Rule 110
brought in the name of the People of the
Section 1. Institution of Criminal Actions
Criminal actions shall be instituted as
follows:
(a) For offenses where a preliminary
investigation is required pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 112, by filing the
complaint with the proper authority for
the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation.
(b) For all other offenses, by filing the
complaint or information directly with
the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the
complaint with the office of the
prosecutor. In Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint shall be
filed with the office of the prosecutor
unless otherwise provided in their
charters.
The institution of the criminal action shall
interrupt the running period of
prescription of the offense charged unless
otherwise provided in special laws. (1a)
This section does not apply to offenses
which are subject to summary procedure.
The period of prescription of municipal
or city ordinance, being subject to the rule
on summary procedure, is two months (Act
No. 3326). It is interrupted by the
institution of judicial proceeding against
the offender.
On the other hand, the prescriptive period
for offenses covered by Section 1, Rule 112
is interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the appropriate officer for
preliminary investigation.
While the information is not quashable if not
Philippines, if the information is grossly
deficient, the same may be quashed for
failure to conform with the prescribed
form.
The information must be “against all
persons who appear to be responsible for
the offense involved.” While the fiscal
(prosecutor) has discretion to determine who
should be included in the information, he
can be compelled by mandamus if he
abuses his discretion by refusing to
include a person as a co-accused despite
sufficient evidence thereof; such inclusion
may be demanded by those charge in
information (Guiao vs. Figueroa).
However before the mandamus may be
resorted to, the petitioner must exhaust all
remedies in the ordinary course of law by
filing a motion in the trial court for such
inclusion.
Where the fiscal refuses to file an
information, or to include a person as an
accused therein despite the fact that the
evidence clearly warrants such action, the
offended party has the following
remedies:
1. In case of grave abuse of discretion
by the fiscal, may file an action for
mandamus to compel fiscal to file
such information.
2. He many lodge a new complaint
against the offenders before the court
having jurisdiction over the case and
have anew examination conducted as
required by law.
3. He may take up the matter with
Secretary of Justice who may take
measures in the interest of justice.
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 4. He may institute administrative
charges against the erring prosecutor.
5. He may file criminal charges under
art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code.
6. He may file a civil action for
damages under art. 27 of the Revised
Penal Code.
7. He may secure appointment of
another prosecutor.
8. He may institute another criminal
action if no double jeopardy is
involved.
Writs of injunction or prohibition to
restrain a criminal prosecution are
generally not available.
Except (Brocka et al. vs. Enrile):
a. To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused.
b. When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions.
c. When there is a pre-judicial question
which is sub judice.
d. When the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority.
e. Where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation.
f. When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent.
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction
over the offense.
h. Where it is a case of persecution
rather than prosecution.
i. Where the charges are manifestly
false and motivated by lust for
vengeance.
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie
case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has
been denied.
Where the Ombudsman authorized the
Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation or to file an information in the
case at bar, the latter is vested with
discretion and is endowed with competence
to determine whether the complainant filed
is sufficient in form and substance to merit
such referral.
The Ombudsman himself may dismiss the
complaint in the first instance if in his
judgment the acts or omissions complained
of are not illegal, unjust, improper or are
sufficient.
The Special Prosecutor, in case of referral of
the complaint, may also dismiss the same on
proper grounds after the requisite
investigation and adjudicatory
proceedings.
But is emphasized by the Ombudsman,
the evidence presented during the
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preliminary investigation constitute very
valid grounds to charge the accused and
her co-accused, no compelling reason
would exist for the court to rule
otherwise.
Section 2. A complaint is a sworn written
statement charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the offended party,
any peace officer, or other public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law
violated.
Section 3. An information is an accusation
in writing charging a person an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor and filed
with the court.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the prosecutor need not be
filed by the offended party, but may be filed
by any competent person, unless the subject
thereof cannot be prosecuted de officio.
Where the accused is acquitted or the case
was dismissed, the capability of the
offended party to question that acquittal
or dismissal is limited only to the civil
aspect of the case.
For that matter, while an appeal may be
taken only by the State from the dismissal of
the criminal aspect of the case, the
complainant may appeal the civil aspect
of the case separately.
R.A. 732 which required the filing of an
information in addition to the complaint
has been amended by R.A. 5180.
In case of variance between the complaint
filed by the offended party and to
information in crimes against chastity, the
complaint controls.
Variance between the allegations in such
complaint and the information should not be
a ground for dismissal as the prosecution
should be based on the complaint.
Prosecution in the RTC is always
commenced by information. Except certain
crimes against chastity:
1. Concubinage
2. Adultery
3. Seduction,
4. Abduction; and
5. Acts of lasciviousness
and defamations, imputing any of the
aforesaid offenses wherein a sworn written
complaint is required in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 110.
The mere fact that the certification of the
investigating fiscal is defective (it refers to a
preliminary investigation having conducted
with only one of the two accused, or is
incomplete, or where the information did not
even contain the requisite certification by
the investigating fiscal) is not necessarily
fatal.
The lack of certification is not a
jurisdictional defect, but it may be a
ground for a motion to quash.
Section 5.
The fiscal/prosecutor assumes full discretion
and control over a case.
(1) He determines whether prima facie
case exists or not;
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(2) whether to move for dismissal of
insufficiency of evidence;
(3) to present such evidence as he
considers necessary;
(4) to move for dismissal of a case filed in
the Court of First Instance after
preliminary investigation by a municipal
court;
(5) or to reinvestigate a case dismissed
after preliminary investigation by a
municipal court or elevated by said court
to CFI.
As a general rule, the power vested in the
fiscal cannot be interfered with even by the
courts nor by the Secretary of Justice.
A fiscal cannot be compelled to file a
criminal information and prosecute the case
where he is convinced that he does not have
the necessary evidence.
The better procedure is to appeal the
fiscal’s decision to the Department of
Justice and/or ask for a special
prosecutor.
Where however, the information has been
already been filed in court, said court
acquires jurisdiction until the termination of
the case.
Hence neither prohibition or mandamus
lies against the fiscal to control the action in
connection with the said case since he has
no more control over it and any relief
desired by any party thereto should be
addressed by the trial court.
Thus, whether the accused has been
arraigned or not, and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by
the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss the case was filed in court, the
court in the exercise of sound discretion
may grant or deny it and require that the
trial on the merits proceed.
It has been settled in the Crespo case that the
trial court is the sole judge on whether a
criminal case should be dismissed after the
complaint or information has been filed in
court, nonetheless any motion of the
offended party for the dismissal of the
criminal case even if without the objection
of the accused, should first be referred to
the prosecuting fiscal. Only after hearing
the fiscal should the court exercise its
exclusive authority to dismiss or continue
with the prosecution of the case.
The offended party who has neither
reserved, waived, nor instituted the civil
action may intervene and such right to
intervene exists even when no civil
liability is involved (such as threats).
But where the civil interest of the principal
in the criminal case is not present, as where
he has filed a separate action, there can be
no intervention by the private prosecutor
and the act of the court permitting
intervention under such circumstances
constitutes grave abuse of discretion
correctable by certiorari and prohibition.
Such intervention includes the active
conduct of the case with the permission of
the fiscal, but copies of the pleadings in
the case are served on the fiscal and the
accused, the private prosecutor not being
entitled to a copy thereof as a matter of
right.
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But where the accused pleaded guilty upon
arraignment, although there was an
appearance by a private prosecutor, such
appearance does not constitute the active
intervention as would impart an intention
to press the claim for civil liability in said
case and could not, therefore, bar the
institution of a separate civil action for
damages ex delicto.
The offended party cannot appeal from
an order dismissing the criminal case
granted on motion of the fiscal, especially
where he has filed a civil action arising from
the same act, or where the offended party
has died, since aside from the fact that the
prosecution of the case is under the control
of the fiscal, said private prosecutor ceased
to be upon the death of the offended party
who is his principal.
Article 29 of the Civil Code:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution
is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Upon motion of the defendant, the court
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of
acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred
from the text of the decision whether or not
the acquittal is due to that ground.
Article 29 of the Civil Code requires the
institution of a separate civil action wherein
the defendant can file the appropriate
responsive pleadings or a motion to dismiss
and which are available in a criminal action.
However, it was subsequently held that
where the accused was acquitted grave
coercion, on the finding that the offense was
either threats or malicious mischief which
are not included under the allegations of the
information, he may nevertheless be held
civilly liable where the evidence already
presented established the damages caused
to the offended party.
A separate civil action contemplated therein
may be warranted when additional facts or
more evidence is necessary to establish the
civil liability, or the criminal case has been
terminated but a remand for the reception of
evidence on the civil aspect is indicated,
hence a separate civil action would just be
efficacious.
Rule 120, Section 2. Contents of the
judgment. — If the judgment is of
conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by
the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended its commission; (2) the
participation of the accused in the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil
liability or damages caused by his wrongful
act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is
any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived.
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In case the judgment is of acquittal, it
shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the
guilt of the accused or merely failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did
not exist. (2a)
It is necessary for the validity of the
proceedings that the fiscal be present but
this requirement applies only to courts
which are provided by law by their own
fiscals, and not municipal courts.
When the prosecutor assigned thereto or to
the case is not available in the MTC or the
MCTC, the offended party, any peace
officer or public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated may
prosecute the case until the intervention of
the prosecutor or the elevation of the case to
the RTC.
The further amendment of Sec. 5 has now
limited the delegation of such
prosecutorial power only to the private
prosecutor, but extended the duration of
his authority under the contingencies
specified therein.
What the head of the prosecution office or
the regional state prosecutor who extends
the authority to the private prosecutor with
the approval of court is the authority “to
prosecute the case” in his stead, as indeed
it must be under the supervision and control
of the public prosecutor.
The private prosecutor has the right to
notices of and to attend the proceedings to
ensure that his client’s interests in the civil
aspect, if included in the criminal action, are
duly protected by his intervention short of
the active conduct of trial, unless he is so
authorized by the public prosecutor.
The crime of rape can be prosecuted
without the sworn statement of the
complaint of the persons consecutively
named in Sec. 5 because of R.A. 8353 or
the “Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The crimes of concubinage and adultery can
be prosecuted only by the offended
spouse, regardless of his or her age, as
long as he or she is not otherwise
incapacitated.
The crimes of seduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness can be prosecuted exclusively
and successively by way of any of the
following persons in this order, to wit:
(1) By the offended woman:
a. Even if the offended woman is a minor:
she can validly file and subscribe to a sworn
written complaint.
b. If the said offended woman is of legal
age and not otherwise incapacitated only he
can file the complaint.
c. If the offended woman is a minor or is
otherwise incapacitated and she refuses
or fails to file the complaint, either of her
parents, grandparents or guardians in that
successive order can file the complaint.
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(2) By the parents, grandparents:
a. Neither of those in the succeeding
classes can file the complaint if any of
those in the preceding classes are present
and not otherwise incapacitated.
b. Either of the parents can file the sworn
written complaint.
c. Where not one of those in the preceding
classes can file, or is otherwise incapacitated
from filing, the requisite sworn written
complaint, the grandparents can do so.
d. With respect to guardians, only legal or
judicial guardians are qualified to bring the
action.
Where the rape victim died and a person
claiming to be her aunt and guardian filed
the requisite sworn written complaint, it was
held that the said complaint was sufficient
to vest the court with jurisdiction.
The findings of the CA that the said
complainant was qualified to swear to the
complaint was held to be binding on the
Supreme Court, even where said
complainant subsequently declared that
the victim was not her niece. (People vs.
Ponelas)
(3) By the State in the exercise of the right
parens patriae, when the offended party
dies or becomes incapacitated before she
could file the complaint and she has no
known parents, grandparents or guardian.
The complex crime of rape with homicide or
robbery does not require a sworn written
complaint and can be instituted de oficio.
(Peope vs. Ancheta)
A defamation imputing to a person any of
the foregoing crimes of:
a. Concubinage
b. Adultery
c. Seduction
d. Abduction
e. Rape or Acts of lasciviousness
can be prosecuted only by the party or
parties defamed.
The complaint filed by the offended party in
the inferior court which conducted the
preliminary investigation confers
jurisdiction on the CFI and she does not
have to file another complaint in the
latter court nor does she have to sign the
information if the fiscal files one.
Such complaint may be introduced in
evidence in the trial court, or the court may
take judicial notice thereof as a part of the
record of the case.
But is said complaint was neither
presented in evidence nor did it form part
of the case of the case records elevated to
the then CFI, the latter does not acquire
jurisdiction.
However in view of Section 8, Rule 112, it
would appear that the foregoing doctrines
have been modified in the sense that, since
the complaint shall not form part of the
record of the criminal case in the RTC
and cannot be subject to judicial notice,
hence the complainant has to be marked
and introduced in evidence for the
prosecution.
In prosecution for adultery and concubinage,
the person who can file the complaint
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should be the offended spouse and
nobody else. It necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
Where the offended party filed a complaint
for attempted rape but, after preliminary
investigation, only the crime of acts of
lasciviousness was proved, it is not
necessary for her to subscribe again to
another complaint for the latter crime as
the same is included in the original for
attempted rape.
The effect of pardon, condonation or
consent in the foregoing crimes, as well the
subsequent marriage between the accused
and the offended party:
a. It was held that consent refers to
future acts of adultery while pardon
refers to past acts thereof. In order to
be valid and to constitute a bar to
prosecution for adultery or
concubinage, the pardon of the
offended spouse must be extended
to both offenders; but consent
granted to one of the offenders for
the adulterous act would be
sufficient and deemed granted to
both.
b. In the crimes of adultery or
concubinage, only the offended
spouse, even if a minor, but not
otherwise incapacitated, can
validly extend the pardon or
consent contemplated therein.
c. In seduction, abdication, rape and
acts of lasciviousness:
1. The offended minor, if with
sufficient discretion, can validly
pardon the accused herself if she
has no parents or where the
accused is her own father and her
mother is dead.
2. The parents, grandfather or
guardians of the offended
minor, in that order, cannot
extend a valid pardon without
the conformity of the offended
party, even if that latter is a
minor.
3. If the offended woman is of age
and not otherwise capacitated,
only she can extend a valid
pardon which would absolve the
offender from any of the
aforesaid offenses.
The pardon contemplated in seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness
must be express.
But in concubinage and adultery, a pardon,
whether express or implied, will suffice to
bar a criminal prosecution thereof.
The subsequent marriage between the
offended party and the accused extinguishes
the criminal liability of the latter or shall
remit the penalty already imposed upon him,
together with that of the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories, except:
1. In adultery and concubinage;
2. Where the marriage was invalid or
contracted in bad faith in order to
escape criminal liability.
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 3. In private libel, or libelous
imputation to the complainant of the
commission of the crimes of
concubinage, adultery, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, and in slander by
deed.
4. In multiple rape, in so far as the
other accused in the other acts of
rape respectively committed by
them are concerned.
The acquittal or death of one of the accused
in the crime of adultery does not bar the
prosecution of the other accused.
The same rule applies to prosecutions for
concubinage.
However the death of the offended party
before the filing of complaint for adultery
bars further prosecution, but if the said
offended spouse died after the filing of the
corresponding complaint, his death will
not prevent the proceeding from
continuing to its ultimate conclusion.
In a prosecution for libel, the death of the
offended party before or after the complaint
was field does not abate the action if the
libelous imputation is not for an offense
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
The crimes of corruption of minor (Art. 340)
and white slavery (Art. 341) are considered
crimes against chastity under the RPC, the
foregoing rules are not applicable to
them.
These crimes can be prosecuted de oficio
and cannot be terminated in accordance with
the rules hereinbefore set forth.
A sworn written complaint of the
offended party in the prosecution of the
crimes of concubinage, adultery, seduction,
abduction, acts of lasciviousness and any
defamatory imputation of any of the
foregoing offenses is a jurisdictional
requisite.
Consequently, a complaint sworn to by a
prosecuting officer is quashable, not for
lack of authority on the part of the said
officer, but for lack of jurisdiction of the
court.
Where, in the prosecution for adultery, the
sworn statement of the offended party
sufficiently states the facts and elements of
the offense and an express statement that he
was charging the accused therewith, such
sworn statement is sufficient to constitute
the requisite complaint, especially if it was
attached to an information filed in said
case as an integral part thereof.
When a private offense, however, is only a
component, together with a public offense,
of a crime specifically punished by the RPC
(as in the complex crimes of robbery with
rape, or rape with homicide), the sworn
complaint of the offended party is not
required as public interest is paramount
to public interest.
Where the information designates the crime
as “intriguing against honor” but the
allegations constitute adultery, hence the
information should be dismissed since a
sworn written complaint is necessary to
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confer jurisdiction on the court. (People
vs. Padilla)
Where the accused called a married woman
a “prostitute,” although the statement also
imputes adultery, such defamatory remark
specifically implies prostitution, a public
crime, hence he can be prosecuted de
oficio.
In a prosecution for rape where force or
intimidation was not proved, the accused
may be convicted of qualified seduction
where the victim was a 13-year old virgin
and the other elements of the latter crime
were alleged in the information.
But where force or intimidation alleged in a
complaint for rape was not proved and the
elements of qualified seduction are not
alleged in the complaint, the accused can
neither be convicted of rape nor qualified
seduction, as where there was no
allegation of virginity of the complainant.
Where the rape charge merely stated that the
act was committed through force and
intimidation which however, were not
proved, the accused cannot be convicted of
qualified seduction, since there were no
allegations of the complainant’s virginity
or age. Neither can he be held guilty of
simple seduction, for lack of allegations on
the age and reputation of the victim.
In a prosecution for forcible abduction with
rape, the complaint did not allege the
elements of forcible abduction but such
ultimate facts were alleged in the sworn
statement of the complainant on which the
complaint was based, the trial court has
jurisdiction to try the accused for the said
complex crime.
Furthermore, the requirement for the
complaint is jurisdictional in the sense that
such complaint starts the prosecutor process,
not that it is the complaint which confers
jurisdiction on the court to try the case since
jurisdiction is conferred by the Judiciary
Act.
A sworn written complaint is required in
both written and oral defamations
imputing a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio.
Section 6. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states.
a. The name of the accused;
b. The designation of the offense
given by the statute;
c. The acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense;
d. The name of the offended party;
e. The approximate date of the
commission of the offense;
f. And the place where the offense
was committed.
When an offense is committed by more
than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information.
An error in the name of the defendant is not
reversible as long as his identity is
established, and this defect is curable at
any stage of the proceedings.
The question as to the name of the accused
should be raised at the arraignment, not for
the first time on appeal.
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Section 7. Name of the accused. — The
complaint or information must state the
name and surname of the accused or any
appellation or nickname by which he has
been or is known. If his name cannot be
ascertained, he must be described under a
fictitious name with a statement that his
true name is unknown.
If the true name of the accused is
thereafter disclosed by him or appears in
some other manner to the court, such true
name shall be inserted in the complaint or
information and record. (7a)
Section 8. Designation of the offense. —
The complaint or information shall state:
a. the designation of the offense given
by the statute
b. aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances.
If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute
punishing it. (8a)
An error in specifying the provisions of law
involved is not reversible, as the allegations
in the indictment determine what offense
is charged.
The nature and character of the crime
charged is determined not by the
specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated but by the facts
alleged in the indictment.
It is not the technical name appearing in the
caption of the information, but the facts
alleged in the body thereof that determine
the character of the crime
Thus, an accused was convicted of trespass
to dwelling duly alleged in the information,
although the caption designated the
unproved crime of acts of lasciviousness.
This is especially true where the crime
designated in the caption includes another
offense, as where that caption speaks of
abduction but the particulars in the
indictment only constitute the crime of
illegal detention or where direct bribery is
charged but the averments make out a case
for indirect bribery.
Hence, an accused was validly convicted of
bribery although the offense was designated
as an anti-graft charge.
The caption in an information is not
controlling; what matters are the material
allegations therein.
However in capital offenses, the trial court
should call the attention of the accused to
the discrepancy between the designation of
the offense in the preamble of the
information (rape with illegal detention) and
the facts pleaded in the body thereof
(forcible abduction with rape), so he can
adjust the strategy of his defense.
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. — The
acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used
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in the statute but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the
court to pronounce judgment. (9a)
This rule requires that the information
should be describe the offense with such
particularity as to appraise the accused of
what he is being charged and in such a way
that a person of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what it is meant.
The Supreme Court took note of the fact that
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 as now revised
both require that not only qualifying
circumstances but also aggravating
circumstances should be alleged in the
information.
It was then resolved that both qualifying and
aggravating circumstances should be
expressly and specifically alleged in the
complaint or information, otherwise the
same will not be considered by the court
even if proved during the trial.
This new doctrine applies to all criminal
cases and not only where the aggravating
circumstances would result in the
imposition of the death penalty, as in the
application of Art. 63 of the RPC.
Since all prosecutors may not be expected to
be infallible, it is believed that the failure to
allege an aggravating circumstance,
especially if there was bad faith or collusion,
may be remedied by a timely amendment
of the information for that purpose,
before the arraignment.
Even thereafter, such amendment may be
made since it would only be a formal
amendment contemplated in the rules,
unless the same would be prejudicial to
the rights of the accused.
Facts constituting habitual delinquency must
be specifically alleged and shall not be
considered if generally averred even if the
accused pleaded guilty.
If the particular facts constituting
habitual delinquency are not alleged in
the information, evidence to prove such
circumstances can be properly be
objected to by the defense.
The facts constituting recidivism and
reitaracion must be sufficiently alleged in
the information. Thus, if the circumstances
of recidivism is alleged in a general way
without particulars, as by alleging merely
that the accused is a recidivist, and the
accused pleads guilty, this aggravating
circumstance is not considered admitted
as only allegations of fact, and not
conclusions of law, are admitted by such
plea.
However, amendments to include specific
allegations of the particulars of habitual
delinquency and recidivism are allowed as
these are only matters of form.
Where the information merely alleged that
the accused committed the offense while
serving sentence but no competent evidence
was presented to prove final conviction or
commitment pursuant thereto, quasi-
recidivism cannot be appreciated despite the
plea of guilty of the accused.
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Where the information alleges that the
accused were “convicts serving sentences”
at the time of the commission of the offense,
and their extrajudicial confessions set out
the details of their conviction, these
constitute sufficient allegations of quasi-
recidivism.
The same doctrine applies where the
information alleged that the crime was
committed by the accused “while they were
confined at New Bilibid Prison” and there is
no question, as it was even admitted by the
accused, that they were serving sentences
under final convictions.
In libel, the publication complained of must
be set out verbatim in the information and
the defamatory portions singled out.
It must, therefore, contain the colloquium,
which shows that the defamation was
directed at the victim, and the innuendo,
which particularizes and explains the
defamatory portions. This is so because the
identity or indentifiability of the victim
and the defamatory imputation are
elements of the crime which must thereof
be alleged. Furthermore, it is not the duty
of the court to seek out the said
imputations in the publication.
If the article is in a non-official language, a
translation in the official language is
sufficient.
In the crime of threats to publish libel, the
defamatory article should not be set out in
the information, otherwise it would be
publishing facts the revelation of which the
law punishes and thereby seeks to prevent.
The rule on averment of negativing
exceptions in an information may be
stated as follows:
a. Where the statute alleged to have
been violated applies only to a
specific class of persons and to
special conditions, the information
must allege facts establishing that the
accused falls within the specific class
affected and not those excepted from
the coverage of law, otherwise it is
quashable for failure to state facts
constituting an offense.
b. Where the statute penalizes
generally the acts therein defined
and is intended to apply to all
persons indiscriminately, although
some special situation are
excepted from its coverage, the
information is sufficient even if it
does not allege that the accused falls
within the excepted situation, for
then the complete definition of the
offense is entirely separable from the
exceptions and can be made without
reference to the latter. If he falls
within the specified class affected
and not those excepted from the
coverage of law.
Where the information is defective
because it is not in the proper form,
the remedy is a motion to quash on
said ground under the Secction
3(e), Rule 117.
If the allegations are vague or
indefinite, the accused should move
for a bill of particulars under
13
 Section 9, Rule 116 on or before
arraignment, otherwise objections
on said ground shall be deemed
waived.
Section 10. Place of commission of the
offense. — The complaint or information
is sufficient if it can be understood from
its allegations that the offense was
committed or some of the essential
ingredients occurred at some place within
the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed
constitutes an essential element of the
offense or is necessary for its
identification. (10a)
The rule merely requires the information to
show that the crime was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
said court may even take judicial notice that
the said place is within its jurisdiction.
Where the place of the commission
is an essential element of the offense,
e.g., robbery in an inhabited house,
public building or place of worship
(Art. 299, RPC) or is necessary to
identity of the offense, e.g.,
destructive arson(Art. 320, i.d.), the
place of the commission must be
alleged with particularity.
Section 11. Date of commission of the
offense. — It is not necessary to state in
the complaint or information the precise
date the offense was committed except
when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to
have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its
commission. (11a)
The rule requires that the allegation
be only “as near as possible to the
actual date” of the commission of the
crime, except when time is an
essential element of the offense as
in infanticide wherein the victim
must be less than three days of age.
The same is true in physical injuries
where the gravity is determined by
the number of days of incapacity
from customary labor or the duration
of medical attention, in which case
the date when the injuries were
inflicted must be specifically
averred.
An amendment will not be permitted if
prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
Section 12. Name of the offended party.
— The complaint or information must
state the name and surname of the person
against whom or against whose property
the offense was committed, or any
appellation or nickname by which such
person has been or is known. If there is
no better way of identifying him, he must
be described under a fictitious name.
a. In offenses against The property must
property, If the name be described with
of the offended party such particularity
is unknown as to properly
identify the offense
charged.
14
 an essential element of the offense charged,
an error in such designation.

b. If the true name of The court must

the person against cause such true In robbery with homicide, the name of the
who or against name to be inserted person robbed is an essential element.
whose property the in the complaint or
offense was information and In homicide by reason or on occasion of
committed is the record. the robbery; and in oral defamation (the
thereafter disclosed same should be true of libel), the victim
or ascertained must be correctly named since the law
requires that the offended party must either
c. If the party is a it is sufficient to
juridical person state its name, or be identified or identifiable from the
any name or imputations made.
designation by
which it is known To avoid ridicule or continuing humiliation
or by which it may to the victim which it declares as being in
be identified, the nature of “psychological violence”,
without need of Section 3, R.A. 9262 contains a
averring that it is a confidentiality provision that all records
juridical person or pertaining to cases of violence against
that it is organized women and their children shall be
in accordance with confidential.
law. (12a)
It is suggested, however, that in line with
Sec. 12, Rule 110, the offended party must
The rule is that the offended party must be be correctly named and identified in the
designated by name, nickname, any other complaint and affidavits filed for
appellation or by a fictitious name; but in preliminary investigation and in the
crimes against property, the description initiatory pleadings for the trial stage,
of the property must supplement the such as the information.
allegation that the owner is unknown.
However, no unnecessary publicity thereof
An error in the designation of the offended shall be made or his identity divulged
party is not reversible where the offense can without his consent unless officially or
still be ascertained despite such error, as in legally required.
estafa where the offended party was really
In the appellate stage, the confidentiality
the drawee bank instead of the payee as
rule also applies and copies of pleadings
alleged or in harmful crimes affecting the
shall not be furnished to unauthorized
public at large, as in illegal practice of
persons, thus observing the aforesaid
medicines.
practice of the Supreme Court in its
Where the identity of the offended party is

15
decisions, since these are not intended for
general dissemination by publication.
Section 13. Duplicity of the offense. — A
complaint or information must charge
but one offense, except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for
various offenses. (13a)
The purpose of this rule is to give the
defendant the necessary knowledge of the
charge so that he may not be confused in his
defense.
Where an offense may be committed in any
of the different modes provided by law and
the offense is alleged to have been
committed in two or more modes specified,
the indictment is sufficient.
The allegations in the information of the
various ways of committing the offense
should be considered as a description of
only one offense and the information
cannot be dismissed on the ground of
multifariousness.
The narration in the information of the
specific acts is only considered as a bill of
particulars of the facts with which the
accused is charged.
Duplicity in the charges is a ground for a
motion to quash and the refusal of the court
to order segregation of the charges is a
reversible error; but failure of the accused
to interpose an objection on this ground
constitutes a waiver.
Thus, the accused was convicted of three
crimes of kidnapping alleged in the
information and proved at the trial, he not
having objected to the duplicity in the
charges.
The exception to the rule against duplicity
refers to the complex crimes under the RPC
wherein a single penalty is imposed (Art.
48) and the special complex crimes or
composite crimes penalized therein.
Where the allegations of the acts imputed to
the accused are only to show the modes of
commission the crime, or are merely
different counts specifying the acts of
perpetration of the same crime, there is no
duplicity.
There is likewise no duplicity when the
other offenses stated in the information
constitute only an ingredient or essential
element of the real offense charged, or when
several acts stated are related in describing
the offense.
Section 14. Amendment or substitution.
— A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea
and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea,
which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its
16
order shall be furnished all parties, commit the accused to answer for the
especially the offended party. (n) proper offense and dismiss the original
case upon the filing of the proper
If it appears at any time before judgment information. (11a)
that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss
the original complaint or information
upon the filing of a new one charging the Both amendment of the information
proper offense in accordance with section substitution of the information may be made
19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall before or after the accused pleads but they
not be placed in double jeopardy. The differ in the following respects:
court may require the witnesses to give Amendment Substitution
bail for their appearance at the trial. May involve either Necessarily involves
(14a) formal or a substantial change
substantial changes. from the original
The first paragraph provides rules for charge.
amendment of the information or Amendment before Must be with leave
complaint, while the third paragraph refers plea has been of court, as the
to substitution of the information or entered can be original information
complaint. effected without has to be dismissed.
leave of court.
Under the third paragraph, the court can Where amendment In substitution of
order the filing of another information to is only as to form, information,
there is no need for another preliminary
charge the proper offenses, provided the
another preliminary investigation is
accused would not be placed thereby in investigation and the entailed and the
double jeopardy and that could only be true retaking of the plea accused has to plead
if the offense proved does not necessarily of the accused. anew to the new
include or is not necessarily included in the information.
offense charged in the original information.

Hence, Section 19, Rule 119 provides:
Section 19. When mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense. — When
it becomes manifest at any time before
judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense and the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged or any other offense necessarily
included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears good cause to
detain him. In such case, the court shall
An amended information refers to the same
offense charged in the original information
or to an offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the original
charge, hence substantial amendments to
the information after the plea has been
taken cannot be made over the objection
of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the
accused could invoke double jeopardy.
On the other hand, substitution requires or
presupposes that the new information
17
involves a different offense which does not
include or is not included in the original
charge, hence the accused cannot claim
double jeopardy.
Where amendment is only as to form,
there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of
the accused.
The contention of the accused, that to amend
the information from frustrated murder to
murder because of the supervening death of
the victim is a substantial amendment which
cannot be done at any rate requires another
preliminary investigation, is not well taken.
It is evident that frustrated murder is but a
stage in the execution of the crime of
murder; hence the former is necessarily
included in the latter.
This is because, except for the death of the
victim, the essential elements of
consummated murder likewise constitute the
essential ingredients to convict the accused
for the offense of frustrated murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an
identity of the offense charged in both the
original and amended information.
What is involved here is not a variance in
the nature of different offenses charged but
only a change in the stage of execution of
the same from frustrated to consummated.
Consequent thereto, an amendment of the
original information, and not a substitution
thereof, will suffice.
A substantial amendment consists of a
recital of facts constituting the offense
charges and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the court. All other matters are merely
of form.
An objective appraisal of the amended
information for murder shows that the nature
of the offense originally charged was not
actually changed. Instead an additional
allegation, that is, the supervening fact of
the death of the victim was merely supplied
to aid the trial court in determining the
proper penalty for the crime.
That the accused committed a felonious act
with intent to kill the victim continues to be
the prosecution’s theory. There is no
question that whatever defense the
accused may adduce under the original
information for frustrated murder
equally applies to the amended
information for murder.
Accordingly, the amended information for
involves, at most, an amendment as to form
which is allowed even during the trial of
case without necessity of another
preliminary investigation.
The variance between the indictment and the
proof may be as follows:
a. When the offense proved is less than,
and is necessarily included in, the offense
charged (as when the offense proved is
homicide and the offense charged is
murder), in which case the defendant shall
be convicted of the offense proved.
b. When the offense proved is more
serious than and includes the offense
charged (as when the offense proved is
18
serious physical injuries and the offense
charged is light physical injuries), in which
case, the defendant shall be convicted
only of the offense charged.
c. When the offense proved is neither
included in, nor does it include, the
offense charged and is different
therefrom (as when the offense proved is
estafa and the offense charged is theft), in
which case the court should dismiss the
action and order the filing of the new
information.
The situation set forth above (c.) is one
proper for substitution of information as no
double jeopardy will be involved.
In Galvez, et al. vs. CA, et. al., after the
accused had been charged with homicide
and two accounts of frustrated homicide but
before having arraigned thereon, the trial
court dismissed the informations on motion
of the prosecution.
Thereupon, four separate informations for
murder, two counts of frustrated murder and
illegal possession of firearms were filed
against the same accused for the same acts
arising from the same incident involved in
the preceding charges.
After their arraignment on the subsequent
charge, the accused questioned in the
Supreme Court, inter alia, the dismissal of
the homicide charges and their substitution
by murder filed in another branch of the trial
court, instead of amendments being
introduced to the original informations in the
original branch.
The Supreme Court held that while
amendment, and not substitution, of the
information was the proper procedure as
explained and clarified in Teehankee, Jr.
vs. Madayag, et. al., supra, such
procedural lapse was not fatal error since
all the said incidents took place before the
accused were arraigned.
Thus, even if the substitution was made at
that stage, both accused were not placed in
double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil
sought to be prevented under the rule of
substitution.
Also, since the informations involving the
crime of murder were filed immediately
after the informations involving homicide
were ordered dismissed, their right to speedy
trial was not violated.
Where the information charges attempted
murder and the offense proved is frustrated
homicide, the accused can be convicted
only of attempted homicide, as frustrated
homicide is not necessarily included in the
offense charged.
Before the plea is taken, the information
may be amended in substance and/or form,
without leave of court; but if amended in
substance, the accused is entitled to another
preliminary investigation, unless the
amended charge is related to or included in
the original charge.
After the plea, amended is permitted only as
to matters of form, provided (i) leave of
court is obtained, and (ii) such
amendment is not prejudicial to the rights
of the accused.
19
To change the date of commission from
“1952” to “1947” is prejudicial to the rights
of the accused and cannot be permitted.
But to change the date from “March 2,
1965” to “March 2, 1964” is only a formal
amendment.
In these cases, time is not an essential
element of the offense charged and the
disparity of dates is not so great as to
prejudice the accused in the preparation
of his defense.
Where the information stated the year
“1967” but the same is merely a
typographical error as it differs from the
statement of the witness who categorically
declared at the preliminary investigation,
in the presence of the accused, that the crime
was committed in 1966, the amendment of
such information is not substantial and
may be allowed by the court.
An amendment in the information, originally
charging the crime of malversation
committed from “February 28, 1964 to
September 24, 1964” to read “from July 7,
1964 to September 24, 1964” is only a
matter of form, as the latter period is
included in the first.
However, an information charging the crime
of malversation through falsification
covering “the period from March 31, 1959
to April 30, 1959” cannot sustain a
conviction for such crime covering the
period from “March 18 to 31, 1959 which is
a different offense and involves a different
period.
One test as to when the rights of an accused
are prejudiced by the amendment is where a
defense under the original complaint or
information would no longer be available
after the amendment is made and when any
evidence that the accused might have would
be inapplicable to the complaint or
information as amended.
An amendment which merely states with
additional precision something which is
already contained in the original
information, and which therefore adds
nothing essential for conviction of the crime
charge, is a formal amendment.
On the other hand, changing the charge from
robbery to robbery in an uninhabited place
and changing the items subject of the
offense, are substantial amendments and
even result in a higher penalty.
An amendment to charge conspiracy is
substantial as it will require a new defense to
meet a different situation and will make the
accused liable not only for his acts but also
for those of his co-conspirator.
An amendment is only in form where it
neither affects nor alters the nature of the
offense charged or where the charge does
not deprive the accused of a fair opportunity
to present his defense, as where it merely
changes the name of the accused, or serial
number, or merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and
not to introduce new and material facts, or
where it does not involve a change in the
basic theory of the prosecution.
An amendment to include an additional
accused in the commission of the offense
charged is only amendment in form.
20
In such case, there was no change in the
prosecution’s theory and the amendment
was not prejudicial to the original accused
since it consisted merely of the insertion of
the allegation that the additional accused
acted in conspiracy with the original
accused, and no additional acts were
imputed to the new accused which under a
theory of conspiracy would be likewise
imputable to and binding on the original
party.
In the case of People vs. Zulueta, the
amendment sought therein to include an
additional accused under the theory that
he acted in conspiracy with the original
accused is a substantial amendment and
cannot be allowed, over the latter’s
objection, since it would be prejudicial to
him and he had already pleaded to original
charge.
The court pointed out in this case that the
amended pleading with its deletions,
transpositions and rephrasings, practically
added a full page to the original seven-page
information.
The original information alleged that the
accused commissioner committed
malversation by deceiving his co-
commissioners who was subsequently
charged as an additional co-accused, or by
his negligence or abandonment, that the said
original accused permitted a third person to
purchase the government property at a very
cheap price.
On the other hand, the amended
information alleged that the original
accused connived and conspired with the
additional accused.
This contradicts the original theory of the
prosecution because if the accused
conspired with the additional accused,
then he did not deceive the latter and did
not by mere negligence permit the give-
away transaction.
It introduced another alternative imputation
which was even inconsistent with the
original allegations, hence the amendment
in this latter case was clearly substantial
in nature.
An amendment after plea resulting in the
inclusion of an allegation of conspiracy and
the indictment of other persons in addition
to the original accused was a mere formal
amendment, as there was no change in the
theory or additional liability prejudicial
to the original accused.
The amendment of the crime from homicide
to murder was also a mere formal
amendment as the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength was alleged in
the original information.
A substantial matter, in a complaint or
information is a recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters
are merely of form.
While an amendment to change the year
when the crime was committed is a formal
amendment, as where the error was in
good faith and did not unfairly mislead or
surprise the defense, nevertheless such an
amendment would be substantial if the date
of the commission alleged in the original
information was prior to the date when the
law punishing such act took effect and the
21
purpose of the amendment is to allege that
said acts were committed on dates
subsequent to the effectivity of law.

The second paragraph of Section 14, Rule

110 is intended to prevent the amendment of
the information, through confabulation or
improvidence, to charge a lesser or different
offense to favor the accused, such as through
a supposed reinvestigation of the case.

Hence, as an exception to the rule on

amendments before plea, it must be upon
motion of the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and leave of court.

The court itself can order the filing of an

amended information where the accused
moves to quash the original information and
the defects objected to are curable by
amendment (Sec. 4, Rule 117).

As a rule, where the information is alleged

to be either not in the prescribed form or that
it is duplicitous, such defects are curable by
amendment.

The witnesses who may be required to post

bail for their appearance at the subsequent
hearings are, generally, the prosecution
witnesses, not those for the defense whose
identities may even not yet have been
decided upon.

However, under Sec. 14, Rule 119, the

court, on motion, of either party, may also
require bail to be posted by material
witnesses of either the prosecution or
defense under the circumstances
contemplated therein.

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