Abbas v Abbas
GR No. 183896 | Marriage License Exemption
| January 30, 2013
Petitioner: Syed Azhar Abbas
Respondent: Gloria Goo Abbas
Doctrine: The certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the
non-issuance of said license.
Facts:
 Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) seeks
annulment of his marriage to Gloria Goo-
Abbas (Gloria), alleging the absence of a
marriage license, as provided for in Art. 4,
Family Code, as a ground.
o In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and
Syed, it is stated that ML 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite, was
presented to the solemnizing officer.
 At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen,
testified that he met Gloria in Taiwan and
married her there, and arrived in the
Philippines, where his mother-in-law
entered him into a ceremony which he
claimed that he did not know was a
marriage until Gloria told him later.
 He further testified that he did not go to
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in
that area.
o The record in the MCR of Carmona
certifies that 9969967 was the number
of another marriage license issued to
another couple.
 Thus, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the MCR of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and
Syed, as ML 9969967, and the same MCR
had certified that no marriage license had
been issued for Gloria and Syed.
 It also took into account the fact that neither
party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite,
the place where ML 9969967 was issued, in
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.
 As the marriage was not one of those
exempt from the license requirement, and
that the lack of a valid marriage license is
an absence of a formal requisite, the
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9,
1993 was void ab initio. Gloria appealed to
the CA, which granted her appeal and
declared her marriage to Syed valid and
subsisting. Syed filed a MFR to the CA,
which was denied. Hence, the current
petition to the SC.
Issue:
W/N the absence of a valid marriage license still
renders a marriage valid. (NO)
Provisions:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except
those covered by the preceding Chapter.
Held:
 No. The Court cited Arts. 3, 4, and 35(3) of
the Family Code.
 Respondent Gloria failed to present the
actual marriage license, or a copy thereof,
and relied on the marriage contract as well
as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove
the existence of said license.
1
  To prove that no such license was issued, given the weight of evidence presented by
Syed turned to the office of the MCR of petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license
Carmona which had allegedly issued said cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who
license, which issued a certification to the took steps to procure the same. The law must be
effect that no such marriage license for applied. As the marriage license, a formal
Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria
serial number of the marriage license and Syed is void ab initio.)
pertained to another couple.
 In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the
case of Republic, it was held that the
certification of the LCR that their office had
no record of a marriage license was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license.
o The case of Cariño further held that the
presumed validity of the marriage of the
parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage
was valid, and that the required marriage
license had been secured. Gloria has
failed to discharge that burden, and the
only conclusion that can be reached is
that no valid marriage license was issued.
o All the evidence cited by the CA to show
that a wedding ceremony was conducted
and a marriage contract was signed does
not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family
Code is clear.
 As the marriage license, a formal requisite,
is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.

Disposition:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution
dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5,
2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling
the marriage of petitioner with respondent on
January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

(NOTE: As to the motive of Syed in seeking to

annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to
evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent
to prove that they had a valid marriage license,

FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO 2
Republic v. Encelan
GR No. 170022 | Psychological Incapacity |
January 9, 2013
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Cesar Encelan
Doctrine: Psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations.
Facts:
 Cesar Encelan married Lolita on August
25, 1979. They bore two children, Cesar
left for Saudi Arabia to work and support
his family. While abroad he learned of
that Lolita was having an illicit affair with
a man named Alvin Perez. In 1991 Lolita
allegedly left the conjugal home with her
two children to live with Alvin. Since then
Lolita and Cesar were separated.
o On the 16th of June, 1995, Cesar filed
a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity with the
Regional Trial Court.
 At the RTC Lolita denied that she had an
affair and insisted that she is not
psychologically incapacitated and that
she left home due to irreconcilable
differences with her mother. Cesar
presented psychological evaluation
report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda
Fatima Flores of the National Center for
Mental Health.
o Dr. Flores found that Lolita was not
suffering from any form of psychiatric
illness. On June 5, 2002 the RTC
declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita
void, finding sufficient basis to declare
Lolita psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her marital obligations.
 The Office of the Solicitor General
appealed to the Court of Appeals and set
aside the verdict of the RTC, finding that
Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling and infidelity were not serious
cases of personality disorder. Lolita
merely refused to comply with her marital
obligation which she was capable of
doing, not for the nullity of marriage.
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
o The petitioner then sought for
reconsideration and was attained. The
original decision was set aside and
affirmed the RTC’s verdict.
 Cesar then sought for reconsideration
and was attained. The original decision
was set aside and affirmed the RTC’s
verdict.
 Court of Appeals found two
circumstances indicative of Lolita’s
serious psychological incapacity that
resulted in her gross infidelity;
(1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal
to perform her marital obligation to
Cesar, and
(2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate
act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a sufficient basis exist to nullify
Cesar’s marriage on the grounds of psychological
incapacity. (NO)
Provision/s:
Article 36 of the Family Code
A marriage contracted by any two party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Held:
 No. There is no sufficient basis that exists
to annul Cesar’s marriage under the ground
of psychological incapacity, sexual infidelity
and abandonment of conjugal dwelling,
even if true, does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation. For it to
constitute to psychological incapacity, it
must be shown that the unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality
that completely prevented the erring
spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations.
 Article 36 of the Family Code governs
psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
o It provides “A marriage contracted by
any two party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
3
 incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligation of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.”.
o In interpreting the said provision, the
supreme court stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates
“downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligation”, not merely
the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.

Disposition:
Wherefore, we GRANT the petition and SET
ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583.
Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar
Encelan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.

FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO 4
Republic v Dayot
GR No. 175581 | Marriage License Exemption
| March 28, 2008
Petitioner: Republic Of the Philippines
Respondent: Jose A. Dayot
Doctrine: Marriages of exceptional character
are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.
Facts:
 Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the
Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986.
 In lieu of a marriage license, they executed
a sworn affidavit that they had lived
together for at least 5years.
 On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage
with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were
both employees of the National Statistics
and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed
on June 1993 an action for bigamy against
Jose and an administrative complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman.
 On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint
on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he
contended that his marriage with Felisa was
a sham and his consent was secured
through fraud.
Issue:
WON the marriage is void ab initio due to lack of
marriage license. (YES)
Provisions:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless
all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character
Art. 76, Civil Code
No marriage license shall be necessary when a
man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Art 80 (3)
Those solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character
Held:
 The court held that the allegation of the
Republic that as a marriage under a license
is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited
for at least five years as required by law.
o The contrast is flagrant. The former is
with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the
absence of one.
o Here, there is no marriage license at
all.
o Furthermore, the falsity of the
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath. If
the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere
scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no
affidavit at all.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot
to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
5
People v Odtuhan
GR No. 191566 | Bigamous Marriage | July 7,
2013
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Edgardo V. Odtuhan
Doctrine: A declaration of the absolute nullity of
a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. It has
been held in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or
else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
Facts:
 Edgardo V. Odtuhan, respondent, was
married to Jasmin Modina on July 2 ,
1980.
 Respondent Odtuhan also married Eleanor
Alagon in October 28 , 1993.
 In August 1994, respondent filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage with Jasmin
Modina.
 RTC of Pasig City Branch 70 granted
petition and declared Odtuhan’s marriage
with Modina void ab inito for lack of a valid
marriage license.
 Eleanor Alagon died on November 10 ,
2003.
 Private complainant Evelyn Abesamis
Alagon learned of Odtuhan’s previous
marriage with Jasmine Modina in June
2003 , thus charged Odtuhan with
Bigamy.
 Odtuhan filed an OMNUBUS MOTION
praying that he be allowed to present
evidence to support his motion and grant
his motion to quash.
 RTC ordered denial of Odtuhan’s Omnibus
Motion.
 Odtuhan filed a civil action on certiorari
to the Court of Appeals assailing the
denial of his motion to quash despite his
first marriage being declared null and void
before he was charged with bigamy.
 Dec 17, 2009- CA ordered RTC to give due
course to and receive evidence of
Odtuhan’s motion to quash and resolve the
case with dispatch.
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
 March 4 , 2010- CA committed reversible
error when it rendered its first decision
granting Odtuhan’s petition for certiorari.
Issue: WoN Respondent’s first marriage void ab
initio did not extinguish respondent’s criminal
liability of Bigamous Marriage.
Provisions:
Family Code Art 13
In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth or
baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding, article, the death certificate of the
deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or
her previous marriage. In case the death
certificate cannot be secured, the party shall
make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance
and his or her actual civil status and the name
date of death of the deceased spouse.
Family Code Art 35 (6)
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void
under Article 53
Family Code Art 53:
Ether of the former spouses may marry again
after complying with the requirements of the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Held:
The Family Code has settled once and for all
the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
 A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense.
 It has been held in a number of cases that
a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy
is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. Parties to the marriage should not
6
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity
of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Court of Appeals Decision dated December
17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for
further proceedings.

FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO 7
Alcantara v Alcantara
GR No. 167746 | Marriage License and
Solemnizing Officer | August 28, 2007
Petitioner: Restituto Alcantara
Respondent: Rosita Alcantara and CA
Doctrine: The solemnizing officer is not duty-
bound to investigate whether or not a marriage
license has been duly and regularly issued by the
local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer
needs to know is that the license has been issued
by the competent official, and it may be presumed
from the issuance of the license that said official
has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements
of law.
Facts:
 Petitioner claims that on December 8, 1982,
without securing a marriage permit, went to
Manila City Hall to look for someone to
arrange their marriage.
 They met a person who, for a fee, rranged
their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the
CDCC BR Chapel and got married on the
same day. Petitioner and respondent went
through a second marriage ceremony in
Tondo, Manila on March 26, 1983.
 Petitioner claims it was also celebrated
without a marriage license. The alleged
license was procured in Cavite, but neither
of them are residents of the area.
 On Oct 14, 1985, respondent gave birth to
their child Rose Ann Alcantara but parted
ways on 1988 living separate lives.
 Petitioner filed for annulment for lack of the
marriage certificate but the RTC of Makati
City dismissed the case.
 The Court of Appeals held that the marriage
license of the parties is presumed to be
regularly issued and petitioner had not
presented any evidence to overcome the
presumption.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the marriage is valid despite the
fact Marriage License No. 7054133 was not used
as evidence in trial, and was not the Marriage
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
License No. appearing on the face of the
Marriage contract.
Provisions:
Old Civil Code
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless
all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but
not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by
the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides.
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen
and fourteen years by the male and female
respectively, even with the consent of the
parents;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages;
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character;
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not
falling under Article 83, Number
2;
(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81;
(6) Those where one or both contracting parties
have been found guilty of the killing of the spouse
of either of them;
(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters
and other marriages specified in Article 82.
Held:
 Valid. In this case, the marriage contract
between the parties reflects a marriage
license number.
 A certification to this effect was also issued
by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. Additionally, the petitioner, by
counsel, admitted that marriage license
was indeed issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of
8
 the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of the
10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage.
 An irregularity does not affect the validity of
marriage. Court also rules that the
petitioner cannot pretend he was not
responsible for his actions.
o They even got married twice and less
than a year. Petitioner admitted into
the civil marriage willingly.
o He knowingly and voluntarily went to
the Manila City Hall and went through
a marriage ceremony.
o The petitioner is an educated person,
and is an engineer by profession.
o He cannot benefit from his actions and
be allowed to pull himself out of the
marriage at his mere say-so when the
situation is no longer to the favor of his
lifestyle. The presumption is always in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
 The solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage
license has been duly and regularly issued
by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that
the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed
from the issuance of the license that said
official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled
the requirements of law.

Disposition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February
2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO 9
Enrico v Heirs of Sps. Eulogio and Trinidad
Medinaceli
GR No. 173614 | AM No. 02-11-10-SC |
September 28, 2007
Petitioner: Lolita Enrico
Respondents: Heirs of Spouses Eulogio B.
Medinaceli and Trinidad Cali-Medinaceli
Doctrine: A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application.
Facts:
 It is petition assailing the RTC’s
reinstatement order on the formerly
dismissed filed action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between the petitioner
and respondents father. Eulogio Medinaceli
and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, were married
on June 14, 1962, begotten seven children.
Trinidad died on May 1, 2004; Eulogio
married another woman named Lolita
Enrico on August 26, 2004. Six months
later, Eulogio passed away.
 Respondents filed an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage between Petitioner
and the respondent’s late father on two
grounds: 1. that the marriage lacks the
requisite of marriage license, and; 2. the
lack of marriage ceremony due to
respondent’s father serious illness that
made its performance impossible.
 Loleta, defend her stand by citing Article 34
of the family code arguing her exemption
from getting marriage license. She sought
then the dismissal of the respondent’s filed
action by citing the AM-02-11-10-SC, Sec.
2, par. (a) Rule of the family code.
 Pursuant to “AM-02-11-10-SC” embodied
the rule on declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages.
 RTC dismissed the respondents filed
action. Respondents filed motion for
reconsideration invoking the ruling in the
case of Niñal v. Bayadog, holding that the
heirs of a deceased spouse have the
standing to assail a voidable marriage even
after death of one of the spouses. RTC
granted the motion and issued an order for
reinstatement of the case. Petitioner filed
motion for reconsideration but denied,
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
thereby petitioner assailed a petition
directly to Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not respondent heirs can
assail the validity of said marriage after
the death of Eulogio. (YES)
(2) Whether which of the two rule “AM 02-11-
10-SC” or “Niñal v. Bayadog” shall
govern the instant case. (NO)
Provisions:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
[Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Held:
(1) NO. Respondent/heirs have NO legal
standing to assail the validity of the second
marriage after the death of their father;
because the rule on “AM 02-11-10-SC”
shall govern the said petition, under the
Family Code of the Philippines. Particularly
Sec 2, par. (a) Provides that a petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void
Marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
(2) Question: Why the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC
should govern this case not the held
decision on Niñal v. Bayadog case whereas
the two cases expressed a common cause
of issue?
10
  Here the court resolved that; in Niñal v.
Bayadog case the heirs were allowed
to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their father’s second marriage
even after their father’s death because
the impugned marriage there was
solemnized prior to the affectivity of
the Family Code. Unlike in this case
Enrico v Heirs of Medinaceli where
same holding cannot be applied
because the marriage here was
celebrated in 2004 where the Family
Code is already effective and under
family code is embodied the rule on
“AM 02-11-10-SC” where this rule
shall govern petitions for the
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages.
 Nonetheless, as the heirs major
concern here, the court supplied; that
the heirs have still remedy to protect
their successional rights not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity,
but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.

Diposition:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil
Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is
ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to
challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita
D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
latter. No costs.

FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO 11
Nial v Bayadog
Gr No. 133778 | Declaration of Nullity | March
14, 2000
Petitioner: Enrico Nial, Guardian ad Lietm of the
Minors Babylin, Ingrid. Archie, & Pepito Nial
Respondent: Norma Bayadog
Doctrine: Void marriages are deemed to have
not taken place and cannot be the source of
rights. It can be questioned even after the death
of one of the parties and any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage.
Facts:
 Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa
Bellones on September 26, 1974.
 They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid
and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot
inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter
died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children
under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1
year and 8 months later, Pepito and
 Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. They instituted an
affidavit stating that they had lived together
for at least 5 years exempting from securing
the marriage license. Pepito died in a car
accident on February 19, 1977.
 After his death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of
action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already
dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of
plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from
assailing the validity of the second marriage after
it was dissolved due to their father's death.
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
Provision/s:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice
shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any
impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
Held:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for
absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit
and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had
started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their
five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his
marriage to Norma is still void.
The applicable law, for the determination of
marriage, is the Civil Code and not the Family
Code. (In determining the validity of marriage, it
is to be tested by the law in force at the time the
marriage was contracted. There is no second
marriage. The absence of a marriage license
renders marriage void ab initio. The exemption for
a marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the
one described by the Civil Code because the
cohabitation, after the first marriage, was only
twenty months whereas the law requires five
years. If the respondent took into consideration
the other years and months before the second
marriage, then the cohabitation would include the
period of the first marriage. This is in violation of
the law. Separation in fact (not the legal
separation) by the first marriage does not count
cohabitation.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order
of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
12
Corpuz v Sto. Tomas
GR No. 186571 | Validity and Applicability of
Foreign Judgment | August 11, 2010
Petitioner: Gerbert R. Corpuz
Respondents: Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas
Doctrine: The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
Facts:
 Petitioner, Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino
who is now a Canadian through
naturalization, married Respondent,
Daisyliyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina from Pasig
city. After they got married, petitioner went
back to Canada because of his work. He
returned after a few months to surprise his
wife (respondent), but he was shoecked
after he found out that she was having an
affair, petitioner left for Canada again to file
for divorce, which took effect on January 8,
2006.
 After a couple of years, petitioner moved on
and sonsequently found another woman
whom he wants to marry. Petitioner went
back to the Philippines to register his
Canadian divorce in the Pasig Civil
Registry. However, an official of the NSO
informed the petitioner that a marriage
between him and the respondent still exist
under the Philippine Law, and is still
enforceable, despite the registration of
divorce. According to the official, foreign
divorce decrees must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine Court
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4 Series of
1982.
 Petitioner filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce/declaration of
marriage but was denied by the RTC. RTC
stated that only a Filipino spouse can avail
the remedy according to Art 26 of the Civil
Code.
Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. (NO)
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
Provisions:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon
a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order
against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
Art. 17 of the Civil Code
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.
Held:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second
paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because
the substantive right it establishes is in favour of
the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family
Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The petitioner, being a
naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by
the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of
foreign divorce decree with conformity to alien’s
national law.
13
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line
when it registered the foreign decree of divorce
on the petitioner and respondent’s marriage
certificate without judicial order recognizing the
said decree. The registration of the foreign
divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is void.

The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the

RTC decision is reversed and Court ordered t6he
remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in light of the ruling.

Disposition:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review
on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.

FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO 14

Fujiki v Marinay
GR No. 196049 | Recognition of Foreign
Judgment declaring Nullity of Marriage | June
26, 2013
Petitioner: Minoru Fujiki
Respondents: Mari paz Marinay, Shinichi
Maekara, LCR of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO.
Doctrine: Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with
an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and
(2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment.
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese
national who married respondent, Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23
January 2004. The marriage was at first not
accepted by the petitioner’s parents, thus,
petitioner could not bring his wife to Japan where
he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara prompting her to leave him.
She then subsequently regained contact with the
petitioner and they were able to rekindle their
relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki
filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” The petitioner
prayed that:
(1) The Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay
and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines; and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO).
*DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition
for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Provision/s:
(1.) FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
(2.) FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O.
No. 209 as amended):
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages
not falling under Article 41;
xxxx
15
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person
during subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
Held:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court
held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply
if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages
are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
2. Yes. “The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact.”
Rule 108, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons that have
been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction
of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. According
to the court, there is no doubt that the prior
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from
it.
(3) Yes. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an
action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under
foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine
courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under
foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party
to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts
are limited to the question of whether to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines.
In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country,
Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only
determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
16
People v Zamoranos
GR Nos 193902, 193908, 194075 | Muslim
Marriage & Divorce | June 1, 2011
Petitioner: ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS
Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.
Doctrine: If both parties are Muslims, there is a
presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law
is complied with. If together with it or in addition
to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines,
in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage
rites whichever comes first is the validating rite
and the second rite is merely ceremonial one.
But, in this case, as long as both parties are
Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect,
two situations will arise, in the application of this
Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both
parties are Muslims and when the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A
third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the
Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce
of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
the Civil Code.
Facts:
Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim
convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos
was a Roman Catholic who had converted to
Islam. Subsequently, the two wed again, this
time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio
(Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman
obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of
their marriage was confirmedy
theShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which issued a
Decree of Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married
anew. As she had previously done in her first
nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson
Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the
Bureau of Customs where she worked, under
Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte.
Thereafter, in order to strengthen the ties of their
marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed
their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before
Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City.
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
However, unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to
De Guzman, the union between her and
Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely:
Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship
between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour
and the two were de facto separated. The volatile
relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum
escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their
minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and
Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement
which vested primary custody of the children in
the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights
thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on
Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a
criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and
disbarment from the civil service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the
Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor
Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution, finding
prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for
Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for
Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the
RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration
of a Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision
in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of
Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and
De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the
time of their marriage, whose marital relationship
was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Issue/s: WoN the marriage of Zamoranos to
Pacasum is bigamous? (NO)
Held:
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by
Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment
made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which
heard the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his
marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous
marriage. In that case, the decision of which is
17
already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2,
Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was
the Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction
over the subject matter thereof.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
which heard the case for Bigamy, should have
taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of
the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is
a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim,
De Guzman, was valid and recognized under
Islamic law. In fact, the same court further
declared that Zamoranos' divorce from De
Guzman validly severed their marriage ties.
From the foregoing declarations of all three
persons in authority, two of whom are officers of
the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim
who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under
Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature,
consequences, and incidents of such marriage
are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in
criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense.
In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on
Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim,
and her marriage to De Guzman was governed
by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth,
and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim status should
have been apparent to both lower courts, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy
dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and
has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should
haveuspendedtheproceedings until Pacasum
had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De
Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit
Court and had successfully shown that it had not
been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq
entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in
the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
the advancement and effective participation of
the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the
State shall consider their customs, traditions,
beliefs and interests in the formulation and
implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the
regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the
offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal
recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim
Filipinos.
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book,
unequivocally state that one of the effects of
irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of
divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,
entitling one to remarry.
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos'
divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an
Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit
Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was
valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum
in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for
the crime of Bigamy.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is
GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No. 194075 is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for
Bigamy is GRANTED.
18
Republic v Pangasinan
GR No. 214077 | Psychological Incapacity |
August 10, 2016
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Danilo A. Pangasinan
Doctrine: A person's psychological incapacity to
comply with his or her essential obligations, as
the case may be, in marriage must be rooted on
a medically or clinically identifiable grave illness
that is incurable and shown to have existed at the
time of marriage, although the manifestations
thereof may only be evident after marriage.
Totality of Evidence to establish the psychological
incapacity of the parties
What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
Facts:
 On December 29, 1981, Danilo and
Josephine contracted a civil marriage
 Sometime in September 2007, Josephine
underwent hysterectomy. Danilo flew to
tacloban for a business trip. As it turned out,
Josephine did not want him to leave. Danilo
came home to find an irate Josephine
seething at him. Josephine's sudden
demand to see his bank passbook so
enraged Danilo that he tossed the
passbook in front of her. Josephine, in turn,
became incensed and started to curse and
berate him. Out of anger and exasperation,
Danilo grabbed and smashed two glass
cups beside him, while Josephine
continued on with her tirade against him.
Josephine left the conjugal home the next
day, never to resume cohabitation with
Danilo.
 Josephine filed a number of cases against
Danilo, viz: two cases for violation of
Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence
against Women and Their Children Act of
2004 and a petition for annulment in all of
which she would withdraw. Subsequently,
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
however,she filed an action for legal
separation
 Danilo filed a petition dated May 25, 2011
before the RTC, praying for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Josephine on the
ground of the latter's psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Issue/s: Whether or not the totality of evidence
presented warrants, determined the declaration
of nullity of Danilo and Josephine's marriage
based on their psychological incapacity under
Art.36 of the Family Code. (NO)
Provisions:
Art. 36 of the Family Code
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence
against Women and Their Children Act of
2004
Section 3. (a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who
is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty
Held:
The present case, the Court finds that the totality
of evidence presented is insufficient to establish
Josephine and Danilo's psychological incapacity.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental—not merely
physical—incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
19
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed in Article 68 of the Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.
In Molina, the Court laid down guidelines in the
disposition of psychological incapacity:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.
The totality of evidence presented fails to
establish the psychological incapacity of the
parties
The stringency by which the Court assesses the
sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is
necessitated by the pronouncement in our
Constitution that marriage is an inviolable
institution protected by the State. It cannot be
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially
where the pieces of evidence presented are
grossly deficient to show the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
condition of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume and
perform the essential marital duties. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of its existence and
continuation and against its dissolution and
nullity.
Danilo's characterization of his wife, without
more, is insufficient to constitute psychological
incapacity. At most, it merely establishes that
their personalities are different and that their
frequent arguments and differences in handling
finances and managing their business affairs
were money-related. No less than Danilo's own
sister, Gatus, narrated during her interview with
Dr. Dayan that the couple's problems started
when Danilo's business began to slow down and
he began to have difficulty supporting his family
at the same level they were used to. Thus, it
appears that her "incapacity" surfaced only in the
latter years of marriage when they experienced
difficulties in their business ventures.
It has been held that mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" does not constitute psychological
incapacity nor does failure of the'parties to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married
persons. These differences do not rise to the level
of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and are not manifestations thereof
which may be a ground for declaring their
marriage void. If at all, these are difficulties that
couples ordinarily deal with in the course of their
marriage.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 99739 is SET ASIDE.
The basic petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage commenced by Danilo A. Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 11-0205 is DENIED. The parties
are enjoined to comply with the Compromise
Agreement dated December 8, 2011, excluding
paragraph 3 thereof which is declared to be
inoperative and without legal force and effect.
20
Silverio v Republic
GR No. 174689 | Change of Name, Change Of
Sex and Marriage | July 4, 2013
Petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
Doctrine: Marriage, one of the most sacred
social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman.
One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity
of the contracting parties who must be a male and
a female. To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex
reassignment.
Facts:
 Rommel Silverio, petitioner, filed a petition
to change his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The case recognized the civil
registrar of Manila as the respondent.
 Silverio states in his petition that he was
born in the City of Manila on April 4, 1962.
His parents, Melecio Silverio and Anita
Dantes, registered his name in the
certificate of live birth as “Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio.” Silverio’s sex at birth was
registered as “male.”
 In Silverio’s petition, he alleges that he is a
male transsexual and that he identified
himself as a girl since childhood. Through
his petition, he wants to change his name to
“Mely” and his sex to “female.” Before the
he filed the petition, he underwent multiple
surgeries and medical operations in the
United States and Bangkok, Thailand to
complete his transformation into a
“woman.” Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a
plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, issued a medical certificate to
prove Silverio’s operations.
 Silverio continued to live as a “female” and
was engaged to his American boyfriend,
Richard Edel.
 The trial date was published in a newspaper
of general circulation in Metro Manila for
three consecutive weeks. The trial was then
heard without objections and/or
oppositions, and with all jurisdictional
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
requirements established. The RTC ruled in
favor of Silverio.
 On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the
Philippines, thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA. It argued that there is
no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
 On February 23, 2006, CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the RTC lacked legal basis for its
decision. Silverio moved for reconsideration
but was denied.
 Silverio claims that the change of his name
and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Art. 407 – 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court,
and RA 9048.
Issue/s: Whether or not the entries pertaining to
sex and first name in the birth certificate may be
changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
(NO)
Provision/s:
Art. 376 of the Civil Code: No person can
change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
Art. 412 of the Civil Code: No entry in the civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
RA 9048: Clerical Error Law
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of
such entries finds no support in existing
legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL
GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY
AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT
NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed.
This law provides that it should be the local civil
registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the
change of first names and not the regular courts.
Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his first
name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even
21
assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot
be granted still because the ground upon which it
is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of
those provided for by the law. Under the law, a
change of name may only be grounded on the
following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname
to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name
or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the
above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment
as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition
before the regular courts or a petition for the local
civil registry. Not with the courts because there is
no law to support it. And not with the civil registry
because there is no clerical error involved.
Silverio was born a male hence it was just but
right that the entry written in his birth certificate is
that he is a male. The sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there
is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial
legislation. To grant the changes sought by
Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It
will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-
to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code
on employment of women, certain felonies under
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131
of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if Silverio’s
petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name
and sex to conform to his reassigned sex, it has
to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in
turn governing the conferment of that privilege.”
On Essential Requisite and Validity of
Marriage
The changes sought by petitioner will have
serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself
found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male
fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman.
One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity
of the contracting parties who must be a male and
a female. To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws
which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code and the presumption of survivorship in case
of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, among others. These laws underscore the
public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were
to be granted.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
22
Republic v Albios
GR No. 19870 | Validity of Marriage on the
Purpose of Acquiring Foreign Citizenship |
October 16, 2013
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Liberty D. Albios
Doctrine: A “freely given” consent requires that
the contracting parties are willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent
must be real and it’s neither vitiated nor defective
pursuant to Articles 45 & 46 of the Family Code.
Furthermore, consent must be conscious or
intelligent, the contracting parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature
of and both the beneficial and consequences of
their acts.
Facts:
 On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American
citizen, and Albios were married, as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On
December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the
RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Fringer, alleging that
immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and
wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital
obligations.
 Fringer did not file his answer. On
September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion
to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-
trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her
counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite
being duly notified of the schedule.
 The RTC declared the marriage void ab
initio. The RTC opined that the parties
married each other for convenience only.
Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship and that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she
did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the
latter never processed her petition for
citizenship.
 The OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
found that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of lack or no consent. (NO)
Provision/s:
Family Code
Article 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless
these essential requisites are present:
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of
the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(3) That the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards,
with full knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was
obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or
ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction
by final judgment of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that
at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by
a man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible
disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the
time of the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism
existing at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
23
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the marriage is valid
on the ground that Article 2 of the Family Code is
present. Under said Article 2 of the FC, consent
is an essential requisite wherein there must; first,
“freely given” consent; and second, made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. Hence, a
“freely given” consent requires the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real and not vitiated
or defective under Articles 45 & 46 of the Family
Code. Also, Consent must be conscious or
intelligent; the contracting parties must be
capable of understanding the nature and both
beneficial and consequences of their acts.

In the case at bar, the consent was not lacking

between Albios and Fringer. It was a real consent
because it wasn’t vitiated nor rendered defective
consent. Also, the consent was conscious and
intelligent, as they understand the nature and
beneficial and unfavorable consequences of their
marriage. That their consent was freely given is
best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring citizenship through their marriage.
Therefore, there was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie.

Furthermore, the SC said that there is no law that

declares a marriage if it is entered for purposes
other than what Constitution or law declared,
such as acquisition of American Citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is
not void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law, it shall declared void.

Disposition:
Wherefore the petition is granted. The decision of
the CA is annulled and civil case is dismissed for
lack of merit

FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO 24
Morigo v People
GR No. 145226 | Bigamy and Judicial
Declaration of Nullity | February 06, 2004
Petitioner: Lucio Morigo y Cacho
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Doctrine: The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration
of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage
for which petitioner might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage.
Facts:
 Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete
met each other in 1974 at Bohol as
boardmates. Years later, after losing
contact, they exchanged letters leading to
their relationship. In 1990, Lucia came back
to the Philippines from Canada and
proposed to petition appellant to join her
there.
 They agreed to get married on Aug. 30,
1990 at Bohol. After a while, Lucia reported
back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind. A year later, Lucia
filed with the Ontario Court a petition for
divorce against appellant which was
granted by the court on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
 On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago. Roughly
a year later, on September 21, 1993,
accused-appellant Morigo filed a complaint
for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
in the RTC of Bohol.
 The complaint seeks the declaration of
nullity of accused's marriage with Lucia, on
the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place. The trial court annulled
his marriage to Lucia. Subsequently, on
October 19, 1993, appellant was charged
with Bigamy filed in the RTC of Bohol.
 He argued that he could not be convicted of
the crime of bigamy since he relied on
Lucia’s foreign divorce decree, making his
second marriage done through a mistake in
the interpretation of law which should result
in good faith. Accused Morigo moved for
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case, which was denied by the Court and
found him guilty of the crime of Bigamy.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
seeks a reversal of the lower court’s
decision.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not there was a valid marriage
between Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete? (NO)
(2) Whether or not accused-appellant Lucio
Morigo committed bigamy? (NO)
Provision/s:
Arts. 36, 15,& 17 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines; Art. 3, 4 & 40 of the Family Cod.
Held:
(1) NO. Petitioner Morigo's marriage to Lucia
cannot be held as a valid marriage. No marriage
ceremony was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. They merely signed a
marraige contract on their own. The mere private
act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage. Their marriage must be declared
void ab initio.
(2) NO. The first element of bigamy as a crime
requires that the accused must have been legally
married. In the case at bar, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete since their
marriage was held by the trial court as void ab
initio or void from the beginning. Thus, there is no
first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null and
bears no legal effect. Hence, petitioner Morigo
was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
his second marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage
being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no
first marriage to speak of.
25
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
as well as the resolution of the appellate court
dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the
charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt
has not been proven with moral certainty.

FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO 26
Mallion v Alcantara
GR No. 141528 | Final Judgment on Nullity of
Marriage on the grounds under Psychological
Incapacity | October 31, 2006
Petitioner: Oscar P. Mallion
Respondent: Editha Alcantara
Doctrine: When material facts or questions in
issue in a former action were conclusively settled
by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or
questions constitute res judicata and may not
again be litigated in subsequent action between
the same parties or their privies regardless of the
form of the latter
Facts:
 Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City
seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Editha Alcantara under Article
36 of the Family Code, citing Editha’s
alleged psychological incapacity. The case
was docketed Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the
petition upon the finding that Oscar “failed
to adduce preponderant evidence to
warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking.”
The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals
was likewise dismissed in a resolution for
failure of Oscar to pay the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period.
 After the decision attained finality, Oscar
filed another petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage with the RTC of San
Pablo City, this time alleging that his
marriage with Editha was null and void due
to the fact that it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license. In Editha’s part, an
answer with a motion to dismiss the petition
on the ground of res judicta and forum
shopping. The RTC granted her motion to
dismiss the petition. A motion for
reconsideration was again filed by Oscar
but it was also denied. He argues that while
the relief prayed for in the two cases was
the same (declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Editha), the cause of action in
the earlier case was distinct and separate
from the cause of action in the present case
because the operative facts upon which
they were based as well as the evidence
required to sustain either were different.
FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO
Because there is no identity as to the cause
of action, he claims that res judicata does
not lie to bar the second petition. In this
connection, he maintains that there was no
violation of the rule on forum shopping or of
the rule which proscribes the splitting of a
cause of action.
 On the other hand, Editha counters that
while the present suit is anchored on a
different ground, it still involves the same
issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
that is, the validity of their marriage, and
prays for the same remedy, that is, the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. She
contends that Oscar violated the rule on
forum shopping. Moreover, she asserts that
he violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as
the ground he cites in this petition could
have been raised during the trial in Civil
Case No. SP 4341-95.
Issue: WoN a previous final judgment denying a
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
lack of marriage license? (YES)
Provision/s:
Article 4. The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Article 35(2). The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning:
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted wit either or both
parties believing in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do
so;
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
27
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
Held:
necessary to sustain the first petition which was
anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity
of respondent is different from the evidence
necessary to sustain the present petition which is
anchored on the purported absence of a marriage
license.

Yes. Petitioner insists that because the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
absence of marriage license constitute separate
causes of action, the present case would not fall
under the prohibition against splitting a single
cause of action nor would it be barred by the
principle of res judicata.
Res judicata is defined as “a matter adjudged; a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the
rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits
by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
of the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits on points and matters determined in
the former suit.” xxx
… Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior
judgment obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the
former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order
onthemerits; and (4) there is — between the first
and the second actions — identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action.
Petitioner is simply invoking different grounds for
the same cause of action. In both petitions,
petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs
is the ground upon which the cause of action is
predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner
essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal
issue that holds the key to the resolution of this
controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner
and respondent’s marriage. Moreover, in the first
petition, the petitioner impliedly conceded that the
marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by
this admission. The alleged absence of a
marriage license which petitioner raises now
could have been presented and heard in the
earlier case.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the

first three requisites. What is in issue is the
presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the
test to determine whether the causes of action
are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether
there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts
or evidence would sustain both, the two actions
are considered the same, and a judgment in the
first case is a bar to the subsequent action. Based
on this test, petitioner would contend that the two
petitions brought by him seeking the declaration
of nullity of his marriage are anchored on
separate causes of action for the evidence

FIRST YEAR GO3 DLSU | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – JUDGE AGUINALDO 28