Essay 1

Compare the inductivists and falsificationist accounts of science.

Philosophy of science (PHIL_2050) – A1705780

Introduction

What is the value of evidence? A rationalist will tell you that evidence is unnecessary and that
reason is the source of knowledge. An empiricist will tell you that reason is only necessary after the
observation of evidence. The inductivists and falsificationist will both agree with the empiricist’s
value of evidence, but inductivists and falsificationist also seek to formalise the process by which
theories are developed and validated.

Inductivism is the use of induction to validate theories. Induction being a form of reasoning in which
multiple premises provide evidence for a given conclusion, but cannot prove it with certainty. This is
opposed to deduction in which the conclusion is guaranteed through the use of formal logic. There
are two forms of inductivism; Naïve and sophisticated inductivism, they are as follows:

- Naïve inductivism - there are formal methods for the discovery of theories or hypotheses
- Sophisticated Inductivism - there are formal methods for the justification of theories and
hypotheses(Chalmers 1982, pp.1-12)

The key here is the distinction between discovery and justification. Discovery is the creative process
by which theories are “discovered” or “invented” where as justification is the methods by which
theories, one proposed are, are justified (lecture 1.2 inductivism).

An example of justification is the Hypothetico-Deductive (HF) method. Its states for a given
hypothesis or theory and a set of test conditions along with a deduced prediction. Should the
prediction hold true then that is inductive support for the hypothesis. Repeating this method under
different test conditions for a given hypothesis furthers the support for that hypothesis. The
problem is that induction is an invalid form of argument (Ladyman 2002, pp.19-20). It doesn’t matter
how much positive evidence you have to corroborate a theory, that doesn’t remove the possibility of
a negative instance occurring or existing. It is this flaw in inductive reasoning that gave rise to
Falsificationism.

Karl Popper (1902-1994) founded Falsificationism on the framework of empiricism and the value of
evidence and like inductivists sought out to formalise and understand the logic of scientific
justification, but Popper didn’t believe that the HD method provided the needed logic. Popper
proposed a solution to the problems he saw with inductivism:

- Theory is prior to observation. This tells us which test conditions should be modified and
how we should modify them.
- Science is powered by deductive reasoning, not inductive. Popper proposed that the
principal form of scientific reasoning is a deductive process he called falsification. (lecture
2.1 Falsificationism)

Popper proposed an altered version of the HD method that included a falsifier, this turned the
invalid induction into a valid deduction. He proposed that science is not about proving theories
rather science should focus on disproving or falsifying theories. We should approach a theory that
has survived falsification cautiously as such a theory is not confirmed but merely corroborated.
Inductivism vs Falsificationism

Whilst induction is an invalid form of argument, from a purely logical perspective, it is not a bad form
of argument. Although you can’t produce absolute truths using induction you can judge how
accurate a given theory is based on how many confirmed test you have conducted. We can even
assign a value to the validity of the given inductive theory by using Bayesian analysis and without
crossing into mathematics the point remains that induction is accurate even if it isn’t absolute.

Science is only as useful as it applications, therefore a falsificationist approach to science is

unnecessary. Every set of test conditions that support a theory are a set of conditions under which
the theory is valid. Therefore in future that theory can be applied to those conditions and it will still
be accurate. Even if the theory has been falsified under a different set of conditions, this doesn’t
change the validity of the theory under conditions for which it was previously valid. So if a theory
survives a lot of falsifications it shouldn’t necessarily be completely thrown out, as Falsificationism
tell us it should be.

I believe that whilst science is based on the absoluteness of observation it in of itself is not absolute.
It is in the nature of science to change and adapt, and a falsificationist approach stunts the progress
of science. It causes the scientific community to focus on falsifying its own theories. Apart from
causing an inherit self-destructiveness within the community, it almost causes science to move
backwards. This is by no means to say that falsifying theories or attempting to do so should be
avoided but, to say that as a whole, that a falsificationist approach to scientific discovery is one that
does not drive progress.

There is an important distinction between simply falsifying a theory and Falsificationism as a school
of thought. The inductivist approach is open to and even welcomes the falsification of a theory, but
to use this as a basis to change those theories to suit the new evidence. A full falsificationist
approach tells us that a falsified theory should be entirely disregarded. This just doesn’t capture the
nature of science, just because a theory is shown to false doesn’t necessarily mean that is was based
on the same falsehoods, it could simply be that a given theory in incomplete and that the new
evidence simply drives the perfection of that theory.

Take for example Newton and Einstein, Einstein showed that Newton’s laws of gravity and motion
breakdown at speeds near that of light. Using a falsificationist approach Newton’s laws should have
been thrown out as an invalid theory, yet they are still used and still accurate. Newton’s laws
allowed humans to land on the moon and send probes out into the solar system with amazing
precision. This doesn’t mean that falsifying isn’t important, should near light speed travel ever be
achieved, then new theories will need to be developed and tested. Science is about applications and
falsifying is an important part of knowing when a particular theory is applicable, but that doesn’t
mean that a falsified theory should be thrown out completely.

Conclusion

Falsificationism may be a better formalisation of scientific discovery than inductivism by every

measure of logic. I won’t dispute the fact that it is a more logically sound form of justification, but it
simply isn’t in the nature of science. Popper tells us that she primary goal of science should be to
falsify existing theories, throw them out, and make way for new ones. And whilst this does happen,
scientists are not in the business of falsehoods, they are in the business of discovery.
Inductivism is a more natural approach for developing scientific theories, instead of simply throwing
out an idea when it is shown to be wrong we work with it, change it, to fit the new evidence. And if
that can’t be done, it archived, remembered, because just because it was shown to be wrong once
doesn’t mean it can’t be right sometimes. Science isn’t about absolute truths, it’s a tool and thus
needs to be useful. Sure, Newton’s laws break down near the speed of light but for the 98% of
speeds that they do work at they are a lot simpler than the theories Einstein developed to account
for relativity. In my opinion, inductivism best captures the nature of scientific reasoning. From an
applied perspective a theory doesn’t need to be correct, it just need to give the right answers, and
what is science if not practical?

This is not to say that Falsificationism should be entirely disregarded, to do so would not only be
hypocritical but naïve. The falsification of a popular or well accepted theory is something that should
be celebrated, just a Popper proposed. This allows us to move forward and develop more accurate
theories, but who is to say that those theories can’t be based in previously falsified theories. As we
sit at the forefront of science, studying the un-observably small and large, the possibilities of other
dimensions, both spatial and temporal. Where implied and circumstantial evidence is the best we
can hope for, we cannot afford to disregard anything. Should these theories of multiverses and dark
energy evade scrutinization or simply be accepted, absolutely not. But when you wait 10 years to
observe a gravitational wave or a neutrino you can’t simply disregard a theory when new evidence
comes to light.

That’s why I believe whilst inductivism better captures the nature of scientific discovery
Falsificationism deserves a place in our minds as we continue our crusade into frontiers of science.

Bibliography

Chalmers, A F (1982) What is this thing called Science? Queensland University Press.

Layman, J (2002) Understanding the philosophy of science? Routledge.