AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.

G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918

STREET, J.:

Facts:

The plaintiff was riding on his pony over the bridge in Carlatan, San Fernando
City, La Union. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from
the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles
per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his
horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken
the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile and heard the warning signals. Being perturbed by the
rapid approach of the vehicle, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the
right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. The bridge is about 75 meters and a
width of only 4.80 meters. The vehicle approached without slowing down. Smith quickly
turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the
railing where it as then standing; but due to the automobile’s close proximity to the
animal, the animal became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its
head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the
flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

Issue:

Was Smith guilty of negligence and liable for civil obligations?

Ruling:

Yes.

The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was
his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other
persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the
horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight
on until he was almost upon the horse.

A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to
guard against the threatened harm. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was
not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
other party.

EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, et al. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS

G.R. No. 89880, February 6, 1991

MEDIALDEA, J.:

Facts:

A collision occurred between gravel and sand truck and a Mazda passenger bus
along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion
(barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus,
ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat. As a result several
passengers of the bus were thrown out severely injured and died.

Before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching
each other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was
still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle
wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding
this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking,
Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the
bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a
Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. While
the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was
approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side.
After the impact, the truck skidded towards the other side of the road and landed on a
nearby residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it."

Issue:

Does the doctrine of last clear chance applicable in this case?

Ruling:

No.

In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the Court citing the landmark
decision held in the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled that the
principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the
negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence."

Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the
field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to
the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be
invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a
negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take
action which could have avoided the injury." (57 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 806-807).

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Court
committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the
defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against
both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred
in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs. THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO

G.R. No. L-65295, March 10, 1987

FELICIANO, J:

Facts:

Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails and dinner meeting
where he had two shots of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just
crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal,
Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when
his car headlights suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The
dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction
Inc. was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street, facing the oncoming
traffic. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the
street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-
called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or
rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner
Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of
work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he
tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some
physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Issue:

Can the doctrine of last clear chance be applied in the case at bar?
Ruling:

No.

Petitioners raised that the doctrine of last clear chance must be applied. The
theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private
respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his
injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his
own injuries alone. 

Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose
negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's — was the legal or proximate cause of
the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or
physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening"
or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be
taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act
or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act
or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver
(and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior
negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence
which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's
own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping
out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to
reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the
very bonds of society.

GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER AND HARDWARE, et al. vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989

NARVASA, J.:

Facts:

Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on the
jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as
it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City
at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that time, the cargo track, loaded
with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants,
coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South Cotabato,
had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo
truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while
Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the
impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,
including its fender and hood, was extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell
and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck,
while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road.

Issue:

Whether last clear chance is present in the case.

Ruling:

Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each other's
vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a
speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour.  The private respondents have
admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they
have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the
truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From
these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial
doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still
at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his
jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a
speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize
that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the
Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., Petitioner, v. MARICAR BASCOS BAESA

G.R. Nos. 79050-51., November 14, 1989.

CORTES, J.:

Facts:

Spouses Baesa and their children, with spouses Ico and their son were aboard a
passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to
celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Spouses Baesa. The jeepney was driven by
David Ico. From Ilagan, Isabela, they proceeded to Barrio Capayacan to deliver some
viands to one Mrs. Bascos and thenceforth to San Felipe, taking the highway going to
Malalam River. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to
Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards
Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to
Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with
it.

As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa
and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the
passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively damaged. After the accident
the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to
Santiago, Isabela. From that time on up to the present, Ramirez has never been seen
and has apparently remained in hiding.

Issue:

Does the doctrine of last clear chance applicable in this case?

Ruling:

The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the
doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the
last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should,
with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an
accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the
peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of
the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was
encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder
on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its
own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction.

By the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its
own lane, it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an
accident. The speed at which the approaching bus was running prevented David Ico
from swerving the jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the
collision. Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few
seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has
held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of
all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered" [Ong v.
Metropolitan Water District, supra].

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL'S

MARKETING CORP

G.R. No. 97626 March 14, 1997

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Facts:

May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds
in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose
of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with Philippine Bank of
Commerce (PBC). They were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited
to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas.

Romeo Lipana  never checked their monthly statements of account reposing

complete trust and confidence on PBC. Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2
copies of deposit slip upon and both are always validated and stamped by the
teller Azucena Mabayad : original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his
current account number - retained by the bank and duplicate copy was written the
account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank.

After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank
in the duplicate copy and change the account number to RMC's account number. This
went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge. Upon
discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money and
later on filed in the RTC.

Issue: 

Whether or not applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing
to avoid the injury by not exercising the proper validation procedure.

Ruling:

The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the
deposit slips prepared and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the
duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure
of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate.

The bank teller’s negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection
and supervision of its bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the
private respondent, not the latter’s entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Xxx Even if
Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds, she would not have
been able to deposit those funds in her husband’s current account, and then make
plaintiff believe that it was in the latter’s accounts wherein she had deposited them, had
it not been for the bank teller’s aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.

MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT

G.R. No. L-7664, August 29, 1958

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Facts:

Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara
filters, Diliman, Quezon City. 14 year old Dominador Ong drowned while swimming in
one of those pools. Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs’ son was drowned in one of
its swimming pools but avers that his death was caused by his own negligence or by
unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection of, and supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence
required by law under the circumstances.
 After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and
dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on
appeal directly to this Court because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance could be used against the
respondent.

Ruling: 

We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does not
show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record
discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker
room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened
to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply
means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care
and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding
his negligence. Or, “As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.”

Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it
being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the
regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that the
lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and
immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put
into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the
application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..

The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of
all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in
which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed
to the injury.

GREGORIO ANURAN, MARIA MALIGAYA, ET AL., vs. PEPITO BUÑO, PEDRO

GAHOL, et al.

G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966

BENGZON, C.J.:

Facts:
 The passenger jeepney, owned by spouses Gahol and Alcantara, driven by
defendant Buno was on its regular route travelling from Mahabang Ludlud, Taal,
Batangas, towards the poblacion of the said municipality. When said passenger jeepney
crossed the bridge separating Barrios Mahabang Ludlud and Balisong, Taal, Batangas,
the vehicle was overloaded with passengers at the time.

After crossing the bridge, defendant Buño stopped his vehicle in order to allow
one of his passengers to alight. But he so parked his jeepney in such a way that one-half
of its was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half, on the right
shoulder of said road. Approximately five minutes later and before Buño could start his
vehicle, a speeding water then being driven by Guillermo Razon from the direction of
Mahabang Ludlud, Taal, Batangas, towards the poblacion of that municipality, violently
smashed against the parked jeepney from behind, causing it to turn turtle into a nearby
ditch.

Issue:

Should the driver and the owner of the jeepney be made liable?

Ruling:

No.

Upon further and more extended consideration of the matter, we have become
convinced that error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability. It
must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely
is such that the New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art.
1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756). In this instance, this
legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of Appeals' finding that the
driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in parking the vehicle improperly. It must
follow that the driver — and the owners — of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its
passengers.

The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a
suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise
where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney
and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.

EDNA A. RAYNERA v. FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA

G.R. No. 120027, April 21, 1999

PARDO, J.:

Facts:
 On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his
way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East Service
Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30
kilometers per hour.  The asphalt road was not well lighted. Reynaldo Raynera crashed
his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail
lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino
D. Lucelo rushed him to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the
attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on
arrival.

Issue:

Whether the respondents were negligent which was the proximate cause of the
death of Reynaldo Raynera.

Ruling:

Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Reynaldo Rayneras death was
respondents negligence in operating the truck trailer on the highway without tail lights
and license plate.

We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim.
Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in
front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with
headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service
road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.

It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are
presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The
rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of
the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision
with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other
person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his
motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the
accident.

OSMUNDO S. CANLAS and ANGELINA CANLAS, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

ASIAN SAVINGS BANK, MAXIMO C. CONTRARES and VICENTE MAÑOSCA

G.R. No. 112160, February 28, 2000

PURISIMA, J.:

Facts:

Canlas and Mañosca decided to venture in business. To raise capital, Canlas

executed an SPA authorizing Mañosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land. Eventually, Canlas
agreed to sell these to Mañosca for 850k. Canlas delivered the TCTs, and Mañosca
issued postdated checks (40k, 460k), but the check for 460k was not sufficiently funded.

            Mañosca was able to mortgage the parcels of land to an Atty. Magno with the
help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as Sps. Canlas]. Mañosca was
granted a 500k loan by Asian Savings Bank [ASB] with the involvement of the fake
couple. It was said that Canlas was with Mañosca when the latter submitted documents
for the loan application. Mañosca showed Canlas several TCTs, which were collaterals
for the loan, and Canlas was confident that his parcels of land were not involved.
However, Mañosca used Sps. Canlas’ parcels of land as collaterals. A 200k check was
released, and Canlas received it as payment of the parcels of land he sold to Mañosca.

The loan was not paid so the mortgage was foreclosed. Canlas wrote to ASB,
saying that the execution of the mortgage was without their authority, so steps should
be taken to annul the mortgage. Canlas also wrote the sheriff to cancel the auction sale;
however, the sale pushed through.

Issue:

Whether the doctrine of last clear chance applicable in this case.

Ruling:

The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case.

Under the doctrine the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In
essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought
about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences
arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of
the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise
of due diligence.

Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Mañosca the
opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to latter the owner's copy of the
transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of land, it cannot be denied that the bank
had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud, by the simple expedient of faithfully
complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the persons
transacting with them.

For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, whose
business is impressed with public interest, respondent Asian Savings Bank has to bear
the loss sued upon. In ruling for respondent bank, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the petitioner Osmundo Canlas was a party to the fraudulent scheme of Mañosca and
therefore, estopped from impugning the validity of subject deed of mortgage.
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 138569. September 11, 2003.

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing

under Philippine laws. Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPA’s, is a
professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting. In March 1976, L.C.
Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through
its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a
savings (checks) deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz,
Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the
Solidbank passbook.

Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and
the passbook. The teller acknowledged the receipt of the deposit by returning to
Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit
slips with the words “DUPLICATE” and “SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD
OFFICE.” Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for
L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to
Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6
informed him that “somebody got the passbook.” Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and
reported the incident to Macaraya.

Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of

P200,000. Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the
deposit slip and check. The teller stamped the words “DUPLICATE” and “SAVING
TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE” on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When
Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the
passbook but she could not remember to whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya
asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone
shorter than Calapre got the passbook. Calapre was then standing beside Macaraya.

Issue:

Is Solidbank liable?

Ruling:

Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa

contractual.

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.
The antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair
chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. This is a
case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor
his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability.
Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to
reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant
from his breach of contract