work. When Cosalan
demanded his compensation from Beneco, the latter denied the same, thus,
compelling Cosalan to file a case with the NLRC assailing the legality of his
suspension and termination and demanding the release of his compensation. He
also thereafter prayed for reinstatement. The LA ruled for Cosalan’s reinstatement
and the payment of his backwages and allowances. The Board Members appealed
to the NLRC via Memorandum of Appeal. The NLRC modified the LA judgement
holding Beneco alone liable for Cosalan’s backwages and allowances. Beneco
comes before the SC arguing that the NLRC erred in entertaining the Board
Members’ appeal despite being filed out of time.

Issue
Whether or not Beneco’s claims are tenable

Ruling
Yes. The Board Members received the LA decision on 21 April. Thus, they
had until 01 May to file their appeal. Considering, however, that 01 May is a
holiday, they had until 02 May to file the same. The Board Members, however,
were able to post the memorandum of appeal via registered mail only on 03 May.
Thus, it was filed out of time. The SC disagreed with the Board Members’
contention that the memorandum of appeal was filed on time as it was received by
Garcia Communications Company, a licensed private letter courier, on 01 May.
The SC held that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding
agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such
cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the
private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading. Moreover, the Board
Members’ contention runs counter to the rule that transmission through a private
carrier or letter-forwarder – instead of the Philippine Post Office – is not a
recognized mode of filing pleadings.
 SALVADOR O. MOJAR, et al. v. AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY
SERVICE AGENCY, INC.
G.R. No. 187188, June 27, 2012
Facts
Mojar, et al. were security guards in the employ of Agro Commercial. They
were originally assigned in various branches of the Bank of Commerce in
Pangasinan, La Union, and Ilocos Sur. In separate office orders, Mojar, et al. were
directed to report to their new assignments in Metro Manila. Thereafter, Mojar, et
al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC claiming that their
reassignments were due to their pressing claim for salary differential against Agro
Commercial. The LA found that Mojar, et al. were illegally dismissed. The NLRC
affirmed the LA’s decision. Agro Commercial moved for an extension of time to
file its appeal before the CA, which was granted. Thereafter, Agro Commercial
filed its appeal. After noting Mojar, et al.’s failure to file their Comment to the
Petition raised by Agro, the CA reversed the NLRC decision.

Mojar manifested before the CA that he and the other petitioners had not
been served a copy of the CA Petition. He also said that they were not aware
whether their counsel before the NLRC, Atty. Jose C. Espinas, was served a copy
thereof, since the latter had already been bedridden since December 2007 until his
demise on "25 February 2008." Neither could their new counsel, Atty. Mario G.
Aglipay, enter his appearance before the CA, as petitioners failed to "get [the]
folder from the office of Atty. Espinas, as the folder can no longer be found."

Issue
Whether or not service was validly made

Ruling
Yes. The SC held that service in this case was validly made to Atty. Espinas,
Mojar, et al.’s counsel. In the CA Resolution dated 16 March 2009, the appellate
court stated that Atty. Espinas was duly served a copy of the following: CA
Resolution dated 20 February 2008 granting respondent’s Motion for Extension of
Time to file the CA Petition; CA Resolution dated 24 April 2008 requiring
petitioners to file their Comment on the CA Petition; and CA Resolution dated 30
June 2008, submitting the case for resolution, as no comment was filed. Such
service to their counsel of record was sufficient and consistent with the rule that if
a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall
be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party is
specifically ordered by the court. It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during
the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the
litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether
its associates are still connected with the firm.
 MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN v. FRANCISCO DOLOR (substituted by his
heirs) and HERMOGENA DOLOR
G.R. No. 198120, February 20, 2017
Facts
The Dolor spouses alleged that a parcel of land in Novaliches, Quezon City,
had been sold to them by Manuel Cammayo. They also alleged that they
authorized Cecillo Manzanilla and his family to occupy the said lot. To their
surprise, however, Gatmaytan filed an ejectment suit against Encarnacion vda. De
Manzanilla and her family claiming ownership over the parcel of land in question.
This became the basis for the Dolor spouses’ complaint against Gatmaytan and
Cammayo for reconveyance and damages. On March 27, 2006, the RTC rendered a
Decision in favor of the Dolor spouses, and ordering Gatmaytan to reconvey said
property to the former. On June 16, 2006, Gatmaytan filed her MR, which was
denied by the RTC. On appeal to the CA, the CA noted that the RTC decision had
already attained finality as of the time Gatmaytan filed her MR on June 16, 2006.
In the Resolution of Gatmaytan’s MR, the CA noted that a certain Maricel Luis
received a copy of the RTC decision on April 14, 2006. Before the SC, Gatmaytan
argues that on June 8, 2004, she filed a Notice of Change of Address of Counsel,
which the RTC noted. Despite this, however, the RTC still served a copy of its
March 27, 2006 decision on the former address of Gatmaytan’s counsel at No. 117
West Avenue, Quezon City on April 14, 2006. Gatmaytan, moreover, alleged that
her counsel only received a copy of the Decision on June 1, 2006.

Issue
Whether or not the service made by the RTC was effectual

Ruling
No. The SC held that the service made by the RTC to the former address of
Gatmaytan’s counsel was ineffectual. Nevertheless, the SC held that Gatmaytan
could not interpose the present appeal because she failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that service was, indeed, made on her counsel’s updated address
on June 1, 2006. Without proof of the date Gatmaytan’s counsel actually received
the RTC decision, it is impossible to reckon whether or not her MR to the RTC
decision was timely filed.
 PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. JULIE CHANDUMAL
G.R. No. 195619, September 5, 2012
Facts
The case stemmed from a contract to sell between BF Homes (as seller, later
substituted by PDB by virtue of assignment) and Chandumal (as buyer). Due to
Chandumal’s failure, despite demand, to settle her outstanding obligations to PDB,
an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession
was filed by PDB against Chandumal. Summons were served by deputy Sheriff
Galing to Chandumal. According to his return, Sheriff Galing attempted to
personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on July 15, 19 and 22, 1999 but it
was unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff
caused substituted service of summons on August 5, 1999 by serving the same
through Chandumal’s mother who acknowledged receipt thereof. For failure to pay
her Answer on time, Chandumal was declared in default, and a judgement by
default had been rendered against her by the RTC. On appeal to the CA, the latter
nullified the RTC decision due to invalid and ineffective substituted service of
summons. For her part, Chandumal asserts that she never received a copy of the
summons or was ever notified of it and she only came to know of the case
sometime in July or August 2000, but she was already in the United States of
America by that time, and that the CA correctly ruled that there was no valid
service of summons; hence, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

Issue
Whether or not there was a valid substituted service of summons

Ruling
No. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines,
service of summons may be made through personal service, that is, summons shall
be served by handing to the defendant in person a copy thereof, or if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant cannot be personally
served with summons within a reasonable time, it is then that substituted service
may be made. In this case, there was invalid substituted service of summons. In
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid
substituted service of summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of
prompt personal service – the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff
must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service; (2) specific details in the return – the sheriff must describe in the
Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service; (3) a person of suitable age and discretion – the sheriff must
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is
of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether
said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his
duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of
said receipt of summons, which matters must be clearly and specifically described
in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons. In this case, none of these requisites were complied with. The Return of
Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of
efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process server in attempting to
serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return merely states the
alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.
 MA. TERESA CHAVEZ BIACO v. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL
BANK
G.R. No. 161417, February 8, 2007
Facts
Due to failure to pay their loans with Phil. Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB),
the latter instituted a complaint for foreclosure of real estate mortgage which the
Sps. Biaco executed as security for their loan. Summons were served through
Ernesto at his office. Ernesto received the same but for unknown reasons, he failed
to file an Answer. Hence, Sps. Biaco were declared in default, upon motion of
PCRB, and the latter was allowed to present its evidence ex parte. The trial court
rendered a decision ordering Sps. Biaco to pay their outstanding obligations within
90-100 days and, in case of failure, their property subjected to REM would be sold
at an auction sale. Ma. Teresa Biaco sought to have the RTC decision annulled on
the ground that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the proceedings,
and that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not
personally served with summons. On the validity of summons, the CA held that
since judicial foreclosure proceedings were actions quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
her person is not required. The purpose of notifying her was nevertheless for
purposes of due process.

Issue
Whether or not a judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem

Ruling
Yes. The SC held that a judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in
rem. Thus, jurisdiction over the person of Biaco is not required, it being sufficient
that the trial court had jurisdiction over the res. Nevertheless, the trial court noted
that Ma. Teresa Biaco was not afforded due process because she was not
sufficiently informed of the present case. The violation of petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of summons
on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court. There is more, the
trial court granted respondent PCRB’s ex-parte motion for deficiency judgment
and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the spouses Biaco to satisfy
the remaining balance of the award. In short, the trial court went beyond its
jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal judgment against the spouses
Biaco.
 BOBIE ROSE D. V. FRIAS, as represented by MARIE REGINE F. FUJITA
v. ROLANDO F. ALCAYDE
G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018
Facts
For Alcayde’s refusal to pay the rentals pursuant to the contract of lease he
entered into with Frias, Alcayde was forced to institute an action for unlawful
detainer against Alcayde. In that case, the MeTC ordered Alcayde to vacate the
premises and pay Frias his outstanding obligations. Alcayde then filed a Petition
for Annulment of Judgement averring that the MeTC’s decision was not binding
upon him since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. A copy of the
petition for annulment of judgment was allegedly served to the petitioner. Based on
the Officer’s Return14 dated July 27, 2007, Sheriff IV Jocelyn S. Tolentino
(Sheriff Tolentino) caused the "service of a Notice of Raffle and Summons
together with a copy of the complaints and its annexes" to the petitioner, through
Sally Gonzales (Ms. Gonzales), the secretary of petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Daniel
S. Frias (Atty. Frias).

The RTC then issued a TRO enjoining the MeTC from enforcing its assailed
decision. Thereafter, Frias filed a Preliminary Submission to dismiss the Petition
for Annulment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. She assails the
mode by which service of summons was made, as the sheriff allegedly did not
exert sufficient efforts in locating her, and did not certify that Ms. Gonzales was
one with whom Frias had a relation of confidence. The RTC initially granted the
Preliminary Submission and dismissed the Petition for Annulment but after
receiving the comment of Alcayde thereto, reversed itself. The CA likewise denied
Frias’ petition for certiorari.

Issue
Whether or not jurisdiction over the person of Frias had been acquired

Ruling
No. The SC held that the nature of a petition for annulment of judgement is
one in personam for the following reasons: First, To consider a petition for
annulment of judgment as either in rem or quasi- in-rem, would create an absurdity
wherein the petitioner would simply file the petition in court, without informing
the respondent of the same, through a valid service of summons. Second, a petition
for annulment of judgement will not be binding upon the whole world, but will
affect the parties in the case alone. In this case, had the RTC granted the
respondent’s petition, the MeTC’s July 26, 2006 judgment would have been
declared a nullity. This would have resulted to the following consequences: as to
the respondent, he would no longer be required to pay the rentals and vacate the
subject property; and, as to the petitioner, she would be deprived of her right to
demand the rentals and to legally eject the respondent. Clearly, through the RTC’s
judgment on the petition, only the parties’ interest, i.e., rights and obligation,
would have been affected. Thus, a petition for annulment of judgment is one in
personam. It is neither an action in rem nor an action quasi in rem.
 ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL and FATIMA A. AFDAL v. ROMEO CARLOS
G.R. No. 173379, December 1, 2010
Facts
Carlos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners claiming
that they were merely occupying, by means of tolerance, a parcel of land in Carlos’
name. Per the records, there were 3 attempts to serve the summons and complaint
to the petitioners – 14 January, and 3 and 18 February. The MTC ruled in favor of
Carlos. Petitioners, after realizing that an earlier petition for relief they filed with
the MTC is a prohibited pleading, filed a petition for relief from the MTC
judgement before the RTC, which the latter dismissed, alleging that they were not
properly served with summons.

Issue
Whether jurisdiction over Carlos had been acquired

Ruling
No. The SC held that an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a
real action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal
obligation on the defendant for the latter to vacate the property subject of the
action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages
by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.
Record shows that there were three attempts to serve the summons to the
defendants. The first was on January 14, 2004 where the same was unserved. The
second was on February 3, 2004 where the same was served to one Gary Akob and
the last was on February 18, 2004 where the return was duly served but refused to
sign. The SC held that the sheriff failed to comply with the requisites set forth by it
in the case of Manotoc in that the process server failed to specify Gary Acob’s
age, his relationship to petitioners and to ascertain whether he comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to deliver it to petitioners
or at least notify them of said receipt of summons.
 HENRY S. OAMINAL v. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and GUIA S.
CASTILLO
G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003
Facts
Oaminal filed a complaint for collection praying that the Castillos be ordered
to pay liquidated damages of P1,500,000 and attorney’s fees of P150,000. The
summons together with the complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal, secretary of
respondent Mrs. Castillo. Respondents filed their Urgent Motion to Declare
Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective alleging that the Sheriff's
Return has failed to comply with Section (1), Rule 14 of the Rules of Court or
substituted service of summons. It is, however, worth noting that the Castillos were
able to file their Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim; Urgent Motion to Dismiss; and Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim. The RTC then ruled in favor of Oaminal. Before
the CA, the Castillos raised the issue of whether the RTC validly acquired
jurisdiction over them. The CA held that the RTC didn’t because summons had
improperly been served upon them.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the Castillos

Ruling
Yes. The SC held that the Castillos voluntarily appeared in this case. The
filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief -- to admit answer, for additional time
to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration -- are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. In this case, Assuming arguendo that the service of
summons was defective, such flaw was cured and respondents are deemed to have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an
Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim,
an Answer with Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for
Reconsideration and Plea to Reset Pre-trial.
OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION v. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS,
INC.
G.R. No. 183035, January 9, 2013
Facts
Optima is engaged in the business of leasing and renting out commercial
spaces. It rented out a commercial space to Hertz. The terms of the contract state
that the same could be renewed only by a new negotiation between the parties and
upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor at least 90 days before the
termination of the contract period. Because Hertz failed to comply with the said
conditions, Optima was constrained to file a complaint for unlawful detainer and
damages against the former. Summons for Hertz in said case was served to Henry
Bobiles, upon instruction of Hertz’ manager. In Hertz’ Motion for Leave to File
Answer with Counterclaim and Admit Answer with Counterclaim, Hertz stated that
in spite of the defective service of summons, it still opted to file the said Answer
with Counterclaim. The MeTC ruled for Optima, which the RTC affirmed. The
CA, however, reversed such rulings and held that due to the improper service of
summons, the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over Hertz.

Issue
Whether or not jurisdiction had been acquired over Hertz

Ruling
Yes. Generally, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject only to the
concept of conditional appearance, which must comply with the following
standards in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Sps. Dy:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary

appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court.

The Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the defense of
improper service of summons. The defenses that it pleaded were limited to litis
pendentia, pari delicto, performance of its obligations and lack of cause of action.
Finally, it even asserted its own counterclaim against Optima. Moreover, the
Answer with Counterclaim failed to satisfy the standards set forth in Phil.
Commercial International Bank which would have operated to constitute Hertz’
Answer with Counterclaim as its conditional appearance.
 PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. JULIE CHANDUMAL
G.R. No. 195619, September 5, 2012
Facts
The case stemmed from a contract to sell between BF Homes (as seller, later
substituted by PDB by virtue of assignment) and Chandumal (as buyer). Due to
Chandumal’s failure, despite demand, to settle her outstanding obligations to PDB,
an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession
was filed by PDB against Chandumal. Summons were served by deputy Sheriff
Galing to Chandumal. According to his return, Sheriff Galing attempted to
personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on July 15, 19 and 22, 1999 but it
was unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff
caused substituted service of summons on August 5, 1999 by serving the same
through Chandumal’s mother who acknowledged receipt thereof. For failure to pay
her Answer on time, Chandumal was declared in default, and a judgement by
default had been rendered against her by the RTC. On appeal to the CA, the latter
nullified the RTC decision due to invalid and ineffective substituted service of
summons. For her part, Chandumal asserts that she never received a copy of the
summons or was ever notified of it and she only came to know of the case
sometime in July or August 2000, but she was already in the United States of
America by that time, and that the CA correctly ruled that there was no valid
service of summons; hence, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

Issue
Whether or not there was a valid substituted service of summons

Ruling
No. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines,
service of summons may be made through personal service, that is, summons shall
be served by handing to the defendant in person a copy thereof, or if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant cannot be personally
served with summons within a reasonable time, it is then that substituted service
may be made. In this case, there was invalid substituted service of summons. In
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid
substituted service of summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of
prompt personal service – the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff
must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service; (2) specific details in the return – the sheriff must describe in the
Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service; (3) a person of suitable age and discretion – the sheriff must
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is
of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether
said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his
duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of
said receipt of summons, which matters must be clearly and specifically described
in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons. In this case, none of these requisites were complied with. The Return of
Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of
efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process server in attempting to
serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return merely states the
alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.
MARIA IMELDA M. MANOTOC v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
et al.
G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006
Facts
Imee Marcos Manotoc (Manotoc) was a defendant in a civil case filed by
Agapita Trajano which seeks to enforce a decision rendered by a Hawaiian court
for the wrongful death of Archimedes Trajano caused by Manotoc. The Summons
in said case was served to a Macky dela Cruz (dela Cruz), an alleged caretaker of
Manotoc. When Manotoc failed to file her Answer, she was declared in default.
Manotoc then moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the address in the
Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her proper address. Trajano, in defense,
presented Atty. Robert Swift, who allegedly conducted the deposition of
Manotoc’s brother, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. who admitted during said deposition that
Manotoc’s address was at Alexandra Homes, Pasig City. The trial court dismissed
the case rejecting Manotoc’s claims and giving credence to Atty. Swift’s
testimony. The CA adopted the trial court’s findings.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. Due to the overwhelming number of cases filed before courts assailing
the improper resort of sheriffs to substituted service of summons, the SC laid down
the following grounds for a valid substituted service of summons:
(1) Impossibility of prompt service – for purposes of determining
compliance with this requisite, the SC defined a “reasonable time” as one (1)
month from the issuance of summons for personal service on the defendant.
Moreover, “several attempts” would mean at least three (3) separate tries on two
(2) separate dates. In this case, the sheriff’s return failed to specify how many
times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were made.
(2) Specific details in the return – the date and time of the attempts on
personal service, he inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the
occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done,
though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return
to justify substituted service.
(3) Person of suitable age and discretion – A person of suitable age and
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and
is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a
summons. To be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and
understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the
need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible
time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the
"relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or
at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. In this case, the sheriff’s Return
lacks information as to the sufficiency of the age, discretion, and residence of dela
Cruz. Moreover, it was doubtful that dela Cruz was residing with Manotoc since
the latter was already married.
(4) A competent person in charge – If the substituted service will be done
at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a
competent person in charge of the place.
 REMELITA M. ROBINSON v. CELITA B. MIRALLES
G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006
Facts
Miralles filed a complaint for sum of money against Robinson for USD
20,054. Summons were initially served upon Robinson at her given address but
sheriff Maximo Potente’s return averred that Robinson no longer resides at such
address. The trial court then issued an alias summons to be served at Robinson’s
new address in Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa City. When sheriff Potente attempted to
serve the summons, however, the security guard assigned at the gate of Alabang
Hills named A.H. Geroche refused to let sheriff Potente go inside the village
because of Robinson’s instructions to not let anybody proceed to her house if she is
not around. For such reason, sheriff Potente just left the summons with the security
guard who refused to affix her signature on the original copy thereof. Due to
Robinson’s failure to answer, she was declared in default and a judgement was
rendered against her by the trial court.

Issue
Whether or not Summons had properly been served upon Robinson

Ruling
Yes. The SC held that for substituted service to be justified, the following
circumstances must concur: (1) personal service within a reasonable time was
impossible; (2) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (3) summons were
served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of
business. In this case, Robinson never controverted the allegations of the sheriff
that she instructed the security guard to disallow anyone from proceeding to her
home when she is not around thus, preventing the service of summons to her.
Considering her strict instructions to the security guard, the SC held that Robinson
must bear the consequences. The SC agreed with the trial court that summons has
been properly served upon Robinson.
 SIXTO N. CHU v. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013
Facts
For failure to pay the balance of the purchase price of three (3) heavy
machineries bought from Mach Asia, Chu was sued before the RTC for sum of
money, replevin, attorney’s fees and damages. The sheriff went to Chu’s given
address in order to serve the summons but he was not there. Thus, the sheriff
immediately resorted to substituted service by serving the summons to a certain
Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of Chu. Due to his failure to file his answer,
Chu was declared in default. Thereafter, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of
Mach Asia. Chu appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision and
even held that “in the interest of fairness, the process server’s neglect in the service
of summons should not unduly prejudice [Mach Asia’s] right to speedy justice.”

Issue
Whether or not the CA is correct

Ruling
No. In case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the
person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom
the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually
receive the summons. In this case, the sheriff’s return merely provides “that the
Summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond was received on
December 7, 1999, by Rolando Bonayon, a security guard on defendant Sixto Chu
at his given address who received and signed receipt thereof.” Clearly, it was not
shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner
was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would
definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by
law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial
compliance with the requirements of substituted service.
 CARSON REALTY & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. RED ROBIN
SECURITY AGENCY, et al.
G.R. No. 225035, February 8, 2017
Facts: Santos filed a complaint for sum of money against Carson before RTC
Quezon City. A copy of the summons was served upon Carson’s business address
at Ortigas Center, Pasig City, to its “corporate secretary”, Precilla Serrano.
Thereafter, the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Carson, Atty. Roxas, filed
an Appearance and Motion dated 25 April 2007 wherein he entered his appearance
and acknowledged the receipt of Summons by one of his assistants and requested
for additional time to file their Answer. Instead of filing a responsive pleading,
however, Atty. Roxas moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that summons was
not properly served. The RTC denied Carson’s MD and directed the issuance of an
alias summons to be served anew on Carson. The process server attempted to serve
the alias summons on the President, GM, BOD, and Corp. Sec. of Carson but to no
avail. Thereafter, the process server was advised by a certain Lorie Fernandez to
serve such summons to Atty. Roxas’ law office which the process server attempted
to do twice but to no avail thus, prompting him to serve the summons to one JR
Taganila who refused to acknowledge receipt of the alias summons. Atty. Roxas
pointed out this flawed service of summons once more, and manifested his intent
to return such summons. This time, it was Santos who requested the RTC to issue
another alias summons which the RTC did dated 09 September 2008. In process
server Pajila’s Return, he averred that he attempted to serve the 09 September 2008
alias summons on 02, 16, 27, and 28 October 2008 to the President/GM/Secretary
of Carson but to no avail. It was only on 28 October 2008 that PS Pajila served the
09 September 2008 alias summons to Lorie Fernandez. Thereafter, Lorie
Fernandez filed a Manifestation manifesting her intent to return the summons on
the ground that it was improperly served. Santos again filed a motion to declare
Carson in default which had been granted this time by the RTC. Carson then
moved to set aside order of default as the RTC has yet to acquire jurisdiction over
its person due to improper service of summons. The RTC denied the same. The CA
affirmed the RTC and held that Carson’s earlier motion for additional time
effectively operated as a voluntary appearance.
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct
Ruling: Yes. It noted the flagrant and widespread practices of defendants in trying
to evade proper service of summons by refusing to give their names, rebuffing
requests to sign or receive documents, or eluding officers of the court. In
particular, several attempts to serve the summons on these officers were made on
four separate occasions: October 2, 2008, October 16, 2008, October 27, 2008, and
October 28, 2008, but to no avail. On his fourth and final attempt, Process Server
Pajila served the summons on Fernandez, Carson's receptionist, due to the
unavailability and difficulty to locate the company's corporate officers. Based on
the facts, there was a deliberate plan of Carson's for its officers not to receive the
Summons. It is a legal maneuver that is in derogation of the rules on Summons
which the SC refused to tolerate. Moreover, Carson voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed, through Atty. Roxas, the Appearance and
Motion dated April 25, 2007 acknowledging Carson's receipt of the Summons
dated April 11, 2007 and seeking additional time to file its responsive pleading. As
noted by the CA, Carson failed to indicate therein that the Appearance and Motion
was being filed by way of a conditional appearance to question the regularity of the
service of summons. Thus, by securing the affirmative relief of additional time to
file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
 CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN v. BANCO DE ORO
G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017
Facts
Eliseo and Carmelita were co-owners of a real property situated in Pasig
City. When they proceeded to the RD to obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation of
a prospective sale of said property, they were surprised to find out that their
property was covered by an execution sale. It appears that Carmelita signed as a
surety to a debt incurred by Tancho Corporation where Carmelita was a director.
Thus, due to Tancho Corp.’s default in paying its obligations, BDO instituted a
complaint for sum of money against it, including Carmelita. The records reveal
that Summons was served to all the defendants at the business compound of
Tancho Corp. which was provided by BDO at Fumakilla Compound in Pasig City.
After a failed single attempt by the process server to serve the summons to
Carmelita and her co-defendants, BDO moved to serve the summons by
publication, which the RTC granted. Thereafter, BDO also moved to serve another
summons to Carmelita but there was no actual personal service made as Carmelita
is “no longer residing at the given address and the said address is for rent. The
Makati RTC subsequently declared defendants and Carmelita in default, and
thereafter rendered a judgement by default ordering the defendants and Carmelita
to pay their principal obligations and in the event that the judgement obligors fail
to pay their principal obligations, the sheriff shall levy upon the properties of the
defendants to satisfy the award.

BDO was subsequently successful in requesting for the issuance of a Writ of

Possession and the issuance of a new TCT covering the property in its favor.
Arguing that the Makati RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her person due to
the defective service of Summons, Carmelita filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgement of the Makati RTC before the CA, which the latter denied.

Issue
Whether or not there was a valid service of summons

Ruling
No. In July 2003, the sheriff attempted to serve the summons on the
defendants, including petitioner Carmelita, at Fumakilla Compound, i.e., at the
property already foreclosed, acquired, and possessed by the respondent bank as
early as August 2001. Immediately after this single attempt at personal service in
July 2003, the respondent bank moved in October 2003 for leave to serve the
summons by publication (and not even substituted service), which motion the RTC
granted. Clearly, there was no diligent effort made to find the Carmelita and
properly serve her the summons before the service by publication was allowed.
Neither was it impossible to locate Carmelita’s residence and her whereabouts for
the General Information Sheet (GIS) of Tancho Corp., the principal debtor in the
Makati RTC case readily provides for the names and addresses of its Board of
Directors, including Carmelita. The Makati RTC could have easily resorted to
looking for the GIS as it was readily available to the public through the SEC.
 MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS v. ABELARDO B. LICAROS
G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003
Facts
Abelardo filed a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity against his wife Margarita, who earlier had
obtained a divorce decree in the US. As Margarita was then residing in Mulberry
Lane, California, Abelardo initially moved for service of summons via
International Express Courier Service. The court a quo, however, denied the
motion and instead ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same
time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding
summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the US through the
DFA, all at the expense of Abelardo. Subsequently, the trial court rendered a
judgement declaring null and void the marriage between Abelardo and Margarita.
9 years later, Margarita sought to annul the judgement of the trial court declaring
her marriage with Abelardo null and void after she received a letter from Atty.
Valencia informing her that she can no longer use the name “Licaros” inasmuch as
her marriage with Abelardo had been dissolved. Margarita argued before the CA
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over her as the service of summons made
upon her was invalid. The CA, however, rejected her contentions and instead ruled
that the instant case involves the personal status of Abelardo which is an action in
rem or quasi in rem which does not need jurisdiction over her person but merely
required the service of summons to afford her due process.

Issue
Whether or not the CA is correct

Ruling
Yes. Under Sec. 15 of Rule 14, a non-resident defendant who is not found in
the country may be served with summons via extraterritorial service if the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff. Accordingly, service of summons may
be done in any of the three ways: (1) by personal service out of the country, with
leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of
the court via registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, with leave of
court; and (3) by any other means which the judge may deem as sufficient. The
instant case clearly affects the personal status of the plaintiff Abelardo, thus, the
rules on extraterritorial service is applicable. Moreover, in this case the court
served the summons by means of the third way, and not the first and the second,
which is within its authority to do.
 STEVEN R. PAVLOW v. CHERRY L. MENDENILLA
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017
Facts
Petitioner, an American citizen, married Maria Sheila, a Filipino. Barely 3
months into their marriage, Sheila filed a complaint for slight physical injuries
including maltreatment in relation to Anti-Violence Against Women and Children
Act (VAWC). Makati Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for failure
to substantiate the allegations. The mother of Petitioner, Cherry Mendenilla
(Mendenilla), filed a Petition praying for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order(TPO)or Permanent Protection Order (PPO) against the Petitioner. When the
service of summons with the TPO was served, Petitioner was out of the country,
hence, it was served to one of his employees who was also residing in the same
building.

Issue
Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner’s person

Ruling
Yes. We see no reason for holding as ineffectual the substituted service of
Summons. Jurisprudence has long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily
out of the Philippines, the availability of extraterritorial services does not preclude
substituted service. Resort to substituted service has long been held to be fair,
reasonable and just. This Court has noted that a contrary, restrictive view is that
which defeats the ends of justice. It has been emphasized that residents who
temporarily leave their residence are responsible for ensuring that their affairs are
in order, and that, upon their return, they shall attend to exigencies that may have
arisen. Rule 14, Section 7 stipulates that substituted service may be resorted to "if,
for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally served within a
reasonable time."

Time was of the essence. The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of
justifiable causes and how, by the convenience of petitioner Steven Pavlow's
temporary absence, immediate personal service was rendered impossible. These
exigencies justified substituted service of summons upon petitioner during his
temporary absence through Monette Tolentino, a person of suitable age and
discretion, who also resided at petitioner's own residence. Jurisdiction over
petitioner's person was then validly acquired, and the dismissal of respondent
Cherry L. Mendenilla's petition on this score was correctly held by Judge
Natividad Giron-Dizon to be unwarranted.
 EXPRESS PADALA (ITALIA) S.P.A., now BDO REMITTANCE (ITALIA)
S.P.A. v. HELEN M. OCAMPO
G.R. No. 202505, September 6, 2017
Facts
BDO remittance filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgement before
RTC Mandaluyong against Ocampo. the sheriff attempted to personally serve the
summons on Ocampo in her local address alleged in the petition located in San
Bernardo Village, Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. However, since the address was
incomplete, the sheriff sought the help of barangay officials, who pointed him to
the house belonging to Ocampo's father, Nicasio Ocampo. Victor P. Macahia
(Macahia), uncle of Ocampo and present occupant, informed the sheriff that
Ocampo and her family were already in Italy, and that he was only a caretaker of
the house. The sheriff then proceeded to serve the summons upon Macahia. 9 After
Ocampo failed to file an answer, BDO Remittance filed a motion to declare
Ocampo in default. The RTC granted the motion and allowed BDO Remittance to
present evidence ex parte.

The RTC subsequently ruled in favor of BDO. Ocampo filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 arguing that the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing the Turin Decision. The CA set aside the RTC decision holding that
since Ocampo’s whereabouts are unknown, summons should have been effected
under Sec. 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

Issue
Whether service of summons was validly effected upon respondent, who
lives in Italy, through substituted service

Ruling
No. When the defendant's whereabouts are unknown, the rules allow service
of summons by publication. As an exception to the preferred mode of service,
service of summons by publication may only be resorted to when the whereabouts
of the defendant are not only unknown, but cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry. The diligence requirement means that there must be prior resort to
personal service under Section 7 and substituted service under Section 8, and proof
that these modes were ineffective before summons by publication may be allowed.
This mode also requires the plaintiff to file a written motion for leave of court to
effect service of summons by publication, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or
some person on his behalf, setting forth the grounds for the application.

Substituted service is improper under the facts of this case. Substituted

service presupposes that the place where the summons is being served is the
defendant's current residence or office/regular place of business . Thus, where the
defendant neither resides nor holds office in the address stated in the summons,
substituted service cannot be resorted to. Based on the sheriff's report, it is clear
that Ocampo no longer resides in San Bernardo Village, Darasa, Tanauan,
Batangas. The report categorically stated that "defendant Helen M. Ocampo and
her family were already in Italy," without, however, identifying any specific
address. Not being a resident of the address where the summons was served, the
substituted service of summons is ineffective. Accordingly, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of Ocampo.
 E.B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD. v. HON. HERMINIO I.
BENITO, et al.
G.R. No. 136426, August 6, 1999
Facts
Private respondent filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages
against petitioner before the RTC of Makati for failure of the latter to comply with
its contractual obligation. Summons, together with the complaint, were served
upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the
stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return
of Service stated that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL
SABULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth,
Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original
copy of the summons."

Petitioner filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss alleging that

on May 6, 1998, "summons intended for defendant" was served upon Engr.
Wendell Sabulbero, its employee at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper
service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
(petitioner).

The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager

Ruling
No. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept
summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more
clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary"
instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or
any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. Service of summons
upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has
been held as improper. Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of
a firm's branch office has been held as improper as summons should have been
served at the firm's principal office.

Accordingly, the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner

at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its
principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
 G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC. v. TIARA COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 201378, October 18, 2017
Facts
G.V. Florida instituted a third-party complaint against TCC. The RTC
ordered the service of summons on TCC. In the return of summons, it appears that
the sheriff served the summons to a certain Cherry Gino-gino (Gino-gino) who
represented herself as an accounting manager authorized by TCC to receive
summons on its behalf. TCC filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. it
argued that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it due to improper service of
summons. Under Section 11 of Rule 14, there is an exclusive list of the persons
upon whom service of summons on domestic juridical entities may be made. As
the summons in this case was not served on any of the persons listed in Section 11
of Rule 14, there was no proper service of summons on TCC that would vest the
RTC with jurisdiction over it. The RTC denied TCC’s motion to dismiss and its
subsequent motion for reconsideration.

TCC filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 challenging
the RTC’s denial of its motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for
reconsideration. In the meantime, TCC filed its Answer Ad Cautelam which
repeated its arguments pertaining to jurisdiction, the prescription of the implied
warranty claim, the impropriety of the third-party complaint and the venue of the
action, and the failure to implead Michelin. Notably, TCC filed its pre-trial brief
without any reservations as to the issue of jurisdiction. Moreover, not only did it
fail to include in its identification of issues the question of the RTC's jurisdiction,
TCC even reserved the option to present additional evidence.

The CA granted TCC’s petition and reversed the RTC’s orders. It found that
the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over TCC due to improper service of
summons upon a person not included in the enumeration.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over TCC

Ruling
Yes. There was improper service of summons upon TCC. When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of
the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel. This enumeration is exclusive.

In the present case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial

supervisor of TCC. While she is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 11
of Rule 14, TCC has voluntarily appeared before (and submitted itself to) the RTC
when it filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation as to the court's jurisdiction
over it. At no point in its pre-trial brief did TCC raise the issue of the RTC's
jurisdiction over it. While it is true that TCC initially filed an Answer Ad
Cautelam, TCC waived any objection raised therein as to the jurisdiction of the
court when it subsequently filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation and even
prayed to be allowed to present additional evidence. This is unequivocal
submission to the RTC’s jurisdiction.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways, through the Hon. Secretary, HERMOGENES
EBDANE v. ALBERTO A. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 175299, September 14, 2011
Facts
Domingo filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against
DPWH Region III. Summons was issued by the RTC and was served upon DPWH
Region III through Nora Cortez, Clerk III of the said office. For failure to file their
responsive pleading, DPWH Region III was declared in default upon motion by
Domingo. Thereafter, a judgement by default was rendered by the RTC.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment. The Republic averred that, under the law, the statutory representatives
of the government for purposes of litigation are either the Solicitor General or the
Legal Service Branch of the Executive Department concerned. Since no summons
was issued to either of said representatives, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Republic.

The CA dismissed the Republic’s petition for annulment of judgement

holding that nothing in the functions of the OSG remotely suggests that service of
summons upon the Republic should be made exclusively on the OSG.

Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic

Ruling
No. Sec. 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that when the defendant
is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General;
in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may
be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or
the court may direct. In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance
with Damages filed by Domingo specifically named as defendant the DPWH
Region III. As correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its regional office
are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real party in
interest. Thus, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the
summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.
 DANTE Y. GO v. HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, et al.
G.R. No. 58986, April 17, 1989
Facts
California Manufacturing Co., Inc. (hereinafter, simply, California) brought
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Dante Go, accusing him
of unfair competition. About two weeks later, however, California filed a notice of
dismissal with the CFI on November 12, 1981. Four days afterwards, or on
November 16, 1981, California received by registered mail a copy of Dante Go's
answer with counterclaim which had been filed with the Court on November 9,
1981.

On December 1, 1981, California filed another complaint asserting the same

cause of action against Dante Go, this time with the Court of First Instance at
Caloocan City. On December 3, 1981, Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining
order against Go. On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante
Go filed the present petition for certiorari, etc. praying for its nullification and
perpetual inhibition. Dante Go's thesis is that the case filed against him by
California in the Manila Court remained pending despite California's notice of
dismissal. According to him, since he had already filed his answer to the complaint
before California sought dismissal of the action three (3) days afterwards, such
dismissal was no longer a matter of right and could no longer be effected by mere
notice in accordance with Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, but only on
plaintiff's motion, and by order of the Court; hence, the Caloocan Court acted
without jurisdiction over the second action based on the same cause. He also
accused California of forum shopping, of selecting a sympathetic court for a relief
which it had failed to obtain from another.

Issue
Whether or not Dante Go is correct

Ruling
No. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the
action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant's answer with the Court
(either personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its
action in the Manila Court after the filing of Dante Go's answer but before service
thereof. Thus having acted well within the letter and contemplation of the afore-
quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto brought
about the dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila Court, without need of
any order or other action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected
without regard to whatever reasons or motives California might have had for
bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, "without
prejudice, "the contrary not being otherwise "stated in the notice" and it being the
first time the action was being so dismissed. There was therefore no legal obstacle
to the institution of the second action in the Caloocan Court of First Instance based
on the same claim.
 SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC. v. MRS. LETICIA B.
MAGSALIN, doing business under the trade name "KAREN'S
TRADING,"et al.
G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 02-488 against both
Magsalin and FGU Insurance. Petitioner claims that one Leticia Magsalin, doing
business as "Karen's Trading," had breached their subcontract agreement for the
supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in the
petitioner's Makati City condominium project called "The Regency at Salcedo."
The complaint sought more than P2 Million as damages for breach of contract.

FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party

complaint. Attached to the motion was the subject complaint, with Reynaldo
Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and Concordia Garcia named as third-party
defendants. FGU Insurance claims that the three had executed counter-guaranties
over the surety and performance bonds it executed for the subcontract with
Magsalin and, hence, should be held jointly and severally liable in the event it is
held liable in Civil Case No. 02-488. Of the three (3) persons named as third-party
defendants, only Baetiong filed an answer to the third-party complaint.

On December 16, 2003 the RTC issued a tersely worded order dismissing Civil
Case No. 02-488. For clarity, we quote the dismissal order in full:

ORDER

For failure of [petitioner] to prosecute, the case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal order is void

Ruling
Yes. Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is
authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Procedurally, when a
complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the
dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits. As an adjudication on the
merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of
the Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders. The
December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to
disclose how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither
the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to know the particular facts that had
prompted the prejudicial dismissal. Had the petitioner perhaps failed to appear at a
scheduled trial date? Had it failed to take appropriate actions for the active
prosecution of its complaint for an unreasonable length of time? Had it failed to
comply with the rules or any order of the trial court? The December 16, 2003
dismissal order does not say.
 MA. MERCEDES BARBA v. LICEO DE CAGAYAN UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. 193857, November 28, 2012
Facts
Barba used to be the Dean of the College of Physical Therapy of Liceo De
Cagayan University (LDCU). However, due to the significant drop in the number
of enrollees, the College of Physical Therapy ceased its operations thus, LDCU
made Barba an instructor in the College of Nursing and directed her to report to the
latter’s dean. Barba argued that this amounted to constructive dismissal, and filed a
case before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter found that LDCU did not
constructively dismiss Barba. The NLRC reversed the LA and found that Barba
had been constructively dismissed. LDCU filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA arguing that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
Thereafter, LDCU filed a Supplemental Petition arguing that the LA did not have
jurisdiction over the case because Barba’s position as dean is considered a
corporate office. The CA did not give credence to this argument and held that the
By-laws of LCDU merely provided for the position of a College Director which is
available only for a single person. If it was LCDU’s intent to have all college deans
as college directors, LCDU should have amended its By-laws. Moreover, the CA
held that it is too late for LCDU to assert lack of jurisdiction as it actively
participated in the proceedings before the NLRC and LA, and did not raise the said
issue before said tribunals. The CA, however, thereafter abandoned the said
Decision after the MR filed by LCDU and held this time that Barba was a
corporate officer.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. The SC upheld the CA’s prior decision. The SC held that the CA
correctly ruled that Barba could not be deemed to be a college director for her
appointment as dean did not specify that she was appointed also as college
director. Moreover, it agreed with the CA that LCDU should have amended its By-
laws if it considers its deans to be its College Directors. Lastly, the SC agreed with
the CA in holding that LCDU is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
NLRC and the CA. Under the Rules, the admission of supplemental pleadings is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Nevertheless, as found above, the
SC gave no credence to LCDU’s assertion that Barba was a corporate officer.
 ELOISA MERCHANDISING, INC., et al. v. BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL
BANK, et al.
G.R. No. 192716, June 13, 2012
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage against
respondent BDO before RTC Makati. For failure of the petitioners to appear
despite due notice at the scheduled pre-trial conference on January 12, 2004, the
case was ordered dismissed. In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners'
counsel claimed that his failure to attend was due to his accidental falling on the
stairs of his house in the morning of January 12, 2004, due to which he had to be
attended by a "hilot". In an Order dated May 7, 2004, the trial court reconsidered
the dismissal and scheduled anew the pre-trial conference on June 29, 2004, which
date was subsequently reset to August 3, 2004 for lack of proof of service upon
petitioners' counsel. Since petitioners again failed to appear on the re-scheduled
pre-trial conference on August 3, 2004, the trial court dismissed the case pursuant
to Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners moved to reconsider the above order, their counsel alleging that
he had misplaced or lost his calendar book and could not have ascertained the
availability of his schedule. On December 29, 2004, the trial court issued an Order
granting petitioners' motion for reconsideration "in the interest of justice" and
reinstating the case. The trial court, however directed petitioners to be "more
circumspect in attending to this case."

In its Order dated September 20, 2005, the trial court dismissed the case for
failure of petitioners to prosecute their case. Citing the two previous dismissals on
account of petitioners' non-appearance at the pre-trial conference, the trial court
said that “from the date of its second reconsideration of the order of dismissal on
December 29, 2004 until today, plaintiffs did not do anything to prosecute the
instant case.” The CA subsequently affirmed the dismissal by the trial court.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal by the trial court was proper

Ruling
Yes. Despite the trial court's leniency and admonition, petitioners continued
to exhibit laxity and inattention in attending to their case. Assuming domestic
problems had beset petitioners' counsel in the interregnum, with greater reason
should he make proper coordination with the trial court to ensure his availability on
the date to be chosen by the trial court for the long-delayed conduct of a pre-trial
conference. Petitioners themselves did nothing to get the case moving for nine
months and set the case anew for pre-trial even as BDO was already seeking their
judicial ejectment with the implementation of the writ of possession issued by
Branch 143. Such circumstance also belies their pretense that the parties were then
still negotiating for a settlement. A party cannot blame his counsel when he
himself was guilty of neglect; and that the laws aid the vigilant, not those who
slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt.
 PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE
CORPORATION v. AMALGAMATED MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al.
G.R. No. 177729, September 28, 2011
Facts
AMDC obtained from the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia
(NCBSA) a loan amounting to SR3.3 million (equivalent to P9,000,000.00).
Petitioner issued a letter of guaranty in favor of NCBSA as the lending bank upon
the request of AMDC. As the security for the guaranty, Amalgamated Motors
Philippines Incorporated (AMPI), a sister company of AMDC, acted as an
accommodation mortgagor, and executed in favor of the petitioner a real estate
mortgage over two parcels of land located in Dasmariñas, Cavite. AMDC executed
in favor of petitioners a deed of undertaking with Cuevas and Saddul as co-
obligors. In the deed of undertaking, AMDC, Cuevas, and Saddul jointly and
severally bound themselves to pay to the petitioner, as obligee, whatever damages
or liabilities that the petitioner would incur by reason of the guaranty.

AMDC subsequently defaulted on the obligation, prompting petitioner to

pay NCBSA, upon the latter’s demand. Petitioner then demanded AMDC, Cuevas,
and Saddul to pay the amount of the obligation it paid but to no avail. Hence, it
extrajudicially foreclosed the aforementioned real estate mortgage. On the premise
that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale were not sufficient to cover the guaranty
because a balance of P45,839,219.95 remained unpaid, the petitioner sued AMDC,
Cuevas and Saddul in the RTC to collect the deficiency.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and against AMDC but absolved
Cuevas and Saddul of any liability. Petitioner appealed to the CA asserting that
Cuevas and Saddul should be held jointly and severally liable with AMDC on its
deficiency claim which the CA rejected. Before the SC, petitioner claims that in
the RTC’s pre-trial order, the only issue to be resolved was whether there was a
deficiency claim after the foreclosure of real estate mortgage; that the liability of
Cuevas and Saddul on the deficiency claim was already an admitted fact under the
pre-trial order; and that the RTC improperly considered and determined their
liability.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner’s contentions are correct

Ruling
No. While it is true that the issues to be tried between the parties in a case
shall be limited to those defined in the pre-trial order, a pre-trial order is not
intended to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be taken
during the trial, for it is unavoidable that there are issues that are impliedly
included among those listed or that may be inferable from those listed by necessary
implication which are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those
expressly listed. In this case, petitioner impleaded Cuevas and Saddul as
defendants, and adduced against them evidence to prove their liabilities. With
Cuevas and Saddul being parties to be affected by the judgment, it was only
appropriate for the RTC to inquire into and determine their liability for the purpose
of arriving at a complete determination of the suit. Thereby, the RTC acted in
conformity with the avowed reason for which the courts are organized, which was
to put an end to controversies, to decide the questions submitted by the litigants,
and to settle the rights and obligations of the parties.
 REAL BANK, INC. v. SAMSUNG MABUHAY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 175862, October 13, 2010
Facts
Respondent Samsung filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Real
Bank, Inc. The case was originally raffled to the RTC, Branch 9 of Manila. On 19
October 2000, the counsel of respondent Samsung, V.E. Del Rosario and Partners,
filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance with the conformity of respondent
Samsung. On 7 March 2001, the trial court issued an Order requiring both
petitioner Real Bank, Inc. and respondent Samsung to appear in a mediation
proceeding set on 3 April 2001. This Order of the trial court was sent to respondent
Samsung's former counsel, V.E. Del Rosario and Partners which had at that time
already filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance.

The mediation proceedings took place as scheduled on 3 April 2001 and

Mediator Tammy Ann C. Reyes, who handled the mediation proceedings
submitted her report to the Court stating therein that no action was taken on the
case referred for mediation because respondent Samsung failed to appear. On 5
June 2002, an Order was issued by Judge Umali of Branch 20, where the case was
re-raffled, dismissing the complaint of respondent Samsung for failure to appear at
the mediation conference previously scheduled by the trial judge. Respondent
Samsung’s new counsel moved to reconsider such dismissal on the ground that the
notice of the scheduled mediation was sent to the former counsel of Samsung who
had already withdrawn its appearance and not to the new counsel’s address.

Judge Umali denied the motion for reconsideration. The CA rendered a

decision in favor of respondent Samsung.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the dismissal of the trial court
for respondent Samsung’s failure to appear at the scheduled mediation conference

Ruling
No. In Senarlo v. Judge Paderanga, the Court accentuated that mediation is
part of pre-trial and failure of the plaintiff to appear thereat shall be cause for
dismissal of the action. However, the ruling in Senarlo will not resolve the present
case where the basic issue is whether or not respondent's Samsung non-appearance
at the mediation proceedings is justifiable from the records. Under Sec. 26, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, the withdrawal of counsel with the conformity of the
client is completed once the same is filed in court. No further action thereon by the
court is needed other than the mechanical act of the Clerk of Court of entering the
name of the new counsel in the docket and of giving written notice thereof to the
adverse party.

In this case, it is uncontroverted that the withdrawal of respondent

Samsung's
original counsel, V.E. Del Rosario and Partners on 19 October 2000, was with the
client's consent. Thus, no approval thereof by the trial court was required because a
court's approval is indispensable only if the withdrawal is without the client's
consent. It being daylight clear that the withdrawal of respondent Samsung's
original counsel was sufficient as the same carried the stamp of approval of the
client, the notice of mediation sent to respondent Samsung's original counsel was
ineffectual as the same was sent at the time when such counsel had already validly
withdrawn its representation. Corollarily, the absence of respondent Samsung
during the scheduled mediation conference was excusable and justified.
 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. LETICIA BARBARA B. GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 189100, June 21, 2017
Facts
The Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), through Gutierrez, then its
Director, issued a Notice of Award to Linkworth for three (3) units of LCD
projectors for the aggregate amount of P297,000.00. The notice also required
Linkworth to signify its conformity and to post a performance bond equivalent to
5% of the total price. When a representative of Linkworth tried to tender the bond,
the agency refused to accept the same, prompting Linkworth to write Gutierrez for
an explanation. Later, Gutierrez explained that it was another company, Gakken,
hwo actually won the award. Gutierrez then asked Linkworth to disregard the
Notice of Award earlier made in its favor. This became the basis for an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct which was filed by Linkworth
against Gutierrez.

The Ombudsman eventually found Gutierrez guilty of grave misconduct.

Respondent appealed to the CA, personally serving a copy of such appeal to the
petitioner. The CA thereafter reversed the findings of the Ombudsman in a
decision dated June 16, 2009. Petitioner Ombudsman received a copy of said
decision on June 22, 2009. Thereafter, it filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention
and for Admission of Attached Motion for Reconsideration (Omnibus Motion).
Petitioner argued that under the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman, as the mandated
disciplining body with quasi-judicial authority to resolve administrative cases
against public officials, has legal standing to explain, if not defend, its decisions in
disciplinary cases.

The CA, however, denied the Omnibus Motion in its assailed resolution
holding that the time for intervention has already passed with the rendition by the
CA of its decision on June 16, 2009.

Issue
Whether or not the appellate court erred in denying petitioner’s Omnibus
Motion

Ruling
No. Verily, aside from (1) having legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2)
having legal interest in the success of any of the parties; (3) having an interest
against both parties; (4) or being so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof, the movant must also be able to interpose the motion before rendition of
judgment, pursuant to Sec. 2 of Rule 19. The period requirement is premised on the
fact that intervention is not an independent action, but is ancillary and
supplemental to an existing litigation. Thus, when the case is resolved or is
otherwise terminated, the right to intervene likewise expires. It is this requirement
of timeliness that petitioner failed to satisfy, prompting the appellate court to issue
the July 23, 2009 Resolution denying the Omnibus Motion.
 LORENZA C. ONGCO v. VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY
G.R. No. 190810, July 18, 2012
Facts
Respondent Dalisay applied for registration of a parcel of land and filed an
application for land registration before the MTC of Binangonan. At the hearings,
aside from the Republic of the Philippines, no oppositor came. Consequently the
MTC found respondent Dalisay to have clearly shown a registrable right over the
subject property and ordered that a registration decree be issued in her favor after
finality of the MTC decision. The Republic filed an appeal with the CA.

While the appeal was pending, herein petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene with an attached Answer-in-Intervention. Petitioner sought for the
dismissal of respondent’s application on the ground that contrary to the allegations
of Dalisay, the subject property was not free from any adverse claim. In fact,
petitioner Ongco had allegedly been previously found to be in actual possession of
the subject land in an earlier case filed before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) when she applied for a free patent on the land.
Respondent objected to said intervention and argued that petitioner had no legal
interest over the property; intervention would now unduly delay the registration
proceeding which was now on appeal; and that the intervention was filed out of
time pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.

The CA denied the Motion for Intervention for having been filed beyond the
period required by law.

Issue
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in denying the Motion for
Intervention filed by petitioner

Ruling
No. Intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to the trial court’s sound
discretion. The trial court must not only determine if the requisite legal interest is
present, but also take into consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice to
the original parties that the intervention will cause. Both requirements must concur,
as the first requirement on legal interest is not more important than the second
requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. To help ensure that delay
does not result from the granting of a motion to intervene, the Rules also explicitly
say that intervention may be allowed only before rendition of judgment by the trial
court.

In this case, petitioner has not shown any legal interest of such nature that
she "will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment." On the
contrary, her interest is indirect and contingent. She has not been granted a free
patent over the subject land, as she in fact admits being only in the process of
applying for one. Her interest is at best inchoate. In any event, the Motion for
Intervention was filed only with the CA after the MTC had rendered judgment. By
itself, this inexcusable delay is a sufficient ground for denying the motion. To
recall, the motion should be filed "any time before rendition of judgment."

Last, it is worth noting that a land registration case is a proceeding in rem.

Thus, only general notice to the public is required. In the present case, the MTC
found that the required publication was made by respondent Dalisay when she
applied for land registration. That publication was sufficient notice to petitioner.
 IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF
ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH
EMMA K. LEE v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010
Facts
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) had 11 children,
herein collectively referred to as the Lee-Keh Children. Lee brought from China a
young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The
respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved
into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh
died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu's children with Lee
(collectively, the Lee's other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee
and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. The NBI reported that the mother of
Lee’s other children could not have been Keh. Thus, prompting the Lee-Keh
Children to file a petition before the RTC for the deletion from the certificate of
live birth of petitioner Emma Lee the name Keh and replace the same with Tiu to
indicate her true mother’s name.

The Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed
mother, to testify in the case. Tiu moved to quash the subpoena claiming it was
oppressive and violated Sec. 25, Rule 130 pertaining to the filial privilege. The
RTC quashed the subpoena. The CA reversed the RTC’s order.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to
testify

Ruling
No. Petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to
come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would
subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her
parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.

Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on

Tiu if she were compelled at her age and condition to come to court to testify,
petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court.
Moreover, Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother
of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a
common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH
DIVISION), et al.
G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011
Facts
The petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil
Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano
Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. At the trial of Civil Case No.
0009, the petitioner filed a motion wishing to adopt the testimony of Mr. Maurice
Bane, among other deponents. The Sandiganbayan on April 1, 1998, denied
petitioner’s motion.

Petitioner argues that Sec. 4, Rule 23 of the Rules must prevail over Sec. 47,
Rule 130 of the same Rules.

Issue
Whether or not the Bane deposition may be admitted

Ruling
No. Sec. 4, Rule 23 of the Rules provide that “at the trial or upon the hearing
of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as
admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was
present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice
thereof…” A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the
petitioner's position that the Bane deposition can be admitted into evidence without
observing the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending
action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due
observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition for
admissibility, compliance with "the rules on evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule
23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23
in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding
admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on
evidence under Section 47, Rule 130.
 HARRY L. GO, et al. v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012
Facts
Petitioners Harry Go, et al. were charged with Other Deceits under Art. 318
of the RPC. On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a
Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated
for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that,
upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by
reason of ill health. Notwithstanding petitioners’ opposition, the MeTC granted the
prosecution’s Motion, which was reversed by the RTC.

On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which

held that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing
the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of
procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that,
in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the
complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the oral
deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be
taking the deposition of the witness.

It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly

applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the
deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be
deemed allowable also under the circumstances.

Issue
Whether or not said argument is tenable

Ruling
No. The suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial
examination of an unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out
by the Court in the same case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos, as follows: “It is true
that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil
procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect,
it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal
cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily
governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119
adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent
reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.”

Moreover, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and

not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a
detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial
judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. The right of
confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal
proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to
allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.
 SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA v.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., et al.
G.R. No. 185145, February 5, 2014
Facts
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint 6 for
nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other
documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.
(Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos City.

After the filing of the parties' pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial,
petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum to require Metrobank's officers to appear and testify as the
petitioners' initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their
loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and
sale of petitioners' 200-square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20411 (M). Metrobank filed an Opposition
arguing that pursuant to Secs. 1 and 6, Rule 25, Metrobank's officers — who are
considered adverse parties — may not be compelled to appear and testify in court
for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written interrogatories.

The trial court denied petitioner’s Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum Ad Tesificandum. The CA denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari for lack
of merit. The CA held that the trial court did not err in denying petitioners' Motion
to secure a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum, ratiocinating that Rule 25 is
quite clear in providing that the consequence of a party's failure to serve written
interrogatories upon the opposing party is that the latter may not be compelled by
the former to testify in court or to render a deposition pending appeal.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the
witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the
latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules. In the present case,
petitioners seek to call Metrobank's officers to the witness stand as their initial and
main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank's possession as part of
their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be
allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that,
to present Metrobank's officers — who are considered adverse parties as well,
based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly
authorized agents — as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain
access to Metrobank's documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their
own.
 REY LAÑADA v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA
HEMEDEZ
G.R. No. 102390, February 1, 2002
Facts
Spouses Hemedez filed an action for damages against several persons for the
death of Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia Hemedez which happened in a dispersal operation
during a strike staged by the Union of Filipino Employees on account of alleged
unfair labor practices committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc. The Hemedez spouses
served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of the facts set forth in
their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents appended thereto.
Through their respective counsel, defendants filed their verified answer to the
request for admission.

Contending that under Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court the parties
themselves and not their counsel should personally answer the request for
admission and hence the answer filed by their counsel in their behalf was "by
nature based on hearsay," Sps. Hemedez sought the striking out of said answers.
The trial court denied the Sps. Hemedez’ motion to strike out defendants’ answers
and/or declare the matters sought to be admitted as impliedly admitted. The
appellate court, on the other hand, reversed the trial court and granted the motions
to strike out the answers subject of the requests for admission and declared each of
the matters requested to be impliedly admitted, and remanding the case to the court
a quo for proper proceedings.

Issue
Whether or not an answer to a request for admission signed and sworn to by
the counsel of the party so requested is sufficient compliance with the provisions of
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court held that there is no reason to strictly construe the
phrase "the party to whom the request is directed" to refer solely or personally to
the petitioners themselves. Moreover, as correctly observed by the lower court, the
subject matters of the request for admission are the same as the ultimate facts
alleged in the complaint for which the private respondents have filed their
respective answers. Private respondents desired the petitioners to admit once again
the very matters they had dealt with in their respective answers.
 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 153034, September 20, 2005
Facts
Irene Canadalla obtained various loans from DBP to finance her piggery
business and, as security therefor, executed four (4) real estate mortgages over four
(4) parcels of land. Candalla failed to comply with her obligations to DBP,
prompting the latter to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgages. Canadalla was able
to redeem 2 of 4 foreclosed properties. When she attempted to redeem the other
two at a redemption price of P1.5 Million, DBP refused. Subsequently, she
assigned her right to redeem to Go whose offer to redeem the properties was also
rejected by DBP, prompting Go to file with the RTC Makati City a Supplemental
Complaint for the Exercise of the Right of Redemption, among others.

Go filed a Request for Admission by Adverse Party. Thereafter, DBP filed

its Comment. , Go objected to the Comment reasoning that it was not under oath as
required by Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and that it failed to state the
reasons for the admission or denial of matters for which an admission was
requested. For its part, the DBP manifested that, first, the statements, allegations,
and documents contained in the Request for Admission are substantially the same
as those in the Supplemental Complaint; second, they had already been either
specifically denied or admitted by the DBP in its Answer; and third, the reasons for
the denial or admission had already been specifically stated therein.

The RTC granted Go’s motion to consider as impliedly admitted all matters
sought to be admitted in the Request for Admission. DBP filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA reiterating the abovementioned arguments. The CA
dismissed DBP’s petition for lack of merits.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing DBP’s petition

Ruling
Yes. A request for admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an
earlier pleading is inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which, as a
mode of discovery, contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to
shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in the pleading. Rule 26 does not
refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.
Indeed, as pointed out by the DBP, the matters stated in Go's Request for
Admission are the same as those alleged in her Supplemental Complaint. Besides,
they had already been either specifically denied or admitted in DBP's Answer to
the Supplemental Complaint. To require the DBP to admit these matters under
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court would be pointless and superfluous. Hence, the DBP
did not even have to file its Comment on Go's Request for Admission, which
merely reproduced the allegations in her complaint. DBP's Answer itself
controverts the averments in the complaint and those recopied in the request for
admission.
 NENITA A. GONZALES, et al. v. MARIANO BUGAAY, et al.
G.R. No. 173008, February 22, 2012
Facts
Petitioners filed an Amended Complaint for Partition and Annulment of
Documents with Damages against Enrico, Consolacion, and the respondents
herein. Petitioners averred that in 1987, Enrico executed fraudulent documents
covering all the properties owned by the Spouses Ayad in favor of Consolacion
and respondents, completely disregarding their rights. Thus, they prayed, among
others, for the partition of the Spouses Ayad's estate, the nullification of the
documents executed by Enrico, and the award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees. The RTC rendered a Decision declaring the
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition executed by Enrico and the respondents null
and void.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial from said
Decision. Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order granting respondents’ motion for
the specific purpose of receiving and offering for admission the documents referred
to by the respondents. However, instead of presenting the documents adverted to,
consisting of the documents sought to be annulled, respondents demurred to
petitioners' evidence. respondents elevated their case to the CA through a petition
for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
denying their demurrer notwithstanding petitioners' failure to present the
documents sought to be annulled. The CA rendered the assailed Decision reversing
and setting aside the Orders of the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the CA’s dismissal was proper

Ruling
No. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the
court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof
to sustain the judgment. Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to
evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment. In this case,
respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after the RTC promulgated its
Decision. While respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was
granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving and offering for admission the
documents not presented at the trial. As respondents never complied with the
directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be deemed
abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's original Decision stands.
 FREDERICK FELIPE v. MGM MOTOR TRADING, et al.
G.R. No. 191849, September 23, 2015
Facts
In his Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents
MGM Motors and Ayala General Insurance, petitioner alleged that he purchased
on an installment basis a Nissan Terrano Wagon. He allegedly gave a P200,000.00
down-payment and P5,000.00 reservation fee to Sarmiento, an authorized
representative. He then insured the vehicle with Ayala Insurance under Policy No.
PC970000440001-00-000 and paid a premium of P40,220.67. Unfortunately, the
subject vehicle, while parked along Adriatico Street in Manila, was reportedly lost.
Petitioner tried to claim from Ayala Insurance but the latter refused. MGM Motors,
on the other hand, refused to produce the document of sale by installment covering
the vehicle. Petitioner allegedly paid an additional of P200,000.00.

Trial proceeded with petitioner and his father Alberto Felipe (Alberto)
testifying on the behalf of the former. Petitioner's testimony was however stricken
off the record because he failed to return, despite numerous opportunities, to the
witness stand for cross-examination. Only two pieces of evidence were admitted
by the trial court: (1) the Official Receipt dated 7 May 1998 issued by MGM
Motors wherein it acknowledged receipt of P200,000.00 from petitioner; and (2)
the testimony of his father Alberto that he was present when petitioner paid
P200,000.00 to MGM Motors. To this, MGM Motors and Ayala Insurance filed
their respective Motions to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence.

The trial court dismissed the case. The CA affirmed the dismissal.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court correctly granted the demurrer

Ruling
Yes. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an
objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which
his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make
out a case or sustain the issue. A review of the dismissal of the complaint naturally
entails a calibration of the evidence to determine whether the material allegations
of the complaint were sufficiently backed by evidence. Thus, the remedy of appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, availed of by petitioner,
contemplates only questions of law, not of fact.

In any event, the only pieces of evidence admitted in court are the testimony
of Alberto and the receipt showing MGM Motors receiving P200,000.00 from
petitioner as partial payment of the subject car. The allegation that the purchase of
the vehicle was on an installment basis was not supported by any evidence. The
receipt of a partial payment does not suffice to prove that the purchase was made
on an installment basis. Petitioner did not present any document to prove said
allegation while MGM Motors produced a sales invoice wherein it was stated that
the mode of payment is "COD" or cash on delivery. In the same vein, petitioner
failed to substantiate his allegation against Ayala Insurance. Petitioner has the
burden of proof to show that a loss occurred and said loss was covered by his
insurance policy.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO R. DE BORJA
G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017
Facts
Petitioner Republic, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, for “Accounting, Reconveyance, Forfeiture, Restitution, and
Damages” (Complaint) before the SB (Civil Case No. 0003) for the recovery of ill-
gotten assets allegedly amassed by the individual respondents therein, singly or
collectively, during the administration of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Geronimo Z. Velasco (Velasco), one of the defendants in said case, was the
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC). Herein respondent De Borja is Velasco's nephew.

PNOC, in the exercise of its functions, received “address commissions”

which amounting to 5% of the total freight. Allegedly, during Velasco’s stint, these
commissions were not remitted to PNOC. Petitioner claimed that it was De Borja
who collected these address commissions in behalf of Velasco, basing its
allegation on the testimony of Epifanio F. Verano (Verano), a witness for
petitioner Republic. De Borja was further alleged to have acted as Velasco's
dummy, nominee, and/or agent for corporations he owned and/or controlled, such
as DRMC.

After petitioner filed its formal offer of evidence, respondent De Borja filed
his Demurrer to Evidence of even date, stating therein, among others: (i) that
Verano, on two (2) occasions, testified that he delivered an envelope to Velasco
who, in turn, instructed him to deliver the same to De Borja; (ii) that Verano
admitted that the envelope was sealed; (iii) that Verano did not open the envelope
and therefore had no knowledge of the contents thereof; (iv) that Verano did not
deliver the envelope personally to De Borja; and (v) that Verano did not confirm
whether De Borja in fact received the said envelope. The Sandiganbayan (SB)
granted the same.

Issue
Whether or not the SB committed reversible error in granting respondent De
Borja's Demurrer to Evidence

Ruling
No. Nothing in the testimony of Verano reasonably points, or even alludes,
to the conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy or conduit of Velasco in
receiving address commissions from vessel owners. The Court concurred in the
SB's observations pertaining to Verano's want of knowledge with respect to the
contents of the envelopes allegedly delivered to respondent De Borja's office,
which remained sealed the entire time it was in Verano's possession. As admitted
by Verano himself, he did not and could not have known what was inside the
envelopes when they were purportedly entrusted to him for delivery. In the same
vein, Verano did not even confirm respondent De Borja's receipt of the envelopes,
despite numerous opportunities to do so. Relatedly, it was further revealed during
the cross-examination of Verano that in the first place, Velasco did not even deal
directly with brokers.
 ESPIRITA N. ACOSTA v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 131488, August 3, 1998
Facts
During the May 12, 1997, barangay election, petitioner Espirita Acosta won
with a winning margin of four votes. He was proclaimed as the duly elected
Punong Barangay of Brgy. Sobol, San Fabian, Pangasinan. On May 15, 1997,
Raymundo I. Rivera filed an election protest praying for a recount of the votes with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan. The
following day, the court a quo summoned Acosta who, on May 19, 1997, filed a
Motion for Time to File Answer. In an order dated May 21, 1997, the court denied
said motion and concluded that the election protest was sufficient in form and
substance. On May 29, 1997, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for
certiorari and prohibition questioning the May 21, 1997 order of the MCTC.
However, on the following day, May 30th, after determining that Rivera should
have garnered 408 three votes more than Acosta's 405, the lower court rendered a
decision nullifying petitioner's proclamation and declaring Rivera as the duly
elected Punong Barangay. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on June 11, 1997,
which respondent Judge granted. On December 2, 1997 the COMELEC issued an
en banc Resolution in SPR No. 13-97 dismissing the petition for lack of merit and
affirming the assailed order as well as the trial court's decision dated May 30 th.
Hence, this petition.

Issue
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing the aforementioned
resolution

Ruling
Yes. The COMELEC indeed exceeded the bounds of its authority when it
affirmed the trial court's decision when said judgment was not the subject of SPR
No. 13-97, a special civil action assailing an interlocutory order of the same lower
court. The fact that the decision was eventually elevated to the COMELEC on
appeal does not cure the defect since said appeal was not consolidated with SPR
No. 13-97. In fact, it was still undocketed at the time and the parties had not yet
submitted any evidence relating to the election protest. While the COMELEC
cannot be faulted for resolving the issue raised by petitioner in SPR No. 13-97,
namely, the propriety of the lower court's order dated May 21, 1997, it exceeded its
authority and thereby gravely abused its discretion when, in the same resolution, it
affirmed said court's decision dated May 30, 1997, which was the subject of
petitioner's appeal, UNDK No. 5-97.
 DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORPORATION v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 161122, September 24, 2012
Facts
The petitioner acquired a parcel of land in San Roque, Cebu through a deed
of absolute sale between petitioner, as vendee, and Agripina R. Goc-ong (a
respondent herein), Porferio Goc-ong, Diosdado Goc-ong, Crisostomo Goc-ong,
Tranquilino Goc-ong, Naciancena Goc-ong and Avelino Goc-ong (collectively, the
Goc-ongs), as vendors. Petitioner later on discovered that the Goc-ongs mortgaged
the said parcel of land in favor of the Ngs to secure their obligation, subject to the
condition that should they fail to pay, the Ngs would automatically become the
owners of the property.

With the Goc-ongs failing to pay their obligations to the Ngs, the latter filed
a complaint for sum of money with the RTC or, in the alternative, for the
foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC rendered its decision on October 16, 1997 in
favor of the Ngs. In 2001, petitioner commenced in the CA an action for the
annulment of the October 16, 1997 decision of the RTC. The CA dismissed the
petition for annulment considering that nowhere therein is there an allegation on
why "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

Issue
Whether the action for annulment of judgement under Rule 47 was a proper
recourse for the petitioner to set aside the October 16, 1997 decision of the RTC

Ruling
No. The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment,
final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-
honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid
corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the
risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.
 MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO v.
SPOUSES RICHARD Y. HUANG and CARMEN G. HUANG, et al.
G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017
Facts
Stephen Huang and his parents Sps. Huang filed a complaint for damages
based on quasi-delict against Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando J. Del
Rosario. Mercury Drug was the owner of a six (6)-wheeler truck driven by Del
Rosario which figured in an accident with Stephen’s car, which left Stephen
injuries. Stephen is now a paraplegic. The RTC found Mercury Drug and Del
Rosario jointly and severally liable for actual damages, compensatory damages,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
The CA affirmed the RTC but reduced the award for moral damages.

Stephen and his parents then moved for the execution of the judgement
before the RTC of Makati to which Mercury Drug and Del Rosario opposed. The
RTC granted the Motion for Execution. Mercury Drug and Del Rosario moved to
quash the Writ of Execution on the ground that it allegedly contravened the tenor
of the judgement. Mercury Drug and Del Rosario then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA where they argued that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in allowing the execution of the judgment despite clerical errors in the
computation of life care cost and loss of earning capacity.

The CA denied the petition holding that the perceived error in the
computation of the award and its correction entailed a substantial amendment of
the judgement sought to be enforced.

Issue
Whether or not the case falls under any of the exceptions to the doctrine of
immutability of judgements

Ruling
No. The doctrine of immutability of judgements is subject to the following
exceptions: (i) correction of clerical errors; (ii) nunc pro tunc entries which cause
no prejudice to any party; (iii) void judgements; and (iv) circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. It is
the first exception which is being invoked by petitioner. In this case, there are no
clerical errors or ambiguities regarding the computation of life care cost and loss of
earning capacity awarded to respondent Stephen. The amounts indicated in the
dispositive portion of the judgment faithfully correspond to the findings of fact and
conclusions of the trial court.

The trial court deemed it adequate and proper to award P23,461,062.00 as

life care cost and P10,000,000.00 as loss of earning capacity based on the evidence
presented during trial. In awarding life care cost, the trial court did not limit itself
to respondent Stephen's actual expenses in 1997 and 1998 and his projected life
expectancy. The trial court also considered the testimonies of respondent Stephen's
doctors regarding his future medical expenses. On the award of loss of earning
capacity, the trial court did not likewise limit itself to respondent Stephen's
projected initial monthly salary and life expectancy. It considered other equally
important factors such as respondent Stephen's capacity prior to the injury,
physical conditions, disposition to labor, and his professional habits.
 ROBERTO A. TORRES, et al. v. ANTONIO F. ARUEGO
G.R. No. 201271, September 20, 1971
Facts
Antonia Aruego and Evelyn Aruego, represented by their mother, filed a
complaint with the RTC Manila for “Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights” against Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five minor children of
Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and guardian ad litem Justo M. Torres,
Jr. (collectively defendants). In their Complaint, Antonia and Evelyn alleged that
they are the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego (Aruego) who
had and maintained an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian, their mother, up to
the demise of Aruego.

After trial on the merits, the court rendered a Decision on June 15, 1992
declaring Antonia an illegitimate child of Aruego and is thus entitled to a share
equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego. Antonia
then filed a Motion for Partition with the trial court. Meanwhile, petitioners filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City seeking to nullify the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Antonia in favor of Sharon Cuneta, Inc. covering ½ portion of
one of the properties comprising the estate of Aruego.

Antonia filed another Motion for Partition before the trial court in order to
implement the June 15, 1992 Decision of the trial court. Petitioners opposed the
motion arguing that the partition could not take place as there was no conclusive
adjudication of the ownership of the properties declared as constituting the estate
of Jose M. Aruego and that all the identities of his heirs had yet to be determined.
The lower court rejected petitioners’ opposition. The CA dismissed their appeal for
lack of merit.

Issue
Whether or not the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo, which attained
finality more than 20 years ago, may still be subject to review and modification by
the Court

Ruling
No. True, the doctrine on immutability of final judgments admits of
exceptions such as the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc
pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the
judgment is void. These exceptions, however, are not obtaining at bench. Hence,
there is no ground to justify the modification of the June 15, 1992 Decision. what
petitioners in the present case seek is an order from the court to allow them to
present evidence with regard to the properties comprising the estate of Aruego and
the heirs who are to share in the inheritance. This is, in effect, an appeal from the
June 15, 1992 Decision which has long become final and executory, and not from
an order of execution which is yet to be carried out, thru a Project of Partition still
to be submitted to and approved by the court.
 BEVERLY ANNE C. YAP v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 199810, March 15, 2017
Facts
Pagarigan filed his own Free Patent Application and subsequently, a Free
Patent was issued in his favor over the subject lot. Pagarigan mortgaged the lot to
Banco Davao-Davao City (the Bank) as security for his loans. For failure to pay his
loans, the Bank foreclosed the subject lot. Meanwhile, Teodoro Valparaiso and
Pedro Malais (the protestants) filed a protest before the Bureau of Lands seeking to
cancel the free patent issued to Pagarigan. The protestants also caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens in the certificate of title of the subject lot.

Meanwhile, without consolidating ownership over the subject lot, the Bank
sold the same to Beverly Yap and Rosanna Villamor. A TCT was thereafter issued
in their favor. The DOTC filed an expropriation case of the subject lot before the
RTC Davao City Branch 13. The RTC Branch 13 rendered its decision in favor of
DOTC and held that Villamor and Yap are the ones entitled to payment of just
compensation.

Respondent, through the OSG, filed a complaint for cancellation of patent,

nullification of title, and reversion before the RTC Branch 16 of Davao City. RTC
Branch 16 dismissed the case holding that since Branch 13 had already declared in
the previous decision that Yap and Villamor were purchasers in good faith and for
value of the land, it is bound by the principle of conclusiveness of judgements. The
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC Branch 16 is bound by the principle of
conclusiveness of judgements

Ruling
No. The principle of conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them
are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such
parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. RTC Branch 16 falsely appreciated
Branch 13. the question of whether or not Yap and Villamor are innocent
purchasers was not an actual issue of fact in the case before the RTC Branch 13,
and which called for said court's adjudication. "An issue of fact is a point
supported by one party's evidence and controverted by another's." That Yap and
Villamor were buyers in good faith is merely an allegation which was not proven
in court. The RTC Branch 13 did not actually make any clear pronouncement on
the matter. The RTC Branch 13's pronouncement that Yap and Villamor were
buyers in good faith was, at best, a mere obiter dictum. Contrary to Yap's claim,
there was nothing final or conclusive with the decision of the RTC Branch 13
which the CA should be bound.
 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUARIÑA
AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 160758, January 15, 2014
Facts
Guariña Corporation applied for a loan from DBP to finance the construction
of its resort complex which DBP released in installments. Guariña Corporation
also executed a real estate mortgage over several properties in favor of DBP as
security for the repayment of the loan. It also executed a chattel mortgage over the
personal properties existing at the resort complex and those yet to be acquired out
of the proceeds of the loan. Guariña Corporation then demanded the release of the
rest of the loan which DBP refused. Subsequently, DBP initiated initial
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Thus, prompting Guariña Corporation to sue
DBP before the RTC to demand specific performance under the loan agreement
and to stop the foreclosure of the mortgages (Civil Case No. 12707). In the
meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a writ of possession by the RTC which
the latter granted. Guariña Corporation assailed the granting of such application
before the CA on certiorari (C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP) which the CA dismissed.

The RTC rendered its judgement in Civil Case No. 12707 in favor of
Guariña Corporation. DBP assailed such decision before the CA which was
docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491. The CA, however, sustained the RTC
judgement. Before the SC, DBP insists that the decision of the CA in C.A.-G.R.
No. 12670-SP already constituted the law of the case. Hence, the CA could not
decide the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491 differently.

Issue
Whether or not DBP is correct

Ruling
No. The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an
appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be
the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus
laid down may have been reversed in other cases. The foregoing understanding of
the concept of the law of the case exposes DBP's insistence to be unwarranted. For
practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard
having been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the
law of the case and should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine
other issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies,
concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.

To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP's application for the issuance
of the writ of possession was entirely independent from the judicial demand for
specific performance herein. In fact, C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP, being the
interlocutory appeal concerning the issuance of the writ of possession while the
main case was pending, was not at all intertwined with any legal issue properly
raised and litigated in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491, which was the appeal to
determine whether or not DBP's foreclosure was valid and effectual. And,
secondly, the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not settle any question of law
involved herein because this case for specific performance was not a continuation
of C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP (which was limited to the propriety of the issuance of
the writ of possession in favor of DBP), and vice versa.
 EVELYN DE LUNA, et al. v. HON. SOFRONIO F. ABRIGO, et al.
G.R. No. 57455, January 18, 1990
Facts
Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of land to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc.
(the foundation). The donation was subject was subject to certain terms and
conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated
property in case of violation or non-compliance. Herein petitioners, Evelyn,
Rosalina, Prudencio, Jr., Willard, Antonio and Joselito, all surnamed de Luna, who
claim to be the children and only heirs of the late Prudencio de Luna who died on
August 18, 1980, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
alleging that the terms and conditions of the donation were not complied with by
the foundation. Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and
the reversion of the donated land to the heirs.

Respondent foundation claimed that it had partially and substantially

complied with the conditions of the donation and that the donor has granted the
foundation an indefinite extension of time to complete the construction of the
chapel. An order was issued dismissing the complaint. Petitioners brought the
instant petition for review alleging that the lower court erred in rendering
judgement on the merits by way of judgement on the pleadings.

Issue
Whether or not the lower court erred

Ruling
Yes. Considering that the allegations in the complaint on the matter of the
donee's non-compliance with the conditions of the donation have been contested by
private respondents who claimed that improvements more valuable than the
donated property had been introduced, a judgment on the pleadings is not proper.
Moreover, in the absence of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court
cannot motu proprio render such judgment. Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: "Where
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading."
 SPOUSES VILLUGA v. KELLY HARDWARE & CONSTRUCTION
SUPPLY, et al.
G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012
Facts
Kelly Hardware sued Sps. Villuga for the amount of P259,809.50 as value of
the construction materials the latter purchased from the former. In their Answer,
Sps. Villuga argued that they made partial payments in the amounts of
P110,301.80 and P20,000. Nevertheless, they manifested their willingness to pay
P259,809.50 to buy peace. Kelly Hardware filed an Amended Complaint arguing
that the original obligation was P279,809.50 and Sps. Villuga paid P20,000 thus,
the balance of P259,809.50. Kelly Hardware thereafter filed a Request for
Admission for Sps. Villuga to admit the genuineness of various documents.
Thereafter, Kelly Hardware filed Second Amended Complaint modifying the
period covered by the original complaint and arguing that the P110,301.80 was
applied to other obligations. It reiterated that Sps. Villuga’s obligations still
amounted to P259.809.50. The RTC ruled in favor of Kelly Hardware, which the
CA affirmed. Before the SC, Sps. Villuga argued that Kelly Hardware waived its
Request ofr Admission when it filed the Second Amended Complaint and that all
motions and requests based on the complaint, which was amended, should no
longer be considered.

Issue
Whether or not Sps. Villuga’s contentions are tenable

Ruling
No. An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However,
admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the
pleader; and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended
pleading shall be deemed waived. From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent's
Request for Admission is not deemed abandoned or withdrawn by the filing of the
Second Amended Complaint.
 THE HEIRS OF NICOLAS S. CABIGAS, et al. v. MELBA L. LIMBACO, et
al.
G.R. No. 175291, July 27, 2011
Facts
Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of titles of various pieces of land
registered in the names of Melba Limbaco, Linda Logarta, Ramon Logarta,
Eugenio Amores, New Ventures Realty Corporation, Henry See, Freddie Go,
Benedict Que, AWG Development Corporation (AWG), Petrosa Development
Corporation (Petrosa), and University of Cebu Banilad, Inc. (UCB) with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. The complaint alleged that petitioner
Lolita Cabigas and her late husband, Nicolas Cabigas, purchased two lots (Lot No.
742 4 and Lot No. 9535) from Salvador Cobarde on January 15, 1980. Cobarde in
turn had purchased these lots from Ines Ouano. Notwithstanding the sale between
Ouano and Cobarde, and because the two lots remained registered in her name,
Ouano was able to sell these same lots to the National Airports Corporation on
November 25, 1952 for its airport expansion project.

When the airport expansion project fell through, respondents Melba

Limbaco, Ramon Logarta, and Linda Logarta, the legal heirs of Ouano, succeeded
in reclaiming title to the two lots through an action for reconveyance filed with the
lower court; the titles over these lots were thereafter registered in their names.
Thereafter, respondents AWG, Petrosa, and UCB filed a motion for summary
judgment admitting as true the facts stated in the petitioners' complaint, but
claiming that the petitioners had no legal right to the properties in question. The
RTC granted the motion for summary judgement. The CA affirmed.

Issue
Whether or not rendition of summary judgement was proper

Ruling
Yes. Under the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may be rendered
where, on motion of a party and after hearing, the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions and admissions on file show that, “except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The petitioners assert that the RTC erred
in rendering a summary judgment since there were factual issues that required the
presentation of evidence at a trial. The SC disagreed. Several respondents denied
that the sale between Ouano and Cobarde ever occurred. It would, therefore,
appear that a factual issue existed that required resolution through a formal trial,
and the RTC erred in rendering summary judgment. A closer examination of the
parties' submissions, however, makes it apparent that this is not a genuine issue of
fact because, as will be discussed below, the petitioners do not have any legally
enforceable right to the properties in question, as their predecessors-in-interest are
not buyers in good faith.
 ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 213027, January 18, 2017
Facts
The present consolidated petitions emanated from the same Civil Case No.
0141, when the Republic filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 24
June 2009 with respect to another property listed in the 1991 Petition. By way of
that motion, the Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to render judgment declaring
the pieces of jewelry, known as the Malacañang Collection and specifically
mentioned under paragraph 9 (6) of the 1991 Petition, as ill-gotten; and to
subsequently cause this collection of jewelry to be declared forfeited in favor of the
Republic.

On 3 July 2009, the Republic also filed a Request for Admission addressed
to the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos. The Republic also submitted a Supplement to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 14 July 2009. It restated that the
object of the motion covered only the Malacañang Collection, as the ownership of
the two other collections had been settled by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
dated 25 October 1996. In their Manifestation and Motion to Expunge, Imelda
Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta claimed that the filing of the Request for
Admission was tantamount to an abdication of the earlier position of the Republic
that the case was ripe for summary judgment. The Sandiganbayan denied the
Marcoses' Manifestation and Preliminary Comments and Manifestation and
Motion to Expunge. It ruled that the Republic's Request for Admission was not
inconsistent with the Motion for Summary Judgement.

Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgement was not inconsistent with the request for admission

Ruling
Yes. A request for admission can be the basis for the grant of summary
judgment. The request can be the basis therefor when its subject is deemed to have
been admitted by the party and is requested as a result of that party's failure to
respond to the court's directive to state what specifically happened in the case. The
resort to such a request as a mode of discovery rendered all the matters contained
therein as matters that have been deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the basis of respondent Imelda Marcos's
letter dated 25 May 2009; respondents' Answer to the 1991 Petition, which was
considered to be a "negative pregnant" in Republic v. Sandiganbayan; and
respondents' failure to timely respond to petitioner's Request for Admission, the
Sandiganbayan thus correctly granted the Motion for Summary Judgment of the
Republic. A careful scrutiny of the three bases used by the Sandiganbayan in
justifying the absence of a genuine issue and eventually granting the Motion for
Pmtial Summary Judgment leads us to no other course of action but to affirm the
ruling of the Sandiganbayan. The prima facie presumption on unlawfully acquired
property indeed finds application on the first basis. Section 2 of R.A. 1379
provides that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of propmtion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired." And in this regard, the Sandiganbayan
had taken judicial notice of the legitimate income of the Marcoses during their
incumbency as public officers for the period 1966-1986 which was pegged at USD
304,372.43.
 ILOILO JAR CORPORATION v. COMGLASCO
CORPORATION/AGUILA GLASS
G.R. No. 219509, January 18, 2017
Facts
Petitioner and respondent entered into a lease contract over a portion of a
warehouse building in Iloilo City. Respondent requested for the pre-termination of
the lease agreement which was refused by petitioner. Respondent, nevertheless,
still removed all its stock from the leased premises. From then on, respondent
never paid any rent due petitioner. Petitioner then filed a civil action for breach of
contract and damages before the RTC.

Comglasco filed its Answer and raised an affirmative defense, arguing that
by virtue of Article 1267 of the Civil Code (Article 1267), it was released from its
obligation from the lease contract. Comglasco admitted that it had removed its
stocks and merchandise but it did not refuse to pay the rentals because the lease
contract was already deemed terminated. Iloilo Jar filed its Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings arguing that Comglasco admitted all the material allegations in
the complaint. It insisted that Comglasco's answer failed to tender an issue because
its affirmative defense was unavailing.

The RTC granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings. It opined that
Comglasco's answer admitted the material allegations of the complaint and that its
affirmative defense was unavailing because Article 1267 was inapplicable to lease
contracts. The CA reversed the RTC and held that judgment on the pleadings was
improper as Comglasco's answer tendered an issue considering that Iloilo Jar's
material allegations were specifically denied therein. Further, the CA opined that
even if the same were not specifically denied, the answer raised an affirmative
issue which was factual in nature.

Issue
Whether or not judgement on the pleadings was proper

Ruling
No. What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary
judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the
Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations
in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party's pleadings
by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a
judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer
specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative
defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided
that the issue raised is not genuine. "A 'genuine issue' means an issue of fact which
calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which does
not constitute a genuine issue for trial." In the case at bench, Comglasco interposed
an affirmative defense in its answer. While it admitted that it had removed its
stocks from the leased premises and had received the demand letter for rental
payments, it argued that the lease contract had been pre-terminated because the
consideration thereof had become so difficult to comply in light of the economic
crisis then existing. Thus, judgment on the pleadings was improper considering
that Comglasco's Answer raised an affirmative defense. Nevertheless, no genuine
issue was raised because there is no issue of fact which needs presentation of
evidence, and the affirmative defense Comglasco invoked is inapplicable in the
case at bench.
 ROBERTO A. TORRES, et al. v. ANTONIO F. ARUEGO
G.R. No. 201271, September 20, 1971
Facts
Antonia Aruego and Evelyn Aruego, represented by their mother, filed a
complaint with the RTC Manila for “Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights” against Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five minor children of
Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and guardian ad litem Justo M. Torres,
Jr. (collectively defendants). In their Complaint, Antonia and Evelyn alleged that
they are the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego (Aruego) who
had and maintained an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian, their mother, up to
the demise of Aruego.

After trial on the merits, the court rendered a Decision on June 15, 1992
declaring Antonia an illegitimate child of Aruego and is thus entitled to a share
equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego. Antonia
then filed a Motion for Partition with the trial court. Meanwhile, petitioners filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City seeking to nullify the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Antonia in favor of Sharon Cuneta, Inc. covering ½ portion of
one of the properties comprising the estate of Aruego.

Antonia filed another Motion for Partition before the trial court in order to
implement the June 15, 1992 Decision of the trial court. Petitioners opposed the
motion arguing that the partition could not take place as there was no conclusive
adjudication of the ownership of the properties declared as constituting the estate
of Jose M. Aruego and that all the identities of his heirs had yet to be determined.
The lower court rejected petitioners’ opposition. The CA dismissed their appeal for
lack of merit.

Issue
Whether or not the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo, which attained
finality more than 20 years ago, may still be subject to review and modification by
the Court

Ruling
No. True, the doctrine on immutability of final judgments admits of
exceptions such as the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc
pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the
judgment is void. These exceptions, however, are not obtaining at bench. Hence,
there is no ground to justify the modification of the June 15, 1992 Decision. what
petitioners in the present case seek is an order from the court to allow them to
present evidence with regard to the properties comprising the estate of Aruego and
the heirs who are to share in the inheritance. This is, in effect, an appeal from the
June 15, 1992 Decision which has long become final and executory, and not from
an order of execution which is yet to be carried out, thru a Project of Partition still
to be submitted to and approved by the court.
 ANGELITO L. CRISTOBAL v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. and LUCIO
TAN
G.R. No. 201622, October 4, 2017
Facts
Cristobal was a pilot for PAL. In line with a downsizing program of PAL,
Cristobal applied for leave without pay from PAL to enter into a four (4)-year
contract with EVA Air. PAL approved the application and advised him that he
would continue to accrue seniority during his leave and that he could opt to retire
from PAL during this period. In a letter, Cristobal advised PAL of his intent to
retire. In response, PAL advised him that he was deemed to have lost his
employment status on June 9, 1998. Thus, Cristobal filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission.

The LA found Cristobal’s dismissal illegal. On September 30, 2010, the

NLRC affirmed the LA decision. Cristobal filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration while PAL also filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The National
Labor Relations Commission resolved both motions in its Decision dated May 31,
2011, deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages and reducing the
amount of Cristobal's retirement benefits. On June 24, 2011, Cristobal filed his
Motion for Reconsideration, seeking reconsideration of the reduction of retirement
benefits. The NLRC denied Cristobal's Motion for Reconsideration, deeming it a
second motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2011 Decision.

Issue
Whether or not the June 24, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner Angelito L. Cristobal assailing the National Labor Relations
Commission May 31, 2011 Decision was a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration.

Ruling
No. Where a tribunal renders a decision substantially reversing itself on a
matter, a motion for reconsideration seeking reconsideration of this reversal, for
the first time, is not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. The National
Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure prohibits a party from
questioning a decision, resolution, or order, twice. In other words, this rule
prohibits the same party from assailing the same judgment. However, a decision
substantially reversing a determination in a prior decision is a discrete decision
from the earlier one.

Here, the National Labor Relations Commission May 31, 2011 Decision
substantially modified its September 30, 2010 Decision. Thus, petitioner was not
precluded from seeking reconsideration of the new decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission, and it was clearly an error for the Court of Appeals to find
that petitioner's petition for certiorari was filed out of time on that ground.
 DOMINGO NEYPES, et al. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005
Facts
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito
Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment
of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands,
Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe,
Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.

The trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the ground that the action
had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998,
filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration3 which petitioners received on
July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal
and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. The trial court denied the notice of
appeal holding that it was filed 8 days late.

Before the appellate court, petitioners argued that the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they
received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed
and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. The CA dismissed
the petition holding that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow
a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration. Petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal
within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt
of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. This
new rule does not run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of
cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and
the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days
becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
G.R. No. 171496, March 3, 2014
Facts
Respondent Ortigas & Company owned a parcel of land in Pasig City.
Respondent Ortigas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for
authority to sell to the government Lot 5-B-2-A-1.7 Respondent Ortigas alleged
that the Department of Public Works and Highways requested the conveyance of
the property for road widening purposes.

Finding merit in respondent Ortigas' petition, the Regional Trial Court

issued an order on June 11, 2001, authorizing the sale of Lot 5-B-2-A-1 to
petitioner Republic of the Philippines. On June 29, 2001, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration of the Regional Trial Court order
dated June 11, 2001, reiterating its argument in its opposition. In an order dated
October 3, 2001, the Regional Trial Court denied petitioner Republic of the
Philippines' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner
Republic of the Philippines' appeal on the ground that an order or judgment
denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable.

Issue
Whether or not the appeal should be dismissed

Ruling
No. Section 1 of Rule 41 prohibits is an appeal taken from an interlocutory
order. An interlocutory order or judgment, unlike a final order or judgment, does
"not completely dispose of the case because it leaves to the court something else to
be decided upon." Appeals from interlocutory orders are generally prohibited to
prevent delay in the administration of justice and to prevent "undue burden upon
the courts." Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always
interlocutory orders. A motion for reconsideration may be considered a final
decision, subject to an appeal, if "it puts an end to a particular matter," leaving the
court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision.

The trial court's order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines' motion
for reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell
its property to the government was not an interlocutory order because it completely
disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it would not cause delay in the
administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines' appeal to the Court
of Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the former used the wrong
mode of appeal.
 TONGONAN HOLDING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v.
ATTY. FRANCISCO ESCAÑO, JR.
G.R. No. 190994, September 7, 2011
Facts
Respondent Atty. Francisco Escano was the counsel of petitioner THDC in a
case for eminent domain. Atty. Escano sought the entry of his attorney’s liens on
the basis of the Memorandum of Agreement contracted between him and THDC.
Eventually, THDC terminated the services of Atty. Escano on the ground of loss of
confidence, which was approved by the RTC. Afterwards, Atty. Escano filed a
Motion to Enter into the Records Attorney’s Lien for additional Attorney’s fees.
The RTC denied the motion and approved only the 15% Attorney’s Lien on the
money judgment in favor of Atty. Escaño and his former partners. After his motion
for reconsideration was denied on January 26, 2006, Atty. Escaño filed a Notice of
Appeal. THDC then filed its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss
Appeal arguing that the Notice of Appeal was not the proper remedy as the order
being questioned was interlocutory which could not be the subject of an appeal.
THDC contends that it was merely interlocutory because the issue was only
collateral to the main issue of eminent domain. Atty. Escaño, on the other hand,
counters that the Orders are not interlocutory, but final orders and, therefore,
appealable. He reasons that both orders finally disposed the issue of his attorney’s
fees before the RTC and there was nothing more to be done pertaining to the same
matter.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC’s order of denial of the motion for entry for
additional attorney’s fees was interlocutory

Ruling
No. An order or judgment of the RTC is deemed final when it finally
disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial
court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court.
On the other hand, an order which does not dispose of the case completely and
indicates that other things remain to be done by the court as regards the merits, is
interlocutory. In this case, the RTC orders denying the claim for additional
attorney’s fees were final considering that the main action for eminent domain, was
already final. In fact, it was the subject of several motions for execution. Thus, the
RTC had nothing more to do with respect to the relative rights of the parties
therein. There is nothing left for the judge to perform except to enforce the
judgment.

Moreover, as correctly noted by the CA, the RTC ended with finality the
issue of Atty. Escaño’s attorney’s fees when it rendered the aforementioned orders,
having ruled that he was not entitled to it. The RTC need not resolve anything else
thereby making the said orders final.
 FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ v. OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014
Facts
In view of what it deemed to be a wide variance between Aguilar's acquired
assets and what she spent for her four-year overseas travels, on one hand, and her
income, on the other, the PNP-CIDG, through P/Director Eduardo Matillano — in
a letter-complaint of July 28, 2003, with enclosures, on a finding that she has
violated Republic Act No. (RA) 1379 in relation to RA 3019 and 6713 — charged
her with grave misconduct and dishonesty. Hernandez was charged too with the
same offenses.

The Ombudsman adjudged petitioners guilty of the offenses charged.

Aguilar and Hernandez moved for but were denied reconsideration via an Order of
February 28, 2005. The two then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on a petition
for review under Rule 43. The CA affirmed the Ombudsman. Even as it junked
petitioners' contention on the sufficiency of the complainant's inculpating evidence
and on the nature of the Ombudsman's judgment, the CA declared that petitioners'
remedy under the premises is an appeal to the Supreme Court by force of Section
14 in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

Issue
Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 was proper

Ruling
Yes. In administrative disciplinary cases, an appeal from the OMB's decision
should be taken to the CA under Rule 43, unless the decision is not appealable
owing to the penalty imposed. In the case at bar, the Ombudsman, in the exercise
of his administrative disciplinary jurisdiction had, after due investigation, adjudged
petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty and meted the corresponding
penalty. Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is the proper mode of appeal.
Rule 43 governs appeals to the CA from decisions or final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies. Reliance by the CA on Sec. 14 in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770 to
support its position as to which court a party may repair to to assail the OMB's
decision in disciplinary cases is misinformed. As has been held, those portions of
said Sec. 27 and any other provisions implementing RA 6770, insofar as they
expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its concurrence, violate
Article VI, Sec. 30 of the 1987 Constitution.

As a consequence and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in

appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) v. BCA INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION & AD HOC ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, et al.
G.R. No. 225051, July 19, 2017
Facts
Petitioner DFA awarded the Machine Readable Passport and Visa Project
(MRP/V Project) to respondent BCA International Corporation. Respondent
opposed the termination and filed a Request for Arbitration on April 20, 2006. On
October 5, 2013, respondent manifested that it shall file an Amended Statement of
Claims so that its claim may conform to the evidence they have presented.

In Procedural Order No. 11 dated February 15, 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal
granted respondent's Motion to Admit Attached Amended Statement of Claims
dated April 30, 2015 on the premise that respondent would no longer present any
additional evidence-in-chief. On February 18, 2016, respondent filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration 13 of Procedural Order No. 11 and prayed for the
admission of its Amended Statement of Claims by the Arbitral Tribunal without
denying respondent's right to present evidence on the actual damages, such as
attorney's fees and legal cost that it continued to incur. On February 19, 2016,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Procedural Order No. 11. The
Arbitral Tribunal, thereafter, issued Procedural Order No. 12 dated June 8, 2016,
which resolved respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Procedural
Order No. 11, disallowing the presentation of additional evidence-in-chief by
respondent to prove the increase in the amount of its claim as a limitation to the
Tribunals' decision granting respondent's Motion to Amend its Statement of
Claims. In Procedural Order No. 12, the Tribunal directed the parties to submit
additional documentary evidence in support of their respective positions in relation
to the Amended Statement of Claims and to which the other party may submit its
comment or objections.

As Procedural Order No. 12 denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of

Procedural Order No. 11, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court with application for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to annul and set aside Procedural
Order No. 11 dated February 15, 2016 and Procedural Order No. 12 dated June 8,
2016.

Issue
Whether the petition may be granted

Ruling
No. Under Rule 19.36 of the Special ADR Rules, review by the Supreme
Court is not a matter of right and must be from decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Under Rule 19.37 of said Special ADR Rules, an appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court should from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals and only questions of law may be raised. There have been instances when
we overlooked the rule on hierarchy of courts and took cognizance of a petition for
certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by the Regional Trial Court when it
granted interim relief to a party and issued an Order assailed by the petitioner,
considering the transcendental importance of the issue involved therein or to better
serve the ends of justice when the case is determined on the merits rather on
technicality. However, in this case, the appeal by certiorari is not from a final
Order of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, but from an
interlocutory order of the Arbitral Tribunal; hence, the petition must be dismissed.
 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. v. BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., and
MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE CO., LTD.
G.R. No. 193986, January 15, 2014
Facts
Sumitomo Corporation shipped through MV Eastern Challenger, a vessel
owned by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, various steel sheets on various dates.
The cargo was insured against all risk by Sumitomo with respondent Mitsui
Sumitomo Insurance (Mitsui). Upon the unloading of the cargo from the said
vessel on different dates, the coils thereof were either badly damaged or were
found to be in poor condition. Thus, an insurance claim was filed against Mitsui.
Mitsui and BPI/MS then filed a complaint for damages against petitioner and
Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI). The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Mitsui and
against petitioner. Petitioner and ATI appealed to the CA, who affirmed the RTC’s
findings.

Petitioner and ATI filed their respective petitions for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court but ATI’s petition was dismissed by the Court in a
separate case. In its Memorandum, petitioner essentially avers that the CA erred in
affirming the decision of the RTC because the survey reports submitted by
respondents themselves as their own evidence and the pieces of evidence submitted
by petitioner clearly show that the cause of the damage was the rough handling of
the goods by ATI during the discharging operations. Petitioner attests that it had no
participation whatsoever in the discharging operations and that petitioner did not
have a choice in selecting the stevedore since ATI is the only arrastre operator
mandated to conduct discharging operations in the South Harbor. Thus, petitioner
prays that it be absolved from any liability relative to the damage incurred by the
goods.

Issue
Whether the CA committed any reversible error in finding that petitioner is
solidarily liable with ATI on account of the damage incurred by the goods

Ruling
No. Factual questions may not be raised before this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari as this Court is not a trier of facts. This is clearly stated in
Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. A question
of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law
or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.

In this petition, the resolution of the question as to who between petitioner

and ATI should be liable for the damage to the goods is indubitably factual, and
would clearly impose upon this Court the task of reviewing, examining and
evaluating or weighing all over again the probative value of the evidence presented
— something which is not, as a rule, within the functions of the Court and within
the office of a petition for review on certiorari.
 MARIO MAGAT, SR., et al. v. TANTRADE CORPORATION and PABLO
S. BORJA, JR.
G.R. No. 205483, August 23, 2017
Facts
Respondent Tantrade Corporation filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money against Juliana Magat (Juliana) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Tagbilaran City. The MTCC found Juliana liable to pay Tantrade. Juliana appealed
the MTCC decision to the RTC but passed away pending the appeal thus, was
substituted by petitioners as her heirs. The RTC affirmed the MTCC ruling in toto.

On May 23, 2011, one (1) day before the lapse of the 15-day period to file a
Petition for Review under Rule 42, petitioners filed their First Motion for
Extension. asking for an additional 15 days, or until June 8, 2011, to file their
appeal. They justified their First Motion for Extension by citing financial
constraints. Despite their declared financial difficulties, petitioners managed to pay
the docket and other fees and to make a deposit for costs, as required. In its May
31, 2011 Resolution, the CA denied the First Motion for Extension faulting
petitioners for their “procrastination” as they filed a motion for extension a day
before the end of the reglementary period. It further bewailed that it could not be
expected to have acted on such very limited time especially so when the Rollo was
received by the office of the ponente only after its raffle on May 24, 2011."

On June 6, 2011, or two (2) days before the expiration of the 15-day
extension that petitioners originally prayed for in the First Motion for Extension,
petitioners filed their Second Motion for Extension. They had not yet received a
copy of the assailed Court of Appeals May 31, 2011 Resolution by this time. They
sought another 15-day extension, or until June 23, 2011, to file their Petition for
Review. On June 22, 2011, a day before the end of the second 15-day extension
they prayed for, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for
Review under Rule 42. It was only on June 29, 2011 that petitioners received a
copy of the assailed Court of Appeals May 31, 2011 Resolution. On July 11, 2011,
they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied their MR.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days each.
An initial extension may be given, provided that it is sought through a proper
motion, docket and lawful fees are paid, and a deposit for costs is made before the
expiration of the reglementary period. After this initial extension, Rule 42 permits
a second extension of another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only
be "for the most compelling reason." To legitimately seek an initial extension,
petitioners had to file a proper motion and to ensure that docket and lawful fees
were paid and deposit for costs was made before the expiration of the reglementary
period. Save for the Court of Appeals' assertion of procrastination, there is no
intimation that petitioners failed in any of these requirements. No other technical
defect has been attributed to petitioners' First Motion for Extension. They also
timely paid the docket and other fees, and deposited for costs. Petitioners did not
abuse court processes when they sought a second extension. Their Second Motion
for Extension was filed two (2) days before the end of the first 15-day extension. It
was filed, not only within, but in advance of the lapse of the period for seeking the
second extension sanctioned by the final sentence of Rule 42, Section 1.
 NUEVA ECIJA II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., et al. v. ELMER B.
MAPAGU
G.R. No. 196084, February 15, 2017
Facts
Respondent Mapagu was employed by NEEC as a data processor. After an
audit, Mapagu’s electric consumption was found to be under-read and under-billed
for the months of April 2004 and March to May 2005, respectively. Mapagu was
informed that the penalty for the charges would be dismissal at the first instance.
On January 2, 2007, Mapagu was dismissed. Thus, Mapagu filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against petitioners. The LA ruled in favor of petitioners. The
NLRC, however, reversed the ruling of the LA, and denied petitioners’ subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a Rule 65
petition which the CA dismissed outright for their failure to attach a Verification
and Certification Against Forum Shopping. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Accordingly, petitioners received the
Resolution by the CA denying their motion for reconsideration on March 17, 2011.

On May 5, 2011, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45. This was opposed to by Mapagu on the ground that
petitioners filed the same out of time. Petitioners insist that they have 60 days from
March 17, 2011 or until May 17, 2011 within which to file their petition for review
on certiorari. Since the petition was filed on May 6, 2011, they maintain that the
same was, in fact, filed 11 days ahead of the deadline.

Issue
Whether or not the petition for review on certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period

Ruling
No. Under Rule 45, The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial
of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the
docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an
extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.

Petitioners failed to comply with the foregoing provisions. They confuse

petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65. It is the latter which is required to be filed within a period of not later than
60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. If a motion for new trial
or reconsideration is filed, the 60-day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of the motion. A party litigant wishing to file a petition for review on
certiorari must do so within 15 days from notice of the judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be appealed. Here, petitioners received the Resolution of the
CA denying their Motion for Reconsideration on March 17, 2011. Under the Rules,
they have until April 1, 2011 to file the petition. However, they filed the same only
on May 6, 2011. Even if petitioners were given the maximum period of extension
of 30 days, their petition still cannot stand. The Rules allow only for a maximum
period of 45 days within which an aggrieved party may file a petition for review on
certiorari.
 RUBEN MANALANG, et al. v. BIENVENIDO and MERCEDES BACANI
G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015
Facts
Petitioners were the co-owners of Lot No. 4236. In 1997, petitioners caused
the relocation and verification survey of Lot No. 4236 whereby they found that
respondents had encroached on said lot to the extent of 405 sqm. When the
respondents refused to vacate the land, petitioners commenced an action for
unlawful detainer in the MTC of Guagua. The MTC Branch 2 dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction as it found that the action essentially involved a boundary
dispute which should be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. On appeal, the RTC
reversed the MTC Branch 2, and remanded the case to the latter for further
proceedings.

The MTC Branch 2 ultimately dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Once more, petitioners appealed to the RTC. At that point, the RTC ordered the
petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of
encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor, Engr. Emmanuel
Limpin, then Acting Chief of the Survey Section of the CENR-DENR. The RTC
then rendered a decision setting aside the MTC decision. On appeal, the CA held
that the RTC acted as a trial court in ordering the relocation survey and hearing the
testimony of the surveyor in violation of Sec. 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred in ordering the relocation survey

Ruling
Yes. Sec. 18, Rule 70 states that the judgment or final order shall be
appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on
the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the
Regional Trial Court. Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the
conduct of the relocation and verification survey "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was
tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact
that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the surveyor's
testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin.
 DARMA MASLAG v. ELIZABETH MONZON, et al.
G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint for reconveyance of real property with
declaration of nullity of original certificate of title against respondents before the
MTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The MTC found respondent guilty of fraud in
obtaining an OCT over petitioner’s property. Respondents appealed to the RTC of
La Trinidad, Benguet. The RTC issued its October 22, 2003 Order declaring the
MTC without jurisdiction over petitioner’s cause of action. The RTC thereafter
issued a Resolution dated May 4, 2004, reversing the MTC Decision.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the RTC’s May 4, 2004 Resolution.
Respondents moved to dismiss petitioner's ordinary appeal for being the improper
remedy. They asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 because the RTC rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its
appellate jurisdiction. The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner chose the correct mode of appeal

Ruling
No. First, the SC resolved that the case, contrary to the RTC’s findings, is an
action to recover ownership of real property thus, a real action where exclusive
jurisdiction belongs either to the MTC or the RTC depending on the assessed value
of the property. In this case, Exhibit “A”, a declaration of real property, revealed
that the assessed value of the real property subject of this case was only P12,400
which is well within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues

of fact and law. The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where
the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC. The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases
where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done
by filing a Petition for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between
these two modes of appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in
the Order or Decision being appealed.

As discussed above, the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have
taken cognizance of the case and review the court a quo's Judgment except in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the
proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
 BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC. v. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL,
et al.
G.R. No. 181182, April 10, 2013
Facts
Boardwalk filed before the MeTC of Manila a complaint for replevin against
Villareal covering a 1995 Toyota Tamarraw FX for the latter’s alleged failure to
pay a car loan obtained from the former. The MeTC ruled in favor of Boardwalk.
Villareal thus appealed to the RTC who reversed the MeTC decision. Boardwalk,
through counsel, filed with the Manila RTC a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review, praying that it be granted 30 days. It paid the docket and other
legal fees therefor at the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC.
Boardwalk then, through mail, filed its Petition for Review before the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition outright. The CA held that Boardwalk erred
in filing its Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees therefor with the
RTC. It should have done so with the CA as required by Section 1 of Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court. It held that as a result of Boardwalk's erroneous filing and
payment of docket fees, it was as if no Motion for Extension was filed, and the
subsequent filing of its Petition with the appellate court was thus late and beyond
the reglementary 15-day period provided for under Rule 42. The CA added that
Boardwalk's prayer for a 30-day extension in its Motion for Extension was
irregular, because the maximum period that may be granted is only 15 days
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. A further extension of 15 days should only be
granted for the most compelling reason which is not obtaining in the present case.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner may invoke the liberal construction of the Rules

Ruling
No. Petitioner committed various violations of the Rules. First, the Rules
require that the Petition must be accompanied by a VCNFS as well as copies of the
relevant pleadings and material portions of the record, and in case petitioner is a
juridical entity, it must be shown that the person signing on behalf of the
corporation is authorized to do so. Here, there is no SPA or board resolution
attached to the Petition filed by petitioner. Petitioner also failed to attach copies of
the relevant pleadings and other material portions of the record. Second, the Rules
require that payment of the docket fees should be made to the clerk of the CA.
Here, it was grave error on the part of petitioner to have paid the same to the clerk
of the RTC. Its subsequent payment to the clerk of the CA did not cure the defect.
Third, petitioner sought 30 days extension for it to file its Petition for Review
which is not allowed by Sec. 42 as the said Rule merely allows the second
extension of 15 days but only for exceptional circumstances which was not shown
here. Last, Section 8 of Rule 42 provides that the appeal is deemed perfected as to
the petitioner upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees." Undisputably, petitioner's appeal was
not perfected because of its failure to timely file the Petition and to pay the docket
and other lawful fees before the proper court which is the CA. Consequently, the
CA properly dismissed outright the Petition because it never acquired jurisdiction
over the same.
 AMADO G. PEREZ, et al. v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. No. 131445, May 27, 2004
Facts
Petitioners instituted two complaints against several respondents, one of
whom was Muntinlupa Mayor Ignacio Bunye, for violation of R.A. 3019 before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondents allegedly destroyed the doors of the
KBMBPM office while serving on petitioners the Take-Over Order of the
KBMBPM management dated October 28, 1998 issued by then Agriculture
Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez. In its Resolution, the Ombudsman excluded
respondent Bunye from the criminal indictment.

Petitioners assailed the exclusion in the CA through an original petition for

certiorari and mandamus. The CA dismissed the same in accordance with Sec. 27
of R.A. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act.

Issue
Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the petition

Ruling
Yes. The Court noted, however, that the CA erroneously invoked Sec. 27 of
R.A. 6770 of the Ombudsman Act as it applies only to administrative cases, and
not to criminal cases, such as that in the case at bar. Nevertheless, the Court
declared said Sec. 27 unconstitutional for expanding the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction without its consent.

It is the nature of the case that determines the proper remedy to be filed and
the appellate court where such remedy should be filed by a party aggrieved by the
decisions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman. If it is an administrative case,
appeal should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. If it is a criminal case, the proper remedy is to file with the Supreme Court
an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65. As the present controversy
pertained to a criminal case, the petitioners were correct in availing of the remedy
of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but they erred in filing it in the Court of
Appeals. The procedure set out in Kuizon vs. Ombudsman and Mendoza-Arce vs.
Ombudsman, requiring that petitions for certiorari questioning the Ombudsman's
orders or decisions in criminal cases should be filed in the Supreme Court and not
the Court of Appeals, is still the prevailing rule.
 AMANDO P. CORTES v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 187896-97, June 10, 2013
Facts
Petitioner charged respondents with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and
Misconduct. In a Consolidated Evaluation Report, the Office of the Ombudsman
Visayas recommended the dismissal of the cases due to the fact that two (2) other
cases involving the same parties and issues had already been filed by petitioner.
After denial of its MR, petitioner took the appeal directly to the Supreme Court via
a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner chose the correct remedy

Ruling
No. Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act, insofar as it provided for appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases, had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as
early as in the case of Fabian v. Desierto. In Fabian, the Court held that appeals
from decision of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a

criminal case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Court made the
pronouncement in Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon that the remedy of an
aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative and

a criminal complaint, petitioner had the option to either file a petition for review
under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals or directly file a certiorari petition under
Rule 65 before the Supreme Court. Neither of these two remedies was resorted to
by petitioner. By availing of a wrong remedy, this petition merits an outright
dismissal.
JULIET VITUG MADARANG, et al. v. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and
CAROLINA N. MORALES
G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014
Facts
Spouses Morales filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for judicial
foreclosure of a house and lot located in Bago Bantay, Quezon City against herein
petitioners. In a Decision, the trial court ordered petitioners to pay Sps. Morales.
Should defendants fail to pay, the Bago Bantay property shall be sold at public
auction to satisfy the judgment.

In its order dated May 25, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners. They received a copy of the May 25, 2010
order on June 24, 2010 through their counsel. On August 11, 2010, they filed a
notice of appeal which was denied by the RTC for having been filed out of time.
According to the RTC, petitioners, through their counsel, Atty. Arturo F. Tugonon,
received a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on June 24,
2010. This is evidenced by the registry return receipt on file with the court.
Consequently, they had 15 days from June 24, 2010, or until July 9, 2010, to
appeal the trial court's decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal only on
August 11, 2010, which was beyond the 15-day period to appeal.

On September 24, 2010, petitioners filed the present petition for relief from
judgement blaming their 80-year-old lawyer who failed to file the notice of appeal
within the reglementary period. They argued that Atty. Tugonon's failure to appeal
within the reglementary period was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to
their former lawyer's old age. The trial court denied the petition for relief. The CA
denied outright the petition for certiorari.

Issue
Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal
within the reglementary period is excusable negligence

Ruling
No. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is
allowed only in exceptional cases. It is not available if other remedies exist, such
as a motion for new trial or appeal. To set aside a judgment through a petition for
relief, the negligence must be so gross that ordinary diligence and prudence could
not have guarded against. This is to prevent parties from reviving the right to
appeal already lost through inexcusable negligence.

Petitioners argue that their former counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal
within the reglementary period was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to
their former counsel's age. This argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens.
It asks this court to assume that a person with advanced age is prone to
incompetence. This cannot be done. There is also no showing that the negligence
could have been prevented through ordinary diligence and prudence. As such,
petitioners are bound by their counsel's negligence.

Petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal, considering that
their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's decision on June 24, 2010. Since petitioners filed
their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, the trial court correctly denied the
notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
 PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEVARD, INC. v. FAR
EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014
Facts
Bonier de Guzman (Bonier), then the President of Pinausukan, executed four
real estate mortgages involving the petitioner’s parcel of land in favor of Far East
Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC). When the unpaid obligation secured by the
mortgages ballooned, FEBTC commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgages. Learning of the impending foreclosure sale of its
properties, Pinausukan brought against FEBTC an action for annulment of real
estate mortgages alleging that Bonier had obtained the loans in his personal
capacity and failed to secure written authorization from Pinausukan to mortgage its
properties via board resolution. Sometime later, on October 31, 2002, the RTC
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.

Claiming surprise over the turn of events, Pinausukan inquired from the
RTC and learned that Atty. Michael Dale Villaflor (Atty. Villaflor), its counsel of
record, had not informed it about the order of dismissal issued on October 31,
2002. Pinausukan then brought a petition for annulment of judgement in the CA
seeking nullification of the October 31, 2002 order of the RTC. The CA dismissed
the petition for annulment citing the failure to attach the affidavits of witnesses
attesting to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud supporting the cause of
action as required by Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; and observing that
the verified petition related only to the correctness of its allegations, a requirement
entirely different and separate from the affidavits of witnesses required under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment

Ruling
No. Pinausukan’s petition for annulment is procedurally and substantively
defective. The procedural defect consisted in Pinausukan's disregard of the fourth
requirement mentioned earlier consisting in its failure to submit together with the
petition the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action. It
is true that the petition, which narrated the facts relied upon, was verified under
oath by Roxanne. However, the submission of the affidavits of witnesses together
with the petition was not dispensable for that reason.

The substantive defect related to the supposed neglect of Atty. Villaflor to

keep track of the case, and to his failure to apprise Pinausukan of the developments
in the case, which the CA did not accept as constituting extrinsic fraud, because
such neglect of counsel, even if it was true, did not amount to extrinsic fraud
because it did not emanate from any act of FEBTC as the prevailing party, and did
not occur outside the trial of the case. Moreover, the failure to be fully aware of the
developments in the case was Pinausukan's own responsibility. As a litigant, it
should not entirely leave the case in the hands of its counsel, for it had the
continuing duty to keep itself abreast of the developments if only to protect its own
interest in the litigation. It could have discharged its duty by keeping in regular
touch with its counsel, but it did not. Consequently, it has only itself to blame.
 JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN v. SPOUSES NELSON S. CRUZ and
CRISTINA P. CRUZ, et al.
G.R. No. 220940, March 20, 2017
Facts
Petitioner Sebastian alleged that Nelson Cruz and Cristina Cruz were the
registered owners of a parcel of land in Pangasinan. Sometime in November 2009,
Nelson, through his father and attorney-in-fact, Lamberto, sold the subject lot in
favor of Sebastian. Sebastian then paid the corresponding capital gains tax, among
others, to cause the transfer of title to her name. however, upon presentment of the
necessary documents to the RD-Pangasinan, the latter directed her to secure an
SPA executed by Sps. Cruz authorizing Lamberto to sell the property to Sebastian.
It appears that sometime in 2013, Sps. Cruz filed a petition for issuance of the
second owner’s copy of the OCT covering the subject parcel of land which was
granted by the RTC.

This compelled Sebastian to file a petition for annulment of judgement

before the CA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. She alleged that the RTC had
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Sps. Cruz’ petition as the duplicate copy of
the OCT was never lost but was, in fact, in her possession all along. The CA did
not give due course to her petition and dismissed the same outright.

Issue
Whether or not the CA correctly denied due course to Sebastian's petition for
annulment of judgment, resulting in its outright dismissal

Ruling
No. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim. In judicial reconstitution of lost or destroyed titles, the fact of loss or
destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial in clothing the
RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings.

In this case, Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment before the CA

clearly alleged that, contrary to the claim of Spouses Cruz in LRC Case No. 421,
the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566 was not really lost, as the same
was surrendered to her by Lamberto, Nelson's father and attorney-in-fact, and was
in her possession all along. Should such allegation be proven following the conduct
of further proceedings, then there would be no other conclusion than that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 421. As a
consequence, the Decision dated March 27, 2014 of the RTC in the said case
would then be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 RENE H. IMPERIAL and NIDSLAND RESOURCES AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. HON. EDGAR L. ARMES, et al.
G.R. No. 178842, January 30, 2017
Facts
Julian Napal and Rene Imperial entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
to organize a domestic corporation to be named NIDSLAND. Under the MOA,
Napal and Imperial agreed that for Napal’s capital contribution, he undertook to
convey to NIDSLAND a tract of land (subject property) and to Imperial a two-
hectare portion of a property in Taysan, Legazpi City. While Imperial faithfully
ocmplied with his obligation under the MOA, Napal failed to do so. Thus,
Imperial, for himself and in representation of NIDSLAND, filed a derivative suit
before the SEC. Sometime after, Napal sold the subject property to Cruz.

The SEC rendered a Decision in favor of Imperial and NIDSLAND. The

Decision declared the Deed of Absolute Sale between Napal and Cruz void ab
initio as the SEC found that the sale was simulated and was intentionally made to
appear to have been perfected prior to the filing of the notice of lis pendens. Napal
then filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgement seeking the
nullification of the SEC Decision. The CA held that Rule 47 of the Rules is not
available to annul the judgement of the SEC. Cruz then filed a Petition before the
RTC Legazpi City seeking to nullify the SEC Decision. Imperial and NIDSLAND
sought the dismissal of the RTC Petition but was denied by herein respondent
Judge Armes.

Issue
Whether RTC Legazpi City has jurisdiction to declare the nullity of the
Decision of the SEC

Ruling
No. While it is correct that both the regional trial courts and the CA cannot
take cognizance of a petition for annulment of judgment of a quasi-judicial body
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, they may nevertheless do so, if a law
categorically provides for such a remedy and clearly provides them with
jurisdiction.
Applying this to the present case, we rule that there is no law at the time pertinent
to this case, which allows the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment before
the regional trial courts and the CA to set aside a void judgment of the SEC on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction. This leads to the conclusion that the RTC Petition is
not the proper remedy to assail the SEC Decision. Since it is an action for the
annulment of judgment, the RTC Petition cannot prosper as we have already ruled
that this remedy is not available in this particular case.
 BACLARAN MARKETING CORPORATION v. FERNANDO C. NIEVA
and MAMERTO SIBULO, JR.
G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017
Facts
The RTC Antipolo issued a writ of execution to enforce a judgement for
damages emanating from a CA Decision which is final and executory against
herein petitioner BMC, who was the defendant therein. The writ of execution was
implemented against the real property of BMC in Parañaque City after it was found
that BMC had no personal properties. The sheriff of the Antipolo Court sold the
property to herein respondent Fernando Nieva. For failure of BMC to redeem the
property within one year from the sale, Nieva consolidated ownership over it.
Nieva then filed a petition for cancellation of BMC’s title and the issuance of a
new one before the RTC Parañaque. The latter granted the petition, which became
final.

Consequently, Nieva filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession

over the property in the Parañaque court, which the latter granted. BMC then filed
a petition for annulment of judgement before the CA. BMC alleged that its
counsel, Atty. Isagani B. Rizon (Atty. Rizon), committed acts of gross and
inexcusable negligence constituting "extrinsic fraud," which deprived it of due
process and an opportunity to present its side. It discovered the fraud only in
December 2008 when its representatives tried to pay the real estate tax on the
property, only to learn that the title to it had already been transferred to Nieva. The
CA dismissed BMC’s petition holding that the remedy of annulment of judgement
is unavailable because extrinsic fraud must be perpetrated by the prevailing party,
and not the unsuccessful party’s own counsel; BMC is bound by Atty. Rizon’s own
negligence; and a writ of execution or auction sale are not in the nature of a fina
judgement.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing BMC’s petition for annulment of
judgement

Ruling
No. First, a writ of possession is not a final order which may be annulled
under Rule 47. It is merely a judicial process to enforce a final order against the
losing party. For this reason the Decision of the Antipolo Court ordering the
issuance of writ of possession is also not amenable to an action for annulment of
judgment. In fine, only the Decision of the Parañaque Court ordering the
cancellation of BMC's title over the property qualifies as a final judgment. It is a
judgment on the merits declaring who between Nieva and BMC has the right over
the title to the property. Therefore, it may be the subject of an action for annulment
of judgment. Be that as it may, BMC failed to prove that any of the grounds for
annulment are present in this case. Second, extrinsic fraud refers to a fraud
committed to the unsuccessful party by his opponent preventing him from fully
exhibiting his case by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a
compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or when an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat. In this case, the CA correctly found that
BMC neither alleged nor proved that the gross negligence of its former counsel
was done in connivance with Nieva or Sibulo. Therefore, it is not the extrinsic
fraud contemplated under Rule 47, Section 2.
 ESTRELLA MEJIA-ESPINOZA and NORMA MEJIA DELLOSA v. NENA
A. CARIÑO
G.R. No. 193397, January 25, 2017
Facts
Petitioner Espinoza was the plaintiff in an action for ejectment against
respondent Nena A. Cariño (Nena) before the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan,
Pangasinan (MTC). The MTC rendered a decision in Espinoza’s favor. Nena and
Alberto separately appealed the joint decision to the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, Branch 43 (RTC Branch 43), which reversed the decision only with
respect to Civil Case No. 1420 and dismissed the case against Nena for lack of
cause of action. On Espinoza's petition for review, the Court of Appeals Special
Seventeenth Division (CA 17th Division) reversed the decision of the RTC Branch
43 and affirmed the MTC decision. Espinoza filed a motion for issuance of a writ
of execution before the MTC which was granted by the latter.

Nena filed a complaint captioned as “Annulment of Court's Processes with

prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction
and/or Prohibition, and Damages” before the RTC of Dagupan City, which was
raffled to Branch 41 (RTC Branch 41). Nena argued that she was deprived of the
opportunity to ask for reconsideration of the order granting Espinoza's motion for
issuance of writ of execution because she was not furnished a copy of the order.
RTC Branch 41 dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The CA,
however, reversed the RTC, and held that Nena correctly filed the petition for
annulment with the RTC in accordance with Sec. 10, Rule 47.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC

Ruling
Yes. A petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is an
extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only under certain exceptional
circumstances. Under the Rules, there are three requirements that must be satisfied
before a Rule 47 petition can prosper. First, the remedy is available only when the
petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner.
Second, an action for annulment of judgment may be based only on two grounds:
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Third, the action must be filed within the
temporal window allowed by the Rules.

The averments of Nena's complaint a quo, however, do not make out an

action for annulment of judgment or final order. Nena is challenging the MTC's
order granting the issuance of the writ of execution, the writ of execution itself, as
well as the sheriff's notice of levy and notice of sale on her real property. Clearly,
these are not the judgments or final orders contemplated by Rule 47. A final order
or resolution is one which is issued by a court which disposes of the subject matter
in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else
to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court.
Rule 47 does not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public auction.
Neither does it apply to an action to annul a writ of execution because a writ of
execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of
the court in the enforcement of a final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial
process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party.
 SPOUSES EULOGIA MANILA and RAMON MANILA v. SPOUSES
EDERLINDA GALLARDO-MANZO and DANIEL MANZO
G.R. No. 163602, September 7, 2011
Facts
The controversy stemmed from an action for ejectment filed by respondents
Sps. Manzo against petitioners Sps. Manila before the MeTC of Las Piñas City.
The MeTC rendered its decision in favor of Sps. Manzo, the plaintiffs therein.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC who reversed the MeTC. In the dispositive portion
of its decision, the RTC decreed that Sps. Manzo execute a deed of absolute sale
over the subject parcel of land in favor of Sps. Manila.

Respondents filed a petition for annulment of the RTC decision in the CA.
Respondents assailed the RTC for ordering them to sell their property to petitioners
arguing that said court's appellate jurisdiction in ejectment cases is limited to the
determination of who is entitled to the physical possession of real property and the
only judgment it can render in favor of the defendant is to recover his costs, which
judgment is conclusive only on the issue of possession and does not affect the
ownership of the land. The CA granted the petition, annulled the RTC decision,
and held as regards the issue on lack of jurisdiction, that the RTC materially
changed the nature of petitioners' cause of action by deciding the question of
ownership even as the appealed case involves only the issue of prior physical
possession which, in every ejectment suit, is the only question to be resolved.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in so ruling

Ruling
Yes. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to
either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion
but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of
jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. The ground for
annulment of the decision is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should
not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision, they
failed to show that the RTC did not have the authority to decide the case on appeal.
The CA therefore erred in annulling the RTC decision on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction as said court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners' appeal.
 LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA
DIONA v. ROMEO A. BALANGUE, et al.
G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013
Facts
Respondents obtained a loan of P45,000 from petitioner payable in 6 months
and secured by a REM over their property in Valenzuela. When the debt became
due, respondents failed to pay, prompting petitioner to file a complaint praying for
respondents to be ordered to pay the principal obligation of P45,000 with interest
at 12% per annum. For failure to file their answer, and upon motion by petitioner,
respondents were declared by the RTC in default. In a Decision dated October 17,
2000 (Oct. 17 Decision), the RTC granted petitioner’s complaint ordering
respondents to pay the P45,000 plus 5% monthly interest from March 2, 1991 until
fully paid. Petitioner then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution in view of
respondents’ failure to appeal the Oct. 17 Decision despite the receipt thereof by
their counsel. The RTC issued a writ of execution. However, since the writ could
not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction of the properties subjected
to the REM. Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgement and to
Set Aside Execution Sale. In view of the same, the RTC thus reduced the interest
rate from 5% monthly to 12% per annum. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA,
who declared that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the grossly
excessive 5% interest per month. Petitioner now comes before the SC invoking the
doctrine of immutability of judgements.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred

Ruling
Yes. The SC held that the RTC erred in awarding the grossly
unconscionable interest of 5% monthly. The Rules of Court provide that a
judgement rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount nor be
different from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages. In this case,
petitioner only prayed in her complaint for payment of the P45,000 with interest at
the rate of 12% per annum. She did not allege nor pray for the disputed 5%
monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly,
the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and
disregards due process.
 CAGAYAN DE ORO COLISEUM, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 129713, December 15, 1999
Facts
Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. obtained from Santiago Maceren a loan. As
security for the loan, petitioner executed a promissory note and a mortgage over all
its assets and properties, including a parcel of land situated in the poblacion of the
City and registered in its name. The loan, together with the promissory note and
the mortgage, were later assigned by Maceren to the Commercial Credit
Corporation of Cagayan de Oro (Commercial Credit). Petitioner failed to pay the
loan when it became due, hence, the Commercial Credit commenced foreclosure
proceedings on the said parcel of land. On October 23, 1979, five stockholders of
petitioner corporation instituted before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Misamis Oriental, Branch IV, a petition for injunction against Commercial Credit,
the City Sheriff of Cagayan de Oro and herein petitioner corporation. Eventually,
the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, entered into a compromise
agreement which became the basis of a judgment rendered by the trial court on
March 11, 1980, whereby the five stockholders ratified the loan of the corporation
to Commercial Credit in the amount of P249,263.23, computed as of February 15,
1980.

Commercial Credit filed with the court a quo an “Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution.” The trial court granted the Motion. The
following day, the Branch Clerk of Court issued the writ of execution on the
personal and real properties of petitioner corporation. Petitioner forthwith filed a
"Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Execution" alleging that the issuance
of the order of execution ex-parte violated petitioner's right to due process, among
others. In an order dated November 26, 1986, the trial court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the court ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution for the collection of said amount.

Issue
Whether or not there was a valid execution

Ruling
No. It was on the basis of the November 26, 1986 order that the execution
sale actually took place on February 13, 1987. Since this order was not filed with
the Register of Deeds prior to the execution sale, it follows that the levy was not
effected and the execution sale of February 13, 1987 proceeded without a levy. A
lawful levy on execution is indispensable to a valid sale on execution. In other
words, a sale, unless preceded by a valid levy, is void, and the purchaser acquires
no title to the property sold. Without a proper levy, the property is not placed under
the authority of the court. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the property
subject of execution, hence, it could not transmit title thereto at the time of the sale.
Where in the instant case no jurisdiction was acquired over the subject property,
the execution sale was void and of no legal effect. And the trial court did not err in
so ruling.
 VENTURA B. AYO v. JUDGE LUCIA VIOLAGO-ISNANI, et al.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1445, June 21, 1999
Facts
Complainant was the representative of Vilma C. Aquino and her minor
children who are plaintiffs in a civil case. In an amended decision rendered by the
respondent judge, the plaintiffs were awarded indemnity for the death of her
husband, for the loss of earning capacity, actual damages and moral damages. She
filed the complaint against respondent judge and some of his staff due to the delay
in the issuance and implementation of the writ of execution in relation to the said
civil case. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the cases filed
against all other respondents be dismissed except that of the Clerk of Court (Atty.
Jaime M. Luy).

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Luy should be liable

Ruling
Yes. A judgment that is left unexecuted is nothing but an empty victory for
the prevailing party. In the case at bar, Clerk of Court Jaime M. Luy must take
responsibility for the delay in the implementation of the writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 91-354. He gave no reason why, considering that the writ of execution
was issued as early as July 15, 1997, he gave the same to complainant for delivery
to the RTC of Bataan only on December 17, 1997. It would appear that had not
complainant followed up the matter with respondent, the writ would not have been
sent to the RTC of Bataan. Worse, when he finally issued the writ, respondent Luy
endorsed it to the Balanga branch of the RTC of Bataan which does not have the
territorial jurisdiction to enforce the writ. He was finally able to endorse an alias
writ of execution to the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the appropriate
court, the RTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan, only on June 9, 1998. As an officer of the
court, respondent was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of his officially designated duties.
 HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA, et
al. v. SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ
G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011
Facts
Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in
the RTC in Trece Martires City averring that they were the true owners of a parcel
of land in Tanza, Cavite; that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March
1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his
rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales
Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by
the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.

Respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack

of jurisdiction. The RTC granted a motion to dismiss. The petitioners timely filed a
motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied. Petitioners assailed the
dismissal of their motion for reconsideration via petition for review on certiorari
but the CA dismissed the petition, holding that the basic requisite for a special civil
action for certiorari to lie, which is that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, is not obtaining in the case.

Issue
Whether or not a certiorari petition was proper

Ruling
No. The petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari was their
proper remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light of certain rules of procedure,
specifically pointing out that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court prohibited an appeal of a denial of the motion for reconsideration,
and that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
expressly declared that an order denying a motion for reconsideration was not
appealable.

The order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the
order granting the respondents' motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final
order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the
trial court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the
correct remedy. A 'final' judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an
adjudication on the merits. Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the
case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is 'interlocutory.'

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration

independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for
reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or
changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the
judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence.
 PAQUITO BUAYA v. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 139020, October 11, 2000
Facts
Respondent company filed a complaint against petitioner, its branch
manager for Cebu, for the collection of the principal amount of P678,076.83 owing
to the respondent. For failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear at the
scheduled pre-trial, the petitioner was declared in default and respondent was
allowed to adduce its evidence, ex parte. In a decision dated September 17, 1987,
the court a quo ordered the petitioner to pay the aforestated sum, plus legal interest
and attorney's fees. Petitioner appealed to the CA which, on March 30, 1990,
annulled the decision of the court a quo and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Accordingly, the court a quo set the case for hearing. Petitioner
thereafter filed a series of motions for postponement of hearings. Finally, on March
18, 1992, the court a quo reinstated its September 17, 1987 decision. On August
24, 1992, the CA rendered a decision dismissing petitioner's petition for lack of
merit. The decision of the court a quo became final and executory on June 28,
1993. The court a quo issued an order dated October 29, 1993 directing the
issuance of a writ of execution. Petitioner subsequently filed a notice of appeal
from said order, and a petition for relief from said order but was denied by the
court a quo.

Petitioner condemns the unfairness of the trial court when it ruled that he
had waived his right to submit evidence, when it should have merely ordered
plaintiff to present its evidence first. He interprets the CA remand to mean that
both parties, subject to cross examination, would again present their respective sets
of evidence.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner’s contention is tenable

Ruling
No. The CA remanded the case to the court of origin for further hearing, not
for retrial. A motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, is a remedy
separate and distinct from an appeal. Plaintiff (herein respondent) had rested its
case long before the September 11, 1987 Decision was rendered. In fact, the
evidence adduced by herein respondent became the sole basis of the Default
Judgment of September 11, 1987. More importantly, the September 11, 1987
Decision of the trial court become final and executory on June 28, 1993. A Writ of
Execution of the March 16, 1995 Order of the trial court reinstating the September
17, 1987 Decision was issued by the trial court on May 11, 1995. Once a judgment
becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter
of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the
court. It is axiomatic that once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the
case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer
be altered even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it may contain.
 VLASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 121662-64, July 6, 1999
Facts
Seizure proceedings were instituted by the BOC against the vessel and cargo
owned by Poro Point Shipping Services on suspicion that it was a hijacked vessel
which belonged to Med Line Philippines Co. While seizure proceedings were on
going, a typhoon struck La Union where the ship was docked, and the vessel ran
aground and was abandoned. Thus, Poro Point’s authorized representative entered
into a salvage agreement with private respondent Dureproof Services for the repair
of the vessel.

Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against petitioner, among many others as
defendants. On certain occasions, private respondent moved to declare petitioner,
among other defendants, in default. However, there is no record that the trial court
acted upon the motions. The trial court rendered a decision ordering petitioner to
pay the private respondent P3,000,000 as damages. Private respondent moved for
the execution of the decision and various properties of petitioner were levied.

Issue
Whether the judgement may be enforced against petitioner

Ruling
No. The sheriff's return shows that Angliongto who was president of
petitioner corporation, through his secretary Betty Bebero, was served summons on
January 18, 1990. A corporation may be served summons through its agents or
officers who under the Rules are designated to accept service of process. A
summons addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of its president
binds that corporation. In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of
Angliongto, who was president of both VSI and petitioner, but she was an
employee of VSI, not of petitioner. Thus, jurisdiction was never acquired over
petitioner. Moreover, as pointed to above, the trial court never acted on the motion
of private respondent to declare it in default.

That said, Section 1 of Rule 39 provides that execution shall issue only upon
a judgment that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall
issue as a matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal it, if no appeal
has been duly perfected. In the present case, however, the trial court's Decision has
not become final and executory against petitioner. In fact, the judgment does not
even bind it. Obviously, Respondent Court committed serious reversible errors
when it allowed the execution of the said judgment against petitioner.
 FEDERICO PALLADA, et al. v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF KALIBO,
AKLAN, BRANCH 1, et al.
G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999
Facts
Private respondents commenced a civil case against petitioners for recovery
of possession and ownership of land with damages before the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 1. The RTC-Aklan declared petitioners the absolute and lawful
owners and possessors of the subject land. Private respondent appealed to the CA
who reversed and set aside the RTC-Aklan Decision. Petitioners found their way to
the Supreme Court who affirmed the CA, in a separate case. The SC Decision
lapsed into finality.

Private respondents then filed an Ex Parte Motion for Execution with RTC-
Aklan, which granted the motion. The respondent court issued the Writ of
Execution. Petitioners again come before the SC, arguing that the writ of execution
is invalid for private respondents’ ex parte motion for execution was without
notice to petitioners.

Issue
Whether or not the contention of petitioners is correct

Ruling
Yes. There is tenability in petitioners' contention that the Writ of Execution
was irregularly issued insofar as the Ex-Parte Motion for Execution of private
respondents did not contain a notice of hearing to petitioners. The foregoing
requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall
state the time and place for the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if not
religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not
comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and
which the court has no authority to act upon. Under Supreme Court Circular No.
24-94, a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution must contain a notice to
the adverse party. It bears stressing that a similar provision is found in Section 1 of
Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

The Court is not prepared, however, to invalidate the Writ of Execution

issued below. The petition is obviously a dilatory move on the part of petitioners,
designed to prevent the final disposition of the case.
URBANO JACA and BONIFACIO JACA v. DAVAO LUMBER COMPANY,
et al.
G.R. No. L-25771, March 29, 1982
Facts
Petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance a Complaint for
Accounting, Return of Price Differentials and Damages against respondent Davao
Lumber Company. In its answer and counterclaim, respondent company alleged,
among others, that petitioners Urbano Jaca and Bonifacio Jaca were the ones
indebted to it in the sum of P756,236.52 and P91,651.97, respectively; that on
January 24, 1961, Urbano Jaca executed a chattel mortgage in favor of respondent
company to secure the payment of any and all obligations contracted by them in
favor of said company covering several chattels valued at P532,000.00; that said
obligation of Urbano Jaca totalling P756,236.52 is overdue and unpaid despite
repeated formal demands for settlement thereof; and that the action brought by
petitioners is purely baseless and malicious for which they should be required to
pay respondent company damages and attorney's fees amounting to at least
P20,000.00. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered petitioners to pay
the amounts claimed by respondent company.

Respondent company filed a motion for execution pending appeal, which

was granted by respondent judge. Petitioners contend that respondent judge acted
in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order
granting execution pending appeal and the order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order granting execution pending appeal.
Issue
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the execution pending appeal

Ruling
Yes. Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that on motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party the court may, in its discretion,
order execution to issue even before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order. the existence of good reasons is what
confers discretionary power on a court of first instance to issue a writ of execution
pending appeal. The reasons allowing execution must constitute superior
circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damage
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal.

The decision requires petitioners to pay the enormous amount of

P867,887.52. Clearly, premature execution of said decision will result in
irreparable damage to petitioners as the collection of said amount may be enforced
through the seizure of money and/or sale of properties used in the logging business
of petitioners. In other words, execution of the decision may result in the
termination of petitioner's business. Thus, any damage to the petitioners brought
about by the premature execution of the decision will be justified only upon a
finding that the appeal is being taken only for the purpose of delay and of
rendering the judgment nugatory.

The facts of record show that the petitioner's appeal is not frivolous and not
intended for delay. The findings of the respondent judge that the petitioners are
indebted to the respondent Davao Lumber Company are based solely on the report
submitted by Estanislao R. Lagman, the commissioner appointed by the court. This
report was assailed by the petitioners as null and void in a motion to strike out the
report from the records of the case.
 ARTURO G. EUDELA, et al. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 89265, July 17, 1992
Facts
This case arose from two complaints filed by the private respondents against
the petitioners for injunction, specific performance and damages, in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. These complaints were consolidated and, after trial,
decided against the petitioners. The petitioners were found to have defrauded the
private respondents and held solidarily liable to them in the amount of P450,000.00
plus 15% interest and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. The petitioners filed a notice
of appeal of the original decision. Private respondents filed a motion for execution
pending appeal.

The said motion was granted by respondent Judge Mendoza grounded on the
following reasons: (1) The case at bar had been filed way back on May 26, 1984
and only decided, after a long Court battle, on December 16, 1987 and February 1,
1988 and in view hereof, the court is uncertain whether the individual private
defendants may satisfy the awards granted in favor of the plaintiffs and thus will
render this judgment a mere paper judgment, in the event the questioned Decision
is affirmed by the higher court; (2) The defendant bank is presently under
receivership as they are under the state of insolvency and thus its assets might not
be sufficient to pay the plaintiffs as there are many creditors of said banking
institution; and (3) The fact that defendant Renato Tuazon and his family are
already and in all possibility they will stay abroad permanently and real properties
are being sold.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court order is valid

Ruling
Yes. Execution pending appeal requires observance of the following
requisites: (a) there must be a motion therefor by the prevailing party with notice to
the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for issuing the writ of execution;
and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. The justification given by
the trial court in its challenged order constitutes the "good reasons" required by
Section 2 of Rule 39 for authorizing execution pending appeal.

It is noted that the decision under appeal held the petitioners solidarily liable
to the private respondents for what it described as "the fraudulent combination of
the defendants against the plaintiffs." Of these defendants, Pioneer Savings and
Loan Bank is under receivership and in a state of insolvency; Renato Tuazon and
his family have immigrated and his real properties are being sold; Leo Guevarra
and Arturo Eudela appear to have no registered real properties in their name, and
Eudela himself is reportedly at large and facing malversation charges filed by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Francisco Pangilinan, the president of the insolvent
bank, appears to be the only one who may be able to satisfy the private
respondents' claims although he has not denied their allegations that his real
properties are heavily mortgaged and that he has sold two of his cars. Added to
these danger signals is the fact that the complaints were filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City as early as 1986, and the private respondents have yet to
execute the judgment in their favor because of the petition at bar and the appeal
pending in the Court of Appeals. In these circumstances, the Court felt that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion but in fact acted quite judiciously in
granting the motion for execution pending appeal.
 ADELAIDA INFANTE v. ARAN BUILDERS, INC.
G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007
Facts
Private respondent Aran Builders, Inc. filed a complaint for revival of
judgement before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The judgement sought to be
revived was rendered by the RTC of Makati City in an action for specific
performance and damages. The RTC Makati judgement decreed as follows: (1) for
petitioner Adelaida Infante to deliver to Aran Builders, Inc. (a) the complete plans
(lot plan, location map and vicinity map); (b) Irrevocable Power of Attorney; (c)
Real Estate Tax clearance; (d) tax receipts; (e) proof of up to date payment of
Subdivision Association dues referred to in the "CONTRACT TO SELL" dated
November 10, 1986; (2) To execute the deed of sale of Lot No. 11, Block 9, Phase
3-A1, Ayala Alabang Subdivision covered by TCT No. 114015 for P500,000.00 in
favor of Aran Builders; (3) To secure the written conformity of AYALA
CORPORATION to the said sale; and (4) To register the deed of sale with the
Registry of Deeds and deliver to AYALA CORPORATION the certificate of title
issued in the name of plaintiff pursuant to such registration.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival of judgment) on

the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties and that venue was improperly laid. The Muntinlupa RTC denied the
motion to dismiss. The CA held that since the judgment sought to be revived was
rendered in an action involving title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, the action for revival of judgment is then an action in rem which should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is located.

Issue
Whether or not the lower courts erred

Ruling
No. Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment and before it is barred by
the statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced
by action. The Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival of
judgment should be filed. Nevertheless, in Alduguer v. Gemelo, the Court held that
other provisions in the rules of procedure which fix the venue of actions in general
must be considered. Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of
whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal
action.

The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final and executory
judgment has ordered herein petitioner to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of
land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein private respondent; pay all
pertinent taxes in connection with said sale; register the deed of sale with the
Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala Corporation the certificate of title issued in
the name of private respondent. The same judgment ordered private respondent to
pay petitioner the sum of P321,918.25 upon petitioner's compliance with the
aforementioned order. The previous judgment has conclusively declared private
respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property conveyed to it. It is,
therefore, undeniable that private respondent has an established interest over the lot
in question; and to protect such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to
revive the previous judgment. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real
action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real property.
 ROLANDO TING v. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO
G.R. No. 168913, March 14, 2007
Facts
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No.
N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12
Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787. The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and
executory on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of
November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the
spouses Lirio.

On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot.
The herein respondents heirs of Diego Lirio filed their Answer calling attention to
the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and
executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of
petitioner's application on the ground of res judicata. After hearing, the RTC
dismissed petitioners’ application on the ground of res judicata.

Before the Supreme Court, petitioner claims that under Sec. 6, Rule 39, the
December 10, 1976 Decision became “extinct” in light of respondents’ failure to
execute the same within the prescriptive period.

Issue
Whether or not Sec. 6, Rule 39 is applicable to the case at bar

Ruling
No. In Sta. Ana v. Menla, the Court explained that Sec. 6, Rule 39 does not
apply to land registration proceedings because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and
his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the
Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to
be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except
when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
 RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. FEDERICO A.
SERRA
G.R. No. 203241, July 10, 2013
Facts
Serra owns a parcel of land in Masbate. Serra and RCBC entered into a
contract of lease wherein Serra agreed to lease his land to RCBC for 25 years.
Serra further granted RCBC the option to buy the land and improvement (property)
within 10 years from the signing of a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy. RCBC
informed Serra of its intent to buy the property. Serra, however, refused, prompting
RCBC to file a Complaint for Specific Performance in RTC Makati. The RTC
Makati subsequently ordered Serra to deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of
RCBC.

Serra appealed to the CA. In the meantime, Serra donated the property to his
mother Ablao, who sold the same to Liok. RCBC then filed an Annulment case
against Liok, Ablao and Serra (Annulment case) before the RTC of Masbate City.
The CA, and later the SC, affirmed the order of the RTC Makati in the Specific
Performance case. RCBC moved for the execution of the specific performance
case which was denied by the RTC Makati opining that RCBC should have asked
for the execution of the deed of sale and have the same registered with the Registry
of Deeds, so that even if Serra sold or transferred the subject property to any
person the principle of caveat emptor would set in.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred

Ruling
Yes. The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be
executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after
the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows
exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of five
years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or
advantage.

In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the
decision which became final and executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders
Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. However, to
evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao,
who then transferred it to Liok. Serra's action prompted RCBC to file the
Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the execution of the decision was caused by
Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively
suspended the five-year period to enforce through a motion the decision in the
Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the Annulment case attained
finality on 3 March 2009 and RCBC's motion for execution was filed on 25 August
2011, RCBC's motion is deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement
of a decision through a motion.
 PABLITO T. VILLARIN and P.R. BUILDERS DEVELOPERS &
MANAGERS, INC. v. CONRADO P. MUNASQUE
G.R. No. 169444, September 17, 2008
Facts
The case stemmed from a complaint for collection of sum of money filed by
respondent Conrado Munasque against petitioners. Before the answer could be
filed, the parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein petitioners
acknowledged their joint and solidary obligation to respondent in the amount of
P15 million, with a monthly interest of P450,000.00 from 18 October 2001 until
full payment, and promised to pay the whole amount within ninety (90) days from
the date of the said agreement which was approved by the trial court. Petitioners
managed to pay only P250,000 of their total obligation. Thus, respondent filed a
motion for execution.

The motion was granted and deputy sheriff of Makati, Antonio Q. Mendoza,
issued a notice of levy and had the same annotated on the certificates of title of
numerous properties of petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioners’ collaborating counsel
sent a letter to respondent’s counsel and the deputy sheriff arguing that the latter
did not comply with Sec. 9, Rule 39 which requires first a personal demand for
payment of the full amount of the obligation before levy on the properties could be
made; that when levy was made, petitioners were not given the option to choose
what property should be levied. Thereafter, they filed a motion to recall the notice
of levy and cancel the deputy sheriff’s auction sale.

Respondent opposed the motion, contending that the day before the levy,
petitioners' counsel, Atty. Salamero, informed respondent's counsel that petitioners
did not have the money to pay even one month's interest at the time. It was also
averred that Atty. Salamero also agreed to the immediate levy of the real properties
of petitioners provided that the auction sale be scheduled earlier than 20 November
2002 because by then, according to her, petitioners shall have already had the
funds needed to pay their obligation. The RTC initially denied the motion but
subsequently granted it. The CA ruled favorably to respondent.

Issue
Whether or not the deputy sheriff violated Sec. 9, Rule 39

Ruling
No. The present rule now requires the sheriff to first make a demand for
payment, and it prescribes the procedure for and the manner of payment as well as
the immediate turnover of the payment by the sheriff to the clerk of court. Levy as
a mode of satisfying the judgment may be done only if the judgment obligor
cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check, or other mode
of payment acceptable to the judgment oblige. In the case at bar, it is not disputed
that Deputy Sheriff Mendoza failed to first demand of petitioners the immediate
payment in cash of the full amount stated in the writ of execution. However, it is
also extant in the records that petitioners never disputed the admissions of their
counsel, Atty. Salamero, that they had no funds to pay even a month's interest and
that they agreed to the levy so long as the auction sale would not be set earlier than
20 November 2002. The admissions provide reasonable basis for the deputy sheriff
to forego prior demand on petitioners for payment in cash and proceed to levy on
the properties right away. Furthermore, while petitioners, in their 13 November
2002 letter, complained of procedural defects in the enforcement of the writ, they
at the same time also actually "exercise[d] their right to choose which properties
may be levied upon in satisfaction of their aforesaid obligation".
 YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ v. SERGIO V. PASCUA
A.M. No. P-11-2972, September 28, 2011
Facts
This case arose from a complaint filed by Alicia Panganiban for violation of
BP 22 against Juanito Corpuz. Both parties entered into a compromise agreement
which was approved by the MTCC. When Juanito failed to comply with his
obligations under the Compromise Agreement, Panganiban filed motions for
execution. The MTCC granted such motions and issued a writ of execution
addressed to the Sheriff of Trece Martires City.

On June 2, 2010, Juanito’s wife and her daughter were in the Cavite
Provincial Engineering Office of Trece Martires city when Sheriff Pascua arrived
and demanded that Yolanda surrender the Toyota Town Ace Noah with Plate No.
471 registered in Yolanda’s name, threatening to damage the said vehicle if
Yolanda would refuse to do so. Yolanda subsequently surrendered the keys. This
prompted Yolanda to file an administrative complaint against Pascua, wherein
Yolanda further alleged that Sheriff Pascua parked the vehicle in the garage of his
own house instead of parking the same within court premises. Yolanda also
claimed that her vehicle was illegally levied upon by Sheriff Pascua because the
Writ of Executon that the latter was supposedly implementing was addressed to her
husband, Juanito, and not to her.

Issue
Whether or not Sheriff Pascua should be held liable

Ruling
Yes. A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging
to the judgment debtor. The sheriff may be liable for enforcing execution on
property belonging to a third party. If he does so, the writ of execution affords him
no justification, for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ.
Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the presumption that the vehicle is the conjugal
property of Juanito and Yolanda. Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first
prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption
in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired
is material. There is no such proof in the records of the present case.

Moreover, Sec. 9, Rule 39 states that the levy upon the properties of the
judgment obligor may be had by the executing sheriff only if the judgment obligor
cannot pay all or part of the full amount stated in the writ of execution. In this case,
Sheriff Pascua totally ignored the established procedural rules. Without giving
Juanito the opportunity to either pay his obligation under the MTCC judgment in
cash, certified bank check, or any other mode of payment acceptable to
Panganiban; or to choose which of his property may be levied upon to satisfy the
same judgment, Sheriff Pascua immediately levied upon the vehicle that belonged
to Juanito's wife, Yolanda.
 SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELISA VERSOLA v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 164740, July 31, 2006
Facts
Private respondent filed a complaint for sum of money against Ledesma,
petitioners, and Asiatrust before RTC Branch 217, Quezon City. The RTC
rendered a judgement in favor of private respondent. The CA affirmed the
judgement of the trial court. The CA’s Decision attained finality. Private
respondent then filed a motion for execution with the trial court which the latter
granted. The property covered by TCT No. 83104, in the names of petitioners was
levied upon. Petitioners filed with the sheriff an "Objection/Exception to the
Sheriff's Sale of Defendant Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola's Family Home Pending
Court Order or Clearance." Despite petitioners' objections, however, the property
was still sold at public auction on 19 September 2000 and was awarded to private
respondent at the bid price of P2,835,000.00.The trial court, however, debunked
petitioner’s arguments and granted private respondent's Ex-parte Motion and
confirmed the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale.

Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 79300, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court Judge in confirming the judicial sale of their family home. The CA dismissed
the Petition for lack of merit.

Issue
Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is
exempt from execution

Ruling
No. The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment
debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself
before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim
for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exception.

In this case, petitioners allegedly filed with the trial court an "Urgent Motion
to Suspend Auction Sale on the Property of Defendants under TCT No. 83104
located at Sunville Subdivision, Quezon City" which was filed on 19 September
2000, the scheduled date for the sale of the subject property at public auction. The
records of the case, however, do not disclose that petitioners in the said motion set
up and proved that the property to be sold was their family home. In any event,
said motion was treated by the trial court as a mere scrap of paper presumably on
the ground that such motion did not contain a notice of hearing. Moreover, on the
day immediately prior to the scheduled sale of the subject property, petitioners
filed with the sheriff an Objection/Exception to Sheriff's Sale of Defendant Sps.
Eduardo and Elsa Versola's Family Home. Petitioners simply alleged there that the
property subject of the intended auction sale was their family home. Instead of
substantiating their claim, petitioners languidly presupposed that the sheriff had
prior knowledge that the said property was constituted by them as their family
home. petitioners did not set forth therein any evidence to substantiate their claim
that the property to be sold at the execution sale was indeed exempt for having
been constituted as a family home.
 POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION (PSALM) v. MAUNLAD HOMES, INC.
G.R. No. 215933, February 8, 2017
Facts
Respondent Maunlad Homes filed with the MTCC an unlawful detainer case
with damages against NPC. The MTCC issued a Decision ordering NPC to vacate
the premises and surrender physical possession thereof to respondent; to pay
reasonable compensation equivalent to Php20.00 per square meter per month of
respondent's 25,896-sq. m. properties, reckoned from the date of demand on
October 6, 2008, until complete vacation and surrender of the subject premises;
and to pay Php20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and cost of suit. The RTC
affirmed the MTCC ruling in toto. Respondent filed a Motion for Execution which
was granted by the RTC.

On November 4, 2010, the sheriff issued a Notice of Levy on execution

pending appeal of personal properties/sale of seven (7) units transformer radiator
fins, one (1) unit power transformer with Serial No. 77740395, and four (4) pieces
angle bars. On November 10, 2010, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for
Issuance of Status Quo Order with the RTC arguing that it is the owner of the
subject properties pulled out by the sheriff by operation of law; that it is not a party
to the instant case and therefore cannot be bound by the judgment therein; that the
obligation to pay respondent had not been transferred to it. Petitioner also prayed
for the nullification of the levy of its properties and restoring their immediate
possession to it. The RTC denied petitioner’s motion.

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing, among
others, the RTC Order denying the motion for issuance of Status Quo Order and
the third-party claim. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for being the
incorrect remedy.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner availed of the correct remedy

Ruling
No. A denial of a third-party claim is not appealable because the remedy of a
third-party claimant is to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his
claim of ownership or right of possession of the levied properties against the
judgement creditor or the purchaser of the property at the public auction sale. It is
in this separate and independent action that the issue of the third-party claimant's
title to the levied properties can be resolved with finality.

Hence, petitioner's claim in their jurisdictional allegations in its petition for

certiorari filed with the CA that it was constrained to file the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 to protect its rights and interest over the subject properties because
of the absence of a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, is contradicted by the
procedure laid down under Section 16 of Rule 39, i.e., the third-party claimant may
file an independent action to vindicate its claim of ownership to the levied
property. Where a specific remedy has been laid down by our rules for the
protection or enforcement of rights, the same should be resorted to.
 ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING v. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004
Facts
The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of
P 9 Million from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). PBMCI, however,
defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, ABC filed a complaint for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to
collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges.
ABC then applied for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, arguing that
the defendants are guilty of fraud in falsely representing themselves to be
financially capable of paying their obligations upon maturity thereof. The trial
court granted ABC’s application for writ of preliminary attachment. the deputy
sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of
Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.

Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo, filed a Motion to

Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged that the 100,000 shares of stocks
levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their
marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was
established in 1974. She likewise claimed that being the wife of Alfredo, she was a
third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the properties. The
trial court lifted the writ of preliminary attachment on the property, but the CA,
however, set aside the order of the trial court, holding that petitioner was not a
party in the trial court; hence, she had no right of action to have the levy annulled
for that purpose. Her remedy in such case was to file a separate action against the
private respondent to nullify the levy on the 100,000 Citycorp shares of stocks.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the
levy on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment
Philippines

Ruling
Yes. The SC held that a third-party claimant has various remedies in case a
sheriff levies upon a property not belonging to the judgement debtor. First, the
superior authority of the court which has authorized the execution may be invoked
by the aggrieved third person in the same case. Upon application of the third
person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining
whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in
the execution of the writ of attachment, more specifically if he has indeed levied on
attachment and taken hold of property not belonging to the plaintiff. Second, the
aggrieved third party may also avail himself of the remedy of "terceria" by
executing an affidavit of his title or right of possession over the property levied on
attachment and serving the same to the office making the levy and the adverse
party. Third, such party may also file an action to nullify the levy with damages
resulting from the unlawful levy and seizure, which should be a totally separate
and distinct action from the former case.

In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on
attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband
claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for
the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner- wife had the right to file the motion for
said relief.
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. FILOMENO GARCIA, et al.
G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014
Facts
Respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. filed a complaint for sum of
money against Villasi before the RTC of Quezon City. Finding that FGCI was able
to preponderantly establish by evidence its right to the unpaid accomplishment
billings, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26 June 1996 in FGCI's favor. The CA
reversed the RTC’s decision, finding that Villasi in fact made an overpayment, and
ordered FGCI to return to Villasi his overpayment in the amount of P1,244,543.33
and the amount of P425,004.00 representing unpaid construction materials
obtained by it from Villasi. FGCI filed a petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court which was denied by the latter in a Resolution for being filed
out of time.

Villasi filed a Motion for Execution of the 20 November 2000 Court of

Appeals Decision, which was favorably acted upon by the RTC. The sheriff levied
on a building located at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, covered by Tax
Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the lots registered under Transfer
Certi􏰍cates of Title (TCT) Nos. 379193 and 379194. While the building was
declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was
erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno Garcia and
Ermelinda Halili- Garcia (Spouses Garcia). The Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit
of Third Party Claim 10 and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution,
claiming that they are the lawful owners of the property which was erroneously
levied upon by the sheriff.

The RTC held in abeyance the conduct of the sale on execution. The
appellate court dismissed Villasi’s petition for certiorari.

Issue
Whether or not the lower courts erred in holding in abeyance the sale on
execution

Ruling
Yes. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his
title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its
supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the
restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably
establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. A perusal of the record
shows that, as the party asserting their title, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that
they have a bona fide title to the building in question. Aside from their postulation
that as title holders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners of the
improvements built thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible
evidence to prove their ownership of the property. In contrast, Villasi was able to
satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru the pieces of evidence she
appended to her opposition. Worthy to note is the fact that the building in litigation
was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses
Garcias'.

It likewise failed to escape our attention that FGCI is in actual possession of

the building and as the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land
covered by tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership. Quite
significantly, all the court processes in an earlier collection suit between FGCI and
Villasi were served, thru the former's representative Filomeno Garcia, at No. 140
Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, where the subject property is located.
 SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. RIZAL POULTRY and
LIVESTOCK ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 167050, June 1, 2011
Facts
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by Angeles before the Social
Security Commission (SSC) to compel respondents Rizal Poultry or BSD Agro to
remit to the SSC all contributions for and due in his behalf. Earlier, Angeles filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against BSD Agro and/or its owner, Benjamin San
Diego. The LA found that Angeles was an employee. However, the NLRC
reversed the findings of the LA and held that there was no employer-employee
relationship between Angeles and respondents. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling.

It appears that the SSC did not take the NLRC decision into consideration,
as it held that at most, the NLRC’s findings are persuasive, and could not
constitute res judicata before it. Respondents sought recourse before the CA, who
reversed the rulings of the SSC. It held that there is a common issue between the
cases before the SSC and in the NLRC; and it is whether there existed an
employer-employee relationship between Angeles and respondents. Thus, the case
falls squarely under the principle of res judicata, particularly under the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment.

SSC maintains that the prior judgment rendered by the NLRC and Court of
Appeals, that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties, does
not have the force of res judicata by prior judgment or as a rule on the
conclusiveness of judgment.

Issue
Whether res judicata applies so as to preclude the SSC from resolving anew
the existence of employer-employee relationship, which issue was previously
determined in the NLRC case

Ruling
Yes. Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgement; and
(2) conclusiveness of judgements. There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as
between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of
judgment."

The principle of res judicata as “conclusiveness of judgement” applies in

this case. First, the CA decision affirming the NLRC was a final and executory
decision. Second, NLRC’s jurisdiction was undisputed. Third, the NLRC case was
clearly decided on the merits, as well as the CA decision. With respect to the
fourth element which is the identity of parties, there is substantial identity of
parties as BSD Agro, Rizal Poultry, and San Diego were litigating under one and
the same entity both before the NLRC and SSC. Moreover, identity of causes of
action need not obtain for res judicata by conclusiveness of judgement to apply –
identity of issues will suffice. Here, the cases before the NLRC and the SSC
involve the issue of employer-employee relationship. Therefore, the judgement in
the NLRC case pertaining to the absence of ER-EE relationship is conclusive on
the SSC case.
 LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014
Facts
LZK Holdings obtained a loan from Planters Development Bank and
secured the same with a real estate mortgage over its lot in La Union. The lot was
sold in a public auction after Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real
estate mortgage thereon due to LZK’s failure to pay its loan. Planters Bank
emerged as the winning bidder and was issued a certificate of sale. Planters Bank
then filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC-
San Fernando. RTC-San Fernando, however, held in abeyance the resolution of the
ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in view of a TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction issued by RTC-Makati.

Thus, Planters Bank appealed the said RTC-San Fernando Order before the
CA. The latter granted the appeal and annulled the RTC-San Fernando Order. LZK
Holdings sought recourse with the Supreme Court in a petition for review docketed
as G.R. No. 167998. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s ruling and decreed that
Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled to a writ of possession as the purchaser
of the property in the foreclosure sale. Armed with the said ruling, Planters Bank
filed before the RTC-San Fernando a motion to ex-parte set a hearing for the
issuance of a writ of possession which the RTC-San Fernando granted. The CA
dismissed LZK Holdings’ petition for certiorari.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of Planter's
Bank to a writ of possession as adjudged in G.R. No. 167998 is binding and
conclusive on the parties. The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of
judgment postulates that "when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such
trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them."

All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment
in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the
review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of
Planters Banks's right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the
parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present case.
Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank's right to a writ of
possession over the subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment bars the relitigation of such particular issue.
 BEVERLY ANNE C. YAP v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 199810, March 15, 2017
Facts
Pagarigan filed his own Free Patent Application and subsequently, a Free
Patent was issued in his favor over the subject lot. Pagarigan mortgaged the lot to
Banco Davao-Davao City (the Bank) as security for his loans. For failure to pay his
loans, the Bank foreclosed the subject lot. Meanwhile, Teodoro Valparaiso and
Pedro Malais (the protestants) filed a protest before the Bureau of Lands seeking to
cancel the free patent issued to Pagarigan. The protestants also caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens in the certificate of title of the subject lot.

Meanwhile, without consolidating ownership over the subject lot, the Bank
sold the same to Beverly Yap and Rosanna Villamor. A TCT was thereafter issued
in their favor. The DOTC filed an expropriation case of the subject lot before the
RTC Davao City Branch 13. The RTC Branch 13 rendered its decision in favor of
DOTC and held that Villamor and Yap are the ones entitled to payment of just
compensation.

Respondent, through the OSG, filed a complaint for cancellation of patent,

nullification of title, and reversion before the RTC Branch 16 of Davao City. RTC
Branch 16 dismissed the case holding that since Branch 13 had already declared in
the previous decision that Yap and Villamor were purchasers in good faith and for
value of the land, it is bound by the principle of conclusiveness of judgements. The
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC Branch 16 is bound by the principle of
conclusiveness of judgements

Ruling
No. The principle of conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them
are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such
parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. RTC Branch 16 falsely appreciated
Branch 13. the question of whether or not Yap and Villamor are innocent
purchasers was not an actual issue of fact in the case before the RTC Branch 13,
and which called for said court's adjudication. "An issue of fact is a point
supported by one party's evidence and controverted by another's." That Yap and
Villamor were buyers in good faith is merely an allegation which was not proven
in court. The RTC Branch 13 did not actually make any clear pronouncement on
the matter. The RTC Branch 13's pronouncement that Yap and Villamor were
buyers in good faith was, at best, a mere obiter dictum. Contrary to Yap's claim,
there was nothing final or conclusive with the decision of the RTC Branch 13
which the CA should be bound.
 ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE. LTD. v. GRAND INTERNATIONAL
AIRWAYS, INC.
G.R. No. 140288, October 23, 2006
Facts
Petitioner is a foreign corpotion based in Singapore. Petitioner and
respondent executed an “Agreement” for the maintenance and modification of an
airbus. Under the stipulation, petitioner agreed to undertake maintenance and
modification works on respondent’s aircraft. They also agreed that the
“construction, validity, and performance thereof” shall be governed by the laws of
Singapore. They further agreed to submit any suit arising from their agreement to
the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts. During the period from
March 1996 to October 1997, petitioner billed respondent in the amounts of
USD303,731.67 or SSD 452,560.18. But despite petitioner’s repeated demands,
respondent failed to pay in violation of the terms agreed upon. Thus, petitioner
filed with the High Court of the Republic of Singapore an action for
USD452,560.18. Upon petitioner's motion, the court issued a Writ of Summons to
be served extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon respondent. The court sought
the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City to effect service of the summons upon
respondent. However, despite receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the
claim.

The Singapore high Court rendered a judgement by default against

respondent. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Enforcement of Judgement.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that (a) Singapore High Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over its person; and (b) the foreign judgement sought to be
enforced to be enforced is void for having been rendered in violation its right to
due process. The RTC denied respondent’s motion to dismiss. Respondent filed
with the CA a petition for certiorari which the latter granted.

Issue
Whether or not the foreign judgement may be enforced

Ruling
Yes. A foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by
want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to the party
against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden
of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Generally, matters of remedy and
procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which in this case is the
law of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the
Writ of Summons outside Singapore. Thus, the High Court of Singapore granted
leave to serve summons upon respondent by a valid mode of service authorized by
the law of the Philippines, in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of
Court 1996 of Singapore.

In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of

summons either personally or by substituted service. In this case, the Writ of
Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was served upon respondent at its
office in Pasay City. The Sheriff’s Return reveals that it was received by Joyce
Austria, Secretary of respondents’ GM. However, respondent completely ignored it
and was thus declared in default. Considering that jurisdiction was acquired over
respondent, the judgement of default rendered by the court against respondent is
valid.
 SPOUSES ELISEO F. ESTARES and ROSENDA P. ESTARES v. COURT
OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 144755, June 8, 2005
Facts
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against private respondent
Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) before RTC, Biñan, Laguna.
They alleged that they obtained a loan from PLCC which was secured by a real
estate mortgage over a parcel of land with improvements situated in Santa Rosa,
Laguna; that the promissory note and the real estate mortgage were falsified
because they affixed their signatures on blank forms; and that for their failure to
pay their obligations, PLCC filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure with the
Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna and that the latter already sent a Notice
of Foreclosure to the spouses. In the interim, petitioner spouses also sought for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin PLCC from taking possession
of the mortgaged property and proceeding with the sale.

The trial court denied Estares spouses’ application for a writ of preliminary
injunction holding that the latter failed to establish the facts necessary for its
issuance. The CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for lack of merit.

Issue
Whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued

Ruling
No. The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the
following requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a) the existence
of their right to be protected; and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to
be directed are violative of such right. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the
petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to
injunctive relief. They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC but only
question the amount thereof. Their property is by their own choice encumbered by
a real estate mortgage. Upon the nonpayment of the loan, which was secured by
the mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.
Rosenda's testimony sealed the fate of the necessity of the writ of preliminary
injunction. She admitted that: they did not question PLCC in writing why they only
received P637,000.00; they did not question the figures appearing in the Statement
of Account when they received it; and, when they received PLCC's demand letter,
they went to the former's office not to question the loan's terms and conditions but
merely to request for extension of three months to pay their obligation. She
acknowledged that they only raised the alleged discrepancy of the amount loaned
and the amount received, as well as the blank documents which they allegedly
signed, after PLCC initiated the foreclosure proceedings.
 DAVAO LIGHT & CO., INC. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 93262, November 29, 1991
Facts
Davao Light filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against
Queensland Hotel which was accompanied by an ex parte application for writ of
preliminary attachment. Judge Nartatez granted the ex parte application and fixed
the attachment bond at P4,600,513.37. The attachment bond having been submitted
by Davao Light, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued. Defendants
Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of
jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was
promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11, 1989), the
Trial Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of
the defendants.

The trial court denied the motion to discharge. The appellate court, however,
reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that the Court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant until he in duly summoned or
voluntarily appears, and adding the phrase that it be issued 'ex parte' does not
confer said jurisdiction before actual summons had been made, nor retroact
jurisdiction upon summons being made.

Issue
Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a
defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of
summons or his voluntary submission to the Court's authority

Ruling
Yes. Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter." The phrase, "at the
commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of the filing of the
complaint — which, as above pointed out, is the date that marks "the
commencement of the action;" and the reference plainly is to a time before
summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. What the
rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced — by the
filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees — the
plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon
fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at
any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant. And this
indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts: for the plaintiff
or other proper party to incorporate the application for attachment in the complaint
or other appropriate pleading (counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for
the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement of the action if it
finds the application otherwise sufficient in form and substance.
 SECURITY BANK CORPORATION v. GREAT WALL COMMERCIAL
PRESS COMPANY, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 219345, January 30, 2017
Facts
Security Bank filed a complaint for sum of money with application for writ
of preliminary attachment against respondents Great Wall Commercial Press
Company, Inc. and its sureties (respondents). The complaint sought to recover
from respondents their unpaid obligations, and argued that in spite of the lapse of
the maturity date of the obligations, respondents failed to pay their obligations. The
RTC granted the application for writ of preliminary attachment. Respondent filed a
motion to lift the preliminary attachment on the following grounds: (a) Security
Bank’s allegations did not show prima facie basis thereof; (b) the application and
the accompanying affidavits failed to allege at least one circumstance which would
show fraudulent intent on their part; and (c) the general imputation of fraud was
contradicted by their efforts to secure an approval for a loan restructure.

The RTC denied respondents’ motion to lift. The CA lifted the writ of
preliminary attachment.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the writ of preliminary attachment
issued by the trial court

Ruling
Yes. For a writ of preliminary attachment to issue under the above-quoted
rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged
fraud. It is settled that fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere
non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. To support its
allegation of fraud, Security Bank attached the Affidavit of German Vincent Pulgar
IV (Pulgar), the Manager of the Remedial Management Division of the said bank.
He detailed how respondents represented to Security Bank that they would pay the
loans upon their maturity date. Pulgar added that respondents signed the Credit
Agreement which contained the Warranty of Solvency and several Trust Receipt
Agreements in favor of Security Bank. The said trust receipts were attached to the
complaint which stated that respondents were obligated to turn over to Security
Bank the proceeds of the sale of the good or to return the goods. The several
demand letters sent by Security Bank to respondents, which were unheeded, were
likewise attached to the complaint. These pieces of evidence were presented by
Security Bank during the hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment in the RTC.
 EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION v. SPECIAL STEEL
PRODUCTS, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 175350, June 13, 2012
Facts
SSPI sold wielding electrodes to Interco. The invoices provided that Interco
would be paying the interest of 36% per annum in case of delay. In payment of the
above wielding electrodes, Interco issued three (3) checks payable to the order of
SSPI. Each check was crossed with the notation “account payee only” and was
drawn against Equitable. For one reason or another, Uy had obtained possession of
the checks on the day of its issuance, presented the same to Equitable, and claimed
that he had good title thereto. He demanded the deposit of the checks in his
personal accounts in Equitable. Equitable acceded to Uy’s demands, on the
assumption that Uy, the son-in-law of Interco’s majority shareholder, was acting
on Interco’s orders.
Subsequently, SSPI and Interco knew that the proceeds of the checks were issued
to Uy. Thus, SSPI, and its president Pardo, filed a complaint for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Uy and
Equitable.

Equitable assails as error the trial court's dismissal of its counter-claim for
wrongful preliminary attachment. It maintains that, contrary to SSPI's allegation in
its application for the writ, there is no showing whatsoever that Equitable was
guilty of fraud in allowing Uy to deposit the checks. Thus, the trial court should
not have issued the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of SSPI. The wrongful
attachment compelled Equitable to incur expenses for a counter-bond, amounting
to P30,204.26, and caused it to sustain damage, amounting to P5 million, to its
goodwill and business credit.

Issue
Whether or not the attachment of Equitable’s properties was wrongful

Ruling
Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment is too harsh a provisional remedy to
be issued based on mere abstractions of fraud. Rather, the rules require that for the
writ to issue, there must be a recitation of clear and concrete factual circumstances
manifesting that the debtor practiced fraud upon the creditor at the time of the
execution of their agreement in that said debtor had a preconceived plan or
intention not to pay the creditor. In this case, no proof was adduced tending to
show that Equitable had a preconceived plan not to pay SSPI or had knowingly
participated in Uy's scheme. Thus, the writ of preliminary attachment was uncalled
for.
 PEROXIDE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, et al. v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, et al.
G.R. 92813, July 31, 1991
Facts
Private respondent BPI sued herein petitioner Peroxide Philippines Corp.,
Eastman Chemical Industries, Inc., and the spouses Edmund O. Mapua and Rose
U. Mapua in Civil Case No. 48849 before the CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila for the
collection of an indebtedness of Peroxide wherein Eastman and the Mapuas bound
themselves to be solidarily liable. Upon the filing of said action, the trial court,
then presided over by Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. Sometime later, on May 29, 1986, Judge Acosta issued an
Order suspending the writ of preliminary attachment pursuant to an ex parte
motion filed by herein petitioners.

In an Order dated December 16, 1987, Judge Gerona held that the
preliminary attachment, being a provisional remedy, must necessarily become
effective immediately upon the issuance thereof and must continue to be effective
even during the pendency of an appeal from a judgment of the court which issued
the said provisional remedy and will only cease to have effect when the judgment
is satisfied or the attachment is discharged or vacated in some manner provided by
law. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for the reason
that the order of May 29, 1986 of Judge Acosta was based on an ex parte motion
without reasonable notice, hence a patent nullity for lack of due process.
Accordingly, the aforesaid order of December 16, 1987 held that the writ of
attachment continued to be effective.

Issue
Whether or not the writ was validly lifted by Judge Acosta’s May 29, 1986
Order

Ruling
No. It is undeniable that when the attachment is challenged for having been
illegally or improperly issued, there must be a hearing with the burden of proof to
sustain the writ being on the attaching creditor. That hearing embraces not only the
right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of
the opposing parties and meet them. The right to submit arguments implies that
opportunity, otherwise the right would be a barren one. It means a fair and open
hearing. And, as provided by the aforecited Section 13 of Rule 57, the attaching
creditor should be allowed to oppose the application for the discharge of the
attachment by counter-affidavit or other evidence, in addition to that on which the
attachment was made.

The order of Judge Acosta, dated May 29, 1986, suspending the writ of
attachment was in essence a lifting of said writ which order, having likewise been
issued ex parte and without notice and hearing in disregard of Section 13 of Rule
57, could not have resulted in the discharge of the attachment. Under the facts of
this case, the ex parte discharge or suspension of the attachment is a disservice to
the orderly administration of justice and nullifies the underlying role and purpose
of preliminary attachment in preserving the rights of the parties pendente lite as an
ancillary remedy.
 SECURITY PACIFIC ASSURANCE CORPORATION v. THE HON.
AMELIA TRIA-INFANTE, et al.
G.R. No. 144740, August 31, 2005
Facts
Reynaldo Anzures filed a complaint against Teresita Villaluz for violation of
BP 22. An ex parte motion for the issuance of preliminary attachment was filed by
Anzures. The trial court then issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon
Anzures’ posting of a bond. The bond was posted by Anzures and approved by the
trial court. Thereafter, the sheriff attached certain properties of Villaluz which were
duly annotated on the certificates of title.

The trial court acquitted Villaluz but held her civilly liable. Villaluz
interposed an appeal before the CA which affirmed the trial court’s decision in
toto. The case was elevated before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 106214), and
during its pendency, Villaluz posted a counter-bond in the amount of
P2,500,000.00 issued by petitioner Security Pacific Assurance Corporation.
Villaluz, on the same date of the counter-bond, filed an Urgent Motion to
Discharge Attachment. In G.R. No. 106214, the Court affirmed in toto the CA. in
view of the finality of said decision, private complainant moved to execute the
same before the trial court.

Petitioner now refuses to be held liable for the counterbond, arguing that the
writ of attachment earlier issued against the real properties of Villaluz was not
discharged, and that the agreement between it and Villaluz was not a surety
agreement, in the sense that petitioner has become an additional debtor. It merely
provided for the waiver of the benefit of excussion.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner is liable on the counterbond

Ruling
Yes. In Luzon Steel Corporation v. Sia, et al., the Court held that
counterbonds posted to obtain the lifting of a writ of attachment is due to these
bonds being security for the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may
obtain; they are thus mere replacements of the property formerly attached, and just
as the latter may be levied upon after final judgment in the case in order to realize
the amount adjudged, so is the liability of the countersureties ascertainable after the
judgment has become final. In Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held that the counterbond is intended to
secure the payment of 'any judgment' that the attaching creditor may recover in the
action.

Petitioner does not deny that the contract between it and Villaluz is one of
surety. However, it points out that the kind of surety agreement between them is
one that merely waives its right of excussion. This cannot be so. The counter-bond
itself states that the parties jointly and severally bind themselves to secure the
payment of any judgment that the plaintiff may recover against the defendant in the
action. A surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in
relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their
liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. Petitioner's argument that the mere
filing of a counter-bond in this case cannot automatically discharge the attachment
without first an order of discharge and approval of the bond, is lame. The filing of
the counter-attachment bond by petitioner Villaluz has discharged the attachment
on the properties and made the petitioner corporation liable on the counter-
attachment bond.
 CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, in her capacity as the Ombudsman v.
COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION), et al.
G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Facts
A complaint/affidavit was filed against Mayor Binay, Jr. before the Office of
the Ombudsman for alleged violations of R.A. 3019 in connection with the five (5)
phases of procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
The Special Panel of Investigators of the Ombudsman charged Mayor Binay of six
(6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of
their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd
Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order,
placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6)
months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.

Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a
TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. At noon of the same day, the CA
issued a Resolution (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,
notwithstanding Peña, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
The Ombudsman filed the present petition before the Supreme Court assailing the
March 16, 2015 Resolution granting Binay, Jr.’s application for TRO. Meanwhile,
the CA issued another Resolution, this time granting Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a WPI
which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order.
Thus, Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition before this Court. The
Ombudsman essentially argues, among others, that the grant of the preventive writs
by the CA violates the Ombudsman’s independence.

Issue
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the injunctive
writs

Ruling
No. The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to
insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the
courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals
and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt
from an incident of judicial power — that is, a provisional writ of injunction
against a preventive suspension order — clearly strays from the concept's rationale
of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.

Nevertheless, the Court noted that the basis for the issuance of the CA’s
injunctive writs was the condonation doctrine. This Court simply finds no legal
authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. In this
jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically
implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic
and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an
elective official’s administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this
jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing
legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has
it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision,
exists.
 PALM TREES ESTATES, INC. and BELLE AIR GOLF AND COUNTRY
CLUB, INC. v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 159370, October 3, 2012
Facts
PTEI entered into a loan agreement with PNB for the amount of P320
Million. As security for the payment of the loan, a Real Estate Mortgage over 48
parcels of land was executed by PTEI in favor of PNB. As a result of PTEI's
transfer to BAGCCI of the ownership, title and interest over 199,134 sq.m. of the
real properties mortgaged to PNB, PTEI executed an Amendment to Real Estate
Mortgage 11 in favor of PNB with BAGCCI as accommodation mortgagor with
respect to the real properties transferred to it by PTEI.

PNB demanded payment of PTEI's outstanding obligations which amounted

to P599,251,583.18 as of August 31, 2010. As PTEI defaulted in its payment of
past due loan with PNB, the bank filed a Petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgaged properties on March 27, 2001. To enjoin PNB from foreclosing the
mortgage, PTEI and BAGCCI filed a complaint in the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City for
breach of contract, among others, with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The RTC of Lapu-Lapu City granted the prayer for the WPI. PNB filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA who held that PTEI and BAGCCI failed to
show a clear and unmistakable right which would have necessitated the issuance of
a WPI.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the WPI

Ruling
Yes. A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must
be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The right of
PNB to extrajudicially foreclose on the real estate mortgage in the event of PTEI's
default is provided under various contracts of the parties. Foreclosure is but a
necessary consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtedness. In view of
PTEI's failure to settle its outstanding obligations upon demand, it was proper for
PNB to exercise its right to foreclose on the mortgaged properties. It then became
incumbent on PTEI and BAGCCI, when they filed the complaint and sought the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to establish that they have a clear and
unmistakable right which requires immediate protection during the pendency of the
action. The Order dated May 17, 2001 of the trial court granting the application for
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction failed to show that PTEI and BAGCCI
discharged that burden. The Order of the trial court failed to state a finding of facts
that would justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. It merely
stated the conclusion that "real controversies exist" based on the observation that
"the positions of the parties are completely opposed to each other."
 BICOL MEDICAL CENTER v. NOE B. BOTOR, et al.
G.R. No. 214073, October 4, 2017
Facts
BMC issued a Memorandum regarding the re-routing of the traffic scheme
inside its compound. The re-routing scheme ordered for the closure of Road Lot
No. 3. Mayor Bongat filed with the RTC a petition with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction against BMC. The RTC denied Naga City’s
application for injunctive relief ruling that it failed to prove a clear and
unmistakable right to the writ prayed for. The intervenors filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA. The CA held that the Intervenors were able to prove the
public character of Road Lot No. 3, considering that "the general public had been
using [it] since time immemorial," with even Dr. Nerva admitting that he passed
through it when he was young. It thus ruled that Naga City and the other
intervenors were able to present prima facie evidence of their right to the writ.

Petitioners and BMC filed the instant petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. They argue that although Road Lot No. 3 has been open to
vehicles and pedestrians as BMC's service road, it was never intended for use by
the general public and was not owned by Naga City, as evidenced by the
certification issued by the Office of the City Engineer of Naga City.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in directing the RTC to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction on the closure of Road Lot No. 3

Ruling
Yes. Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. explained that
a clear legal right which would entitle the applicant to an injunctive writ
"contemplates a right 'clearly founded in or granted by law.' Absent a particular
law or statute establishing Naga City’s ownership or control over Road Lot No. 3,
the Department of Health's title over the BMC compound must prevail over the
unsubstantiated claims of Naga City and respondents. Department of Health's
ownership over Road Lot No. 3, with the concomitant right to use and enjoy this
property, must be respected.

Moreover, a careful reading of the records convinces this Court that

respondents failed to establish prima facie proof of their clear legal right to utilize
Road Lot No. 3. Whatever right they sought to establish by proving the public
nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the Department of Health's certificate of
title and the City Engineer's categorical statement that "the road from Panganiban
Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of BMC was not included in the list" of city
roads under Naga City's control.
 ROSARIO E. CAHAMBING v. VICTOR ESPINOSA and JUANA ANG
G.R. No. 215807, January 25, 2017
Facts
Petitioner and respondent are siblings and the children of deceased spouses
Librado and Brigida Espinosa. Brigida Espinosa and respondent Victor Espinosa
entered into an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate subdividing Lot No. 354. Not
being included in the partition of Lot No. 354, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent and his representative, Juana Ang, for the annulment of the
Extrajudicial Partition of Real Property. In one of the pre-trial conferences, the
Clerk of Court, as the Commissioner, issued an Order directing the parties to
maintain the status quo.

Thereafter, respondent Victor Espinosa filed an Application for the Issuance

of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order against petitioner alleging that the latter violated the status quo
ante order by allowing her sons to occupy the space rented by Jhanel's Pharmacy
which is one of respondent Victor Espinosa's tenants. The RTC issued an Order for
the issuance of a WPI. The CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the CA and the RTC erred in issuing the WPI

Ruling
No. For a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites
must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that
must be protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. In this case, private respondent Victor Espinosa had
established a clear and unmistakable right to a commercial space heretofore
occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy. He had an existing Contract of Lease with the
pharmacy up to December 2009. Without prejudging the main case, it was
established that, at the time of the issuance of the status quo order dated April 16,
1998, Jhanel's Pharmacy was recognized as one of private respondent Victor
Espinosa's tenants.

As such, pursuant to the status quo order, it is private respondent Victor

Espinosa who must continue to deal with Jhanel's Pharmacy. Correspondingly, the
commercial space occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy must be deemed to be under the
possession and control of private respondent Victor Espinosa as of the time of the
issuance of the status quo order. The right of possession and control is a clear right
already established by the circumstances obtaining at that time. Hence, petitioner's
act of entering the premises of Jhanel's Pharmacy, through her sons, is a material
and substantial violation of private respondent Victor Espinosa's right, which act
must be enjoined.
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
et al.
G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000
Facts
Petitioner Miriam College Foundation, Inc., through its Discipline
Committee, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon herein private respondents,
members of the editorial board of the Miriam College's School Paper "Chi Rho"
and the magazine "Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho." The School
described the September-October 1994 issue of the said publications "vulgar,"
"indecent," "gross," "explicit," "injurious to young readers," and devoid of all
moral values." The students filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City questioning the jurisdiction of the Miriam College Discipline Board over
them. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
school from enforcing and/or implementing the expulsion or dismissal orders. Both
parties moved for reconsideration, but the trial court eventually dismissed the
petition. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The
Court, however, resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
Respondent appellate court granted the students' petition. The appellate court
declared the RTC decision as well the students' suspension and dismissal, void. On
May 19, 1995, a TRO was issued by the CA.

Issue
Whether or not the TRO lost its effectivity

Ruling
Yes. A judge (or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order with a
limited life of twenty days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the 20-day
period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary order
would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge
on the application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary
restraining order would automatically expire on the 20 th day by the sheer force of
law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. In the instant case, no
such preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TRO earlier issued
automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court.

This limitation as to the duration of the temporary restraining order was the
rule prevailing when the CA issued its TRO dated 19 May 1995. By that time
respondents Elizabeth Valdezco and Joel Tan had already served their respective
suspensions. The TRO was applicable only to respondents Jasper Briones, Jerome
Gomez, Relly Carpio, Jose Mari Ramos and Gerald Gary Renacido all of whom
were dismissed, and respondent Camille Portugal whose graduation privileges
were withheld. The TRO, however, lost its effectivity upon the lapse of the twenty
days. It can hardly be said that in that short span of time, these students had already
graduated as to render the case moot.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. v. FORERUNNER MULTI RESOURCES,
INC.
G.R. No. 199324, January 7, 2013
Facts
EO 156 issued by PGMA imposed a partial ban on the importation of used
motor vehicles. Respondent, a corporation engaged in the importation of motor
used vehicles via the Ports of Aparri, Cagayan and San Fernando, La Union, sued
the government in the RTC of Cagayan seeking to declare invalid EO 156.
Respondent also sought the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin the
enforcement of EO 156.

The trial court granted the preliminary injunctive writ. On petitioner’s

motion, however, the trial court reconsidered its Order granting the injunctive writ
and lifted the same. The CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in lifting the preliminary injunctive writ and held that the
implementation of EO 156 would put petitioner in a financial crisis.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in granting respondents the preliminary
injunctive relief to enjoin the enforcement of EO 156

Ruling
Yes. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the force and
effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added
burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or
issuances. Respondent sought preliminary injunctive relief as ancillary to its
principal cause of action to invalidate EO 156. Respondent's attack on EO 156,
however, comes on the heels of Executive Secretary v. Southwing where the Court
passed upon and found EO 156 legally sound, albeit overextended in application.
The Court found EO 156 a valid police power measure addressing an “urgent
national concern.”
TML GASKET INDUSTRIES, INC. v. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 188768, January 7, 2013
Facts
TML obtained a loan from what was then Bank of Southeast Asia (now
BPI). As security for the loan, TML executed a real estate mortgage over
commercial and industrial lots located at Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Parañaque City.
TML defaulted in the payment of its loans, leading BPI to extra-judicially
foreclose the mortgaged properties. Because of the imminent foreclosure of its
properties, TML filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief, among others, with
prayer for the issuance of a WPI. TML alleged that despite the global financial
crisis, it tried hard to religiously pay its obligations to BPI and that contrary to their
understanding, BPI unilaterally imposed a 33% interest rate per annum, and
ultimately, a penalty of 36% interest on past due principal and corresponding
interest thereon. TML likewise pointed out that it had demanded an independent
accounting and liquidation of its loan account, which went unheeded. Ultimately,
for TML, it cannot be considered in default of an obligation with an undetermined
and unascertained amount.

The trial court denied TML’s application for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court reversed itself. BPI filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA who found grave abuse
discretion on the part of the trial court in granting the WPI in favor of TML and
enjoining the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred when it lifted the injunctive writ

Ruling
No. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing
of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal
action. The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual
or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be
protected and the violation against that right must be shown.

In this case, TML categorically that it has an existing loan with BPI secured
by a real estate mortgage and several promissory notes and that it stopped paying
for one reason or another. Affirming the appellate court’s findings, the SC held that
TML's failure to comply with the terms and conditions of its credit agreement with
BPI, as embodied in the real estate mortgage and the promissory notes it issued in
favor of the latter, entitles BPI to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties.
 MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. RIVERA
VILLAGE LESSEE HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 143870, September 30, 2005
Facts
The Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), who administers and manages
MIA, entered into individual lease contracts with its employees for the lease of a
four-hectare lot situated in what is now known as Rivera Village in Pasay City.
Sometime in January 1995, MIAA stopped MIAA stopped issuing accrued rental
bills and refused to accept rental payments from the lessees. As a result, respondent
Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc. (homeowners association),
purportedly representing the lessees, requested MIAA to sell the subject property
to its members. The MIAA denied the request.

Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against MIAA and the NHA.
The petition sought to restrain the MIAA from implementing its Conceptual
Development Plan insofar as Rivera Village is concerned. The trial court denied
the petition. The CA, however, reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial court
and granted a writ of preliminary injunction restraining and preventing respondent
MIAA from evicting the members of petitioner Rivera Village Association from
their respective lots in the Rivera Village.

Issue
Whether or not the issuance of a WPI is proper

Ruling
No. The Executive Secretary as representative of the President of the
Philippines is, therefore, an indispensable party in actions seeking to compel the
sale or disposition of properties of the MIAA. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that parties-in- interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. Thus, the
presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power.

For the foregoing reasons, the prayer for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction must perforce be denied. Preliminary injunction is a mere
ancillary remedy which cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the
main case. Having declared that the petition filed before the trial court was
correctly dismissed, the determination of the homeowners association's entitlement
to a writ of preliminary injunction is already moot and academic. Besides, as
earlier noted, the right of the members of the homeowners association to possess
and purchase the subject property is still uncertain considering that they have not
completed the process for the acquisition of their lots as outlined in PD 1517.

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights

and
interests. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect
contingent or future rights. Where the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed,
injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of
actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
 SPS. NICASIO C. MARQUEZ and ANITA J. MARQUEZ v. SPOUSES
CLARITO ALINDOG and CARMEN ALINDOG
G.R. No. 184045, January 22, 2014
Facts
Petitioner Anita Marquez extended a loan to Gutierrez. As security therefor,
Gutierrez executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in Tagaytay City
registered under the name of Benjamin A. Gutierrez. Since Gutierrez defaulted in
paying his obligations, Anita sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject
property. Upon Gutierrez’ failure to redeem the property, title was consolidated
under TCT No. 41939 which bore the annotation of an adverse claim in the names
of respondents-spouses Alindog. Subsequently, respondents filed an action for
annulment of REM and certificate of sale with damages against Sps. Marquez and
a certain Gonzales. Meanwhile, Anita filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession before the RTC.

The RTC granted the same, and issued a writ of possession in her favor.
Claiming that they would suffer grave and irreparable injury if the implementation
of the writ of possession was left unrestrained, respondents sought the issuance of
a WPI before the RTC in a separate case. The RTC issued a WPI. The CA held that
the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the WPI.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC when it issued the injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez
from taking possession of the subject property

Ruling
Yes. Jurisprudence is clear on the matter: without the exception under
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules availing, the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser of an extra-judicially foreclosed property — such as Sps.
Marquez in this case — should come as a matter of course, and, in such regard,
constitutes only a ministerial duty on the part of the court. Here, while the RTC
had initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it defied existing
jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting
Sps. Alindog's prayer for injunctive relief. The RTC's finding anent the initial
evidence adduced by Sps. Alindog constitutes improper basis to justify the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in their favor since, in the first place,
it had no authority to exercise any discretion in this respect.

Besides, it was improper for the RTC to have issued a writ of preliminary
injunction since the act sought to be enjoined, i.e., the implementation of the writ
of possession, had already been accomplished in the interim and thus, rendered the
matter moot. Case law instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought
to be enjoined had already become fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or
consummated act).
 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L.
HONTANOSAS, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 157163, June 25, 2014
Facts
Respondents obtained a loan from petitioner. As security for the same,
respondents constituted real estate mortgages on several parcels of land in favor of
petitioner, and were also made to constitute a chattel mortgage on a Mitsubishi
Pajero and a continuing surety agreement. Respondents’ obligation to petitioner
reached Php 17 million but they were only able to pay Php 13 million due to
financial difficulties brought about by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Petitioner
required respondents to issue postdated checks to cover the loan under threat of
foreclosure, which forced respondents to apply for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondents bolster their alleged entitlement to the writ on
the fact that they would suffer grave and irreparable injury should petitioner
foreclose the mortgages and file criminal complaints for violation of BP 22.

The RTC granted the respondents’ application for preliminary injunction.

The CA held that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue
Whether or not the lower courts erred in issuing a WPI

Ruling
Yes. Respondents failed to establish the irreparable injury they would suffer
should the writ of preliminary injunction not be issued. They principally feared the
loss of their possession and ownership of the mortgaged properties, and faced the
possibility of a criminal prosecution for the post-dated checks they issued. But
such fear of potential loss of possession and ownership, or facing a criminal
prosecution did not constitute the requisite irreparable injury that could have
warranted the issuance of the writ of injunction. Moreover, as a general rule, the
courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction — whether preliminary or
final — in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal prosecution. But there are
extreme cases in which exceptions to the general rule have been recognized,
including: (1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when
there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority; (5) when the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) when the
court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) when it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution; (9) when the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT v. THE HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN,
et al.
G.R. No. 157494, December 10, 2004
Facts
Respondent City filed a case for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner
before the sala of respondent judge. The petition stated that BACIWA published in
the Visayan Daily Star a schedule of automatic water rates adjustment. The rates
were supposed to take effect seven (7) days after its posting in the local papers on
January 22, 1999. The increase was aborted when petitioner unilaterally suspended
the January 22, 1999 implementation. On March 15, 1999, petitioner announced
that the rate hike will be implemented on April 1, 1999.

After a hiatus of more than seven (7) months, on February 18, 2000,
respondent City filed an urgent motion for the issuance of the TRO and/or WPI
praying that the case be set for hearing on February 24, 2000. Respondent Court
heard respondent’s application and issued an Order commanding the petitioner to
stop, desist, and refrain from implementing the proposed water rates for the year
2000. On December 21, 2000, respondent Court issued the assailed Decision
granting the final injunction which allegedly confirmed the previous preliminary
injunction. After having its motion for reconsideration denied, the petitioner filed a
special civil action for certiorari before the CA who, however, dismissed the
petition holding that the Order of respondent judge dated February 24, 2000,
though termed by BACIWA as a TRO, was, in fact, a preliminary injunction.

Issue
Whether or not the Order dated February 24, 2000 was a TRO or a
preliminary injunction

Ruling
It was a TRO. A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve
the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which
cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue
a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of
issue. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order would
automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial
declaration to that effect being necessary.

Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the
temporary restraining order granted automatically expired after twenty (20) days
under the Rules. The fact that respondent court merely ordered "the respondent[,]
its agents, representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and
refrain from implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will
start on March 1, 2000" without stating the period for the restraint does not convert
the temporary restraining order to a preliminary injunction.
 STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. STAR
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al.
G.R. No. 187872, April 11, 2011
Facts
In compliance with the November 17, 2010 decision sought to be
reconsidered, petitioner STRADEC, on the one hand, seeks the admission and
approval of the injunction bond issued by the Empire Insurance Company in the
sum of P 10 Million. On the ground, however, that grave and irreparable damage
will be wrought by the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in these
premises, CTCII's motion for reconsideration of the grant of said writ is
accompanied by an offer to post a counterbond in the sum of P20,000,000.00. For
this purpose, CTCII calls our attention to the supposed fact, among other matters,
that it is currently the principal shareholder of SIDC which, as a public utility
company, holds the concession for the construction, operation and maintenance of
the STAR toll road; that SIDC is scheduled to expand Stage II, Phase 2 of the
STAR toll road with the construction of two additional new lanes at an estimated
cost of P2,000,000,000.00; that if it is prevented from exercising proprietary rights
over the subject shares and SIDC is inhibited from implementing the 20 July 2006
stockholders' resolution increasing its authorized capital stock, CTCII will be
unable to infuse the equity participation commonly required for bank loans; and,
that since the security for said loans consisting of SIDC's assets requires the vote of
stockholders owning/controlling 2/3 of SIDC's outstanding capital stock, the writ
of preliminary injunction would cause grave and irreparable damage which cannot
be indemnified by the injunction bond to be posted by STRADEC.

Issue
Whether or not STRADEC should be granted the WPI

Ruling
Yes. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of
the following essential requisites, to wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is
material and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and, (3) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage. Concurrence of the foregoing requisites is evident from
the fact that STRADEC has been deprived of its rights to its shareholdings and to
participate in SIDC's corporate affairs as a consequence of the impugned loan and
pledge as well as the transfer of the shares to respondent Wong and CTCII. For
these reasons alone, we find that STRADEC is entitled to a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain: (a) CTCII from further exercising proprietary rights over the
subject shares; (b) SIDC and its officers from recognizing the transfer or further
transfers of the same; (c) the implementation of the resolutions passed during the
20 July 2006 SIDC stockholders' special meeting; and, (d) the SEC from acting on
any report submitted in respect thereto. Far from amounting to a prejudgment of
the case, the restraint of said acts is merely in the service of the office of a writ of
preliminary injunction, i.e., the restoration of the status quo ante as well
preservation and protection of the rights of the litigant during the pendency of the
case.
 AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., et al. v. MUNICIPALITY
OF PADRE GARCIA, BATANGAS PROVINCE
G.R. No. 183367, March 14, 2012
Facts
The municipal government invited petitioner APRI to rebuild the public
market and construct a shopping center on the former municipal market which had
been ravaged by a fire. Thereafter, a MOA was executed between petitioner APRI
and respondent. Under the MOA, APRI undertook to construct a shopping
complex. In return, APRI acquired the exclusive right to operate, manage, and
lease stall spaces for a period of 25 years.

When the mayor of the municipality changed, respondent initiated a

complaint for declaration of nullity of MOA with damages before the RTC of
Rosario, Batangas. The court rendered a judgement in favor of respondent. There
having been no timely appeal made, respondent moved for the execution of the
RTC decision. A writ of execution was thus issued. Petitioners then filed a petition
for relief from judgement which was denied by the RTC. Before the CA, the
petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of status quo order and motion for
issuance of TRO and/or WPI. The motion prayed for an order to restrain the RTC
from "further proceeding and issuing any further Order, Resolution, Writ of
Execution, and any other court processes" in the case before it. The CA issued a
resolution denying the motion.

Issue
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion for the issuance of a status quo order and motion for the
issuance of a TRO and/or WPI

Ruling
No. To be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there
exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly
threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious and irreparable damage. In this case, no grave abuse of discretion
can be imputed to the CA. It did not exercise judgment in a capricious and
whimsical manner or exercise power in an arbitrary or despotic manner. There is
no clear legal right in this case. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. A perusal of the Motion for
Injunction and its accompanying Affidavit filed before the CA shows that
petitioners rely on their alleged right to the full and faithful execution of the MOA.
However, while the enforcement of the Writ of Execution, which would nullify the
implementation of the MOA, is manifestly prejudicial to petitioners' interests, they
have failed to establish in their Petition that they possess a clear legal right that
merits the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Their rights under the MOA
have already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to respondent in the
RTC case, under a judgment that has become final and executory. There is also no
irreparable injury in this case. Damages are irreparable where there is no standard
by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. In this case,
petitioners have alleged that the loss of the public market entails costs of about P30
million in investments, P100,000 monthly revenue in rentals, and amounts as yet
unquantified — but not unquantifiable — in terms of the alleged loss of jobs of
APRI's employees and potential suits that may be filed by the leaseholders of the
public market for breach of contract. Clearly, the injuries alleged by petitioners are
capable of pecuniary estimation.
 MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER CABOVERDE v.
DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, et al.
G.R. No. 203585, July 29, 2013
Facts
Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny, and Laluna, are the
registered owners and in possession of certain parcels of land denominated as Lot
Nos. 2,3, and 4 in Zamboanga del Norte. Respondents Eve and Fe filed a
complaint before the RTC of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte praying for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring Lots 2,3, and 4 from their
parents, Maximo and Dominalda, in favor of petitioners Mila and Roseller and
their other siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny, and Laluna (Civil Case No. S-760). During
the pendency of this case, Maximo died. Thus, Eve and Fe filed an Amended
Complaint adding eight (8) more real properties of the Caboverde estate in the
original list. As encouraged by the RTC, the parties executed a Partial Settlement
Agreement (PSA) where they fixed the sharing of the additional 8 parcels of land.

Dominalda then filed with the RTC a Verified Urgent Petition/Application

to place the controverted Lot Nos. 2,3, and 4 under receivership. She claimed that
while she had a legal interest in the properties and their produce, she could not
enjoy them since the income derived was solely appropriated by petitioner Mila.
She also alleged that she needs her legal share in the income of these properties for
her daily sustenance and medical expenses. The trial court granted Dominalda’s
application for receivership. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration arguing that
concerns raised by Dominalda in her application for receivership are not grounds
for placing the properties in the hands of a receiver. The trial court denied the
same. The CA denied petitioner’s petition for certiorari.

Issue
Whether or not the grant of Dominalda’s application for receivership was
proper

Ruling
No. Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not
the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the
injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the
appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a
consideration from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership.
Under the circumstances, Dominalda’s application has no leg to stand on. First,
Dominalda's alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is
not a valid justification for the appointment of a receiver. Second, there is no clear
showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially
impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible
means to preserve, administer or dispose of them. Third, it was patently erroneous
for the RTC to grant the Application for Receivership in order to ensure
Dominalda of income to support herself because precisely, the PSA already
provided for that. Finally, the defendants in Civil Case No. S-760 are the registered
owners of the disputed properties that were in their possession. In cases such as
this, it is settled jurisprudence that the appointment should be made only in
extreme cases and on a clear showing of necessity in order to save the plaintiff
from grave and irremediable loss or damage.
 ADVENT CAPITAL AND FINANCE CORPORATION v. ROLAND
YOUNG
G.R. No. 183018, August 3, 2011
Facts
The present controversy stemmed from a replevin suit instituted by
petitioner Advent Capital and Finance Corporation against respondent Roland
Young to recover the possession of a 1996 Mercedes Benz E230 with plate number
UMN-168, which is registered in Advent's name. After Advent's posting of
P3,000,000 replevin bond, which was double the value of the subject car at the
time, through Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated (Stronghold), the trial
court issued a Writ of Seizure directing the Sheriff to seize the subject car from
Young. Upon receipt of the Writ of Seizure, Young turned over the car to Advent,
which delivered the same to the rehabilitation receiver.

Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the replevin case for
failure to prosecute. Young filed an omnibus motion, praying that Advent return
the subject car and pay him P1.2 million in damages "(f)or the improper and
irregular seizure" of the subject car, to be charged against the replevin bond posted
by Advent through Stronghold. Young filed a motion to resolve his omnibus
motion, but the trial court denied the same. The CA ruled in favor of Young.

Issue
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in directing the return of
the seized car to Young

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in directing the
trial court to return the seized car to Young since this is the necessary consequence
of the dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute without prejudice.
Upon the dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute, the writ of seizure,
which is merely ancillary in nature, became functus officio and should have been
lifted. There was no adjudication on the merits, which means that there was no
determination of the issue who has the better right to possess the subject car.
Advent cannot therefore retain possession of the subject car considering that it was
not adjudged as the prevailing party entitled to the remedy of replevin.

The dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute results in the
restoration of the parties' status prior to litigation, as if no complaint was filed at
all. To let the writ of seizure stand after the dismissal of the complaint would be
adjudging Advent as the prevailing party, when precisely no decision on the merits
had been rendered. Accordingly, the parties must be reverted to their status quo
ante. Since Young possessed the subject car before the filing of the replevin case,
the same must be returned to him, as if no complaint was filed at all.
 MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON v. JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS
G.R. No. 185595, January 9, 2013
Facts
Petitioner filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36
of the Family Code. The trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s
application for support pendente lite. On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial
court issued an Order directing private respondent to give support in the amount of
P42,292.50 per month. Private respondent filed a motion to reduce support citing,
among other grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed
by the court was even higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city
councilor. The trial court granted private respondent’s motion.

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the trial court Order
granting private respondent’s motion to reduce the amount of monthly support.
The trial court denied the same. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a Decision
declaring petitioner and private respondent’s marriage null and void, and decreeing
that private respondent provide support to the children in the amount of P30,000
per month. Petitioner now appealed to the CA the Order of the trial court granting
the reduction of the amount of support, as well as the Order denying her motion to
reconsider the same. The CA dismissed the appeal holding that petitioner failed to
avail of the proper remedy to assail interlocutory orders.

Issue
Whether or not the subject orders on matters of support are interlocutory in
nature

Ruling
Yes. Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the
pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of
the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because
they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action,
and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon
the result of the main action. The subject orders on the matter of support pendente
lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Private respondent's obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed

by the RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what
transpired in the early stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private
respondent in contempt of court and ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to
comply with the order granting support pendente lite. A few years later, private
respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed her own motion
to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and support in arrears.
This fact underscores the provisional character of the order granting support
pendente lite. Petitioner's theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be
provisional due to the arrearages incurred by private respondent is therefore
untenable.
 FAUSTINO REYES, et al. v. PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008
Facts
According to petitioners, they were the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who
co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera. Petitioners executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Dionisia involving a small portion of the
subject parcel of land. Petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera also
executed a Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale over the same
property. Respondents Peter B. Enriquez, for himself and in behalf of his minor
daughter, respondent Deborah Ann, on the other hand, alleges that their
predecessor-in-interest, Anacleto Cabrera co-owned the subject parcel of land with
his wife, Patricia Cabrera. They further claimed that the Sps. Cabrera was survived
by two daughters, Graciana, who died single, and Etta, the wife of Respondent
Peter. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to respondents Peter and
Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Thereafter, Peter
and Deborah Ann sold a portion of the subject parcel of land to Spouses
Fernandez.

When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land,
they discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so. Alleging that
the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a
complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
damages. The RTC, on motion of the petitioners, dismissed the case on the ground
that respondents were actually seeking to be declared the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
which must be done through a special proceeding. The CA reversed the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the instant case could be resolved in an ordinary civil
proceeding

Ruling
No. An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A
special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact.

In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was

registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary
civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition, or nullification of
transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto, this Court
has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil
action since the matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a special
proceeding". In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action
for the "Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of
Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right
being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who
they claim co-owned one- half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as
stated in the documents the respondents sought to annul.
 LEANDRO R. OCAMPO v. LEONORA TIRONA
G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005
Facts
Ocampo alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of land. He claimed that
he bought it from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject land’s registered owner,
Alipio Breton Cruz. Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee occupying a portion of
the subject land. Ocampo then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Tirona before the MeTC. Tirona filed her answer, and asserted that it was one
Doña Lourdes Yaneza who actually owned the land.

The MTC ruled that Tirona does not have any reason to suspend payment of
rents until after PD No. 1517, in relation to PD Nos. 1893 and 1968, is
implemented in her favor. Tirona's non-payment of rents rendered her occupation
of the subject land illegal. As owner of the subject land, Ocampo is entitled to its
use and enjoyment, as well as to recover its possession from any person unlawfully
withholding it. Tirona, on appeal to the RTC, filed her memorandum, asserting, for
the first time, that Alipio Breton is the registered owner of the land, and was her
landlord since 1962. Tirona claims that she has never stopped paying her rent to
Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, an heir of Alipio. Tirona also claims that Rosauro
cannot transfer ownership over the subject land to Ocampo because Rosauro
conveyed the subject land to Maria Lourdes.

The RTC dismissed Tirona’s appeal. The CA ruled that the partition of the
estate of Alipio Breton was a prerequisite to Ocampo’s action thus, dismissed the
case.

Issue
Whether or not the case should be dismissed

Ruling
No. Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the
elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper are present. Ocampo
notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from Tirona's lessor. Tirona's
continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampo's
terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating
the lease.

Moreover, the Court held that Tirona should have filed an action for
interpleader. The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has
property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which
in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and
asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves
entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine flnally who is entitled to one or the other thing.

As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing

the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution
of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for
interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay
rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.
 RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. METRO
CONTAINER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001
Facts
For failure of Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON) to settle its loan
obligations, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) instituted an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding against it. In a bidding, RCBC was adjudged
the highest bidder. LEYCON promptly filed an action for Nullification of
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages against RCBC docketed as Civil Case
No. 4037-V-93. Meanwhile, RCBC consolidated its ownership over the property
due to LEYCON's failure to redeem the mortgaged property within the 12-month
redemption period. By virtue thereof, RCBC demanded rental payments from
Metro Container Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the mortgaged
property from LEYCON. On the other hand, LEYCON filed an action for
Unlawful Detainer against METROCAN before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 82 of Valenzuela, docketed as Civil Case No. 6202.
Consequently, METROCAN filed a complaint for Interpleader against LEYCON
and RCBC docketed as Civil Case No. 4398-V-94 before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 75 of Valenzuela to compel them to interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves and to determine which among them shall rightfully
receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. During the pre-trial
conference of the interpleader case, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case
insofar as METROCAN and LEYCON were concerned in view of an amicable
settlement they entered into. On 31 October 1995, judgment was rendered in the
Unlawful Detainer case, which, among other things, ordered METROCAN to pay
LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises. The said decision became
final and executory. By reason thereof, METROCAN and LEYCON separately
filed a motion to dismiss in the interpleader case. However, the said two motions
were dismissed for lack of merit. Thereafter, METROCAN sought relief from the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Thus, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the interpleader case.
Hence, RCBC filed the instant petition.

Issue
Whether the dismissal was proper

Ruling
Yes. An action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against
double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires,
as an indispensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest
whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants.” The decision in Civil Case No. 6202 resolved the
conflicting claims insofar as payment of rentals was concerned. Petitioner then was
correct in saying that it is not bound by the decision in Civil Case No. 5202. It is
not a party thereto. However, it could not compel METROCAN to pursue Civil
Case No. 4398- V-94. RCBC has other avenues to prove its claim. It is not bereft
of other legal remedies. In fact, the issue of ownership can very well be threshed
out in Civil Case No. 4037-V-93, the case for Nullification of Extrajudicial
Foreclosure Sale and Damages filed by LEYCON against RCBC.
 WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v. LEE E. WON alias
RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN
G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976
Facts
The Wack Wack Golf & Country Club (Corporation) filed the instant case
for interpleader. It alleged for its first cause of action that the defendant Lee E.
Won claims ownership of its membership certificate 201, by virtue of the decision
rendered in civil case no. 26044 by the CFI of Manila; and that the defendant
Bienvenido A. Tan also claims ownership over membership certificate 201 by
virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him on July 24,
1950 pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz,"
the original owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201. In separate
motions the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res
judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription.
Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment and failure to state a cause of action
well taken, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with costs against the
Corporation.

The Corporation contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint, instead of compelling the appellees to interplead because there actually
are conflicting claims between the latter with respect to the ownership of
membership fee certificate 201, and, as there is no identity of parties, of subject-
matter, and of cause of action, between civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila and
the present action, the complaint should not have been dismissed upon the ground
of res judicata.

Issue
Whether or not the action for interpleader was properly and timely filed

Ruling
No. It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late
when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the
contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims
prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the
adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so,
because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable
to the latter.

The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an
application for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to
litigate between themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after
adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of interpleader was
invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to be entitled to this remedy the
applicant must be able to show that he has not been made independently liable to
any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a
final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing.
 SOLEDAD CHANLIONGCO RAMOS, et al. v. TERESITA D. RAMOS, et
al.
G.R. No. 144294, March 11, 2003
Facts
Petitioners are the children of the late Paulino V. Chanliongco, Jr. who was
the co-owner of a parcel of land. He co-owned the property with his sister Narcisa,
and his brothers Mario and Antonio. By virtue of an SPA, executed by the co-
owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter Adoracion C. Mendoza had sold the lot to
herein respondents. Because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the
validity of the sale, respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for interpleader to
resolve the various ownership claims.

The RTC upheld the sale insofar as Narcisa was concerned. On appeal, the
CA modified the RTC, holding that while there was no SPA in favor of Adoracion,
the sale was nonetheless valid, because she had been authorized by her mother as
her sub-agent. The CA decision lapsed into finality. Thereafter, petitioners filed
with the CA a Motion to Set Aside the Decision. They contended that they had not
been served either the Complaint or the Summons. The CA denied petitioners’
motion.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioners’ Motion

Ruling
No. The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an
interpleader to determine the ownership of the real property in question.
Specifically, it forced person claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute
among themselves as to which of them owned the property. Essentially, it sought
to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directed against the personal
liability of any particular person. It was therefore a real action, because it affected
title to or possession of real property. As such, the Complaint was brought against
the deceased registered co-owners: Narcisa, Mario, Paulino and Antonio
Chanliangco, as represented by their respective estates.

Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but
represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had not
standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because the
latter was represented by an executor or administrator. Thus, there was not need to
implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-
owners had already been made parties.
 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by Governor Luis J.
Villafuerte, Jr. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 175064, September 18, 2009
Facts
RA 305 took effect and, by virtue thereof, the Municipality of Naga was
converted into the City of Naga. Subsequently, RA 1336 was approved,
transferring the site of the Provincial Capitol of the Province of Camarines Sur
from the City of Naga to the barrio of Palestina, Municipality of Pili. The City of
Naga filed a complaint for declaratory relief before the RTC. The City of Naga
alleged that Camarines Sur possessed and claimed ownership of Plaza Rizal. As a
result, Camarines Sur had long exercised administrative control and management
of Plaza Rizal, to the exclusion of the City of Naga. The City of Naga could not
introduce improvements on Plaza Rizal, and its constituents could not use the
property without securing a permit from Camarines Sur. The City of Naga asserted
that it did not intend to acquire ownership over Plaza Rizal, rather, the City of
Naga sought a declaration that administrative control and management of Plaza
Rizal should be vested in it, given that Plaza Rizal is within its territorial
jurisdiction.

Camarines Sur filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the remedy of

declaratory relief was improper given that the City of Naga did not intend to
acquire ownership over Plaza Rizal. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, and
subsequently ruled in favor of the City of Naga, thereby granting administrative
control and management over Plaza Rizal in favor of the latter. Before the Court,
Camarines Sur asserts that declaratory relief is improper because there was no
actual controversy in this case as Camarines Sur had long managed and
administratively controlled Plaza Rizal without objections from the City of Naga.

Issue
Whether or not declaratory relief is proper

Ruling
Yes. The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy between persons whose interests are adverse; (2) the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (3) the issue is ripe for
judicial determination. In this case, the interests of the City of Naga and Camarines
Sur in this case are adverse. The assertion by the City of Naga of a superior right to
the administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal, because said property
of the public domain is within its territorial jurisdiction, is clearly antagonistic to
and inconsistent with the insistence of Camarines Sur. The latter asserted in its
Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title that it should maintain
administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal having continuously
possessed the same under a claim of ownership, even after the conversion of the
Municipality of Naga into an independent component city. The City of Naga
further asserted that as a result of the possession by Camarines Sur, the City of
Naga could not introduce improvements on Plaza Rizal; its constituents were
denied adequate use of said property, since Camarines Sur required that the latter's
permission must first be sought for the use of the same; and it was still Camarines
Sur that was able to continuously use Plaza Rizal for its own programs and
projects. The City of Naga undoubtedly has a legal interest in the controversy,
given that Plaza Rizal is undisputedly within its territorial jurisdiction. Lastly, the
issue is ripe for judicial determination in that, in view of the conflicting interests of
the parties to this case, litigation is inevitable, and there is no adequate relief
available in any other form or proceeding.
 EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMMEL ALMEDA v. BATHALA
MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 150806, January 28, 2008
Facts
Respondent Bathala Marketing and Ponciano Almeda, husband of Eufemia
Almeda and father of Rommel Almeda, for a lease of a certain portion of the
Almeda compound. During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died, thus,
respondent dealt with herein petitioners. In a letter, petitioners advised respondent
that the former shall assess and collect Value-Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly
rentals. Respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed
in the contract of lease were supposed to have included the VAT already.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals, but continued to pay the
stipulated amount stated in their contract.

Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of

determining the correct interpretation of condition nos. 6 and 7 of the lease
contract. Petitioners, in turn, filed a separate action for ejectment, rescission, and
damages against respondent. Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the action
for declaratory relief for being an improper remedy considering that respondent
was already in breach of the obligation and that the case would not end the
litigation and settle the rights of parties. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and
against respondents. The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification.

Issue
Whether or not an action for declaratory relief is proper

Ruling
Yes. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory
relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents
in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be
ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding.

It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case,
except that petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract
when the petition was filed. The Supreme Court did not agree with petitioners.
After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that
followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their
contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously
fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit.
There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the
subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the
trial court the petition for declaratory relief.
 BERNADETTE S. BILAG, et al. v. ESTELA AY-AY, et al.
G.R. No. 189950, April 24, 2017
Facts
Respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title against petitioners before
the RTC Branch 61. Respondents allege that Iloc Bilag, petitioners’ predecessor-
in-interest, sold to them various portions of a parcel of land located at Sitio Benin,
Baguio City, and had registered the same. Nevertheless, respondents allege that
petitioners refused to acknowledge the sale by asserting their rights over the
subject lands. Petitioners even threatened and harassed respondents. For their part,
petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
among others. To substantiate the same, petitioners argue that the subject lands are
untitled, unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation which
were long classified as lands of the public domain. The RTC Br. 61 ruled in
petitioners’ favor. The CA, however, set aside the dismissal and remanded the case
to the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the CA correctly set aside the dismissal

Ruling
No. A review of the records show that the subject parcel of land forms part
of the Baguio Townsite Reservation. Notably, such parcel of land was awarded to
Iloc Bilag due to the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record
No. 211, as evidenced by a Decision dated promulgated by the then-Court of First
Instance of Baguio City. In a catena of cases, however, it was expressly declared
that all orders and decisions issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet in connection with the proceedings for the reopening of Civil Reservation
Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, covering lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation are null and void and without force and effect. In view of the
foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that the subject lands should be classified as
lands of the public domain as well.

Therefore, since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered public lands,
then petitioners correctly argued that it is the Director of Lands who has the
authority to award their ownership. Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly recognized its
lack of power or authority to hear and resolve respondents' action for quieting of
title.
 ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 91500, October 18, 1990
Facts
On January 19, 1960, Republic Act No. 3001 was enacted granting
petitioner the permit or franchise to construct, maintain and operate radio
broadcasting stations in the Philippines. Petitioner was able to construct, maintain
and operate ten (10) radio broadcasting stations all over the country. On November
11, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 576-A was enacted. Pursuant to Section 6 of the
said Decree, all franchises grants, licenses, permits, certificates, or other forms of
authority to operate radio or television broadcasting systems/stations, including the
franchise or permit of petitioner under Republic Act No. 3001, have been deemed
terminated or revoked. Thus, petitioner is left with only 3 radio stations located in
Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City.

Petitioner alleged that said Decree has caused it great and irreparable
damage, because — (a) it divested petitioner of its franchise without due process of
law and forced it to divest itself of some of its radio stations; (b) it deprived
petitioner of its right to further construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting
stations in other cities or municipalities of the country; (c) it deprived petitioner of
its right to avail of loan facilities or renew its existing loan availments from any
bank or financial institution in order to expand and continue the operation of its
radio broadcasting business; and (d) petitioner suffered loss of income. Hence, this
petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether or not the petition would prosper

Ruling
No. The petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity
of Presidential Decree No. 576-A. As such, it must be treated as one seeking
declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action should be
brought before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme Court. A
petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.

Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to

be annulled. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an application for a license
to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and that
the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under
Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner does not also allege that it had been
penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is,
likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been confiscated or
shut down pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the
constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or
controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights. All that petitioner seeks
is the nullification of Presidential Decree No. 576-A and the reinstatement of its
rights under Republic Act No. 3001.
 VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL v. JOSE J. CAFÉ, et al.
G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005
Facts
Petitioner filed before the RTC of Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory
relief against respondents. He questioned the constitutionality of Municipal
Resolution No. 7 which is an appropriation ordinance for the appropriation of
P765,000 for the construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the
Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, the petition was
amended due to the passage of Resolution No. 49 which appropriates a further
amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the public market.

Prior to the passage of these resolutions, respondent Mayor Café had already
entered into contracts with those who advanced and deposited from their personal
funds the sum of P40,000 each. Some of the parties were close friends/relatives of
public respondents. For these reasons, petitioner alleges that Resolutions Nos. 7
and 49 were discriminatory thus, unconstitutional, for they serve only the interests
of private respondents. The RTC dismissed petitioner’s petition. The dismissal was
affirmed by the CA.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner had the standing to bring the petition for
declaratory relief

Ruling
No. Foremost, the SC noted the CA’s error in holding that petitioner had no
legal standing because he was not part of the contracts entered into by the public
and private respondents. The SC held that this was a taxpayer’s suit who need not
be a party to the contract to challenge its constitutionality. Nevertheless, the SC
still held that petitioner had no legal standing to sue. Petitioner did not seasonably
allege his interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or the
specific injury to him as a result of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions
and contracts. It was only in the "Remark to Comment" he filed in this Court did
he first assert that "he (was) willing to engage in business and (was) interested to
occupy a market stall." Such claim was obviously an afterthought.

But even disregarding petitioner’s lack of standing, the petition would still
nevertheless fail. Petitioner failed to prove the subject ordinances and agreements
to be discriminatory. Considering that he was asking the Court to nullify the acts of
the local political department of Panabo, Davao del Norte, he should have clearly
established that such ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not
notified and who were thus not given the opportunity to make their deposits. His
unsubstantiated allegation that the public was not notified did not suffice.
Furthermore, there was the time-honored presumption of regularity of official duty,
absent any showing to the contrary.
 BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 161140, January 31, 2007
Facts
Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Pasig City,
seeking the suspension of the requirement under Sec. 21 of R.A. 7925 of a public
offering of 30% of the aggregate common stocks of telecommunication entities
with regulated types of services within five years from the effectivity of the Act or
the entity's first start of commercial operations, whichever comes later. Petitioner
claimed that it was impossible for it to make a bona fide public offering at that
time because its financial condition, the Philippine economy, and the stock market
were not conducive for a successful public offering. It also claimed that
impossibility of performance was an implied exception to the abovecited provision
of Rep. Act No. 7925.

The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of action.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

Issue
Whether or not an action for declaratory relief is proper in this case

Ruling
No. For such an action for declaratory relief before a trial court to prosper, it
must be shown that (a) there is a justiciable controversy, (b) the controversy is
between persons whose interests are adverse, (c) the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy, and (d) the issue invoked is ripe for judicial
determination. Respondents contest the presence of the first and last requisites
insofar as petitioner's case is concerned.

A justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete dispute touching on the

legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a
court of law through the application of a law. In the case at bar, petitioner fears the
risk of possible sanctions. However, a mere apprehension of an administrative
sanction does not give rise to a justiciable controversy. Rep. Act No. 7925 does
not provide for a penalty for noncompliance with Section 21. An issue is ripe for
judicial determination when litigation is inevitable, or when administrative
remedies have been exhausted. Petitioner should have first raised its concerns with
the NTC, the agency authorized to implement Rep. Act No. 7925. Only after a
categorical denial of its claim of exemption from or deferment of compliance with
Section 21 can petitioner proceed to court.
 RENATO V. DIAZ and AURORA MA. F. TIMBOL v. THE SECRETARY
OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 193007, July 19, 2011
Facts
Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of the
impending imposition of the value-added tax (VAT) by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue on the collections of tollway operators. Petitioners claim that since the
VAT would result to an increase in toll fees, they have an interest as regular
tollway users in the present action. Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not,
when it enacted the NIRC, intend to include toll fees within the meaning of "sale of
services" that are subject to VAT; and that a toll fee is a "user's tax," not a sale of
services, among others.

The Supreme Court issued a resolution treating the present petition as one
for prohibition. The government has sought reconsideration of the Court's
resolution, however, arguing that petitioners' allegations clearly made out a case
for declaratory relief, an action over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
The government adds, moreover, that the petition does not meet the requirements
of Rule 65 for actions for prohibition since the BIR did not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions when it sought to impose VAT on toll fees.

Issue
Whether or not the Court may treat the petition for declaratory relief as one
for prohibition

Ruling
Yes. There are precedents for treating a petition for declaratory relief as one
for prohibition if the case has far-reaching implications and raises questions that
need to be resolved for the public good. Here, the imposition of VAT on toll fees
has far-reaching implications. Its imposition would impact, not only on the more
than half a million motorists who use the tollways everyday, but more so on the
government's effort to raise revenue for funding various projects and for reducing
budgetary deficits.

To dismiss the petition and resolve the issues later, after the challenged VAT
has been imposed, could cause more mischief both to the tax-paying public and the
government. A belated declaration of nullity of the BIR action would make any
attempt to refund to the motorists what they paid an administrative nightmare with
no solution. Consequently, it is not only the right, but the duty of the Court to take
cognizance of and resolve the issues that the petition raises.

Although the petition does not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule
65, the Court has ample power to waive such technical requirements when the
legal questions to be resolved are of great importance to the public.
 KAREN E. SALVACION, et al. v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997
Facts
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen
Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg
detained Karen for four days and raped her several times. After policemen and
people living nearby rescued Karen, Greg was arrested and detained at the Makati
Municipal Jail. A case for Serious Illegal Detention and four counts of rape
charges were filed against Greg Bartelli. A Civil Case for damages with
preliminary attachment was also filed against him. On the scheduled day of hearing
for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail, thereby causing all
criminal cases filed against him to be archived pending his arrest.

Meanwhile, the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment was granted

for the petitioners and the writ was issued. However, China Banking Corporation
failed to honor Notice of Garnishment served by the Deputy Sheriff of Makati.
China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No.
960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default. After
hearing ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. Petitioners
tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation.
Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioner seek relief from the Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether or not petition should prosper

Ruling
Yes. Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court.
But this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a
petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of
execution. While the Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus,
where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be
resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus. The application of the law
depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if the Court rule that the questioned
Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or an order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Bartelli.

The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 were held to be inapplicable to the
case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents were required to comply
with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 and to release to the
petitioners the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the
judgment.
 DIONISIO MANANQUIL, et al. v. ROBERTO MOICO
G.R. No. 180076, November 21, 2012
Facts
Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-dagatan, Navotas form part of the land previously
expropriated by the NHA and placed under its Tondo Dagat-dagatan Foreshore
Development Project. In October 1984, Lot 18 was awarded to spouses
Illuminardo and Prescilla Mananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell. Lot 19,
on the other hand, was sold to Prescilla by its occupant. Illuminardo and Prescilla
died without issue, but it turned out that Prescilla had a child by a previous
marriage named Eulogio Francisco Maypa. After the spouses’ death, the
Mananquil heirs, herein petitioners, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among
Heirs and adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They
took possession of Lots 18 and 19 and leased them out to third parties.

Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio and
two others, Eulogio Baltazar Maypa and Brenda Luminugue, on the claim that they
are surviving heirs of Iluminardo and Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale, and a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of Roberto Moico (Moico). In May 1997, Moico began evicting the
Mananquil heirs’ tenants and demolishing the structures they built on Lots 18 and
19. Thus, prompting the Mananquils to file an action for quieting of title.

The RTC held in favor of the Mananquils. The CA reversed the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the action for quieting of title would prosper

Ruling
No. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.

From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the petitioners have failed
to show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the
NHA program/project. They failed to present any title, award, grant, document or
certification from the NHA or proper government agency which would show that
Iluminardo and Prescilla have become the registered
owners/beneficiaries/awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified
successors or beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking over
Iluminardo's rights after his death. They did not call to the witness stand competent
witnesses from the NHA who can attest to their rights as successors to or
beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19. They failed to present proof, at the very least, of
the specific law, provisions, or terms that govern the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan
Foreshore Development Project which would indicate a modicum of interest on
their part. For this reason, their rights or interest in the property could not be
established.
 SPOUSES EROSTO SANTIAGO and NELSIE SANTIAGO v. MANCER
VILLAMOR, et al.
G.R. No. 168499, November 26, 2012
Facts
Spouses Villamor, Sr., the parents of respondents, mortgaged their 4.5
hectare coconut land in San Jacinto, Masbate to the Rural Bank of San Jacinto
Masbate (San Jacinto Bank) as security for a P10,000.00 loan. For non-payment of
the loan, the San Jacinto Bank extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage and
obtained a final deed of sale over the property. Thereafter, the San Jacinto Bank
issued a Deed of Sale in favor of Domingo, Sr. After that, the sps. Villamor, Sr.
sold the land to petitioners for P150,000.00.

After respondents and Catalina refused to vacate the land, petitioners filed
the instant complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against
respondents. The RTC declared petitioners the legal and absolute owners of the
land, finding them to be purchasers in good faith. The CA found that petitioners’
action to quiet title could not prosper because petitioners failed to prove their legal
or equitable title to the land.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the RTC decision

Ruling
No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud,
doubt or uncertainty affecting title to real property. The plaintiffs must show not
only that there is a cloud or contrary interest over the subject real property, but that
they have a valid title to it. Worth stressing, in civil cases, the plaintiff must
establish his cause of action by preponderance of evidence; otherwise, his suit will
not prosper. In this case, petitioners failed to prove that they have any legal or
equitable title over the subject land.

First, the execution of the deed of sale is only a prima facie presumption of
delivery. In other words, the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a
prima facie presumption of delivery, which is negated by the failure of the vendee
to take actual possession of the land sold. In this case, no constructive delivery of
the land transpired upon the execution of the deed of sale since it was not the
spouses Villamor, Sr. but the respondents who had actual possession of the land.
The presumption of constructive delivery is inapplicable and must yield to the
reality that the petitioners were not placed in possession and control of the land.

Second, petitioners are not purchasers in good faith. The spouses Villamor,
Sr. were not in possession of the land. The petitioners, as prospective vendees,
carried the burden of investigating the rights of the respondents and respondent
John who were then in actual possession of the land. The petitioners cannot take
refuge behind the allegation that, by custom and tradition in San Jacinto, Masbate,
the children use their parents' property, since they offered no proof supporting their
bare allegation. The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies
upon the party asserting that status and cannot be discharged by reliance on the
legal presumption of good faith. The petitioners failed to discharge this burden.
 PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION v.
MAXIMO BONIFACIO, et al.
G.R. No. 167391, June 8, 2011
Facts
Phil-Ville is the registered owner of parcels of land designated as Lots 1-G-
1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3 of the subdivision plan Psd- 1-13-006209, located in Caloocan
City. Said parcels of land form part of Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917
in the name of Isabel Gil de Sola as the judicial administratrix of the estate of
Gonzalo Tuason and thirty-one (31) others. Phil-Ville acquired the lots by
purchase from N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc. on July 24, 1984.

Earlier, a group, claiming to be the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, a

co-owner to the extent of 1-189/1000% of OCT Nos. 982-985 and 994, filed a
petition with the CFI of Rizal. They prayed for the substitution of their names in
place of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal on OCT No. 994. Thereafter, Eleuteria
Rivera, an alleged heir of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, filed a supplemental
motion for the partition and segregation of the portions of OCT No. 994.
Thereafter, the RTC directed the segregation of portions of Lot 23, 28-A-1, and 28-
A-2 and ordered the RD of Caloocan City to issue Eleuteria Rivera new certificates
of title over them. The RD of Caloocan issued TCT No. C-314537 in favor of
Eleuteria.

Petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against the
surviving heirs of Eleuteria Rivera (herein respondents). The RTC ruled in favor of
petitioner. The trial court held that it was physically impossible for respondents to
be the heirs of Eleuteria Rivera's grandmother, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one
of the registered owners of OCT No. 994, because Maria de la Concepcion was
born sometime in 1903, later than Eleuteria Rivera who was born in 1901. The CA,
however, reversed the RTC and dismissed petitioner’s complaint.

Issue
Whether or not TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera
constitutes a cloud over petitioner’s titles over portions of Lot 23-A of the Maysilo
Estate

Ruling
No. In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites
must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest
in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. As regards the first requisite, petitioner was able to establish its title over
the real properties subject of this action by presenting the Deed of Absolute Sale
by which it acquired the subject property from N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc. as
well as copies of OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and all the derivative titles
leading to the issuance of the TCTs in petitioner’s favor. However, as regards the
second requisite, while it is true that TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria
Rivera is an instrument that appeared to be valid but was subsequently shown to be
invalid, it does not cover the same parcels of land that are described in petitioner's
titles. Foremost, Rivera's title embraces a land measuring 14,391.54 square meters
while petitioner's lands has an aggregate area of only 8,694 square meters.
 TOMATIC ARATUC, et al. v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.
G.R. No. L-49705-09, February 8, 1979
Facts
Over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan (KB) candidates, the
Regional Board of Canvassers of Region XII issued a resolution declaring all the
eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL) candidates elected representatives to the
Batasang Pambansa. The KB candidates appealed the resolution to the Comelec
which consequently issued the now assailed resolution declaring seven KBL
candidates and one KB candidates as having obtain the first eight places, and
ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates.
The Aratuc petition alleged that the Comelec in arriving at its conclusion
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
Mandangan petition, on the other hand, claims that it was error of law for Comelec
to consider spurious and manufactured the returns in voting centers showing that
the votes of the candidates obtaining the highest number of votes exceeded the
highest possible number of valid votes, because the excess was not more than 40%
as was the rule followed in Bashier/Basman (L-33758, February 24, 1972), and
that the Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction and denied due process to petitioner in
extending its inquiry beyond the election records of "the 878 voting centers
examined by the KB experts and passed upon by the Regional Board of
Canvassers" and in excluding from the canvass the returns form voting centers
showing 90% to 100% voting in places where military operations were certified by
the army to be going on, the same being unsupported by evidence.

Issue
Whether or not the Supreme Court can review decisions of the COMELEC
involving grave abuse of discretion

Ruling
Yes. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have de􏰃nite
knowledge of what its means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court". And since instead of
maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be
instead brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", the Supreme Court cannot
insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that
the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial
law. A review includes digging into the merits or unearthing errors of judgment,
while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not
exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. Certiorari implies indifferent
disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent
considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effects
of an error of judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of
policy, there are matters that by their nature ought to be left for final determination
to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the Supreme
Court to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent
arbitrariness.

We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory

provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and decisions of the
Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due
process.
 LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST
CORRUPTION (CIBAC) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
Facts
Two different entities, purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the
COMELEC their Manifestations to participate in the Party-List System of
Representation. The First Manifestation was signed by Pia Derla, purporting to be
the acting secretary general of CIBAC, while the Second Manifestation was
submitted by respondents Chinchona Cruz, and Virginia Jose, as the party’s vice
president and secretary-general, respectively. Both entities also filed their party-list
nominees. Respondents sought to expunge from the records the nomination
submitted by Pia Derla, naming Lokin, Jr., et al. as its party-list nominees. The
COMELEC First Division granted the petition, which was affirmed by the en banc.
Petitioner now argues that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to resolve the case as
the case involved intra-corporate disputes cognizable by special commercial
courts.

On the other hand, the COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the
winning party-list organization has been done and its nominee has assumed office,
any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to
the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the
question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for
quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court

Ruling
Yes. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an
action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is
seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election
protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat
another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the
winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes,
Lokin's case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization
thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization.
Neither does an action forquo warranto lie, considering that the case does not
involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales Gonzales to the Republic
of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the
COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the
COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, 􏰎nal orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the
mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be
􏰎led in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the
Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin's petitions for certiorari
and for mandamus against the COMELEC.
 RUBEN REYNA and LLOYD SORIA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011
Facts
The Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) was engaged in a cattle-
financing program wherein loans were granted to various cooperatives.
Cooperatives who wish to avail of a loan under the program must fill up a Credit
Facility Proposal (CFP) which will be reviewed by the Ipil Branch. One of the
conditions stipulated in the CFP is that prior to the release of the loan, a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the supplier of the cattle, Remad
Livestock Corporation (REMAD), and the cooperative, shall have been signed.
The MOA shall further provide for a buy-back agreement, technology, transfer,
provisions for biologics requirement and technical visits and replacement of sterile,
unproductive stocks.

The Ipil Branch granted six loans to four cooperative borrowers. Three
checks were issued by the Ipil Branch to REMAD to serve as advanced payment
for the cattle. REMAD, however, failed to supply the cattle on the dates agreed
upon.

Petitioners, were made respondents in a Complaint filed by the COA

Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, before the Office of the Ombudsman for
Gross Negligence, Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Interest of the Bank and Giving Unwarranted Benefits to persons,
causing undue injury in violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
petitioners administratively liable

Ruling
No. Petitioners cannot rely on their supposed observance of the procedure
outlined in the Manual on Lending Operations when clearly the same provides that
“payment to the dealer shall be made after presentation of reimbursement
documents (delivery/official receipts/purchase orders) acknowledged by the
authorized LBP representative that the same has been delivered.” Petitioners have
not made a case to dispute the COA's finding that they violated the foregoing
provision. Any presumption, therefore, that public officials are in the regular
performance of their public functions must necessarily fail in the presence of an
explicit rule that was violated.
 ERNESTO B. FRANSISCO, et al. v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, et al.
G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010
Facts
The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Toll Regulatory
Board (TRB), Benpres Holdings Corporation (Benpres), and First Philippine
Holdings Corporation (FPHC) executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
envisaged to open the door for the entry of private capital in the rehabilitation,
expansion, and extension, as flagship projects, of the expressways north of Manila,
overwhich the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) has a
franchise. Consequent to the MOU, PNCC entered into financial and/or technical
JVAs with private entities/investors for the toll operation of its franchised areas
following what may be considered as a standard pattern, viz.: (a) after a JVA is
concluded and the usual government approval of the assignment by PNCC of the
usufruct in the franchise under P.D. 1113, as amended, secured, a new JV company
is specifically formed to undertake a defined toll road project; (b) the Republic of
the Philippines, through the TRB, as grantor, PNCC, as operator, and the new
corporation, as investor/concessionaire, with its lender, as the case may be, then
execute a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement ("STOA") to implement the
TOA previously issued; and (c) once the requisite STOA approval is given, project
prosecution starts and upon the completion of the toll road project or of a divisible
phase thereof, the TRB fixes or approves the initial toll rate after which, it passes a
board resolution prescribing the periodic toll rate adjustment. Petitioners Francisco
and Hizon seek to nullify the various STOAs. To petitioners, the STOAs and the
toll-fixing resolutions violate the Constitution insofar as they impose upon the
public the burden of financing tollways. Petitioners also assail the constitutionality
of Sections 3 (a) and (d) of PD 1112 in relation to Sec. 8 (b) of PD 1894 insofar as
they vested the TRB the power to grant toll operating awards as well as the power
to issue, modify, and alter toll rate charges.
Issue
Whether or not petitioners have standing to do so
Ruling
Yes. In fine, the certiorari petitions impute on then President Ramos and the
TRB, the commission of acts that translate inter alia into usurpation of the
congressional authority to grant franchises and violation of extant statutes. Verily,
when an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. In doing so, the judiciary merely defends the sanctity of its duties
and powers under the Constitution. In any case, the rule on standing is a matter of
procedural technicality, which may be relaxed when the subject in issue or the
legal question to be resolved is of transcendental importance to the public. 30
Hence, even absent any direct injury to the suitor, the Court can relax the
application of legal standing or altogether set it aside for non-traditional plaintiffs,
like ordinary citizens, when the public interest so requires. There is no doubt that
individual petitioners, Marcos, et al., in G.R. No. 169917, as then members of the
House of Representatives, possess the requisite legal standing since they assail acts
of the executive they perceive to injure the institution of Congress. On the other
hand, petitioners Francisco, Hizon, and the other petitioning associations, as
taxpayers and/or mere users of the tollways or representatives of such users, would
ordinarily not be clothed with the requisite standing. While this is so, the Court is
wont to presently relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the
transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the
implementation of the laws on the Luzon tollways, a roadway complex used daily
by hundreds of thousands of motorists
 EDGARDO J. ANGARA v. FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 156822, October 18, 2004
Facts
Respondent filed a complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria and/or Quieting of
Title against petitioner before the RTC, Branch 14, Batangas City. Respondent
alleges that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land, and that sometime in
August 1995, respondent learned that petitioner fenced said parcels of land without
its knowledge and consent. Respondent undertook a relocation survey, in deference
to petitioner who was a Senator of the Republic, but nevertheless still found that
the subject lots fenced and occupied by petitioner are within the parcel of land it
owned.

The RTC opined that the issue boils down to whether the property of
petitioner is within or outside the property of respondent. Thus, the RTC ordered
the constitution of a committee of three surveyors. Thereafter, the RTC issued a
subpoena ad testificandum to the three Geodetic Engineers to testify as regards
their reports. Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion praying that judgement be
rendered on the basis of the commissioners’ report. The RTC denied such Omnibus
Motion. Ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner
sought recourse to the CA who dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed
the Orders of the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. In this case, the assailed orders of the RTC are but resolutions on
incidental matters which do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the
proceedings. They are interlocutory orders since there leaves something else to be
done by the RTC with respect to the merits of the case. Ordinarily, the remedy
against an interlocutory order is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue
with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to
take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. However, where there are special
circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal, the special civil
action of certiorari may exceptionally be allowed. Special circumstances are
absolutely wanting in the present case.

The wisdom or soundness of the RTC's orders involves a matter of judgment

which is not properly reviewable by petition for certiorari, which is intended to
correct defects of jurisdiction solely and not to correct errors of procedure or
matters in the RTC's findings or conclusions. Any error therein amounts only to an
error of judgment. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its
legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion." Errors of
judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are reviewable by
certiorari.

Petitioner failed to demonstrate his claim that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying
petitioner's prayer for rendition of judgment based on the commissioners' report.
The Rules of Court clearly provides that the trial court is not bound by the findings
of the commissioners or precluded from disregarding the same. It may adopt,
modify, reject the report or recommit it with instructions, or require the parties to
present further evidence.
 ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC., et
al. v. HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, et al.
G.R. No. 217872, April 26, 2017
Facts
Subject of this Resolution is the Omnibus Motion filed by respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking partial reconsideration
of the August 24, 2016 Decision of the Supreme Court. In the dispositive portion
of which, the Court directed the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to formulate
rules of procedure in the screening, evaluation, and approval of all contraceptive
drugs and devices that will be used under R.A. 10354, which rules shall contain the
minimum requirements of due process.

Respondents argue that the requirements of due process need not be

complied with because the standards of procedural due process laid down in Ang
Tibay v. CIR were inapplicable considering, among others, that the courts had
jurisdiction nor competence to review the findings of the FDA, on the non-
abortifacient character of contraceptive drugs or devices.

Issue
Whether or not respondents’ contentions are tenable

Ruling
No. On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by
the FDA in the exercise of its "regulatory powers" and, therefore, beyond judicial
review, the Court held that it has the power to review all acts and decisions where
there is a commission of grave abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution
decrees that the Court must exercise its duty to ensure that no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. Such is committed when there is a violation
of the constitutional mandate that "no person is deprived of life, liberty, and
property without due process of law." The Court's power cannot be curtailed by the
FDA's invocation of its regulatory power. When there is grave abuse of discretion,
such as denying a party of his constitutional right to due process, the Court can
come in and exercise its power of judicial review. It can review the challenged
acts, whether exercised by the FDA in its ministerial, quasi-judicial or regulatory
power.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN and JUAN
ROBERTO L. ABLING
G.R. No. 198119, September 27, 2017
Facts
COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona authorized the audit of confidential
agencies, including the Economic Support Fund Secretariat (ESFS). Based on the
special audit conducted, it appeared that ESFS made several cash advances
amounting to P35 Million to private respondent Abling, but only P13 Million was
refunded to the ESFS. After finding that respondent Abling failed to comply with
the demand by COA to liquidate the P22 Million, the Ombudsman found basis to
charge him with the crime of malversation before the Sandiganbayan. Public
respondent Sandiganbayan, however, acquitted respondent Abling.

It noted that the prosecution should have presented direct evidence showing
that private respondent Abling appropriated the amount in question for his personal
use. Absent which, the testimony of private respondent Abling coupled with the
three memoranda, cast reasonable doubt over the latter's guilt of the crime charged.
Thus, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether or not the Supreme Court may take cognizance of the instant
petition

Ruling
Yes. The general rule is that a judgment of acquittal rendered after trial on
the merits shall be immediately final and unappealable because further prosecution
will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the defense of double
jeopardy will not lie in a Rule 65 petition. Unlike in an appeal, this remedy does
not involve a review of facts and law on the merits, an examination of evidence
and a determination of its probative value, or an inquiry on the correctness of the
evaluation of the evidence. Judicial review incertiorari proceedings shall be
confined to the question of whether the judgment for acquittal is per se void on
jurisdictional grounds. The court will look into the decision's validity — if it was
rendered by a court without jurisdiction or if the court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction — not on its legal
correctness. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to
act in contemplation of law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. More specifically, to prove that
an acquittal is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner must show that
the prosecution's right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a
sham.
 MARVIN CRUZ and FRANCISCO CRUZ, in his capacity as bondsman v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 224974, July 3, 2017
Facts
Cruz, along with seven (7) others, was charged with Robbery in an
Uninhabited Place by a Band for unlawfully taking four (4) sacks filled with scraps
of bronze metal and a copper pipe worth P72,000.00 collectively. Cruz posted bail
through a cash bond in the amount of P12,000.00. The private complainant in the
criminal case subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance stating that he was no
longer interested in pursuing his complaint against Cruz On October 23, 2014,
Assistant City Prosecutor Deborah Marie Tan filed a Motion to Dismiss, which
was granted by Branch 170, Regional Trial Court.

Cruz, through his bondsman, Francisco, filed a Motion to Release Cash

Bond. The RTC denied the Motion on the ground that the case was dismissed
through desistance and not through acquittal. Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals arguing that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion to Release Cash Bond. The CA,
however, dismissed the petition. It held that petitioners should have filed an appeal
instead of a petition for certiorari to question the denial of their Motion to Release
Cash Bond.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for
being the wrong remedy to question the denial of the motion to release cash bond

Ruling
Yes. An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation
that the judicial tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as a "capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." In
order to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy, it is necessary to find out whether the
Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion as to warrant the filing of
a petition for certiorari against it.

The provisions of the Rules of Court are clear. Bail shall be deemed
automatically cancelled in three (3) instances: (1) the acquittal of the accused, (2)
the dismissal of the case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction. The
Rules of Court do not limit the cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of the
accused. Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not, as the Office of the
Solicitor General asserts, a mere error of judgment. It constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. When a court or tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule 114,
Section 22 of the Rules of Court, petitioners' remedy was the filing of a petition for
certiorari with the proper court.
 CEFERINA LOPEZ TAN v. SPOUSES APOLINAR P. ANTAZO and
GENOVEVA O. ANTAZO
G.R. No. 187208, February 23, 2011
Facts
Respondent spouses are the registered owners of two parcels of land. They
filed an accion revindicatoria suit with damages against petitioner for encroaching
on their properties. The RTC rendered a decision favoring respondents. Petitioner
then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which the CA dismissed for being
the wrong mode of appeal. While conceding that certiorari is available only if
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, petitioner avers that her case presents an exception to such general
rule because the decision rendered by the trial court is an example of an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority.

Issue
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the petition

Ruling
Yes. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may only issue if the following
requirements are alleged and established by the petition: (1) that the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In this case, only the first requisite is present. Petitioner alleges seven (7)
errors which it alleged to be the particulars of the grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA. Item VII argues that the trial court's judgment is void for lack of
factual and legal bases. This allegation is worthy only if it is read to mean that the
questioned judgment did not state the facts and the law on which it is based, i.e.,
that it violates Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. After perusing the trial court's
decision, the Court found that the assailed decision substantially complied with the
constitutional mandate. While the decision is admittedly brief, it however contains
all factual bases to support its conclusion.

She questioned the trial court's appreciation of her arguments and defenses;
the sufficiency of evidence to prove encroachment; and the existence of a clear title
to the alleged encroached properties in Errors (I), (II), and (III). Errors (IV), (V),
and (VI) pertain to legal questions such as whether there was violation of forum-
shopping; whether the award of attorney's fees is proper; and the validity of the
counterclaims. A petition for the writ of certiorari does not deal with errors of
judgment. Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending
parties' respective evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight. Verily, the
errors ascribed by petitioner are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
Anent the third requisite, a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of
appeal is available to the aggrieved party. In this case, the remedy of appeal under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court was clearly available to petitioner. She however
chose to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. As the Court of Appeals
correctly surmised and pointed out, petitioner availed of the remedy of certiorari to
salvage her lost appeal.
 ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS v. SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, INC. (SODACO), et al.
G.R. No. 198209, March 22, 2017
Facts
Petitioner filed an amended complaint seeking to annul the deed of sale
executed by and among respondents. Petitioner alleged that he had owned and had
occupied the parcel of land involved in this case until he was forcibly dispossessed
by respondent SODACO. Petitioner claimed that Caridad sold the property to
Rolando, a purported dummy of SODACO. During the proceedings, Rolando filed
a Request for Admission. Petitioner, however, failed to file a sworn statement
specifically denying the matters set forth in the request for admission. Thus,
Rolando filed a motion for summary judgement. petitioner opposed such motion
on the ground that he was not personally served a copy of the Request for
Admission. Moreover, he averred that the same was fatally defective for failure to
comply with Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearings.

The RTC then concluded that by petitioner's failure to respond to the

Request for Admission, he was deemed to have admitted or impliedly admitted the
matters specified therein. In particular, petitioner is deemed to have admitted the
fact that the property in question had been validly sold to Rolando thereby
rendering the complaint without any cause of action. After his motion for
reconsideration was denied by the RTC, petitioner sought recourse before the
Supreme Court through the instant Petition for Review.

Issue
Whether or not the Court may entertain such

Ruling
No. The instant Petition denominated as a petition for review, wrongfully
alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. A petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is glaringly different from a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. "A petition for review under
Rule 45 of the x x x Rules of Court is generally limited only to questions of law or
errors of judgment. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may
be availed of to correct errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Here, petitioner
ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the RTC claiming that contrary to the lower
court's ruling, he could not have received the motion on March 24, 2010 (as stated
in the postmaster's certification) given that the motion was filed only on June 26,
2010. It must be stressed that only questions of law may be properly raised in a
petition for review. Whether or not petitioner received a copy of the motion on
March 24, 2010 is a factual issue and such is not within the ambit of a petition for
review.

Moreover, petitioner raises the following as issues: (1) whether after the
filing of the motion for summary judgement and denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, the trial court could dismiss petitioner’s complaint motu proprio
for petitioner’s failure to file his objections to request for admission which was
only furnished to his counsel; and (2) whether or not the trial court could interpret
that for his failure to file his objections, he is deemed to have impliedly admitted
the matters in the request. Addressing these issues would require the Court to
examine the veracity of petitioner’s claim that the Request for Admission was
unserved. Such goes beyond the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on
certiorari.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
et al.
G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003
Facts
On November 18, 1996, petitioner received a copy of the assailed Court of
Appeals' decision which ruled that Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) and
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) were trustees of the investments of the
private respondents and not merely custodians thereof, hence, IBAA and LBP had
legal title over the property covered by the said investments and that the Regional
Trial Court had jurisdiction over the petitions of the private respondents.
Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but on April 18, 1977,
they received a copy of the questioned resolution denying the said motion. On June
17, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. But private
respondents moved for the dismissal of this petition by claiming that the proper
remedy of petitioner should be an appeal to be filed within 15 days from receipt of
the resolution denying its motion for reconsideration.

Issue
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed

Ruling
Yes. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of
jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or
agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the said Rules.
 RUBEN C. MAGTOTO and ARTEMIA MAGTOTO v. COURT OF
APPEALS and LEONILA DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 175792, November 21, 2012
Facts
Leonila filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance against
petitioners Sps. Magtoto. Leonila alleged that she sold her three parcels of land in
Mabalacat, Pampanga to petitioner Ruben C. Magtoto and as payment therefor,
Ruben issued several postdated checks. Leonila delivered the TCTs of the subject
properties to Sps. Magtoto. However, most of the checks delivered by Ruben were
dishonored, and despite Leonila’s repeated demands, Sps. Magtoto failed to pay
the remaining balance.

Sps. Magtoto were served with summons requiring them to file an Answer
within 15 days from notice. The Spouses, however, moved thrice for extensions of
time to file such Answer. The RTC granted a final extension until August 2, 2003
within which to file their Answer. On August 4, 2003, or two days after the last
day for the filing of their Answer, Sps. Magtoto filed a motion to dismiss. The
RTC denied such motion. Thereafter, Leonila filed a motion to declare Sps.
Magtoto in default. The RTC subsequently granted the same, and rendered
judgement in favor of Leonila. Sps. Magtoto filed an appeal with the CA, which
was denied by the latter for lack of merit. The Sps. Magtoto are now before the
Supreme Court by way of this petition for certiorari.

Issue
Whether or not Sps. Magtoto availed of the correct remedy

Ruling
No. Petitioners' resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is inappropriate. Petitioners' remedy from the adverse Decision of the CA
lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. As such, this petition
should have been dismissed outright for being a wrong mode of appeal. Even if the
petition is to be treated as filed under Rule 45, the same must still be denied for
late filing and there being no reversible error on the part of the CA. Records show
that petitioners received a copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for
Reconsideration on October 30, 2006. They therefore had 15 days or until
November 14, 2006 within which to file their Petition for Review on Certiorari
before this Court. However, they filed their Petition for Certiorari on December 29,
2006, after the period to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 had
expired. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was resorted to as a
substitute for a lost appeal which is not allowed.
 MAHARLIKA A. CUEVAS v. ATTY. MYRNA V. MACATANGAY, in her
capacity as Director IV of the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, et al.
G.R. No. 208506, February 22, 2017
Facts
Petitioner was one of the employees of the National Museum who vied for
the position of Director III. Petitioner was appointed by the Chairman of the
National Museum Board of Trustees, Antonio O. Cojuangco, on a permanent
status. Elenita D.V. Alba, another applicant for the same position, appealed the
dismissal of her protest contesting petitioner’s earlier appointment on a temporary
capacity to the CSC insisting that she is more qualified for the position. The CSC
issued Resolution No. 10-1438 finding no merit on Alba’s claim. Nevertheless, the
CSC found that petitioner’s appointment was not in accordance with R.A. 8492 or
the National Museum Act which requires the Board of Trustees to appoint the
Assistant Director or Director III, and not the Chairman.

Director Jeremy Barns wrote the CSC asking for a clarification of the
October 14, 2010 letter of the latter invalidating petitioner’s appointment. The CSC
replied in a letter dated June 27, 2011 declaring that its earlier Resolution is final
and executory because the proper party, the appointing authority or the appointee,
the petitioner, failed to appeal the Resolution. Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the June 27, 2011 letter, which was denied by the CSC in a letter
dated September 26, 2011. Petitioner then elevated the case to the CA through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CSC
gravely abused its discretion when it issued its June 27, 2011 and September 26,
2011 letters. The CA dismissed the petition and held that petitioner should have
sought reconsideration of the CSC Resolution No. 10-10438, and not the
aforementioned letters.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA in finding that petitioner should
have sought reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 10-1438 which invalidated his
appointment and which was communicated to the National Museum, copy
furnished the petitioner, on October 14, 2010; and an appeal should have been filed
instead of a letter seeking clarification and reconsideration as was done by Director
Barns on October 21, 2010. Thus, this is a classic case of resorting to the filing of a
petition for certiorari when the remedy of an ordinary appeal can no longer be
availed of. Jurisprudence is replete with the pronouncement that where appeal is
available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action of certiorari will not be
entertained — remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on
the merits, final order or resolution is appeal.

Clearly, petitioner should have moved for the reconsideration of CSC

Resolution No. 10-1438 containing the Commission's resolution as to the invalidity
of his appointment and, thereafter, should have filed an appeal. Sadly, failing to do
so, petitioner utilized the special civil action of certiorari. And to make matters
worse, petitioner questioned, not the proper resolution of the CSC, but the mere
letter- responses of the same Commission.
 FESTO R. GALANG, JR. v. HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO, et al.
G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011
Facts
Private respondent, a rival mayoralty candidate of petitioner in the
Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon, filed an election protest against
petitioner before the RTC. The following day, the sheriff went to petitioner’s
residence to serve summons. The Sheriff’s Return states that he was able to serve
summons by leaving the same with one Gerry Rojas. Petitioner thereafter filed his
Motion to Admit Answer with the attached Answer on June 11, 2010. The trial
court then issued the assailed order, finding the service of summons valid and
declaring the Answer filed on June 11, 2010 as filed out of time.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to: (1) Restore Protestee's Standing in

Court; (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated June 24, 2010; and (3)
Suspend Proceedings Pending Resolution of Falsification Case Before the Law
Department of the COMELEC. The trial court, however, issued the second assailed
Order denying the Omnibus Motion. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65, alleging that respondent judge acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in considering as valid, the Sheriff's Service of Summons on May
28, 2010 on a person not residing in petitioner's residence.

Issue
Whether or not the Supreme Court may take cognizance of the present
petition

Ruling
No. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a
regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction," the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et
al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body,
then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an

appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving
elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred
in invoking this Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ.
 WILLIAM R. WENCESLAO, et al. v. MAKATI DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, et al.
G.R. No. 230696, August 30, 2017
Facts
The case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by petitioners
against private respondent Makati Development Corporation before the Labor
Arbiter. Petitioners claimed that they were regular employees of MDC and were
illegally dismissed for refusing to apply and be transferred to another contractor,
Asiapro Multi-purpose Cooperative. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. The NLRC Fourth Division affirmed the LA decision in toto. The petitioners
filed before the CA a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC for issuing the
order affirming the LA. The CA dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioners
to attach the pertinent records of the case.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The CA was justified in initially dismissing the petition based on the
petitioners' failure to attach to the petition the certified true copies of the assailed
decision and resolution of the NLRC, as well as other portions of the records of the
case. As noted by the CA, only photocopies, not the certified true copies, of the
NLRC decision and resolution complained of were attached; neither were the
pleadings and other papers filed before the labor arbiter and the NLRC appended.
Absent such required documents, the CA correctly opined that it would have no
basis to determine whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding the
petitioners as project employees and that their termination was not illegal.
 SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION v. THE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, et al.
G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017
Facts
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with application for TRO and/or
WPI with the CA seeking to declare as unconstitutional (a) Section 4 (a) of R.A.
No. 9257, and (b) Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 and Section 5.1 of its IRR, insofar
as these provisions only allow tax deduction on the gross income based on the net
cost of goods sold or services rendered as compensation to private establishments
for the 20% discount that they are required to grant to senior citizens and PWDs.

The CA dismissed the petition ruling, among others, that the petitioner
resorted to the wrong remedy as a petition for prohibition will not lie to restrain the
actions of the respondents for the simple reason that they do not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial duties relative to the issuance or implementation of the
questioned provisions. The CA noted that the action, although denominated as one
for prohibition, seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 4 (a) of
R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442. It held that in such a case, the
proper remedy is not a special civil action but a petition for declaratory relief,
which falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in the first
instance, and of the Supreme Court, on appeal.

Issue
Whether or not prohibition may be resorted to in the instant case

Ruling
Yes. Generally, the office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being
no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. It is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons
from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been
vested by law. Prohibition was also recognized as a proper remedy to prohibit or
nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority.
And, in a number of jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action to
assail the constitutionality of a law or prohibit its implementation.

In the same manner, the supposed violation of the principle of the hierarchy
of courts does not pose any hindrance to the full deliberation of the issues at hand.
It is well to remember that "the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.
Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and
important reasons, such as when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice. Thus, when based on
the good judgment of the court, the urgency and significance of the issues
presented calls for its intervention, it should not hesitate to exercise its duty to
resolve. The instant petition presents an exception to the principle as it basically
raises a legal question on the constitutionality of the mandatory discount and the
breadth of its rightful beneficiaries. More importantly, the resolution of the issues
will redound to the benefit of the public as it will put to rest the questions on the
propriety of the granting of discounts to senior citizens and PWDs amid the fervent
insistence of affected establishments that the measure transgresses their property
rights. The Court, therefore, finds it to the best interest of justice that the instant
petition be resolved.
 EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA v. HON. MARIANO M.
MALONES, both in his private and official capacity as Mayor of the
Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo
G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009
Facts
Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market. Herein respondent
approved Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 which contained a provision on
increased rentals and the imposition of “goodwill fees” in the amount of P20,000
payable every month. Petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus against
respondent, seeking to enjoin the latter from implementing the aforementioned
Municipal Ordinance. Petitioners alleged that they were bona fide occupants of the
stalls at the municipal public market, who had been religiously paying the monthly
rentals for the stalls they occupied. Petitioners argued that Municipal Ordinance
No. 98-01 was invalid on the ground that the conferences held on August 11, 1998
and January 22, 1999 could not be considered public hearings.

The RTC dismissed the petition. It held that petitioners could not avail
themselves of the remedies of prohibition/mandamus. It reasoned that mandamus
will not lie because petitioners failed to show a clear legal right to use the market
stalls without paying the goodwill fees imposed by the municipal government. It
also reasoned that prohibition would not apply where respondent’s acts sought to
be enjoined did not involve the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The
CA again ruled in respondent’s favor, holding that respondent’s acts in question
did not involve the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.

Issue
Whether or not prohibition is proper

Ruling
Yes. The Court first clarified that the intent of petitioners in this case was
really to file a petition for prohibition as they sought to enjoin respondent from
implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, which is not the office of
mandamus which is to compel performance. For a writ of prohibition, the
requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a "tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi- judicial or ministerial
functions"; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." The exercise of judicial function consists of the power to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate
upon the rights of the parties.

The term quasi-judicial function applies to the action and discretion of

public administrative officers or bodies that are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as
a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. In
implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, respondent is not called upon to
adjudicate the rights of contending parties or to exercise, in any manner, discretion
of a judicial nature.

A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the

context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the
exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. The Court thus held that respondent herein is performing a ministerial
function.
 RODOLFO LAYGO and WILLIE LAYGO v. MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF
SOLANO, NUEVA VIZCAYA
G.R. No. 188448, January 1, 2017
Facts
Aniza Bandrang sent two letter-complaints to the Municipal Mayor as well
as the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing them of the
illegal sublease she entered into with petitioners over public market stalls which
petitioners leased from the municipal government. Bandrang claimed that
petitioners demanded her to vacate the stalls which they subsequently subleased to
others. The Sangguniang Bayan endorsed the letter to the Mayor, along with
Resolution No. 183-2004 which authorized the Mayor to enforce the provision
against subleasing of stalls in the public market. Bandrang wrote another letter to
the Sangguniang Bayan due to the Mayor’s inaction. The Sanggunian once again
referred the letter to the Mayor who, once more, did not act on the letter.

This compelled Bandrang to file a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya against the Mayor and the Sanggunian alleging that
despite already being aware of the violations of the lease contracts of petitioners
with the municipality, the Mayor still failed to enforce the provisions of the lease
contracts against subleasing. Bandrang concluded that the Mayor’s inaction could
be labelled as unlawful neglect in the performance and enforcement of his public
duty. The RTC granted the petition, which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue
Whether or not mandamus is proper

Ruling
No. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction,
in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal,
or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the
party to whole the writ is directed or from operation of law. Thus, mandamus, as a
rule, will not lie to compel the performance of duties that are discretionary in
nature.

In this case, the petition sought an order to direct the Mayor to cancel the
lease contract of petitioners with the Municipal Government and to lease the
vacated market stalls to interested persons. As settled in the early case of Aprueba
v. Ganzon, the privilege of operating a market stall under license is always subject
to the police power of the city government and may be refused or granted for
reasons of public policy and sound public administration. Being a delegated police
power falling under the general welfare clause of Section 16 of the Local
Government Code, the grant or revocation of the privilege is, therefore,
discretionary in nature.
 DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN, JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, et al.
G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013
Facts
Petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima to
include Kenny Dalandag, who was admitted to the Witness Protection Program, on
account of the latter’s sworn declarations admitting his participation in the
infamous Maguindanao massacre which was the basis of the panel of prosecutors
in charging 196 individuals with multiple murder. Secretary De Lima denied the
request. Thus, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus before the RTC Manila
seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the
various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.

Issue
Whether mandamus is proper

Ruling
Yes. Mandamusshall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act
against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or
officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus
may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the
particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal
of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the

letter- request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e.,
to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of
Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as
petitioner's recourse.
 SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO and OFELIA R. DACUDAO v.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013
Facts
Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and
his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded through the
Legacy Group’s “buy back agreement.” After their written demands for the return
of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for
syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.

Thereafter, on March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued DO No. 182
directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to
the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
Petitioners come directly before the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave
abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182, claiming that the same violated their
right to due process, their right to equal protection of the laws, and their right to
speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 is an obstruction of
justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.

Issue
Whether or not the petition for mandamus is proper

Ruling
No. Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by
coming directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason
to justify the direct filing of the petition. Secondly, even assuming arguendo that
petitioners' direct resort to the Court was permissible, the petition must still be
dismissed. The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a special civil action forcertiorari to
prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.

Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start
with, they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of
Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the
Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial
functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his
subordinates' efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The function involved
was purely executive or administrative.
 SPECIAL PEOPLE INC. FOUNDATION v. NESTOR M. CANDA, et al.
G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013
Facts
Petitioner was a proponent of a water-source development and utilization
project in Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water
from the Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of
Loboc and six other municipalities. Petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-
Coverage with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR
Region 7, seeking to be exempt from the requirement of an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Sec. 4 of PD 1586. Upon evaluating the
nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project, Bohol EMB
Chief Nestor Canda found that the project is located within a critical area; hence,
Environmental Examination is required.

Petitioner appealed Canda’s findings to Regional Director Bienvenido

Lipayon (RD Lipayon) who notified petitioner that its documents substantially
complied with the procedural aspects of EMB review, and assigned a control
number to its application. RD Lipayon then required petitioner to submit several
documents in order to enable the EMB to determine whether the project was within
a critical area or not. Despite petitioner’s compliance, RD Lipayon still declared
that the project was within an environmentally critical area, and that the petitioner
was not entitled to the CNC. Thus, prompting petitioner to file a petition for
mandamus before the RTC of Bohol which was eventually dismissed. Thus, the
present recourse before the SC via petition for review on certiorari.

Issue
Whether or not mandamus was proper

Ruling
No. First, petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies,
and because it failed to show that it was legally entitled to demand the performance
of the act by the respondents. Accordingly, petitioner should have appealed the
EMB Regional Director’s decision to the EMB Director who exercises supervision
and control over the former. Second, petitioner did not establish that the grant of its
application for the CNC was a purely ministerial in nature on the part of RD
Lipayon. Hence, mandamus was not a proper remedy. the grant or denial of an
application for ECC/CNC is not an act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one
that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by the EMB Director or
Regional Director, who must determine whether the project or project area is
classified as critical to the environment based on the documents to be submitted by
the applicant.

The petitioner maintains that RD Lipayon already exercised his discretion in

its case when he made his finding that the application substantially complied with
the procedural requirements for review. As such, he was then obliged to issue the
CNC once the petitioner had submitted the required certifications. The petitioner
errs on two grounds. Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion
with regard to the CNC application when he made his finding. It is clear that his
finding referred to the "procedural requirements for review" only. He had still to
decide on the substantive aspect of the application. Secondly, there is no sufficient
showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the requirement to submit
the needed certifications.
 KNIGHTS OF RIZAL v. DMCI HOMES, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017
Facts
The Knights of Rizal filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary
restraining order, and later a permanent injunction against the construction of
DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila project. The KOR argues that the completed project
will “stick out like a sore thumb, dwarfing all surrounding buildings within a
radius of two kilometer/s” and “forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal monument in
Luneta Park: Torre de Manila would loom at the back and overshadow the entire
monument, whether up close or viewed from a distance. In a Resolution dated
November 25, 2014, the Court resolved to treat the present petition as one for
mandamus.

Issue
Whether the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the
City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila project

Ruling
No. The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when
there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be
compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear
legal right to the performance of such act. In the present case, nowhere is it found
in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the
construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is
within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no
legal duty on the part of the City of Manila "to consider," in the words of the
Dissenting Opinion, "the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119" in relation to
the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance
these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. While
the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de
Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is "not part of the Rizal
Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site in 1995," and the Torre de
Manila area is in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal Park, according to NHCP
Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno. Neither has the area of the Torre de
Manila been designated as a "heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical
landmark or even a national treasure."
 VANGIE BARRAZONA v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 61,
BAGUIO CITY, et al.
G.R. No. 154282, April 7, 2006
Facts
Petitioner has been leasing portions of the building owned by San-an Realty
and Development Corporation, herein respondent, located in Baguio City.
Petitioner started defaulting in paying the rentals despite demands from
respondent, compelling the latter to file with RTC Branch 61 of Baguio City a
complaint for collection of sum of money with damages. Petitioner moved to
dismiss on the ground that the RTC is without jurisdiction over respondent’s
complaint as it is, in reality, a complaint for ejectment (illegal detainer) which is
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. The RTC denied the motion for lack
of merit.

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court alleging
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in denying her motion to dismiss. Respondent, in praying for the dismissal of the
present petition, insists, among others, that petitioner should have first filed a
motion for reconsideration before resorting to the extraordinary suit of certiorari.

Issue
Whether or not respondent’s contention is tenable

Ruling
No. While the rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must
first file a motion for reconsideration with the lower court of the act or order
complained of, however, such rule is not without exception. We have, in several
instances, dispensed with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a lower
court's ruling, such as: where the proceedings in which the error occurred is a
patent nullity; where the question is purely of law; when public interest is
involved; where judicial intervention is urgent or its application may cause great
and irreparable damage; and where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, as in this
case.
 BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG v. SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC.
G.R. No. 162575, December 15, 2010
Facts: Respondent entered into a Distributorship Agreement with petitioner and
Able Transport. Respondent, as seller, will sell, deliver, or procure to be delivered
petroleum products, and petitioner, as distributor, will purchase, receive, and pay
for its purchases from respondent. Sec. 6.3 of the Distributorship Agreement
provides that petitioner may be required to put up securities, real or personal, or to
furnish respondent performance bonds chosen by the latter. Thus, petitioner
applied for and was granted a credit line by the UCPB, IEBank, SBC, and AUB.
Petitioner allegedly failed to pay her obligations despite demand thus, respondent
tried to withdraw from these bank undertakings. Petitioner then filed with the RTC
separate petitions against the banks for declaration of nullity of the bank
undertakings, with application for the issuance of a TRO and WPI. Petitioner asked
for the annulment on the ground that the prevailing market rate at the time of
respondent’s intended drawing with which petitioner will be charged of as interests
and penalties is oppressive. The RTC granted the WPI enjoining the banks from
releasing any funds to respondent. Respondent filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari with prayer for issuance of a TRO and WPI against respondent Judge
Pizarro and petitioner. The CA granted the petition and ruled that respondent’s
non-filing of an MR before the certiorari petition is excused by jurisprudence as
when a definite question has been properly raised, argued and submitted in the
RTC and the latter had decided the question, a motion for reconsideration is no
longer necessary before filing a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling: No. Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. The rule is,
however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is
a patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is
one purely of law or where public interest is involved. Respondent explained their
omission of filing a motion for reconsideration before resorting to a petition for
certiorari based on exceptions (b), (c) and (i). The CA brushed aside the filing of
the motion for reconsideration based on the ground that the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court. We agree.
Respondent had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the
injunction prayed for by petitioner should not be granted. However, the RTC
granted the injunction. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and
presented the same arguments which were already passed upon by the RTC. The
RTC already had the opportunity to consider and rule on the question of the
propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the injunction.
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et
al.
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011
Facts
Private respondents filed a complaint with the RTC Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and Sen. Tamano for
being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May
31, 1958, under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993. Instead of submitting an Answer, Estrellita filed a
motion to dismiss where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both
Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites. Estrellita argued that the RTC
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari'a courts.

The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over
the case. Estrellita filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court which
was referred by the latter to the CA and was docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 39656.
During the pendency of this case, the RTC continued to try the declaration of
nullity case. Eventually, the CA rendered a decision adverse to Estrellita. The
Supreme Court also upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction. After numerous postponements
from Estrellita, the RTC ruled that Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano is void
ab initio.

Estrellita filed an appeal to the CA arguing that the RTC should have waited
for the finality of the Supreme Court decision in her motion to dismiss. The CA,
nevertheless ruled that Estrellita was given several opportunities to answer but
ignored the same by asking for numerous postponements.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s judgement even though
it was premature for the judgement was rendered without waiting for the Supreme
Court’s final resolution of her motion to dismiss

Ruling
No. The CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does
not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is
an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted
in the rendition of the judgment complained of." Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal
case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we

never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal
action. With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained
obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when it was her
turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R.
No. 126603.
 SPS. NICASIO C. MARQUEZ and ANITA J. MARQUEZ v. SPOUSES
CLARITO ALINDOG and CARMEN ALINDOG
G.R. No. 184045, January 22, 2014
Facts
Petitioner Anita Marquez extended a loan to Gutierrez. As security therefor,
Gutierrez executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in Tagaytay City
registered under the name of Benjamin A. Gutierrez. Since Gutierrez defaulted in
paying his obligations, Anita sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject
property. Upon Gutierrez’ failure to redeem the property, title was consolidated
under TCT No. 41939 which bore the annotation of an adverse claim in the names
of respondents-spouses Alindog. Subsequently, respondents filed an action for
annulment of REM and certificate of sale with damages against Sps. Marquez and
a certain Gonzales. Meanwhile, Anita filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession before the RTC.

The RTC granted the same, and issued a writ of possession in her favor.
Claiming that they would suffer grave and irreparable injury if the implementation
of the writ of possession was left unrestrained, respondents sought the issuance of
a WPI before the RTC in a separate case. The RTC issued a WPI. The CA held that
the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the WPI.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC when it issued the injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez
from taking possession of the subject property

Ruling
Yes. Jurisprudence is clear on the matter: without the exception under
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules availing, the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser of an extra-judicially foreclosed property — such as Sps.
Marquez in this case — should come as a matter of course, and, in such regard,
constitutes only a ministerial duty on the part of the court. Here, while the RTC
had initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it defied existing
jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting
Sps. Alindog's prayer for injunctive relief. The RTC's finding anent the initial
evidence adduced by Sps. Alindog constitutes improper basis to justify the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in their favor since, in the first place,
it had no authority to exercise any discretion in this respect.

Besides, it was improper for the RTC to have issued a writ of preliminary
injunction since the act sought to be enjoined, i.e., the implementation of the writ
of possession, had already been accomplished in the interim and thus, rendered the
matter moot. Case law instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought
to be enjoined had already become fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or
consummated act).
 RALPH P. TUA v. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, et al.
G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014
Facts
Respondent filed a verified petition for herself and in behalf of her minor
children for the issuance of a protection order pursuant to RA 9262 or the Anti-
VAWC, against her husband, herein petitioner Ralph Tua. Respondent claimed that
there was a time when petitioner went to her room and cocked his gun and pointed
the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to proceed with
the legal separation case she filed; there was also an instance when petitioner fed
her children with the fried chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and spat
out; in order to stop his child from crying, petitioner would threaten him with a
belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with the latter's
presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he wanted or she
would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious and threatened her of
withholding his financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to
lie flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with
companions went to her new home and forcibly took the children and refused to
give them back to her.

On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a temporary protection order (TPO).
petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction and hold departure order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the
RTC. The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly issued by the
RTC and found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof as the same
were in complete accord with the provision of RA 9262.

Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23, 2005 as the petition
was bereft of any indication of grounds for the issuance of the same. Petitioner
claims that while the issuance of the TPO is ex parte, there must be a judicial
determination of the basis thereof.

Issue
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion in this case

Ruling
No. The alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he cocked the gun and
pointed the same to his head in order to convince respondent not to proceed with
the legal separation case; feeding his other children with the food which another
child spat out; and threatening the crying child with a belt to stop him from crying
which was repeatedly done; and holding respondent by her nape when he got
furious that she was asking him not to come often to their conjugal home and hold
office thereat after their agreed separation and threatening her of withholding half
of the financial support for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the
issuance of a TPO. It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when
there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The CA did not
err when it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in the
issuance of the TPO.
 ADTEL, INC. v. MARIJOY A. VALDEZ
G.R. No. 189942, August 9, 2017
Facts
Adtel hired respondent to work as an accountant for the company.
Thereafter, respondent was promoted as the company’s purchasing and logistics
supervisor. Adtel then entered into a dealership agreement with respondent’s
husband, Mr. Valdez. Thereafter, things got sour between Mr. Valdez and Adtel,
especially when Mr. Valdez filed a civil case for specific performance and
damages against Adtel, as well as a criminal case for libel against Adtel’s
chairman, president, and officers. Not long thereafter, Adtel terminated respondent
from employment, prompting the latter to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with
the Labor Arbiter. The LA dismissed respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA.

Adtel filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC on
24 December 2008. Adtel received the NLRC Resolution on 5 February 2009. On
7 April 2009, the last day for filing its petition for certiorari with the CA, Adtel
filed a motion for extension of time with the CA. On 22 April 2009, fifteen (15)
days after the last day for filing or the 75th day, Adtel filed its petition for
certiorari with the CA. The CA denied Adtel’s petition for certiorari for being filed
out of time.

Issue
Whether the CA erred

Ruling
No. Petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from the
notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the rule is that in filing petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, a
motion for extension is a prohibited pleading. However in exceptional or
meritorious cases, the Court may grant an extension anchored on special or
compelling reasons.

In Adtel’s motion for extension filed with the CA, it alleged that “due to the
undersigned counsel's heavy volume of work, petitioner is constrained to request
for an additional period of fifteen (15) days from today or up to 22 April 2009
within which to file the Petition for Certiorari.”

This Court held that the circumstance of heavy workload alone, absent a
compelling or special reason, is not a sufficient justification to allow an extension
of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari. Accordingly, in the absence of
a more compelling reason cited in the motion for extension of time other than the
"undersigned counsel's heavy volume of work," the CA did not commit a
reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
 DENNIS M. CONCEJERO v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 223262, September 11, 2017
Facts
Petitioner Dennis Concejero was the Assistant Vice President and Head of
the Branch Operations Review Department (BORD) of PNB. In a memorandum
dated January 24, 2013, PNB charged petitioner with several acts constituting
abuse of authority, concealment of knowledge of commission of fraud, deceit or
other forms of irregularity, willful breach of trust resulting in loss of confidence
and gross misconduct. Not long thereafter, PNB found him guilty of willful breach
of trust resulting in loss of confidence and he was meted the penalty of dismissal.
Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, among others, against PNB.

The LA ruled that petitioner’s dismissal was for a just and valid cause and
that he was afforded due process. Thus, dismissed the complaint. The NLRC
affirmed the ruling of the LA. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied
by the NLRC. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution on September 23, 2014.
On October 8, 2014, or 21 days after receipt of the NLRC resolution, petitioner
filed with the CA a motion for extension of time to file his petition for certiorari.
On November 3, 2014, the CA promulgated a resolution dismissing the case.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 2014, counsel for petitioner filed a manifestation

and motion stating that in filing the motion for extension of time, he overlooked
Sec. 4 of Rule 65 which provides a period of 60 days to file a petition for
certiorari. Hence, his last day to file is on November 22, 2014. On November 24,
2014, petitioner filed his petition for certiorari because November 22 was a
Saturday. The CA dismissed the case.

Issue
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA

Ruling
Yes. Petitioner had 60 days to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Since petitioner received the NLRC Resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration on September 23, 2014, he had until November 22, 2014 (the 60th
day) within which to file his petition. However, November 22, 2014 fell on a
Saturday; hence, petitioner had until the next working day or until November 24,
2014 (Monday) to file the petition under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case on
November 3, 2014 before the 60-day period to file the petition for certiorari
expired. Even if petitioner, who sought an extension of 15 days, or until October
23, 2014 to file the petition for certiorari, failed to file the petition on October 23,
2014, the case, however, was not yet dismissible because petitioner was entitled to
a 60-day period within which to file the petition and had until November 24, 2014
to file it. The records show that petitioner timely filed his petition on November
24, 2014.
 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON, and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, Jr. v. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.
G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Facts
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe or Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ
represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Victorino F.
Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, filed a petition docketed as SPA No. 04-
003 before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course to or cancel
his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born citizen when in truth
and in fact, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother was
American, and his father was a Spanish national. Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R.
No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it.
The Constitutional provision reads: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

Issue
Whether or not the petition should prosper

Ruling
No. Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view,
i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. The rules categorically speak of
the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest
can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of
votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election
scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by

Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly
brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency
or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
 SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA v. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING
SYSTEM, INC. and PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING SERVICE, INC.
G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009
Facts
Respondents are the grantees of a legislative franchise by virtue of R.A. Nos.
7477 and 7582. Sec. 9 of R.A. 7477 and Sec. 3 of R.A. 7582 contains a common
provision which mandates respondents to “democratize ownership of public
utilities” by making a public offering of 30% of their stocks. Petitioner, alleging
that he was the actual and beneficial owner of 12% of the shares of stock of
respondents, filed two complaints before the NTC. Petitioner essentially alleges
that despite the provisions in R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582 mandating the
public offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of PBS and CBS, both
entities had failed to make such offering. Thus, he argued that the failure on the
part of PBS and CBS "to comply with the mandate of their legislative franchise is a
misuse of the franchise conferred upon it by law and it continues to exercise its
franchise in contravention of the law to the detriment of the general public and of
complainant who are unable to enjoy the benefits being offered by a publicly listed
company. He thus prayed for the provisional authorities or CPCs of respondents on
account of the violation of their respective legislative franchises.

The NTC issued a consolidated decision dismissing both complaints. The

NTC ruled that it was not competent to render a ruling on that issue, the same
being more properly the subject of an action for quo warranto to be commenced by
the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the NTC.

Issue
Whether quo warranto is proper in the case at bar

Ruling
Yes. The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by which
the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a
public office or exercises a public franchise. It is settled that "[t]he determination
of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the
prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the
State 'upon complaint or otherwise', the reason being that the abuse of a franchise
is a public wrong and not a private injury."

The issuance of licenses by the NTC implements the legislative franchises

established by Congress, in the same manner that the executive branch implements
the laws of Congress rather than creates its own laws. And similar to the inability
of the executive branch to prevent the implementation of laws by Congress, the
NTC cannot, without clear and proper delegation by Congress, prevent the exercise
of a legislative franchise by withholding or canceling the licenses of the franchisee.

And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly
complements the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis.
The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the
final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law. The question of whether a
franchisee is in breach of the franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one
inherently suited to a court of law, and not for an administrative agency, much less
one to which no such function has been delegated by Congress.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR
GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
Facts
The Republic, through the OSG, claimed that an action for a quo warranto
proceeding is a proper remedy to question respondent’s appointment for the latter’s
transgressions were discovered during the House Committee hearings on the
impeachment complaint filed against her. Alternatively, the Republic claims that it
has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto proceeding under the maxim
nullum tempus occurit legi. The Republic posited that respondent must be ousted
from position for she failed to show that she is a person of proven integrity, an
indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary as provided by the
Constitution because she failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing her
complete SALN, notwithstanding the latter’s ostensible nomination of respondent.
In sum, since respondent is unqualified for the position for her lack of proven
integrity, she has no right to hold office and may be ousted via quo warranto.

Respondent contends that a sitting Chief Justice may only be ousted by

impeachment. Respondent avers that the phrase “may be removed from office” in
Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not signify that members of the
Supreme Court may be ousted by means other than impeachment. Likewise, since
a petition for quo warranto may be filed with the RTC, the same would result to a
conundrum since the latter would have effectively exercised power and
disciplinary supervision over an official of the Judiciary which is higher in rank
which would run contrary to the Constitutional duty of the SC to be the
disciplinary and administrative arm over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Hence, should the petition be entertained, the same would render Congress’ power
to impeach inutile.
Issue
Whether the SC can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant
petition for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer, and
who also has a pending impeachment case before the House of Representatives
Ruling
Yes. Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution grants the SC the power to
exercise original jurisdiction over certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. The SC shares such power with the Court of
Appeals, and the RTCs. Relatedly, Sec. 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides
that the venue of a quo warranto proceeding may be filed by the Solicitor General
either in the RTC of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or the SC. A direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor. In the case, it is justified for the person subject of the
quo warranto petition is no less than a member of the SC. The issue of whether or
not a person usurps or unlawfully holds a public office is of public concern over
which the government has a special interest as it cannot allow a usurper to occupy
a public post. Impeachment is political in nature, while quo warranto is judicial
and is lodged in the courts. Impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the
legislative, a process that is meant to vindicate a violation of the people’s trust,
while a quo warranto action involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or
validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined
rules. Impeachment and quo warranto proceedings may proceed independently as
they are distinct as to (1) grounds (2) jurisdiction (3) applicable rules pertaining to
initiation, filing, and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Stated differently, the crux of
the controversy in quo warranto proceedings is whether respondent legally holds
the Chief Justice position to be considered an impeachable officer in the first place.
 MIKE A. FERMIN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA
RAMIL BAYAM DILANGALEN
G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008
Facts
On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay
Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for a
transfer of his registration record to said Barangay. In the meantime, the creation of
North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006, formally
making Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan. The COMELEC
approved petitioner’s application. Fermin then filed his COC for Mayor of
Northern Kabuntalan. Private respondent filed a Petition for Disqualification
against petitioner (docketed as SPA No. 07-372) on April 20, 2007. Elections were
held, and Dilangalen, the private respondent, emerged as the victor.

The COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 07-372 disqualified petitioner

for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. The En Banc affirmed the Second
Division’s ruling. Thus, petitioner instituted the present action, arguing that the
Dilangalen petition is a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Following Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6646, the same must be filed within 5 days from the last day for the filing of
CoC, which, in this case, is March 30, 2007, and considering that the said petition
was filed by Dilangalen only on April 20, 2007, the same was filed out of time.
The COMELEC should have then dismissed SPA No. 07-372 outright.

Issue
Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is one under Sec. 68 or 78 of the
OEC

Ruling
It is one under Sec. 78. The petition contains the essential allegations of a
"Section 78" petition, namely: (1) the candidate made a representation in his
certificate; (2) the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect
the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for which he
filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render him ineligible. It likewise appropriately raises a question on a candidate's
eligibility for public office, in this case, his possession of the one-year residency
requirement under the law.

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of

the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the
candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks.Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC
that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course
to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or quali􏰂cation of a candidate, with the
distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. APOLONIO V. MARASIGAN, et
al.
G.R. No. 220367, November 20, 2017
Facts
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) negotiated with herein
respondents regarding the construction of transmission lines in its properties in
1970. In 2006, NAPOCOR filed an expropriation complaint and offered to pay
P300k for the subject property, which was based on the tax declaration classifying
subject properties as agricultural, and the value of the property during the time
NAPOCOR undertook the construction and negotiation in 1970. Herein
respondents contend that the said land should be classified as industrial,
commercial, and residential based on tax declarations and the value of the land
should be reckoned at the time the expropriation complaint was initiated at 2006.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) pegged the value of the property in 2006. The CA
affirmed the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the value of the property should be reckoned at the time of
taking in the 1970s

Ruling
No. Sec. 4, Rule 67 lays down the basic rule that the value of the just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint, whichever came first. The peculiarity of the instant case is
that NPC insists that it took the subject properties in the 1970s despite having
initiated the expropriation complaint only on January 23, 2006. Following the
general rule, NPC thus reasons that the value of the properties should be reckoned
in the 1970s. However, NPC's expropriation complaint and the very testimonial
evidence it offered strongly militate against such proposition. NPC's expropriation
complaint filed on January 23, 2006 clearly sought "to acquire an easement of
right-of-way over portions of the [subject properties]" to enable it "to construct and
maintain its steel transmission lines and wooden electric poles for its Naga-Tiwi
230 KV (Single Bundle), Naga-Tiwi 230 KV (Double Bundle) and 69 KV Naga-
Daraga Transmission Lines." NPC's action relative to the acquisition of an
easement of right-of-way made prior to the filing of its expropriation complaint
was limited only to the conduct of negotiations with respondents. Even then, such
negotiations pertained to the construction of HVDC 350 KV transmission lines
which was not among the transmission lines subject of the expropriation
complaint. This, as much, was alleged by NPC itself in its expropriation complaint
and was testified to by NPC's right-of-way officer who conducted the negotiations
in 1996. The lower courts were thus correct in disregarding NPC's claim of actual
taking in the 1970s as such was not alleged in the expropriation complaint nor was
it successfully proven during the trial.

There being no sufficient proof that NPC actually took the subject properties
at a date preceding the filing of the expropriation complaint, the time of the taking
should be taken to mean as coinciding with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings on January 23, 2006. Hence, the value at the time of the
filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when
the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the
commencement of the proceedings.
 AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) and MACTAN-CEBU
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. APOLONIO GOPUCO, JR.
G.R. No. 158563, June 30, 2005
Facts
Respondent was the owner of Lot No. 72 located in the vicinity of the Lahug
Airport in Cebu City. On April 16, 1952, the Civil Aeronautics Administration
filed a complaint with the CFI of Cebu for the expropriation of Lot No. 72 and its
neighboring realties, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881. The CFI promulgated a
Decision declaring the expropriation of the subject lots, including Lot No. 72.
There having been no appeal from the Decision, absolute title to Lot No. 72 was
transferred to the Republic of the Philippines. Subsequently, when the Mactan-
Cebu International Airport commenced operations, the Lahug Airport was ordered
closed by then President Corazon Aquino.

On August 6, 1992, respondent filed an amended complaint for recovery of

ownership of Lot No. 72 against Air Transportation Office (ATO) with the RTC of
Cebu. He maintained that by the closure of the Lahug Airport, the original purpose
for which the property was expropriated had ceased or otherwise been abandoned,
and title to the property had therefore reverted to him. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. Respondent appealed to the CA who overturned the RTC decision and
ordered petitioners to reconvey Lot No. 72 to Gopuco upon full payment of the
reasonable price as determined by it, and deleted the award to petitioners of
exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and costs.

Issue
Whether or not the judgement of expropriation in Civil Case No. 1881 vest
absolute and unconditional title in the government

Ruling
Yes. The Court already ruled on this matter in Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority v. CA which is a related action for reconveyance of a parcel of
land also subject of the expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. R-1881. One
of the landowners affected by the said proceeding was Virginia Chiongbian, to
whom the CFI ordered the Republic of the Philippines to pay P34,415.00, with
legal interest computed from the time the government began using her land. Like
the herein respondent, she did not appeal from the CFI's judgment. Also like
Gopuco, she eventually filed for the reconveyance of her property when the airport
closed. Although she was upheld by both the RTC of Cebu and the Court of
Appeals, on appeal the Court held that "the terms of the judgment (in Civil Case
No. R-1881) are clear and unequivocal and granted title to Lot No. 941 in fee
simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the
effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a
right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended
or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport."
Moreover, the Court held that although other lot owners were able to successfully
reacquire their lands by virtue of a compromise agreement, since CHIONGBIAN
was not a party to any such agreement, she could not validly invoke the same.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region,
Branch 47, Bacolod City, et al.
G.R. No. 94193-99, February 25, 1992
Facts
Petitioner filed seven (7) eminent domain complaints before the RTC of
Bacolod City for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over portions of the
parcels of land described in the complaints for its Negros-Panay Interconnection
Project, particularly, the Bacolod-Tomonton Transmission Line. On 25 June 1990,
respondent Judge issued an Order fixing the provisional value of the subject areas.
The defendants moved for the reconsideration of the 25 June 1990 Order alleging
that the provisional value of the property involved therein had been set too low.
Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the provisional value to
that stated in the motion for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to deposit the
differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order while holding in
abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order which the
petitioner immediately complied.

Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in full amount the

defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner assailed such order to be in
violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge
hence this petition.

Issue
Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

Ruling
Yes. There are two stages in every action for expropriation: the first is
concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, 'of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned
with the determination by the Court of 'the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken.' This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the
property involved upon compliance with P.D. No. 42 which requires the petitioner,
after due notice to the defendant, to deposit with the Philippine National Bank in
its main office or any of its branches or agencies, "an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation." This assessed value is that
indicated in the tax declaration. P.D. No. 42, however, effectively removes the
discretion of the court in determining the provisional value. What is to be
deposited is an amount equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purposes. No
hearing is required for that purpose. All that is needed is notice to the owner of the
property sought to be condemned.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Judge either deliberately disregarded P.D. No.
42 or was totally unaware of its existence and the cases applying the same. In any
event, petitioner deposited the provisional value fixed by the court. As a matter of
right, it was entitled to be placed in possession of the property involved in the
complaints at once, pursuant to both Section 2 of Rule 67 and P.D. No. 42.
 CITY OF MANILA v. ALEGAR CORPORATION, et al.
G.R. No. 187604, June 25, 2012
Facts
The petitioner City of Manila sought to expropriate certain lots belonging to
respondents for use in the socialized housing project of petitioner. During the
proceedings, the parties agreed to forego with the pre-trial, opting instead to
simultaneously submit their memoranda on the issue of whether or not there is
necessity for the City to expropriate the subject properties for public use. The
owners of the lots submitted their memorandum but the City did not. The RTC
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the City did not comply with Sec. 9 of
RA 7279 which set the order of priority in the acquisition of properties for
socialized housing. Private properties, like those sought to be expropriated in this
case, ranked last in the order of priorities for such acquisition and the City failed to
show that no other properties were available for the project. The City also failed to
comply with Section 10 which authorized expropriation only when resort to other
modes (such as community mortgage, land swapping, and negotiated purchase)
had been exhausted.

The City moved for reconsideration but before the RTC could resolve the
same, filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal mainly
for the reason that the City failed to comply with the requirements of Sections 9
and 10 of R.A. 7279 which ranked privately-owned lands last in the order of
priority in acquiring lots for socialized housing and which preferred modes other
than expropriation for acquiring them.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that the RTC denied the City
its right to due process when it dismissed the case without hearing the City’s side

Ruling
No. An expropriation proceeding of private lands has two stages: first, the
determination of plaintiff's authority to exercise the power of eminent domain in
the context of the facts of the case and, second, if there be such authority, the
determination of just compensation. The first phase ends with either an order of
dismissal or a determination that the property is to be acquired for a public
purpose.

Here, the City's action was still in the first stage when the RTC called the
parties to a pre-trial conference where, essentially, their task was to determine how
the court may resolve the issue involved in the first stage: the City's authority to
acquire by expropriation the particular lots for its intended purpose. As it
happened, the parties opted to simultaneously submit their memoranda on that
issue. There was nothing infirm in this agreement since it may be assumed that the
parties knew what they were doing and since such agreement would facilitate early
disposal of the case.

Unfortunately, the agreement implied that the City was waiving its right to
present evidence that it was acquiring the subject lots by expropriation for a proper
public purpose. Counsel for the City may have been confident that its allegations in
the complaint can stand on their own, ignoring the owners' challenge to its right to
expropriate their lots for the stated purpose. Parenthetically, the City moved for the
reconsideration of the RTC's order of dismissal but withdrew this remedy by filing
a notice of appeal from that order to the CA. Evidently, the City cannot claim that
it had been denied the opportunity of a hearing.
 CITY OF ILOILO v. HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA, et al.
G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain against herein private
respondent Javellana to expropriate a parcel of land the latter owns for the
construction of a school. The trial court, upon the alleged deposit of herein
petitioner of the amount of Php 40,000.00 issued a Writ of Possession in favor of
petitioner and the latter was able to take possession of the said parcel of land
sometime in 1985. 16 years later, Javellana manifested that when he sought to
withdraw the P40k allegedly deposited by herein petitioner, it was discovered by
the Philippine National Bank that no such deposit was made. Thereafter, private
respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession against petitioner. The said
case was consolidated with the prior expropriation case.

Javellana insisted that the fair market value of the subject property should be
reckoned from the date when the court ordered the condemnation of the property,
and not the actual taking since it was proven that petitioner’s possession was
questionable. The trial court in this case amended their initial order thrice,
seemingly confused as regards the date of reckoning – one saying it shall be
reckoned as of the time of filing the complaint, and two saying that it should be at
the time the order was issued.

Issue
What is the correct reckoning point for the determination of just
compensation?

Ruling
As of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court held that the
determination of just compensation must be reckoned as of the filing of the
complaint, as there was no reason to depart from the general rule in this case.
Moreover, the Court faulted the trial court for reversing its order which had
become final when Javellana failed to make an appeal when the said court granted
a writ of possession in favor of petitioner. The SC also held that non-payment of
just compensation does not entitle private respondent to recover his possession.
Concededly, Javellana slept on his rights for 16 years, and was to be faulted for not
checking with the PNB back then whether a deposit was made or not. Despite that,
respondent may still recover the just compensation that was due him for over 30
years, and that the petitioner is liable to pay respondent damages in view of the
taking of the property without just compensation.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN,
INC., et al.
G.R. No. 185124, January 25, 2012
Facts
NIA filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a complaint for the
expropriation of a portion of three parcels of land belonging to herein respondents.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order forming a committee tasked to determine the
fair market value of the expropriated properties to establish the just compensation
to be paid the owners. The first set of commissioners submitted a Report whereby
they stated that the committee members could not agree on the market value of the
subject properties and recommended the appointment of new and independent
commissioners. The new committee submitted its Commissioners' Report to the
lower court. The committee had agreed that the fair market value of the land to be
expropriated should be P65 per square meter based on the zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

The RTC promulgated its judgement whereby it adopted the findings of the
new committee as regards the fair market value of the properties. NIA appealed the
RTC Decision to the CA. NIA assailed the trial court’s adoption of the
Commissioner’s Report which had determined the just compensation to be
awarded to the owners of the lands expropriated. The CA affirmed with
modification the RTC Decision. It ruled that the committee tasked to determine the
fair market value of the properties and improvements for the purpose of arriving at
the just compensation, properly performed its function.

Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s ruling which adopted the
findings of the committee

Ruling
No. The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure
under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee
that was tasked to determine the just compensation. The first set of committee
members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation.
When the members were unable to agree on the valuation, the trial court selected
another batch of disinterested members. The new committee members even made a
second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from
the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated properties,
interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such as
distance from the highway and the nearby town center. Further, the committee
members also considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated
by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provide for the value of
the properties and the improvements for taxation purposes. In National Power
Corporation v. Diato-Bernal, the Court emphasized that the "just"-ness of the
compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for
fixing the value of the condemned property. The reliable and actual data we
referred to in that case were the sworn declarations of realtors in the area, as well
as tax declarations and zonal valuation from the BIR.

In the instant case, the committee members based their recommendations on

reliable data and, as aptly noted by the appellate court, considered various factors
that affected the value of the land and the improvements.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. SPOUSES NORBERTO and
JOSEFINA DELA CRUZ, et al.
G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain and easement right-of-way
against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated. Thereafter, the trial court terminated the pre-trial insofar as
respondent Ferrer was concerned considering that the sole issue was the amount of
just compensation, and issued an Order directing the constitution of a Board of
Commissioners with respect to the property of respondent S.K. Dynamics. The
trial court designated Mr. Lamberto C. Parra, Cavite Provincial Assessor, as
chairman, while petitioner nominated the Municipal Assessor of Dasmariñas, Mr.
Regalado T. Andaya, as member. Respondent S.K. Dynamics did not nominate any
commissioner.

The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of S.K. Dynamics’

property, and thereafter submitted a report to the trial court recommending that the
property of S.K. Dynamics, to be expropriated by petitioner, to be valued at
P10,000 per square meter. The records show that the commissioners did not afford
the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they
conduct hearings before them. In fact, the commissioners did not issue notices to
the parties to attend hearings nor provide the concerned parties the opportunity to
argue their respective causes. Upon the submission of the commissioners' report,
petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of it nor given any
opportunity to file its objections to it.

The trial court fixed the just compensation to be paid by petitioner at

P10,000 per sqm. The CA affirmed the trial court ruling petitioner’s filing of its
motion for reconsideration accorded it ample opportunity to dispute the findings of
the commissioners.

Issue
Whether or not petitioners were deprived of due process

Ruling
Yes. Based on the provisions on expropriation under Rule 67, it is clear that
in addition to the ocular inspection performed by the two (2) appointed
commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct a hearing or hearings
to determine just compensation; and to provide the parties the following: (1) notice
of the said hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to
introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and (3) the opportunity
for the parties to argue their respective causes during the said hearings.

In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the
parties the opportunity to present their own evidence should have impelled the trial
court to disregard the commissioners' findings. The absence of such trial or hearing
constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial court because the parties' (in
particular, petitioner's) right to due process was violated.
 TERESITA M. YUJUICO v. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 164282, October 12, 2005
Facts
The City Council of Manila enacted an Ordinance authorizing the City
Mayor to acquire by authorization or expropriation certain parcels of land for
utilization as a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary School. The property
chosen is covered by Transfer Certificates of Title all in the name of petitioner.
Failing to acquire the land by negotiation, the City filed a case for eminent domain
against petitioner. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the City. Petitioner
then filed a Motion for Execution of Judgement which the trial court granted.
During the hearing on the motion, counsel for the City manifested that the amount
of P36 Million had been appropriated by the City School Board, of which P31
Million was available for release. In line with this manifestation, the trial court
ordered the release of the P31 Million deposited with the Land Bank, in partial
payment of the just compensation due petitioner.

As there was no action on the part of CSB, petitioner filed a petition for
contempt of court against herein respondents. The petition was, however, denied
by the trial court. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus against the
members of the CSB, the same respondents in the petition for contempt of court,
seeking to compel them to pass a resolution appropriating the amount necessary to
pay the balance of the just compensation awarded to petitioner in the expropriation
case. The lower Court granted the petition for mandamus. Failing to seasonably
file an appeal, respondents filed a petition for relief from judgement which the trial
court granted. Thus, petitioner comes before the Supreme Court in the instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue
Whether mandamus is the proper remedy

Ruling
Yes. In Municipality of Makati v. CA, the Court held that where a
municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final
money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of
mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds
therefore. Clearly, mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a
money judgment is rendered in its favor and against a municipality or city, as in
this case.

Moreover, the very ordinance authorizing the expropriation of petitioner's

property categorically states that the payment of the expropriated property will be
defrayed from the SEF, which provides that “an amount not to exceed the current
fair market value, prevailing in the area appraised in accordance with the
requirements of existing laws, rules and regulations, of the property to be acquired
or so much thereof as may be necessary for the purpose shall be allocated out of
the Special Education Fund of the City to defray the cost of acquisition of the
above-mentioned parcels of land.”
 SPOUSES RICARDO ROSALES and ERLINDA SIBUG v. SPOUSES
ALFONSO and LOURDES SUBA
G.R. No. 137792, August 12, 2003
Facts
On June 13, 1997, the RTC Branch 13 of Manila rendered a decision in civil
cases nos. 94-72303and 94-72379. The decision became final and executory.
Spouses Ricardo and Erlinda Rosales, judgment debtors and herein petitioners,
failed to comply with paragraph 2 of the same, i.e., to deposit with the Clerk of
Court, within 90 days from finality of the Decision, P65,000.00, etc., to be paid to
Felicisimo Macaspac and Elena Jiao. This prompted Macaspac, as judgment
creditor, to file with the trial court a motion for execution.

Thereafter, the trial court issued a writ of execution ordering the sale of the
property subject of litigation for the satisfaction of the judgement. An auction sale
of the property was held wherein the property was sold for P285,000 to herein
respondents Sps. Alfonso and Lourdes Suba. On July 15, 1998, the trial court
issued an order confirming the sale of the property and directing the sheriff to issue
a final deed of sale in their favor. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order dated July 15, 1998 confirming the sale of the property to private
respondents. The trial court denied the same, and ruled that petitioners no longer
have the right to redeem the property since the case is for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage under Rule 68. Petitioners tried their luck with the CA who dismissed the
petition outright for lack of merit holding that there is no right of redemption in
case of judicial foreclosure of mortgage.

Issue
Whether the CA erred

Ruling
No. Since the parties' transaction is an equitable mortgage and the trial court
ordered its foreclosure, execution of judgment is governed by Sections 2 and 3,
Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. There is no right of
redemption in case of a judicial foreclosure of a mortgage. The only exemption is
when the mortgagee is the Phil. National Bank or a bank or a banking institution.
Since the mortgagee in this case is not one of those mentioned, no right of
redemption exists in favor of petitioners. They merely have an equity of
redemption which is their right, as mortgagor, to extinguish the mortgage and
retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt prior to the
confirmation of the foreclosure sale. Petitioners, in this case, failed to exercise this
equity of redemption.
 RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD VIRAY
v. SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA USI
G.R. No. 192486, November 21, 2012
Facts
The case involves a piece of land, lot no. 733, registered under the name of
Ellen and Moses Mendoza. The said lot was subdivided to 6 parts by Engr. Fajardo
but was not officially approved by the LMB. On April 29, 1986, Mendoza
executed two separate deeds of absolute sale, the first, transferring Lot 733-F to
Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray (Jesus Viray), and the second deed conveying Lot 733-A
to spouses AvelinoViray and Margarita Masangcay (Sps. Viray). The
aforementioned conveyances notwithstanding, Mendoza, Emerenciana M.
Vda.deMallari (Vda. de Mallari) and respondent spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T.
Usi (Sps. Usi or the Usis), as purported co-owners of Lot 733, executed on August
20, 1990 a Subdivision Agreement, or the 1st subdivision agreement (1st SA)
where lot no. 733 was divided to 3 lots: Lot 733-A, Lot 733-B and Lot 733-C. Lot
733-C was further subdivided to 13 lots under a 2nd subdivision agreement (2nd
SA) where herein respondents appeared as owners of some the further subdivided
lots covering a part of the lot sold to herein petitioners. The foregoing overlapping
transactions involving the same property or portions thereof spawned several suits
and countersuits between petitioner and respondents herein. Spouses Usi instituted
complaints against Viray, among others is a Petition for accion
publiciana/reivindicatoria before the RTC. On the other hand, petitioners moved
for the dismissal of the said petition, on the ground of litis pendencia and res
judicata. The RTC dismissed the petition for failure to establish preponderant
evidence to support their claim of title, possession and ownership over the subject
lots. Hence, they appealed before the CA. The CA reversed RTC’s decision basing
its ruling on the 2 notarized subject agreements. Viray appealed but was denied.
Hence, this.

Issue
Whether or not the two subdivision agreements partake of a bona fide and
legally binding partition contracts

Ruling
No. Partition, in general, is the separation, division, and assignment of a
thing held in common by those to whom it may belong. Contrary to the finding of
the CA, the subdivision agreements forged by Mendoza and her alleged co-owners
were not for the partition of pro-indiviso shares of co-owners of Lot 733 but were
actually conveyances, disguised as partitions, of portions of Lot 733 specifically
Lots 733-A and 733-B, and portions of the subsequent subdivision of Lot 733-C. It
is fairly clear that Lot 733, even from the fact alone of its being registered under
the name of the late Moses Mendoza and Ellen Mendoza, formed part of the
couple’s conjugal property at the time Moses’ demise on April 5, 1986. Equally
clear, too, is that Vda. de Mallari became a co-owner of Lot 733 by virtue of the
purchase of its 416-square meter portion on February 14, 1984, during the lifetime
of Moses. Be that as it may and given that the Sps. Usi have not been shown to be
co-owners of Mendoza and Vda. de Mallari prior to the sale by Mendoza on April
29, 1986 of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan) to the Sps. Viray and Jesus
Viray, respectively, then the execution of the 1st SA on August 20, 1990 could not
have been a partition by co-owners of Lot 733. The same could be said of the 2nd
SA of April 5, 1991 vis-à-vis Lot 733-C, for the records are similarly completely
bereft of any evidence to show on how the purported participating co-owners,
namely Sps. Usi, the Sps. Lacap, the Sps. Balingit and the Sps. Jordan became co-
owners with Mendoza and her children, i.e., McDwight, Bismark, Beverly and
Georgenia.
 EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA v. CAROLINA VDA. DE
FIGURACION, et al.
G.R. No. 154322, August 22, 2006
Facts
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion had six children:
petitioner and respondents Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased), Hilaria
Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-
Ginez. Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his
six children. When he died, he left behind two parcels of land: (1) Lot 2299 in the
name of “Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento” and (2) Lot 705 in
the name of “Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento.” What gave rise
to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between petitioner and her
sister, respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot 707.

Lot 707 belonged to Eulogio Adviento. When Adviento died, his two
daughters, Agripina Adviento, and respondent Carolina, succeeded him to it.
Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner over one-half eastern portion
of Lot 707. Agripina died later. Before Agripina’s death, however, respondent
Carolina adjudicated unto herself the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to
respondents Felipa and Hilaria. The latter two immediately had the OCT cancelled
and TCT No. 42244 was issued in the names of Felipa and Hilaria.

Petitioner then filed a complaint with the RTC praying for: (1) the partition
of Lots 2299 and 705; (2) the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication by
respondent Carolina over Lot 707; and (3) the declaration that petitioner was the
owner of ½ Lot 707. The RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition
holding that it could not grant the reliefs prayed for without any prior settlement
proceedings. The CA upheld the dismissal for being premature.

Issue
Whether or not there needs to be prior settlement of Leandro’s estate before
partition

Ruling
Yes. There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by
agreement under Section 2 and through commissioners when such agreement
cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6. Neither method specifies a procedure for
determining expenses chargeable to the decedent’s estate. While Section 8 of Rule
69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property's income (rentals
and profits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the
accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedent's estate may
be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses
enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.

In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to

the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is
allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion's only
legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses"
including those related to her father's final illness and burial have not been properly
settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father's
estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in
an action for partition.
 PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS,
administratrix of his estate v. ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ
G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005
Facts
Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against Pedro
Sepulveda for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land. During the
presentation of evidence for the plaintiff, Sepulveda died. Thus, his lawyers, Attys.
Antigua and Branzuela, manifested in open court that their client Sepulveda had
died, and that their contract with them had also expired. Notwithstanding said
manifestation, the trial judge set the case for hearing and even sent notices to
Attys. Antigue and Branzuela. The trial judge then substituted the heirs of the
deceased Sepulveda, and ordered the counsel of the plaintiff to present their
evidence even in the absence of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela. The trial court then
rendered a decision against the deceased Sepulveda. Thereafter, petitioner, who
had just been appointed as administratrix of Sepulveda’s estate, moved to intervene
and substitute the deceased. The trial court denied the same holding that the
decision had already become final. Petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA to nullify the proceedings but the latter was denied.

Issue
Whether or not the trial judge erred

Ruling
Yes. Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a
party’s death and the claim is not thereby extinguished, to order the proper legal
representative of the deceased to appear within a period of 30 days or such time as
it may grant. In this case, in view of the pendency of a Special Proceeding and
petitioner’s application to be the judicial administratrix of the deceased’s estate,
the trial judge should have waited first for the appointment of the petitioner and
granted her motion to substitute the deceased Sepulveda.
 BETTY B. LACBAYAN v. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.
G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011
Facts
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent with three
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. Five parcels
of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner
and respondent's names, ostensibly as husband and wife. Eventually, their
relationship turned sour and both parties agreed to divide the said properties and
terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially,
respondent agreed to petitioner's proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don
Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other
properties will go to respondent. However, when petitioner wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. Feeling
aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties
before the RTC in Quezon City.

Petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live as husband and
wife in 1979 and worked as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting
to P15 Million. Respondent, in his Answer, denied petitioner’s claim of
cohabitation and argued that the properties were acquired out of his own personal
funds. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The petitioner
elevated the case to the CA. Petitioner argued that the trial court's decision
subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack
contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to
thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition.

Issue
Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of
ownership

Ruling
No. The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is
proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. The second phase
commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition"
directed by the court. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for
partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real
estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the
subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until
and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the
complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even
have any rightful interest over the subject properties.
 HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR v. HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON
G.R. No. 161720, November 22, 2005
Facts
Emilio Restar died intestate leaving eight compulsory heirs. In 1960, Flores
Restar (Flores), Restar’s eldest child, caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration
No. 6696 in Restar’s name and the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his
name. Flores died in June 10, 1989. On November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores
discovered the cancellation of Restar's Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance
in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his name.

The heirs of Flores' sisters Dolores R. Cichon, Perpetua Sta. Maria, and
Maria Rose who had in the meantime died, together with Flores' surviving sisters
Dominica Restar-Relojero and Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a Complaint
against Flores' heirs for "partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of documents,
ownership with damages and preliminary injunction" before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Aklan. The defendants-herein petitioners Heirs of Flores claimed
that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than
thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since time immemorial.

After trial, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores' share in
Restar's estate was not the lot but that covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183.
Nevertheless, the trial court, holding that Flores and his heirs had performed acts
sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they had
acquired the lot by prescription. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court, it finding that the defendants Heirs of Flores failed to
prove that their possession of the lot excluded their co-owners or that they derived
title to it from a separate conveyance to them by Restar.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the trial court ruling that the
petitioners have acquired ownership by adverse possession of the land in question

Ruling
Yes. While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not
prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there
exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of
the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership. Contrary to the findings of the
appellate court, the records of the case amply support petitioners' claim that the
requirements for extraordinary prescription had been duly met. When Restar died
in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate
succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their
claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition
subject of the present petition. In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after
Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion thereon — tilling and cultivating the
land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof. The statutory
period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores,
who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may,
therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents
were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim.

Flores' possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive

prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted
Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.
 SPOUSES BERNARDITO AND ARSENIA GAELA (DECEASED) v.
SPOUSES TAN TIAN HEANG AND SALLY TAN
G.R. No. 185627, March 15, 2017
Facts
The case stemmed from a complaint for ejectment over two parcels of land
filed by respondents against petitioners. Petitioners claimed that they were the
lawful owners of the subject properties. They averred that sometime in 2002, their
daughter, Bernardita Gaela, took the certificates of title registered in their names
and forged their signature in the real estate mortgage executed in favor of
Alexander Tan Wong (Wong); that their certificates of title were cancelled and
issued to Wong, who thereafter sold the same to respondents. Respondents, on the
other hand, averred that the subject properties were mortgaged by petitioners to
Wong and that for petitioners’ failure to pay the real property tax due on the
subject properties, new titles were issued to Wong who thereafter sold the
properties to them.

The MeTC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, dismissing the

complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. The RTC granted the appeal
and set aside the MeTC’s ruling. In overturning the MeTC's ruling, the RTC held
that the respondents have the better right to possess the subject properties since
they are the registered owners of the same. The respondents' lack of prior physical
possession over the subject properties is of no moment since it is enough that they
have a better right of possession over the petitioners. On appeal, the CA, in its
Decision dated April 28, 2008, denied the petition and affirmed the RTC's
judgment in toto. Before the Court, petitioners claim that respondents failed to
prove that they had prior physical possession of the subject properties before they
were unlawfully deprived of it.

Issue
Whether petitioners are correct

Ruling
No. Petitioners erroneously argued that the respondents' prior physical
possession is necessary for an action for unlawful detainer to prosper. Contrary to
the petitioners' argument, nowhere does it appear in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court that, in an action for unlawful detainer, the, plaintiff must be in
prior physical possession of the property. The Court has repeatedly ruled that prior
physical possession by the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in an
unlawful detainer case brought by a vendee or other person against whom the
possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
a right to hold possession. There is no dispute with the fact that the petitioners
were the previous owners of the subject properties. However, the respondents were
able to prove by preponderance of evidence that they are now the new owners and
the rightful possessors of the subject properties being its registered owners under
TCT Nos. PT-126446 and PT- 126450. The TCTs of the respondents are,
therefore, evidence of indefeasible title over the subject properties and, as its
holders, they are entitled to its possession as a matter of right.
 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR LUIS
RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR. v. BODEGA GLASSWARE,
represented by its owner, JOSEPH D. CABRAL
G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017
Facts
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga
City. Petitioner donated around 600 square meters of this parcel of land to the
Camarines Sur Teachers’ Association (CASTEA). On August 1995, CASTEA
entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent Bodega over the leased property.
CASTEA leased the property to Bodega for a period of 20 years commencing on
September 1, 1995, and ending on September 15, 2015. Bodega took actual
possession of the lot in September 1, 1995. Sometime in July 2005, the Office of
the Provincial Legal Officer of the Province of Camarines Sur wrote Bodega
regarding the building it built on the property. The Provincial Legal Officer
requested Bodega to show proof of ownership or any other legal document as legal
basis for his possession. Bodega failed to present any proof. Nevertheless,
petitioner still left Bodega undisturbed and tolerated its possession of the property.

On November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega demanding that it

vacate the property. Bodega refused. Petitioner revoked its donation to CASTEA
by virtue of a Deed of Revocation of Donation asserting that CASTEA violated the
conditions set in the Deed of Donation when it leased the property to Bodega. On
March 13, 2008, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega
before the MTC, Naga City. MTC Naga City ruled in favor of petitioner. Bodega
appealed to the RTC, who reversed the MTC. Petitioner went up to the CA, who
affirmed the RTC, holding that petitioner should have first filed an action for
reconveyance against CASTEA. Thus, the present petition.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner has a better right over the property

Ruling
Yes. When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of
possession alleges that the opposing party occupied the subject property by mere
tolerance, this must be alleged clearly and the acts of tolerance established. In this
case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof
of its legal basis for occupying the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this
demand. For several years, petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's possession by
allowing it to continue using its building and conducting business on the property.

Moreover, it is settled that a party to a contract with an automatic rescission

clause, who believes that there has been a breach warranting rescission, may
consider the contract rescinded without previous court action. Accordingly,
petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it
violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation and as such, the property
automatically reverted to it. It even executed a Deed of Revocation. The records
show that CASTEA never contested this revocation. Hence, applying the ruling in
De Luna, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Dolar and Zamboanga Barter
Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc., petitioner validly considered the donation revoked
and by virtue of the automatic revocation clause, this revocation was automatic and
immediate, without need of judicial intervention. Thus, the CA clearly erred in its
finding that petitioner should have first filed an action for reconveyance.
 HUBERT NUÑEZ v. SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC., through its
representative, CESAR SYLIANTENG
G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010
Facts
The subject of this case is a parcel of land registered in the name of
respondent SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc. It appers that respondent was
constrained to leave the subject parcel of land idle and unguarded for some time
due to important business concerns. In October 2003, an ocular inspection
conducted by respondent’s representatives revealed that the property was already
occupied by petitioner Hubert Nuñez and 21 other individuals. Respondent then
filed its complaint against them for forcible entry. It alleged that thru its
representatives and predecessors-in-interest, it had continuously possessed the
subject realty, over which it exercised all attributes of ownership; that without the
benefit of any lease agreement or possessory right, petitioners and his co-
defendants have succeeded in occupying the property by means of stealth and
strategy; and that the latter had been in occupancy of the same parcel since 1999,
according to reliable sources.

The MeTC ruled in favor of respondent. On appeal, the foregoing ruling was
affirmed in toto. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way or petition for
review. The CA dismissed the petition for review. Petitioner now files the petition
at bench, arguing that the lower courts erred because the courts have no
jurisdiction to try the instant case considering that the elements of forcible entry
are not present in the instant case and, additionally, there is a question of
ownership.

Issue
Whether or not the elements of forcible entry are present in this case

Ruling
Yes. Respondent's complaint was able to make out a cause of action for
forcible entry against petitioner. As the registered owner of the subject parcel,
respondent distinctly alleged that, by its representatives and thru its predecessors-
in-interest, it had been in possession of the subject parcel and had exercised over
the same all attributes of ownership, including the payment of realty taxes and
other expenses; that an ocular inspection conducted in October 2003 revealed that
petitioner and his co-defendants have succeeded in occupying the property by
means of stealth and strategy; and, that its subsequent demands to vacate had been
unheeded by said interlopers. Considering that the test for determining the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is whether, admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
plaintiff, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over
the case.
LOURDES DELA CRUZ v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MELBA TAN
TE
G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006
Facts
The Reyes family owned the lot located at Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila.
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz was one of their lessees, and she religiously paid her
rent well over 40 years. Sometime in 1989, a fire struck the premises and
destroyed, among others, petitioner’s dwelling. After the fire, petitioner and some
tenants returned to the lot to rebuild their respective houses. The Reyes family
made several demands for the tenants, including petitioner, to vacate the lot but the
latter refused. Despite this, the Reyes did not institute court proceedings against
any of the lessees. On November 26, 1996, the disputed lot was sold by Lino
Reyes to respondent Melba Tan Te. Despite the sale, petitioner still refused to give
up the lot.

Respondent Tan Te was then constrained to file an ejectment complaint with

damages before the Manila MeTC. The complaint averred that: (1) the previous
owners, the Reyeses were in possession and control of the contested lot; (2) on
November 26, 1996, the lot was sold to Tan Te; (3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz
forcibly entered the property with strategy and/or stealth; (4) the petitioner
unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical possession of the property and
continues to do so; and, (5) the respondent sent several written demands to
petitioner to vacate the premises but refused to do so. The MeTC ruled in favor of
respondent. Petitioner appealed the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC who set
aside the decision of the MeTC, and dismissed the complaint on the ground that it
was the RTC who has jurisdiction over the case because Tan Te’s predecessor-in-
interest learned of the intrusion as early as February 21, 1994, thus, an ejectment
suit before the MeTC should have been filed 1 year therefrom or until February 25,
1994. The CA reversed the Manila RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the Manila MeTC had jurisdiction over the case

Ruling
Yes. Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te
ejectment complaint is after all a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was admitted
that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4) decades.
Thus, initially petitioner as lessee is the legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue
of a contract of lease. When fire destroyed her house, the Reyeses considered the
lease terminated; but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in returning to the lot and
occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of the owners. The Reyeses
howevertolerated the continued occupancy of the lot by petitioner. Thus, when the
lot was sold to respondent Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses, with respect to the lot,
were transferred to their subrogee, respondent Tan Te, who for a time also
tolerated the stay of petitioner until she decided to eject the latter by sending
several demands, the last being the January 14, 1997 letter of demand. Since the
action was filed with the MeTC on September 8, 1997, the action was instituted
well within the one (1) year period reckoned from January 14, 1997. Hence, the
nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer and the Manila MeTC had
jurisdiction over the complaint.
 CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, et al. v. MANALITE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. (MAHA)
G.R. No. 182953, October 11, 2010
Facts
MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land. Through
force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, petitioners entered the premises and
constructed their temporary houses and an office building. MAHA demanded that
petitioners vacate the land. Petitioners then pleaded that they be given one year
within which to look for a place to transfer, to which MAHA acceded. Thereafter,
the petitioners came up with a proposal that they become members of MAHA so
they can be qualified to acquire portions of the property by sale pursuant to the
Community Mortgage Program (CMP). MAHA again agreed and tolerated
petitioners' possession, giving them until December 1999 to comply with the
requirements to avail of the CMP benefits. Petitioners nonetheless failed to comply
with said requirements. Thus, on August 9, 2000, MAHA sent formal demand
letters to petitioners to vacate the property. Upon the latter's refusal to heed the
demand, MAHA filed the complaint for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer."

The MTCC of Antipolo City dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The MTCC held that the complaint filed was one of forcible entry, but MAHA
failed to establish the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in its
complaint. The MTCC also held that MAHA’s failure to immediately initiate legal
action after petitioners unlawfully entered its property and its subsequent
declaration of benevolence towards petitioners cannot be construed as tolerance to
justify the treatment of the case as one for unlawful detainer. The RTC rendered a
decision reversing the MTCC. Petitioners then filed a petition for review assailing
the decision of the RTC before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC holding that
while the complaint in the beginning alleged facts which make out a case for
forcible entry, the rest of the averments therein show that the cause of action was
actually for unlawful detainer.

Issue
Whether or not the case is one for unlawful detainer

Ruling
Yes. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer
if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was
by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession
became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of
the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one
year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment. In this case, after MAHA acquired the
property, MAHA tolerated petitioners' stay and gave them the option to acquire
portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. Petitioners' continued
stay on the premises was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the
requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their obligations,
MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property. The moment
MAHA required petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally
occupying the land. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound
by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Thus, the RTC and the CA
correctly ruled in favor of MAHA.
 JUANITA ERMITAÑO v. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS
G.R. No. 174436, January 23, 2013
Facts
Respondent and petitioner executed a contract of lease wherein petitioner
leased in favor of respondent a residential lot and a house standing thereon.
Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract, respondent received information
that sometime in March 1999, petitioner mortgaged the subject property in favor of
one Charlie Yap (Yap) and that the same was already foreclosed with Yap as the
purchaser of the disputed lot in the extra-judicial foreclosure sale. Yap’s brother
later offered to sell the subject property to respondent. On June 1, 2000, respondent
bought the property from Yap. However, it was made clear in the Deed of Sale that
the property was still subject to petitioner’s right of redemption. Meanwhile, on
May 25, 2000, petitioner sent a letter demanding respondent to pay the rentals
which are due and to vacate the premises. A second demand letter was sent.
Respondent ignored both letters.

Petitioner then filed with the MTCC, Davao City a case for unlawful
detainer against respondent. The MTCC dismissed the case filed by petitioner. The
RTC affirmed the MTCC. The CA, thereafter, affirmed the RTC.

Issue
Whether or not the complaint should prosper

Ruling
No. It is settled that during the period of redemption, it cannot be said that
the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property, since the rule up
to now is that the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until
after the period of redemption has expired without the right being exercised. In the
instant case, there is neither evidence nor allegation that respondent, as purchaser
of the disputed property, filed a petition and bond in accordance with the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135. In addition, respondent defaulted in the
payment of her rents. Thus, absent respondent's filing of such petition and bond
prior to the expiration of the period of redemption, coupled with her failure to pay
her rent, she did not have the right to possess the subject property. On the other
hand, petitioner, as mortgagor and owner, was entitled not only to the possession
of the disputed house and lot but also to the rents, earnings and income derived
therefrom.

The situation became different, however, after the expiration of the

redemption period on February 23, 2001. Since there is no allegation, much less
evidence, that petitioner redeemed the subject property within one year from the
date of registration of the certificate of sale, respondent became the owner thereof.
As a consequence, petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was rendered
moot when the period of redemption expired on February 23, 2001 without
petitioner having redeemed the subject property, for upon expiration of such period
petitioner lost his possessory right over the same. Hence, the only remaining right
that petitioner can enforce is his right to the rentals during the time that he was still
entitled to physical possession of the subject property — that is from May 2000
until February 23, 2001. In this regard, this Court agrees with the findings of the
MTCC that, based on the evidence and the pleadings filed by petitioner,
respondent is liable for payment of rentals beginning May 2000 until February
2001, or for a period of ten (10) months.
 VELIA J. CRUZ v. SPOUSES MAXIMO and SUSAN CHRISTENSEN
G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017
Facts
Cruz alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land in San Juan City. She
further alleged that Susan Christensen had been occupying the property during
Javier’s (Cruz’ predecessor-in-interest) lifetime, as they had a verbal lease
agreement. Cruz claimed that ever since she inherited the property, she tolerated
Susan’s occupancy of the property. However, due to Susan’s failure and refusal to
pay the rentals of P1,000.00 per month, she was constrained to demand that Susan
vacate the property and pay all unpaid rentals. Three (3) years later, or on August
5, 2008, Cruz, through counsel, sent Susan a final demand letter demanding that
she pay the rentals and vacate the property. Susan still refused, thus, compelling
Cruz to file a complaint for unlawful detainer. In her Answer, Susan admitted to
occupying a portion of the property since 1969 on a month-to-month lease
agreement. Susan denied receiving any demand letter from Cruz and claims that
the signature appearing on the registry return card of the demand letter was not her
signature. Susan also alleged that Cruz refused to receive her rental payments
sometime in 2002.

The MTC of San Juan City dismissed Cruz’s complaint. Cruz appealed to
the RTC who reversed the MTC. The Sps. Christensen appealed to the CA, arguing
that Cruz was unable to prove Susan’s actual receipt of the demand letter. The CA
reinstated the dismissal of the MTC, holding that the registry receipts and return
cards are insufficient proofs of receipt.

Issue
Whether or not a demand letter was necessary

Ruling
No. The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the
action is premised on the termination of lease due to expiration of the terms of
contract. The complaint must be brought on the allegation that the lease has
expired and the lessor demanded the lessee to vacate, not on the allegation that the
lessee failed to pay rents. The cause of action which would give rise to an
ejectment case would be the expiration of the lease. Thus, the requirement under
Rule 70, Section 2 of a prior "demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the
lease and to vacate" would be unnecessary. Respondents admit that they only had a
month-to-month lease since 1969. They contend that they had been continuously
paying their monthly rent until sometime in 2002, when petitioner refused to
receive it. Thus, as early as 2002, petitioner, as the lessor, already refused to renew
respondents' month-to-month verbal lease. Therefore, respondents' lease had
already long expired before petitioner sent her demand letters.

Respondents cannot feign ignorance of petitioner's demand to vacate since

the matter was brought to barangay conciliation proceedings in 2005. The
barangay certification issued on August 11, 2005 shows that no compromise was
reached between the parties. Therefore, respondents' insistence on the non-receipt
of the demand letter is misplaced. Their verbal lease over the property had already
expired sometime in 2002. They were explicitly told to vacate in 2005. They
continued to occupy the property until petitioner sent her final demand letter in
2008. The demand letter would have been unnecessary since respondents'
continued refusal to vacate despite the expiration of their verbal lease was
sufficient ground to bring the action.
ROSA DELOS REYES v. SPOUSES FRANCISCO ODONES and ARWENIA
ODONES, et al.
G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents. In her
complaint, petitioner alleged that she is the owner of a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 392430; that respondents are staying on the said property with a
house/improvements therein, with the mere tolerance of petitioner only without
any contract whatsoever and for which there is an implied understanding to vacate
upon demand; that petitioner previously demanded verbally upon respondents to
vacate which they refused and for which a written notice was sent advising them to
vacate the said property; that the said letter was sent via registered mail which was
duly received. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to
vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same, plus
attorney’s fees. Respondents appealed to the RTC arguing that since the complaint
failed to allege how respondents entered the property or when they erected their
houses thereon, it is an improper action for unlawful detainer, and the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the same.

The RTC set aside the MTC’s judgement and held that the complaint failed
to aver acts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer since it did not state
how the entry was effected or how and when the dispossession had started. The CA
affirmed the judgement of the RTC.

Issue
Whether the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property
from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of
his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession
by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in
nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial
court. The action must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand,
and the issue in the case must be the right to physical possession.

Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, petitioner's allegations in
the complaint clearly makes out a case for unlawful detainer, essential to confer
jurisdiction over the subject matter on the MTC. Petitioner alleges that she is the
owner of the lot, as shown by TCT No. 392430, issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Tarlac; that respondents are occupying the lot by virtue of petitioner's tolerance;
and that petitioner sent a letter to respondents on June 17, 2005, demanding that
they vacate the property, but they failed and refused to do so. The complaint was
filed on July 12, 2005, or within one year from the time the last demand to vacate
was made.
 ABIGAIL L. MENDIOLA v. VENERANDO P. SANGALANG
G.R. No. 205283, June 7, 2017
Facts
The property subject of the case is a parcel of land in Maginhawa, Quezon
City, originally registered in the name of Honorata Sangalang (Honorata).
Honorata had two siblings, Sinforosa and Angel. Sinforosa had three children,
petitioner Abigail Mendiola, Vilma Aquino (Vilma), and Azucena De Leon; while
Angel had four children: respondent Venerando, Ma. Lourdes, Angelino, and
Fernando. Sinforosa and Angel predeceased Honorata, and in 1994, Honorata died
intestate and without issue. In 2003, respondent and his siblings discovered that the
subject property was already registered in the names of petitioner and Vilma. It
was also around this time that respondent, allegedly without asking permission
from the petitioner or Vilma and with the use of force and violence upon things,
broke open the door of the unit and detained the same. In April 11, 2005, petitioner
and Vilma demanded respondent to vacate, but the latter refused.

Petitioner and Vilma then commenced the complaint for accion publiciana
against respondent for the latter to return the illegally occupied unit and pay
reasonable rental therefor. In his Answer, respondent claimed, among others, that
as heirs of Honorata, they all have become co-owners in equal undivided shares of
the subject property. The RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that since
respondent raised the defense of ownership, the case was converted from accion
publiciana to accion reinvindicatoria. Petitioner and Vilma elevated the case to the
CA, who disagreed with the RTC in converting the action to accion
reinvindicatoria but nevertheless held that in passing over the issue of ownership,
the parties are deemed co-owners of the subject property.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in doing so

Ruling
No. It is settled that the issue of ownership may be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. In this case, it is undisputed that the Deed of
Sale, through which ownership over the property had been purportedly transferred
to the petitioner and Vilma, was executed in 1996. However, it is perfectly obvious
that Honorata could not have signed the same as she passed away as early as 1994.
If any, Honorata's signature thereon could only be a product of forgery. This makes
the Deed of Sale void and as such, produces no civil effect; and it does not create,
modify, or extinguish a juridical relation.

A necessary and logical consequence of the foregoing pronouncements is

that, title over the property remained in the name of Honorata as original registered
owner thereof. By theory of succession, petitioner and respondent are co-owners of
the property and equally entitled to possession thereof, either de facto or de jure.
As such, petitioner and Vilma had no right to exclude respondent from enjoying
possession thereof through a possessory action.
 RURAL BANK OF STA. IGNACIA, INC. v. PELAGIA DIMATULAC, et al.
G.R. No. 142015, April 29, 2003
Facts
Prudencia Reyes purchased from the now defunct Rural Progress
Administration (RPA), an 800-square meter parcel of land identified as Lot 11,
Block 8 of the Subdivision Plan, Psd-24941 located in Barrio Suizo and Barrio San
Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. As a result of the purchase, TCT No. 65765 was issued in
her favor. However, the deed of sale in favor of Reyes was later cancelled by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) by reason of her non-occupancy of said
property, and made the land available for distribution to the landless residents of
San Rafael. Respondents took possession of the property and were allocated
portions of 200 square meters each. They paid the purchase price and awaited their
Emancipation Patent titles. Despite her knowledge that the land had reverted to the
government, Reyes sold the property to the spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina
Razon in a Deed of Sale. The spouses thereafter obtained TCT No. 106153
thereon. On finding, however, that respondents were in possession of the property,
Valentin and Razon filed a complaint for recovery and damages against
respondents. The Republic intervened in said case, and along with respondents,
contended that the title of the spouses was null and void, because the sale by Reyes
was in violation of the terms and conditions of sale of the lot by the RPA to Reyes.
The trial court decided in favor of the spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina Razon.
But on appeal, the appellate court in CA G.R. CV No. 14909 reversed the
judgment, cancelled the title of the spouses, and decreed the reversion of the
property to the government for disposition to qualified beneficiaries. During the
pendency of the case, Razon, through her attorney-in-fact, mortgaged the property
to petitioner rural bank to secure a loan of P37,500.00. The property was
subsequently extra-judicially, foreclosed when Razon failed to pay the loan.
Petitioner purchased the property and TCT No. 330969 and was accordingly
issued. Petitioner rural bank filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages
against respondents with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac. The
MTC dismissed the complaint. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac City which affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court, however, dismissed the petition. Hence, the present petition.

Issue
Whether the appellate court erred

Ruling
No. Respondents' possession springs from their right as lawful beneficiaries
of a government program, pursuant to law. The decision of the appellate court in
CA G.R. CV No. 14909 binds not just the beneficiary but also the rural bank as
claimant of the land. In contrast, petitioner's claim to possession of the land
emanates from a nullified and non-existing title of its predecessors-in-interest,
from which it cannot rely to eject the respondents from the premises. Having
derived title from the Spouses Razon, whose title was nullified by the final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909, the
petitioner cannot escape the effect of the appellate court's judgment in said case.
The rural bank as purchaser at an auction sale does not have a better right to said
property than their predecessors-in-interest, namely, the Razon spouses. According
to the Court, had petitioner taken extra steps, time and effort in dealing with the
property it purchased by conducting proper ocular inspection of the premises, it
could have discovered early the presence of settlers therein who are land reform
beneficiaries.
 RUBEN MANALANG, et al. v. BIENVENIDO and MERCEDES BACANI
G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015
Facts
Petitioners were the co-owners of Lot No. 4236. In 1997, petitioners caused
the relocation and verification survey of Lot No. 4236 whereby they found that
respondents had encroached on said lot to the extent of 405 sqm. When the
respondents refused to vacate the land, petitioners commenced an action for
unlawful detainer in the MTC of Guagua. The MTC Branch 2 dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction as it found that the action essentially involved a boundary
dispute which should be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. On appeal, the RTC
reversed the MTC Branch 2, and remanded the case to the latter for further
proceedings.

The MTC Branch 2 ultimately dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Once more, petitioners appealed to the RTC. At that point, the RTC ordered the
petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of
encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor, Engr. Emmanuel
Limpin, then Acting Chief of the Survey Section of the CENR-DENR. The RTC
then rendered a decision setting aside the MTC decision. On appeal, the CA held
that the RTC acted as a trial court in ordering the relocation survey and hearing the
testimony of the surveyor in violation of Sec. 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC erred in ordering the relocation survey

Ruling
Yes. Sec. 18, Rule 70 states that the judgment or final order shall be
appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on
the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the
Regional Trial Court. Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the
conduct of the relocation and verification survey "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was
tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact
that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the surveyor's
testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin.
 HERMINIA ACBANG v. HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014
Facts
Respondent spouses Maximo and Heidi Lopez (Sps. Lopez) commenced an
ejectment suit against petitioner, among other defendants, in the MTC of Alcala,
Cagayan. The defendants, including petitioner, did not file their Answer thus, the
MTC rendered a decision in favor of Sps. Lopez. The petitioner appealed to the
RTC. In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for the execution of the decision
pending appeal in the RTC, alleging that the defendants had not filed a supersedeas
bond to stay the execution. The Acbangs opposed the motion for execution
pending appeal, insisting that the failure of the Spouses Lopez to move for the
execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate
execution; and that, therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering the filing of the
supersedeas bond unnecessary.

Respondent Judge Luczon granted the motion for immediate execution. The
RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file the
instant petition before the Supreme Court submitting that Judge Luczon thereby
committed grave error in granting the motion for immediate execution of the
Spouses Lopez without first fixing the supersedeas bond as prayed for by the
Acbangs.

Issue
Whether or not Sps. Lopez are entitled to the immediate execution of the
judgement

Ruling
Yes. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately
executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an
appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals
becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Although the petitioner correctly
states that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution pending appeal
before the court may issue an order for the immediate execution of the judgment,
the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they were entitled to the
immediate execution of the judgment in view of the Acbangs' failure to comply
with all of the three abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate
execution. The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not
suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient
supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals.
 ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR. v. ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF, et al.
G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017
Facts
This case stemmed from when petitioner, together with his clients, the
family of slain Jennifer Laude, went to Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo after news
broke out that the prime suspect, US Marine Private Joseph Scott Pemberton, had
been flown and detained therein. Respondents state that petitioner, with his clients,
forced their way inside the premises of the Mutual Defense Board-Security
Engagement Board and gained entry despite having been instructed by Military
Police personnel not to enter the compound, and even though the gates were
closed.

In response to these events, respondent released a press statement that they

were considering filing disbarment proceedings against petitioner. On November 4,
respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. On the same day, respondent Cabunoc called a conference
at Camp Aguinaldo, and publicly announced that a disbarment complaint had been
filed against petitioner. Petitioner asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious
violations of Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Further, petitioner
claims that respondents' acts put to question his professional and personal
reputation.

Issue
Whether or not respondents should be cited for contempt

Ruling
No. Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the
confiidentiality rule. This is laid down by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first,
respondents' supposed public threats of filing a disbarment case against him, and
second, respondents' public statement that they had filed a disbarment complaint.

Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to keep
private and confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4,
2014, and there was no proceeding to keep private. As for the Press Statement
made on November 4, 2014, a close examination reveals that it does not divulge
anything that merits punishment for contempt. The Press Statement declared only
three (3) things: first, respondent AFP filed a disbarment complaint against
petitioner; second, petitioner is a lawyer, and thus, must conduct himself according
to the standards of the legal profession; and third, petitioner's "unlawful conduct" is
prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Press Statement's
coverage of the disbarment complaint was a brief, unembellished report that a
complaint had been filed. Such an announcement does not, in and of itself, violate
the confidentiality rule, particularly considering that it did not discuss the
disbarment complaint itself. Although the Press Statement mentioned that a
disbarment complaint had been filed against petitioner, no particulars were given
about the content of the complaint or the actual charges filed.
 P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN v. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL I. DIOKNO
and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA’O
G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014
Facts
The petitioner in this case was the accused in a shooting case (Ortigas
incident) before the Supreme Court (SC case) wherein the respondent Atty. Jose
Manuel Diokno was the counsel. In that case, the Atty. Diokno and the
complainant prayed that the Court reverse or modify the findings of the
Ombudsman against Marantan and upgrade the penalty from homicide to murder.
In the meantime, another shooting incident occurred involving herein petitioner as
ground commander in Atimonan (Atimonan incident). Atty. Diokno and the
complainant in the SC case appeared on a press conference, where Atty. Diokno
made remarks regarding their petition before the SC which was not yet acted upon,
and how 8 years have passed since the Ortigas incident. Petitioner assails Atty.
Diokno’s acts for being violative of the subjudice rule and for being contemptuous.

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Diokno’s acts are contemptuous

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court found nothing wrong with the comments made by
Atty. Diokno. Diokno was merely rehashing their arguments in their petition
before the SC which was currently pending. A mere rehash of their argument in the
petition cannot actually influence the court in any way. As to the conduct of the
SC, the SC noted that there was no complaint, express or implied, regarding the
inordinate delay in resolving their petition before the same. There was merely an
observation that the SC had not yet acted upon their petition. A public utterance or
publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the
courts, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the
orderly and fair administration of justice.
 LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, et al. v. DISTRIBUTION
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011
Facts
The MARINA issued a letter-resolution advising respondent DMAP that a
computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer for
freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with
MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153). In order to challenge the
constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4,
2001, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or
temporary restraining order. The CA, however, dismissed the petition for
certiorari and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213 and MC 153. DMAP
appealed to the Supreme Court who denied DMAP’s petition for review on
certiorari "for petitioners' failure to: (a) take the appeal within the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to
Section 5 (a), Rule 56, in view of the foregoing denial of petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file the petition; and (b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and
clerk's commission in the total amount of P202.00 in accordance with Sections 2
and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1 of Revised
Circular No. 1-88 of this Court."

In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting on the

occasion of which DMAP publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update, the
pertinent portions of which read: “the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the
Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue
DMAP presented”; and “Supreme Court ruling in one month only, normal lead
time is at least 3 to 6 months.” This became the basis for the present petition to
charge respondents with indirect contempt for these allegedly contemptuous
statements.

Issue
Whether or not respondents should be cited in indirect contempt

Ruling
No. The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents'
publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the acts punishable as
indirect contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71, supra. The petitioners' mere
allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases the Supreme Court because of
the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein that the Court
allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as concocted in Supreme Court
ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months," was
insufficient, without more, to sustain the charge of indirect contempt. We have
long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that
matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made
in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. We have no cause or reason to
depart from such recognition and respect, for the Court has long adhered to the
sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen: “. . .
every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers.”
 MARIANO Y. SIY v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and ELENA EMBANG
G.R. No. 158971, August 25, 2005
Facts
This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment
of holiday pay and holiday premium pay filed by Embang against petitioner and
Philippine Agri Trading Center. The LA ruled in favor of Embang, which was
affirmed by the NLRC. The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s appeal.
Eventually, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the CA. In accordance with
the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embang's counsel filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution dated February 16, 2004 before the labor arbiter.
Subsequently, Atty. Quevedo entered his appearance for the petitioner and filed a
comment to the motion for writ of execution. He alleged that Embang rejected the
various offers of reinstatement extended to her by petitioner; hence, she should be
entitled to backwages only up to September 29, 2000, the date of the promulgation
of the labor arbiter's decision. Finding that his office was never informed by
petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center of any intention on their part to
reinstate Embang to her former position, the labor arbiter issued an order granting
the February 16, 2004 motion and directing that a writ of execution be issued.

Atty. Quevedo refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal with the NLRC

insisting that the LA committed grave abuse of discretion. Pending the resolution
of the appeal, Embang filed the instant motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in contempt
of court.

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Quevedo should be cited in contempt

Ruling
Yes. Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition
to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the court's orders but also conduct tending to bring the authority of
the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to
impede the due administration of justice. We denied with finality the petitioner's
petition for review on certiorari almost two years ago. But the decision of the labor
arbiter (affirmed with modification by the NLRC and upheld by the CA and this
Court) remains unsatisfied up to now because of Atty. Quevedo's sly maneuvers on
behalf of his client. Atty. Quevedo's act of filing a baseless appeal with the NLRC
was obviously intended to defeat the implementation of a final and executory
decision. Elementary is the rule that an order granting a motion for a writ of
execution is not appealable. Thus, Atty. Quevedo's deceptively "innocent" appeal
constituted either a willful disregard or gross ignorance of basic rules of procedure
resulting in the obstruction of justice.

By his acts, Atty. Quevedo has tried to prevent Embang from enjoying the
fruits of her hard earned legal victory. In effect, he has been tying the hands of
justice and preventing it from taking its due course. His conduct has thwarted the
due execution of a final and executory decision. By appealing an order which he
knew to be unappealable, he abused court processes and hindered the dispensation
of justice. His dilatory tactics were an affront to the dignity of the Court, clearly
constituting indirect contempt.
 RIVULET AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. ANTHONY
PARUÑGAO, et al.
G.R. No. 197507, January 14, 2013
Facts
Petitioner was the registered owner of Hacienda Bacan, an agricultural land
situated in Negros Occidental. In April 2001, DAR commenced the administrative
process to acquire the property under R.A. 6657 and sent Notices of Coverage
(NOC) to Atty. Arroyo. Subsequently, Rivulet voluntarily offered for sale (VOS)
to the government the subject property. During the pendency of the administrative
process, the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Negros Occidental, enacted an
ordinance reclassifying Hacienda Bacan from agricultural to agro-industrial.

Thereafter, Rivulet demanded the RD not to cancel TCT No. T-105742 in its
name, and not to issue any certificates of land ownership awards (CLOA) in
connection with the government’s impending confiscation of Hacienda Bacan. No
action or reply having been received, Rivulet filed before the RTC of Negros
Occidental a petition for injunction with application for preliminary injunction
and/or TRO. However, the same was dismissed by the trial court holding that the
RTC chose to defer to the primary jurisdiction of the DAR per RA 9700. Rivulet
then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. On December 15, 2010,
the Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 193585 enjoining the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental and the LRA Administrator and/or all persons acting upon their
orders or in their place and stead from canceling TCT No. T-105742 in Rivulet's
name; issuing a new certificate of title in the name of the Republic; and issuing and
distributing CLOAs in favor of anyone during the pendency of the case. In the
instant petition, Rivulet claims that the act of respondents in installing farmer-
beneficiaries in the subject landholding constitutes an open defiance and
disobedience of the Court's December 15, 2010 TRO for which they should be
cited for indirect contempt of court.

Issue
Whether or not the aforementioned acts constitute indirect contempt of court

Ruling
No. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful
disregard of the court's order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority
of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to
impede the due administration of justiceIn this case, the December 15, 2010 TRO
issued by the Court was only expressly directed against the LRA Administrator,
the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and/or all persons acting upon their
order or in their place and stead, and specifically for the following acts: "(a) from
canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. 105742 issued in favor of petitioner
RIVULET Agro-Industrial Corporation; (b) from issuing a new certificate of title
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines; (c) from issuing Certificate of Land
Ownership Award in favor of anyone covering Hacienda Bacan, a 157.2992-
hectare property situated in the Municipality of Isabela, Province of Negros
Occidental; and (d) distributing such Certificate of Land Ownership Award that it
may have heretofore issued pending trial on the merits." Clearly, the DAR and its
officials were not among those enjoined. Neither can they be considered agents of
the LRA Administrator and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. Moreover,
the installation of farmer-beneficiaries was not among the acts specifically
restrained, negating the claim that the performance thereof was a contumacious act.
 MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO v. ANTONIO S. GO
G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007
Facts
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal
filed by respondent Go against Eurotech Hair Sytems, Inc. (EHSI), and its
President Lutz Kunack, and General Manager Jose E. Barin. The LA ruled that
respondent Go was illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the LA’s ruling.
Respondent Go elevated the case to the CA, who reinstated the ruling of the LA.
After the promulgation of the CA decision but before the receipt of the parties of
their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release
Waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of the LA. In view of such settlement, the
LA issued an order dismissing the illegal dismissal complaint with prejudice. The
execution of the compromise agreement was attended by the counsel for EHSI,
Kunack and Barin, petitioner Atty. Regalado, and respondent Go, but in the
absence and without the knowledge of respondent Go's lawyer.

After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent Go,
through counsel, filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the
Release Waiver and Quitclaim dated 16 July 2003 on the ground of fraud, mistake
or undue influence. In the same motion, respondent Go, through counsel, moved
that petitioner Atty. Regalado be made to explain her unethical conduct for directly
negotiating with respondent Go without the knowledge of his counsel. The
appellate court initially ordered Atty. Regalado to explain why she should not be
cited for contempt of court for violating the Canons of Professional Ethics, but
later disregarded Atty. Regalado’s claims and defenses and adjudged her guilty of
contempt.

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Regalado was validly cited for contempt

Ruling
No. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1)
motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance
with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined
must be complied with. In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was
initiated by respondent Go through a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion. It was
based on the aforesaid Motion that the appellate court issued a Resolution dated 19
November 2003, requiring petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should
not be cited for contempt.

Clearly, respondent Go's Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the

catalyst which set everything in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty.
Regalado. It was respondent Go who brought to the attention of the appellate court
the alleged misbehavior committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such
positive act on the part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have
been initiated at all.
 MEMORIA G. ENCINAS and ADOLFO A. BALBOA v. NATIONAL
BOOKSTORE, INC.
G.R. No. 162704, July 28, 2005
Facts
In the Resolution dated 6 April 2005, the Court required Atty. Ricardo T.
Calimag, counsel for Roberto P. Madrigal-Acopiado and his attorney-in-fact Datu
Mohaldin R.B. Sulaiman, to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt
of court for his participation in the submission of a fake judicial decision to this
Court. Counsel explains that he filed the Motion for Intervention with Leave of
Court and Petition-In-Intervention (to which was appended a copy of the fake
decision) on behalf of his clients to seek the truth in order that justice will prevail.
He reasons that he was misled in the appreciation of the evidence (referring to the
forged judicial decision) made available to him at the time of submission of the
Motion and Petition-In-Intervention. At the same time, he asserts that there was an
honest mistake in the appreciation of the documents and that there was never any
malice intended in the submission of the questioned documents. In fact, he even
welcomes the referral of the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation so as
to identify the mastermind of the production of the fake decision.

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Calimag should be cited in contempt

Ruling
Yes. Direct contempt, or contempt in facie curiae, is misbehavior committed
in the presence of or so near a court or judge so as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, and can be
punished summarily without hearing. It is conduct directed against or assailing the
authority and dignity of the court or a judge, or in the doing of a forbidden act.

As had been earlier observed, it is insulting to assert a claim before this

Supreme Court based on an obvious and incompetent forgery and conceived by
one with so primitive a sense of what normative standards would pass judicial
muster. We cannot accept counsel's declarations of good faith and honest mistake
since, as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, he is presumed to know
better. He is required to thoroughly prepare himself on the law and facts of his case
and the evidence he will adduce. The minimum he could have done was to verify
with the appropriate authorities the documents upon which his clients based their
claims, and not have relied on his clients' assertions.
RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA
A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC, July 22, 2005
Facts
In a letter to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with copies
thereof furnished all the Associate Justices of the Court and other government
entities, RTC judges and counsels listed thereunder, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who
identified himself as "member, Philippine Bar", expressed his frustrations over the
unfavorable outcome of and the manner by which the Court resolved the cases
filed by him. In the letter, Atty. Sorreda addressed the Chief Justice in this wise:
“Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the aforesaid
case is totally execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty and office
of the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action not of men of reason or those
who believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from whom "might
is right." I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitor's throat
a ruling which, from all appearances, it could not justify.”

Reacting to the above, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August 14,
2001, required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be properly
disciplined "for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by using
vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it". In
response to the "show cause" order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more letters to
the Court dated December 2, 2001 and June 16, 2002, arguing for the propriety of
his action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts of Legal and Judicial
Ethics and Constitutional Law.

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Sorreda should be cited in contempt

Ruling
Yes. Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass
the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their
employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct
contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer's oath
and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Sorreda, as a
citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court,
to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error. But, certainly,
this does not give him the unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and
bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-bound “to act to
preserve its honor and dignity . . . and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the
legal profession”.
 FERDINAND A. CRUZ v. JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON, et al.
G.R. No. 170404, September 28, 2011
Facts
This case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner against his neighbor,
Benjamin Mina, for abatement of nuisance. In the said case, petitioner sought
redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the "basketball goal" which was
permanently attached to the second floor of Mina's residence but protrudes to the
alley which serves as the public's only right of way. After trial, Judge Gingoyon, in
his Decision dated October 21, 2005, declared the basketball goal as a public
nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked "locus standi."
In his Decision, Judge Gingoyon wrote a general description of what happens on
Edang street, where petitioner’s residence is located, to wit: place is bursting with
people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for
recreation, to laze around or [do] their daily household chores . . . . The alleys
become the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults
do all sorts of things to entertain [themselves] or pass the time, their wash area or
even a place to cook food in . . . . Ambulant vendors who display their wares in the
alley and their customers that mill around them; . . . children chasing each other,
dodging and [ducking] from awnings or canopies; . . . clotheslines full of dripping
clothes that encroach [on] the alleys . . . ."

In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner was baffled at how respondent

Judge came to know about these details, and even accused respondent Judge of
communicating with the defendant in the case, Mina. Judge Gingoyon thereafter
found petitioner guilty of contempt.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of contempt

Ruling
Yes. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner with the respondent
court contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating
with the defendant off the record, which is considered as a grave offense. This
allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis. In fact, when asked
to adduce proof of the allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but
repeatedly argued that it is his "fair observation or conclusion." Instead of showing
proof of the alleged communication between Judge Gingoyon and the defendant
off the record, petitioner stubbornly insisted that there is nothing contumacious
about his allegation against the Judge as he was just giving his fair and logical
observation. Clearly, petitioner openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing
without factual basis. Suffice it to say that this accusation is a dangerous one as it
exposes Judge Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from office.
 SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY v. MERLINOE E.
RODRIGUEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 160270, April 23, 2010
Facts
A cargo shipment, described as an “agricultural product” arrived at the Port
of Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Hilda Bacani, respondents’ authorized representative,
wrote BOC Subic Port District Collector Billy Bitbit claiming that she was the
representative of Metro Star Rice Mill (Metro Star), the importer of the subject
cargo. She stated that there was a "misshipment" of cargo which actually contained
rice, and that Metro Star is an authorized importer of rice. Bacani requested that
the "misshipment" be upgraded from "agricultural product" to a shipment of rice,
and at the same time manifested willingness to pay the appropriate duties and
taxes. the BOC issued Hold Order No. 14/C1/2001 1025-101, directing BOC Subic
Port officers to (1) hold the delivery of the shipment, and (2) to cause its transfer to
the security warehouse.

Thereafter, respondent WIRA, the consignee of the shipment, paid the

amount of P259,874 to the BOC representing additional duties and taxes for the
upgraded shipment. On 04 December 2001, Fertony G. Marcelo, OIC of the Cash
Division of BOC Subic Port issued a certification that a Gate Pass was issued with
the signature of the District Collector. Despite the above certification/letter,
petitioner SBMA, through Seaport Department General Manager Augusto Canlas,
refused to allow the release of the rice shipment. Hence, on 11 June 2002,
respondents filed with the RTC of Olongapo City, a complaint for Injunction and
Damages with prayer for issuance of Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and
Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against petitioner
SBMA and Augusto L. Canlas. On June 13, 2002, the Executive Judge of the RTC
of Olongapo, Branch 72, issued a TRO. Augusto L. Canlas, Attys. Francisco A.
Abella, Jr. and Rizal V. Katalbas, Jr. of the SBMA, however, refused to honor the
TRO.

This prompted respondents to file a verified indirect contempt charge against

the aforementioned personnel which was granted by the RTC. The CA agreed.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
Yes. When the TRO issued by the RTC was served upon the SBMA officers
on 13 June 2002, there was already an existing warrant of seizure and detention
(dated 22 May 2002) issued by the BOC against the subject rice shipment. Thus, as
far as the SBMA officers were concerned, exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
shipment remained with the BOC, and the RTC had no jurisdiction over cases
involving said shipment. Consequently, the SBMA officers refused to comply with
the TRO issued by the RTC. Considering the foregoing circumstances, we believe
that the SBMA officers may be considered to have acted in good faith when they
refused to follow the TRO issued by the RTC. The SBMA officers' refusal to
follow the court order was not contumacious but due to the honest belief that
jurisdiction over the subject shipment remained with the BOC because of the
existing warrant of seizure and detention against said shipment. Accordingly, these
SBMA officers should not be held accountable for their acts which were done in
good faith and not without legal basis. Thus, we hold that the RTC Order dated 21
November 2002 which found the SBMA officers guilty of indirect contempt for
not complying with the RTC's TRO should be invalidated.
 RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. FEDERICO A.
SIERRA, et al.
G.R. No. 216124, July 19, 2017
Facts
RCBC filed a motion for execution of the RTC-Makati’s decision in Civil
Case No. 10054. It sought to execute RTC-Makati’s Order directing respondent
Serra to sell to RCBC a parcel of land in Masbate City covered by OCT No. O-
232. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 10054, Serra mortgaged the subject
property to respondent Sps. Anueza. RTC-Makati denied RCBC’s motion for
execution. RCBC then filed a petition for review before the Court assailing the
RTC-Makati’s denial of its motion for execution, which was docketed as G.R. No.
203241. The Court issued a Decision in G.R. No. 203241 which made the earlier
TRO it issued permanent. Pursuant to the said Decision, RCBC filed a new motion
for execution before RTC-Makati.

Meanwhile, acting on the petition for extra-judicial foreclosure, respondents

Atty. Lanuza and Jovito Soriano of RTC-Masbate set the date for the auction sale
of the subject property. The public auction sale proceeded with Anueza being the
highest bidder. Thereafter, Anueza, through counsel, filed a motion for issuance of
a writ of possession over the subject property. Thus, RCBC filed the present
petition for indirect contempt.

Issue
Whether or not respondents are guilty of indirect contempt

Ruling
Yes, but only Serra and Sps. Anueza are guilty of indirect contempt. As
a party in G.R. No. 203241, Serra cannot feign ignorance of the Court's decision
and restraining order in that case. The TRO was issued on 3 December 2012 while
the decision was promulgated on 10 July 2013. By virtue of the TRO, which was
made permanent, Serra was enjoined to perform any act to remove RCBC from the
subject property. Yet, by defaulting on his loan obligation with Andueza, and
Andueza's foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, Serra in effect allowed the
removal of RCBC from the subject property. Serra's conduct tended to impede the
administration of justice by effectively allowing RCBC to be removed from the
premises of the subject property, in contravention of the clear directive in the
decision and restraining order in G.R. No. 203241. Therefore, Serra is guilty of
indirect contempt and accordingly fined P30,000.

Despite being non-parties in G.R. No. 203241, Spouses Andueza have notice
of the pendency of such action. On 14 February 2013, RCBC had the TRO issued
by this Court annotated on OCT No. O-232 under Entry No. 2013000087.
Therefore, Spouses Andueza have actual knowledge of the Court's TRO in G.R.
No. 203241 prior to their filing of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
subject property on 13 August 2013. Further, the decision in G.R. No. 203241 was
promulgated prior to the Spouses Andueza's initiation of foreclosure proceedings.
Spouses Andueza cannot therefore invoke lack of knowledge of RCBC's interest
over the subject property when they filed the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure.
Hence, such knowledge should have prevented, or at the very least cautioned, the
Spouses Andueza from proceeding with the foreclosure which had the effect of
removing RCBC from the property, in contravention of the clear language of the
Court in G.R. No. 203241.
 CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., and PABLO B.
ROMAN, JR. v. MANUEL O. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014
Facts
Respondent, a stockholder of petitioner, filed a petition for the nullification
of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002, and the special meeting of
stockholders on April 23, 2002. On August 12, 2002, respondents filed a motion
for production and inspection of certain documents, which the trial court granted in
an Order dated September 10, 2002. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the August 9, 2002 which denied their motion for preliminary hearing.
Meanwhile, respondent, on October 7, 2002, filed an Omnibus Motion to
immediately allow him to inspect and photocopy the documents and compel
petitioners to deposit with the court the documents subject of the September 10,
2002 Order. On December 9, 2002, the court denied petitioner’s MR and ordered
the immediate implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order. Petitioners
elevated the case to the CA via petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated
August 9, 2002 and December 9, 2002. The CA denied the same in its Decision,
which was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court.

On September 3, 2007, the trial court issued a Resolution, the concluding

portion of which stated that “Failure of the defendants to comply with all the
requirements of the order dated September 10, 2002 will result in this court citing
all the defendants in contempt of court.” Petitioners questioned the Resolution via
petition for certiorari. The CA held that the September 3, 2007 merely warned the
petitioners that they would be cited for contempt for their failure to comply with
the court’s directive.

Issue
Whether or not the September 3, 2007 Resolution effectively cited
petitioners in contempt

Ruling
No. In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been
initiated. To the Court's mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated
as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or
final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the
Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution
petitioners of the consequence of possible non- observance of the long-overdue
order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the
requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to comply with
the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt
proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing
jurisprudence.

Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or

final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt," this would still not work to
petitioners' advantage. Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court lays down the
proper remedy from a judgment in indirect contempt proceedings. the person
adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the
Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously,
these were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making
the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.
 FEDERICO S. ROBOSA, et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (First Division), et al.
G.R. No. 176085, February 8, 2012
Facts
Due to the union’s request for the withdrawal and deferment of CTMI’s
directives, branding them as union busting and acts constituting unfair labor
practice, CTMI issued a notice of termination of employment to the sales drivers
due to the abolition of the sales driver positions. The union and the affected
members then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against CTMI, De Luzuriaga,
and other CTMI officers. The union also moved for the issuance of a TRO. The
NLRC issued a TRO. The respondents, however, did not comply with the NLRC’s
directives. The NLRC upgraded the TRO to a WPI. The respondents moved for
reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite
responsible CTMI in contempt of court. The NLRC heard the contempt charge but
thereafter dismissed the same.

Issue
Whether the NLRC has contempt powers

Ruling
Yes. Under Article 218 22 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor
arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and
impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The penalty for direct
contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on
whether the contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor
Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect
contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate
indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed
only when there is no law granting them contempt powers. As is clear under
Article 218 (d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is
empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or
indirect contempt.
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SEVERINO LISTANA, JR.
G.R. No. 152611, August 5, 2003
Facts
Respondent herein voluntarily offered to sell his land to the government
through the Department of Agrarian Reform. After summary administrative
proceedings, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
set the just compensation of the land and ordered the petitioner bank to pay the said
amount to the herein respondent. Respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the
PARAD when the petitioner failed to comply with the writ of execution. PARAD
granted the motion for contempt, and later on directed the issuance of an arrest
order against petitioner's manager. Petitioner filed a petition for injunction of the
arrest order, which was approved by the trial court. After the respondent's motion
for reconsideration was denied by the court, it filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The appellate court nullified the order of
the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Issue
Whether or not the CA erred

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court granted the present petition. According to the Court,
quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt
can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. In this case, it
was the PARAD that cited petitioner's manager with indirect contempt. Hence, the
contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified motion for contempt filed by
the respondent with the PARAD were invalid.